"What would there be to create if gods existed".
Nietzsche (1974: 111)

Having forsaken all reference to a metaphysics of Social Anthropology as constituting a discrete discursive field, or text, and, more generally, upon releasing the general text which is society from corresponding metaphysical determinants, we are left with (only) those material statements which constitute social intercourse. However, if all appeals to underlying determinant structures and internal dynamics were to be so suspended, how shall we account for the emergence of new discursive fields? Indeed, as an example of such, we might note the relatively recent appearance of Social Anthropology as a field of discourse in some ways separate from the nineteenth century ethnographical and ethnological discourses from which it might be said to have emerged.

We repeat that the set of statements which together constitute, and have constituted, the discursive field, the text, of Social Anthropology, are not to be seen as constituting a text on account of their common subject matter or referent. Other discursive fields contain reference to a number of these objects (see below). The point is made here that there is no set of objects, or concepts, solely by reference to which any statement is rendered particularly social anthropological. This amounts to a re-statement of the supremacy of the text; adds up to a recognition of the primacy of the material statements which together comprise Social Anthropology (see ref. to Paul de Mann, fn. 3) and by 'material' is meant 'supported' in the sense of constituting and occupying a node (locus) within a network of discursive relations (pace Foucault, 1972).

Neither is any suggestion being made that these material statements constitute a discrete set of discursive elements. By which we mean that social anthropological discourse neither emerged, nor is it maintained, as a function of an internal dynamic peculiar to itself. Rather, the discursive field of Social Anthropology itself constitutes and occupies a node within a whole network of discursive relations which together constitute that general text of the social; that general text which is at once the support of anthropological discourse and the proper object of its study.

Following Heidegger, our present enterprise might be seen as the destruction (in the sense of 'de-structuring') of the signified; the de-structuring of that Being, as a set of classificatory features, by reference to which elements of language have been credited with a function of power, have been regarded as significant. From Heidegger we note, also, that metaphysical thinking has presupposed such a Being, and recognise how subsequent investigations have combined to disguise the active potential of being behind several layers of intelligibility and knowledge. But the construction of these layers of information which have provided answers to questions of what Being is, and provided accounts for the fact that Being is, has done no more than substitute an external understanding of Being in place of an acknowledgement of the active capacity of being, i.e. the fact that it is. As a field of discourse dealing with a metaphysical subject...
But what is this active potential which we claim Social Anthropology conceals? It could be said that it is that title itself - Social Anthropology (capital letters and all) - which, by attributing an a priori substantiality to itself (or to that which it signifies), pre-disposes us to assume that all the writings which we might recognise as social anthropological, we recognise as such to the extent that they refer to, or are compatible with, that existent (Being) which is Social Anthropology. Unlike those philosophers arguing in the debate over the existence of God, we cannot accept that Social Anthropology is that one which contains its own reason for being; Its very essence being Its own necessity.

It has already been pointed out, however, that Social Anthropology is evidenced only as text; as pen, pencil, or type-written marks on paper. The papers, notepads, journals, and books, are but evidence of an activity; they are evidence of, but not signs of, social anthropology. They are the traces of work undertaken; they do not signify a Social Anthropology situated elsewhere.

An analogy with an organic life-form, so effectively used by a founding father of our work, Wilhelm Von Humboldt, can perhaps help to elucidate this point. Regarding a living organism (let us take as our example, a tree) as developing through time, we can take these traces as evidencing this development, thereby enabling a diagnosis of the state of that organism at the instance of those traces. The organism develops, producing new limbs, new branches, new growths; all the while being in an ecological relationship with all other features of its environment. To the extent that this organism is essential for the continuance of this environment, and having such compounded and fundamental relations with all other features, its development must be regarded as a profound and intimate function of the whole. That these traces might be taken naively as enabling merely a diagnosis of the state of the single organism is question would amount to a trivialisation of our procedure, placing unacceptable limits on any diagnosis. [2]

The traces of that activity which is social anthropology, therefore, might enable an historian of academia to construct a history of the development of Social Anthropology (or of social anthropological thought) as a discrete and unitary discipline; but only at his peril. Rather, each statement (trace), whether sentence-length or book, is to be seen as occupying a locus of discursive relations; a nexus of linkages and connections, both intra- and inter-discursive field, which constitutes the proper instance for that particular discursive event (statement).

The Being of Social Anthropology evidences itself in the materiality of text. [3]. But do these material texts conceal the Being of Social Anthropology? A discipline is Being at rest in unconcealment. The repose of Being is sometimes defended by an appeal to those statements as the bearers of Truth. In such a fashion it is being emasculated; the
impetus of being (verb), and its capacity to overcome resistance, congeals as inertia. That inertia is the resistance presented by Being.

Yet Beings, in our case, disciplines, discursive fields, and statements, do not exist a priori. They come into Being, and this through the action of being (verb). "Being' names this 'that' as the decisiveness of the insurrection against nothingness." (Heidegger, 1973:1)

The considerable knowledge which constitutes the intelligibility of Being at once both obscures and evidences being. Being congeals and becomes lost in the 'true', and the Being of those statements which represent this truth become established authorities suppressing all insurrection. And this after their Being is established by a similar insurrection. The authority of Being thus represents a reactionary force. This is the power of inertia, the resistance of the mechanisms of the customary.

Having emerged through the activity of being, Being itself becomes an object for study. This constitutes the field of metaphysics: the largely complementary analyses of what a Being is and that a Being is. These analyses of whatness and thatness represent synchronic and diachronic studies respectively.

Such investigations should occupy our time no longer. We must learn to live with them and not allow ourselves to become concerned with them. The attraction of any investigation into Being is a function of the acceptance of the authority of Being. This authority is the guarantee of Truth regarding the products of such investigations into Being. As such a guarantor, Being might rest in the authority of its own Truth. Concerning investigations into Being, it has been possible for investigators arriving at different analytical results to exchange arguments, to demonstrate their validity, and 'to be right'. Such arguments over the whatness and thatness of Being have been articulated in an arena of theoreticism which we have since left. We are no longer preoccupied with such debates over our knowledge and the intelligibility of this authoritative Being, regarding all such 'knowledge' as obscuring the primitive force of being; that process of becoming, of coming into Being.

So that our concern lies rather with that very primitive force of becoming. We must be careful to ensure that our writings concerning this process of coming into Being are not confused with those writings of the metaphysician, who undertakes a diachronic survey in order to account for the fact that a 'Being' exists. The metaphysician's enquiry is possible only having first accepted the authority of that Being. That such an authority has been invested in Being, might be seen to present the most formidable obstacle in our path. The problem can thus be stated: to the extent that Being is attributed with actuality, as That wherein is situated Authority as the Guarantor of Truth, to that same extent is being denied its capacity for productive activity, and as Being occupies the locus of inertia.

"The activity of the actual can be limited to the capacity of producing a resistance." Whereas we note: the actual to be the completed act or product of an activity, by 'actual' we refer to that Being which is constructed at/s a node within the general text. Upon coming-into-Being, the
actual (as a crystallization of prior activity) provides a foundation for new beginnings; a material point of departure for subsequent discursive developments.

We are able to outline a certain ambiguity in Heidegger's statement that "The activity of the actual can be limited to the capacity of producing a resistance". How can the completed act, this end product of activity, which is Being (the 'actual' which has the 'thingness' of 'whatness' and 'thatness') how can this completed act be seen to exercise that activity which Heidegger credits it with?

"The capacity of producing a resistance"; but a resistance to what?

It was previously, if naively, suggested how Being is allocated a role as arbiter of the truth of successive statements. This we might take as the Authority of Being; as that completed Being which operates as the external criterion of validity for subsequent statements; thereby providing a security for the complacent.

In what other way might Heidegger's statement be read? Does the use of the term 'resistance' necessitate such a reactive reading?

Making reference to Edward Said's book, Beginnings, we note that for reasons of material significance there is a practical necessity to base each new beginning within the completed act of discursive Being. Only as a correlate to the accepted materiality of the customary can each beginning be said to have a material point of departure. "With its point of departure secure, each subsequent development is able to utilise the energy implicated in the completed act of Being by evoking a resistance to its own development. Hence Derrida in L'ecriture (1967:404)

"Thus we perceive force in recognizing the tension, the divided significance of any limiting boundary: as the enclosure of a homogeneous system of meaning and as the point which necessarily incites the transgression of that system."

and again, in De la grammaologie (1967:25)

"Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect and always perilous manoeuvres, risking constantly a relapse back into what ones intends to deconstruct, our task is to encircle the critical concepts with a prudent and scrupulous discourse, to note the conditions, the context, the limits of their effectiveness, to indicate in a rigorous manner their adherence to the mechanisms which they themselves will enable us to deconstruct."

It would appear that for Said, and to a lesser (if more obscure) degree, Derrida, the articulation and animation of these uncircumscribed systems depends upon the intentions of an author.

We should like Said to indicate more clearly whether his central notion of 'intention' refers to an author's intention to produce a foreseen end-product, or to an intention involving the production of difference, with no concern as to the results.
Does the author need to examine motives and intentions for producing particular differences, exciting certain resistances, perhaps unleashing certain destructive energies? Or does the responsibility lie within discourse itself? We need only note that, contrary to Enid Blyton, as caricatured by Joyce Grenfell, books do not "write themselves".

It does not appear to be straightforward, nevertheless. Jean-Pierre Faye certainly appears to place the responsibilities (and blame) within the procedures of discourse (language-field). Witness what he has to say (?) in a passage taken from his monumental monograph \textit{Languages Totalitaires}:

"Action follows on, is only possible within a 'language field' (un champ de langage). The semantic structures create an empty but prepared space, which political action must fill; or they can seal off other spaces of alternative political behaviour."

Reviewing Faye's book for the \textit{T.L.S.} (5 April 1974) an un-named critic had this to say:

"What rational sense can be attached to the proposition that it is 'the linked series of utterances' (les chaînes de l'enonciation) which has constituted the 'locus' (le lieu) in which, in advance, the Nazi murders were possible, justified, and accomplished?"

It would appear that for Faye the limits of our political action are established by the procedures of semantic structures within a 'language field'. What we should like to know, if our behaviour is so pre-determined, is what are the criteria to which these semantic structures appeal in deciding which 'semantic spaces' to create and which to 'seal-off'. It might well prove to be an instructive exercise to plot the beginnings and subsequent development of that discursive procedure which created the semantic space within which "the Nazi murders were possible, justified, and accomplished." But such an academic exercise would be as speculative as its arguments and associations would be tenuous. Like the statistician who relates the state of the United Kingdom 'balance of payments' to the average midnight temperature on the island of Muckle Flugga. What we would rather investigate are the control mechanisms, the several limitations on the 'acceptability' of various beginnings; the procedures whereby one potential development is selected and allowed to create its semantic space, whereas other discursive activities are, in some way, disallowed.

Two obvious and external criteria in relation to which a selection can be accomplished are, the availability of financial backing, and the presence of physical opposition or defence. In both cases it is the author with intention who is to be encouraged or otherwise. But by that time the initial selection has been made.

It seems as though from an infinite number of possible beginnings the author has selected the one he has selected. Why? We might be led into inquiring why the beginning selected by the author appeared to him 'more imperative' than the others.
(We recognise the importance of Derrida's warning:

"Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect and perilous manoeuvres, risking constantly a relapse back into what one intends to deconstruct,...")

This question is raised because I feel it demonstrates, quite adequately, the import of Derrida's warning, rather than that it presents a substantial problem. In any discursive development which aims at the deconstruction of a previous language field it is re-emphasised that the beginnings of such a development are given a material ground within the completed act of discursive Being; i.e. "(Within the enclosure itself", within the language field which is the object of that discursive development. But that language field is 'at once' the object of Deconstruction and the means by which that deconstruction will take place.

(Derrida: "...our task is to encircle the critical concepts (and) to indicate in a rigorous manner their adherence to the mechanisms which they themselves will enable to deconstruct.")

Hence the risk of a relapse "back into what one intends to deconstruct". We shall observe how the imperative question which might be answered only in the form of an explanation of why one discursive development rather than another constitutes (invites) such an opportunity for relapse.

Questions relating to the origins of Beings tend to be answered by making appeal to that (or those) being(s) which 'existed' prior to that Being under question. Thus appeal is made to concepts of causation and history; evidence is provided in order to situate this Being (existent) as the contemporary representative of an evolutionary or developmental process; as the effect of "ings (as cause).

But such questions are based upon the false assumption that phenomenological evidence of Being is of the primitive nature of Being; rather, it is proposed that prior to that evidence of Being, there is developed a necessity of Being. This necessity is referred to as the ground of Being. Hence Leibnitz: "Thus every possible being can be said to strive to exist."

Our question regarding the 'selection' out of possible discursive developments, now becomes directed towards the distinction between 'possibility' and 'necessity'. Why, from amongst the 'possibles' is one seen as 'necessary'; as representing the 'imperativeness of the structure'? In this we detect an echo of Foucault's criticism of linguistics; that having accepted a notion of e.g. grammatical competence, of an infinite number of immanent well-formed strings, no account is offered, nor as yet demanded, of why any one of these strings should be 'realised', should break through the 'threshold of materiality', rather than any other string. Appeals to contexts will not help as this simply implies a sub-language, the grammar for which retains a smaller, yet still infinite, competence.

As a generality we are able to state that the 'necessity' of Being (along with the possibility of Being(s)) is 'generated', rather, 'developed', by the activity of being, prior to the evidence of Being presented to the philosophical subject. And it is in this sense that we understand the concept of materiality.
A statement (which presupposes materiality) is an articulation of the ground. That ground is constituted by its contemporaneity with those relations which are produced by the articulation of the statement in its materiality. The statement does not fill a prepared space, neither does it represent the construction of a material edifice upon an area made fit beforehand. In this we might be seen to differ from Faye.

Yet we note that Faye claims that it is the 'semantic structures' which do the selection and this is certainly more in keeping with the general theme of this thesis. It is as though our category 'discourse' is, in some as yet obscure fashion, its own criterion of developmental advection; "that which within the 'general text' mechanisms operate which, in their own particular instance appear to exercise a power of veto and engender some function of necessity". Such a discourse is a process without criteria. We hear Foucault admonishing us to consider only those statements which have been articulated in their material instance. Foucault's admonition might be contrasted with Heidegger (1973:40) "What is possible previously determines what is real" and "soon they let this origin become completely forgotten". No effort must be wasted on determining which other 'acceptable' statements might have been articulated. Our concern is with statements and in using this term we assume materiality. Neither will it be of value to provide explanation, nor give reason, why one statement was articulated rather than other apparently possible, and what would appear, equally probable statements. Such an investigation would place us back in that area of metaphysics which was concerned with the provision of accounts of whatness and thatness. The fundamental importance of Heidegger's writings can thus be demonstrated in the subsequent writings of contemporary critics such as Derrida, Foucault, Faye, and Said.

We can perhaps summarise by saying that Being is the crystallisation of the activity of becoming-into-Being. This is equally the case whether we refer to the Being of a statement or to the Being of an academic discipline. We note further that the activity of 'becoming' is the proper sense of the verb 'being'. The completed act which is Being presents a resistance in two senses of the term. It can assume an Authority-of-Being (what is actual) regarded by some as the guarantor of Truth. In this it invites complacency and self-satisfaction to those who see themselves as in possession of the Truth. Yet it also provides that essential point of departure; that material resistance which provides a ground (Ur-grund) for new beginnings, for new activities of being.

If one were to credit discourse with an internal dynamic; regard it as exemplifying an 'organic', as opposed to an imposed 'technical', or analytic, form, then by analogy (or to the extent that 'society' is a variable, dependent upon discourse as a free variable), society must be recognised as containing its own dynamic. Humboldt and Heidegger both appear to identify the site of this linguistic (so. discursive) activity as the functioning of several declensions, in the sense of a falling away from a standard.

Yet by 'standard' there is no wish to imply a reference to some normative state situated in either a mythical or an historic past; nor yet to any theoretical category of 'language'.
On the contrary, though not immediately recognisable as such, by 'standard' I refer to an idealised state of affairs within discursive development; any synchrony (pace Saussure); any idealised stage represented by the relative positions of the pieces in Saussure's chess board analogy. However, contrary to Saussure, we propose that the 'value' (valeur) of any piece depends on the possible positions which that piece might occupy at its next move, and the state of the board which such a move might anticipate. Not that the state of the board at any moment in the game is a notion which might be ignored. Such an idealised 'state' we might take as representing that 'norm', or 'standard', which both Humboldt and Heidegger declared constitutes that from which these various declensions originate. Yet to accept this would constitute a compromise.

Again we recognise the true magnitude of Derrida's warning:

"Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect and perilous manoeuvres, risking constantly a relapse back into what one intends to deconstruct..."

(1967:25)

(It is as though the whole weight of argument conspires to urge us to take that prior theoretical category of 'language' as the normative, or standard, from which actual articulated linguistic performance deviates; we shall constantly be in danger of reverting back to that security offered to the complacent; for ever aware that that same Being which provides the necessary resistance to any departure will also provide both relief and accolade for those faint-hearted who either choose or are deceived into reposing in Truth's authority.)

Within linguistic studies, since Saussure, the distinction between la langue and la parole is generally accepted as being of the very nature of the object of linguistic study, viz. language. Coinciding with the acceptance of such a distinction has been the demand to regard la langue as the proper object of linguistic enquiry. Yet historical studies have tended to focus upon phonological matters, which, alongside both semantic and syntactic investigations, have been largely restricted to the comparison of two or more stages of development. Evidence for such development is gained upon a consideration of recorded linguistic performance, i.e. at the 'level' of la parole. There is no contradiction here, and it is necessary to demonstrate such.

The distinction between la langue and la parole is no more than a statement regarding the 'form' of any natural language.

It is a statement which is:

"...in itself independent of any experience. In itself, it says nothing at all about the possibility of its application and relation to experimental data. It includes no existence postulate. It constitutes what has been called a purely deductive system, in the sense that it may be used alone to compute the possibilities that follow from its premises."

(Hjelmslev, L:1953:8)
This distinction, between *la langue* and *la parole*, consists of the fewest and most general premises. In many ways it might be said to correspond to Chomsky's distinction between *competence* and *performance*. In that such a linguistic theory need make no reference to recorded linguistic performance there is good reason to suppose that any such linguistic theory is arbitrary. (ibid. 1953:8) Similarly Chomsky proposes a linguistic theory based only on such formal assumptions as he feels are necessary for the construction of an adequate grammar for any natural language. Contrary to the arbitrariness of both Saussure's and Chomsky's linguistic theory, a grammar (which is a theory of a particular language) must be appropriate, i.e. it must provide a sufficient account of: "all and only those utterances which a competent native speaker would recognise as being grammatically well-formed".

Many grammars might be constructed, and be sufficiently justified to the extend that they account for, not only those recorded sample data of *performance* (*la parole*), but also the competent native speaker's intuition of well-formedness (*la langue - competence*).

"In this sense, the grammar is justified on external grounds, on grounds of correspondence to linguistic fact." (Chomsky, 1965:27)

It is precisely in the matter of principles, of those 'fewest and most general premises'; to the extent that a grammar, as a theory of a particular language, is based upon those 'formal assumptions', that a grammar is said to be justified on internal grounds. A grammar which is justified on internal grounds must demonstrate its own possibility as reflecting or as deducible from those fundamental premises which constitute a linguistic theory.

It should not be necessary to point out that linguistic theories such as proposed by Saussure and Chomsky, which make statements regarding the nature of the object under investigation, and which are situated 'out of time', are timeless. It may not be so widely accepted that in theories of language such as composed by Saussure and Chomsky respectively, the categories of *la langue* and *competence*, are similarly ahistoric. This point was made by Hjelmslev:

"The calculation permits the prediction of possibilities, but says nothing about their realisation." (Hjelmslev, 1953:9)

and has been articulated more recently by Ardener:

"Such models are in themselves 'timeless', or neutral in regard to time - achronic." (Ardener, 1971:210)

So that, in no way, could it be said that *la parole* (*performance*) is but an element, or example, of *la langue* (*competence*). *La langue* (*competence*) comprises those lexical items, the set of rules allowing for their various combinations, and a device which will enable a semantic and phonetic representation of such combinations to be realised. *La parole* (*performance*) on the other hand, is precisely those realised representations.
To suggest, therefore, that a contradiction pertains between la langue and linguistic performance (la parole), evinces a misapprehension. La langue (compétence) and la parole (performance) are of a different order and thus not comparable in this fashion; the one is abstract and atemporal, the other is recordable as an event in an historical instance; on the one hand we might refer to a purely theoretical systematic, on the other hand we are confronted with a material, and hence, significant object. We must also bear in mind that statements which either constitute linguistic theories, or comment upon the same, are situated within the category la parole. We would feel more justified in situating the origin of the category la langue within la parole, than we would in seeking the grammatical 'history' of la parole within la langue

The acceptance of la langue as the proper object of linguistic enquiry, and the necessity of considering la parole when undertaking historico-comparative studies, does not constitute any contradiction. Such assumptions and procedures do raise various obstacles however, and, subsequently, these must be addressed. But the claim that there was a contradiction at issue here is discredited and we must conclude this aside and return to our main argument.

It will be remembered that we left unsolved those problems relating to the selection of particular discursive developments from amongst the plethora of possibilities. But to address ourselves to this problematic would be to surrender our effort, and to enjoy the satisfaction and compacency proper to those engaged in providing account of the metaphysical history of Being. Corresponding to our decision to consider only material statements, we must necessarily abandon those enquiries which aim to demonstrate what 'might have been said' in their place.

With the recent nullifying of the apparent contradiction engendered between the categories of la parole and la langue, our criticisms of Linguistics might be situated more specifically. Providing account of a purely theoretical and ahistorical systematic will, in no way, provide detail of the emergence of a statement in that material instance proper to it. Working within the boundaries set by such a timeless automaton, it is surely impossible to provide adequate account as to how its own phenomenal existence, and those theoretical categories proper to itself, came to emerge at that historical conjuncture at which it did.

A claim is made that discourse is the essential process of becoming-into-Being; that this process is the very nature of discourse. It has been proposed, however, that any discursive development requires a material point-of-departure in the Authority-of-Being. There appears to be yet another paradox here. If the essential nature of discourse is that of becoming-into-Being, where then is that Being which provides that point-of-departure, which is to be regarded as a function of the trace left by that discursive activity? We propose that discourse is the very activity of producing those traces which evidence that activity. There can be no discourse except it leaves a trace. (It is the elucidation of such traces in the subconscious, that constitutes the problematic of psychoanalysis. For example, see Derrida: 'Freud and the scene of writing'. In Y.F.S.) An 'understanding'
of the trace left behind by that activity constitutes the Being from which that development will proceed. The activity of writing, for example, is thus a constant-moving-away-from-Being; an articulation, which we regard as the corollary of the production of a trace, might be described as the attempt to escape that Being, which congeals immediately behind that activity. This constitutes a resistance, a tension, between the articulation (speaking or writing) and the becoming-into-Being. Like Lot's wife, a suspension of activity and a retrospective glance in search of verification, will precipitate a collapse of that tension which is the essential characteristic of that activity which is discourse, and will precipitate a calcification of that activity into Being.

NOTES.

1. By 'founding father' we simply refer to the one who occupied the site at which the development of being (verb) overcomes the resistance offered by the boundaries of that Being (noun). The impetus of the activity of being eventually necessitates, and so constitutes, an insurrection against the Authority of Being. This insurrection is energised from within that Being which it displaces. Institutions have the essential function of maintaining the Being of a discursive formation. Thus, no reference is made, nor implied, to any category of 'creative subject' or 'genius'.

2. A reference to homeopathic medicine. Contemporary medicine is concerned only to suppress individual symptoms, whereas the homeopathic practitioner considers the state of affairs of the patient as a whole.

3. Paul de Mann has this to say about history, a subject which we recognise as having much in common with social anthropology.

"To become good literary historians, we must remember that what we usually call literary history has little or nothing to do with literature and that what we call literary interpretation - provided only it is good interpretation - is in fact literary history. If we extend this notion beyond literature, it merely confirms that the bases of historical knowledge are not empirical facts but written texts, even if these texts masquerade in the guise of wars and revolutions."


4. Marxists have no difficulty in providing such accounts. For example:

"(I)t is clearly necessary to think the history of discursive events as structured by material relations embodying themselves in institutions."

Dominique Lecourt: Marxism and Epistemology; 1975:795.

5. There is, however, at least one major sense in which Chomsky's competence:performance couple differs from that of Saussure's la langue : la parole distinction. This difference evinces the historicity of the respective theories. Working within the volkgeist of late 19th.-early 20th. century France,
Saussure situated la langue in le consentement collectif, i.e. as a social fact. Chomsky, in an increasingly liberal, Post-War America, proposes that competence is a function of the individual's bio-chemical constitution.

6. It is worthy of note, however, that any theory of language (which is a theory of la langue, or competence) must be founded upon an initial consideration of linguistic performance. Thus, as a footnote to p.14 in Syntactic Structures, Chomsky writes: "Notice that to meet the aims of grammar,..., it is sufficient to have a partial knowledge of the sentences.... of the language, since a linguistic theory will state the relation between the set of observed sentences "and the set of grammatical sentences; i.e. it will define 'grammatical sentence' in terms of 'observed sentence,' certain properties of observed sentences, and certain properties of grammars. To use Quine's formulation, a linguistic theory will give a general explanation for what 'could' be in language on the basis of 'what is plus simplicity of the laws whereby we describe and extrapolate what is'. (W.V. Quine, 1953:54)"

Thus it can be argued that Chomsky offers us a 'performance' model, but of an extended type.

7. The qualification 'material' is here redundant, as by 'statement' we assume materiality.

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