When Paul Dresch commented (1976:73) that anthropology's 'pretensions to radicalism' were 'laughable', he was right. And yet there may be a fine irony in such laughter for it expressly rings through an expansive that should no longer be taken seriously - riddling a broadly marxian edifice which nonetheless inheres as the 'rationality of our time' (Jenkins:1977:82).

It is the notional laughter that I wish to roam with here, merely as an organising thwart and cursory excuse for more general comment on, and exploration through, a broad sweep of educated radicalism and its apparent, educated dismissal. Indeed the sweep of the following paragraphs, it should be emphasised, draws on - and often rides on the language of - a fairly widely dispersed family of radicals, some more wistful than others, and some better known to us perhaps.1 We shall pick up Dresch's comments in a moment and return to them later on again; indeed, we shall change pace often, seemingly re-trace our steps, tread lightly here and more heavily there, and turn full circles - but there neither has been nor will be any mere 'pre-amble' here. We might note that this discussion writes itself through and as its own ethnography, situated as it is especially in a School where radical pretensions of various kinds have long been within its truth. Moreover, all that I say is ethnographic material, a part of the very subject and object of a discussion which has no easy entry or departure, no clear beginning and end - nor can it be said to have any 'deviation' which does not itself point to, emanate from and define an educated preserve where a rigorous ideality sets strayness aloose, extra-mural. The whisper perhaps of some 'ethnomethodological' conceit in some instances bears its own pretensions, but even as the text here seems to comment upon itself, we should not be too anxious to get to an essential point or unearth any strata. It is still always and evenly a reading, a lecon; it is itself at once a grammaticalising closure and an event, let us say, but one that will also be 'read' and should not be reconstituted in any pristine, unspoken intentionality nor, indeed, rigorously and cuttingly excavated for its 'effective cement' (Merleau-Ponty: cited Wood: 1978:124).

Dresch's comments were not, of course, a simple act of relegation, denigration and diminution; he was not, for instance, expressly questioning or belittling the definitive status of 'marxist' rationality for those who live it out in various forms. It is more the claim to a generalised analytical competence that he is laughing out, by pointing to some of its inadequacies and naiveties. But for the moment, and for our purposes here, we can allow ourselves to read in another, subtle throwback. Marxism is one particularly forceful example of educated radicalism and one which has the notorious power of diminishing the status of other world-structures, of denying them rationality and autonomy, of englobing the irrational and incorporating the illusory; it has the power of epistemological derision.

However, when its enunciations involve, for example, the conflation of other rationalities and the mists of early social development along with the fantasies of childhood and of mystical fervour (e.g.Godelier: 1973:337) and, further, when we learn that some people are virtually and unwittingly standing on their heads in the forests of darkest Africa (e.g.Godelier:1975 on the Mbuti), then even as our oppositional propriety
is secured - the joke must be on us. Quite how we ever took it seriously, if we did, is a function not only of a certain schooled weight of discursive authority but also of an enduring metaphysical-metaphorical complex which insists on such re-writes in the proper understanding of 'other cultures': an unworked complicity with the lines of compulsion in this complex, lines that lubricate a truth well-born as well as obvious good sense, draws others demeaningly into the light of our self-evident rationality, letting them float evocatively into educated ethnographies, marxist and non-marxist alike (cf. Chapman:1977b for an account of some European ethnography in this respect). So often they enter the realm of the serious with the full ambiguity of an appealing, ingenuous ignorance - looking even rather daft, pathetic, sleepy in their tradition as we solemnly yet hastily structuralise them before they wane and are lost in some night of dreams. Alternatively we might try to wake them out of it, to re-animate the inert (cf. Foucault (1966)1974:328) and to let them - as the emergent force of History - cross the line firmly on their feet with politico-economic effectiveness. On this side already are those who claim the weighty competence of theoretical clarity. Feeling wide awake and alert, we have taken ourselves seriously, variously claiming a grip on reality and a handle on history.

In order merely to suggest how the motor of educated, radical Reason may have started well - embarking on a course which has its own quasi-automatic validity - but has since back-fired, we are setting out on a brief and necessarily impressionistic journey through a moral and metaphorical space, through a metaphysical edifice which can house revolutionaries and conservatives alike as companion travellers, drawing breath with the same natural inspiration. If we seem, in some instances, to be playing with the rippling and echoing elasticity of language, celebrating its wildness and irrationality - that 'blurring and sliding of signifieds' (Culler:1977:11) - and if it appears that we are not engaging in serious work, or panning the world for unequivocal signs, then we are moving still within this same space. Within it too we might intuitions that some readings will no doubt pretend to structure their sense as Proper, as in some way seizing on and representing the real meaning (underlying, implied or whatever) of this essay, just as some would lay claim to the real, serious, tidy, true or fundamental ordering of the world. It is a space also then wherein certain tacitly prescriptive lines of demarcation might wish to conjure up some 'poetic licence' in this presentation; we may ultimately sense, however, that this licence - solemnity's concession to frivolous excrescence, to loose departure or deviation - is difficult surely to place, if not ironically redundant: an interference, getting in the way - not of History - but of the movement of language.

Now in this space, in which we are travelling already, we can expect neither a tidy scheme nor a neat sequence; do not await either one here. If you renounce analytical surety and purity and suspend the security of external guarantees, you will not lose the thread nor leave the ground. You will not be let loose in some awesome ether or escape into unstructured free space; nor need you fall into any yawning abyss of floundering relativism where worlds drift apart, as if untied and decentred. Involution, inversions and slovenly, unstrained analogies need not worry us, and any omissions will readily present themselves. This is not an apology for lazy scholarship but a gentle push and reminder in a journey through casual structuration and the wear and tear of semiotic inflation and symbolic conflation.
In a space of linguistic reflex, memory and evocation, there is no fixed or innocent substratum and linearity has no privilege. It is a tense and perhaps tortuous and perplexing exercise, but you can relax. Change gear as you will, read in what you like; distraction is all right, language is behind and ahead of us. But do not motor too hard, keep calm. The slope of common-sense will keep us moving all the while.

It is hoped, nonetheless, that within and through all this very blurring and sliding some key points will be clear enough - even if only, in the manner of educated fetish, this piece should seem aptly suggestive already by a certain density and opacity, swept up in the quiet but irresistible promise of clearer vision. Clarity bears its own power and expansive effectivity, both as rational lucidity and transparent unity (cf. Jenkins:1977). Indeed, Marxism and radicalism generally and conscientization (or 'consciousness-raising') in particular perhaps - that 'pedagogy of the oppressed' (Freire:1972a) which is one of radicalism's most influential and well-dispersed pedagogical forms - can be seen as a wish for clarity, a struggle for power. Nonetheless, if this presentation seems to be rambling without discipline now, to require more rigorous organisation and taming, if it appears to be superficial or to rest on ephemeral metaphor if not on some spontaneous intuition...if it appears uneducated, unsound...then the argument is already making itself. In this meandering, we might just note a comment from Paulo Freire, from that 'architect' (Colonnese L.M. (ed):1971:109) of a subversive, revolutionary education: it is a comment offered on his own tightly referenced and succinctly ponderous texts, telling us that they mark the aspirations of

...a petit-bourgeois, of a university professor who, at the time of writing, had not yet attained the post (Freire: (1973)1976:8; my trans.).

In particular, any seemingly presumptuous aspiration to sophistication and trenchancy here on the part of a woman would, in this instance, bear its own peculiarly meet leçon. In effect, it may be that the flow of argument throughout will be seen, suitably enough, as no more perhaps than an evanescent bubble, blown up before you only soon to burst and leave the hardier to get on with the real tasks ahead; it may appear, fittingly again, as no more than a commentary unsettled, resting on the solidity of Dresch's (op.cit.) incisive deconstruction, at once parasitic on and supportive of its acuity. Yet, by that very deconstruction, we may have glimpsed already the difficulties of asserting primacy, the problem of stacking the world in layers. The comments here aim rather to slip into and re-present a current and murmuring disquiet about 'what it is we are doing' (Dresch:op.cit.:72); they do not seek valeur in any too easy opposition to either Dresch - or, indeed, to the macho edifice of Marxism - as female to male (even though such a relation would be a tidy nicety indeed for the lines of symbolic classification we are both expressly and unwittingly weaving through here). Moreover, any such opposition itself would merely risk ready incorporation, posing willingly as a supportive alterity with delimited competence - and this piece, this little bit of stuff, would then, as a matter of course, be tacitly sifted, as the fanciful from the serious, and slipped into a box of trifles, devoid of materiality, like many an otherness of our rational Schooling.

We need a little mental hop-scotch; we can return to Jonathan Culler for some helpful pointers in our flexes and arabesques. We
are well reminded by Culler, in his reading of Derrida, that in any attempt to be a master-hand at clarification by dismissing any seemingly 'non-serious uses of language' (1977:3), by deeming them of secondary concern, let us say, as merely spontaneously poetic, metaphorical and symbolic, for example, then we commit them as proper only to an unrigorous realm that permits play and bemusement. Moreover, we effectively cast them as obscure, shut them off 'from the clear light of day, where indeed they have no place'(ibid). They are thereby defined, he tells us, as lacking 'a direct relation to the light'(ibid); they immediately appear as 'ungrounded...derivative'(ibid) and, moreover, as 'unguided...in an oblique and problematic relationship to truth...based on figures of speech or appeals to emotion'(op.cit). In the all too familiar and now conservative position that Culler has evoked for us here, we are also sitting comfortably through a radical hermeneutic, cradled in a revolutionary edifice. And that very familiarity and comfort perhaps is one significant problem. However, in order to resist any too easy recourse to complacency and satisfied alignment, we might take up Culler's reminder again to note that there is no place outside 'the literary system of philosophical discourse'(ibid) to make a dismissive judgement of this kind. There is no position without, no infra- or meta-level, no secure, steadfast or transcendent place to sit or to stand to effect a dismissive critique; we shall not stride then to the assumption of a stance more educated than educated or more radical than radical... Hence, in the educated space where our journey is housed, '...we can only try to deconstruct it from within'(ibid); we are going to take seriously its metaphors; we will risk educated impropriety; we may even dabble a little perhaps in the mischief of deviance.

Now we know, for example, that the fact/value dialogue that still rages in social science (see e.g.Lesnoff M.:1974) moves in a familiar way (cf. Chapman:1977a). It works with a measured strictness and constraint; its propriety demands a strained and sieved space, demands that untidy edges be cleared away on all sides to bound its Truth and shear off, distance, and relegate the unreliable. The rich metaphorical haul that this dialogue reaches into can centre a certain innocent ground, can protect the serious and the real (or indeed practical, analytical and properly philosophical discourse) from mere parasitic commentary, from flights of fancy and speculation, and from any undermining engagement with considerable ideological effectiveness (cf. Culler:op.cit). It is no soft and easy task of course; clearance is unending; hard data are laced with frills in spite of themselves. However, in the way in which facticity can define itself against an unreliable wilderness that hovers ever on its fringes, we can perceive a certain congruence perhaps between the rustication of the colonised and of 'value-judgements' that elided in social anthropology (cf. Hurley:1976 for some examples of this). This double image, in which the scientific observer senses a sejuction and redeems his alter ego cross-culturally, risks, however, framing those thereby deemed given to Tradition, to the non-scientific, to the emotional, to the familial ('kinship'), to the extensions of the hearth and heart, to the spiritual even superstitious, and to the mythical, in clear and self-validating opposition to the facts and necessities of reason and material advance (cf. Conlin:1976; Hurley:op.cit., for a discussion of some of the 'dualist' arguments here, including developmentalism and isolationism.

If, however, in a not dissimilar vein; French blood can now flow freely, as well we know, where positivism of this kind has congealed; if
We are following the tale of a figure that is ever a 'novelist of himself'. We are following the tale of a figure that is ever a 'novelist of himself', capable dualities would seem to defy collapses akin to that of culture into nature or vice versa. We are safe. Do not let the references jangle or nature er vice versa. We are safe. Do not let the references jangle or nature er vice versa. We are safe.

Franco Co:1974; Lizarzaburu:1976; see also Bataille(ed):1976; Lister 1972a; 1972b; Salazar Bondy:1975; Ladimeji:1972; Calhouri:1976; Franco C.:1974; Lizarzaburu:1976; see also Bataille(ed):1976; Lister (ed)1974 etc. etc.; cf. also Foucault(1966)1974 on this pursuit). Without any fatuous stretch of language, we can quietly read in Man's parts as we go along, wending through the slips and elisions of such part-worlds and sliding between the constitutive domains of the individual, the social and the global, even as the figure is 'dissolved'. Language has no other medium of dissolution but itself and is its own hermeneutic. So just let language play all along here and it will have done the work for us; mine is the task of 'arbitrary' punctuation in this journey, not heavy road-works.

We are moving on now towards a sweeping compendium at once dense and fragile, on towards an arbitrary list that may seem contrived but is the work of spontaneous conspiracy. Conflations will pose themselves with unsummoned agility as might echoes of what has gone before and shadows of what might be said. The few selected references that I am throwing in here - but very few of very many, like the imagistic congruities themselves - will seem clumsy perhaps, but will serve to re-assure us of our status. You can read the academic 'necessity' of such references, and of the examples too, as part of the ethnography: they weight spontaneity, pin it down. They give solidity and shared ground too to any vaporous superficiality or lonely musing. Parentheses may be involuted, turned outside in or inside out, but mutually interdependent and irreducible dualities would seem to defy collapses akin to that of culture into nature or vice versa. We are safe. Do not let the references jangle or tie the flow untidily; however, and do not pretend to leave intuition behind nor try to grasp the whole. You may well feel a compulsive desire to get on now to the basic point or an impatience for the root of the matter, if not for some spruce summation, amidst the blur. But any such tunnelling impatience or keenness for stark precision might well evoke its own resistance to narrowness, inevitability and closure within this space, conjuring up within it some mystery and freedom of manoeuvre again in 'ethnological fictions' (cf. Chapman:1977:vii) or metaphysical-metaphorical othernesses of various kinds. We are moving, after all, in the endless to-ing and fro-ing of an 'unavoidable duality', of an 'empirico-transcendental doublet' (Foucault:1966)1974: e.g. pp.326-7). We are following the tale of a figure that is ever a 'novelist of himself' (Salazar Bondy:1969:129), through a complex terrain 'always open,
never finally delimited, yet constantly traversed' (Foucault op.cit.:322).
Bear with me now through this rhetorical chorus; if it should get boring,
such after all is the traditional nature of ethnographic facts. Con-
templative susurrations might gather themselves around any stolidity here,
as the limitations of the 'facts', their fringes marked with joy, and
stark edges softened if not erased.

We all know now about the shift from function to meaning; even if
not precisely cognisant of the fullness of its promise, we are riding
well the tandem of its appeal. We recognise the force of its protest
at least. The ineffability of Man in the positivist idiom marks a well-
dispersed metaphysical concern: a loss, an absence, a neglect, a
reduction. It is the language of alienation (as elsewhere, many a
referential pin would guarantee our text here), of violation (e.g.Freire:
(e.g.Crick:1976:49), of confinement and closure (e.g.Berger:1976:112;
1971:21); it is the language of black boxes, of hollow emptiness (e.g.
Freire:1972a:60; (1972)1974:19), of massification (e.g.Freire:1972b:79),
of death in a mass (e.g. Bauman:1976:55), of the immaterial lost to the
material. We slip now into an elastic consonance of reports; in this
dialogue we can find aversions voicing the worries of this fatal confine
or protesting the chill of a dominant, heedless monotone, lacking in
texture, richness and harmony. It is no encroachment of the extraneous
nor any futile subjective detour to wave markers before you like this.
We might recall, too, that we are merely skimming here: a deeper weight
and broader expanse can be found in the references cited and elsewhere;
we place an essential largesse in parentheses, at once suggested and
repressed by the meticulous and evident demands of space and time, but
promised.

And now some reports, where we are to trip lightly (and fantasti-
cally) and as convolutions (and caution) might slow us to a measured
pace, or lull us in rhythmic cadence. We might, for example, read of
a bewailed absence of meaning in the word and the solitary letter
(e.g. Freire:1972a:60; Verne:1976:219), in that 'dead letter', as
Derrida puts it, 'the carrier of death' (Derrida (1967)1976:7). We
hear too of a lack of unity and life in inertia (e.g. Freire(1972)1974:
20; Lizop:1976:209; Taylor:1977), of a lack of a radical 'anthropo-
logical essence' (e.g. Salazar Bondy:1969:21), or of 'sensual and
active being' (e.g. Smart:1976:33), of a loss of free play, free space,
spontaneity and interiority all lost in exteriority, in 'inert object-
ivity', in rationalist causality and formalistic rigidity (e.g. Salazar
We meet too the noting of a lack of vital depth in linearity (e.g.
sources of energy' untapped in surface pedestrianism (e.g. Hampshire:
1973:19); and we learn too of a deadly cold absence of temporality in
space, of the loss of an inner dynamism and richness in an outer world,
and of the very pulse of history grown faint in Structure (e.g.
1973; Hughes:1977). And more. We read too of the neglect of soft
'music' in repressive silence (e.g. Mariátegui(1928)1971:276;
Althusser:1972:260), and of 'joy' repined in the tensionless taken-
for-granted (e.g.Illich:1974:18; Freire:1973:7); we learn of some
untutored, soulful heartbeat barely heard in effete decadence (e.g.
Mariátegui(1928)1971:276), and of an animate, living ideality cast
aside in vulgar materialism (e.g. Mariátegui:op.cit.:287; Friedman: 1974) - like mind in matter, along with the soul and heart neglected in the privilege of the body or of the intellect abstracted, skin-deep. And yet more. We have heard tell of the absence of semantics, of a full-blooded meaning, in syntax, in that 'unsavoury skeleton' (e.g. Brittan:1972:1974:337; Smart:1976; Illich(1971):1973:74; Giddens:op.cit.:45) as we know too of religion or art sadly disregarded in science (e.g. Apel:1974:48) and enchantment bewailed in calculating logic (Weber:1924:cited Giddens:op.cit. loc.cit.). Indeed, provisionality, speculation, imagination, novelty and creativity are menaced and dulled, we learn, in the clamps of Schooled Truth, in positivist-empiricism and in the mundane and the trivial (e.g. Bernstein:1971:57; Holt(1967) 1971; Dresch:1976:67; Freire:1973:7; C. Wright Mills:1970).

We shall keep on moving here for a while. Just take what you want from all this; celebrate or tie up its looseness; you will cover it all in your own way.

We well know of the much lamented lack of 'direct experience' and of the 'immediate', of relevance and heart-felt response, in opacity and abstraction (e.g. Merleau-Ponty:1962:54; 58). We know too of the loss of living speech in the linear, printed text, as we do of the silencing of some 'rural tom-toms' and of the 'discourse of the masses' in the stony somnambulance of the industrial production-line (e.g. Verne:1976:216;227). As the pastoral has thus ceded to the urban, openness has given way to closure, informality to formality, flexibility to rigidity, and learning to Schooling (e.g. Lister (ed) 1974; Salazar Bondy:1975; Illich(1971):1973; Dale, Esland & MacDonald (eds) 1976). The very 'smile' of a child can be suppressed by the demands of a harsh world outside, where rigorous 'basic skills' are necessary properly to cope in an adult reality (e.g. Gray J.: 1978:308). From there comes the lament of some absent 'unbroken text', of a lost continuity and participation, and of an 'unbroken beginning' denied in the worrying and 'lifeless' prejudice of the external (e.g. Merleau-Ponty:1962:54; Ashton Warner(1963)1971:185; Calhoun:1976). It is as common to hear of the total vacuity of non-cooperative isolation and secular specialisation as to bewail that sense of 'community' absent in the Modern (e.g. Salazar Bondy:1965:461; 1975:65; Poole: 1975; T h e i r n s (1887)1955:39; UNESCO:1972:xxxix; cf. Plant:1974). We have heard tell thus of a hearth lost in 'homelessness' (e.g. Berger: 1976:39), of the personal lost to the impersonal (e.g. Illich:op.cit.: 74; Lizop:1976), and of the private shut off and neglected in the public (e.g. Franco:1974:543). Stay with me: the sense of loss is still deeply with us, the absent is elusive (and the not-yet and the unsaid spur us on with a curious, casual urgency) like some secret, intangible.

We have been reminded of an invisible wealth occluded in the insensitive shutters of an outsider's 'camera lens', warned of a half-world crudely reduced by an intrusive eye (e.g. Hughes:1977:13; Ladimeji: op.cit); we have glimpsed a tantalising part-world dimly shrouded but narrowly caught in time, only to be rudely laid out like a 'dead stretch' (Ardener:1973) on tangible but untextured record. And yet while we need a living base, some kind of provision amidst destruction let us say, we might have all the while, it seems, but a 'fleeting presence' (Althusser:(1968)1975:27) of absence.

But now, somewhat breathless, we can again find ready inspiration, as many have done after all the Naturalizations of the unnatural. We
know that the savage barbarian, ever at the edge of Civilisation, trailing Progress from behind and below, has been fondly - if ambivalently - re-evaluated (cf. Chapman:1977a). By this same dexterity, we can quickly step to recall that there have been numerous kindred, resourceful re-evaluations, variously gathering up the East, an inner world, primitives, naturality, children (see e.g. Dearden:1972; Holt: op.cit.), women, the working-class, as well as values (e.g. Pocock:1977), irrationality and emotions (e.g. Kneller:1958:5), spontaneous curiosity (e.g. Hodgkin:1976), myth (e.g. Hughes:1977) and spirituality (e.g. Ladimeji:op.cit.). They are to be re-gathered into the family of Man along with some communal, 'convivial' bonhomie (e.g. Verne:1976), the kindred spirit, those close to the soil, 'bound to nature' and basic (e.g. Freire:1972a:142; cf. Benton:1976). Innocent communities without writing (e.g. Lévi-Strauss:1955; Verne:op.cit.) and the Third World, that child of super-power politics (e.g. Berger:1976), equally swell into the hollow of alienation where some essence is ever risked in the world to be known and recuperated. They might all linger meanwhile out there, elsewhere, as part-worlds: 'worlds apart' (cf. Bernice:1977), with a frontier between, and yet safely (and parenthetically) engulfed in the mature embrace of an all-encompassing world-structure. This fond interest, perforce, homes in also on those Indians 'in whose concept of life', we are told by a firmly committed and still influential radical, 'it is not Reason, but Nature that is interrogated' (Mariátegui:1928)1971:276-7). We sense a fondness for all those domains given a certain tristesse and quietus by the Modern. Gross artificiality, torpid superficiality, mechanical and punctilious routine along with grubby materialism and the boring indignities of 'functional imperatives' (e.g. Berger & Pullberg:1965:208) demand recourse to the unaffected; the grill of myopic rigour demands a half-world of purity uncontaminated, or a fancy unstructured, and looks to all those fanciful elisions of the non-serious, seen now as the 'casualties of Modern life' (Chapman:1977b:146). Variously tossed aside in the cramping of a weighty facticity and external analytic, or functionally dressed in the slips of the ephemeral and the immaterial, they are, not surprisingly, looked to - like an inner world - for inspiration in the fullness of resurgence of Man, of a figure that 'haunts thought from within' (Foucault:1966)1974:327).

But we have had a hint of ambivalence. Whilst its echoes can be sounded at intervals here, no crystal tone can iron it out nor pitch too stark a line anywhere, nor fall back on any singular couplet. Just bear it in mind, weaving it through the loom of our doublet. The ambivalent appeal of the very 'marginality' of all those inspiring realms slides easily into all that might be ambiguous to the anxious imperialism of a dominant male model: both outside and within, possessed of an uncontrollable, if not sinister, power of otherness. It is a power that can sentimentally assuage neurosis and is one that can also be drawn, in the politics of reversal, inversion or revolution, into dangerously close contact - as a challenging negative to an existing positive, as Unreason to Reason, in the manner of the historical dialectic, that comfort of intellectual radicals, a wildness tamed. We can tread more soberly here to note that, in an internal dialogue of educated protest and re-thinking, we can find that the necessary taming of any unfettered, spontaneous naturality (where, let us say, the unintentional must contain the intentional (e.g. Godelier:1973)1977:209; 218), where a wandering curiosity requires instruction after all (e.g. Hodgkin:op.cit.), where phenomenological idealism must find surer footing (e.g. Gintis:1972)1976) and where sedimentations are everywhere
to surface in a controlled manner with the pace of theoretical leverage) reminds us that any unruled, unguided free space is impossible anyway (e.g. Culler:1975:251-3; Foucault & Chomsky:1974; Apel:1974). Such assertions might slide together into a grateful message of cultured circles fearing the dissipating and dehumanising collapse of culture into nature or any uncontrollable, bloody revolt alike. Naturality, we recall too, is always close to base animality and sensuality, and is situated where a lack of firm and measured constraint unleashes the fringes of factuality and the petticoats of reality. Exciting, perhaps, but these are licentious realms for the educated to (re)turn to; dabbling there is a 'risk' (e.g. Freire:1972a:16) always, dangerous and unsound of footing perhaps, if not improper and impure. A mere slip and we can easily find some coherence in this piece. Hold on to these images whenever we seem to be polluting bounds of acceptability, to be falling out of the category of 'educated', or hovering dangerously on its fringes. We might bear in mind, too, that all those marginal realms then, by their very ambiguity, find their every utterance an already fitting text for the hermeneutics of suspicion.

Such realms, at the bottom and on the edge, are re-evaluated, brought and discovered within, to be channelled and tamed; they exist at once to be celebrated and mourned. As the proper domains of the political Left, they offer a rich, youthful and radical otherness to draw upon even as they remain ambiguous as both a construct of diminution - being all that cultural subtlety and the serious materiality is not - and yet also a powerfully evocative counter-weight to a maturity itself grown oppressively stale. Growing up in the world has had its price; and yet also a powerfully evocative counter-weight to whatever we seem to be polluting bounds of acceptability, to be falling out of the category of 'educated', or hovering dangerously on its fringes. We might bear in mind, too, that all those marginal realms then, by their very ambiguity, find their every utterance an already fitting text for the hermeneutics of suspicion.

Not surprisingly, those who have emerged thus look again to the 'submerged' (Freire:op. cit.:70) for re-generation, for their own 're-animation' (e.g. Salazar Bondy:1975:66; cf. Foucault:1966:1974:328) and satisfaction. Not only does the Fall of the body seem to look to the direct, the free and uncastrated (cf. Spivak:1976 lxix; lxxiii) but it seems that all this rigor mortis, this suspension of life, of
energy, of warm softness, of joy and of the very substance of humanity itself has been long 'freezing the blood of the thoughtful' (Chapman:1977a:93) even if they are not bent on revolutionary endeavour or satisfactory monographs. If Man's 'integrity' is recovered only 'on the basis of what eludes him' (Foucault:op.cit.:323), this would seem to apply ever as rhetorical solace becomes the language of Structure or a sophisticated dialectical restorative. Concerned as it is, in Merleau-Ponty's terms, with the 'absence of something which consciousness could bring into its presence' (1962:58), the broken immediateness of the structural thematic generally is peculiarly suggestive for those who lament a 'lost plenitude' (Said:1975:319). It commends itself well to those who would seek the recovery of a 'complete and original being' (e.g. Salazar Bondy:1969:13), of some human autonomy sullied, repressed and 'forgotten' along with its 'roots' (e.g. Salazar Bondy:1965:458-9; 1969:10; Berger & Pullberg:1965:205). Radicalism has its own appeal. It can reap the full play of a space where 'the lack of foundation is basic and nonempirical' and where 'security of presence in the metaphorical form of ideality arises' (Derrida:1973:7).

We are accustomed then to the search for an anchor for reality and real meaning which is beneath and other than our actual and present understanding of ourselves. The shan of this-wordliness and the fallacies of appearance are ever persuasive notions (e.g. Ambroggio L.:1971). Moreover, a lingering metaphysic of the material, as well as the gravitational force of those deemed to be living out a basic reality, weights the marxist construction. In its solid architecture, which variously has roots, foundations, functions, as well as structures, floors and levels, it seems that we are still looking down and within for a fullness of knowledge (for epistemological and moral security) as we are to a symbolic fount, to a temporal or logical primacy, for autonomy, completeness and at-one-ment. The radical construction, with its ideas at the top and the economic at bottom, as well as theorists at the head and the working-class below at the base, draws on its own internalty too and has always an 'inner darkness of exclusion' (Althusser:1968) - its limitations again 'outside, within' (ibid:27). It covers positive and negative, as well as truth and error, overt and secret, public and private along with its implicit morality and explicit science (cf. Jenkins:1977); it scours the entire complex, penetrating every aspect of the social, of the globe and of Man, by a facility of metaphorical meerness, evocation and elision.

As its promise leashes the force of opposing severalities, shorn of their excesses (e.g. in a rational community, a spiritual body and material ideality, basic and inner rewards in a meaningful outer world etc.), it speaks with all the authority of tradition. The Althusserian notion of a determinant that is not dominant appears thus as a particularly masterful stroke of compromise in an old see-sawing dialogue of part-worlds that have long chased each other and now seek merger. However, for all the polished mutation of the construction, the individual is dissolved into the social which is dissolved into Structure which re-emerges as Man, a figure that spills out in the proper ordering of its parts, into individuals and groups again, in a customary division of labour which many marxist intellectuals take for granted (cf. Williams R.: 1978). It is the head that speaks of the base, after all, as if
from the heart. In connection with this figure, too, we find that that transcendental signifier - the Structure (as a 'structure of structures' (Althusser (1968) 1975:17)), captures a desire for all absences it represents, as the Other of the Subject; it is an anthropological and anthropomorphic totality, itself an efficacious 'occult' (e.g. Godelier (1973) 1975:163), which ever scans the text-analogue for a 'fleeting presence' of its own invisible spectre (cf. Jenkins: op.cit.). 

Man persists then, to try to see himself, in spite of himself, clearly in the glass - as much an 'impossible dream of plenitude' (Spivak: op.cit.: xvii; xx) as of an 'omnipresent providence' (Glucksmann A.: (1967) 1972:77).

Lamenting a loss and variously constructing an Other in its likeness, confirms the politico-economic unfitness of others as it does the shrewd autonomy and wholesomeness of the thoughtful: they are convinced of their own head and heart, of their own soul and body, of both hands, of their stomach and ideas, and of their sexual and politico-economic prowess in the very labour of Man's birth. In dealing with the unifit, by a 'symptomatic reading' (Althusser (1968) 1975:28) and with an 'informed gaze' (ibid), the marxist diagnostician is free to perceive and assert his own significant level of causality, his own reality, wherein the 'economic' and the struggle for power pose a telling 'index of effectivity' in themselves. In the meantime however, if the proletariat is made the symbol of alienated man, it is still the otherness of theoretical clarity, of percepacious, radical Reason. If the masses are deemed so well given to the 'use of metaphor' (e.g. Freire:1972b:47) - to that untrustworthy language - then we know who would claim pervasive, lucid literalness, who would wish to lead some 'dumb-experience...to the pure expression of its own meaning' (Husserl:1931:33; cited Merleau-Ponty:1962:xv). Radicalism's all too frequent distrust of language, however, has often led us to suspect that certain blurred signs or some ephemeral ideology might fly off - like the 'beating of wings', like mere 'wind' (Foucault (1969) 1974:209), into a nether-ideality, as if arbitrary somehow implied speculative, untrustworthy (...) We sense that they might indeed be flapping up there, 'in the air' (Althusser 1972:247), if they are not pinned down, grounded (referenced), or related by 'structural causality' or whatever, to the prime reality of radicalism's own rectifying and disillusioning register, of which the de-poeticization might again seem as violating as positivist disenchantment (e.g. Ricoeur (1965) 1976).

If the joy is to go out of the world again in this way, what of the laughter? We are coming to that now, weaving around it slowly and subtly. We have long jovially lightened the weight of cultural practices, as we know, by slipping them into the realms we tacitly sift as of 'non-real status' (Ardenner:1975b:25). To talk of our own process of thesis production as one long ritualised corpus of Schooling mythology implies a de-bunking. We can laugh. The domains of the serious and the phantasmic (which permits play and bemusement, we recall) are incontrovertible (cf. also Chapman:1977b). Shake up the categories, shake up and strain an edifice to its very structures, and - if it is not to collapse - a joke must fall out. By the same prescription of security and stability, it does not seem so unnatural still to make a long circular journey to 'discover' Indians, poetic and familial, engaged prolifically in ritual, rich in mythology, and to describe their manioc-processing or whatever as one long symbolic rite. Their commentary is lightened and supplies refreshment. Ours
supplies the references, the guarantees and the real. If kinship, ritual, mythology and symbolism etc., the realms of the 'unreal', seem aptly, persistently and overtidily to incorporate other cultures in the language of Reason, then we should not be surprised that this imperiously serious rationality would seem to have engaged in a furious debate with itself in the '60's. That autochthonous flurry of intellectual onanism wore itself out, blithe and blind, 'sterile' (Dresch:1976:64) indeed - and its impotence evocative of our immediate concerns.

Yet marxist machismo is masterfully resistant to 'frustration', as we know; with a virile unfalsifiability, it has its own solution for gaining satisfaction, enjoying all the frills with a rigorously de-flowering earthiness. It will require little effort to appreciate the organising metaphor and grasp the serious ripples here. Marxism is endowed with a prime externality vis-à-vis the subject it thereby dissolves, but it is in the internality of the total formation that it finds the irresistible energy which spurs it on. Enticed by an internality which is at once basic to its own re-production and is yet variously concealed in the mists of intuition, the macho neatly incorporates its female, in the multiplex shadows of metaphorical aptitude. Its generalisations aptly cover the specificity of her competence - but if she is to burst through her undecided chimera and decisively claim the competence and obligations of a male preserve, then she must renounce her claim to a domain set apart, no longer hold the gracious mystique of an unassailable femininity, renounce her uncontrollable powers. We are slipping fast here. At the heart of the matter is the ceding of her inner world, making it public, open to penetration. Radical Reason, after all, we learn, is the very 'driving force' (Salazar Bondy:1975), the very thrust that will drive through the 'veil' in a 'passage opened up' (ibid:49), and indeed 'illuminated', by its very own 'evident reason' (ibid), inhering in the seminal 'reality' it thereby introduces into this 'fertile' counter-factual (Salazar Bondy:1965:459).

If the imagery here seems to offer us too easy, too fatuous, a journey, then so might marxist politicking: a ticket to ride. As marxism persists, discursively or in khakis, in 'racing...through the jungle' (Dresch:1976:60) or wherever, in its 'scythed chariots' (Ardener:1971:460), hunting its supportive alterity, it finds an already given location of the unreal; it meets other world-structures already promisingly debunked and yielding - if not passionately crying out for invasion, as 'parasitic on the serious' (Guller:1977:3), like a fluttering femininity. Moreover, those deemed muted in their helpless 'culture of silence' (Freire: e.g.1972b:57) are the unwitting prime targets: qui tacet consentere. And, anyway, should they speak out and protest, fickleness can claim no sure and mature credibility, as we know. It seems that those living out a basic reality do so without knowledge of the real - they are mistaken (e.g. Godelier(1973) 1977:164) and suffer from mystification in the illusions of their 'unscientific, spontaneous consciousness' (ibid) - in not knowing themselves, their needs and desires as the theorists know them. Saying no really means yes. For the fanciful and non-serious to presume otherwise, to cross the line without the required passport of educated capital or to cross it alone, can invoke a self-satisfied smirk from those already there on the other side - something akin to the old joke about the woman wearing the trousers, a joke that masterfully tames the unease of what might be castrating mockery in the tension of that divide.
But then, elsewhere, tradition is more explicitly assured and the lines marking off those part-worlds and half-worlds are maintained by the firmly discrete proprieties of their relative domains. We learn from UNESCO, for example, that that mysterious 'subjectivity', like some mere slip and whimsy of fancy, must shyly retire to her 'own particular domain', a domain where spontaneity freely 'flourishes', having properly left a 'field where it has no place', a field where politico-economic decisions are made (UNESCO:1972:147). We have to beware, however, of any insolent, butch transvestitism: of 'emotions dressed up as reasons' (ibid). Radicals can have it all taped in this manner: they are not fools, they know you and you won't sneak past them in presumptive disguise. At that frontier of serious political engagement, all those 'spontaneous impulses' (e.g. Salazar Bondy:1965:459; Freire:1976(1973):13-17; cf. Hall, Lumley & McLennan:1977, on Gramsci here too), along with symbolic affectivity and the undirected, unguided 'natural wisdom of the people' (e.g. Franco C.:1974:541) become 'irrational and immediate action' (ibid:542). Immediacy, directness and naturality, admirable in their own sphere, become irrational at the border. Without the aid of that clear-sighted reader above the text, helping them properly to cross the line, to become 'progressively rational' (Franco: op.cit.: loc.cit.), they are then dithering in the mythical and are 'naive' (e.g. Freire:1974:64-5). Heart in mouth then, they border the realms of the serious with improper, inadequate, untamed structuration, if not with irrationality, as if unstructured. Instruction answers progressivism. Appealing realms may flourish, blossom in their beds, but the masses only make history by waking up to reality; uprooted from lethargy, they must put their feet on the ground and step out in strict formation, playing their part in the drama of an 'authorless theatre' (Althusser:(1968)1975:193) but with script in hand. They have to learn to 'think structurally' (e.g. Salazar Bondy:1975:167; Freire:1972b:57-60; Franco:op.cit.:542) - and the dominant rationality, with its acute totalitarianism and securely accredited power of reality definition, demands that the world be structured in a particular way.

If those realms are not to fail then, to flounder in error and folly, they must slough off all 'mental obstacles' (Salazar Bondy: op. cit:49), along with the 'superficial, intuitive' (ibid:48) and that 'opacity and simplicity' (ibid) residing in their given leanings to 'emotions...impulses, myths' (ibid). In some instances, it would seem that their unreliable world has to be unpacked in the medium of progressive transparency, peeling off the layers that get in the way. As the product of 'space specialists' (Ardener:1975a:12), the marxian construction is all too easily shifted into the gear of spatialised time, in spite of warnings to the contrary (e.g. from Freire himself (1972a:65) and also Dreusch:1976: esp.pp.71-2; Jenkins:1976: e.g.p.40). Those deemed gifted in the metaphorical and the symbolic seem to offer an already representational language on a vertical axis, like some literary excrescence, a poetic commentary condensed: the manifest, laconic float selected from the sure embrace of a reality lurking somewhere below. Hence, as so often, we learn that the real is to be 'unveiled' (e.g. Freire:1972a:52; 1972b:42) and, indeed, a 'recuperation' of that 'hidden or mystified reality' (da Veiga Coutinho:1972:9) would seem to offer that certain presence at last of a literal substrate; preferring thus a deep and essential base amidst anxious insecurity, it might seem there is a place to rest now, a hearth, an abode, a part-world that history has dispersed and restored.
But, of course, they never make it - for epistemological security, in the 'last instance' (Althusser e.g.1972:247), is an intellectual conceit, as would be the baldness of the edifice's own collapse, and finality is majestically elusive - sparing us some barren and meaningless petrifaction on that score at least. The students of politico-economic effectivity might be sped instead on a course by a radical pedagogy, by 'consciousness-raising', that revolutionary arousal of intuitive consciousness, which invokes both an Althusserian science and the energies of phenomenological-existentialism to offset the inertia of Structure (see Freire:1972a; 1972b). The promise of transparent satisfaction is now unfulfilled as they strain to hear the 'endless murmur' (Foucault(1966)1974:327) of the Unconscious so that consciousness can re-appropriate it, so that they can 'discover' what the pedagogue knows in an endless theoretical registration and re-registration of the 'concrete' (Freire:e.g.1972b:36) - in a register that is acutely 'prophetic' (Ardener:1975a). It seems that the 'muted' (e.g. Freire:1972b:45;47) might well find an 'authentic voice' (ibid) again only 'within the true' (cf.Foucault:1971:16) of educated discourse, struggling for power whilst the 'politico-discursive energy' (Mehlman:1976:15;17) of the entire construction would be barrenly dissipated without their gravitational force and subordinate dependency. Creatures of impasse are disciplined, as also nature is de-naturalised, by an epistemological crusade which has an all powerful language of context, of structure, of situation; it will not allow that castrating mockery or emasculation that Godelier fears, for example, as the 'triumph of mythical thinking over the science which analyses it' (Godelier 1977(1973):220; cf. pp.209;218). Other knowledges can be shelved with ready stratification in a presumptuous hierarchy, in the space of an 'inexhaustible doublet' (Foucault(1966)1974:327) and in an 'inexhaustible' edifice (e.g. Freire:(1971)1976:225) which shrewdly points upwards and onwards and is ever watched over by an 'unsleeping Reason' (Deleuze:1973:113; cited Jenkins:1977:3). There is now no 'zero-point calm' (Said:1975:328) at which it can come to rest.

We might well intuit here a subtle ruse of Teaching - as it usurps the constitutive instability of Reading to sustain its own educated piety (cf. Mehlman 1976) - or we might detect the towering authoritarianism pointed to by Dresch (op.cit.). Reasoning with nature and the universal imaginaire for its own good, can have, as Mehlman tells us, all the qualities of 'farce': it can have 'all the aplomb of the Russian army protecting the socialist republic of Czechoslovakia from bourgeois relapses' (Mehlman:op.cit.:18). Certainly, the possible epistemological bullying and arrogance that might well be entailed here(as both Berger:1976:137-8 and Jenkins:1977:61 have noted) can breed its own monstrous absurdities, as we know. Proffering insistently, as it does, the commentary of all possible commentaries, the dizzy heights of such arrogance might well spin us in those very 'circles of certainty' (e.g. Freire:1972a:18) which radicalism seeks to uproot. Any 'know-all ideo-logic' (Dresch:1976:68) of an educated milieu is merely underlined. The strict fuss of any Knowledge too tidy, too finished, necessarily generates fools (and this we know in multiple, ironic ways); we seem to move round and round, analytically drying and tightening the world till it splits, gathering up the pieces, injecting new life, and trying still to tidy it virtually to a stop. We move uneasily, too, between 'capitalism's rapacity' (Jenkins: op.cit.:182) and Science's violations again. In the same revolution,
you may put on your paradigmatic lenses, for example, only readily to
spot your own syntagms; opposition all too easily becomes conflict
In this connection, too, we might note that Paulo Freire, for example,
in his desire to resurrect meaning and to give profound materiality
to the politically ineffective, spontaneous structuration of those he
deems to be oppressed, shifts all too easily between a chomskyan
'deep structure' (e.g. Freire:1972b:32), phenomenological 'background
awareness' (e.g. 1972a:87) and a marxist 'infrastructure' (e.g. 1972a:
76). In extreme, however, a sleight of conflation here would give
us the absurdly imperious notion of everyone everywhere being born
with the ineluctable syntax and relevances of our 'economic', thereby
harnessing our worst fears about depth analysis of any kind. Elsewhere
the position is simpler perhaps. Whilst experience may dance with
evasive agility, no-one is performing acrobatics in the sense of
categorically falling head over heels in their rashness or standing
on their heads; nor are they categorically up to their waists in
the economic with their heads in the clouds. That much is clear at
least. Nor yet are they inherently unstable, or psychotically or
childishly unable to distinguish the real from the unreal. We seem
to have an all too ready mythologic and prolific symbolism by which
naively to make this distinction ourselves, as well as to suspect and
to deride, and to destroy, to lament and to chase the ever disappearing.

Now, for all those with an earthy turn of mind, the sexual
implications that I have invoked in some instances, as playing out the
moral space involved, may well have made this presentation 'real' - as Ardener long ago noted of the forceful calques of 'positivist-
analagoues' and of 'divisions in the most behaviourist reality' alike -
including, he tells us, those 'sex differences, bodily laterality,
geographical directions' (1971:458). The woundabout of certainty has
its axis, its anchor, and reality is guaranteed. Along with this,
the mainstay of dense reference and the back-up of an educated passport
may persuade you of some truth in this piece. Equally, the solidity
of the marxist construction has weighted its favour with a near
bewitching self-verification. We can exploit the richness of the
riddle.

If marxism already feels 'real' with its own earthy persuasions,
then it can ride with Truth and Reality all too easily, without need
of and spurning any sexual calques. We know that its epistemological
heftiness is by no means flighty, but that it nonetheless pretends to
skirt under the wear of the 'conceptual' and the merely 'semantic'
(e.g. Friedman:1974:449), tearing a seemingly flimsy veil it cannot
take seriously, as the fluff of mere words. Yet even if wafting in
this ethereal sphere has felt strangely real, flirting outside and
within, we too may have taken advantage of a fragile realm to bring
a point home, raised a blush and impertinently gone too far, with
permissive, unwarranted licence. (And all the questions are begged:
where do we look for permission, what is the measure of our looseness,
where the providential centre of propriety, and what realms are
retreating shyly or what domains trespassed upon?) It may be that my
own evocative surrender to the temptation of a sexual reading will
radically secure an appeal. It may well sound the death-knell too
of this piece in serious academic debate, and the argument will not
be heard: Malinowski, after all, we have learnt, might well be dis-
missed as a commercial profiteur for his account of the sexual life
of savages (e.g. Leach:1965:1966). Eliding wilds and fundamentals could be my undoing, dismissed as I thereby dismiss others. No serious, 'educated' journal would take us perhaps, for the elisions at once strengthen and cheapen, if not sully and weaken, our textual validity. And yet, we have met with this before and marxism and indeed structuralism, for instance, would seem to have survived such a domesticating dismissal already. Marvin Harris, for example, in his account of The Rise of Anthropological Theory (1969) detected also a Fall. When social anthropology here began to have fanciful recourse to the non-empirical, to unconscious energies (when the ponderous Anglo-Saxon found himself seduced, aptly enough, by his ever-inspiring alter-ego), then Harris warned of 'debauchery', of a 'weakening of the...fibres', with the venture pronounced moribund as it seemed to evoke 'all manner of musical and sartorial novelty', something to do with our 'mysticism...miniskirts' (Harris:1969:544-5; cited Ardener:1971:458-9). Licentious realms indeed and altogether non-serious. Positivism can become reductive constraint but culture dissipated in naturality is also a sensuality - as much as is a 'puritanical' (Harris:ibid) externality going overboard in the unfettered plumbing of depths, in the joyful exploration of fringe fancies and of those petticoats of factuality and the real world.

A mere conflational whisper would seem readily and riotously to evoke 'all manner of' wine, women and song here and conjure up for us thus a picture of many a belittled otherness safely and enchantingly glossed and ethnographed. At the same time, kindred loose associations closer to home, improper in the keen and wary realm of Proper structuration, suggest a multiplex resonance of the fatally undermining dissipations of rigour, of serious, educated discourse. Little wonder perhaps that where marxism has raped gleefully in the conviction of proprietal union, it is now felt necessary to defer full satisfaction (e.g. Derrida:1973:129-160; Spivak:1976:lxvi). If, however, Harris secures propriety and if he finds the possibility of derision in the improper crossing of lines, along several axes, and if he finds danger therein - then the relative purity of this piece is confirmed - dismissed or not. Moreover, if expressly selecting some of the imagistic and symbolic conceits of our own theoretical venture seems to trivialise it here - to lighten it to the frivolous - then such is the nature of poetic justice; therein we might find the very economy of social anthropology and its own curious existential duality.

Meanwhile, in the intellectual ventriloquism of much marxism, a self-contained dialogue of Rationality with its own limitations (cf. Chapman:1977b) and the striking lack of any 'phenomenological rectitude' (Dresch:1976:70) in many instances, has meant that others find their parts spoken for them. With an infusion of blood again from a familiarly lively source, a certain textual-sexual energy of inconsummate union (e.g. Derrida: La Dissemination:1972:260; see Spivak:op.cit.:lxvi) would indicate that language has played its own tricks and has caught up with the radical pretensions. An impenetrable 'hymen', a multi-implicational veil that will not be pierced, has left them confusedly resentful perhaps, undoing their 'assurance of mastery', and an economy of energy has erupted to deconstruct the construction (e.g. Spivak:op.cit.:xl; cf. Jenkins:1977). Life and death, along with presence and absence, play against each other in the edifice of radical Man and it has reached its own inertia, frustrated; it has been self-ruptured anyway, castrated and shorn of its roots in
the curious intensity of its own discontinuity (cf. Mehlman:1976). The convoluted profundity of an absurd riddle would suggest that many a marxist has structured his own spontaneous structuration into Proper Structure, has structured himself into inertia, his flow of energy congealed, and the vital signifié frozen.

And so why then is it 'laughable'? By way of calquing some final points on to what we might have intuited already, we can turn again to our point of departure and vainly try to clear a little of the clutter. We can picture the attempt to control the world via the intellectualty of traditional marxism as the '...İkany Nuer sacrificing in front of advancing smallpox' - a juxtaposition that Dresch(1976:55) has posed for us. If we find ourselves smiling, as well we might, then the bonumest would seem to flow in good measure and with peculiar imperativeness, not merely from the permissive celebration of order, laughing out the untidiness of the mix, but from the force lying in the oppositional lines of the domains in which the activities related to sacrifice and to smallpox, respectively, are covered in our world - in the divide of our own religion and science and their unlaboured conflations. We have, in that picture of the Nuer, an evocation then of a fanciful claim to competence in a weighted realm where it has no place, of the sheer impotence of a will to power and mastery through an activity that has its own domain of competence - properly delimited, elsewhere and intruding with no little degree of impertinence. Religiosity, the immaterial, vainly crosses a maginot line and the dust settles in a chuckle. Crossing back again, it is not surprising perhaps that we should smile somewhat quizzically at Science's laboured quest for a heavy, material infrastructure in the 'religious' and the 'mythical' etc. - in those domains lightly set apart anyway only for ready capture. But there is more than that. We have a picture too from Dresch (op.cit.) of an inner world of the academic cloister - of the ivory tower where the Left flourishes, devoid of panopticon influence, locked in its own abstractions - attempting to placate and dominate an external world of economic recession and political strife by throwing out books, words, by chucking impotent ephemera on to the blaze outside with all the presumptive conviction of masterful materiality.

And yet more, and finally here. If we can find an inappropriateness and inadequacy in the structural-functionalists in terms of their naive and superficial concerns (e.g. Crick:1976:101), just as we have long sifted the superficial and naive from the profundities of Reason - then it is natural also to find an impertinent inadequacy in those who would blindly carry their own naive, immediate reality - their everyday, spontaneous rationality with its pressing 'necessity' - into the wider world of political effectivity and grandiose theoretical abstraction outside and beyond, across the lines. This is what marxists have done, by pretentiously sophisticated tropes, with their generalised, organising ontology of the 'economic' (cf. Dresch: op.cit.:70). If it is a measure of reason to take this metaphor seriously at home (cf.ibid.:60), it may well be a naive, improper and intrusive impertinence to extend it thus outside, in disguise, hastily clad in the remnants of its neighbouring domains, as if others are fools. '...kinship is really "economics" (but the locals don't realise it?)...'(ibid:59).

If we have laughed at all then, we have at least recognised what Merleau-Ponty has so aptly termed the 'presumption on reason's part' (1962:63; orig.emph.).

Maryon McDonald.
1. I should point out here that since one field of particular interest to me has been that of current educational re-thinking and its more or less 'radical' proponents, then many of the authors cited in this text are drawn from a family of the thoughtful concerned with that area. Augusto Salazar Bondy, José Carlos Mariátegui, Alfonso Lizarzaburu and Carlos Franco, for example, are all Peruvian writers who share this concern in various forms. Paulo Freire is Brazilian by birth and now based in Geneva; Vasconi is also Latin American and Illich figures here too as does his French colleague, Etienne Verne. John Holt, Ian Lister and others variously associated with the 'de-schooling' ethos are also drawn upon as is Ashton-Warner, a fore-runner in some respects of Freire's pedagogical theory. Others such as Althusser, Godelier, Friedman, Smart and Merleau-Ponty, for example, are perhaps better known educated radicals, all of whom in various ways have directly and indirectly influenced and re-presented a radical re-thinking of education and 'educated' in a marxian framework. It will be evident that the organising terms of 'radical' and 'educated' embrace a loose field here but their juxtaposition suggests a certain irony and can effect a tight discursive closure with considerable influence from above. From there, the internal dialogue of disciplined Propriety then looks down upon the untutored realms it has at heart and surveys them for controlled surfacing to its own lofty heights, leading them properly up and out into the wide world of Reality. Certain tensions and axes of the relations involved here are played upon in this paper.

2. Whilst it seems, in a sense, to fall back into certain niceties I might wish to avoid, it is necessary, if only as a point of good manners, to note that this piece does indeed owe a direct and grateful debt to the work of Dresch (1976), Jenkins (1977), Chapman (1977a, 1977b), Ardener (1971, 1973, 1975a, 1975b) and Needham (e.g. 1973), for example. That they are all male, and seemingly given to analytical trenchancy, is significant for this commentary - but does not, I hope, render it merely derivative, nor naively dependent, nor aptly given to any fickle equivocation or muddled contrariness.

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