Dumont has argued (1980: xvi) that 'hierarchy is at the heart of the “unthought” (l’empensé) of modern ideology.' Anthropologists themselves are not free from the ideological blindness to hierarchy of their own background and must therefore make an unusual effort to overcome it. Dumont argues that whereas we readily perceive different positions within a chain of command, or inequalities of aptitude and function, we are prone to misconstrue hierarchy proper. Hierarchy is an inevitable and necessary part of any society, even the most egalitarian in outlook. We must give hierarchy its due.

Dumont's aim is to goad us into according hierarchy its appropriate place in social analysis. The question posed by the sociology of India—whether there is caste, in the sense of a jati-like system, outside India—is not parallel to the issue of the generality of hierarchy. Although Dumont places emphasis on the specificity of the Indian institution and gives consideration only to certain historical and ethnologically related cases in the near vicinity of India, hierarchy, which is closely linked to religious or cosmological conceptions, is in some configuration or other universal. Dumont's position is that while holistic societies differ in the pattern of their systems, they are linked by the presence of hierarchical levels of value and the identity of the supreme value with the totality (cf. ERASME 1984: 74—7).

Dumont reminds us (1980: 6) that 'actual men do not behave, they act with an idea in their heads.' But (p. 20), 'man does not only think, he acts.' Furthermore, men have not just ideas, but values. Whereas we may be tempted to treat ideas as timeless systems, values imply choice and action. 'To adopt a value is to introduce hierarchy.' Hierarchy, therefore, is an inevitable result of the fact that men think and act, that is, of social action.

Dumont employs (ibid.: 343) a suggestive use of the word ideology, which might be characterized as systems of ideas and values in social action.
Specifically, he declines to adopt the commonplace usage of 'ideology' to refer negatively to the doctrines and delusions of social classes. Over and above possible contradictions and variations according to social milieu, 'there is a basic ideology, a kind of germinal ideology tied to common language and hence to the linguistic group or the global society'. In turning to hierarchy, Dumont intends to give primacy to meaning (ibid.: xx) over mere forms which (like social stratification) can be observed from the outside.

Structuralism as Dumont conceives it has entailed a shift from function to meaning, such as he (1975: 333), following Pocock (1961: 76), finds in Evans-Pritchard's classic monograph, The Nuer. This new, structuralist, emphasis on meaning depends on sensitivity to context. Since the matter of context enters into some criticism that Dumont has aimed at recent, and avowedly structuralist, studies of ideology, something should be said about the subject in advance. Certainly nothing is more widely shared or commonsensical than the notion that nothing can be understood except in its context, taking the word in the derivative sense of 'the interrelated conditions in which something exists or occurs'. Why waste time talking about it? There are specific reasons, having to do with the history of anthropology in Britain, which in any case justify a few desultory remarks.

If there is justice in Dumont's various criticisms of British anthropology, it lies not in any indifference to context, but in a failure to put their recognition of context to structuralist purposes. Malinowski may have been 'a futile thinker' (Evans-Pritchard 1981: 199), but ‘the Evans-Pritchard distinction of situations' (Dumont 1979: 807) is perfectly Malinowskian. It may be too that a shift from function to meaning occurs within The Nuer, but it is anachronistic to suppose that anthropology had not previously paid attention to meaning. A few dates will demonstrate the point. Malinowski's functional classic Argonauts of the Western Pacific was published in 1922, while his contribution on 'The Problem of Meaning in Primitive Languages' appeared only a year later in Ogden and Richard's The Meaning of Meaning (1923). His more modern Coral Gardens and their Magic, with its extensive yet pragmatic attention to meaning, came out in 1935, two years before Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande. The worst and most extreme version of Malinowski's functionalism appeared posthumously in 1944, four years after The Nuer. No doubt Malinowski's functionalism extended to language (J.R. Firth 1957: 101). At any event, his discussion of 'context of situation' in 1923 (pp. 306-9) differs from Evans-Pritchard's attention to context in The Nuer (1940: 135-6) principally in its omission of any reference to value. Justifiably Leach (1957: 120) speaks of Malinowski as a 'fanatical theoretical empiricist'. The critical shift was not therefore merely from function to meaning, but from functionalist empiricism to structuralism.

Dumont (1980: 66) defines hierarchy as 'the principle by which the elements of a whole are ranked in relation to the whole'. Hierarchy is a relation between the encompassing and the contrary (ibid.: 239). The idea of encompassing brings in the issue of distinctions within the whole and the oppositions of the resulting parts. Dumont demonstrates (pp. 239-40) encompassment by the
story of Eve's creation from Adam's rib. By this act, the undifferentiated Adam is
differentiated into the opposed prototypes for men and women. 'On the first
level, man and woman are identical; on a second level, woman is opposite or the
contrary of man.' The reader should note in passing Dumont's idiosyncratic use
of the terms 'identical' and 'contrary'. An additional feature of Dumont's theory
is his reference to levels. At some points in his discussions, he appears to have in
mind levels of analysis, but he is quite plain that hierarchy produces levels within
an ideology. 'The same hierarchical principle that in some way subordinates one
level to another at the same time introduces a multiplicity of levels' (ibid.: 241).
Whatever else may be said about it, Dumont's idea of hierarchical levels is an
analytic construct and in that respect may be contrasted with common sense
contexts, situations or contexts of situations. Some of Dumont's remarks (1979:
813) suggest that where empiricists are satisfied with identifying contexts,
structuralists sought further to recognize levels. 'It is not enough here to speak of
different "contexts" as distinguished by us, for they are foreseen, inscribed or
implied in the ideology itself. We must speak of different "levels" hierarchized
together with the corresponding entities' (1982: 225).

In some unexplained indirect way or ways, contexts and levels are
comparable. Levels are brought about by distinctions, that is oppositions, but
they may be identified by reversals (1979: 812; 1982: 241).1 When, in a society in
which the right is pre-eminent, an element classed as left in some regard becomes
pre-eminent, 'this is an indication that the level encountered here is clearly
distinguished from the others in the indigenous ideology.' Although commonly
women are regarded as inferior to men, often they are superior within the
context of domestic or family relations. I take it that Dumont would object to
translating directly the levels in question with domestic context. Those who wish a
concrete definition of levels are bound to remain frustrated.

Dumont's principle of encompassment, by now linked so inextricably in our
minds with his distinctive interpretation of Indian sociology, derives as he tells us
(1980: xvii, 241) from Raymond Apthorpe, who was his student at Oxford. 'In
the hierarchical case, according to Apthorpe, one category (the superior)
includes the other (the inferior), which in turn excludes the first.' Dumont
acknowledges (1979: 810) that at first sight some commonplace oppositions do
not exhibit this relationship. For example, although the right typically has
ideological superiority over the left, we do not normally consider that the right
includes the left. We may agree with Dumont that right and left are defined
'only in relation to the whole' and that they do not have the same relation to the
whole of the body. The difference between them is 'ipsa facto hierarchical because
it is related to the whole'. In relation to the whole, the right is 'more essential,
more representative, etc.' The passage under examination seems to concede that
hierarchy need not fit Apthorpe's model—that all that is essential is division of

1. Needham's recent argument (1983: 112) that the class of reversals is polythetic seems to me no
great objection to Dumont's formulation. It may be less useful to regard reversal from the point of
view of a cognitive class made up by anthropologists, than to focus on the fact that for some purpose
people intend to turn things around.
the whole into unequal pairs. If so, the nature of opposition, hierarchical and otherwise, is a matter for empirical demonstration in each culture, and the results may be very different from culture to culture.

Dumont turns to an empirical example to resolve what initially looked like a merely definitional matter. Evans-Pritchard’s famous article on Nuer spear symbolism (1973: 100) says of the spear that ‘as an extension of the right arm, it represents the whole person’. Perhaps it is typical or even always the case that the right represents the whole. Even so, as an empirical question, it would have to be demonstrated anew each time another field situation were taken up.

Dumont employs two figures in an attempt to distinguish merely complementary opposites from hierarchical opposition (1980: 242). The first is a rectangle cut vertically into equal halves labelled ‘A’ and ‘B’. The second consists in a rectangle labelled ‘X’ in the centre of which is a second rectangle labelled ‘Y’. The first diagram expresses a universe of discourse exhausted by two complementary or contradictory classes. Despite the fact that both ‘A’ and ‘B’ are subsumed within the greater whole, Dumont does not speak of their relationship to it as hierarchical. The second diagram expresses hierarchy. Like the first figure, there is unity at the superior level, distinction at the inferior stage, and ‘X’ and ‘Y’ are related by complementarity and contradiction. Element ‘X’, however, stands both in opposition to ‘Y’ and for the higher order unity. Thus, right and left exemplify this ‘hierarchical opposition’ on those occasions when the right stands for the whole as well as for part of the internal division.

Dumont’s diagrams are remarkably similar to the alternative diagrams of Winnebago society published by Radin in 1923 and exploited by Lévi-Strauss in a paper (1956) on dual organization (see Barnes 1984: 64–5). Lévi-Strauss said that the alternative tribal models given to Radin by Winnebago ‘correspond to two different ways of describing one organization too complex to be formalized by means of a single model’. ‘Even in such an apparently symmetrical type of social structure as dual organization, the relationship between moiety is never static, or as fully reciprocal, as one might tend to imagine’ (English translation, 1963: 134–5). This paper gave rise to a debate concerning the accuracy of his analysis of Winnebago, South American and Indonesian societies (Maybury-Lewis 1960; Lévi-Strauss 1960), which may be left aside here. With justification, Lévi-Strauss interprets Radin’s information as showing alternative theories of society: one based on division into moieties, the other showing a unified tribe set apart from a line of virgin forest on all sides. The first or diametric dual model he describes as static, whereas the second model of concentric dualism is dynamic, containing an implicit triadism (1960: 151). There is no mention in Lévi-Strauss of different levels in an ideology, simply disagreement among informants.

In a society such as the Osage (La Flesche 1973), where moieties are indeed associated with left and right, presumably the apparently static dual opposition of the moiety structure would have to be represented by Dumont’s model of hierarchical opposition, with one moiety encompassed by the other. The Osage Sky moiety is on the left, the Earth moiety on the right. ‘By the interlacing relations between these two great divisions the leaders united the people into one ever-living body’ (ibid.: 32). Published data on the Osage (and also for the very
similar Omaha) show few explicit signs that one half of the tribe stands for the whole, but the mystical superiority of the Sky moiety places it in association with the cosmos, which of course subsumes daily concerns, the earth and the tribe. Implicitly, therefore, a relationship of the kind presupposed by Dumont may underlie traditional tribal organization. In this instance it is the left, not the right, which encompasses the opposite, if that in fact is what happens. A Dumontian interpretation presumably would identify a reversal here and a shift in levels. Unfortunately, the Sky moiety seems always to be associated with the left. When La Flesche does describe a reversal, it involves not a transformation in the association of right and left, but a movement of the point of orientation from the east to the west, bringing the Sky moiety from the south to the north (ibid.: 40). At any event, a moiety system such as the Osage or Omaha tribal circles expresses simultaneously the dual division of the tribe as well as its unity as opposed to the surrounding environment both of nature and of other human groups. Furthermore, the division in two makes no sense except as an expression of the whole (cf. Tcherkézoff 1983: 113 – 26, especially on Osage reversal, p. 120).

That reversals indicate difference in levels in an ideology may be accurate in principle. There may, however, be difficulties in practice about the evidence. The Omaha tribal circle is modelled on the internal organization of the earth lodge. Though it specifies where the tents are pitched when the tribe is on the annual hunt, the orientation is essentially domestic. We might expect, therefore, that some of the binary associations are different in other, external contexts. We must rely now on the published ethnographies, and they give no such evidence.

In passing, it might be noted too that so far as published information goes, right and left is far less emphasised in Omaha than in Osage culture (Barnes 1984: 54–8). Culture changes may cover up or cause the loss of reversals in an expected place. When I was working among the Kédang, they had lost their village-wide ceremonies, now in Léuwayang partially revived. There simply was no opportunity to witness reversals that we might think would be employed in annual ritual cleaning of the village. Furthermore, reversals are commonplace in certain stages of rituals. They may therefore indicate merely that you have arrived at such a stage; or must we say that even in ritual they always indicate a change of ideological levels?

At one point (1980: 239) Dumont speaks of hierarchy as the encompassment of the contrary; at another (p. 242) he speaks of the relationship as being that of contradiction (though the definition he gives [p. 241] of contradiction is the correct one). In the logic of propositions, two statements are contradictions if it is impossible for both to be true and for both to be false. Propositions are contraries when both cannot be true though both can be false. Binary opposites are not propositions, but by virtue of their logical form, they may figure as predicates. Consequently, we may speak, as Lyons says (1977: 272), in a derivative and obvious way of pairs as contradictories or else as contraries. Aristotle, from whom we derive the distinction (Lloyd 1966: 161–2), did deal with oppositions between propositions alongside those between terms (contraries, correlative opposites [double and half], positive and privative terms [sight and blindness]).
For Aristotle, 'male' and 'female' are contradictories, while 'hot' and 'cold' are contraries. Not all contraries are opposites ('red' and 'blue'); furthermore, contraries are gradable in that the negation of one side does not necessarily imply the confirmation of the other. Whereas Dumont treats contraries as though they were the same thing as contradictories, Needham (1980: 51), in what purports to be an application of Aristotle's distinctions among opposites to the Meru, actually reverses their meanings, writing of contraries as 'opposite terms which admit of no intermediate thing or property'. Despite terminological confusions, Dumont and Needham both have in mind exhaustive opposites which are not gradable. Lyons (1977: 272) remarks that the distinction of contradictories and contraries corresponds to the distinction of ungradable and gradable lexemes within the class of lexical opposites, but applies more widely. For this reason, he proposes (p. 279) to use 'antonymy' for gradable opposites (e.g. high and low) and 'complementarity' for ungradable opposites (e.g. male and female).

Lloyd (1966: 96) remarks that the Pythagorean table of opposites (right/left, male/female, rest/moving, straight/curved—all exemplifying limited/unlimited) obscures the difference between the logical relationships in the different pairs, obscuring in particular the fact that some pairs are actually contradictories admitting intermediates. Lyons says (1977: 278) that 'gradable antonyms are frequently employed in everyday language-behaviour as contradictories rather than contraries.' It is a commonplace experience of anthropologists that the oppositions employed in cultures are heterogeneous not only as to content but also in logical nature.

Right and left are commonly regarded as 'exhaustive opposites based on an absolute cut' (Ogden 1967: 72). Both Dumont and Needham treat this opposition as though it permitted no middle term. In fact, in so far as the terms refer to a whole, they very well fit into the tripartite scheme, right, middle and left. Lloyd (1966: 93) comments that in Homer on occasions the battlefield is divided into a right, a left and a middle. Perhaps it is normal that any culture sometimes treats right and left as contradictories, sometimes as contraries. Certainly this situation happens in Kédang, where I did my first fieldwork. Commonplace examples of unmediated reference to right and left occur there as well, for example, when a foetus on the left side of the womb is treated as a sign that the child is female, or, if on the right side, as male. Of course here an analogy is drawn between what happens objectively to be a contrary (right/left) and what can only be a contradiction (male/female). Right and left are mediated in more complicated representations of the whole, as when the village is symbolically divided into head, feet, right, left and middle.

The tendency to treat contraries as though they were in fact exhaustive and unmediable oppositions may go some way toward explaining the implicit dynamism in apparently static dual systems. Mediable contraries are just as capable of referring to the whole as are contradictories, though they suggest the potential of tripartite or other plural schemes. The contraries (above/below, north/south, left/right) associated with the Osage or Omaha moiety systems represent the moieties dyadically, but all allow a middle term—the centre or, in
fact, the middle. Reference to the middle is by no means lacking in Omaha ceremonial. This point seems to underlie Lévi-Strauss's hypothesis of an implicit tripartition in any dyadic scheme; for the complementarity of two opposed halves is only a first approximation of tribal relationships.

Complementary opposition has recently shown a surprising capacity to provoke polemics. In a paragraph which strikes me as more tendentious than not, Dumont (1979: 810) asserts that 'opposition is uniformly treated [presumably by Oxford anthropologists in the first instance] as a distinctive opposition, a simple "polarity" or "complementarity"'. The implication is that to speak of complementary opposition is to take the position that both sides of the opposition have equal status. I should have said rather that, if we include Radcliffe-Brown (1951), anthropologists have either said nothing about the issue or have generally accepted that complementary opposition involves an unequal relationship. What otherwise is 'the near universal pre-eminence of the right hand' about (Needham 1973: xxxiv)? In the conclusion to a study of Kédang representations (Barnes 1974: 305) I said that Kédang conceptual order is based on a form of dualism consisting of pairs of ranked and complementary opposites. 'The hierarchical character of such complementary relationships leads to orientation of the developed representation. The superiority of right to left—seemingly a universal feature of thought—becomes a law of motion to the right.' For my part I see no reason to follow Dumont in distinguishing between complementary opposition and hierarchical opposition, for they are one and the same.

It also seems hard of Dumont (1979: 807) to dismiss the collection on Right and Left because of a supposed neglect of Evans-Pritchard's distinction of situations when the authors of the papers in the book spend so much time talking about contexts. Dumont specifically charges that Needham's use of two-column tables confuses or elides contexts. In the end all that may be involved is Dumont's discomfort with a particular 'expository convenience'. Perhaps such tables ought to be avoided, if for no other reason than their proven capacity to cause misunderstandings. I have not even found it possible, or at least useful, to put all Kédang opposites into a single table. Perhaps Needham has not been as consistent as he would wish. His denial (1973: xxv) that all elements within a single column belong to a single category, although in accord with the position taken in his article on Meru symbolism (ibid.: 117), would have carried more force had he not inadvertently referred (p. 119) to 'the category of the left' or 'the category which includes the left'.

Indeed, there are more substantial inconsistencies in his various publications concerning homology of opposites. Dumont (1979: 807) asserts that for Needham the oppositions in the tables are more or less homologous. At first sight this interpretation would seem a grossly unjust reading of the passage (1973: xxviii) in which Needham makes explicit that the formal relation of analogy a : b :: c : d does not entail the homologies a \equiv c or b \equiv d. Though such homologies may obtain in particular cases they must, Needham says, be demonstrated in each case. The practical example of homology given in the passage is an interpretation, which Needham denies, such as that if women and the north
appear on the same side, then the north is feminine. The main point presumably is that if Needham had never drawn up the table of Meru oppositions, no one would have suggested that the north was feminine. However, in a recent discussion of analogy (1980: 46–7), Needham seems to expose himself more plainly to Dumont’s criticism. There he says, ‘the terms in each column need have no common property, but they are connected as homologues.’ He even goes so far as to suggest that they may constitute a polythetic class. His figure of the ‘quaternary structure of analogy’ now fixes the terms on opposite sides of an analogy in relations of homology. Gone are any reservations about empirical contexts. The Needham position of 1980 is incompatible with the Needham position of 1973.

There are further obscure aspects of the discussion of homology. If through their attitudes and deeds a people exploit an analogy such as right : left : male : female, left may be homologous to female in that they occupy the same relative position in their respective pairs. It is quite another step to say that one can be predicated of the other, such as female is left or left is female. Much of the disagreement occurs in quite a different situation. If there is a further analogy such as right : left : upstream : downstream, there is no reason at all to assume without evidence that male/female enters into an analogy with upstream/downstream or that there are any relationships of homology between the terms.

Another issue is transitivity. In Onvlee’s classic structuralist study (1949) of eastern Sumbanese symbolism there occurs the following set of analogies—Watu Bulu water-channel : Maru water-channel :: high : low :: male : female. At the same time this proportion is also exhibited—Watu Bulu channel : Maru channel :: male : female. Presumably the analogies are transitive. Other analogies in Sumbanese culture may well not be, so that each case still requires demonstration. Other formal issues little or not at all discussed by anthropologists have to do with the symmetry, inversion, inverse symmetry and alternation of analogies (cf. Hesse 1966). Onvlee draws our attention to the fact that for Sumba male/female is a cosmic principle. It relates heaven to earth, God to man, and regulates the relations between men in fundamental ways. It enters into the structure of society, where the asymmetric system of marriage alliances is expressed in an analogy relating wife-givers to wife-takers as male to female, WG : WT :: M : F. Empirical questions can be formulated and explored according to Figure 1.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>WG</td>
<td>WT</td>
<td>M : F</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>M : F :: WG : WT</td>
<td>symmetry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>WT : WG :: F : M</td>
<td>inversion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>F : M :: WT : WG</td>
<td>symmetrical of inverse</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>WG : M :: WT : F</td>
<td>alternation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Figure 1**

Here, no. 1 would be implied in respect of the original term of comparison, i.e., superiority/inferiority, and even though it is only contextually true that M is
superior to F, WG superior to WT. But symmetry replaces the particular by the general and vice versa. The information content is less. No. 2 is certainly implied, and it is also necessary for the social relationship to work. For no. 3, see the comment on no. 1. As for no. 4, it changes the nature of the relationships represented by the two signs: and::. Previously:: were relationships of contrast,:: relationships of similarity. Now:: are relationships of similarity,:: relationships of contrast.

Aristotle, and others after him (Needham, for example, 1980: 51, 58), spoke of the parts of an opposition as comprising species within the genus which is made up by the union of the pair. There is of course a logical difference between an object belonging to a concept on the one hand, and a concept belonging to a higher order concept on the other (Frege 1891: 26–7). There are neither right objects, nor right concepts, though by analogy both things and concepts are compared to right and left.

In a recent book, Needham refers (1980: 46) to hierarchy in a way which might appear to imply the sort of egalitarian treatment of opposition that Dumont criticizes. There he says that the terms of the system are articulated not by hierarchy but by analogy. In fact, he is not speaking about whether right and left refer hierarchically to the whole (genus) of which they are the parts (species) (Dumont 1979: 810). He is merely claiming that the columns in his tables do not themselves represent a genus comprised of the terms listed in the column, and that a given opposition (right/left) is not necessarily hierarchically subsumable in another (north/south). That is, he says nothing specifically about hierarchy as conceived by Dumont. There is, of course, a direct comparison between Dumont’s idea and Needham’s reference to right and left comprising species of the genus that they together make up, but since he makes no explicit use of the word hierarchy here, their similarity in outlook remains only implicit.

Dumont (ibid.: 809) defines hierarchical opposition as obtaining ‘between a set (and more particularly a whole) and an element of this set (or of this whole); the element is not necessarily simple, it can be a sub-set’. Furthermore, the element is identical with the set; for example, a vertebrate is an animal. There is also difference: a vertebrate is not just an animal, and an animal may not be a vertebrate. There is certainly an unacknowledged difference between this example, and that in which Adam simultaneously represents mankind and male individuals. Vertebrates are no more representative of animals than invertebrates. Leaving aside for the moment the question of identity, hierarchy as Dumont defines it here is a part/whole relationship or synecdoche. Aristotle defined metaphor as a transfer from genus to species, species to genus, therefore really synecdoche, while applying ‘metaphor’ to all tropes (Brooke-Rose 1958: 4); and rhetorical theory has trod an unending definitional circle ever since. In Dumont’s theory of hierarchy it is presumably insufficient that a relationship of species to genus obtain; hierarchy requires that one species (or half of a pair) be identical to the genus. This situation he calls a logical scandal, there being a relationship of identity and one of contradiction (that is, difference) in effect at the same time (1980: 242).

There are two main objections which can be advanced against Dumont’s
definition of hierarchical opposition. The first is that it confuses two quite different logical relationships. There are four separate relations which are commonly expressed by the word 'is'. It may refer to 1) existence: 'God exists'; 2) identity: 'Socrates is Plato's teacher'; 3) membership of an element in a class: 'Plato is a philosopher'; or 4) the subordination of one class to another: 'whales are mammals' (Patzig 1962: 9). The so-called ontological proof of the existence of God by Anselm of Canterbury depends on confusing the first relation with the third (Frege 1891: 27). Dumont has confounded at least 3 and 4, and possibly both of these with 2.

It may be that empirical cultures do often confuse an element with the set of which it is a part. But as presented by Dumont, identity is a question of definition and is no longer an empirical matter at all. If we return to Evans-Pritchard's study of Nuer spear symbolism, we find that he speaks of the spear and the right side as standing for and symbolizing the self. He nowhere speaks of the right as being identical with the self. Burell (1973: 176) comments on a tendency to explicate 'similar to' or 'like' on the model of 'identical with', so that similarity appears as a weak or deficient form of sameness. However, he observes that similarity can only be understood by reference to a context, and that similarity expresses a different kind of notion from identity. 'The roles of identical with and similar to are as diverse as is logic from poetry' (ibid.: 177). Aristotle's schema of analogous usage a : b : c : d, resembling as it does mathematical ratio, suggests a paradigm of formal logic. Rather than regarding mathematical ratio as paradigmatic, we might think of it as a degenerate form of proportionality. For mathematical ratio both sides of the proportion are related by nothing more than equality (identity) (ibid.: 184–5). Hesse (1966: 59–63) also distinguishes analogies involving identities from those concerned with only similarities. In fact, it is just this confusion between identity and analogical similarity which Lévy-Bruhl attributed to non-modern cultures (with specific reference to the Veda) and which I had to reject as being applicable to Kédang symbolic use of their otherwise quite practical distinction between odd and even numbers (Barnes 1982: 15–16).

Cassirer attributed the same confusion to mythical thought. 'Mythical thinking makes no sharp dividing line between the whole and its parts, ... the part not only stands for the whole but positively is the whole.' 'Mythical thinking knows only the principle of the equivalence of the part with the whole.' 'Mythical thinking does not know the relation which we call a relation of logical subsumption, the relation of an individual to its species or genus, but always forms a material relation of action and thus ... a relation of material equivalence' (Cassirer 1955: 64–5). At any event, the supposed pars pro toto structure of 'primitive', mythical or religious thought has often been asserted (Nilsson 1920; Cassirer 1956: 42, cf. Eliade 1959), yet without the express emphasis on its hierarchical nature, or the clearly formulated comparative programme characteristic of Dumont's sociology. In an otherwise rather confusing, if not confused, passage concerning participation, Lévy-Bruhl (1975: 84) decides, 'Pars pro toto is not a principle, nor an axiom: it is we who formulate it and who give it an abstract and conceptual expression.' His claim that persons in simple
societies merely feel this participation between the part and the whole may be debated. But if anthropologists do indeed have to give conceptual expression to ideologies in order to ask questions about their logical properties, then let us take care to get our own formal terms straight.

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