

MEANING FOR WHOM?

'Philosophy does not leave everything just as it is, but how it is going to leave things is a matter of delicate historical prophecy rather than a priori deductions from pre-established philosophical viewpoints.'<sup>1</sup>

We can add - and how does everything leave Philosophy? Rather than attempting to present systematically what is involved in philosophical as opposed to other forms of understanding, I discuss instead various anthropologically-based issues. Issues which suggest that an understanding of certain aspects of philosophy is as imperative to the anthropologist as is knowledge to the field-work situation, literary understanding and ability to apply various scientific procedures and theories. Some of these issues will involve us in speaking in 'relevance of' terms; this is largely an organisational device and should not reflect a maginot line mentality in any unnecessary sense.

First, that any form of anthropological understanding involves philosophical pre-suppositions. This involves disputing an inference which can be drawn from Vico's view ('Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge of the true; philology (science) observes the authority of human choice, whence comes consciousness of the certain')<sup>2</sup> to the effect that there necessarily need to be a tension in anthropology between these two supposedly disparate modes of understanding.

Traditionally, no such distinction existed - philosophy contributed to the understanding of particular matters of fact; scientific and philosophical explanations were blurred in that philosophy was envisaged as though it were the queen of sciences. With the increasing autonomy of the sciences, the empiricists and rationalists differently re-conceived the role of philosophy. The 18th century empiricists remained, at least in part, scientists: Hume and his Scottish school attempted to found philosophical theories about man and society on an empirical science of man, attempting to re-integrate society with nature through the reductive analysis of human phenomena, in order to ascertain the necessary foundation of society. Hume himself wrote the first comparative study of religion. A strong tendency in the work of the school was to react against earlier philosophical theories of society which were seen to be charters for political action; as myths.

And so began the long history of various logisms; attempts, that is, to contribute to the philosophical understanding of human nature through scientific endeavour. Such is the basis of Comte's positive philosophy, of Durkheim's sociology, of the psychologism of Levi-Strauss and Chomsky. And finally, of the comprehensive attempts of both Cassirer and Sebeok to analyse the mind through its linguistic expression in various forms of discourse.

Against this awareness of the relevance of philosophical speculation about human nature, stands the other dominant strand of anthropological thought. A variety which combines a sociological interest with 'phrasing the problem of anthropology, and the conceptual schemes it has adopted, according to the patterns which belong to the scientific tradition of western civilization of the past century.'<sup>3</sup> The tendency was to envisage scientific explanation as a sui-generis sphere of operation, falling out of any philosophical framework. Observation and inductive procedures (the hope that in some way the facts would constitute and so explain themselves), left no room for speculation.

What arguments can be brought to bear against these varieties of scientism? Or, more graphically, who is the greater - Radcliffe-Brown or Lévi-Strauss? Both have been criticised, but that directed against the former authorities scientism and all its associated narrowness, is surely of a more fundamental nature than that entailed by those who criticise Lévi-Strauss on the grounds that his dictum, truth is of reason rather than of fact, has led him into a vague a priorism.

I list a series of observations, each set of which presents different reasons for the advisability of retaining a philosophical perspective.

(a) That despite the methodological autonomy of science itself, its basis is inherently speculative. In the sense that no knowledge is absolute, science is founded on as many myths as is literary criticism. Popper<sup>4</sup>

especially argues that scientific understanding is, fundamentally, based on the same inborn expectations as is any other system of knowledge. Heisenberg<sup>5</sup> is in broad agreement: science is founded in the fundamentals of our existence; 'the object of research is no longer nature itself, but rather nature exposed to man's questions, and to this extent man here also meets himself.' Finally, both Harre and Collingwood<sup>6</sup> have traced the extent to which natural phenomena have been re-interpreted during recent European history, according to the conceptual blue print applied.

(b) The cultural neutrality of the social sciences is even more suspect - Bryson<sup>7</sup> writes that comprehensive philosophical ideas 'are to be seen as the "generalised ancestors" of particular social theories' (she concludes that the chief theoretical background of the modern social sciences lies in 18th century Scotland). More specifically, Leach<sup>8</sup> has traced the foundation of Malinowski's body of theory to the pragmatic philosophy of William James, to suggest that Malinowski's non-critical application of this philosophy is a characteristic he shares with Radcliffe-Brown's equally non-critical application of the philosophy of J.S. Mill. On a broader scale, Honigsheim<sup>9</sup> suggests an identification of the various philosophical orientations which have served to distinguish American from European anthropology.

(c) And finally, in so far as Winch's view that 'any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of human society',<sup>10</sup> is correct, it is apparent that even if we discount Winch's view and admit scientific explanation as valuable, such explanation cannot be divorced from the neo-philosophical task of conceptual understanding and the philosophical issues this entails (for instance - the extent to which understanding in terms of reasons is incompatible with explanation in terms of causes, which in turn raises the rules-of-procedure problem.<sup>11</sup>) For now it suffices to say that almost any problem, if pursued far enough, exposes a philosophical nature. For instance Bell<sup>1</sup> writes that if the subject matter of sociology is meaningful behaviour, then the social scientist must necessarily get involved 'in the knotty problem of the relation of thought to action.

In attempting to expose the extent to which both science and philosophy are, although to very differing degrees, both speculative and so not absolutely culturally neutral, it has not been my intention to argue for such extreme positions as presented, for instance, by Gellner and Goldmann (Gellner<sup>12</sup> - that anthropology is, at least implicitly, 'a classification and evaluation of societies,' and Goldmann's<sup>13</sup> view that social philosophy is today much as it was when Hume criticised it. For although there might be a certain degree of truth in such contentions,<sup>14</sup> it seems to me that the greatest danger lies not in the influence of one's vested interests, but through forgetting that theories and viewpoints are not in any sense absolute and total. It is for this reason that Leach wrote Rethinking Anthropology. But what, I suggest, he did not sufficiently stress is that a philosophical perspective affords an 'objective' stance from which to argue for and against theories, discuss the structure of concepts and the nature of what we are studying; in sum a critical perspective to help us avoid the 'infection'<sup>15</sup> of blind scientism.

However, it must be stressed that social theorising is inseparable from philosophical speculation. Lukes<sup>16</sup> traces the extent to which the very different interpretations of nineteenth century industrial European society given by Marx and Durkheim can be attributed to their fundamentally different hypotheses about the nature of man and society. And so, how their interpretations reflect their moral and idealist aspirations. Also in the nineteenth century, it is possible to discern the extent to which popular scientific paradigms reflected and influenced mass value systems - hence the scientist, social scientist and public met in their respective theorising about evolution, other peoples, and race.

I do not think that such considerations, despite what the Marxist would argue, bear so heavily today. But the point still remains that at least on certain issues, the anthropologist faces a moral decision in deciding between certain basic theories of man and society. To perpetuate the system through non-critical involvement? To allow a fellow anthropologist who is scientifically convinced of a racist theory to remain a teaching member of the profession? And finally,

how can Sartre ('Freedom is the irreducibility of the cultural to the natural order') view Marvin Harris?

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Given the fact that philosophy is speculative, arguing only to conclusions of an irrefutable status as opposed to the nature of scientific proof, in what sense can anthropology be envisaged as constituting the empirical branch of philosophy? Ayer<sup>17</sup> takes a typical stand against comprehensive empirical evidence, arguing in his article that a a priori discussion relying on examples drawn from common experience, is an adequate basis from which to 'solve' various problems belonging to the social sciences. Elsewhere, he writes: 'Philosophical theories are not tested by observation. They are neutral with respect to particular matters of fact.'<sup>18</sup> However, Ayer's philosophy is 'pure' to a degree which is not possible, for instance, in much recent work on the philosophy of mind. Hampshire shares with his American colleagues a certain tension between scientific procedures and the employment of reason. He writes that his conclusions are not based on anthropology - 'for the philosophical understanding there is no need to look to primitive man'.<sup>19</sup> For he is interested instead in distinguishing the general from those features of language that are contingent upon a particular social order.

When the anthropologist or modern linguist aims to discern universal and necessary conditions, the essential nature of certain phenomena, they tend to work through the phenomena in a systematically empirical fashion. Later in his book Hampshire realises the necessity for this - 'philosophy as linguistic analysis is therefore unwillingly lured into a kind of descriptive anthropology'; the fundamentals of mind can only be reached 'through the observation of successive forms of the social expressions of mind.' Cassirer also realises the necessity of such an empirical task - 'the philosophy of mind involves much more than a theory of knowledge; it involves also a theory of prelogical conceptions and expressions, and their final culmination in reason and factual knowledge'.

In commonsense terms it would seem that as anthropology loses its autonomous hold over its boxed subject matter, the primitive, and so develops its Social Anthropology as opposed to Social Anthropology, logism contributions can only increase. And that these will bear most directly on such philosophical topics as 'theories' of cognition, of knowledge, aesthetics, innate ideas.<sup>20</sup> Kurtz,<sup>21</sup> in a brief article, argues for the relevance of empirical research to philosophy, and indicates the absurdity of a situation in which philosophers view logism in the worst possible light, whereas for some anthropologists such a contribution would belong to the theorem. Ach conceived psychology as experimental philosophy many years ago. Chomsky takes the same line today; and Chomsky is criticised just as severely<sup>22</sup> as Ach was, even though he is cautious in his suggestions to philosophy.

A rather different variety of contribution can be discussed insofar as social philosophy is concerned. In terms of philosophical interest in the nature of 'meta features' (rules, translation, classification, belief<sup>23</sup>) anthropologists have, at least until recently, limited their interest to the actual social working-out of these phenomena, leaving the philosopher to abstract out interesting issues and problems. Insofar as philosophy is opposed to science, the less the anthropologist engages in scientifically based theorising, the more a philosopher he becomes. In the sense that when studying a primitive economic system the anthropologist 'becomes' an economist, so too does he become a philosopher when he studies conceptual systems.<sup>24</sup> To return briefly to Vico, in the former case explanation is acquired through reduction from full native sui-generis meaning to the formal models of science, whereas in the second case, reason alone can prevail if the system is to be understood in its initial fullness.

So, following Haines<sup>25</sup> definition of social philosophy (the interpretation and discovery of the logic of man's relations in a social context) Evans-Fritchard and Whorf qualify closely. But whereas the anthropologist directs his attention to the phenomena, the philosopher, following Wittgenstein<sup>26</sup>, directs his attention 'not towards the phenomena but toward the possibility of phenomena'.

Thus Whorf's work on the cultural nature of time is only weakly philosophical as compared with the way various American philosophers have reworked his material. And that although Evans-Pritchard and Wittgenstein have much in common (both stressed meaning as a function of, relative to, various language games and not as a function of reality in any 'ideal language' sense)<sup>27</sup>, Evans-Pritchard aims to understand a form of life, whereas Wittgenstein (to Gellner's<sup>12</sup> disgust) accepts the form of life as given. His interests are basically in social issues.

To conclude, the divergencies within philosophy as to the relevance of scientifically based research is considerable (compare, for instance, Winch with Ayer's position). Even Winch, however, avoids empirical research. So although philosophy largely escapes anything anthropology can offer, anthropology can never escape philosophical insight and speculation. The symmetry of the speculation/observation synthesis is loaded in one direction.

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Turning from what philosophy means for anthropologists,<sup>28</sup> I attempt now to discern certain problems in the question 'meaning for whom?' as referred to understanding other societies.

The field-work situation represents the simplest case; to a large extent this spell is characterised by a growing synthesis between what the native means by an expression and what the anthropologist understands by it. Lévi-Strauss,<sup>29</sup> quoting Merleau-Ponty, suggests that the basically philosophical nature of anthropology is exposed during fieldwork. Waisman speaks with consensus 'Philosophy has as its positive aim the establishment of new ways of looking at the world' - to defreeze ways of thinking as an alien, to release the mind from the tyranny of all the embedded hypotheses of one's own language, so to realise the 'true' nature of phenomenal strata in their full specificity.

The extreme relativist<sup>30</sup> in severely diminishing one's innate potential/ability to share other modes of thought is put in a difficult position when it is pointed out to him that we seemingly can understand even the most alien native terms. I cannot discuss this problem now, but much of the difficulty obviously involves what is meant by understand, grasp, share, know, believe etc. To give just a few references: MacIntyre's<sup>31</sup> debate with various theologians over the issue: 'is understanding religion compatible with believing?' raises many of the topics discussed in the eighteenth century under the format of whether religious meaning could only be acquired through revelation, or whether reason would suffice to understand its full meaning. Lonergan, (according to Barden) Tillich, Winch<sup>32</sup> take very different views to those argued by MacIntyre, especially over the extent to which 'sharing' involves evoking one's established criteria of word meaning - that words do not denote internal mental states, but instead that their meaning is to be equated with word usage.<sup>33</sup> This position suggests that the anthropologist does not have to feel with the native in order to understand the native. Perhaps against this stands Jasper's phenomenological position: 'the sclerosis of objectivity is the annihilation of the real nature of human existence.' And finally, the view has been put forward that the fieldworker is in a no more difficult situation than the non-believer learning to understand the Catholic service as rendered in Latin.

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We touch upon some of these points later. But now I want to turn to the region of greater difficulty - what happens when the fieldworker, with two systems of meaning 'grasped', comes to translate them.

Nadel<sup>34</sup> gives a commonsense view - we understand other societies (a) in their terms ('subjective') and (b) in terms of general principles - for as anthropologists we must co-ordinate our knowledge with some degree of objectivity.<sup>35</sup> As can be envisaged, Nadel places great importance on the role of theory in effecting translation into the formal (scientific) code of discourse of anthropology. Theories as 'applied' during fieldwork and at home, reorganise the facts into theoretical intelligibility.

In direct opposition to this stands Winch. He considers that understanding another society consists only in making explicit what is already implicit, so rejecting any form of scientific explanation. The reasons why Winch takes this view are complex. Footnote (11) and Clammer's article (see below) cover the basic points. MacIntyre's criticism of Winch in his 1967 article (Aristotelian Society) combined with Banaji's article (see below) indicate other disadvantages associated with the making the implicit/explicit theory.

Instead of developing these criticisms, I want to argue that both Nadel's and Winch's ideas about how to make a primitive society intelligible are extreme. The former's in that meaning for the native is obscured, the latter in that Winch does not appear to realise that translation necessarily involves theorising. He admits that translation must involve the addition of concepts alien to the native system of meaning, but fails to realise that our concepts are often of a highly theoretical order.

Since translation involves re-classification of native criteria of identity and judgment into terms of our criteria, it is, I feel, essential for anthropologists to attempt to understand what is involved in the logic of translation. Winch gives us no criteria to help us either in relating various native words to our theories and concepts, or in terms of the problem of organizing native words into the greatly increased intelligibility which follows through relating them structurally. His idea of a social science is only a first step even if we do not add scientific criteria of intelligibility.

Historically, anthropologists have approached the problem of translation from:

(a) the ethnocentric point of view - particularly common in the nineteenth century, when attempts were made to elevate notions drawn from particular language games to the level of universal applicability in order to fulfill the needs of comparison. Pitkin and Leach (Rethinking Anthropology) relate this to inductive procedures. It is unlikely that this is a useful approach from which to develop universal semantics. Not only does it vacillate along a lowest common denominator and highest common factor spectrum, but other societies are interpreted, constituted through our conceptual blinkers. The words sacred, incest, mana etc. belong to this category. Do we in fact require universally applicable (in what sense?) definitions for, say, the family? Murdock seems to think so - yet look at all the obvious failings of his Social Structure.

(b) Structural approach - it is, I think, possible to envisage a spectrum of concepts - (approximate).

FORMAL

ETHNOCENTRIC/RELATIVE

Logic	hierarchy	natural	pure	sacred	priest	
<u>analytical concepts</u>	structure	cultural	impure	profane	incest	belief
	duality					

descriptive concepts

Moving from left to right, the scientific status of concepts devoid of cultural content declines gradually as the component of language game specificity increases. And so the advisability of attempting definitive definitions decreases. 36

The extent to which descriptive concepts can be given structural definitions varies. At one extreme it is almost impossible - for such notions as belief and the psychological verbs, the criteria of application are almost totally culturally bound. At an intermediary level we find such concepts as pure or impure. These are culturally bound in a way in which the more (see however (6)) scientifically based oppositions such as nature/culture are not. But, as Dumont demonstrates, in selecting the main articulation points of the pure/impure opposition (i.e. in relating the term structurally, to other concepts related by the various logics, of polarity, analogy etc.), structuralisation and so a relatively neutral translation can be effected. We can think also of how Van Gennep translated the cultural specificity of Rites de passage, and Lévi-Strauss' totemism is in neutral terms. Or of the manner in which apparently meaningless (for us) native associations can be made intelligible (to us). And finally, at the opposite extreme, a native classification of, say trees, can be given definite structural definitions

in that if this classification is only based on certain objective criteria (tall, hard, edible etc.) there is no need to abstract the structures in the same way as is necessary when the terms are involved in complex language games.

(c) The cultural relativists' position - we have seen that whereas the logic of hierarchy is culturally neutral, priests are not. And that a structural definition, being relatively devoid of meaning in native terms, cannot express native meaning as adequately as a translation (or so Winch hopes) of that actual native meaning. Since such translation is imperfect, the position of relativism is unavoidable. The extent to which Wittgenstein's views support his is I think, more debatable than Winch allows. Nielsen,<sup>38</sup> for one, argues that Wittgenstein's position does not necessarily entail relativism. However, from Bambrough's<sup>39</sup> presentation of Wittgenstein's 'Family resemblances' theory of universals and how it dissolves the problems as formulated by the realists and nominalists, we can readily discern the extent to which a view claiming that all that games have in common is that they are games is attractive to a Winchian variety fideist.

Winch, in reaction to a Durkheimian position of treating social facts as things and other forms of scientism, is surely correct in stressing that 'Mugwe is Mugwe'. Presumably though he would have to translate Mugwe as 'Priest' - which would involve theory in (a) discerning a critical element out of the various language games in which the various instances of the family called 'Mugwe' is manifested in terms of meaning, (b) in approximating this critical unit, meaning, with (c) a similar critical element in the home vocabulary. This can only be a nominalistic definition when words such as priest are concerned; so Wittgenstein's 'solution' is not followed.

But through combining a family resemblance approach, linguistic analysis with (a) not translating certain critical terms in any critical sense (Evans-Pritchard never defines Kwoth as God) and (b) a structural approach, allowing in some sense the semantic patterns to speak for themselves with (c) the hypothesing of structures, both the pitfalls of relativism and ethnocentrism can in part be avoided.

The relativists' argument can, however, be presented in a much more extreme form (see note 30). Extreme in the sense that although structural understanding (for us) is not directly threatened, it is indirectly insofar as since we have to understand other cultures semantically (for themselves) before structures can be discerned, if this semantic intelligibility is not possible, nothing much else can follow.

Although Winch writes 'the concepts we have settle for us the experiences we have of the world' and 'there is no norm for intelligibility in general' he does not suggest that inter-social concepts are in any sense incommensurable. In fact, he supports Vico's view that 'there must be in the nature of man a mental language common to all nations which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life and expresses it with as many diverse modifications as these same things may have diverse aspects'. The theories we now present do not stop at this cultural relativism but introduce the idea of mental relativism.

First, the Sapir/Whorf hypothesis; that basic linguistic categories are derived from social organisation, so that the universal constants in language would necessarily reflect only certain empirical uniformities in social life and the conditional necessities of human communication. For Sapir, since societies live in different worlds, categorisations of experience is in terms of unlike prime categories.<sup>40</sup> The degree of incommensurability all but makes comparison impossible. To a much greater degree than in Boas's theory of limited relativism, natural logic (that the cognitive processes of all men have something in common) is as severely threatened as in the work of Levy-Bruhl or Cassirer. In Durkheim's case, although he also was arguing against any a priori basis of morality and logic in suggesting that categories are founded in the social, commensurability is stressed to a much greater extent; as seen, for instance, in his usage of the word 'sacred'.

These theories suffer, fortunately for anthropology, not only from the fact that they are ill-formulated and unproven,<sup>41</sup> but in that alternative hypothesis,

of much greater power, have been recently developed. The work of men as diverse as Lévi-Strauss, Needham and Chomsky, has suggested that language, together with certain aspects of socio-cultural life mirrors certain universal properties of the mind. Cognitive psychologists such as Vygotsky, Bruner, Piaget, Hubel and Wiesel.<sup>42</sup> From another point of view, philosophers such as Clarke, Nielson, Rees and various philosophers of education (such as Hirst) have also argued that various modes of thought do not stand in relationships of absolute autonomy.

Needham<sup>43</sup> writes that 'the more nearly a cultural phenomenon approaches the universal, the more necessary it is to explain it in terms of the general psychic character of man.' Here then is a slightly different basis on which to base a transcultural language, a language with properties sufficient to avoid gross misinterpretation; for it belongs to what it interprets. Such a language, more fundamentally even than the varieties of structuralism we have so far discussed, can be termed theoretical realism. For instance, as a hypothesis it is arguable that the fundamental nature of the mind accords to such processes as we term dualism, polarity, metaphor; or, at a larger scale, as the various mentalities - religious, symbolic, theocratic etc. As universals, these terms belong to native thought, yet make it intelligible to us who can only truly understand, for instance, informal logic, if we stand outside it, in the formal realm.

Such a basis would seem to me to be more adequate than other attempts to found 'ideal languages' (in both senses of the word, that is, as a 'third language' or language as various logical positivists conceived it). Briefly, Gellner, Lounsbury, Murdock, Merton, Feuer, Redfield, Jung and various phenomenologists of religion have all attempted to discern other universal features on which to base transcultural intelligibility. These range from the biology of kinship (Gellner, and Lounsbury's<sup>30</sup> componential analysis of kinship) to a basis in supposedly universal existential world states (Feuer,<sup>44</sup> Murdock but is this not also implied in Van Gennep's and Hertz's theories?), or in universal psychic states in Jungian style.

It seems clear then that there are several bases for universal commonality and so universal intelligibility. But what happens if we ask - how can commonality be discerned when concepts such as belief are concerned? Needham writes<sup>45</sup> anthropology is 'primarily the empirical investigation of human understanding by means of the comparative study of cultural categories' (not of experience itself), so it is essential that problems associated with 'universal semantics' be faced.<sup>46</sup> The problem in brief, is meaning for whom? and in terms of whose criteria of intelligibility? Whose language games?

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A true conclusion to this paper is impossible, for I have only begun to approach the more difficult problems. In general, we have been discussing the contribution philosophical speculation can make in assessing the extent to which understanding of cultures as our various subjects is incompatible with the anthropologist constituting them as objects within an 'objective' sphere of discourse. It could be objected, however, that the philosopher has little to contribute; after all, he has never gone into the field. Who is Winch that he can say that Lévi-Strauss's Savage Mind is philosophically unsound in terms of Winch's idea of a social science? Or that to translate God speaking to Job through the clouds into scientific language is inexcusable?

Although I might be retracting from the general position which I presented, I think that it is strongly arguable that philosophers such as Nietzsche<sup>47</sup> and Popper<sup>48</sup> have more to offer than many of the philosophers we have discussed. But their contributions, and Wittgenstein's, Hume's etc. are largely undiscussable in any comprehensive sense for they do not 'theorise' systematically about our concerns. Instead we have to select their insights.

Finally, and this also goes against the tenor of much of what I have been saying, Max Black suggests that translation problems are more akin to problems of a literary order than to those of philosophy. Against this position I quote Lounsbury:-

'Partiality to one or another of these views (degree of relativity) may considerably influence both one's field observations and one's interpretation of data, and thus one's conclusions...'

and Winch

'the sociologists who misinterpret alien cultures are like philosophers getting into difficulties over the use of their own concepts.'

In the last resort, the style of anthropology written is governed by what 'meaning' is relative to; is the interpretation in philosophical terms? scientific, literary or as through native meaning? Where, in fact, is our supposed objectivity? Our ability, I argue, to balance these various modes of meaning, is not only intuitively based; philosophical awareness is also desirable, if not essential.

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#### References

1. Bell, The Idea of a Social Science, Aristotelian Society 1967.
2. Quoted in Pocock, Social Anthropology, 1961
3. Benedict, Anthropology and the Humanities, American Anthropologist, 1948.
4. Popper, Conjectures and Refutations, 1963.
5. Heisenberg, The Representation of Nature in Contemporary Physics, Daedalus, 1958. See also Hume, quoted by Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 1958 - 'all the sciences have a relation... to human nature... they will return back (to it) by one passage or another.'
6. Harré, Matter and Method, 1964.  
Collingwood, The Idea of Nature, 1945.
7. Bryson, Man and Society - The Scottish Inquiry of the 18th century, 1945.
8. Leach, In Man and Culture, edit. Firth 1957. See also Sebag and Scholte on the implicit philosophical premises of Lévi-Strauss.
9. Honigsheim, The Philosophical Background of European Anthropology, American Anthropologist, 1942.
10. Winch, op. cit., 1958.
11. I do not attempt to summarise the long debate as to whether scientific explanation is inapplicable to the understanding of social phenomena. Clammer (see below) points to certain of the issues. Other references include MacIntyre, 'A Mistake about Causality', Philosophy, Politics and Society, Vol. I, 1967 and The Idea of a Social Science, Aristotelian Society, 1967. The second reference includes a good criticism of Winch's thesis that since meaningful behaviour is only intelligible in terms of native ideas, the student must follow the rules of their criteria of judgment, not the rules of procedure of science.
12. Gellner, Thought and Change, 1964.
13. Goldmann, The Human Sciences and Philosophy, 1969.
14. As is born out, for instance, in the popular argument that Durkheim's classification of suicide exposes his conservatism.



15. See Dewey as quoted by Bryson, op. cit.
16. Lukes, 'Alienation and Anomie', Philosophy, Politics and Society, Vol. II, 1967.
17. Ayer, Man as a Subject for Science, 1964.
18. Ayer, Problem of knowledge.
19. Hampshire, Thought and Action, 1965.
20. We think, for instance, of the possible results of applying Levy-Bruhl's theory to Locke's classification of knowledge.
21. Kurtz, On Culturlogism. In Language and Philosophy, edit. Hook 1969.
22. See, for instance, Pitkin and others in Hook, op. cit.
23. See Encyclopaedia Britannica 'Theory of Knowledge' for the different approaches of the philosopher and scientist to the study of belief.
24. Richards, 'African System of Thought', Man 1967, shows the extent to which for many British Anthropologists this is not in fact true; they tend to 'sociologise' the primitive.
25. Haines, 'Philosophy as Social Philosophy', Philosophy, 1967.
26. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, 1968.
27. These similarities can be traced in much greater detail. See, for instance, Pocock, op. cit., p. 72 and Hartnack's Wittgenstein.
28. Or rather, should mean. Barrington's paper (see below) suggests, for example that Lévi-Strauss is too much a philosopher in intent but too little in practice.
29. Lévi-Strauss, Scope of Social Anthropology, 1967.
30. Following Lounsbury's meaning of the term. See Hook, op. cit.
31. J. Hick edit. Faith and the Philosophers, 1964. MacIntyre (2) p. 115.
32. Lonergan, Theology and Understanding, Gregorianum 1954 (see Barden 'The Symbolic Mentality' Philosophical Studies, 1966)  
Tillich, in edit. Beattis, The Phenomenology of Religion.  
Winch, op. cit.
33. Gellner and MacIntyre both apply this to anthropology. See Gellner's Concepts and Society, 1962 and MacIntyre op. cit (2) (where he relates the issue to Leach's and Evans-Pritchard's differing positions.
34. Nadel, Understanding Primitive Peoples, Oceania, 1955-6.
35. Hampshire suggests that rationality is the opposite of disconnectedness, others have argued that objectivity, in the sense that we are now speaking, comes only through sharing concepts.
36. Hart - the meaning of various concepts is not determined by definition for no particular set of conditions both necessary and sufficient exist to ensure definitive application. See Hartnack, op. cit.
37. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy.