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(c) Journal
The journal is published three times per year. Articles are welcome from students of anthropology and from people in other disciplines. It is preferred that the main emphasis should be on analytical discussion rather than on plain description. Papers should be as short as is necessary to get the point over. As a general rule they should not exceed 5,000 words. They should follow the conventions for citations, notes and references used in the A.S.A. monographs. Comments will also be welcome. Communications should be addressed to the Journal Editors, Institute of Social Anthropology, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

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The editors wish to apologise for the standard of proof-reading in the last issue, which was rather more hurriedly produced than we would have wished for. Thanks are due to Tim and Kathy Weiskl, who translated Mare Augé's paper, to Paul Dresch, and all those who have helped with the production of this issue.
If the problem of ideology is essential in current French anthropology, I think this is because it is resolved in two quite different ways by the neo-Nietzschean trend and by the Marxist trend. Unfortunately it is not clear that the Marxists give a very complete answer to the question which Deleuze, following Reich, is asking: Why do people want their repression, why have they desired fascism?

Insofar as these questions have to do with the problem of the efficiency of symbolism and, in a general way, of ideology, we might fear that they will give way to the idealistic trends which are always very strong in France. This fear is at the same time anthropological and political: the idealisation and the nostalgia for primitive societies and the condemnation of history (where the State, whatever its political forms, is presented as the awful but necessary end) involve reactionary political positions.

The Ideo-logic

By ideo-logic I mean the logical relationship arbitrarily established between the different sectors of representation in a given society or the whole set of syntagms expressed by the juxtaposition of numerous partial theories concerning the psyche, heredity, illness, work, etc. These syntagms are neither unlimited in number nor unsystematic. For example, among the Alladians of the Ivory Coast, I can say that the evil power (āwa) of an individual has attacked the life power (ē) of another individual of his matrilineage (etyoko) and that the malevolent nature of this power is illustrated by the robberies this individual has committed in the treasury of his matrilineage. But the transformation of one of the elements of the syntagm and the substitution of another element endangers the entire structure: I cannot speak of āwa to qualify a father-to-son relationship, or a son-to-father's heir relationship.

Thus, one can imagine all the possible representations in a given society as being made up of paradigmatic series bearing on the psychological powers of the individual, the components of the person, the different social dimensions, the different kinds of social activity, of economic activity, etc. Any one element of a paradigm cannot enter into relation with any other indiscriminately, and the whole set of syntagmatic relations thus defined, corresponds to the sum of possible interpretations of a given event.

The whole set of possible syntagms seems to me to compose, for each society, a conscious 'ensemble,' but it is always used for some specific purpose, therefore only for parts of the whole. A diagnosis never entails all the elements of the ensemble, but it cannot present the elements it has chosen haphazardly nor group together just any elements indiscriminately.

It is precisely this restriction which I would willingly call a 'syntactic limitation,' because it acknowledges grammatical rules, such as the rule of concordance, which makes my 'ideo-logic' function...
as an ideology. The restriction, or limitation, is threefold:

(a) the ideo-logic imposes interpretations along the lines of power which it has established;

(b) it imposes conditions for its own application; he who uses it without having the right or without being in a proper situation to do so, will find that it turns against him;

(c) it imposes social solutions for an individual's most private problems and these are codified according to his status.

With regard to lineage societies (but I think we must say the same of every type of social formation), ideology is never the reflection of the real social structure. For instance, representations touching on witchcraft do not invert the representations of the social order; this is a remark that we have to make in opposition to other analyses, including those of P.P. Rey. This implies that the social order too must itself be considered as an ensemble of representations. It does not need representations of the psyche, of the person, or of the gods to illustrate or justify itself. It is in its own right a representation; choice and idea. One can say the same of all of the orders of order (religious, political...); they all depend upon the initial choice (consensus or 'social contract') which cannot be historically situated, but which one cannot ignore without denying at the same time the coherence of an ideological whole which is not insignificant. The different orders of representations are not hierarchically classified one in relation to another, in the sense that one cannot say that some are simply a reflection of the others.

I would like to make myself clearer and for that purpose take the lagoon societies of the Ivory Coast as an example, and devote a few words to the phenomenon of the lineage as it appears in the local representations. In the language of each of the groups considered, there exists a word to designate an individual's matri-lineage; the lineage is the framework within which exploitation takes place and the lineage treasure is the point of encounter of all the most important prestations, eventually by means of certain 'conversions,' in Bohannan's terms. But other relations to the lineage exist, aside from that of incorporation in the strict sense, and other types of prestations than those which come into the lineage treasure along the lines of the lineage. More precisely, all types of relations correspond to a type of prestation. In these conditions, it may be possible to consider the social organization as a coordinated structure and not only as the addition to intra-lineage relations of other types of relations which may be empirically enumerated. The hypothesis set out here is that taking into account the economic reality, and more precisely the distribution of produce (produced goods), engenders a unified structure. Current anthropological literature is trying to rethink the problem of lineage structure, in order to get away from the circular causality built up by functionalism. It is clear, notably, that the notion of bi-lineal descent does not take into account all the aspects of
the structure of kinship relations in the societies of patrilineal or matrilineal type. In Rethinking Anthropology, E. Leach criti-
cizes Meyer Fortes for his empirism and tries to substitute an
opposition of incorporation/affinity for the pair descent/comple-
mentary filiation. According to him the former distinction would
be more general and could be found at other levels, for instance
in the notion of the person or in the characteristics of the
political system. He tries to delineate an object which is proper
for anthropological research, to define a problem of which the
local oppositions between certain types of descent, certain types
of alliance and certain types of residence, would only be particular
expressions. It is not very different from Rey who, speaking as a
Marxist and drawing from Congolese examples, thinks that he has
found more fundamental relations underlying what he calls the
'language' of kinship relations, which would be those of men living
together and working on the same piece of land, and which would
express the dominant relation of production in the lineage system.
However, independently of other criticisms that we could formulate
concerning these two attempts, we must state that Leach does not
reject the notion of a purely specular relation between 'vertical'
levels (the distribution of 'mystical' influences reflects on the one
hand, the definition of relations of descent and affinity, and on
the other, relations of authority), and Rey sees in the theory of
malevolent powers an inverse projection of social relations of
production.

Speaking of the theory of psychic power as a metaphysical
expression of economic relations, among lagoon people, I have tried
to establish a correlation between the economic categories ('recip-
rorcity' - 'exploitation') and the 'mystical' categories ('beneficent'
and 'malevolent'), thus underlining the structured character of
the economic-metaphysical relations in the lagoon people's repre-
sentations. But, in the same way that the 'malevolent' and the
'beneficent' categories can be decomposed, in the discourses which
are in fact pronounced, into different 'powers' (beneficent or
malevolent, positive or negative) which act on the different
components of the person (the shadow, the blood and the flesh) in
the framework of certain social relations (matrilineage, paternal
matrilineage, patrilineage), the categories of 'exploitations' and
even 'reciprocity' are detailed in different forms of distribution
(direct prestations, indirect prestations, exchanges) corresponding
to distinct activities (individual fishing in the sea, fishing in
the lagoon fisheries, manufacture of salt, farming...) which them-
selves refer to social relations. These social relations may thus be
considered from two points of view, according to whether one
considers them as units of production or as channels of distribution.
As soon as one considers the means of production (objects of work
and means of work), one can in fact envisage different forms of
production, but these forms are not unlimited since they are derived
from the natural conditions of production, from the local ecology.
Thus at the same time, forms of production, insofar as they depend
on natural constraints, are a part of the material infrastructure
and insofar as they depend on an intellectual choice, they are as
arbitrary as all representation which accompanies the institutions
and rules of a given society. Two series may be taken into
consideration: the first (natural conditions - ecology - means of
production - forms of production) corresponds to the totality of the material conditions of production; the second (forms of production - forms of social organisation - metaphysical and religious forms) defines a coherent system of representations which includes forms of production. It is the expression of a tripartite problem in the sense that it confronts three types of relations: a relation to matter (the relation of men and nature), a human relation (the relation of a man to nature and to other men), and a social relation (the relation of men to each other). These relationships are related to one another by a syntactic logic of representations of the person and the society, but which integrate economic relations as well. Once it is admitted that the material conditions of production in the lagoon country require the use of individual techniques (sea fishing and fishing in the lagoon) or collective techniques (lagoon fisheries, or the exploitation of palm tree plantations) the choice of matrilineage, of the paternal compound or of the age grade as units of production is as arbitrary as the definition of these same social units. The case is the same with the modes of distribution: direct exploitation may be characteristic of an intralineage relationship, and not of an interlineage relationship. Individual exploitation, inversely, characterises the father-son relation as a relationship of affinity; the exchange (in different forms) characterises only the father-son relationship.

If one admits that the coherence of the different systems of representation is not of a specular order, but that it is of a syntactic order - the possible agreements, in the grammatical sense of the term, among the different elements of the various systems define and set out the limits of what is possible or probable - one can take into consideration the economic factor while defining the social structure and defining all the individuals (or status) in relation to a given lineage as a differential whole of categories of prestation.

Such an analysis introduces doubt as to the idea of the dominance of kinship in a lineage society. To affirm this dominance has no more sense than to affirm that of any of the other orders of representation within the ideology. The kinship relations function as relations of production, as Maurice Godelier says, but the reverse is also true: kinship relations and relations of production enter into the same syntactic logic which integrates all the other elements of representation too. Nevertheless what is important is that Godelier says that the distinction between infrastructure and superstructure has nothing to do with a distinction between institutions but applies to different functions which every institution can assume in turn, according to the particular social and historical conjuncture.

The more or less complementary themes of culture and ideologies constitute at the present time a place of convergence, with more or less unclear boundaries, for reflections are being carried out in social anthropology, ethnopsychiatry and political sociology. This convergence poses problems of definition with theoretical implications (concerning for example the terms of 'ideology' and 'culture', 'model' and structure'). The question is for me to define as precisely as possible the theoretical status of the notion
of ideo-logic and, beyond that (but this is another problem), to understand the significance or the possible directions of the actual transformations of the different systems that make it up - transformations which are not all equally a simple expression of the conjuncture, but of which some appear as the product of a deliberate will. Even though they may be products of an historical situation, certain men may be tempted to create their history with lucidity; in the Ivory Coast for instance the constitution of a class of great landed proprietors is systematic. But the changing of men's souls is also currently on the programme.

* * *

If one pays some attention to the manner in which the questions concerning the realm of representations and values are approached from different theoretical points of view, one realizes that they have resulted in three types of formulation: the first corresponds to the question of homogeneity or of heterogeneity, of the coherence or diversity of the body of representations in a given society. It concerns notably the relation between the Marxist conception of ideology and the anthropological conception of culture. The second opposes two types of comprehension of ideological phenomena: the first is concerned with their structure and considers them as instruments of knowledge and communication, the second takes into account their economic and social functions. This type of comprehension concerns in particular the opposition of the Durkheimian analysis and the Marxist analysis of religious phenomena. The third formulation concerns the question of the totality of the system of representation of a given society, and is interested in its exact nature: is it an 'empirical' structure (an arrangement of the facts themselves), an indigenous model or the model of the observer making manifest an unconscious structure? I shall deal here only with the first two formulations, in relation to which I shall try to situate the notion of ideo-logic.

The problem of ideology is studied by N. Poulantzas when he deals with the relation between the capitalist state and ideologies. In the introduction to his attempt to define a Marxist conception of ideologies, he criticizes the conception which is centred on a subject: those of the young Marx and of Lukacs, which insofar as they attempt to define a 'conception of the world' are close to Weber's theories and those of functionalism. For them 'the overall social structure is, in the last analysis, considered as the product of a subject-society, creator, in a very finalist way, of certain values or social aims...'. With Lukacs, as with Gramsci, who believes that a 'hegemonic' class can become the 'subject-class' of history and, by a phenomenon of ideological impregnation, provokes the 'active consent' of the dominated classes, the relative coherence of the ideological universe is possible. Poulantzas does not radically contest this coherence but objects that 'the dominant ideology not only reflects the conditions of life of the dominating class as a pure subject, but also the concrete political relation, in a social formation, between dominating classes and dominated classes.' Thus the dominant ideology can be impregnated with elements 'deriving' from the 'way of life' of classes or fractions other than the dominant class or fraction. This aspect of things
can be related to structural discrepancies on the chronological plane - a dominant ideology imbued with the way of life of a dominant class is capable of remaining dominant even when the class itself no longer dominates. Poulantzas finally refuses all conceptions of ideology which relate it to an historical subject class and he disputes the notion of hegemony (Gramsci) in which the problem of the political organization of a class 'appears to be related to the constitution of a conception of the world, which this class imposes upon the whole of the society.' For Poulantzas, one can interpret the structure of the dominant ideology by looking not at 'its relations with a class conscience,' but at the 'unique field of class struggle.'

Thus Poulantzas proposes a conception of ideology very near to that of Althusser in *For Marx*, where he states that the relation which theories constitute is both real and imaginary, or rather that it is a real relation of the men to their life conditions transmuted into an imaginary one.

One can see that the question of the coherence of ideology is at the very heart of Marxist thinking, but the nature of this coherence (sometimes related to that of a class, sometimes related to the real/imaginary continuum typical of one given society) is in itself problematic. In the analyses of Althusser and Poulantzas it is, more precisely, the nature of the 'social/imaginary' which is the problem.

For Althusser and Poulantzas, recourse to a real/imaginary determination does not exclude the fact that different elements of the ideology of a social formation may be related to distinct classes - the concepts of displacement and domination, in a given situation, of one part of the ideology over the other are, in this case, very clear. For cultural anthropology, each society is marked by its own cultural particularity; ethno-psychiatry vigorously opposes the idea of reducing humanity to absolute cultural diversity. But even as it asserts the existence of a culture and a psyche, it recognizes the structural diversity of each culture. What is the relation between the Marxist notion of ideological domination and the anthropological notion of the identity or diversity of culture? A first answer would place culture along side of homogeneity and 'primitive' societies, reserving ideology for class societies. A specific type of society would distinguish itself from others by its ideological harmony (its 'culture'). One could think of this harmony as reflecting another and as referring to a characteristic social homogeneity of less differentiated societies. Only the representation of these societies (in particular their religions) would merit an analysis of the Durkheimian type which treats religion as a language and considers the sociology of religion as a branch of the sociology of knowledge, without posing the problem of the social or economic functions of ritual and religious systems.

Pierre Bourdieu is not far from adopting such a view in a very interesting article on the genesis and structure of the field of religion. His beginning argument nonetheless situates him in a perspective opposite to Durkheim's, whose efforts to
give an empirical foundation to Kantian a-priorism appear to him as the forerunner of the structuralist endeavour. Bourdieu underlines the fact that the interest in myths and collective representation as 'structured structures' leads one to ignore their power to organize (give structure to) the world. Semiology, he says, deals implicitly with all symbolic systems as simple instruments of communication and knowledge (a postulate which is not legitimate except at the phonological level of language). This sciences also proposes to treat as most important in each object the theory of consensus which is implied in the prime importance conferred on the question of meaning and which Durkheim states explicitly in the form of a theory of the function of logical and social integration of 'collective representations' and, in particular, of the 'forms of religious classification...'

In fact, Durkheim insists in the Elementary Forms of Religious Life on the simultaneous need of moral and intellectual conformism of all societies.

Giving prime importance to the question of meaning is to run the risk of eliminating the importance of social, political, or economic functions of the religious systems, says Bourdieu. It is at the price of a radical doubt as to the existence of a relation between symbolic systems and social structures that Levi-Strauss, according to Bourdieu, can approach religious discourse as an intellectual system - at the same time leaving out its function as protector of social order. Bourdieu, who asserts the necessity of a double interpretation of the religious fact, finds in Weber (in agreement with Marx in establishing that religion serves this end of conservation), the means of conciliating the two points of view which both forget the existence of religious work performed by specialists who meet the demands of social groups by elaborating discourses and practices. It is in this 'historical genesis of a group of specialized agents,' among other, that Weber finds 'the foundation of the relative autonomy which Marxist tradition grants to religion without drawing all the conclusions.' Bourdieu is not far from thinking that this interpretation is valid only for societies where the specialists of religion are tied to one or several social classes.

However, is there not a paradox in treating the 'least differentiated' societies in a special manner, when it is precisely in this type of society that one finds systems of representation where scientific theory, moral and civil codes, politics, and economy are the most interrelated? It is truly a case of inter-relation of explicit and manifest relations, not only of implication of latent functions. Is it not also in the 'least differentiated' societies, as Bourdieu says, that the products of the 'anonymous and collective work of successive generations' have a definite tendency to complexity and differentiation? A word, hardly uttered, is full of meaning, and this meaning is conveyed in psychological, social, political, and economic discourse, united by the demands of a unique syntax. But meaning also accompanies silence; the spoken word, in its context, takes charge of the unspoken words for which it is a kind of metaphorical equivalent. It is because there are words which cannot be spoken (except in a
crisis) that everything can be significant. The law of silence is the art of the spoken word. Prudence imposes the use of metaphorical or metonymic detours; prudence, but also a sense of efficiency: no discourse is better heard than that which is not spoken, which underlines the words actually spoken. And the complicity is all the more deep (and tacit) as the relation is more hostile and apparent. If Levi-Strauss in *Tristes Tropiques* describes writing as a source of enslavement, it does not follow that the spoken word is a source of equality. The coherence of the ideo-logic does not correspond to any social homogeneity.

The ambivalence is in the discourse as well as in the social practice. Thus the theory of powers, developed in lineage societies, addresses itself to those of whom it does not speak, since it speaks from 'the eldest' to 'the junior', but it means in this way that the standards of some are not those of all. Its message is implicit, sometimes allusive, but it is perceived. The image of the father, as we have already mentioned, is simultaneously given and perceived as gratifying and menacing; but this ambivalence is perceived and is related to the double role of the father. One can say the same, mutatis mutandis, of the image of the witch, powerful and feared, or marginal and condemned. The ideo-logic furnishes all possible commentaries for all events and types of conduct. In this regard it reminds one of the 'silent discourse,' pronounced 'on the same level as the practices' which defines culture according to R. Establet. At this point, one could be tempted to admit, along with Poulantzas, the equivalence of the notions of ideology and culture (or to state that the first embodies the other), and to say that culture as well as ideology has the function of 'obsuring the real contradictions, of reconstituting, on an imaginary basis, a relatively coherent discourse, which serves as a guide line for men to live by.'

But this imaginary is in fact real: the coherence of the ideo-logic discourse is defined by the coherence of those discourses which can be pronounced. The ideo-logic is not the projection of contradictions, it is in reality their description. We have seen that in relation to the terms of reference chosen in the initial paradigm and in relation to the speaker, all the syntagmatic combinations were not possible. The ideo-logic sets the boundaries of what is possible in order to indicate what is impossible. In its own logic contradictory things may be possible (one and the same event can be caused 'a priori' by contradictory phenomena) but never at the same time and together: successive and contradictory interpretations are always possible. The ideo-logic does function as an ideology insofar as one can define it as a practice and not only as a commentary. The event is interpreted and implies a reaction; the decision is made and is executed only on the basis of patterns of interpretation offered and imposed by this logic. The ideology would thus be the ideo-logic (or the culture) in action.

But from this perspective, is the distinction which Poulantzas, following Establet, suggests between two important meanings of culture, pertinent? I don't think so. Establet calls attention to the fact that 'culture,' according to Linton and Herskovitz, does not have a specific field of application and is distributed
throughout the whole of a social formation. He recommends applying the term culture only to those values which dictate practice. But if we define ideo-logic as at the same time both a language and a practice, functioning for that reason as an ideology, we no longer have to try to distinguish between a field of social structure and a field of ideological representations or between 'relations of power' and 'relations of meaning,' according to Bourdieu and Establet.

Insofar as we can define the ideo-logic as a language and a practice we can, I think, disagree with Rancièr's objection to Althusser. Rancièr argues that Althusser, speaking of ideology as an element indispensable to the historical continuity of human societies, excludes thinking of ideology as the locus of contradiction. I suggest that, in fact, Durkheim's and Marx's points of view are not contradictory. Perhaps it is because we have to think simultaneously of individuals and of society that we need a theory of ideology in general. There is not a dominant ideology; every ideology is dominant but there is no more than one ideology in one social formation. That is not to say that it is impossible to find in the text of ideology all the elements of contradiction that social tensions or class struggle have imported. Even in social anthropology we have means for these kinds of contradictions: rebellion, inversion, ambiguity. We must think of all these notions not only (or not at all) from a functionalist point of view (according to which every negative element is in the end positive) but also from a 'syntactic' one. Where ideology is ambiguous, it means simultaneously a latent opposition and an actual designation of roles. It is not everybody who can speak, but ideology speaks of everybody - from the dominant point of view of course. The dominant must, however, take into account the problem and demand of the dominated, so as to integrate them, or to try to integrate them, eventually to 'situate' them (and admit for instance that some revolutionary ideas are the result of specific jobs or roles). From a revolutionary perspective the problem is to undermine ideology in general, not to create a single ideology.

Marc Augé

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Bibliography

This paper is a structural sketch of the joker figure as he appears in various representations. Whether he takes on the shape of a mythical or folkloristic figure, or is incarnated as a professional entertainer, some very basic similarities are present, such as his ambiguous nature and, consequently, his mediating potential. We shall in the course of the exposition point to such similarities, and to some of the transformations that take place between the actual manifestations.

The cast includes the trickster, the clown, and the court jester, but first in order of appearance is the culture hero.

The Culture Hero

It may not be an obvious choice to classify mythical culture heroes as 'jokers'; the culture hero is not usually conceived of as a funny figure. Our classification is, however, based on the fact that he may be said to fulfill the same role in the cultural system as does the joker in a pack of cards: he can complete any set and finish any game; he brings fire when that is lacking to complete a human setting, or he brings and blesses weapons where these are needed in defense of the cultural game.

The culture hero is able to play King as well as Queen, yet he remains the Joker. The source of his creative powers is not to be sought in any ambiguity of his person; it is found in the fact that he occupies an ambiguous position in the myths of creation. His creativity is thus extrinsic to his person, he is a complete being in himself, and in that sense he is divine. We should note at this point that the kind of creation in which the culture hero is involved is not so much a beginning as it is a transition. It is a transformation from an amorphous, non-human condition to a well known, well formed living reality. Since the culture hero operates with and in transition, he is usually distinguished from an unambiguous creator-god. He is divine but he makes things this-worldly and so secures social reality. From one angle he must be regarded as the cultural being par excellence, from another angle he is God (which in a Durkheimian frame of reference amounts to much the same anyway).

As a mythical figure the culture hero is of worldwide distribution. In so far as we may say that all myths are myths of origin (i.e. they deal with contemporary conditions which are said to have originated under specific circumstances in illo tempore), it is not surprising that the distribution of the culture hero as a cultural joker-transformer should be extensive. Reading one's way for example through the Mythologiques of Levi-Strauss (1964-71) involves a constant encounter with American variants of this figure. We shall here take as our example the Indonesian character Panji; the attributes given to him and the total setting in which he plays his role are aptly documented by Rassers (1959). Panji possesses all the qualities of a culture hero: he is the bringer of cultural goods, the divine mediator on earth. Apparently Panji suffered a kind of degradation in the course of the evolution of the cosmological system; once he embraced sky and earth but now his earthly nature seems to be the most stressed. However, 'upon closer examination we see that in his human form he was god all the same' (p. 296). This may be taken as evidence to the point made above that the culture hero remains the same, only his position changes. It was this fact which originally made us classify the culture hero as a joker: He is a figure who possesses (indeed is)
an admission card to any trick, yet he need not be either tricky or funny by himself. This permanence through transition is reflected in the fact that he is unequivocally an apotheosis of the social.

In the case of Panji he is a symbol of the patrilineal principle, the supreme male ancestor. A consideration of Panji's close connection with the Javanese kris may illustrate this feature and also provide some clues to the significance of Panji in the everyday life of the Javanese people. The kris, which is a kind of dagger, is a mystical object, but it certainly has a very real importance through the peculiar role it plays in the life of the individual man and of the community as a whole. It was invented and first worn by Panji, who also invented the Javanese theatre; the genetic relationship between the Wayang shadow play and the kris is owed to the fact that they are 'children of the same father' (p. 220). In passing we should like to note that Panji also created the Gamelan orchestra, thereby ensuring the percussion to accompany the transition, i.e. the creation of socio-cultural values (cf. Needham 1967). The kris is the only weapon that Panji will handle, and in fact most of his supernatural powers are vested in the kris as the powers of the Norse Thor were vested in his hammer.

Panji stories are also dramatized and form part of the performances of the Wayang shadow plays, the scene of which coincides with the men's house. When a blacksmith makes a kris, as he often does since every man is supposed to possess one, the smithy is for the purpose ritually transformed into the same kind of scene. The workshop of the kris smith and the area within which the adventures of Panji should be acted are essentially the same' (Rassers 1959:225). In an abstract sense the kris is an emblem of the whole community, being a metonymic representation of Panji. But the kris is also a very real object. It is individually owned, and it must be shaped in accordance with the character of its owner; any one kris will not suit any man. It follows that a man has an intimate relationship with his kris; not only does it make him complete culturally, some will add a physical dimension, too, by regarding the kris as replacing the left rib that man is supposed to be in lack of. The kris is a materialization of the eternally living culture hero himself, and through the possession of this dagger, made in 'the house of Panji', a man becomes one with his divine ancestor.

Panji is decidedly a male ancestor, and the kris is unequivocally a male symbol, it is the masculine goods par excellence. The female counterpart of Panji is named Dewa Sri who is the spinner of cloth, the principal female goods. The front of the Javanese house is devoted to the male principles, notably Panji, while the inner part is female. Paradoxically the family kris'ees are kept in the inner part of the house, so we note that though sexually unambiguous the kris - and hence Panji - may occupy different positions in the sex-symbolic universe. The joker can play both King and Queen, as it were.

In general, the Indonesian reality is a beautiful example of the congruence between the social, the symbolic, and the cosmological to the extent that it becomes almost meaningless to maintain the distinction between these spheres. In the case of Panji he certainly mediates such analytical categories since he encompasses the individual's experience of past and present, here and there, self and others, human and god in a simultaneity. This is the supreme power of the joker as culture hero. He does the trick.
The Trickster

We shall start this section by mentioning some transformations that take place from culture hero to trickster. In the first place we note that where the culture hero is an apotheosis of the cultural human being, the trickster is a humanization of sacred cosmological values. The diacritical feature of the trickster as opposed to the culture hero is that of his intrinsic ambiguity. He is both human and animal, man and woman, good and bad. This is clearly in contrast to the 'complete' being of the culture hero. The trickster is a tricky one, whereas the culture hero completes a trick. In terms of creation (i.e. transition) we see the trickster embodying the transition itself while the culture hero brought it about. The culture hero moves from the other world to this world with a strong personal integrity while the trickster stands with one leg in each world, integrating their aspects into one person. It is a permanent transience as opposed to the transitive permanence of the culture hero.

It is by virtue of his intrinsic ambiguity that the trickster is always a source of laughter. In his very figure universes collide continuously, and this collision of universes entails the humorous effect (Milner 1972). In some societies, notably the Amerindian and Indonesian, the trickster is also a mediator between social spheres in the sense that he mediates the opposites of the dual social organization. This latter point becomes pertinent in relation to the Winnebago trickster who is one of the best documented tricksters of all (Radin 1956).

The Winnebago word for trickster is wakdjunkaga which is taken to mean 'the tricky one', but this is in all probability just an inference from a proper name since there is no etymological, or comparative, evidence that it should 'really' mean this (p. 132). The surrounding tribes name him differently, and there are between these other names clearly etymological connections. For the present purpose we shall only mention the Dakota name, ikto-mi which means spider. This is a striking equivalent to the name of the Zande trickster which is Ture, also meaning spider (Evans-Pritchard 1967:20). Evans-Pritchard records an informant telling that 'the character has the name Ture because he was so clever, like the spider which can make a web out of itself' (ibid: 23).

This is a powerful image. The trickster-spider makes a web from intrinsic sources, but these creative powers do not ensure him against being a captive of his very own web. The suspension is also a trap; this is part of the joke. Spiders are ambiguous animals, and tricksters are spiders in this sense. Their ambiguity entails a certain kind of classificatory danger, and as Leach (1964) has pointed out the typical reaction to taboo categories can either be joking or refusal of recognition. In the case of the trickster joking prevails. He is certainly a funny character, and the humanization of the cosmological values and problems he represents occasions relief and laughter where confusion and terror might have dominated. This mediating function is apparently also carried out in the animal manifestations of the figure, as demonstrated by Levi-Strauss' discussion of the logic of myth on the basis of American tricksters' transformation into coyote and raven (1955). Even transplanted into alien cultural settings the humorous properties of the trickster persist, which again lends evidence to the point that the trickster's joking potential is intrinsic to him, as opposed to that of the culture hero whose joker job is done by a change of position rather than a switch of attributes.
Even though we are able to conceive of the culture hero and the trickster as opposed in various ways we should not overlook the similarities that also exist. Both figures are 'mythical', or at least they belong to an oral (and sometimes to a literary) tradition. The personifications are not of the material world, and in fact they belong to the same level of collective representations to the point where they may even conflate; the trickster and the culture hero are sometimes just 'aspects' of one and the same named character. The Zande trickster is a case in point. He is mainly a trickster with all that this involves in terms of inherent ambiguity etc., but he can also act as a culture hero: in the first three tales (Evans-Pritchard 1967) he brings food, water, and fire, respectively. Panji, the Javanese culture hero, may act as a trickster as well, and we find a still better documented merging of the distinct personae among the Winnebago and related tribes; the Hare figure here combines both aspects to the extent that he defies labelling as either trickster or culture hero (Radin 1956).

Even if the particular joker characters may conflate in specific instances, we shall like to keep the categories of trickster and culture hero distinct. This is of course related to our method of presentation upon which we shall make some comments in the concluding paragraph.

As a genre of narrative the trickster tales are distinct, too. In relation to a brief consideration of Propp's Morphology of the Folktale Evans-Pritchard notes that 'it might be said that there is only one theme in the Ture tales, that of the trick' (1967:32), and this theme is acted out in a variety of plots and incidents. The theme is universal, also when considered in a more truly 'structural' way in terms of transformations, oppositions, and mediations, yet the gallery of persons and incidents are culture specific. Despite the common theme - the trick - there is an interesting difference between the Winnebago trickster stories and the Zande tales. The Winnebago stories, namely, built up a cycle, whereas the Zande tales do not. It is difficult to tell, Evans-Pritchard states, which of the Zande stories are versions and which are different tales because they are told in a rather haphazard manner. This should be seen in relation to the apparently more 'sacred' character of the Winnebago trickster stories; they can only be narrated by certain people who have the right to do so, whereas every Zande may tell the Ture stories, provided the sun has set. The comparison indicates that the Wakdjunkaga stories of the Winnebago are closer to the category myth than are the Ture stories which would rather be classified as folktales. Such a classification is not only based upon a consideration of relative sacredness, since this is always somewhat dubious; it is also, and especially, founded upon stylistic features. The Zande tales are told to children as bedtime stories, and they will as a matter of course be provided with a fixed ending, which is a characteristic of the (more literary) tradition of folktales. Although a piece of nonsense in relation to the story itself, the definitive ending fixes the story in time and space, a feature not found in myths. The genres to some extent overlap, but we should note the differences of our particular examples since they are matched by differences in the actual content of the stories. The Wakdjunkaga stories are in the main constructed upon stronger oppositions than are the Ture tales, the former being primarily universal and cosmological, the latter comparatively moral and local (cf. Levi-Strauss 1960:134). Naturally, a number of the oppositions found in the Winnebago trickster stories must be local as well, but the overall concern of the narratives is still of a more culture transcending nature than is that of the Zande tales.

We shall therefore rely for our main example of the trickster's mediating and joking capacities on the Winnebago material, and we shall relate briefly two of the Wakdjunkaga plots since these so admirably provide some clues to the trickster's tour in the joker's cycle. First
there is the battle of right and left: Trickster had killed a buffalo and was engaged in the process of skinning it, making use of his right arm.

"In the midst of these operations suddenly his left arm grabbed the buffalo. 'Give that back to me, it is mine! Stop that or I will use my knife on you!' So spoke the right arm. 'I will cut you into pieces, that is what I will do to you', continued the right arm. Thereupon the left arm released its hold. But shortly after, the left arm again grabbed hold of the right arm. This time it grabbed hold of his wrist just at the moment that the right arm had commenced to skin the buffalo. Again and again this was repeated. In this manner did Trickster make both his arms quarrel. The quarrel soon turned into a vicious fight and the left arm was badly cut up. 'Oh, oh! Why did I do this? Why have I done this? I have made myself suffer!' The left arm was indeed bleeding profusely." (Radin 1956:8)

Obviously, when considering that the Winnebago have a dual organization, the right-left opposition can be seen to be a local fight, but the more universal symbolic load of this pair is also well known and well documented (Needham 1973).

As the fight between right and left took place within Trickster, so is also another opposition, the male/female, embodied in his person: It was getting towards winter, and Trickster was looking for a place to live comfortably during the hard times together with his 'younger brothers', the fox, the jaybird, and the nit. Trickster said

"Listen. There is a village yonder, where they are enjoying great blessings. The chief has a son who is killing many animals. He is not married yet but is thinking of it. Let us go over there, I will disguise myself as a woman and marry him. Thus we can live in peace until spring comes.' 'Good!' they ejaculated. All were willing and delighted to participate.

Trickster now took an elk's liver and made a vulva from it. Then he took some elk's kidneys and made breasts from them. Finally he put on a woman's dress. In this dress his friends enclosed him very firmly. The dresses he was using were those that the woman who had taken him for a racoon had given him. He now stood there transformed into a very pretty woman indeed. Then he let the fox have intercourse with him and make him pregnant, then the jaybird and, finally, the nit. After that he proceeded toward the village." (Radin 1956:22-23)

He was eventually married to the chief's son and gave birth to three sons in succession. Of course the trickery could not go on, and when the true identity of the chief's son's wife was finally revealed, 'the men were all ashamed, especially the chief's son (ibid:24). Trickster, the fox, the jaybird, and the nit then fled from the village, and Trickster went to live with the woman to whom he was really married and by whom he had a son; and for a while he settled down to live an ordinary family life.

These two stories are abundant illustrations of Bastide's point about the semantic richness of the trickster figure as well as of laughter in general (1977).

By way of concluding this section we shall argue that it is useful to make a firm analytical distinction between the trickster as a character in specific narratives and the trickster seen as a
category. As a category the trickster is a distinctive manifestation of the joker, a humorously ambiguous creature, a cosmological buffoon. As a character he is far less distinct, to the extent that particular representations may mediate the categories. We have already mentioned the merging of trickster and culture hero in the Winnebago Hare figure, and it seems that Radin's problems of deciding where in the North American Indian myths he encounters a trickster, and where a culture hero stem from the fact that he does not distinguish between character and category. As far as the North American Indian mythology in general is concerned we should probably have to be content to label the various characters 'trickster-fixer-transformer-hero' (Ricketts 1966) and in each case find out what aspects are prevalent. But for wider structural comparisons we find it more helpful to single out the categorical elements of trickster and culture hero as we did in the beginning of this section by listing a number of inversions that take place from one category to the other.

The Clown

Having considered the culture hero and the trickster as joker figures belonging to certain kinds of narratives we shall now proceed to take a look at jokers in flesh and blood, and we shall start with the clown.

The terminological conflation that was found in respect to culture heroes and tricksters almost becomes a confusion when clowns are considered. We find 'clowns' in circuses, in the theatre, and in rituals, but we are left in doubt as to what are the features that justify the assignment of the label clown to them all. Ortiz (1969) in his analysis of Tewa cosmology speaks of the ritual obligations of ceremonial clowns but leaves us wondering what, for instance, such clowns look like, or how, and why, and if, they are funny; at the same time he repudiates others for sticking the label clown to characters which are not, according to him, clowns at all (p. 77). Ritual clowns are frequently reported from other groups in the American southwest as well, but we shall here concentrate on clown figures as they are found at occasions of rather more plain entertainment. Our point of departure, then, will be a conception of the clown as being a comic figure in some kind of public performance who fools about and jokes, usually, at the expense of his fellow performers and/or himself. The clown is funny, however, primarily because he is a clown and not so much because he performs in a circus or a theatre. As in the case of the trickster the comic potential of the clown can be said to lie in qualities intrinsic to his person.

Peacock's study (1968, 1971) of Javanese popular drama provides a case in which the role of the clown must be understood - much like that of the trickster - as that of a cosmological joker. Although the Javanese ludruk plays are concerned, on a surface sociological level, with the class antagonism, Peacock (1971:57) points out that the actions of the clown can only be appreciated by reference to cosmological categories: by his comments the clown - in the shape of a servant in the play - effects a collision of the cosmological categories adat and kaser ('elite' and 'folk'), and madju and huna ('progressive' and 'conservative'). The clown's marginal position and mediating capacity is stressed over and over again in the plays:

"The clown is an outsider to the story-society whose categories he reveals. In the stories the clown plays a celibate, familyless, infantile, orally-focused, age-less servant in a society whose citizens marry, form families, act grown-up, are genitally-focused, and age... The clown's spatial domain is the stage's..."
edge, where he is an onlooker to the stage-citizens living their lives in the center" (ibid:161)

The European tradition of the clown took its shape during the Renaissance, in the Italian Commedia dell'Arte, the popular comedy in which a number of stock characters to a certain extent improvised over a series of skeleton plots. The plots are not unlike those of the Javanese ludruk plays. In addition to the young lovers and a couple of old men who, frequently in their capacity of father or husband of the heroine, presented obstacles to the love affair, the plays invariably featured two or more comic servants or zanni who were so to speak the dynamic forces of the plot. All the Commedia dell'Arte characters were named: Columbina, the heroine, Pantalone, the husband or father, Il Dottore, his neighbouring friend or enemy; the word zanni was occasionally employed as a personal name, other comic servants being Pedrolino, Pulcinella, and Arlecchino. To all these names, and to quite a few others as well, were assigned individual personalities. The latter name and personality, that of Arlecchino, or Harlequin, meritsour special attention. Not only did he become the favourite among the audiences (especially when the Italian Commedia dell'Arte companies became popular in Paris where they, because of the language difficulty, had to rely more upon individual characters than upon the intrigue), but according to Nicoll he is outstanding as far as personality is concerned:

"Harlequin exists in a mental world wherein concepts of morality have no being, and yet, despite such absence of morality, he displays no viciousness... In contradistinction from many of his companions, too, he exhibits no malice. Another character who has been cheated or insulted will bear a grudge and seek means for securing revenge; only rarely does Harlequin behave this way. ...Maybe a partial explanation of this quality may be traced to another aspect of his nature - his inability to think of more than one thing at a time or, rather, his refusal to consider the possible consequences of an immediate action. He gets an idea; it seems to him at the moment a good one; gaily he applies it, and, no matter what scrape it leads him into, he never gains from his experience: one minute later he will be merrily pursuing another thought, equally calculated to lead him into embarrassment" (1963:70). "Rarely does he initiate an intrigue, but he is adroit in wriggling out of an awkward situation. Although he may seem a fool, he displays a very special quickness of mind, and allied to that, there is evident in him a sense of fun" (ibid:72)

It seems relevant to quote Nicoll at this length, not only because we get a good description of Harlequin's personality, but also because the description applies very precisely to the trickster figure as well.

There are other facts which may be taken as evidence of Harlequin's trickster-like nature. In the Commedia dell'Arte tradition each character was associated with a particular part of Italy; Pantalone was a Venetian, Il Dottore was from Florence, etc., and although Arlecchino was said to be of Bergamese extraction, he is unique in having accomplished to have historians bestow him with a quite different and older origin. He appeared, namely, in the belief of the early Middle Ages as the leader of the 'Harlechin Family', a group of ghosts whose nocturnal procession was known as the Wild Hunt. As repeated encounters with the the Harlequin Family apparently proved them to be fairly harmless, 'the wailing procession of lost souls turned into a troupe of comic demons' (Welsford 1961:292). The supernatural aspects of
Harlequin, however, persisted to a certain extent, for in a couple of French poems from 1585 he is depicted as a kind of diabolic acrobat who 'is not angry at being regarded as a devil, but does object to being described as a disreputable buffoon' (ibid:295). His appearance also supports the impression of his special, almost semi-human nature: the extraordinary agility of his movements, his 'strutting' way of walking, and his hat decorated with an animal's tail suggest his animality; the black mask on his face and the bat in his hand suggest the demonical. He is marginal to the extent that on stage he is frequently invisible to Pantalone and to his fellow zanni. An incident from 'real life' should also be mentioned. Welsford relates that on one occasion in the late 17th century Paris Harlequin appeared

"with one half of him disguised as a female laundress, and the other half as a masculine seller of lemonade, his pantomimic skill culminating in the scene where he made his two halves appear to fight with one another" (1961:298),

an act which begs the comparison with the trickster's adventures referred to above.

The structural similarities between Harlequin and the Winnebago Trickster also extend to their 'biographies': In relation to their original commissions both characters failed; Trickster was originally sent by Earthmaker to help man fight against evil beings, but he failed so completely that not even Earthmaker could rehabilitate him (Radin 1956:145). Harlequin was originally deemed by God to be a wandering ghost, but he was unable to uphold his image as a devil and was welcomed by us as a comic figure. Their personalities became their fate.

Just as criteria of morality do not apply to Trickster and Harlequin, we can say that neither do criteria of intelligence; and this also sets Harlequin somewhat apart from his comic colleagues in the Commedia dell'Arte: Pedrolino (Pierrot) and Pulchinella (Punch) 'are at bottom "fools", that is to say subnormal men who please by the exhibition of stupidity and insensibility' (Welsford 1961: 304).

The latter characters fit better the general idea of typical circus clowns, and although we may also find clowns exhibiting Harlequin-like features in present day travelling circuses,5 we shall argue that circus clowns are essentially of the "fool" variety, and that they are generally of two varieties: The one, the 'white clown', seems a fairly direct descendant of the French Pierrot; solitary, pathetic, frequently substituting music for speech, and with an added touch of transvestism and viciousness. The other (who could possibly be traced back to Pulchinella) is the ridiculous buffoon in the ill-fitting garment, joyful, sociable, and immensely foolish. Each of them is by himself a comic figure, but the interplay between them makes the scene complete, because it exhibits contrasting forms of folly: The excessive splendour of clothes and make-up of the transvestite versus the complete disregard of proportions in the appearance of the largely asexual buffoon; the pathetic insistence on solitude versus the obtrusive sociability; the astute cunning versus the happy, innocent buffoonery.

The viciousness of the white clown may be an outcome of his self-righteousness which may alternatively be expressed in mere sadness. His sexual ambiguity need not be very explicit, either. Both he and perhaps more frequently the other clown display, however, another kind of ambiguity in that they may transgress the boundary between the circus ring and the audience. In fact the principal role of the clown is often that of filling the intervals between other acts, directing our attention away from the changing of equipment etc.; only clowns could conceivably perform while the sawdust was being cleaned of elephants' dung.
This leads us to consider a more theoretical point related to the clown. We shall argue that the clown is essentially a 'muted' figure. The expression 'muted' in this context does not necessarily mean that the characters are actually prevented from speaking; it is a structural concept pertaining to the fact that alongside the dominant structure of any social configuration there exist one or more other structures which the dominant structure prevents from being 'realised', hence their 'mutedness'. The fact that clowns may be said to be in a structurally 'muted' position has a very palpable dimension to it. The primary concern of a circus community will naturally be that of attending the animals and maintaining the equipment of acrobats and jongleurs. This fact plus the necessity of continuous rehearsals and exercises in order to maintain and improve the standard of the most demanding acts have as a result that circus life is more or less dominated by the concern for these acts. This practical dimension is, however, just a correlate to the categorical characteristics of the clown, and the model of dominant and subordinate structures has the advantage that it allows us to look at the problems on a higher level of abstraction. The subordinate position of clowns is expressed very directly in their performances. We noted above that the white clown seldom speaks but expresses himself in music. The 'mutedness' of the white clown is even sometimes doubly stressed; not only is he as a clown member of a muted group but his musical activity is frequently suppressed by the continuous interventions of his fellow performer, the buffoon. The buffoon does speak, but his speech is almost invariably addressed to the audience and not to fellow performers.

Peacock mentioned the marginal position of the clowns in the Javanese ladruk plays, and he points out that also there may the clown mediate the gap between the stage and the audience by addressing the latter; for example by suddenly saying to one of the other actors, 'Sshh, somebody is listening!', and when asked, 'Who?', he will answer, 'Them!', pointing to the audience (1971:161).

The historical origins of the pantomime of Harlequin and others are to be found in 17th century Paris. At that time the Commedia dell' Arte figures were performing with great success at fairs on the outskirts of Paris. However, the monopoly of comedy lay with members of the Comedie Francaise who were jealous of the success of their popular colleagues at the fairs. The Comedie Francaise therefore enforced its monopoly by having other performers forbidden to use dialogue, and Harlequin consequently had to resort to pantomime (Welsford 1961:298-299). We should note that even though the popular actors were suppressed through the prevention of use of actual speech, this is also an expression of the structural phenomenon of dominance and subordination. The dominant structure was that of the bourgeois Comedie Francaise who in a very real sense muted the structurally subordinate popular comedy as it was found in marginal suburban settings. The relative structural position of the two kinds of public performance is not unlike that of the position of the theatre and the travelling circus today.

Ultimately the clown may mediate even the gap between the popular and the elite performance, namely when he succeeds in turning the craft of working with cliches into an 'art'. That he may accomplish such a feat is evidence, once more, of the fact that the joking powers of the clown are intrinsic to his person. When such a mediation takes place, we are, however, leaving the category of the anonymous role player and moving towards the individual star performer; where the former lends his person to enact a stereotype, the latter is exploiting a stereotype to embody his personality. The names of Grimaldi and Grock are thus more closely related to that of Charlie Chaplin than they are...
to their innumerable colleagues in the travelling circuses. When the anonymous clown becomes a Grock, when the teller of folktales becomes a Hans Anderson, when the fiddler becomes a violin virtuoso, etc., we are to some extent leaving collective representations behind and social anthropology must for the present give way to disciplines specially designed for the analysis of these various arts.

The Court Jester

Harlequin has been with us at least since the 16th century and he has changed but little in the course of the centuries. His appearance and personality combined into a powerful symbol and even though his tricks are not much in demand these days he has remained a 'trickster'. Clowns in various guises are found everywhere and at all times. The comic effect of both Harlequin and all kinds of clowns is due to qualities vested in these persons themselves. We shall argue that, in contrast, the comic powers of the court jester, or court fool, rest mainly in his position rather than in his person. As opposed to the clown the court jester is an element in the dominant structure; he may be subhuman, indeed even dumb, but his position prevents him from being structurally 'muted'.

The court jester had his heyday in the 15th and 16th centuries and vanished quickly afterwards. Even so, the jester in cap and bells is our stereotype of the joker today. He has become a symbol much like Harlequin, but, unlike Harlequin and any clown, in his living life he could never exist in his own right. He was kept more or less as a domestic animal and was evidently regarded as such by his master.

Sometimes princes would temporarily exchange fools, and they "regarded a compliment to their fool as a compliment to themselves, and took a pride in possessing rare specimens of folly or deformity" (Welsford 1961:137).

In Levi-Strauss' terms (1966) the jester would be classed as a metonymical non-human being, and it would not matter what kind of folly or deformity made him non-human; dwarf, idiot, or lunatic - any freak would do because any freak could fill the role of the 'fool'. The filling of this role was necessary in order that the ruler could set off his own infallibility and the divine nature of his office. As an individual character the 'fool' may have much in common with the clown, but in the case of the 'fool' the joke lies primarily in the relationship with the ruler. The ruler, in principle the perfect, divinely installed being, is placed in juxtaposition with the fool characterized by his infra-cultural deficiencies (cf. Milner 1972:25). However, to complete the joke and to establish the category court jester as distinct from individual 'fools', a further component should be added. We must think about the court jester not so much as a babbling idiot but rather as a sort of adviser to the ruler. Lowie said that 'a man's jokers are also his moral censors' (1949:95), and this seems to be especially true in the case of the court jester. The jester with (and because of) his infra-cultural deficiencies was permitted to point out moral, political, and other short-comings in the principally infallible ruler who, in his turn, could afford to take the comments seriously because they were made in jest. As long as the divine nature of kingship was unquestioned the jester had to be there, but 'when the divinity that hedges a king was broken down the fool lost his freedom, his joke and the reason for his existence' (Welsford 1961:195).
A specific instance is worth mentioning. Cardinal Richelieu was known to disapprove strongly of Louis XIII's jester; his dislike of the man can be seen not only as a personal affair, but almost as a structural necessity, for we see the following significant transformations take place: The divine king gave way to the ecclesiastic in pursuit of worldly power; and the king's merry jester, dressed in motley and working indirectly (namely in jest), but openly, gave way to the cardinal's 'Grey Eminence', an austere, colourless personage who worked directly, but secretly.

In his capacity of adviser to the king and commentator on his actions the jester bears resemblance to the Norse skjald and the Celtic bard, and a skilful and loyal jester could be of great political value. We may get an impression of his various functions as early as in an episode in the Beowulf epic. Beowulf and his followers were seated at a banquet in their honour at the Danish court before the slaying of the monster Grendel. At a certain time Unferth, son of Ecgflaf, 'who sat at the feet of the lord of the Scyldings', started challenging Beowulf about some allegedly unsuccessful and slightly disreputable adventure of his. Beowulf rejoined by giving his own extended and rehabilitating account of the incident and accusing Unferth of being the slayer of his brothers. After that 'there was glad laughter among the warriors', the king was evidently pleased and the queen could assume her duties as a hostess. A jester, Unferth was certainly no fool; rather we should see him as an intelligencer. By seizing upon the only point in the hero's career that was still obscure to him he got the information he (and the King) wanted and, by giving the hero a chance to rehabilitate himself, he at the same time ensured that the hero was purified before his confrontation with the monster – plus he made the audience laugh. All that was no little diplomatic achievement for which he received only a curse from Beowulf.5

The jester is here also acting as a ritual purifier, a capacity that all jokers may possibly share (cf. Douglas 1966:372-73). Not only could the jester as a purifier redress cosmological irregularities but he was commonly employed as a healer of physical ailments as well. There are many stories of a prince being ill, all sorts of medicines were applied in vain, but when the jester came along and gave a performance the prince was immediately cured. In the capacity of healer the jester bears some resemblance to the culture hero, the healer-fixer who could set things right and complete the cultural setting.

The association of comedy and healing is by no means confined to court jesters. The legend of circus is full of incidents where members of the audience were made well because of a good laugh at the clown. Early 17th century Paris was full of troupes of jugglers performing in the streets.

"In most cases the street-performers were attached to some herb dealer or medicine man who promised to cure any and all ills. At times a single operateur – the term usually applied to the street manipulators of jokes and nostrums – did the stunts and sold the medicaments" (Wiley 1960:70-71).

These were the original charlatans, and both the acting and the medical professions were equally jealous of the success of their medicine shows.
We have mentioned that the office of the court jester ceased to exist when the king lost his divine aspects, but we should also note how an individual jester might end his life. A seemingly wandering story of the death of a jester goes like this: The prince was ill with fever and the jester decided that he ought to be cooled, so he threw him into the cold stream. Momentarily the prince was somewhat shocked and he condemned the jester to death for that improvident trick, 'and although there was no intention of carrying out the punishment the unfortunate fellow died of shock' (Welsford 1961:129-30). He died while operating as a healer, but he died because the prince for once assumed his role. Just as the jester's joking powers were vested in his relationship with his master his proper death was caused by a disorder in that relationship.

Conclusions

Though the office of the court jester, and hence the individual jester characters died out, the category persists as part of our collective representations. We shall return to the categories below, but first we must emphasize the fact that in specific instances it may be impossible to class an individual character as for example either jester or clown. In more general terms we note that at the moment we focus on characters rather than categories we perceive an undulating series of similarities and differences between culture heroes, tricksters, clowns, and jesters; the cycle becomes truly circular. We saw how Harlequin — and by virtue of his transvestism the white clown — was like the trickster who in turn could play the role of either clown (the buffoon) or culture hero (the creator). As for the jester he may, as an individual character, be indistinguishable from the clown since they may both play the role of a merry buffoon while as a healer the jester aligns himself with the culture hero (the fixer). Comparing Harlequin with the court jester Welsford makes the following comments:

"Unlike the fool in cap and bells, he (Harlequin) can tap no hidden source of mysterious wisdom or unworldly knowledge. The fool had his niche in a divinely planned order of society, to whose dependent, ephemeral and often corrupt character it was his function to bear witness. Harlequin, on the other hand, was wholly a creature of make-believe, without background, and therefore without either religious significance or subversive tendencies" (1961:303).

On the other hand, an individual Harlequin figure could put on a trickster-like performance, as related above, or he could play the court jester for a while, as when Harlequin-Tristano Martinelli and his troupe paid their respects to Henry IV in Paris; Harlequin managed to get himself into the King's chair, and speaking to the King he said, 'Very well, Arlequin, you and your troupe have come here to amuse me; I am delighted that you have, I promise to protect you and give you a good pension, and other things too' (quoted by Wiley 1960:27-28).

These comparisons are little more than just summaries of some of the points already made, but we should like to draw attention to the circularity of the similarities and differences that have been demonstrated. Keeping in mind that we are still focusing on the characters we may represent their interconnections in the following model.
This model allows us to see how the roles of the individual characters may mediate the identities ascribed to them. Obviously, it is not the roles per se which define the characters. A culture hero can be a creator as well as a fixer but he is never a cheat or a mocker, as is the trickster who may be a creator-cheat, or the jester who may act as a fixer-mocker, etc. Rather the characters are identified by the specific scenes or settings in which they play their roles as jokers.

The scene for the clown's performance is the stage or the circus ring; the court jester naturally performs in court. The scene for the trickster's adventures is the mythical representation of a particular society; the trickster takes as objects for his joking the very customs and institutions of that society. If the trickster is operating in 'society', we may say that the culture hero operates in 'cosmos'; he brings fire, food, water, weapons, etc. into 'society' from outside, never being confined to an unequivocal place within it.

When we shift the focus of our inquiry from characters to categories the concern for circulating similarities and differences of roles must give way to considerations of distinct oppositions and identities. In the attempt to extract the categorical order from the seemingly unbounded and somewhat accidental configurations of characters and roles we have found it helpful to set up the following model in which the transformations indicated express the oppositions and identities between any pair of categories.
We need not use many more words than those already in the model to explain it since the material for so conceiving of the interrelationship between the categories is presented in the body of the paper. Suffice it to note, therefore, that the categories are of course built up from individual characters and personalities, but as categories they are generalizations and they should consequently not be taken as precise descriptions of every single character. As generalizations they can also be represented in the following diagram which is correlated to fig. 2 but has a different emphasis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>human</th>
<th>non-human</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>metaphoric</td>
<td>Trickster</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>metonymic</td>
<td>Clown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 2 emphasized the transformations that are found between the four categories. Fig. 3 is also about transformations but the stress is here upon the attributes of each category. We noted earlier the placing of the jester in this Levi-Straussian scheme about which we shall make a few explanatory remarks. The trickster and the culture hero are part of a series separated from the ordinary social space but they are, nevertheless, conceived of as 'persons'. Their relationship to man is defined as metaphoric but in inverse ways: The trickster is a metaphoric human; though part of a series distinct from the human he represents a humanization of cosmological values. The culture hero is in contrast a metaphoric non-human because he represents a divinization of the human institutions. The clown and the court jester are related in a metonymic fashion to the human series, but as in the case of the first pair their relationship to man is inverted: The clown is a metonymic human; he is part of the human space, only a little less human than ordinary people, a 'fool'. The jester is also a 'fool', and hence sub-human, but since he has reached the point of becoming an object for the perfect human being he is classified as non-human; even when assuming the role of adviser he remains so classified because his non-humanity is also related to his position as an element in a divine structure.

These interrelationships have a correlate in the interrelationships between the scenes which identify the various characters. The court of the divine king was in many ways seen as a miniature-cosmos; the relation between court and cosmos is one of similarity, it is metaphoric. If we think of the Javanese ludruk plays, or the Commedia dell Arte plays for that matter, it is obvious that the stage is a metaphoric representation. Peacock even depicted the setting of the ludruk plays as the 'story-society', to which the clown was an outsider, as is the trickster to his 'society'.

By establishing these categories and their transformations we have concluded the analysis. Even if individual joker characters continuously transgress the boundaries of the categories we find that we have gained something in respect to clarity. The joker is a tricky fellow and he tends to play his own game with us as analysts; but having exposed his categorical identities we believe to have come to grips with his nature, whatever role he chooses to play.

Kirsten Hastrup and Jan Ovesen.
Notes

1. Radin's primary concern was with the evolution of the figures in North American Indian mythology, and he found the general tendency to be a development from trickster to culture hero (1956, spec. ch. VIII). He said that 'among the Winnebago and Iowa the character of Hare has been purged in order to make him conform more perfectly to the picture of a true culture hero' (ibid: 131). It is interesting that Radin should use the notion of purging in relation to the suggested evolution of Hare. Through his development, then, Hare loses his typological ambiguity and ceases to be dangerous, in Douglas' sense; he becomes pure. Furthermore, this alleged general evolution parallels in a certain sense Douglas' interpretation of the specific Winnebago Wakdjunkaga cycle:

"Trickster begins, isolated, amoral and unselfconscious, clumsy, ineffectual, an animal-like buffoon. Various episodes prune down and place more correctly, his bodily organs so that he ends by looking like a man. At the same time he begins to have a more consistent set of social relations and to learn hard lessons about his physical environment... I take this myth as a fine poetic statement of the process that leads from the early stages of culture to contemporary civilization, differentiated in so many ways" (1966:80).

2. We owe the term 'cosmological joker' to Dr. Niels Fock, Copenhagen.

3. We have a case fresh in mind; in Sir Robert Fossett's Circus, visiting Oxford in May 1975, a couple of Hungarian clowns suggested parallels to a Pulchinella-Harlequin couple. However, in relation to the third clown of that particular circus the couple merged into one kind of clown, the happy buffoon, as opposed to the third, the more pathetic figure of the white clown.

4. The term 'muted' as applied to individuals or groups is part of the theoretical framework developed by the Ardeners (F. Ardener 1975, S. Ardener 1975) for the analysis of structurally determined relative articulateness. The common theme of the book Perceiving Women (S. Ardener (ed.) 1975) is that 'the problem of women' is a problem of the structural articulation of women in a dominant male structure.

5. The suggestion that Unferth be viewed as a jester was made by Welsford (1961).

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The Purity of Irish Music - Some 19th Century Attitudes

The rebellion of 1798 in County Wexford, is interesting as a case of what we might call a pre-modern rebellion, since it shares elements of the primitive rebellion and also of modern nationalism. One can follow the development of attitudes to the rebellion during the following century; in other words how it gradually became a key element in the historical myths of the two factions in Irish politics, myths which permeated Irish life and politics to a remarkable extent. The Loyalist version of the rebellion demonstrated the bestial savagery of the Irish peasant, his superstitiousness, his susceptibility to agitators, and his entire unsuitability for self-government. The Nationalist version emphasised the brutal tyranny of alien rule, the simple bravery of the rebels, and the national aspirations of their cause, other aspects of the cause being pruned. Loyalists emphasised religious conflict; Nationalists minimised it.

Now since it is the case that, in the absence of most modern communications media, song is one of the most effective methods of disseminating opinions and asserting values, and since it is also the case that a large proportion of our most interesting information on the rebellion is in the form of songs (whether contemporary or later), these political songs are clearly of great interest. Perhaps even more interesting are attitudes to the songs, and indeed to traditional music in general.

The aspect which I particularly wish to elucidate here is that of the models and preconceptions of some of the most eminent figures concerned with Irish traditional music in the nineteenth century. Some of these people were collectors; some were concerned to directly exploit Irish music for particular ends other than mere scholarship. All of them were upper middle-class nationalists, and most of them were Protestants. These circumstances coloured their findings and opinions to a large and interesting extent.

* * * * * * *

Nineteenth-century Ireland possessed, in effect, two parallel traditions of vernacular literature, apart from the complicating factor of its two languages. These traditions should not be seen as mutually exclusive - they cross-fertilised one another extensively - but the distinction is a useful convention, and helps to explain the attitudes of the figures mentioned below. One tradition was largely rural-based; some of its songs were in Irish, but English was gradually encroaching. The performers of this tradition were mainly peasants, and their songs and music were transmitted by oral means. Repertoires were relatively constant, and songs were not acquired at any great rate, so that the subjects of the songs remained the same over sizeable periods of time.

The other tradition was largely urban-based, in Dublin and Cork, although it influenced the whole country. It was, as far as is known, restricted to English, and the nucleus of its performers were the urban working class. Most vital of all, the songs were largely transmitted by means of printed broadsheets, composed by hacks (for want of a better term) and sold on the streets extremely cheaply. Thousands of these ballads are known; they were a highly volatile and disposable product. After any noteworthy event, the writers and publishers would issue a new ballad with all possible speed, before the story was stale. Favourite subjects were murders, with the criminal’s last words on the gallows; battles, “signs of the times”, and if news was thin on the ground, reworkings of old material, often some scene from Irish history.
It must again be emphasised that these traditions had no hard and fast division — peasants often sang the broadsides — but the distinction existed, and became the basis of a whole school of thought about traditional music, expressed as dichotomies between urban and rural, ancient and modern, literate and illiterate transmission, and, since the idea of broadsheets had spread from England, native culture and foreign imports, particularly this last as Irish music became a vehicle for nationalism.

I want here to consider attitudes toward Irish music and songs current among their students in the nineteenth century. These attitudes can be correlated with other ideas of the time, and with the position of the folklorists in Irish society. Most students combined academic interest with nationalist aspirations in varying proportions.

The Music Collectors — Bunting and Petrie

Around the mid-18th century Irish music was passing a watershed. The great bard, such as Carolan, who played the harp and travelled the country living from their musical skills as they had done for centuries, were on the decline. (Carolan died in 1738). On the other hand, new influences were arriving, both purely musical — Carolan himself was much influenced by Italian classical music — and also in songs. The increase of English over Irish in much of Ireland, and the gradual influx of literacy into the remotest districts was profoundly altering the nature of the songs people enjoyed. I shall return to the point of literacy later.

Thus the old harp tunes were giving way to new dance music such as the reel and hornpipe, played on the fiddle and the flute, whose volume, portability, and lack of complexity made them highly suitable for dance music, and the old Irish songs transmitted orally were being replaced by over wide areas by Anglo-Irish songs, often disseminated by the printed broadsheet.

It is significant that one of the first episodes in the scholarly discovery of traditional music was organised by Protestant gentlemen in Belfast, those who were radical in the English nineteenth-century sense as well as nationalist: for nationalism in Ireland developed first among the Protestant bourgeoisie and skilled artisans of Ulster. It is also significant that it amounted to a salvage job on the harpers of Ireland. In 1792 these gentlemen organised the Belfast Festival of Harpers, with an explicitly nationalist purpose, and employed a young man named Edward Bunting to note down as many tunes as possible from the mainly very old men who came to play. They specifically instructed Bunting to take down the tunes precisely as they were played, without addition or alteration, but there we meet with the first example of the improving spirit which infused nineteenth-century collecting.

Bunting indubitably admired traditional music — he expended much time and effort on collecting it — and we are much indebted to him for rescuing a vanishing tradition. Yet, both in the case of the Festival tunes and the ones he collected later, not only did he publish his tunes with a piano accompaniment, thus imposing a harmonic system on them which did not necessarily suit them, he also, despite his instructions, altered the melodies to make them fit the normal scales of art music, rather than the modes which characterise Irish music — a Procrustean bed of harmony. We know this because his information on the tuning system of the harpers he studied shows that they could simply not have played some of the tunes he attributed to them; their accidentals are too numerous. Moreover, Bunting transcribed into outlandish keys such
as F minor tunes which the harper played on a C and G instrument.

This conviction that the music had to be improved by its collector, rather than merely transmitted, took most of the century to expire. It means, in effect, that the music is translated from one system of notes to another, and its whole syntagmatic and paradigmatic relationships are altered. In imposing any system of harmony on Irish music, one almost inevitably imposes one's preconceptions, since most Irish music moves in powerful single lines, as in dance music, or in drifting tortuous lines, as in slow airs, where a sudden unexpected note may surprise the listener’s harmonic sense.

Bunting also published some of his airs as songs, with texts composed specially by various people, although he was not particularly eager to note down texts when he was actually collecting - he preferred to concentrate on the melodies. These publications are a clear attempt to blend modern sentiments and styles on to just so much of a past, traditional style as to ensure that the new elements benefited from the authority and charisma of a distinctively Irish past. The result was to become known as National Music.

What is particularly significant is a sidelight on Bunting's reasons for altering the tunes: although he never actually admitted altering them, it seems certain that this is why he did it. He believed that the more ancient the tune, the easier it was for him to harmonise on the piano, and that therefore ease of harmonisation was indicative of ancient origin, and as he put it, "purity". Then all the curiosities of modes, all those melodies most distinctive to Irish music, were modern presumably, degenerate accretions obscuring and perverting the purity of the ancient music, and one was justified in attempting to strip it away. Thus:

"... the most ancient tunes were the most perfect, admitting of the addition of a Bass with more facility than such as were less ancient."

(Bunting, p. ii)

Since Bunting has already said that the tunes are of indeterminate age, although ancient, it is clear that this addition of basses is his only criterion for determining their relative ages; the argument is thus circular

His reason for asserting this is his belief that the ancient composers knew all about harmony, and intended it to be used in their tunes. In this statement we can perceive a Dark Ages Theory as well as a piece of ethnocentricity: since the harmonic systems of modern artifice are to be preferred to those in use among the common people, and since the common people are supposed to have debased the music they play, then the ancients must have understood modern harmony, and their descendants have forgotten it.4

Bunting constantly refers to "pure" or "unalloyed" tunes, which he is attempting to separate from the dross about them. Thus he has omitted one tune by Carolan from his first book of tunes, a tune called "Bridget Cruise", on the grounds that "... (it) was either originally imperfect, or the copy procured of it so corrupt, that a Bass could not be adopted to it."5 Note the idea that it might have been imperfect the way Carolan wrote it, that a composer could get things wrong.

Another assertion on the nature of music was that musicians never changed the tunes they played (presumably the debasement occurred in transmission), and that harpers everywhere played the same tune in
exactly the same way. Only Bunting's preconceptions can have caused him to do this, since he collected in several districts of Ireland, and the people who played for him almost certainly had widely different styles and treatments. A contributory factor may have been his habit, attested by several writers, of merely jotting down a tune in very cursory fashion when actually collecting it, and making a fair copy later, partially from memory.

The next great collector of words and melodies was George Petrie, an officer of the Irish Ordnance Survey, whose first collection appeared in 1851, and whose work, due to lack of money, continued to be published in bits and pieces over the next forty years or so. He had been a close friend and admirer of Bunting, whose collections he contributed to, although he was by no means blind to the latter's shortcomings, and in particular his (Petrie thought) eccentric habits of reconstructing tunes from jottings and memory, and of only bothering to collect one version of each tune, on the grounds that they were all the same. Petrie deplored this lack of systematic collecting technique, and himself collected large quantities of variants for comparative study. His stated motives for doing this however, are revealing for the light they shed on the ideas and models on which Petrie's collection was based.

Petrie's reason for collecting variants is, he writes, to establish "better versions" of a tune; more, it is for "testing (the) accuracy" of versions he already has. Clearly, in Petrie's mind there are not a number of versions, all of equal validity and interest, to be catalogued; there is an ideal, correct version, of which all others are bastardisations or pale imitations, of no interest except insofar as they reflect or conform to the ideal version, or help in its construction or re-structure. The ideal, the Ur-Text is of course the collector's construct.

Petrie also criticised Bunting's habit of collecting tunes mainly from harpers (Bunting, presumably, believed that tunes played on the harp would reflect the antiquity of the instrument, and did not collect any other sort of tunes). Petrie explicitly states that instrumentalists are not to be trusted as bearers of tunes, and that the only reliable way for the student to collect correct tunes is from singers, whose words, by the necessity of preserving the sense, keep them to the tune and discourage variation and improvisation. Singers are thus the guardians of "purity" and "authenticity". Instrumental players, on the other hand, cause their tunes to "assume a new and unfixed character, varying with the caprices of each unskilled performer, who, unshackled by any of the restraints imposed on the singer... (by the words)... thinks only of exhibiting, and gaining applause for, his own powers of invention and execution, by the absurd indulgence of barbarous licences and conventionalities, destructive not only of their simpler and finer song qualities, but often rendering even their essential feature undeter-minable with any degree of certainty."

There are many key words in this passage from Petrie's introduction to his collection: the blanket condemnation of "unskilled", and the gibes at the variations in performance of the music: the "absurd indulgences" of decorations are inseparable from most Irish music, and to divide a performance into "tune" and "decoration" is a futile exercise, an imposition of unsuitable categories.

The key concept, however, is that embodied in the words "simpler and finer". Clearly Petrie means the two words to mean much the same thing, and the implications are evidently that a older, and more worthy tradition is, due to its own restraint, modesty and quiet tastefulness
being overwhelmed by a flood of "barbarous", cheap, flashy rubbish tacked on to its "essential features" in such a way as to leave those features accessible only to the student prepared to ruthlessly strip away the undergrowth. The artists, in short, are destroying the traditions of their art, as defined by the artistically-minded collectors. The brash materialism and showiness of the nineteenth century has swamped a noble past: the savages actually prefer khaki shorts and Coca-Cola, much as the anthropologists might wish that they would not ape modernity.

This, of course, is bound up with the evolutionist doctrine of survivals, fragments of an older culture which the student may extract in rudimentary form from present-day phenomena. (It is of course much earlier than the period normally thought of as classic evolutionist country). However, whereas most of the "survivals" which evolutionist theory postulates are more or less "savage" or "superstitious", the sort of rubbish with which no reasonable man would encumber himself, the "survivals" which observers found in Irish music are roses among thorns: they are gems which it is of interest and artistic value to preserve from the encroachments of modern trash. The reconstructed savages are being extolled, not vilified, and, although the collectors do not state this as an aim, it is nonetheless clear that their material was intended as part of a cultural heritage. Moreover, a putative heritage is being hammered together by a middle-class intelligentsia in preference to the heritage perceived by the people who actually are the bearers of it, who are being exhorted to share the same sort of aspirations as the intellectuals.

It is not for nothing that the language of abuse which Irish nineteenth-century intellectuals and nationalists poured on to the contemporary music and song of the Irish common people coincides with the language of racial debasement and defilement. Irish nationalism was attempting, as it saw itself, to cast off the trammels of the present, largely imported from England, and to reassert a distinctively Irish culture, which would necessarily hark back to an idealised past far enough back in time to escape the effects of the English conquest. The process of asserting and assembling this culture would clearly involve a search for survivals from a simpler, idyllic, older Ireland - a search which would culminate, by the end of the century, in the foundation of the Gaelic League, the revival of the Irish language, and the development of the Gaelic Athletic Association, who all, successfully, revived or rather reconstructed an Irish tradition for political purposes. The movement involved Irish national identity in a struggle for "purity", freedom from foreign influence, and freedom from the apparent inevitability of modernisation, a struggle which continues now, and which is the strength and the weakness of all such movements in Ireland.

So the great nineteenth century collectors pursued their search for "the stamp of unsullied purity" in music, the echo of the genuine, noble, old Ireland. Their aims were largely antiquarian and artistic, although I hope I have shown that they were not entirely so. They were concerned to preserve for posterity something which they felt was worthwhile, and which seemed to be in decay. They hoped to play a part in an Irish reawakening, but they aimed basically to be transmitters of Irish music, and since this view coincides with that of modern collectors and students, they are honoured despite their faults.

The Assimilators - Moore and Young Ireland

What, then of those whose active intention was to use old Irish music, or at least their conception of it, as part of a new music; to
After all, the political effects and influence of songs were clear; as Allingham put it:

"Does that fine gendarmerie of ours, the constabulary, never intermeddle with crime in its rarefied or gaseous form of song?"

The earliest, and perhaps the most notable, of those who utilised songs in this way was Thomas Moore, and his lead was largely followed by the Young Ireland movement of the 1840's and 50's. These people were roused to action largely by political motives, coupled with the view that the current songs of the Irish were poor stuff: these songs were, they felt, failing in the duties of a nation's music, failing to reflect the national character adequately, and failing above all to provide a spur to action, towards asserting Irish identity. They were sufficiently pragmatic to write their songs in English, to a wider audience, but their chief stumbling-block was always their ambiguous attitude to the class of society they were supposed to be aiming at. Moore, at least, had very few qualms: he wrote explicitly for his own upper middle class, for pianos in drawing rooms, and his was a heritage which the Young Irelanders despite their pretensions to mass appeal, were never able to shake off completely.

The attitude of those who applauded the possibilities, and to a lesser extent, the sentiments of popular song (such as Barry deploring the "clannish" nature of old Irish song, but hesitated at the form, was paralleled by those serious musicians who enjoyed Irish music, but regarded it as something wild, to be tamed by Art, and could afford to patronise their sources, reworking them in a consciously literate manner. Thus Moore on his difficulties:

"Another difficulty (which is, however, purely mechanical) arises from the irregular structure of many of (these) airs, and the lawless kind of metre which it will in consequence be necessary to adapt to them... That beautiful Air, "The Twisting of the Rope"... is one of those wild, sentimental rakes, which it will not be very easy to tie down in sober wedlock with Poetry."

This precise combination, patronising, reverent and patriotic all at once, is caught perfectly by Power:

"W. Power trusts he will not be thought presumptuous in saying, that he feels proud, as an Irishman, in even the very subordinate share which he can claim, in promoting a Work so creditable to the talents of the country - a Work, which, from the spirit of nationality it breathes, will do more, he is convinced, towards liberalising the feeling of society, and producing that brotherhood of sentiment which it is so much our interest to cherish, than could ever be effected by the arguments of wise, but uninteresting, politicians... And the chief corruptions, of which we have to complain arise from the unskilful performance of our own itinerant musicians, from whom, too frequently, the airs are noted down, encumbered by their tasteless decorations and responsible for all their ignorant anomalies. Though it be sometimes impossible to trace the original strain, yet, in most of them, 'aura per ramas aura refuglet', the pure gold of the melody shines through the ungraceful foliage which surrounds it, and the most delicate and difficult duty of a compiler is to endeavour, as much as possible, by retrenching these inelegant superfluities, and collating the various
methods of playing or singing each air, to restore the regularity of its form, and the chaste simplicity of its character."

Note the mixture: improvement of the minds and sentiments of the middle classes, and criticism of the very people who the songs were collected from as debasers. This is the idea of folk purity prior to foreign influence at work, of a chaste simple peasantry, innocent in its contentment, in Holland's words; "the purest native Irish... (lived) self-contained and self-contented, a peaceful pious unrepining race, using and enjoying the land without let or hindrance."

Moore's songs, although quite successful with the upper layers of society, failed to penetrate any lower. The Young Ireland movement, and its organ The Nation, were set up in the 1840's in conscious imitation of the Young Italy movement. They consisted or more or less youthful and earnest Dublin intellectuals, with ideals of a free and nationally minded Ireland, and were anxious to communicate not only with their own class, but also with the working classes, and especially the peasants. Dublin and Cork and their street ballads needed re-attuning to the country roots: so "the mass of the street songs make no pretence to being true to Ireland; but only to the puritans of Cork and Dublin."16 Duffy, in his collection, also refers to "the vulgar error of treating street ballads as the national minstrelsy of Ireland",17 and gives them credit only for being marginally preferable to the utterly debauched ballads sung by the English common people.18

The tone of Victorian moral improvement is never far from Young Ireland's efforts to produce a literature "chastened by modern art, but... indigenous, and... marked with a distinct native character"19 nor in their suggestions that the study of elocution should accompany ballad study.20

Despite the considerable influence Young Ireland had on the intellectual life of Ireland, they never acquired the wider influence dreamed of by such as Burry when he wrote "If men able to write, will fling themselves gallantly and faithfully on the work we have here plotted for them, we shall soon have Fair and Theatre, Concert and Drawing-room, Road and Shop, echoing with Songs bringing home Love, Courage and Patriotism to every heart."21 The great mass of Irish people obstinately refused to draw their morals in the form sketched out for their consumption, and clung to their ballads. A very few of the large body of National Songs entered into popular tradition, and are still sung today; the majority foundered without trace. As Duffy himself said of the efforts of earlier writers, they were "too pedantic to be familiar... too cold to be impressive."22

Attempts were made to rationalise this failure, but the true reason was that nationalist writers found it hard to sacrifice their ideals of purity and courage in favour of (they felt) a rather shabby compromise which might ensure popular success: nationalism does not deal in compromises. They were unable and unwilling to "write down" to popular taste and thus only occasionally did they produce a really successful song.

These attempts to study a popular literature and to alter and exploit it at the same time are of considerable interest, both as anthropological attitudes of their time and as an attempt by one political group to draw on the cultural heritage of another in order to construct for itself an authority of antiquity, a national heritage which is in part manufactured. The middle class students applied their
own artistic criteria to an alien phenomenon without any sociological sensitivity. It is clear that the noble wreck of a great artistic tradition which they purported to be rescuing was a construct, whose roots lay partly in their romantic concept of an ideal, pre-industrial Irish world, whose simplicity and health had been perverted through foreign influence, and partly in their impatience with the common people who seemed content to ignore what the intellectuals saw as the reality of history, and historical inevitability. The images of purity and degradation which pervaded their writings were an attempt to express this symbolically, and have clear links with the racial purity theories of the time, and may be seen as an aspect of Celticism, erected in response to English racialist images of a near-simian Paddy. The struggles of this school of thought to assert the past, to try and tease out its survivals and strip off the imported impurities, is summed up by Hyde, writing in the 1890's.

"To the members of the Gaelic League, the only body in Ireland which appears to realise that Ireland has a past, has a literature, and the only body in Ireland which seeks to render the present a rational continuation of the past, I dedicate this attempt at a review of that literature which despite its present neglected position, they feel and know to be a true possession of national importance."24

That this question of purity, of a purging of the roots, is by no means a dead issue can readily be shown. Last year (i.e. 1975) the organisers of the Fleadhanna Ceoil, the great contests where the champion Irish musicians are selected, announced that competitors would no longer be permitted to perform pieces by Carolan in the contests. Their reason for this decision was that they considered Carolan's experiments and flirtations with classical Italian music to have compromised the Irishness of his compositions, which were thus unsuitable for a purely Irish cultural event, however excellent they might be musically, since Irish music should be independent of foreign imports. (This ignores the fact that a very sizeable proportion of Irish traditional music, has ultimately, foreign origins.) Carolan's pieces do indeed bear extensive traces of his cosmopolitan interests; the foreign influence, however, never swamps the Irish, and his works are a fascinating piece of dynamic integration for two styles. But he certainly slid a toe over the boundary of demarcation between native and foreign music; as Professor Douglas might say, a dangerous game, and he has been duly sent off the field.

Chris Halsall

Notes

1. "Bard" is used not in the Welsh sense, but in the sense of a travelling musician depending on patronage wherever he went.

2. There had been harp festivals before 1792, mainly in the South, but they had not been on such a scale as the Belfast one, nor does a collector seem to have been present.

3. Bunting, p. i.

4. Ibid. p. ii.

5. Ibid. p. iii.

6. Ibid. p. ii.

8. This is not true anyway. Singers improvise and decorate just as much as instrumentalists.


10. Ibid. pp. x-xi.

11. Ibid. p. xi.


17. Ibid. p. xiv.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid. p. xi.

20. Ibid. p. xiiiv.


22. Duffy, p. xviii.


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REVIEW ARTICLE


This book, which was published last year, comprises six essays written between 1968 and 1973, with an introduction written in 1975. It is only since the mid-sixties that the notion of 'women' as such could have been an object of study in this way, and it may well become required reading for some women's studies courses. The papers were all read (with the exception of Edwin Ardener's) either at the "informal seminar of women anthropologists" at Oxford or at "a seminar... arranged outside the official programme of the (A.S.A. Decennial) conference" (viii). With the advent of women's studies 'informal' and 'outside' becomes formal and inside, as another facet of an academic discourse and, perhaps, a recuperation. Of all the authors only Shirley Ardener registers the 'political' nature of the papers in their academic context. It is in confronting this problem that the terms 'muted group' and 'famineity' are introduced. I believe that both terms have greater political weight than is claimed for them, and that this denial affects their analytic value.

It is interesting to note that E. Ardener's paper, "Belief and the Problem of Women", which was written earlier than the other papers (1968), and included "(s)ince it has influenced other contributions submitted here..." (vii-viii), nowhere uses the term 'muted' or 'muted group'. These terms, according to the "Introduction" and to E. Ardener's commentary on his earlier article, "The 'Problem' Revisited" (1975), were introduced in discussion between 1968 and 1971, when 'Sexual Insult and Female Militancy' was written. Rather, there is a term 'inarticulate', which does not necessarily mean the same as the later term 'muted', particularly as, whilst muted is opposed to dominant, hence the couple dominant group/muted group, inarticulate is not strongly coupled with an equivalent term, although 'articulate' is used.

The problem in 1968 is posed thus: whilst women are present in monographs at the level of observation, they are completely absent at a second level, that of debate, discussion and so on, which "social anthropologists really depend upon to give conviction to their interpretations... We are, for practical purposes, in a male world"(1); there is no direct reference to the female group - "For the truth is that women rarely speak in social anthropology in any but that... sense of merely uttering or giving tongue. It is the very inarticulateness of women that is the technical part of the problem they present"(2).

The technical problem of inarticulateness turns out, however, to be an analytical problem which in most societies the ethnographer shares with its male members. Then "Those trained in ethnography evidently have a bias towards the kind of models that men are ready to provide (or to concur in) rather than towards
any that women might provide. If the men appear 'articulate' compared with the women, it is a case of 'like speaking to like' (2). The other side of this problem is: "if the models of a society made by most ethnographers tend to be models derived from the male portion of that society, how does the symbolic weight of that other mass of persons... express itself?"(3).

Thus the problem of 'inarticulateness' of women is one of symbolic weight; a complex question, for it is not solely of the ethnographer's own society: Ardener suggests that "the models of society that women can provide are not of the kind acceptable at first sight to men or to ethnographers, and specifically that, unlike either of these sets of professionals, they do not so readily see society bounded from nature. They lack the meta-language for its discussion. To put it more simply: they will not necessarily provide a model for society as a unit that will contain both men and themselves. They may indeed provide a model in which women and nature are outside men and society"(5).

It is in the realm of symbolism that women acquire something more like their due representation; Ardener contends that "much of this symbolism in fact enacts that female model of the world which has been lacking, and which is different from the models of men in a particular dimension: the placing of the boundary between society and nature"(5). The bounding of self at the level of society produces the category 'nature' as 'not-self'; it is then a cultural product and not "a concrete aspect of universal order". Ardener continues: "Since women are biologically not men, it would be surprising if they bounded themselves against nature in the same way as men do"(5). For men, women's fertility is uncontrolled, peripheral: to do with 'nature'. So "(a)lthough the men bound off 'mankind' from nature, the women persist in overlapping into nature again. For men among the Bakweri this overlapping symbolic area is clearly related to women's reproductive powers"(7). In his conclusion Ardener writes: "The objective basis of the symbolic distinction between nature and society... is a result of the problem of accomodating the two logical sets which classify human beings by different bodily structures: 'male'/female'; with the two other sets: 'human'/non-human'. It is, I have suggested, men who usually come to face this problem, and, because their model for mankind is based on that for man, their opposites, women and non-mankind (the wild), tend to be ambiguously placed"(14). It follows, then, that "(s)ince these (reproductive) powers are for women far from being marginal, but are of their essence as women, it would seem that a woman's model of the world would also treat them as central. When we speak of Bakweri belief we must therefore recognize a man's sector and a woman's sector, which have to be reconciled"(7).

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But in addition to this first theme of inarticulateness as unrecognized symbolic weight, there is a second, interwoven theme of the dominance of man's models. It is only weakly or ambiguously stated in 1968, which is not surprising, for as
E. Ardener says (1975): "The paper reprinted above is now somewhat old, and as composed just antedated the main impact of the new feminist literature. It is important to stress therefore that it was not seen as a contribution to that literature"(19). If we look at the male or ethnographer's model where "like speaks to like", we find "...it is because the men consistently tend, when pressed, to give a bounded model of society such as ethnographers are attracted to"(2). Why? Men's models are characteristically dominant in ethnography because "(i)f men are the ones who become aware of 'other cultures' more frequently then do women, it may well be that they are likely to develop metalevels of categorization that enable them at least to consider the necessity to bound themselves-and-their-women from other-men-and-their-women. Thus all such ways of bounding society against society, including our own, may have an inherent maleness"(6). So the heavy marking, both theoretical and ideological, of such male spheres as the economic and political at the expense of the more female areas of symbolism has a functional (and functionalist) aspect. Ardener continues: "(i)f men, because of their political dominance, may tend purely pragmatically to 'need' total bounding models of either type (against nature or other societies), women may tend to take over men's models when they share the same definitional problems as men. But the models set up by women bounding themselves are not encompassed in those men's models. They still subsist, and both sexes through their common humanity are aware of the contradictions"(6). 'Inarticulateness' then is more than that women's separate models are not 'recognised' by men or by ethnographers. For "(m)en's models of society are expressed at a metalevel which purports to define women... Not only women, but... inarticulate classes of men, young people, and children"(14).

In the "Introduction" and "The 'Problem' Revisited" (below) emphasis is moved from the first theme of inarticulateness as an expression of symbolic weight not recognized by men to the second theme of the repression of expression through male political dominance. The shift is presented as the effects of the dominance of one model over another, described in terms of 'mutedness'. Firstly, dominance is reflected in the maleness of appropriate language registers: "... because the arena of public discourse tends to be characteristically male-dominated and the appropriate language registers often seem to have been 'encoded' by males, women may be at a disadvantage when wishing to express matters of peculiar concern to them. Unless their views are presented in a form acceptable to men, and to women brought up in the male idiom, they will not be given a proper hearing". Indeed, "because of the absence of a suitable code and because of a necessary indirectness rather than spontaneity of expression, women, more often than may be the case with men, might sometimes lack the facility to raise to conscious level their unconscious thoughts" (viii-ix). Nevertheless, women's ideas or models of the world around them might find a way of expression in forms other than direct expository speech.
But there is a second, more radical way that dominance is expressed: if "...a society may be dominated or overdetermined by the model (or models) generated by one dominant group within the system" this dominant model "may impede the free expression of alternative models of their world which subdominant groups may possess, and perhaps may even inhibit the very generation of such models" (xii - my italics). But in this case, what is the status of women's models? Shirley Ardener suggests that (1) such muted groups find it necessary to structure their world through the model(s) of the dominant group - "transforming their own models as best they can in terms of the received ones" (xii). (2) That contradictions arise, for while "there may be presumed to be a considerable degree of 'fit' between the dominant model and their (the members of the dominant group's) structural position in society", this is not so for members of subdominant groups "for whom the 'fit' might be very imperfect. As a result the latter might be relatively more 'inarticulate' when expressing themselves through the idiom of the dominant group, and silent on matters of special concern to them for which no accommodation has been made in it" (xii).

A series of possibilities is being developed here. (1) There are models that are not 'recognized' in the official structure. (2) There are areas of concern for the subdominant group which cannot be publicly discussed or expressed: a group may be relatively inarticulate in any situation where the interests of the group are at variance with those of the dominant group. However, a 'muted group' may still generate a counterpart model (xii). But even as a "private view of the world" this still poses the question of the process of overdetermination of the model, for these counterpart models "...are not generated independently of those of the dominant structure, but are to some extent shaped by them..." (xiii). This brings sharply into question the third possibility: (3) That there are regions where there appear to be problems that are inhibited, that are never developed. This category is not, of course, a real possibility.

Yet S. Ardener writes: "...it may well be that while both groups generate ideas of social reality at the deepest level, muted groups find that, unlike dominant groups, they must inhibit the generation of ideas close to or at the level of the surface of events, since the conceptual space in which they would lie is overrun by the dominant model of events generated by the dominant group". This is expanded: in an autonomous (dominant) system the two orders of structures (surface and deep) are linked by certain transformational rules. Then a muted system composed of the deep structures of a muted group and the imposed surface structures of a dominant group will be held together by more complex logical relationships. "If such a system is to be envisaged without a collapse, some adequate binding relationships must nevertheless obtain, so perhaps we must assume that generally muted groups manage to form rickety or cumbersome links between the two orders of structures" (xiv).
The problem is that in such a space 'groups' can only be defined by the dominant structure. 'Inarticulate' has not become 'muted' but 'muted group', with which it is not synonymous. "Thus the dominant and the muted groups may each generate different structural premises, and still come to accept a common state-
ment of perception" (xiv). What defines a muted group other than an outside or post-hoc definition?

Further elaborations become necessary to maintain this definition of a muted group. Thus the 'objectives' of a muted group must be 'encoded' or 'transformed' in terms of the dominant group; a "clear perception of purpose may be clouded or over-
determined in this way by the dominant ideology; the process of
generation of... ideas is thus made more complicated"(xv). There is then "...an adjustment in the system of members of a muted group which transforms their own unconscious perceptions into such conscious ideas as will accord with those generated by the dominant group". This leads even to a kind of psycho-
logism: "We could envisage, perhaps, that the construction and maintenance of any coherent conceptual system conjoining the deep models of a muted group with the surface models of the dominant group would require from the members of the muted group the investment of a great deal of disciplined mental energy. This investment may be one reason why they are often seen to be more conservative than members of dominant groups, even clinging to models which seem to disadvantage them... but after lifetimes of adapting in order to achieve a precarious accommodation, should we be surprised if the prospect of beginning again should be resisted? (xvi-xvii).

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The ambiguity inherent in the use of the term 'muted group' is also present in "The 'Problem' Revisited". E. Ardener describes mutedness as "a technically defined condition of structures - not some condition of linguistic silence"(22), and the accompanying foot-note (4) points out that "sub-
dominant p-structures generate only indirectly - through the mode of specification of the dominant structure" (26). Muted implies both 'dumb' and 'of a reduced level of perceptibility', "(t)he muted structures are 'there' but cannot be 'realized' in the language of the dominant structure"(22). The term 'inarticulate' is reinvoked: "One of the problems that women presented was that they were rendered 'inarticulate' by the male structure; that the dominant structure was articulated in terms of a male world-position. Those who were not in the male world-position, were, as it were, 'muted'" (21-22). A group is muted then ",...simply because it does not form part of the dominant communicative system of the society - expressed as it must be through the dominant ideology, and that 'mode of pro-
duction', if you wish, which is articulated with it" (22; 1973).

This question of 'groups' which are "rendered 'inar-
ticulate'" is partially resolved by the introduction of the concept of a world-structure. "The ultimate negativity of attempts to modify dominant structures by their own 'rules'
derivates from the totally reality-defining nature of such structures. Because of this essential element the manifold of experience through the social may be usefully termed a 'world-structure', for it is an organization both of people and of their reality" (22). Then if we think in terms of a world-structure which defines 'relevant' reality "...if the male perception yields a dominant structure, the female one is a muted structure" (24). Nevertheless, in Ardener's conclusions there is still a separation, this time of the effects of englobing and of dominance: "The woman case is only a relatively prominent example of muting; one that has clear political, biological, and social symbols. The real problem is that all world-structures are totalitarian in tendency. The Gypsy world-structure, for example, englobes that of the sedentary community just as avidly as that of the sedentary community englobes that of the Gypsies. The englobed structure is totally 'muted' in terms of the englobing one. There is then an absolute equality of world-structures in this principle, for we are talking of their self-defining and reality reducing features. Dominance occurs when one structure blocks the power of actualization of the other, so that it has no 'freedom of action'. That this approach is not simply a marxist one lies in our recognition that the articulation of world-structures does not rest only in their production base but at all levels of communication: that a structure is also a kind of language of many semiological elements, which specify all actions by its power of definition" (25).

The last sentence apart, this still lacks the subtlety of the original formulations. The problem of structures either absent from official histories or present but unexpressed has entered again. A class (or group or whatever) is only one when it has consciousness of being a class, and the process of self-definition is a specific, overdetermined one, which may well involve the gaining of a 'meta-discourse'. Self-definition in this sense, though, creates a new entity: there is no deeper reality to be uncovered or unveiled. Ardener's "Mutedness occurs simply because it does not form part of the dominant communicative system of society - expressed as it must be through the dominant ideology..." (22) makes sense if we see mutedness as a condition of the process of self-definition - a profoundly heterogenous concept to that of dominance - a specific and not generalizable case of a change in the rules.

Judith Okely's paper examining exchange of phantasies between Gorgio and Gypsy men and women gives no material that would clarify the notion of a muted group; the change that allows women to be taken note of in this particular way happens in the ethnographer's own society. Hilary Callan looks at one of the premises 'underlying' a structure; that she can do so is perhaps part of a more general questioning she notes. However, the set of apparent paradoxes she relates are normally never perceived because "these conditions belong to the peculiar class of assumptions which, within the terms of a given socio-intellectual system, cannot be stated". Cannot be stated, firstly by those committed (morally and professionally) to the system, but also, by its very nature. "The second point is much more difficult
to express. It is possible, as I have indicated, to hold fierce arguments with people and in this context to force from them statements - some more logical than others - about principles underlying the system. It would, however, be rash to relate these admissions too straightforwardly to the normal, smooth functioning of the Embassy machine. To state the assumptions is already to distort them - whether in any consistent direction I am not sure. But it seems to be true that 'embeddedness' is the nature of these assumptions" (99-100).

The very definition muted demands a shift in such premisses. The alternation dominant/muted has its specific origin in such circumstances; its usefulness has been in the specific situation of the emergence of the women's movement, as a (polemical) intervention. They refer to power relations, and to the control of "the state of affairs as defined by common sense". Then the search for any underlying continuity, such as femineity, subscribed to by both Drid Williams and Hilary Callan, is suspect. Shirley Ardener writes: "...beyond the search for new models of various sets which can include both men and women (we find) a desire, conscious or not, to identify a specifically female model (of that 'special nature') in which the essential attributes, physical, spiritual and moral appear: a model of what we may perhaps term 'femineity' of the deepest structural level and greatest generality, which is quite distinct from the old, supposedly male-derived 'femininity' with its load of associated 'secondary sexual characteristics'"(46). This notion of femineity is applied to both the Cameroons and the West: "Is this the level at which the Cameroon women and the liberationists meet? Both seem concerned with the 'deep structure' of human identity. Since "the one element which the generators have in common apart from their humanity is their sex", we have to consider that, other than chance, "whether or not we are dealing here with phenomena of a universal kind" (49). But although always present the male/female difference is not always marked, or marked in the same way. Even the notion of "the dignity of (women's) sexual identity" is derived from a specific historical situation; it cannot usefully be claimed to exist where and when it is not expressed. Although femineity is not a biologism, it cannot be generalized: its application to other circumstances shows a political rather than a paradigmatic solidarity.

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All the papers here develop specific analyses of great clarity, but that their subject matter and the approach taken are chosen for specific 'local' reasons cannot be ignored, or this choice is transferred to the material. This is felt rather than said throughout the book; the contributions illuminate the issues they approach, and show up several contemporary false-problems, but they do so without seriously threatening to "split apart the very framework in which they conduct their studies".

Tim Jenkins
Michel Foucault's latest book, *Surveiller et Punir*, (Gallimard, NRF, Bibliotheque des Histoires, Paris, 1975), is remarkably difficult to pigeonhole. Penologists will see in it a contribution to penology; French historians will read it as a contribution to French history, and it is, besides, a work of sociological theory, and a work of theory in the History of Ideas. Four books in one? More than that, because the theoretical stance is ambiguous: sometimes Foucault seems to be working from an historicist point of view, while at other times he seems to be working from a "structuralist" point of view. And how do we square Foucault's claim to be "un positiviste heureux" with the fact that he has declared himself to be a committed writer? Readers of *S & P*, especially those who like their discussions of theory to be cut and dried, are likely to be baffled as well as excited by what they read. Has Foucault reached the point at which versatility becomes inconsistency? The subject of the book is an important one; it concerns the semantics and social functions of punishment. The importance of the subject, as well as the idiosyncrasies of Foucault's treatment of it, makes the book worthy, I think, of extended discussion.

The book opens with a contrast. After a detailed account of the truly appalling punishment inflicted on Damiens for attempted regicide in 1757, there follows an account of the internal regulations of a model prison of the 1830s. The contrast is between two techniques, or "modalities", of punishment; as Foucault puts it, 'Punishment changes from an art of intolerable sensations to an economy of suspended rights' (p. 16). Under the Ancien Regime, punishment was an act of ritual atrocity, a drama of corporal violence, impregnated with an obvious political symbolism; but after the Revolution, the normal form of punishment rapidly became the prison, with its timetable of (supposedly) spiritual re-education, and from this drama the public was carefully excluded. The period of the change-over from one modality of punishment to the other was comparatively short in France (from the 1780s to the 1830s). Similar transformations in penal law took place in most European states at about the same time, although elsewhere they may have been less clear-cut.

Foucault claims that the penal system which emerged in the first half of the nineteenth century is still very much our own. Subsequent developments were already implicit in the original conception of imprisonment. But we have now reached the stage where it is no longer the crime which is judged, but the criminal, and where doctors, psychiatrists, and "experts" of all sorts intervene in the very process of trial. Foucault asks how and why these changes came about, and says that the solution will lie in
"trying to study the metamorphosis of punitive methods from the basis of a political technology of the body, wherein might be read a common history of power-relationships and object-relationships"

(p. 26) [Note 17]

It is essential to concentrate on the details of bodily control, because

"if, like Durkheim, we only study the general social forms, there is a risk of seeing the principle of the softening of punishment as lying in processes of individualisation which are, rather, one of the effects of the new tactics of power, among which are the new penal mechanisms."

(p. 28)

Such, then, is Foucault's statement of his subject. But why does Foucault choose this subject, and why does he treat it from this particular angle? The historical puzzle which he sets himself is, in fact, a condensation of a number of problems which are all traditional in sociological theory. The time at which the modern penal system first emerged is also, broadly speaking, the time at which our own modern society emerged. Foucault will base his analysis on the supposition that the mode of punishment is symptomatic of the mode of social relationships within a particular society, so that a change in punitive techniques has to be explained by reference to a change in social texture: thus far, at least, Foucault follows Durkheim fairly closely. But a punishment is not merely a question of social relationships, it also acts directly on a natural object, the body, and is, therefore, a hinge between the socio-conceptual and the material world. Archaic and Modern, Nature and Society, symptom and formant: here are three traditional problem-forms straightaway, but there is more. Almost from the first, Foucault insinuates a note of grave disenchantment with the contemporary, liberal ideology of punishment into his text. As it happens, Foucault has been an active campaigner for penal reform (or revolution?) for some years now. He is also a radical critic of modern French society as a whole. One sees why he takes punishment as the exemplary social relation: he is trying to mobilise simultaneously our guilty conscience as punishers and our indignation at being captives. 'Men is born free and is everywhere in chains', but here Rousseau's image is transposed into the terms of historical research. If Foucault sets out to explode a few current myths, he is not motivated only by his own political commitments; it can be argued that the objective history of an idea, especially of a still-current idea, must demythify, because if it does not demythify, it is merely the restatement of that which has to be explained. By the force of this argument, radicalism and positivism each make the other possible - a standpoint which goes back to the ideologues of the late eighteenth century, and, beyond them, to the social criticism of the Enlightenment.
After all these generalities, back to the historical part of the book. Foucault claims that, by the end of the eighteenth century, there were three incompatible and competing formulae of punishment:

'... in monarchic law, punishment is a ceremonial of sovereignty; it uses the ritual marks of vengeance, which it applies to the body of the convict; and it unfolds to the eyes of the spectators an effect of terror which is all the more intense for the physical presence of the sovereign and his power being discontinuous, irregular and always above his own laws. In the project of the reforming jurists, punishment is a procedure for requalifying individuals as subjects, in law; it uses, not marks, but signs, coded sets of representations, for which the scene of punishment must ensure the fastest circulation and the most universal acceptance possible; Finally, in the developing project of the carceral institution, punishment is a technique for coercing individuals; it deploys body-training procedures, not signs, with the traces that leaves in behaviour in the form of habit; and this form of punishment assumes the establishment of a specific power to manage punishment.'

(PP. 133-4)

A comparison of these three "technologies of power" term by term reveals their incompatibility: sovereign/social body/administrative apparatus; mark/sign/trace; ceremony/theatre/exercise; vanquished enemy/legal subject/individual under constraint; a body tortured and mutilated/a soul manipulated/a body re-educated. Foucault places a good deal of stress on the total incompatibility of one system with another, as well he might, because he needs to establish this point firmly in order to account for the rapidity and completeness of the historical change-over. But are the differences so well-defined as Foucault claims them to be? Apart from anything else, one wonders if Foucault has not been led to assume an unduly naturalistic definition of the human body by his own lack of assumptions about the human being.

Foucault's exposition falls into two main sections. Leading up to the passage I have just quoted is an account of the internal logic of the first modality of punishment, the Prince's justice, and of the reasons for its disappearance, while the second section, from the quoted passage on, is an attempt to explain why the third modality, the correctional, was chosen instead of the second.

Foucault's discussion of the complexities of legal and penal procedure in the late Middle Ages and in the classical period is clear and often illuminating. For example, Foucault comments on the game-like formality of the rules for administering the question, and compares trial-by-torture with the
According to Foucault, during the second half of the seventeenth century, a new technology of the body was discovered. This technology was novel in three respects: first, for the minute scale, the detailed character of its procedures; second, in its aim, which centred on the economy and efficacy of each single punishment. In the old system, the very elaborateness of penal procedure meant that punishment could be applied only sporadically, and, in practice, this meant that certain forms of illegality were countenanced, almost becoming tacit concessions. If the bourgeoisie were to ensure the greater repression of popular illegalisms (minor "thefts" of goods and labour), it had to plead, first of all, for the abolition of the arbitrary excesses of the old system of punishment.

"One must conceive of a penal system as an apparatus for "managing" illegalisms differentially, and not for suppressing them all", says Foucault (p. 91). In context, the remark applies to the reforms of the late 16th and early 19th centuries, but clearly it must apply equally well to the penal system of the classical period, and beyond that to the "differential" penology of earlier, feudal times. But, if every penal system is a new economy of old illegalisms, where is the original legality, except in a conditional time which is doomed to vanish as soon as it emerges into history? Rousseau's problems once more.

Granted that the King's justice was destined to be replaced by another, more extensive and homogeneous system of justice, why, in the event, was the Prison chosen rather than some system of theatrical representation? In explaining this, Foucault embarks on more original and more debatable theses. The second half of his book seems all the more important because Foucault claims that the reasons that lie behind the establishment of Prison also lie behind the emergence of the Human Sciences in the mid-nineteenth century.

Foucault embarks on more original and more debatable theses. Presumably, once one part of this structure collapses, it involves the crumbling of the whole; but Foucault does not lay so much stress on this point as one might expect. In some ways, Foucault's explanation of the crumbling of the monarchical system of justice is rather conventional: he ties it in, for example, with the growth of intensive agriculture and industry and with the rise of bourgeois capitalism, all of which weakened the political and economic bases of the monarchy because they moved the ownership of land, goods and labour into the hands of private individuals. However, Foucault points out that the object of the proposed penal reforms was to promote a new "economy" of punishment, in which a more complete distribution of punishment would have to be paid for by a drop in the level of intensity of each single punishment. In the old system, the very elaborateness of penal procedure meant that punishment could be applied only sporadically, and, in practice, this meant that certain forms of illegality were countenanced, almost becoming tacit concessions. If the bourgeoisie were to ensure the greater repression of popular illegalisms (minor "thefts" of goods and labour), it had to plead, first of all, for the abolition of the arbitrary excesses of the old system of punishment.

Foucault claims that the reasons that lie behind the establishment of Prison also lie behind the emergence of the Human Sciences in the mid-nineteenth century.
of movement; and lastly, in its modality, operating as an uninterrupted coercion. This technology, which Foucault calls, quite simply, "discipline", is not, of course without historical antecedents, in the various forms of slavery, vassalage, the exercises of the monastery, the theatre, and initiatic ceremonies. However, what is comparatively new is the linear organisation of these forms of control and exercise. This exhaustive linear programming operates both in time and in space (v. pp. 143-156).

The demands of a constant supervision brought with them a new geometry of functional spaces, and this geometry quickly passed from the barracks to the public hospital, the school, the workshop and the town-plan. Eventually, the structure of supervision comes to be the organising principle of society at large. On the relation between "supervision" and "discipline", Foucault has this to say:

'Hierarchic, continuous, functional supervision is, no doubt, not one of the great technical "inventions" of the eighteenth century, but its insidious extension owes its importance to the new mechanisms of power that it brings with it. Thanks to supervision, disciplinary power becomes an "integrated" system, linked from the outside to the economy and to the ends of the device in which it operates. Also, it is organised as a power which is multiple, automatic and anonymous; for, although it is true that supervision bears on individuals, its functioning is that of a network of relations from top to bottom, but also up to a certain point, from bottom to top and laterally; this network "holds together" the whole and criss-crosses it integrally with effects of power which take purchase on each other; supervisors perpetually supervised. Power in the hierarchy of supervision in disciplines is not held like a thing, nor is it transferred like a property; it functions like a piece of machinery. And although it is true that the pyramidal organisation gives it a "chief", it is the apparatus as a whole which produces "power" and distributes individuals inside this permanent and continuous field.'

(p. 179).

This passage offers scope for interminable comment, because it embodies so many important assumptions. Take the last sentence, for instance. If Foucault were saying that, in general, "power" were produced by the system as a whole, this would be unobjectionable; but what he is in fact saying is that this way of producing power, "totally" as it were, is peculiar to discipline, and this seems to me to be rather questionable. One appreciates that Foucault is trying to elucidate the anonymity of the new power system, for it is true that after the eighteenth century relations of power become increasingly "faceless" (or impersonal, bureaucratic, etc., - call it what you will). But it seems to me that Foucault has hit on the wrong explanation. Ideology, or express
symbolism, is one thing and structural realities another: no doubt, in the legal and political ideologies of the Ancien Regime, all power was held to emanate from the person of the king, whereas in the political ideology of post-Revolutionary France power was held to emanate, mediately, from the constituted general will: but, in spite of this obvious difference of ideologies (which, in any case, involves a good deal of oversimplification) it remains true that both before and after the revolution, power was produced by the whole network rather than by a particular element of the network, and this is not because of the 'insidious extension' of 'supervision' and 'discipline' during the eighteenth century, but because power is always produced by 'the apparatus as a whole'.

When Foucault turns to the invention of the Norm in the Classical age, he is onto a more promising trail. The norm presupposes a continuous scale of differentiation, and it does therefore make possible a greater degree of individualisation at the same time as it promotes a greater homogeneity in society. In a normative regime, the most strongly individualised are those who are lowest on the scale - children, delinquents, the diseased etc. All of this contrasts with the feudal scale of differentiation, which is based on status: the most individualised are those at the top of the hierarchy (king and great nobles), and the system as a whole tends to accentuate the heterogeneity of society. For these reasons, it can be claimed that 'discipline', with its continuous scales of comparison, creates the individual as an object of knowledge:

'The individual is, no doubt, the fictional atom of an "ideological" representation of society; but he is also a reality manufactured /196/ by this specific technology of power that is called "discipline". One must stop always describing the effects of power in negative terms ... In fact, power produces; it produces something real; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that can be had thereof depend on this production.'

(PP. 195-6).

For Foucault, human nature is moulded by the social and historical conditions in which human beings find themselves - moulded, not absolutely perhaps, but sufficiently profoundly for particular human "natures" to be counted as real as any other sort of reality. The force of this position lies, I think, in the fact that Foucault is not led by the constation of human variability into relativism; what is real can be known objectively. It follows from this that the sciences of the individual, such as psychiatry, criminology, pedagogy and so on, are indeed "objective" sciences; but it also follows that the historian can bracket out all the ontological questions when he writes the history of these, or of any other, sciences, because he will be reconstructing the "Referent" from a different angle.
The techniques of discipline are mostly quite old, as Foucault stresses, but they assume a fundamental importance during the eighteenth century, because they reach a 'technological threshold', beyond which savoir and pouvoir reinforce each other. The aims of the various disciplines were three: to make the exercise of power as cheap as possible, to extend the effects of power as far as possible, and to increase docility and productivity both at the same time. The generalisation of discipline throughout society corresponds to a well-known historical conjuncture - on the one hand, demographic expansion, with an increase in the size of the floating population and a change in the relative sizes of different social groups; on the other hand, a rapid development in the apparatus of production. Discipline emerges as a response to the need for correlating these two sides of the historical conjuncture. The concentration of capital and the concentration of men each requires the other, and, besides, an overall principle of organisation (pp. 220-5). This, then, is the background against which the sciences of the individual become possible, a particular form of social evolution, which when once started, is irreversible, because each of the forces is solidary with the others.

What of penology in all this? The prison, with its stress on the reforming power of isolation, the educative power of work, and the casuistics of individual treatment, clearly owes much to the techniques of the hospital, the factory and the school, and is, in fact, according to Foucault, a replication of the disciplinary structures of the society outside. But it is more too. For the prison failed to be a true correctional from the very first. The effect of prison is to transform the mere law-breaker into a delinquent, to encourage recidivism, to maintain and organise a specific criminal milieu. So why has prison lasted so long?

'One should then suppose that prison, and in a general way punishment, no doubt, are not intended to suppress infractions; but rather to distinguish them, to distribute them, to use them; ... Punishment may, then, be a way of managing illegalisms...'

(p. 277)

In similar vein, Foucault points out that the relationship between the police and the criminal class is a symbolic one, and he claims that the concentration of crime into a small, specific class is a way of containing, or short-circuiting, other, more dangerous and radical illegalisms. A subversive message this, and, perhaps a not unseasonable one at a time when the view seems to be spreading that society consists exclusively of cops versus robbers.

There remains a problem, not peculiar to carceral punishment, no doubt, but crucial in such a system because it depends so heavily on the passivity of those who are punished: how is it that punishment is accepted?
'The theory of contract can only reply by the fiction of a jural subject ceding to others the power to exercise on him the right which he himself holds on them. It is quite probable that the great carceral continuum which makes the power of discipline communicate with that of the law, and stretches without break from the smallest coercions to the great penal detention, constituted the doublet, technical and real, immediately material, of this chimerical surrender of the right to punish.' (p. 310).

This passage is indeed intriguing. Surely, the terms of a doublet show some sort of correspondence, even if only an historical one; but here, to the real and immediately material term there corresponds only an ideological fiction. This seems to run counter to the grain of Foucault's analysis so far, which is largely intended to show that 'Pouvoir et savoir s'impliquent l'un l'autre' (p. 32; I decline to translate). But leaving aside the question of the chimerical nature of legal ideology, there is also the idea that social relations, constantly translated into the material architecture of daily life, eventually become a sort of programme for human experience. (The idea owes as much to Durkheim and Halbwachs as Marx, though I am not sure that Foucault would care to own it). The idea justifies a view of society as structurally repetitive, and large sections of the book put forward just such a view: Bentham's Panopticon becomes the image of the episteme - indeed, at times, Foucault speaks as though the Panopticon is the episteme. Elsewhere, however, Foucault takes an opposite course and speaks as though society were structurally divergent or innovative. (After all, how else is one to explain dramatic changes like the one with which Foucault opens?).

The terms of Foucault's explanation are ambiguous - ambiguous, that is, when one views them from the vantage-point of the traditional dichotomies I spoke of at the beginning. The key words of Foucault's analysis are words like "technique", and "strategy". Now a technique (or strategy) is neither a thing nor an idea: It is a faculty, both pouvoir and savoir; what is more, although it is not a permanent, unlimited capacity of Human Nature, the number of cases in which it may operate is not finite. From this point of view, the concept of a "technique" appears as the analytic counterpart of human being itself; a specifiable indetermination; and one can say that Foucault is striving for an explanation of the same scale as individual men. It is inside the idea of a technique too that the contradiction between a constantly unfolding History and a self-repeating history can be resolved; for a strategy is both endless expiation into act and continuous articulation of one act with another - only, for the historian, history moves through qualitative thresholds, and he can, conceptually, distinguish between different epochs, and between different series within the same epoch.
There is another side to Foucault's ambiguity, besides his quest for the middle road. He crosses sociological categories, speaking of the economy of power, the accountancy of illegality, the political technology of the body and so on. To a certain extent, these are established metaphors, but they betray as well Foucault's conviction that every social act has a "total" significance. Again, this insistence on the interdependence of all social actions derives from the concept of "strategy": if a strategy is the correlation of one act with another, then no act can, therefore, be without repercussion, it must affect at last the global economy of action. Not so much a standpoint of sociological holism, therefore, as an epistemological account of the tendency to systematicity.

Mark Aston

Note

(1): My translation throughout this review. This passage illustrates well the impossibility of rendering the full extent of Foucault's word play into something like normal English. The original French reads: 'essayer d'étudier la metamorphose des methodes punitives a partir d'une technologie politique du corps ou pourrait se lire une histoire commune des rapports de pouvoir et des relations d'objet'.

Each of these six papers has for its aim a "symbolic analysis". This means, they coincide in "a concern to reveal the meaning of symbolic ideas and symbolic (or 'ritual') behaviour, what, in terms comprehensible to us, observers from an alien culture, they 'stand for'." Such is the view of the editor, truer than he perhaps intended, for his statement points to the limitations, as well as the direction, of the collection.

The volume is the product of one of the sessions of the decennial A.S.A. conference, held in 1973, under the general title of 'New Directions in Social Anthropology'. That title, as well as the traditional push of A.S.A. volumes beyond mere clarification and exposition, carries an insistence that the work should at least attempt some major theoretical breakthrough. One has a right to expect, from such a volume, a seminal statement of the problematic in question. That this is lacking derives, largely, from the nature of the enterprises undertaken by the individual authors.

The papers all operate within a disturbingly similar framework. From the culture in which he or she did fieldwork, the author selects one aspect, redolent in symbolism, to be the central matter of the analysis. The meanings of this aspect of its symbols, implicit and explicit, nearer and more distant, are then teased out, through an agglomeration of other aspects of the culture. Whether the original choice falls on everyday actions, spells, rituals, archaic or current texts; in each case the enquiry extends beyond that factor to all the other symbolic elements of the culture. Thus each paper limits itself to the exegesis of the symbolic system of a single culture. Certainly 'comparative' elements from elsewhere are often cited, just as theoretical concerns often come in for peripheral treatment. But, starting from a single feature of a single culture, the weight is always on that feature, and its ramifications within the culture, and still there is insufficient space for a full and satisfactory treatment.

To call attention to this fact is as much praise as it is complaint. In "breaking through the classical constraints" of symbolic studies (Editor's Introduction), the authors have accepted the implications of two injunctions, neither of them new, but only rarely followed through in this field in the past. Firstly, since symbolic systems are codes, languages, wholes, they must be studied as totalities, and pseudo-dictionaries of what 'referents' particular symbols 'represent' are inadequate. Secondly, that symbolism — meaning at once active and reified — is present wherever men are, penetrates all levels of activity (and is therefore the central concern of anthropologists). These two facts join in an absolute militation against reductionism. It is this that the authors, to their credit, have accepted. But the consequences they choose to draw are unfortunate. For in each case they have adopted this liberation as an impulse to total exegesis. The attempt has become to provide an encyclopaedia of a culture, rather than a dictionary.

One could, given the space, argue against the notion that such a task is worthwhile, on the grounds that our aim is not the knowledge of 'other cultures', but reference to ourselves. But whatever one's opinion on that, the fact remains that such total exposition is impossible in anything less than a book. To attempt the enterprise in this format leads ultimately to nothing other than frustration and dissatisfaction.
The authors are not entirely without a sense of their responsibility to theory. They almost all avow that their papers are merely an early stage in the ongoing dialectic between 'data' and 'thought'. But, aside from the feeling that something more than that is called for here, what suggestions there are of theoretical directions are hardly exciting. One can accept, for the most part, that the specific level of our work requires the exegesis of particular cultures. But the authors in this volume all seem still to be bound by the idea, that the general level is inhabited by 'universal characteristics of culture', to be discovered by 'comparative studies'. That attitude is a by-product of the 'dictionary of symbols' approach, reductive by its very nature. There is no sense that the authors are seeking to establish a new general level, correlate to their 'new', broader approach to specific studies.

I am not demanding that 'answers' to general level 'questions' should be provided in this volume. But I am arguing that the generalised problematic at least should receive some direct treatment, some attempt at formulation. This, all the more so, because the papers forever, yet tantalisingly, push one towards it. At their worst the individual papers are competent; at their best highly elegant. And because of this they are always interesting, always pushing one forward, to further questions on the nature of symbols and their inter-relationships, the implications of their role as the penetrative force of ideology, and the methodology required to approach these matters.

If one offers the criticism that the book does not drive forward as it might, it is only because one cares so much. In an incidental collection, or a festschrift, one could more easily accept the static nature, the limited aims, and praise it for its excellence within those limits. Of an A.S.A. collection, particularly at a time when a push forward is much needed, one must say, that elegance is not enough; it is even retrograde, for it enforces the dissipating tendency to consolidation and recuperation.

Martin Cantor


This is a collection of 14 papers first read at a conference in California in 1971. The conference was the fifth of six conferences on Chinese society. In the Introduction Arthur Wolf assesses the contributions made by the various papers and outlines the main argument of each. The Afterword by Robert J. Smith, an anthropologist of Japanese religion is a comment on the papers by an outsider, and a brief comparison of Chinese religious variation with that found in Japan. Of the others, the main bulk of the book, all (except Maurice Freedman's, which is a survey of the sociological study of Chinese religion) are based on fieldwork in Taiwan or Hong Kong. The topics cover a range of themes including Taoist ritual, Cantonese Shamanism, the relationship between this world and the supernatural world. As might be expected, where most of the contributors are American, the majority of essays are concerned with Taiwan.

The question of variation in religious belief and practice, which as Wolf says in the introduction is the 'first question that students of religion in complex societies must face', is the dominant theme to emerge from the collection. Robert J. Smith comments how during the discussion of the papers 'I was struck by the extent to which
the situation resembled a field interview. Each participant seemed
to be dealing with all the others as though they were informants.
Those who had conducted their research in Hong Kong expressed great
interest - and sometimes polite incredulity - when informed of prac-
tices and beliefs on Taiwan. Even within Taiwan and Hong Kong marked
divergences are apparent. Indeed, even within the individual, there
is room for many conflicting points of view. As Nargery Topley in
'Cosmic Antagonisms: A Mother-Child Syndrome' points out, because of
the lack of commitment to a single cosmological system, a Cantonese
mother has a variety of explanations available to her to account for
a sickly or fractious child. As is evident by Smith's comments
above, the full extent of possible variety was not apparent to the con-
tributors until they had heard each others' papers.

Nevertheless, Freedman argues in 'On the Sociological Study of
Chinese Religion' that 'the religious ideas and practices of the Chinese
are not a congeries of haphazardly assembled elements... Behind the
superficial variety there is order of a sort... of a kind that should
allow us to trace ruling principles of ideas across a vast field of
apparently heterogeneous beliefs, and ruling principles of form and
organisation in an equally enormous terrain of varied action and
association'.

In his capacity as editor it is Wolf who emphasises the vari-
ation and the need to specify the conditions under which one inter-
pretation is preferred over another.

It is impossible in a review of this scope to do justice to the
many themes covered in the other essays, underlying most of which is
a concern with the social and political background to certain beliefs
and practices. Hence, for instance, there is Donald R. DeGlopper
in 'Religion and Ritual in Lukang' analysing one case in detail, the
public ritual in the city of Lukang in Taiwan in the hopes of dis-
covering 'the less obvious relationships of religion and society'.

However, four of the articles (Feuchtwang, Wolf, Wang Sung- hsing,
Harrel) which can be loosely grouped together, examine the relation-
ship between laymen and the supernatural. It is clear that for the
Chinese the supernatural are divided into three types: gods, ghosts
and ancestors. But as Wolf points out, these are not exclusive cate-
gories: 'One man's ancestor is another man's ghost'; and Harrel dis-
cusses the circumstances in which a ghost may become a god. All four
papers show clearly, moreover, how the supernatural pantheon reflects
the world order, the gods and ancestors forming the heavenly bureaucracy,
ghosts being the beggars and outcasts of that 'society'. Wolf raises the
important point that in view of this analogy, peasants and elite ob-
viously have a very different attitude to supernatural beings. Indeed
he makes the point that the bureaucracy in Heaven and on earth are two
parallel systems: the governor of an area does not appeal to the local
gods to bring rain, he orders them to do so.

The essays are fascinating and detailed ethnography and go a good
way towards analysing particular variations of belief and practice in
small corners of Taiwan and Hong Kong. The overwhelming question of
what those beliefs have become on the Mainland is unfortunately not
possible to answer in anything like the same degree of detail and has
largely to be left aside. But there is still the task as Wolf says,
of attempting to account for the variation within the whole - if it
is a whole - of Chinese society in 'residual China'.

Diana Martin
Books Received


Woman's Evolution. From matriarchal clan to patriarchal family. Evelyn Reed. Pathfinder Press. New York. 1975. xviii, 491 pp. £2.05

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The journal is published three times per year. Articles are welcome from students of anthropology and from people in other disciplines. It is preferred that the main emphasis should be on analytical discussion rather than on plain description. Papers should be as short as is necessary to get the point over. As a general rule they should not exceed 5,000 words. They should follow the conventions for citations, notes and references used in the A.S.A. monographs. Comments will also be welcome. Communications should be addressed to the Journal Editors, Institute of Social Anthropology, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford.

We have a stock of certain back issues, available at the same prices as the current volume. Vol. III no.2, Vol. IV no.3 and Vol. V no.1 are no longer in print. The subscription rate is - single issues: 60p or $2 for individuals, £1 or $3 for institutions; for one year: £1.50 or $4 for individuals, £3 or $8 for institutions. All prices cover postage. Cheques should be made out to J.A.S.O., and sent to the Journal Editors, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford, England.

Tim Jenkins is resigning his post as editor.

Thanks are due to all those who have assisted with the production of this issue.
Marxist terminology has, over the last few years, appeared in a number of anthropological publications and there can be little doubt that, even now, it is fashionable to quote avowedly marxist authors. In the process not only has marxism become domesticated but the benefits to social analysis have not, somehow, been as marked as one might have hoped. The academic left, observing an economic recession and political stirrings in the outside world, have produced a number of weighty theoretical tomes in a manner reminiscent of the Jikany Nuer sacrificing in front of advancing smallpox. At the same time, to judge from some recent contributions, social anthropology has not even disentangled itself from the confusions engendered by Godelier's *Rationalité et Irrationalité en Economie*, despite the fact that the book is now ten years old. The belief is still fostered that historical materialism is something to do with 'economic anthropology'.

That such a 'short circuit' should have occurred in this country is not altogether surprising. Godelier's *Objets et Methodes de l'Anthropologie Economique* (1965, reprinted in 1966/72) was referred to by two of the contributors to the 1965 ASA conference on economic anthropology and was offered by Godelier himself as a solution to the impasses which economic anthropology had reached. One may reasonably hold that Godelier's position has not undergone any fundamental change since the appearance of that first article. Jonathan Friedman's work, which has attracted considerable attention among the would be "alternative anthropologists", proceeds along similar lines to those laid down in *Rationality and Irrationality* although the lines have been extended, as we shall see, in at least one direction. Both these authors offer anthropological analyses hemmed about with a terminology which establishes fictitious kinship with a rather dull facet of the marxist tradition and I suspect that their particular use of this terminology not only misrepresents what they themselves are doing but also obscures much of what is interesting in Marx and, perhaps more important, in marxism. In this paper I wish simply to examine some indications which exist in their work of the directions in which soi-disant "marxist anthropology" must develop if it is to escape its present constriction. To an extent this constriction derives from the close resemblance between much of institutional marxism and "bourgeois" academic analysis. The problems with which we are faced are, therefore, extremely broad, but we can at least approach them through *Rationality and Irrationality*, a book through which the rhetoric of historical materialism entered the British anthropological debate and was, at the same time, trapped within the limits of economic anthropology.

**Economic Anthropology**

At least from the moment when Engels expounded Marx's ideas, and indeed in the period of gestation where Marx himself was writing, marxism has wrestled with the problem of economism. The theoretical status of "the economy" has changed repeatedly in the course of marxism's development but the edge of the enquiry has, perhaps, been blunted by the fact that the practical importance of economics can hardly be doubted in a society where every day life is moulded and constrained by "economic necessity". The theoretical status of the
economic necessity" is not the catchword of everyday life and to this extent the example of economic anthropology is an instructive prologue to the marxist analyses. The state of economic anthropology at the 1965 ASA conference is set out both by Frankenberg and by Cohen in ASA 6 (Firth ed. 1966), and here one need provide only a brief résumé of the major confusions which were agreed to exist at the time. All of these devolve about the attempt to apply economics (the subject developed to explain and predict the workings of our own 'economy') to the workings of societies which do not recognise an economy.

The broadest division conventionally recognised in the economic anthropology of the time is that between 'formalists' and 'substantivists'. The formalists represented, both for Godelier (1972:253) and for Frankenberg (1966:57), by Robbins Burling, held the proper object of economic analysis to be the allocation of scarce resources (i.e. the maximisation of gain by the individual) no matter what those resources may be. For Burling, of course, the relation of a mother to her baby is as 'economic' as anything else. The formalist approach is akin to that of game-theory and runs the same risk of propounding tautologies in the process of divining the individual's utilities. The maximisation of gain is certainly one referent of the term "economic" and does after all underpin the classical economic analyses of western societies but, as Dalton suggests;

"The 'economic man' of 19th century economics was not a myth but a succinct expression of this institutional fact; the necessity for each of the atomistic units in an impersonal market exchange system to acquire his livelihood through market sale." (1961:2 cit. Frankenberg 1966:66)

Dalton may be counted a supporter of the 'substantive' position according to which economics concerns material wealth such as land, tools, agricultural produce and so on, but he makes the important point that our market economy complies with both the formal and substantive definitions of what is 'economic'. It was a constant point of reference that western society is distinguished by a defined economy in which production and consumption are supposedly governed by (competitive) market forces whereas many societies do not ascribe the production and consumption of material goods to a discrete institution. Dalton conceived the problem which this posed for economic anthropology in extreme terms.

"Primitive economy is different from market industrialism not in degree but in kind. The absence of machine technology, pervasive market organisation and all-purpose money, plus the fact that economic transactions cannot be understood apart from social obligation, create, as it were, a non-Euclidean universe to which Western economic theory cannot be fruitfully applied." (1961:20 cit. Frankenberg 1966:65)

The metaphor of non-Euclidean geometry suggests an irreducible opposition between market and non-market but Dalton himself, in company
with Bohannan, collapses it by the insertion of "peripheral market", an ad-hoc construction in which the law of supply and demand operates on some occasions but not on others, encountering inelasticities as the case demands (see Dalton and Bohannan 1962). The collapse of oppositions into typologies seems to be a symptom of theoretical inadequacy in many areas of post-war social anthropology and the economic anthropology of the early sixties produced a number of such collapses. Frankenberg lists the following:

Firth : Primitive Peasant Industrial
Polanyi : Reciprocal Redistributive Exchange
Sahlins : Generalised Balanced Negative
reciprocity reciprocity reciprocity

It's not suggested that these map accurately one onto another, but all express a similar discomfort which derives in large part from the fact that the term 'economic' has a double nature. First, it claims an empirical referent; second, it articulates with the other terms of the language from which it comes and it is part of this articulation quietly to englobe the former function. The common sense view of the substantivists was, at the least, deceptive in that this articulation already presents activities related to tangible wealth as an 'obvious' object for analysis.

Godelier's Economie

Godelier does little to avoid the problem posed by the term 'economic', and censures Polanyi's distinction between cases where the economy (which neither of them doubts is there) is 'embedded' and those where it is 'disembedded' in the following terms:

"This distinction seems to be a questionable one, since the term 'disembedded' could suggest an absence of internal relation between the economic and the non-economic, whereas this relation exists in every society. Actually the conditions characteristic of the functioning of an industrial commodity economy confer on the economy (during the 19th century at least) a very extensive autonomy in relation to the other structures (the state etc.). (1972:268).

If internal relation between the economic and non-economic is to be found in every society then what are we to make of "autonomy"? Godelier's switch from "the economic" to "the economy" signifies economic anthropology's old confusion between a defined facet of our own society and the fact that people everywhere produce things. "The economic", which might be thought to have cross-cultural validity in so far as people do produce things, is defined as though the substantivist position were fair but incomplete.

"The economic appears as a complex social reality because it is both a particular field of activity, directed toward the production of material goods, and, at the same time, through the mechanism of this production, ...a particular aspect of all non-economic activities." (1972:23)
This willingness to make minor alterations in the original 'problematic', rather than rethink what was recognized at the time as a dubious approach, leads to considerable confusion and Godelier puts himself in very much the same position for which he derides the formalists, i.e.

"Everything becomes economic in principle, while nothing remains economic in fact." (1972:255)

Although we are not concerned here to assess his work as a whole, we should be aware that Godelier pursues two different approaches under the same rubric, talking on the one hand in plainly causal (vulgar materialist) terms (e.g. 1972:IX) and on the other decentralising the economic to the point where it is not the sort of entity which could determine anything (e.g. 1972:102). We shall return to the effects of the more blatant forms of economism but let us, for the moment, examine Godelier's attempt to decentralise the economic and admit it as an integral part of the social formation rather than locate it as an external source of change. The attempt culminates in the following explanation:

"By economic infrastructure is simply meant the totality of the productive forces and of the social relations of human beings with each other and with nature that depend on the level of development of those forces and that program and control the social process of production of the material conditions of existence." (1975:14)

According to this definition, whatever the dominant structure may in fact be it is defined as 'economic' since if a particular set of relations 'programs' the society as a whole as the metaphor of "economic necessity" has our own, it can hardly help but control the swiddening, herding or whatever 'material production' is to be found in the particular case. Our queries as to what exactly determines what are met with a tautology: If it's determinant then it's economic and the economic is, in the last instance, determinant. Moreover, Godelier's definition of the economic infrastructure is exhaustive, i.e. it is difficult to see what the social formation could possibly contain that isn't included in "social relations of human beings with each other and with nature". Certainly the division of society into two parts is difficult to maintain and, while Godelier refers to the whole as infrastructure, the terminology can of course be reversed. Lévi-Strauss refers to the totality of society as superstructure, pushing infrastructures back to the far side of the nature/culture boundary. It would be glib but not untrue to say that, for him, infrastructures are such 'externals' as patterns of rainfall. (see especially 1966: 90-96).

In Godelier's case the totalisation signifies a confusion which he shares with the economic anthropology he sought to correct. Production of (tangible) material goods is governed by (intangible) relations and, when we discuss the respective status of different instances within the social formation, it is the structuring of these relations with respect to one another which is at issue, and not some mysterious property deriving from contact with the soil. Status crops, prohibitions on particular foods, and separated spheres of
exchange for different goods may all mediate between the social and the ecological. If we are to admit them as economic then the economic is everywhere and nowhere, but Godelier wishes to retain it as a separable entity:

"We showed that there is no economic rationality 'in itself', nor any definitive form of economic rationality, that economic rationality is only one aspect of a wider rationality, that of social life, that this aspect plays an ultimately determining role." (1972:102)

Economic values, values pertaining to the production and consumption of material goods, are said to be more basic than other values in that they play some determining role but at the same time they are part of all social values. It seems the contradiction can be resolved only if we resort to a neo-functionalist belief in the ecological adaptiveness of societies, but the anthropological literature offers sufficient examples of value structures which ignore the supposed last instance and grind themselves to destruction.

What of dominant yet apparently non-economic structures such as 'kinship' relations? Godelier's reply is of more importance than the confusions surrounding it.

"In certain societies kinship relations dominate social life... they function as production relations just as they function as political, religious etc. relations. Accordingly the correspondence between productive forces and productive relations is, at the same time, correspondence between economy and kinship." (1972:95)

It is this equation of kinship relations, or whatever it may be in a particular society, with the relations of production that I wish to pursue. Where kinship is "both infrastructure and superstructure" (1972:94) for, let us say, the Kamaroi (see 1975:7-10), is it not the case that economics is both infrastructure and superstructure for us? We live our economic relations much as they live their places in a four-section system. Systems of definition are culture-specific and we can hardly assume that ours is distinguished by a crystal-clear view of the supposed signifies. The assertion that kinship is really 'economics' (but the locals don't realise it?) is empty and serves only to perpetuate a confusion which derives from our own society. Lefebvre makes the point very clearly.

"La réflexion éclaire l'histoire à partir du présent. Ainsi le mode de production féodal se découvre comme condition historique du capitalisme en Europe... Dans le mode de production capitaliste prédomine l'économie politique. Loin de tout expliquer par l'économique, loin de formuler un déterminisme économique, Marx veut montrer que la détermination par l'économie date du capitalisme et le caractérise." (1975:168)

We might hesitate to say exactly what Marx "veut montrer" but Lefebvre's statement is of considerable relevance to our consideration of other
cultures. The "field of activity directed toward the production of material goods" was undoubtedly the form of the dominant structure (i.e. the organising metaphor) in the Britain of which Marx wrote and to an extent it still is. The specific dominance of a structure is, however, a question of ideology before all else and its power within its own society lies precisely in the fact that "the reasonable man" (specific to his own ideology) can, in this case, invoke "economic necessity" while the self-evidence of the structure imparts an appearance of irresponsibility to anyone who questions it. As Althusser makes clear (1971), there is no need, in day to day life, for the dominant class to resort to brute force. Where the "necessity" of the dominant structure is protected largely by accusations of irresponsibility or even stupidity in our own society, elsewhere the accusations may be of witchcraft; irreverence to the ancestors or whatever. The concern of marxism with economics in its analysis of bourgeois society is a productive and necessary articulation with das.Bestehende, but there is good reason to avoid attributing an economy to a society which tells us it doesn't have one, and it should arouse our suspicion to see marxism and capitalism racing each other through the jungle, like missionaries of rival denominations, each carrying a different version of the same message.

Appearances and Materiality

Friedman's examination of fetishism (1974a) offers a parallel development of the position established by Godelier in his consideration of the relation of kinship relations to the relations of production but is, at the same time, concerned with the very heart of marxist theory. Friedman begins from the 'ambiguity' which he finds throughout Marx's work, from The Manuscripts of 1844 to Capital; alienated life seems to exist in forms which are at the same time real and illusory. With respect to The Manuscripts and Capital respectively, he notes,

"...on the one hand we are told that alienation is a material process or act of separation of the worker from his product, a real estrangement. Simultaneously alienation is the appearance that labor (sic) takes on for the laboror." (1974a:28)

and "...when we consider capitalist relations of production themselves i.e. the material structure which is supposed to generate the fetishised categories, we find ourselves in something of a contradiction, since capital after all is not a second or third order fetish but the principle relation of production in the system. How can the illusion be the material relation which is supposed to have generated it?" (1974a:32)

Friedman pursues this ambiguity through the development of Marx's exposition, from the (mythical) genesis of money-capital to the behaviour of this entity in the 'real' world of capitalism. (Vols. I and III of Capital respectively). The point is established that exchange value cannot be held to misrepresent the amount of social labour embodied in a particular product; it represents it perfectly accurately. Value and exchange value, however, have no empirical existence. As Friedman puts it "they are not the phenomenal forms
of capitalist structure" (1974a:41) and the capitalist world operates in terms of money-capital and commodity prices just as it appears to do, although he retains profit, wage and interest in the 'unreal' world of "truly imaginary forms" (ibid.). The important point for our purposes in his characterisation of money-capital.

"This pure form (M-M') specifies the nature of capitalist relations. It determines the way in which labor is exploited, the specific structure of the capitalist class relation. And yet it is fetish, not because it is a misrepresentation of some other activity but because it is opaque with respect to what it does." (1974a:43, emphasis original)

As was the case with Godelier's discussion of kinship, we are presented with an equation, in some very real sense, of appearance and function. While labour is logically prior to all else, it 'appears' only through value and exchange value which, in turn, 'take the form' of price in the discourse organised by money-capital. Value and exchange value are, if you like, unconscious, with all that that might entail, while the discourse organised by money-capital claims, at the least, the priority due to signifiers.

Friedman opposes attempts to situate the relations of production below the text constituted by their appearance in the real world and on this score criticises Althusser and Balibar's usage of 'structural causality' at some length. It will be remembered that in Reading Capital the economy is determinant in a peculiarly roundabout way; it determines, as structural causality, that some other structure be dominant.

"Dans les structures différents l'économie est déterminante en ce qu'elle détermine celle des instances de la structure sociale qui occupe la place déterminante." (1968, II:110 cit. Friedman 1974a:49)

It is as though, whatever the content or appearance of social events may be, there is behind them a determining structure which is unknowable or noumenal. Friedman suggests that

"The attempt to reduce production relations to pure materiality, relegating the rest to a number of super-structural instances whose place in production is determined by this materiality becomes a complex elaboration on a mechanical materialist model." (1974a:52 • See diagram over page).

In fact the case is worse than this since the relations of production in Reading Capital are foralless by virtue of their cultural neutrality. The word "noumenal" was meant seriously; we might tentatively suggest that Althusser's distinction between 'knowledge of the real' and 'the real' has more direct links with Kant than with Marx, and is unavoidably idealist in that it explains determinate historical reality only in terms of an abstraction which cannot be apprehended in "human sensuous activity". As we have already mentioned, Godelier adopts,
on occasion, a model almost identical to Balibar's. E.g.

"What determining power in economic relations is it that dictates that there shall be dominance by kin relations or by politico-religious relations?"

(1972:IX cit. Friedman 1974a:54)

In broad terms, however, we may accept Friedman's assessment of Godelier's contribution

"Godelier's treatment of relations of production, of the non-intentional nature of their structure, of the fantastic form that they take, points in the direction of a new concept of fetishism. But he maintains at the same time, the notion of structural causality which is incompatible with the concept of relations of production as fetish, which denies the ideological representation no matter how 'present' it may be in the process of social reproduction." (1974a:55)

Both Godelier and Friedman are flirting with the realisation that, rather than some structures being no more than analogical accounts of others, all lived relations with the world are tautelogical i.e. every action or statement is, unavoidably, a performative.

Friedman's work, in particular, suggests, and implicitly contains, a new use of the term 'infrastructure' which is perhaps repressed on account of its dissimilarity with more traditional marxist theory, and in reduced form. The "new concept of fetishism" can already be seen at work in Godelier's discussion of the Aborigines and in Friedman's analysis of the Katchin (both in Bloch 1975) where the processes of social reproduction are approached as the mutual limitation of largely autonomous structures which are historically given; structures which persist throughout the span of time considered in the analyses. These structures are 'opaque' with respect to what they do and, just
as "... the pure form \((M-M')\) specifies the nature of capitalist relations", so the pure form \(A \rightarrow B\) or \(A \rightarrow B\) (corresponding to Mayu/Dama) specifies the nature of Katchin relations. There seems to be no sound reason to say one is 'infrastructural' but the other is not; the infrastructural status of a set of relations is seen, particularly through Friedman's work, to lie precisely in its given-ness or persistance and not in its, often indirect, relation to the biological. The given-ness of such relations does not generate a separate lived world but is itself lived, as Friedman stresses.

"Social reproduction takes place through social forms and society lives its reproduction in these forms. It lives its own alienation not as alienated consciousness but as social fetish which both determines the structure of material reproduction and misrepresents it due to its opacity." (1974a:59)

As he notes, the temptation to fall back into a quasi-Feuerbachian position, where appearance is purely derivative, is part of the very language with which marxism has traditionally operated.

"[Fetishism] is the dominant structure of social reproduction. The problem with the term, of course, is that a 'fetish' always seems to be the end product of the process of fetishisation, a mis-representation of some other object or situation i.e. a derivative phenomenon. I would suggest that we keep the idea of fetish as mis-representation but that we drop the corresponding verb form notion as its necessary precondition." (1974a:56)

We can hardly disagree with Friedman's characterisation of the identity 'Fetish/Relation of production' as central to social reproduction. There is, however, a sense in which social phenomena are derivative, in so far as they emerge from the state which historically precedes them. While they are not representations of some other object, we should be aware that to social consciousness all social forms are re-presentations.

**Ideology and Infrastructures**

Friedman is concerned to assert the presence of fetish at the heart of the social formation and concludes that "social relations of production are themselves fetishes" and "... do not adequately represent their material effects not because they are illusions engendered by the material level but because they are opaque with respect to that level." (1974:56) Yet he goes on to say "Thus fetish is not ideology". (ibid, my emphasis) Ideology is certainly superstructural according to the accepted marxist model (see e.g. Friedman 1974b), and, although Friedman fights shy of the terms infrastructure and super-structure, it is not unfair to suggest that we are again presented with a model in which everything is infrastructure. He writes of ideology as though it were illusion and nothing more. e.g.

"... the process of reproduction appears to be controlled by the spirit[k]. All real labor appears as the "work of the gods". This amounts to nothing less than a total inversion of reality..." (1974:58)
"It is because the process of production is represented
upside down that certain lineages can, by controlling the
supernatural, come to dominate the community.

This is not a question of ideology. The chiefly or
royal class is entitled to its surplus on no other basis
than that it occupies an instrumental place in the imaginary
conditions of reproduction of the society. Monopoly over
"wealth giving" spirits is of the same order as monopoly
over money capital. The control of both fictitious items
ensures the domination over material reproduction and the
exploitation of the labor of the society."

(1974:59 my emphasis)

Precisely so, but it is hard to see what ideology could be if it does not
include that set of apprehensions which men live as their social relations,
whether these relations exist in terms of "capital" or in terms of
"nats" and "mayu/dama". There is a confusion in many marxist writings
which rests upon an uncompromisingly negative valuation of ideology; a
negative valuation which all but defines ideology without the need for
further reflection. This view seems generally to be associated with a
conceptual topography in which both ideology (bad) and knowledge (good)
are situated above the text of real events, while whatever is supposed
to give events their "meaning" is situated below the text in the form of,
for instance, the economic infrastructure. Friedman retains a position,
consistent with this scheme, whereby the demonstration that particular
fetishes are relations of production, and hence infrastructural, suffices
to show that they are not superstructural i.e. ideological; as though
we could have one without the other. In marked contrast to such a view,
Gramsci wrote:

"The analysis of Marx's propositions on the force of
popular belief/tends, I think, to reinforce the conception
of 'historical bloc' in which precisely the material forces
are the content and ideologies are the form, though this
distinction has purely didactic value since the material
forces would be inconceivable without form and the ideolo-
gegies would be individual fancies without the material
forces." (1974:59)

Friedman's demonstration that fetish is not simply an illusory image of
material relations, but the form of the more resistant of these relations,
implies this same indissoluble unity of appearance and process. He is
concerned to establish the reality of capitalist relations in the society
of which Marx wrote; a society which "lives its own alienation not as
alienated consciousness" but, unavoidably, in its specific social forms
which are "given" to those within it. Similarly, it is not that the
Katchin are subject to or, more precisely, subject in "nothing less
than a total inversion of reality" but that our respective realities
are specifically alienated in such a way that their's appears inverted
to us. The definitive status of particular worlds for those who live
in them is hardly in question unless we wish to return to the sterile
'rationality' debates of the early sixties. These realities are lived
in the specific ideologies of the groups in question and the point we
wish to make is that the key fetishes which organise each social discourse
are no less ideological for being part of the social infrastructure.
It should be clear that we are not denying the place of the social unconscious (traditionally considered in an extremely muddled fashion under the infrastructure/superstructure rubric) and to do so would be to flirt with a dangerous empiricism where the only conceivable mode of action is an ill-founded voluntarism. We are concerned solely to counter the economism, which haunts so many avowedly marxist analyses, whereby society is a more or less mistaken comment on the fact that people produce things.

The fact that we are concerned with (intangible) relations obliges us to consider what is meant by materialism. Marx was not concerned to elaborate a system in which mind is derived from matter, in the way that analyses of ideology as a purely derivative phenomenon might suggest, but was asserting the primacy of human practice; the human practice which Godelier and Friedman analyse in terms of the development of structures through time. A dominant structure may in one case be referred to as "the economy", in another it may be a marriage rule and in general there is no reason why it should be named at all. To confuse material production, in the pre-Marxian philosophical sense, with such structures is to attempt to explain the social in terms of the physical and, unavoidably to relapse into ecological determinism. We might draw a parallel with a psychoanalytic formulation; needs have no place in the unconscious. Probably the only cross-culturally valid statement we can make about the role of material production in this sense is that the appropriation of the (socially defined) surplus is political, and even then it's a dubious formulation since our ability sensibly to discuss politics apart from the classical 'state' is so questionable. In this light the continuing concern with the effects of infrastructure on superstructure and vice-versa is surely mistaken. The object of our analyses must be the process of social reproduction; by no means a homogeneous process and in every instance fraught with contradiction but one which collapses that accepted usage of infrastructure and superstructure which is effectively pre-marxian. Friedman's appreciation of fetish as a unity of appearance and process at the level of the lived world confirms the presence of 'mind' at the heart of social reproduction. However, he seems to believe semantics, however broadly conceived, to be purely derivative or even epiphenomenal. In this respect he is open to precisely the criticism he himself directs at Althusser and Balibar for their commitment to a clandestinely causal model. Althusser himself has clearly recognized the problem with which we are concerned and, in Ideology and Ideological State Apparatuses, has gone so far as to assert the importance of reproduction as distinct from the 'edifice' of infrastructure.

"I believe that it is possible and necessary to think what characterizes the essential of the existence and nature of the superstructure on the basis of reproduction. Once one takes the point of view of reproduction, many of the questions whose existence was indicated by the spatial metaphor of the edifice, but to which it could not give a conceptual answer, are immediately illuminated."

(1971:131)

It is, however, Friedman's demonstration that the importance of fetishism extends beyond the works of "the young Marx", and his
concentration on the place of fetishism in what has consistently been referred to as infrastructural, which puts Althusser's work on ideology in perspective. Althusser's interest in the reproduction of the relations of production is highly profitable but his pretence that he is dealing only with the superstructure is, in the end, dishonest.

Analysis and Ideology

Althusser correctly holds that the image of infrastructure and superstructure is by no means empty.

"Like every metaphor, this metaphor suggests something, makes something visible. What? Precisely this: that the upper floors could not 'stay up' (in the air) alone if they did not rest precisely on their base." (1971:129)

"It now seems to me that it is possible and desirable to represent things differently. NB, I do not mean by this that I want to reject the classical metaphor, for that metaphor itself requires that we go beyond it." (ibid.:130)

Presumably Althusser feels it necessary to pre-empt accusations of heresy and we should be aware that, behind his interest in reproduction of the relations of production, he retains the model in which "determination in the last instance by the economic base" is both ubiquitous and clandestine. He says that

"The effect of (the) spatial metaphor is to endow the base with an index of effectivity known by the famous terms: the determination in the last instance of what happens in the upper 'floors' ... by what happens in the economic base." (ibid.:130)

We must now go on to examine what it is that is made visible by this further metaphor of "an index of effectivity". The argument developed in the earlier sections of this paper already suggests that the lived world is by no means homogeneous and that it is in terms of priority among the elements of the lived world that the metaphor might be recast.

Marc Augé's article in the last issue of JASO deals with this structuring of the lived world and has the merit of treating ideology as a practice rather than as a powerless commentary. However, he posits a coherence of the lived world which is "...not of a specular order, but... of a syntactic order..." and which rests upon an "ideologic". By ideo-logic is meant,

"... the logical relationship arbitrarily established between the different sectors of representation in a given society or the whole set of syntags expressed by the juxtaposition of numerous partial theories concerning the psyche, heredity, illness, work etc. These syntags are neither unlimited in number nor unsystematic." (1976:1)
In fact there is no a-priori limitation on the number of possible syntagms and one presumes that what is meant here is that, at any particular time, only a limited range of such syntagms is recognised as "well-formed". Augé poses the question,

"What is the relation between the marxist notion of ideological domination and the anthropological notion of the identity or diversity of culture? A first answer would place culture alongside of homogeneity and 'primitive' societies, reserving ideology for class societies." (1976:6)

That homogeneity and 'primitive' societies cannot be placed alongside each other is evident from any number of ethnographies in which it is reported that, in effect, some people 'count' while others do not. An obvious example would be Meggitt's report that, despite the Mae-Enga's affirmation of clan exogamy,

"...intra-clan marriages occasionally occur between families whose members are so poor and obscure that they cannot attract extra-clan spouses. Nobody else in the clan is much interested in whom they marry." (1965:97)

Such heterogeneity is important in all cases of re-articulation of the ideal kinship system with the demographic 'facts on the ground' whether among, for example, the Nuer or among prescriptive marriers such as the Katchin. Augé answers this evident heterogeneity with the assurance that "The coherence of the ideo-logic does not correspond to any social homogeneity." (1976:8) It is worth quoting him at some length to be clear what "the coherence of the ideo-logic" does in fact correspond to:

"The ideologic furnishes all possible commentaries for all events and types of conduct... At this point one could be tempted to admit, along with Poulantzas, the equivalence of the notions of ideology and culture (or to state that the first embodies the other), and to say that culture as well as ideology has the function of 'obscuring the real contradictions, of reconstituting, on an imaginary basis, a relatively coherent discourse, which serves as a guide line for men to live by.'

But this imaginary is in fact real: the coherence of the ideo-logic discourse is defined by the coherence of those discourses which can be pronounced." (ibid.)

This is precisely the problem with which we are faced and Augé's account is, from a certain perspective, an empiricism which sanctions rather than analyses the status quo. We are all familiar with the figure by which "all possible commentaries for all events" are already provided for us, operating as we do in an academic milieu which provides daily examples of instant recuperation, assimilation of novelty to the prevailing "truth", and reinterpretation of one's every utterance. Elsewhere the results of this 'know-all' quality are horrific; thus, anti-social statements are "really" symptoms of medical disorders which can be cured by scorching out portions of one's hypothalamus. Nevertheless it remains the case that many syntagma are "not well-
formed" according to the prevailing "truth" and must be re-written by the ideo-logic. The imaginary is indeed real, but when Augé speaks of "coherence of those discourses which can be pronounced" we must insist that the last three words be glossed "are allowed" and not "are logically possible".

Although the world is very often as Augé depicts it, the very possibility of inadmissible utterances is ruled out by attributing coherence to a generative syntax when novelties do occur and their approval or disavowal is post-hoc. Not surprisingly, he disagrees with Rancière's objection to Althusser - i.e. that he "excludes thinking of ideology as the locus of contradiction". Rancière himself distinguishes between bourgeois ideology and proletarian ideology.

"Bourgeois ideology (the dominant ideology) is a system of power relations reproduced daily by the ideological apparatuses of the bourgeois state. Proletarian ideology is a system of power relations established by the struggle of the proletariat and other subordinate classes against all forms of bourgeois exploitation and domination. It is a system of power relations that is always fragmentary because it defines a certain number of conquests, always provisional because it is not produced by apparatuses but by the development of the struggle." (Jenkins 1975:10). Augé holds that there is no more than one ideology in one social formation and, if the proletariat is to be admitted to the same social formation as the bourgeoisie, then he attributes to the proletariat "...a complicity ...all the more deep (and tacit) as the relation is more hostile and apparent." (1976:9). The theory is certainly of its time; a time in which whatever happens is rapidly rendered banal by the colour supplements and safely ingested by the middle class. Rancière's thesis includes the 'class struggle' from the beginning and, while removing the reactionary notion of a transcendent ahistorical ideology, confirms Althusser's analysis of the concrete importance of ideological apparatuses. It is here that the question of "why...people want their repression" (Augé 1976:1) finds its answer.

We have already suggested that denoting the economy as 'infrastructure' may point to the priority of certain terms which function, as key signifiers, to organise the discourse of bourgeois society and that, by extension, Godelier's equation of kinship relations with relations of production points to a similar priority of different terms in certain other societies. Augé objects that "to affirm this dominance has no more sense than to affirm that of any of the other orders of representation within the ideology...kinship relations and relations of production enter into the same syntactic logic which integrates all the other elements of representation too." (1976:4) Certainly at any given time all the elements of representation may be related to the 'know-all' ideo-logic but let us consider what has happened in our own society to the "...partial theories concerning the psyche, heredity, illness, work etc." In the last century every one of these changed radically and we may mark the changes with the names Freud, Mendel, Pasteur, Marx. Over the same period the partial theory which asserts the necessity and transparency of the relation M↔M' remained the power which organised the social field in which the former changes had effect. We have already quoted Lefebvre to the effect that one partial theory,
that the economy is determinant, dates from capitalism and characterises it. He also notes that

"...la société capitaliste dès le début est opaque et contradictoire jusque dans ce qui fait sa cohérence."
(1971: )

Where this is so, as it is for any society, then the unique structuring of a particular social formation can only be approached through its own terms, terms which control and define their context. The key elements which are, at the same time, power and signs ensure their own reproduction to a greater or lesser extent in so far as they organise their neighbours but the nature of opacity and contradiction should be made clear since it radically affects the possibility of 'correct' analysis. In his discussion of Capital and capitalism, Friedman points out that

"Over production is not caused in the production sphere itself but in the sphere of the realisation of value. ...Money and money-capital are not the inverted representation of real processes... On the contrary it is the forms through which capital passes in social reproduction - specifically as money and as real production, which are mutually contradictory." (1974a:40/41)

Opacity cannot, then, refer to concealment of some entity which is empirically there and would be visible if only... The materiality which is so often conceived in terms of a 'material level' is seen to lie in the effects of the developing structure and at its own level, that of human practice in which the distinction between 'mind' and 'matter' is collapsed. It is precisely the immanence of contradiction at this one (and only) level which obliges us to resist the temptation to empiricism. We have already loosely cast value and exchange-value as unconscious where the discourse organised by money-capital is conscious.

"Now if money=value i.e. corresponds to social labour, then price=exchange value. This is the Ricardian view rejected by Marx. It is not the case in capitalism... Capital is money that can exploit labour in order to reproduce itself on an expanded scale - there is no deeper aspect to this relation." (Friedman 1974a:42)

The recourse to what is not empirically given is essential if the contradictions of the phenomenal world are to be apprehended and this "guess at the programm" (Ardener 1971) is unavoidably a commitment to a particular view. At the same time, the structure of the 'unconscious' is only given to knowledge through the meticulous consideration of the specific forms of the conscious. It would be useless to analyse Britain in terms of a prescriptive marriage system and it is equally absurd to suppose that anything politically useful would emerge from analysing, say, the Wikmunkan in terms of economics.

Friedman's discussion shows clearly that the relation of infra-structure to superstructure is not one of 'levels', nor may it usefully be approached in terms of causality. Althusser's concept of structural
causality is widely recognised as suspect but the idea of 'over-determination', which accompanies it in Reading Capital, may be the baby in the causal bathwater. Althusser himself is unhappy with lifting a term from psychoanalysis and claims to use it "both as an index and as a problem" (1970:101); as he makes clear in chapter four of Reading Capital, the problem is precisely that of the 'index of effectivity' with which we began this section. We might approach the potential usefulness of the term, in clarifying that problem, through the worries voiced by Martin Thom in his discussion of Lacan.

"Whatever one may think of the Lacanian Symbolic...it is...defined as a tissue of meaning and not as a mechanism that determines. When I refer to determination here I do not mean that fatal determination...of which Lacan writes so often. I mean determination issuing from the (Marxist) real, a determination present in the real and in its productions, and one that underlies the overdetermination present in the Symbolic...The Lacanian dialectic must be inverted, and each moment of the Symbolic must be reckoned as being in the last instance determined by the infrastructure" (1975:83)

The last sentence here signifies a confusion in so far as the structuring of the social formation is problematic in every case and the 'infra-structure' can only be identified (through its apparent determination) by a consideration of what is given (the structural equivalent of the Symbolic). The 'unpacking' of this structuring necessarily begins from an overdetermined element of the 'real' and "interpretation is never final" (ibid:81) "Hegelian and idealist as Lacan finally is", his position has a certain phenomenological rectitude. If we wish to retain the term 'infrastructure' then we must realise that its 'determination' is of very much the sort with which Lacan deals and not a mechanically causal determination, no matter how devious. The 'prologue' of economic anthropology showed clearly the futility of decompositions of an over determined element between formalists and substantivists and, a fortiori, the futility of rewriting that opposition in terms of (substantive) reality and (formalist) ideology. The infrastructural quality of the economic in capitalist society is known by the way it confronts analyses of the social with professed (ecological) necessity. Analyses of capitalist society, and of the socialist states which oppose themselves to capitalism in terms of 'socialist economics', do indeed lead, along the paths of apparent determination, to 'the economic', but that is so is the very structure of their dominant ideologies and not the ontology of 'society in general'.

The misidentification of the economic is not confined to anthropology, and the figure whereby the economic infrastructure automatically produces change while the superstructural instances somehow interfere with history is disappointingly salient in leftist journalism. Where all the instances of a social formation are at the same 'level' this faith in infrastructure is no more than a recourse to external guarantees, producing the blindness which has overtaken the European left at every moment of crisis in the last fifty years.12
Conclusions

If the unreflective search for 'economic determinants' in other cultures betrays a certain callow ethnocentrism, we should not forget that it is also an example of fallings which are both more widespread and more subtle. Where 'material relations' have figured as the hidden meaning behind the text of real life so have the various structures deployed with such subtlety by non-marxist analysts and we should examine one such deployment in concluding this paper.

If human practices are tautological to the extent that thought and action, tangible and intangible, are necessarily united then we can no longer accept the schema whereby non-linguistic, linguistic and metalinguistic are stacked on top of one another and equated with meaning, text and commentary. We should, perhaps question even such formulations as Ardener's;

"A black box for a metalanguage of the system... the only social phenomenon that is a serious candidate turns out to be real language... If so it shows that the social is not like real language in its detailed structure. In real language the meta-linguistic faculty is expressed in real language, not in an independent system." (1973:13)

The metalanguage of the social is, then, language. Since language is undoubtedly social (although not a superstructure according to Stalin) might it not be more reasonable to say that the social is in this respect like real language. The metalanguage of the social is the social. The rather obvious point that language 'about' language is still language applies equally to the non-linguistic social, as has become clear in the earlier sections of this paper, and carries implications for any proposed analysis. We have already suggested that, while social events cannot be approached as representations, they are nonetheless representations succeeding one another through time. To ask whether two representations represent "the same thing" is senseless. Benveniste (1971) reminds us that the relation between Saussure's signifiant and signifie is that of two sides of a sheet of paper (between an acoustic chain and a concept; not, as is often supposed, between an acoustic chain and an empirical referent) and is, therefore one of absolute necessity. If we wish to invoke arbitrariness then we should recognise that it may be far more absolute than we had bargained for. Ardener (1973) has pointed out that anthropological accounts generally deal with 'dead stretches' and his observations on this point are of the utmost importance, but I suspect, that the implications are more extensive than might at first be supposed.

Recent analysts have suspended time every bit as much as the much maligned functionalists in so far as they purport to speak 'about' events which are already dead and assume that the 'native account' is 'about' the same thing. The metonymic axis through time is misrepresented as a metaphoric axis of alternative accounts. Where ideology and knowledge are contrasted, as they are by many marxist writers, they are equally 'above the text' and may be presented as alternative accounts of the 'real'; one of them "wrong" and the other one "right". Jenkins (1975) has examined one such schema in the works of Louis Althusser, educing the way in which "...The couple science/ideology becomes equated with
the couple knowledge/ignorance" (1975:9) and hence legitimises the authority of the party intellectual. 'La leçon d'Althusser' has brought to light a problem the importance of which extends beyond the dealings of the PCF and beyond any specifically French academic debate. The authoritative (and authoritarian) analysis of the lives of others situates itself by the claim to be above the text of everyday life and justifies itself by the claim to reveal something below that text, something which is invisible to the ordinary man. The marxist attempt to demonstrate the 'real meaning' of what other people do, and non-marxist analyses such as the Ardeners' attempt to reconstitute the "dead stretch" which loses its meaning at the moment a record is made, have this much in common. They appeal to an unconscious structure. Speaking of dream analysis, the paradigm case of all such analyses, Collingwood notes that

"The mythological way of stating this fact is to say that the structure was 'in the unconscious'. This is frankly nonsense; but there is no reason why psycho-analysts, so long as they can actually perform miracles, should be grudged the privilege of choosing their own language, even if it is nonsensical, when describing them. It is nonsense because the structure is not in the unconscious but precisely in the dream, for it is the structure of the dream; and the dream is conscious enough." (1924:93)

Edwin Ardener clearly answers this point in so far he views his 's-structures' and 'p-structures' as an analytical decomposition of a 'simultaneity' but we might ponder a little on his suggestion that

"With the naive and unreflecting observer, the General Custer and H.M. Stanley, events he records or registers are totally structured by specifications from the p-structures of his own society. There can in such a case be no records of the other society that would yield material for the reconstruction of any p-structures save his own." (1973:8)

The tacit suggestion that the 'true p-structure' of, say, the Sioux can be apprehended more or less correctly must be resisted, for to accept it would be to mistake the unconscious for a quasi-empirical entity as is done by the normative (American) psychoanalysis against which Lacan speaks so forcefully. For our purposes we need only note that Collingwood's statement serves to remind us, if a little wapishly, that, whatever else it may be, the unconscious is primarily the (initially null) term in terms of which the partners in analysis construct a reality. The hypostasis of unconscious structures is as honourable a procedure as most, so long as we are perfectly clear about what it is we are doing. Considering one such hypostasis, of a structure purported to be common to women in this country and in West Africa, Tim Jenkins has hit the nail squarely on the head.

Although femininity is not a biologism, it cannot be generalised; its application to other circumstances shows a political rather than a paradigmatic solidarity." (1976:41)
Recent debates within marxism have already brought to light the necessity of a revaluation which is more radical than any associated with 'structuralism' in so far as it affects both marxist and non-marxist academicism, and throws doubt on the worth of any 'post-structuralist' replacement. In this area the history of marxism is, at least, "good to think with". Whether marxism itself will take up the problems of authoritarianism, associated with the necessary resort to what is not empirically given, is unclear, although the growing independence of Western communist parties may, perhaps, have effects comparable in extent with those of de-Stalinisation. Whatever the case, the necessity of extensive rethinking has become apparent, not least in areas of anthropology whose pretensions to radicalism are, for the moment, laughable. Anthropology will probably be a casualty of this rethinking and, as Needham says, it has "only a nebulous and unconvincing definition" (1970) in any case, but I would end with the hope that its ramshackle structure still offers temporary accommodation for those who will confront the problem which this paper has, in small part, revealed.

Paul Dresch.
Notes

1. Notably Marxist Analyses and Social Anthropology (Bloch ed. 1975) This I reviewed in JASO Vol. VI No. 3 and the present article is an attempt to develop or at least explore some of the points which were raised in that review.

2. All quotations are taken directly from the English edition.

3. Despite Engels' opposition to the rigid economism which commentators espoused once Marx himself was dead, the power of the more subtle brands of economism rests upon the mechanism of the Second International, philosophy of which is pure Engels. Marx himself often writes as a vulgar materialist of the most naive sort e.g. in The 1857 Introduction. It seems to me no more praiseworthy to organise one's reading of Marx around such 19th century bric-a-brac than to hamstring one's appreciation of Freud by treating the more Victorian sections of The Interpretation of Dreams as scripture.

4. I have limited myself to those quotations used by Frankenberg throughout this section. My account of economic anthropology in this paper is necessarily skeletal and his article in JSA 6 not only provides a fuller account of the matter but furnishes a fairly complete bibliography. As will be seen, I think the moral of the tale is very different from the one he himself draws.

5. For a discussion of formal theory and its limitations see Gledhill 1971.

6. Gledhill describes the way in which perfect competition and the rest have, on occasion, served orthodox economists as a definition of their subject. "...since Hick's 1937 paper (the orthodoxy) had been steadily subsuming Keynes as a special case of the neo-classical model, 'useful in practice but contributing nothing in theory'." (1971:61) The idea of some pristine economic sphere which is distorted by the other aspects of society was not confined to anthropology.

7. The characterisation of the structures in question as "kinship" is, obviously, not at all satisfactory. Writing of precisely the sort of society with which Godelier is here concerned, Needham points out 

"...the necessity to study a society such as the Wikmunkan primarily by means of an imaginative apprehension of its system of social categories conceived as the classification which they in fact compose. The moment we reduce this to the trivality of 'kinship' ...we have miscast the indigenous ideology..." (1962:259)

I shall continue to use the term simply as a matter of convenience.

8. While Fichte purported to solve the problem of the "thing-in-itself" by abolishing it and Hegel supposed that it was pure being, Althusser seems to have come across a tertium quid.
9. As this paper was in preparation the BBC broadcast part of a speech by Colonel Gadaffi in which he claimed that marxism was of little relevance to Libya since there "the infrastructure is not economics but religion". He may well be right.

10. It is also part of the neo-Nietzschean trend to which Auge refers in his introduction. If one credits the social formation with only one ideology then the revolutionary function of a particular subordinate class can only be realised through 'slave morality'. This is the mode through which the politically subordinate 'Judea' can triumph over 'Rome' and is not a derogatory term but, based as it is on ressentiment, the mode is necessarily reactionary in the literal sense of that word. I would only point out that On the Genealogy of Morals is a development of Beyond Good and Evil in which it is suggested that one might depass such a recourse to opposites.

11. "Programme" is not the happiest term that one might have lighted on since what is referred to here is immanent in the level of "output" as Ardener himself makes clear (1973).

12. The classic case of such failure is that of the German C.P. and the 'faith in history' is the product of this group who, having been born into the most advanced of European capitalist states had only to wait to inherit the earth. One might also consider the idolatry toward economic definitions of history which paralysed the Russian 'opposition' at vital junctures. Both cases illustrate the truth of Tillich's perception that idols are not empty but "demonic".

13. Apart from the obvious, there is good reason to retain the French here since the example furnished by the revaluation of Althusser's work is both a lesson and a particular reading which is validated by the worth of the lesson it produces.
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Icelandic Folk Tales or National Tales

This paper attempts to explain how the Icelandic tales called *jó·sögur* came to have an added significance, beyond their 'folk' origins, as the nexus of a number of nationalistic movements in nineteenth-century Iceland. In particular, I shall discuss Jon Arnason's collection of tales called *Islenzkar jó·sögur og Áfintyri* (Icelandic Folk Tales and Wonder Tales) which was compiled during a sixteen year period from 1845-1861. This collection may still be considered the major source for this type of literature.

During the following discussion one should keep in mind that the term *jó·sögur* has a range of meanings. *jó* is translated as 'people' or 'nation' (Zoega 1910, Jonsson 1927) and Cleasby, Vigfusson and Powell (1959) elaborate further.

In quite modern times (the last 30 - 40 years) (1820-30) a whole crop of compounds with *jó* has been formed to express the sense of national; *

The important status of Jon Arnason's collection, especially the first volume of tales, in nineteenth and twentieth century Iceland at first seems unlikely because the tales are abstracted from any apparent context. They seem to add nothing new to the body of Icelandic literature either in terms of style or content. Einarsson sums up part of the situation stating:

It should be noted that folktales, similar to the ones collected and published in the nineteenth century, are to be found from the earliest times in the literature, but never isolated as a specific genre (Einarsson 1948:4).

We might ask why people should bother collecting these tales if similar ones could be found in the literature already? I think this difficulty may be explained, but not resolved, by situating Jon Arnason's collection historically within the nationalist movements both in Iceland and Europe. The *jó·sögur* might then be seen as deriving their importance not only because they are 'folk' tales but because they are 'national' tales.

*Islenzkar jó·sögur og Áfintyri* was published in 1862-64 and was a product of the movement begun by the Grimm brothers which swept over Europe at the time. Jon Arnason is said to have been inspired by the Grimms' *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* and we may observe clear links with the German interest in folktales in the history of Jon Arnason's collection.

In 1812 the brothers Grimm published *Kinder- und Hausmärchen* maintaining that in these popular stories is concealed the pure and primitive mythology of the Teutons, which has been considered as lost forever (Taylor 1975:vii).

A similar type of thinking could also be found in England where Farrar, in 1870, spoke of the "immortal interest" of Icelandic, for

in it alone are preserved those songs and legends ... which reveal to us the grand and striking mythology of our heathen ancestors ... from them alone can we learn of what
Thus the general European movement seems to have been motivated by an interest in "primitive and heathen" origins.

Following the Grimms' collection, the Danish Commission for the Preservation of Antiquities called for a collection of folktales from Iceland in 1817. No one took up this work, however, and the request was renewed in 1839 and 1845. It is possible that the Danes viewed these tales as holding the key to the Scandinavian past and, defining them as such, brought this approach to the folktales to the attention of the Icelanders.

In any case, independently of the Danish commission Magnus Grimsson and Jon Arnason agreed to begin a collection in 1845 after having read the Grimms' Mythische Sagen und Hausmärchen.

Magnus Grimsson came from a poor family on Borgarfjord. His interests were in literature and natural science but he was forced to take orders in 1855 in order to earn a living. Many of the tales he collected were provided by schoolmates and by people from his home district (Einarsson 1948: 28-29). He died in 1860 and Jon Arnason continued the collection alone.

Jon Arnason, the son of a parson in Skagafjord, was appointed the librarian of the national library in 1848 but was not paid for his work until 1881. He had to support himself by other jobs. Originally he was to provide a collection of poems, rhyme and superstition. In 1852 he published Isländische Volksägen der Gegenwart. It was the impetus to the folktales to the attention of the Icelanders.

In 1855 Jon Arnason composed an appeal in which he enumerated all the kinds of folklore he wished to know about and to have recorded. He sent it to over 40 people and was soon receiving tales and other items in a steadily increasing stream (Sveinsson 1971: 38).

In the three years that followed this appeal Jon Arnason received twice as much material as during the previous fourteen years (Einarsson 1948: 29). He modelled the organization of his material on that of Maurer. For example, Jon Arnason used the same section headings as those provided by Maurer: I. Mythische Sagen/Götterássógu; II. Spuksagen/Draugasógu; III. Zaubersagen/Galdrasógu; and IV. Natursagen/Naturarsógu. Jon Arnason dropped some of the subdivisions used by Maurer which did not apply, such as Maurer's section called Götter (Sveinsson 1971: 40), and it appears that the fit between the Icelandic material and the German categories is somewhat strained. ²

Neither Jon nor Magnus could afford to travel around the country and so they mainly relied on manuscript contributions. It appears to have been common to write tales down and aside from the tales contained in the earlier saga literature, some of the manuscripts predate Jon Arnason's decision to begin the collection. ³

It therefore seems appropriate to approach these tales as a body of literature within a literary tradition rather than merely as a transcript of oral tales. In the nineteenth century virtually all Icelanders were
literate and the folktales were written in a style not different from saga style. Possibly this is only due to the folktale style being shaped from reading the sagas but Simpson also raises the point that the prose narrative style of the sagas harmonizes with "all that is most vigorous, direct, and swift moving in oral story-telling" (Simpson 1972:11). She concludes:

This harmony is no accident; the sagas themselves, though literary works, sprang from a culture where oral story-telling flourished, and were influenced by its techniques (Simpson 1972:11).

In this case the concepts of an oral and a literary tradition have become completely entangled to the point that they can no longer be distinguished. To say that one is patterned after the other is to go in circles, but it is worth noting some of the factors which contributed to the situation in which the sagas and folktales were identified with one another. The saga style which dates back to the thirteenth century was constantly on hand because the sagas themselves were published and the high rate of literacy in Iceland following the Reformation meant that its influence was potentially very wide. Literacy and literary style, therefore, combined to produce the possibility of a nationally recognizable continuity with Iceland's past.

The situation in the nineteenth century demands the recognition that written communication is of primary importance in understanding the Icelandic context of the tales. Speech is secondary because writing serves as the means of communication not only between speakers separated by geographical space, but also by time (Haugen 1966:53). In the case of Jon Arnason's collection, it is clear that these tales assumed new significance as the modern national literature of Iceland, not as the transcripts of her oral tradition.

Jon Arnason's collection of tales included two types. Pjöntögsur, meaning people's tales, are accounts of supposedly real events. The names, places and approximate dates of these occurrences are given in detail and if this information is not known, this is also stated.

The other major group is Afintyri, meaning adventure tales or wonder tales. These tales are recognized as being completely fictional. They are not associated with specific persons, places or times. Afintyri correspond to what Stith Thompson calls Marchen which is a tale of some length involving a succession of motifs or episodes. It moves in an unreal world without definite locality or definite characters and is filled with the marvellous (Thompson 1946:8).

Similarly, Pjodsogur correspond to what Thompson calls Sage:

This form of tale purports to be an account of an extraordinary happening believed to have actually occurred. ... They are nearly always simple in structure, usually containing but a single narrative motif (Thompson 1946:8-9).

Thus this classification seems to be based primarily on whether the tale is viewed as fiction or non-fiction since many of the motifs may be found in both types. Although the folktales are all purported to be true, some aspects no longer seem to be considered as important as others, if they are believed at all. Thus most if not all of the stories about magic and trolls are set in the past, usually around the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries. However many of the stories about the dead and elves are set in the nineteenth century and some are about a person’s own experiences or those of his parents. We can see this process continuing into the present as well. The dead still seem to occupy an important place in Icelandic life, but the place of elves has diminished in importance, although elf knolls are still respected.

The Icelandic folktales are a valuable source of historical information about Icelandic life. They often give detailed information about the places and people which in some cases can be checked against available records.

Jon Arnason’s collection was published with an introduction by the scholar, Gudbrandur Vigfusson, who later came to Oxford. In Vigfusson’s introduction it is clear that he considers the collection as literature which he almost immediately links with Icelandic nationalism.

*The nation, therefore, which does nothing but remember, must be looked on as dead, as petrified, as no longer to be numbered among the living and acting. These stories will show that Icelanders are not so utterly deprived of mental life as to be unable to replace old with new, and add to their literary treasure heap. Many of them are of quite modern origin, and will not suffer from a comparison with those of older date (Powell and Magnusson, trans., 1864:8).*

It is worth noting in this quote that Vigfusson states that a vigorous nation must develop its contemporary literature, yet in the Icelandic case the criterion of contemporary literary worth is to be found in the classic sagas.

The collection was translated by Powell and Magnusson in 1964 under the title *Icelandic Legends* and in their introduction they refer to the tales as ‘national’ tales rather than folktales.

Jon Sigurðsson, the first president of Iceland, made similar comments about these tales. He explicitly invokes the link with the past which these tales seem to provide as he exhorts the new nation to future efforts. He acknowledges that "Iceland shall rise up and flourish as before" and Icelanders should not despise or neglect their folktales (Nordal 1924:167).

From the above comments by Icelanders during the period when Jon Arnason’s collection was published we can see that the tales were associated with the developing idea of an independent nation. The status of these folktales in Iceland may be more clearly understood by situating the collection in a more general political, economic and literary context. Politically we may observe an increasing nationalism in Iceland. In 1800 Iceland had probably reached a low ebb as a nation when the Alþing was abolished by the order of the king of Denmark. Iceland’s economy was nearly destroyed by the effects of the Danish trade monopoly and the population was at its lowest point due to eruptions, plagues and famine in the eighteenth century. At the beginning of the nineteenth century the Napoleonic wars disrupted the Danish trade monopoly and the Icelandic economy picked up. It continued to improve even after the trade monopoly was reinstated in 1816, but it was with the effects of the French Revolutions of 1789, 1830 and 1848 that real interest was awakened in the idea of Iceland as a nation-state.
The nationalist movement which resulted achieved the reinstatement of the Al-ping in 1843 in Reykjavik (Gjerset: 309-375 passim). Under the guidance of Jon Sigurðsson Icelanders then began agitating for the abolition of all restrictions on trade and in 1854 a bill, releasing Iceland from trade restrictions, became law. Commerce, especially with England, became profitable at this time.

Even after these successes, agitation continued toward self-government which led to such comments as those of Richard Burton:

> All Icelanders ... learn the three R's to say nothing of the fourth R(evolution). (Burton 1875:155).

In 1874 Iceland was presented with its first partly autonomous constitution from Denmark and Jon Sigurðsson became the first president.

It was the literary men who defined and shaped Icelandic nationalism in following the literary and linguistic movements which had begun in Europe. In the nineteenth century the Nationalistic Spirit gave way to romanticism. In Iceland this meant that prose authors began turning away from the Dano-German style which had filtered into post-Reformation religious works and which was taken up in the history and philosophy of Magnus Stephensen. Instead the romanticist authors in Iceland modelled their style on that of the sagas; drawing on the heroic days of old.

The Icelandic folktales collected by Jon Arnason provided examples of a rural prose style which was similar to the style found in the sagas of the thirteenth century. This stylistic similarity demonstrated the existence of a uniquely Icelandic culture and this became a motif running through nineteenth-century nationalism. One result was a new national awareness of the Icelandic language. In 1830 Konráð Gíslason wrote a brilliant essay on the Icelandic language and set about purifying it from two centuries of Dano-German dross and its baroque style. This campaign for the purification of the language set an epoch of linguistic nationalism which lasted unchallenged for nearly a century. It continued up to the modernist period of the twentieth century, and its strength still persists (Einarsson 1957:222).

This movement to purify the language illustrates a linguistic awareness and a move toward prescriptive linguistics directed at establishing a 'correct' standard language which Haugen maintains was characteristic of the combination of nationalism and romanticism in many countries. Haugen generalizes that such a movement to purify the language generally "coincides with the rise of their countries to wealth and power" (Haugen 1966:57).

It was during this period in the nineteenth century that Icelandic literature gained new vitality and prose literature started in earnest. With respect to prose literature, Jon Arnason's Písað sögur og afintyri was to occupy an extremely influential position which Einarsson describes as follows:

> At the head of the prose genres may be placed the Icelandic folktales, ... Following Grimm they were collected by Jon Arnason and his companion and published, a sample in 1852, the great collection
Magnus Grimsson were part of the romanticist literary movement, inspired by the Grimms, which was widespread in nineteenth-century Europe but present day, paralleling the emergence of Iceland in the political field. Icelander's in which newer forms of literature and feelings were presented.

Drama was a new literary form during this period and it drew most of its themes from Icelandic folktales and the sagas, although the plays based on the sagas generally failed.

All attempts to recast either the poetry of the Edda or the prose of the sagas into modern drama have failed as ... Johann Sigurjonsen learned to his distress when he tried to dramatize Njall's Saga in his play Lögmener (The Liar, 1917). Even Henrik Ibsen's attempts to transfer themes from the old literature to the modern drama were among his less happy efforts: The Vikings of Helgeland (1858) and The Pretenders (1864). (Haugen 1967:3)

On the other hand, the most popular plays drew on national legends and folklore, for example: Mattias Johumsson's Utilegumennir (The Outlawed Men, 1861-62); Johann Sigurjonsen's Galdræ-Loftur (Loftur the Magician, 1915); and Davi Stefansson's Gullnaði (The Golden Gate, 1941).

This tendency to draw on folk themes seems to have been further encouraged after 1918 when Iceland was granted home rule by Denmark and writers like David Stefansson won themselves a great reputation as exponents of this first blossoming of a free nation (Haugen 1967:83).

Even radicals like Thorbergur Thorjarsen and Halldor Laxness focused on the folklife of Iceland in their works.

Although Jon Arnason may have removed the Icelandic folktales from their dramatic context in the sagas and the pre-nineteenth century Icelandic literature, they in turn became the context, familiar to all Icelanders, in which newer forms of literature and feelings were presented.

A number of events and movements contributed to the new emphasis which was laid on the Icelandic folktales. The Napoleonic wars caused Denmark to loosen her hold on Iceland and economic prosperity increased. At the same time, the upheavals in eighteenth-century France had spread the idea of the free nation-state to Iceland just as they had to America and other countries. Icelandic nationalism was rewarded in the political field by the reinstatement of the Alping in 1843, the end of the Danish trade monopoly in 1874, home rule in 1918, and finally, full independence in 1944. The increasing awareness of Icelandic as a national language, exemplified by Konrad Isolason's movement to purify Icelandic from foreign influence, may be traced from the early nineteenth century to the present day, paralleling the emergence of Iceland in the political field.

We are dealing with a process of self-definition. Jon Arnason and Magnus Grimsson were part of the romanticist literary movement, inspired by the Grimms, which was widespread in nineteenth-century Europe but their collection of folktales almost inevitably became part of a
political movement. The tales themselves were admirably suited to the demands of Icelandic authors with a sense of national identity, being written in a language and style, and with a subject matter, distinguishable from Danish influence. The similarity of the style to that of the sagas allowed the definition of the Icelandic people, not only in opposition to the ruling Danes, but with reference to their own heroic past.

The fact that there was only one 'Latin School' in Iceland during this period seems to have resulted in a close knit intellectual community with interests in all aspects of Icelandic national life including the church, government, economics and literature. Jon Arnason, who attended Bessasta ír, appears to have had access to Jon Sigurðsson's circle of friends, of which Guðbrandur Vigfússon (who contributed to, and wrote the introduction for the collection) and Eiríkur Magnússon (who translated it into English with Powell) are mentioned in this paper. Jon Sigurðsson himself contributed several tales to the collection. In this group of men we can see a number of interests coming together in support of the collection but the group who attended the 'Latin School' were also the link of Iceland with nineteenth-century European thought. Whether the ruling Danes first suggested the role of this national literature or whether the idea was culled directly from European romanticism, it was this group which defined the coherence of "Iceland" by reference to folktales and saga. The definition had a certain authenticity in this case for two reasons. First, the 'Latin School' pupils were not set apart from the rest of the population as a different class; virtually all Icelanders were literate and open to the process of self-definition. Second, the similarity between folktale and saga style is marked; by referring to it the diachronic continuity and the synchronic coherence of the Icelandic 'people' could be seen as the same.

Melinda Babcock
Notes

1. Alexander Johannesson (1956) gives the following etymology of 'dó': f. 'volf, leute' now. dial. tjo, kjo n. 'gesellschaft, volk' got. 'iuda, age. peod, afries. thiode, as. thiod(a), mnd. det, ahd. diota, dict.

2. In particular, this may be noticed in the sections on Draugasögur (Tales of the Dead) and Galdrasögur (Tales of Magic). Since the different kinds of 'magic' in Iceland are so closely associated with dealings with the dead, both themes often appear in the tales in these sections and in some cases the criteria used to decide which tale should go in what section are not clear. We must also consider the possibility that the German categories may not have been completely translatable into the Icelandic context. For example, one of the subsections of the 'Tales of the Dead' is called 'Widerganger' by Maurer. Although Jon Arnason has translated this term as 'Apturgaungur', the tales in this section also refer to three other types of dead who walk again: úðurvírir, draugur, and vofa. Similar problems arise in the sections on 'magic'.

3. Approximately half of the tales are listed as coming from manuscript sources; a number date from the early eighteenth century. About 20% of all the elf stories come from the manuscripts of a farmer named Ólafur Sveinsson who lived near Reykjavik. Einarsson (1948) states that this manuscript dates from about 1830 and it was compiled in order to prove the existence of elves.

4. Simpson states that the features of oral style which may be found in the sagas are "abrupt shifts from the past to the present tense or from reported to direct speech, simplicity in clause and sentence structure, economy of adjectives and adverbs, and a general preference for concision and even dryness over elaboration and emotional explicitness" (1972:12). However it is difficult to talk about the Icelandic folktales or sagas in terms of oral style at all. In the first place, there is no oral style unaffected by written literature in Iceland because everyone is literate. Secondly, neither the sagas nor the folktales consistently display the features described above, and if we consider the differences between the oral styles of educated Americans and educated Englishmen, we can hardly take the view that these features are universal for all oral styles.

5. I was told this by Thor Whitehead and Guðrún Pétursdóttir.

6. Sveinsson emphasizes this point that national characteristics may be found in the style of the folktales: "Let us compare the story of Snow White and the story of Vilfrírur— it is the same tale— or the stories of Cinderella and Mjáveig Manadóttir. It is no exaggeration to say that moving from the mid-European tales to the Icelandic versions is like moving from one world into another... The Icelandic versions are much franker" (1971:48).
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This paper is a product of a two month's visit - my first - which I paid to Brazil this summer. I went with the intention of finding a good site for future fieldwork on Afro-Brazilian cults. Last year I started work on a theoretical paper on these cults, which I had hoped would lead to a D.Phil. But one result of my visit is that I have decided to limit my research solely to the theoretical paper.

In Brazil I spent 2½ weeks in Rio, eleven days in Salvador, 2 weeks in Recife and one week in Fortaleza and Sao Luís.

One of the most unexpected features of the trip was to discover how deeply anthropologists were involved in the cults they study. The most interesting example of this was in Salvador. So while this paper draws on all my experience (i.e. from other places as well), I shall concentrate on Salvador as the special case. Salvador does have many unique features, and it is perhaps unfair to generalize too widely from it. But there are many lessons - I think - that can be learned about Brazil and about anthropology from the involvement of anthropologists in possession cults in Bahia. Hence the emphasis of this paper is on the role of the anthropologist. I do not deal with the roots of the cults in Brazilian popular culture.

The approach adopted here is thus two-fold. I want to examine some of the assumptions underlying fieldwork, and the circumstances in which it is done. I want to indicate the way these assumptions or circumstances are referred to (or more usually - not referred to) in the ethnographic texts. By illustrating this with reference to the literature on Afro-Brazilian cults I hope to make certain general comments about the difficulties of doing fieldwork in initiate societies. This is something which one receives no guidance about. And the effect of the anthropologist on the community he studies - and vice versa - is practically never mentioned. In addition, by describing something of the context in which anthropologists work in Salvador I hope to throw some light on the control of "popular culture" within Brazil - control which affects the anthropologists as well.

But first, in a brief and highly impressive manner, I want to describe my visit to Salvador. I will then go on to discuss in detail the involvement of anthropologists with their cults.

2. Salvador

Salvador is a port, the historic first capital of Brazil, the centre of the slave and sugar trades. It is built on two levels, the upper and lower cities. The upper city contains most of the churches and baroque architecture, particularly in the Pelourinho district. The poorer areas are in the lower city and outer suburbs. In Salvador 70% of the population is black, whereas the figure is about 20% for the rest of Brazil. Salvador is the centre of Afro-Brazilian culture and religion. The religious cults are called candomble, and derive from West African religious practices in Nigeria and Dahomey. They feature possession by deities or African orixas as the central part of the ceremonies. Possession is traditionally - though not exclusively - limited to women. Most of the terreiros or cult-houses are found in the suburbs.

1. This paper was first given to a Graduate Seminar of Brazilianists at the Latin American Centre, Oxford, in November 1975. I have made a few minor alterations in this version.

2. See Glossary for foreign words.
In my eleven days there I met a lot of people, particularly anthropologists. Among them was an Argentinian anthropologist of German-Jewish extraction called Anita, who has been married to a black cult-leader for over twelve years. She is at war with just about all the other anthropologists in Salvador. In part this feud is a result of her marriage, which led to a split in the terreiro where her husband's late mother ran. Some of the other leading anthropologists in Salvador were at one stage affiliated to it—though not any more. She has started S***, the Society for the Study of Black Culture in Brazil. This is financed by the Ministry of Education and Culture and an independent American source. While I was in Salvador she had a "highly successful meeting" with these two sponsors, which enabled her to get funds for this independent organization. It is staffed by outside ethnographers, with high professional standards of research.

She is in opposition to or conflict with "Fidel," who runs C*** (the Centre for Afro-Oriental Studies) and "Ricardo", who runs the Fundacao Cultural de Bahia. "Fidel" is an ill-looking bureaucrat in his late 30's, beset with administrative troubles. He is engaged on a government supported project to record all African culture in Salvador on tape and film. This is a new undertaking, and, it seemed to me, curiously parallel to the ethnographic task S*** had defined for itself.

On my first to C*** I briefly met Jacques Pasteur, an elderly pear-shaped anthropologist who has been living in Salvador for over thirty years. He regards Afro-Bahian culture as his private preserve, and can hardly bear to talk to young researchers who represent a potential threat. He is, however, collaborating with Fidel and C*** on their systematic survey.

Meeting Pasteur at C*** was something of a coincidence, because the previous night I'd been taken by "Barb'ra" (an American research student) to her terreiro for a festa. Afterwards we went to Casa Branca for another ceremony. Casa Branca is reputedly the oldest cult-house in Salvador, and many of the oguns, or men with ritual membership of the cult, come from the highest strata of Bahian society. And in the seat of honour—for the most distinguished visitor—was Pasteur himself, with a sociological friend from Sao Paulo.

Now Fidel is a close friend of Ricardo's; the latter running a small empire from the centre of the Pelourinho, where the oldest buildings are. Ricardo is directing the restoration of this area, and comparable sites in Bahia. His Fundacao is more like a court than anything else, with himself the centre of attention. Anita is trying to get him to preserve candamble sites (threatened by development) as part of the genuine cultural heritage of Salvador. For all his notoriety I found Ricardo a fascinating figure. He was "born in a cult-house" as they say—his mother was an initiate i.e. Filha-de-Santo. Hence his involvement with the cults has been life-long. He is now not so bound up with anthropology, but has produced monographs of good quality, and was formerly a professor of Anthropology at the Federal University of Bahia. He was, incidently, compadre to Fidel's child, and this was the first thing he told me.

Ricardo and Fidel are both associates of a very stupid man, that I didn't meet, called Vladimir. Vladimir had written a bad book on Capoeira (stylized fighting-dance), and was also studying the cults.

In addition I met several anthropologists at the Federal University of Bahia. One of them told me about a local political figure who waged a "magic war" against the Governor of the State because he (the politician) wasn't made president of the telephone corporation. Another version I heard of the same tale was that he waged the magic war (through a terreiro) until he was made president of the telephone corporation. What seemed significant to me was that these stories had currency in the first place. I paid one visit to Thales de Azevedo on my arrival in Salvador. He is the most senior of anthropologists there, and stands above all factional conflicts.

1 I use pseudonyms for all people at present working in Salvador.
2 i.e. godfather.
I also spent some time with an American research student from New York, called Barb'ra, who had had difficulty in doing any fieldwork in Salvador. She felt a sort of "Mafia" of anthropologists had tried to exclude her from the cult-houses and from access to published material. Whenever I returned from a lunch, dinner or tea engagement with one of the above people she would grab me and draw melodramatically "Well, what happened? Tell me all about it." I found this rather exhausting, as I did the shuttling between the groups. After eleven days I'd had enough; and fled to Recife. Last but not least I visited two terreiros.

Now in a sense this is my fieldwork, these are some of the people I met and some of the impressions I gained. In the time-honoured tradition of anthropological monographs I will now proceed to give an analysis I shall deal primarily with the involvement of the anthropologists in the cults they study.

3. Involvement of the Anthropologists.

One of the difficulties in talking about the 'involvement' of anthropologists is that we are dealing with initiate or secret societies, most of whose practices and beliefs are of an esoteric nature. Many people may be affiliated in some loose sense to the cult; but few (i.e. initiates) penetrate it and gain the body of lore that is at its heart. Thus the problem for a student of such a society is greater than in other areas of social study - something which one receives no guidance about in Oxford. Also it is not clear how we can best define "involvement". However I found that most of the anthropologists had become involved in the cults to the extent of making offerings to the deities or orixas, participating in other rituals, helping to prepare food i.e. in the overall cycle of cult-life. None that I met in Salvador admitted to having been possessed. However I did hear of one student of Social Sciences at the Federal University of Bahia, and one other at Campinas (near Sao Paulo) who had both become cult-leaders (pai-de-santo). I met one researcher in Recife who, since starting research on Xangô had become a filha-de-santo i.e. initiate. Ricardo, as noted above, was 'born in a cult-house', as was Nunes Pereira, an anthropologist who worked in Maranhão. Anita, though a white Argentinian of German-Jewish extraction, told me without any self-consciousness that she 'lived' black culture. With her husband, a well-known figure in Afro-Bahian circles, she participated fully in cult-life.

But, we may now ask, is this at all important? Isn't anxiety about 'objectivity' somewhat misplaced? For if we are studying initiate societies, there is no alternative to involvement. And surely the more involved we become, the more information we'll have access to. Hence we will be in a better position to write monographs.

But unfortunately the situation is not so simple. At the most obvious level the involvement of the anthropologist is practically never acknowledged, at least not in the monographs I've read. That complex network of relationships, the emotional loyalties that bind the 'scholar' to his 'community', receive scant mention. Any suggestion that the student made an offering or two, felt attracted to the power of the orixas, or underwent other rituals practically never occurs. For this side - for the raw emotions - one has to go to frankly autobiographical or sensational works such as David St. Clair's "Drum and Candle: First-hand experiences of voodoo and spiritism", A.J. Langbath's "Mambe", or Pedro McGregor's books. But if we reject overt journalism (which may communicate a feel for the subject) what is wrong with supposedly objective or ethnographic study based on years of involvement? Nothing, so long as we are told something about this involvement, and how the data were collected. For example, Anita and her husband produced a very detailed description of the Egun cult, in Salvador - published in 1969. The article is called "Ancestor Worship in Bahia". It deals with the Yoruban cult of the dead, brought to Salvador in the nineteenth century. There are only two such houses, run by men, in the whole of Brazil; and they are in Salvador. They are also closed to outsiders. Now Anita's husband is a priest in the senior Egun cult-house, which is on the island Itaparica. And
Anita, as noted above, "lives black culture". But no reference to this is to be found in their article. Only through slight personal acquaintance am I able to say which of the two Egum cults is described. To do full justice to the 'scientific' intentions of the authors this information should be placed at our disposal. As the Handbook of Latin-American Studies said, "It is never made clear when, where or how, or by whom the data were collected".

A notorious example of this problem is afforded by Roger Bastide's "Le Candomble de Bahia: rite Nago", published in 1958. It is the most famous single work on candomble known to anthropologists outside the field of Afro-Brazilian studies. This monograph claims to give a definitive account of the most traditional rituals and beliefs in Nago (i.e. Yoruban) candomble. But there is not one reference to the circumstances in which the data were collected, nor, for example, to the number of cult-houses visited. According to Anita, Bastide was introduced to Salvador by Pasteur in the late 40's or early 50's; and never spent more than a month or three weeks in the place at one time. The work is thus a synthesis, a product of about 10 years acquaintance with Salvador - as well as Africa. According to her, parts of it are accurate e.g. description of the Egum; but other parts 'rubbish!' I don't have the esoteric knowledge necessary to make such a judgement. But the absence of any clue to the conditions of fieldwork is enough to raise one's suspicions.

However the 'involvement' of the anthropologists has its effects on them and the cults in ways that extend beyond an omission or two in the list of terreiros visited. The anthropologist has a definite role to play in the structure of the cult-house. He may very well be made an egum - or honorary member, like the local police chief or leading politician i.e. a successful and potentially influential member of the community. But as "the professor", spending a lot of time in one or perhaps more terreiros, he is a status symbol. By his frequent presence he attests to the prestige and power of the cult; particularly if it becomes known that he has made an offering, or is thinking of going through the preliminary stages of initiation. The social distance between "a professor" and most members of the cult will be very great. At one Caboco terreiro I went to (admittedly in Recife), the pai-de-santo stopped the proceedings one evening to announce the sale of raffle tickets, for a bigger and better terreiro. "And the Professor", he added after a significant pause and looking in the direction of the resident anthropologist I was with, "Has already bought one." In this case the presence of the anthropologist - from a high social position - was used to reinforce the authority of the cult and its leader. This is not an isolated example.

Conversely, the role of the anthropologist can have a direct effect on the nature of the rituals. The search for 'traditional' i.e. African survivals can lead to such elements being retained or emphasized on the authority of the anthropologist. For the more 'traditional' a cult-house, the more prestige it has (though this prestige is also linked to the reputed 'powers' of the cult-leader). But instances are known of where the discovery of a 'new' survival has lead to it playing a more prominent part in the cult rituals. An unusual example of the role of the anthropologist is found in Salvador, where a well-known French anthropologist has set up a cult-house with his lover. The anthropologist acts as the authentic source or fount of African "traditions" with which the cult-house aligns itself. Thus the Frenchman, having studied candomble for many years, and having been to Africa, uses his esoteric knowledge to establish a 'really' traditional cult. Apparently he and his associates intend their terreiro to become the mystical center of the Southern hemisphere.

This is an extreme case, yet it represents a tendency I noticed in most of the anthropologists I met. For in a sense they are doubly marginal people. One of the most commonly held views - by social scientists - about possession cults in Brazil is that they are a product of rapid urbanization and industrialization. According to this view, the majority of cults offer a means of social integration and psychological stability to people without either. In other words, to the marginal people ('marginals') who flock to the towns and
cities for jobs and end up living in favelas. Now this is untrue, either of Umbanda in Sao Paulo, or of candomble in Salvador. But the majority of participants are poor - they belong to what Anthony Leeds has called the masses rather than the classes. How curious then - or so it seems to me - that individuals called anthropologists should choose to define their relations and involvement with the cults in this special way. If cults are often marginal to the society - from the point of view of the classes - the anthropologist is marginal in relation to the cult. Why, one is tempted to ask, anthropology at all?

But this is a digression. We are concerned with the effect of anthropologists on cults. Not only do anthropologists interfere on a personal basis, but cult-leaders are in a position to read anthropology text-books. We are not confronted with those 'primitives' of the colonial period who had little or no access to books, let alone the learned monographs about them produced in European universities. In Brazil, on the contrary, a wide range of books about cults is on sale - though usually about Umbanda. In fact the Sao Paulo Umbandistas publish their own books, and these are sold widely. Thus what an Umbanda manual or a fairly learned book says about "African", or other rituals is a definite factor in influencing attitudes towards the cults. This influence acts both to modify rituals etc. within the cults, and also affects the sort of information people give to the anthropologists. This problem was encountered in Belem by Seth and Ruth Leacock when they did the fieldwork for their book "Spirits of the Deep" (1972) on Batuque, the Belem equivalent of Umbanda. I quote from page vii of the introduction:

"Most of the leaders of the Batuque were literate. They were aware that a number of books had been written about the Afro-Brazilian sects in other cities, and they were extremely interested in cooperating in the production of a book about their own sect. Both they and their followers were eager to have photographs of themselves in trance .... We also gave our informants periodic presents of money, but never in a context suggesting that we were paying for information ...."

AND

"... The leaders of the Batuque, however, were not in all respects ideal informants, since they ... were likely to have read books about African-derived religions elsewhere in Brazil and were strongly inclined to substitute the ideal for the reality when explaining the Batuque to literate outside investigators." (p.93).

So not only have the anthropologists had an effect on the cults, but there is a feedback which closes the circle, so to speak. The Leacocks suggest that the cult-leaders may be inclined to tell the anthropologist what they think he wants to hear - as adduced from their reading of anthropology books. Thus in the terreiros of northern Brazil, Life imitates Art.

We may also remember Colin Henfrey's paper, "The Hungry Imagination", which he gave last term. He referred to the difficulty of interviewing informants in Salvador. He often suspected that, mindful of his researches, people deliberately modified their information i.e. gave him what they thought he wanted.

I have tried to suggest something of the interrelations between anthropologists and the cults they study. I would now like to place this in the broader context of the society to which both belong. I will use Salvador as my "special case."
4. Power relations and panelinhas.

By 'panelinhas'¹ I mean the little cliques or interest groups of anthropologists and others who operate to defend one another's interests. I am of course using the term given currency by Anthony Leeds in his article Brazilian Careers and Social Structures (1964). I don't want to get involved in a discussion about Leeds' concept of the panelinha. But what I do want to suggest is that the rival groups of anthropologists constitute panelinhas. These panelinhas, the cults, and other interest groups within Salvador are all bound together. What connects these different groups both horizontally and vertically is power. By horizontally I mean (for example) conflicts or alliances between different groups of anthropologists. By vertically I mean the connections between "levels", e.g. between cult-houses, anthropologists and central government. The notion of level should not be taken too literally. For the interconnections of power interests cannot be easily separated. I shall not define the term 'power' or 'power relations' either. Instead I will leave them as blanket terms to cover a multitude of sins.

I've already indicated something of the rivalries that exist between the different groups of anthropologists at C***, S*****, and others at the Federal University of Bahia. In part the deepness of the antagonism originates in the secrets of the most "traditional" Nago terreiros, which are two or three in number out of the several hundred to be found in Salvador. I was not able to get the "whole story", but the present day rivalry between the terreiros is paralleled, as far as I could judge, by antagonism between the panelinhas of anthropologists who are involved with these terreiros. It is certainly worth noting that these 2 or 3 terreiros are the most extensively studied in Salvador. The majority of cult-houses are thus relatively untouched by anthropologists.

The rivalries between the panelinhas shows itself in various ways. Accusations of idea-stealing are rife, (like witchcraft accusations). In addition the control of information about the cults is an important aspect of this war of the anthropologists. For there are no University libraries worth talking about, and the only good collections of anthropology books are private, usually owned by professors. These private libraries often contain books which are out of print, theses etc. Access to such a library is a great boon to the earnest young research worker, but such access is strictly controlled by the owner. (Perhaps there is an analogy here with the control of information in the oral tradition of the cults themselves). Furthermore the anthropologists know their cult-houses all too well, and can provide introductions which smooth one's path in. Hence a new researcher can be drawn into the orbit of one group, which excludes contacts with other groups. The introductions and contacts with a particular terreiro or so-called ritual specialists somewhat limit or predetermine one's sources. Of course you are free to go for a walk in the slums, and to go into any other terreiro. But where contacts are so personalized, and introductions so important, this latter course of action will be difficult. Thus one may be drawn into the orbit of a panelinha and flattered with promises of help and introductions. I was courted by two such groups, both at daggers drawn. To become part of the group is to be effectively neutralized. For the benefits of the panelinha - whether they eventually materialize or not - place considerable obligations on the recipient. Barbra, the American research student, was given a desk at C***, and plenty of promises. Nothing came of them.

I've even found evidence of similar "channeling" in an article by Herskovits on Africanisms in Porto-Alegre, written in 1943. A careful reading of this article shows that his introductions were given to him by one professor, as a result of which he visited three cult-houses and talked at length to one (female) cult-leader. I suspect that this loquacious mae-de-santo was the one to whom all visiting anthropologists were referred.

¹ Panelinha - "little pot".
in the case of Salvador we can see that the inside information about the cults - information which is zealously guarded - is a source of considerable prestige and influence. In a sense the anthropologists are the guardians of the cults, and their interpreters to the outside world. By virtue of their superior knowledge they can stop "non-traditional" influences (so-called) from infiltrating the cults. They thus become the ultimate authorities on what is and is not "traditional". At the same time they can pose as the guardians and representatives of "Black culture" to the outside world. Hence the anthropologists are mediators between the cults, and society at large.¹ Now this position is one that gives the anthropologists concerned power, which they can manipulate to further their own careers. But their position, between the cults and society, exposes them to many pressures, not least of which are those exerted by the society as a whole. For if the anthropologists occupy a mediating position, then what passes as (say) "tradition" - representing 'true' Afro-Brazilian culture - is of some interest to the powers that be. It does not seem far fetched to me to suggest that "approved versions" of popular culture can be fed back to the people they ostensibly originated from as a form of control. Indeed certain figures come to be legitimizers of these officially approved versions. For example, while I was in Brazil, Jorge Amado's novel "Gabriela" was being shown on T.V. There was an article about him in Veja or some other glossy magazine. On the front cover was a picture of Amado, with the mae-de-santo or Gantois - one of the oldest terreiros in Salvador. Thus one had together the approved representative of "traditional" Afro-Brazilian culture, alongside one of the approved interpreters or spokesmen for that culture i.e. Amado (who also, by the way, won a Lenin prize in the twenties for a novel about peasants in the North-East).

Similarly I feel - subjectively - that the types of books available on candomble and Umbanda are also subject to such constraints. However I do not wish to overstate this part of my argument, because I don't have enough specific information about culture control and anthropologists to back it up with. But I would like to point out that at least in Salvador the position of the anthropologists does have repercussions in the wider political and economic spheres; wider, that is, than the world delineated by the cult-house and inter-departmental conflicts.

This can be seen with reference to the energy problem. Brazil has at present an insatiable need for petrol and petroleum products. It has been decided by the Federal government that the state of Bahia is going to be the centre of the Brazilian petrochemical industry. Now most of Brazil's petrol is imported, and for this reason the Federal government is eager to establish good relations with Nigeria, (a major oil producer, and nearer to Brazil than the Middle East). It is in the move to establish closer ties with Nigeria that Brazil's "Black culture" becomes important. This notion of "Black culture" is contrary to the normal official view of Brazil as a racial democracy and mestizo culture - a view which Gilberto Freyre is the best known proponent of. But in the last few years the Federal Government has encouraged cultural contacts with Nigeria. Delegations of cult-leaders and attendant anthropologists have gone to Lagos to strengthen these relations. Much scandal was generated by the competition between panelinhas to get "their" people onto the delegations. One person I met who had been excluded went to Brazilia off his own bat to see the Nigerian ambassador, and persuaded him that he should be included. Over this incident the Nigerian ambassador apparently criticized a figure in another panelinha for his stupidity. This was a personal judgement; but it circulated speedily in Salvador. The Nigerian ambassador is thus an important person in the life of the cults, particularly in the context of these relations which connect them to the outside world. He is a representative of Africa, and hence that 'tradition' from which the oldest terreiros claim descent. Yet you could search the ethnography of the last ten years in vain for any reference to the Nigerian ambassador in Brazilia; though I did notice a large portrait of him at C ***.

¹. As stated above, my interest here is in the role of the anthropologist, and not in the roots of the cults in Brazilian popular culture.
Now one aspect of this policy of "cultural contact" between Brazil and Nigeria has been support for "Black Studies" in Bahia. Fidel, the head of C • • • told me - surprisingly frank for a first visit - that when he took over the budget was 3000 Cruzeiros a year ... hardly enough to pay for the light bulbs. Now, four or five years later, his budget is half a million. His money comes from the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Town Council of Salvador and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (I think mainly from the latter.) The conditions under which he gets this money are complicated and I didn't altogether understand them. He can't do research off his own bat, but only if commissioned by other University departments. All the same he is somehow able to do his own research. However his main worry is that there had been a shift in government policy. The initial stage of establishing good cultural relations with Nigeria had passed. As the government made economic agreements with Nigeria over the sale of oil, the need for cultural agreements receded. Hence the need for "Black studies" also receded - as seen from this viewpoint. From his reading of the signs Fidel is afraid that sooner or later - and most probably sooner - some bureaucrat in Brazilia would decide to call a halt, and reduce (or cut off) money to C • • •. He is a worried man. I'm not sure, though, how much to believe of all this. I don't know whether it was largely an attempt to win my sympathies - to appear as a 'reasonable' man beset with troubles. But his case does illustrate the different levels of "power relations" that can exist between "Black culture", central government - and the anthropologists.

Likewise Anita, setting up her rival organization, was relying on financial support from an independent American backer and the Ministry of Education and Culture. She was planning to hold a conference in Rio entitled "The Black Diaspora in the New World" - a title with political repercussions, particularly at present in Brazil. Last summer she doubted whether it would be allowed.

While the ramifications of the cults stretch up to the highest political and economic levels, they also extend down to the "lowest" ones (to pass a blatant value judgement). For the cults themselves are not neutral. They are not empty boxes which the anthropologists adroitly manipulate like expert poker players, (though they may be used in that way as well). The cults play a definite part, in that the anthropologists who use them are themselves used. They give themselves to the cult. They may gain prestige and power in the community at large, but inevitably become creatures of the cult. For power is not just about manipulation of people and interest groups within the state. In Brazil it quite blatantly includes the manipulation of supernatural power. In this respect a terreiro is quite different from, say, the Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford. In both cases one is confronted with a closed society, each of which may be racked with personality and power conflicts. Indeed this aspect of terreiro life has been studied most recently by Yvonne Velho and Peter Fry. But where the Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford differs from a terreiro is that - to the best of my knowledge - the personality conflicts within it do not entail the manipulation of supernatural power. Whether or not one believes specifically in the power of the orixas the cults do represent a definite type of power, which the cult-leaders can control. People are attracted to this source of power; and this includes a large proportion of the anthropologists. Now while I do not know what goes on in peoples' heads, I feel that the anthropologists are not much different here from other cult-members. Thus, in their desire for proximity to "supernatural power", the role of anthropologist becomes secondary. For it seems to me, at a certain point you have to make a choice. You either become involved with the cult i.e. make a definite emotional commitment - or you don't. In the first case the notion of "objective" study becomes very difficult; and in the second the notion of study itself is virtually impossible. For the power which the cults represent is not something one can be neutral about, and this is quite apart from the power relations which connect the cults - and the anthropologists - to the society as a whole.

While I do not mean that the cults are effectively manipulating Salvador and the Federal government - through the use of magic - I would suggest that they form one node of power relations within a series of such nodes.
In passing I think it worth noting that this association of an interest in black magic, and the possession of power (however defined) is found in other places. Haiti is the most notorious example, for Duvalier started his career as an anthropologist - studying Voodoo with Metraux.

5. Conclusion

It will have already become apparent that this paper is first and foremost a product of that "education" I received in going to Brazil for the first time. It was in every sense an "unsentimental" educational, though no less enjoyable for that. It was also a shock, and for this nothing prepared me.

However I have tried to demonstrate that anthropologists are not all they seem. By looking at the case of Salvador, which admittedly has special features, we have shown that anthropologists and their monographs are not to be taken on trust. For the anthropologist is not a neutral figure; and in Brazil he is subject to constraints, controls and channeling at different levels. These largely predetermine the access he has to sources, and the circulation and approval which his work receives - particularly if he is Brazilian. To pretend that one can do fieldwork in Brazil in the manner of the famous Africanists of the past is naive. To import those Durkheimian models (as Bastide does), with their conservative and virtually timeless notions of "tradition" is misleading. But to do so without any comment about the circumstances in which the fieldwork was done, or without comment on the theoretical approach employed, is - it seems to me - highly reprehensible.

At a general level what I am saying about ideology and anthropological study has been said before. We all know that the anthropologist isn't as "objective" as he pretends to be. But in the dreary morass of Afro-Brazilian monographs this point apparently has to be made again. Yet the suspicions I voiced about the other monographs, the other books, should by rights be raised about this paper. My questionable generalizations for one thing, the constraints and controls acting on me for another - and the influence of the panelinhas I encountered. These should all be questioned. But this questioning can be widened still further. Why study Afro-Brazilian cults? What ideological factors linking England (an ex-colonial power), and Brazil (formerly colonialized), produce this spectacle of an Oxford trained anthropologist going to study candomble - an "exotic" religion - in the Tropics?

One concrete result of my visit is that I have become much more suspicious of monographs, and the circumstances in which they are produced. There is a conflict here which I have not resolved. Am I against all fieldwork - or am I saying that more information will somehow make it more 'objective'? Obviously I don't have any absolute standards to appeal to here. But with reference to initiate societies I hope I have outlined some of the perils (depending on your point of view) that confront the student. The anthropologist is exposed to intense pressure from within the cult - which he of necessity must become a part - and also from without, from the wider society. These pressures are rarely acknowledged. But whether "acknowledging" them somehow makes fieldwork "possible" again is another question. My unsureness about this reflects my present ambivalence towards fieldwork. However I am not advocating the abolition of all fieldwork. But more attention must be paid to what goes on when people think they are doing it - particularly in initiate societies. For the collaboration between the anthropologist and 'initiates' in the construction of social reality is of a far greater order of magnitude than occurs (say) in the study of working-class movements in Brazil.

In the great era of structural-functionalism, anthropologists went off into the wild to study "their" communities; those groups of primitive savages living an innocent life in forest or savannah, untouched by industrial civilization. Yet by a curious irony we can now see that the anthropologists were the true
innocents, in the seemingly unselfconscious way they produced their monographs. But given the factors which can impinge upon them, and influence their work - as described in this paper - we must conclude that anthropologists can no longer afford to be innocent.

Daniel Tabor.
GLOSSARY


Caboclo: Amerindian spirit.

Candomble: 1) The place where African religious ceremonies are celebrated.
2) The most "traditional" African cults in Brazil, in which the initiates are possessed by deities or orixas.

Candomble dos caboclos: Religious sects in which the adepts receive the spirits of "caboclos" or Amerindians, instead of the African deities.

Egun or Egungun: The dead.

Exu: Intermediary between men and the deities. Often seen as a sort of "Trickster" figure.


Mae-de-santo: "Mother of the Saints" in Portuguese. Priestess in charge of candomble.

Nago: Yoruban.

Ogun: Influential patron and protector of candomble.

Olourun: The Supreme God.

Oríxa: Generic name of the African divinities: the intermediaries between Olourun, the Supreme God, and human beings.

Pai-de-santo: "Father of the Saints" in Portuguese. Priest in charge of candomble.

Terreiro: Cult-house (lit. a place with an earthen floor).

Umbanda: Brazil's most recent "national religion" = Macumba plus spiritism.

Xango: 1) Name of the God of Thunder.
2) Term designating the candombles of Pernambuco and Alagoas.
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The external aspect of 'social fitness', that is: an intellectual evaluation of societies in terms of their fitness or otherwise to adapt and endure, derives most recently from evolutionist ideas of the nineteenth century. The idea has long vanished from social anthropology in that form. The early evolutionists were concerned with a particular solution of a problem that is of much longer standing, - part of a very general tendency of human beings to bring a moral evaluation to the condition of their social fabric. Long before Darwin there were centuries of European and near Eastern historical evidence available for reflection on this subject. The facts of conquest, destruction, dispersal, and absorption of certain societies by others provided the oldest basic material of human history - a seemingly endless series of tragedies for those directly involved with implications that were supremely depressing. The conditions under which polities survived or failed to survive were of genuine, even urgent, interest.

The Victorian evolutionists, in asserting that it is the 'best' (in some sense) that survives thus added a special optimistic nuance to what had formerly been a more pragmatic accommodation with necessity.

It was a commonplace of historical study, for example, that much that was meritorious was destroyed that Rome might survive; the idea that its 'peace' was a kind of 'wilderness' goes, of course, back to its own early imperial days (Tacitus). In the middle ages the idea of the destroyed beauty now included Rome itself. The trajectories of several of the successor states (Goths, Vandals, Byzantium) merely confirmed that the survival of social entities could not be guaranteed. The ages before the evolutionists had therefore inevitably had to come to terms with the matter. It is important to note then that nothing as simple as a vulgar 'might is right' was then accepted as a moral axiom. For many centuries of mediaeval time there was no doubt in the minds of many thinkers that there had been an unfortunate decline in most qualities of civilization despite important religious gains. The fact that Rome or classical civilization had not survived was not endowed with the particular metaphysics of survival that we now know. History in such cases seemed rather to confirm the mythological theme of the 'Golden Age'. It was a feature of Golden Ages that men became unfit to live in them, not that Golden Ages were unfit to survive. The idea of the Renaissance was thus of great significance later. It was explicitly so called because the classical age had been re-born; men had become fit to restore it.

It is interesting that it is in the eighteenth century that the notion of the Classical civilisation having died from a failure of and in itself, became finally fixed in English letters as an ambiguous result of Gibbon's Decline and Fall. That work still set out to show that men in some way had not been fitted for the Roman Empire. Yet its weight of scholarship conveyed the simultaneous conclusion that those same faulty men had been produced by the Roman Empire. Gibbon's masterpiece is, in my opinion, an essential literary precursor (placed as it was in every scholar's library) to the geologically, archaeologically and zoologically based social evolutionism of the next century. For although his work was truly about the

failures of human beings, Gibbon himself produced the cautious assessment that by the late 18th century, the modern system in which he lived had despite its faults not yet to face its own fall. The next century was characteristically less cautious.

The raising of the fact of survival to a measure of fitness in itself, arose in the nineteenth century through a sort of undistributed historical middle. The nineteenth century was assessed to have surpassed the past, by the past's own very best criteria. The course that had led to nineteenth century excellence was retraced back through history - criteria of future promise (not unlike the child Harold Wilson standing outside 10 Downing Street) were selected from the post-classical remains. Contemporary societies were evaluated in the same way: generally as inferior or 'primitive', their 'survival' being related to fitness for certain historical conditions only. This is all familiar enough from nineteenth century social anthropology, which was merely of its age in this respect.

But the problem of fitness as applied to societies was continued unconsciously into the twentieth century, ironically, by that most anti-evolutionist school of social anthropologists - the functionalists. Their demonstration of the internal coherence of social institutions in non-Western societies came in the end to lie very close to the simple view: 'if it is there it has a function'. Although the matter of extancy ('is it there?') was at an important level separated from the question of survival, the 'function' of 'function', in Malinowski's and Gluckman's writings at least, seems to be to maintain the society in being. In this surprising sense functionalism was a last triumph of the evolutionary approach, even as it turned it on its head. It demonstrated, in effect, that 'fitness' redefined as 'function' was not a feature of western societies alone. (This was a source of fruitful and corrective relativism in the best work of the period.) From there the further step to the hyper-relativism which alarmingly removes the word 'alone' from that sentence, was a short one, quickly taken by many of today's ecologists. That is; that western societies may, on a long view, be less 'fit' than 'simpler' smaller ones.

It is still possible to hear the assertion that for humanity evolution has moved from biology to society. The admission of society into the picture is, however, to produce the possibility of a self-evaluation. There is an internal aspect to the idea of social fitness. For the Victorian, the external and internal aspects - his view of 'biology' and of himself - were able to coincide. 'The fittest survive: fortunately (or as it happens), I am the fittest'. Result: happiness. For the 20th century ecologist, it is perhaps rather: 'The fittest survive: although (for my part) I do not feel very fit!'. Result: consternation. This is a fault in logic before it is a fault in life. We are not entirely like science-fiction computers to be outwitted by a paradox and made to self-destruct. The nature of survival must be removed to its pre-nineteenth century position. Any definition of fitness in terms of survival renders the term fitness otiose, for fitness is thus only a property of having survived.

Murdock in this passage thus speaks with the voice of another age:

'By and large, the cultural elements that are eliminated through trial and error or social competition are the less adaptive ones, so that the process is as definitely one of the survival of the fittest as is that of natural selection' (1965: 126; original published in 1956).
And in particular:

'What man has lost, in the main, is a mass of maladaptive and barbarous practices, inefficient techniques, and outworn superstitions.' (Ibid: 127).

The modern redefinition of survival as 'adaptive continuity' raises equally difficult questions where society is concerned. With a broad enough definition, adaptation is historically demonstrable through almost any circumstances. Adaptation may follow adaptation, as it were, until a generation suddenly asks (we must imagine) 'Whatever happened to the Roman Empire?' At some time an evaluation is made that a human entity has not survived - it was with us when we set out but it is no longer to be seen. A kind of objectification has retrospectively occurred. The fitness of a social form cannot be assessed as if it were an organism, because of this arbitrariness inherent in the social. Thus, traditionally, it is stated that the House of Commons has 'survived by adaptation' for seven centuries, the monarchy for ten or more. In contrast, although the American Presidency by external criteria may continue more features of eighteenth century monarchy than does the present British monarchy, the criterion of evaluation that 'the monarchy survives in the United States' is not open to us.

No progress can be expected in this matter until it is accepted that social entities are self-defining systems. Some transformations that are logically possible are defined out of actual experience. Possibly in a certain case only one definitional criterion must remain unchanged to demonstrate adaptive continuity. Frequently this may be only a 'name'. Perhaps in another case there are so many detailed criteria that no significant redefinition is possible. As an example, the Socialist Party of Great Britain, we learn from a recent study, once had a meeting that expelled dissenters by a majority vote. The meeting then voted to expel those who had voted against that motion. It then voted on the expulsion of those who had voted against that. The SPGB has been at times on the brink of biological extinction: a bus-crash or an influenza epidemic might have extinguished the party. The present gathering might have been likely to favour and to stress the ultimate biological explanation had such a tragedy occurred. But in terms of biology the ex-members of the SPGB, like those of the Communist Party, might well be legion. But for the history of the Party, what would have been their survival if the SPGB had not survived? (1)

We may make some helpful comments of a sort. A social entity survives ('in name') then if it does not maintain too many (how many?) self-defining criteria. In that sense then fitness has a marginal place even in modern social anthropology. We may imagine that if an SPGB-like entity were in charge of some critical task like maintaining irrigation, the craft might well be accidentally extinguished, to the detriment of a larger dependent population. Perhaps then we may say that a society's survival is related to the criteria of definition of some critically important unit. Priesthoods in charge of 'knowledge' provide possible examples. The Egyptian priesthood was perhaps more critically balanced in this respect than were the European monasteries (or than are modern universities?). Elsewhere it is argued that criteria of recruitment are the only demonstrable link between evolution and society, with only ambiguous implications for 'social fitness' (Ardener 1974).

We begin to see that the social evaluation of fitness does not make a clear distinction between the social and the biological. High rates of
gestatory difficulties among Bakweri women (Ardener 1961) were certainly in part due to the social definition as 'fertility medicines and treatments' of substances (purgatives) and procedures (enemas) of an abortifacient tendency. The social definition of biologically detrimental substances as beneficial is the oldest problem in preventative medicine.

The internal aspect of social fitness thus comes to our notice. Among several peoples the social is itself felt to be potentially healthy, or unhealthy. Places 'spoil', become bad. Witches become more virulent in bad places. Among sailors, bad ships are accident-prone as well as socially divided. The internal aspect of the idea of 'social fitness' still closely resembles the 'external aspect' we associate with the scholarly tradition whereby societies are evaluated for their historical success or failure. The scholarly version turns out to be merely part of that general tendency to externalisation common to modern thought. The recognition of the inherent entropy in human structures as not necessarily 'progressive' is, however, both very new and very old among observers of the human.

Edwin Ardener

Note

(1) See Barltrop, 1975: 48-50. This interesting case ran as follows. In 1914 a member of the Peckham branch, Mr. Wren, violated the SPGB's 'Hostility Clause' by signing a petition to a liberal M.P. On orders from Executive Committee (EC) the Branch expelled Wren by 14 to 7. The minority of 7 were then expelled (by a poll of all party members) by 103 to 27. The 27 were then pursued. Ten members voted against the final expulsion and EC demanded that these also should be expelled, but branch secretaries and members were becoming elusive and the matter petered out in 1917.

Barltrop asks (p.190) 'What is there to be said for persistent membership of a small party whose electoral returns are absurdly small, whose influence is restricted; and which will not change its mind? Above everything else the SPGB remains the only custodian of the vision of socialism'.

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It is unfortunate that one should feel it necessary to explain why a book published for The Folklore Society might be interesting to anthropologists. I shall only cite Levi-Strauss's observation that the study of folklore is undoubtedly connected, either by its subject or by its methods (and probably by both at once), to anthropology. Certain countries, particularly the Scandinavian ones, seem to prefer to treat folklore as a comparatively distinct branch of study. ... They have thus proceeded from the particular to the general, while in France, for instance, the situation has been reversed. ... The best situation is probably that in which both points of view have been adopted and developed simultaneously (1972:360).

Simpson's excellent translations of Icelandic folktales (þjóðsögur) offer to anthropologists an easily accessible source which preserves the structure and terms of the original text as much as possible. Not only are these tales presented in perfectly readable English, but Simpson has taken care to see that her rendition is grammatically parallel to the Icelandic texts. This is no easy task as is made apparent in the lower quality of the translation by Benedikz ('Loftur the Magician') which is included in this selection. Together with Simpson's book, Icelandic Folktales and Legends (1973), these translations of Icelandic folktales (þjóðsögur) are easily the most reliable that have yet appeared.

The majority of the pieces are taken from Jon Arnason's collection of tales about individual magicians (einstakir galdramenn), although two tales are from Olafur Davísson's þjóðsögur (1945) and three were contributed by Benedikz. The sources range in time from a c. 1700 manuscript to Benedikz's own contributions which were told to him in the 1930's. Thus we are presented with a record of 200 years of tales about these magicians, the majority of whom lived in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, although the greatest of them all, Smundur the Wise, lived from 1056-1135. Simpson has translated Jon Arnason's notes and the sources he cited for the tales, supplementing these notes with her own comments on the motifs which appear. Her notes provide an excellent guide to further readings on the subject, both in English and in Icelandic.

Given the value of this material and the quality of Simpson's translations, it is unfortunate that Benedikz's essay should serve as an introduction. The superficial historical background which he provides for the people described in the tales can hardly compensate for the value laden comments and unverifiable generalizations which he makes; an introduction of this sort can only serve to devalue the book as a whole.

Benedikz's classification of this material into tales about black, white or grey magicians, which Simpson uses in her notes, is also at fault. Of the eight people described in the tales, Benedikz states that four are 'white magicians'; two are 'black magicians'; one is 'grey'; and one, the only woman, is unclassified.

Color or shade classifications still make an anthropologist's ears prick up, but our first criticism is that Benedikz's system of classification is not exhaustive, since one person remains unclassified. Secondly, although this appears to be a trinary classification, Benedikz later lumps the one 'grey magician' in with the 'white magicians' in opposition to the 'black magicians'. If this can be done so easily, we must ask what is accomplished by having a 'grey' category at all.

It should be taken as an index of Simpson's care as a translator, that we can use her versions to investigate this problem further, even though she uses
Mr. Ahmed's book is the most important case study to have appeared in the past twenty years. I should qualify this by adding that its significance derives from the current influence on political anthropology of a hallowed charter - Frederic Barth's study of leadership in Swat. This elegant analysis pioneered and stimulated two critical developments which mark the emergence of our discipline as a science: the relevance of transactionalist models, even for the analysis of our traditional subjects - acephalous, tribal societies; and the need for ethnography to serve theoretical experimentation, specifically in providing data for clear-cut models of behaviour, rather than simply documenting cultural structure. But this charter, upon whose methodology so much of the very best recent work has been built, now appears to be effectively challenged.

In his theoretical approach Mr. Ahmed clearly borrows much from the earlier, and more ideological, critique of his compatriot, Talal Akhund. But with practical experience of tribal politics in this his native area, he is in a position to document his re-analysis with some much needed hard fact. Predictably as an 'outsider', writing this in the middle of an introductory course at SOAS, Mr. Ahmed is weakest when dealing with pure theory. There is some unnecessary jargon, particularly in the introductory chapter - a crash course in current models, which makes one wonder at times to what extent he has tongue in cheek. More serious, perhaps, are some occasional misuses of specific methodological terms (e.g., holism) in describing generalised social phenomena, again following an unfortunate trend. These are very minor, largely stylistic, faults. Readers should not be distracted from an otherwise brilliantly constructed case.

Mr. Ahmed's main point is that Barth's analysis, while revealing important principles of political behaviour in Pathan tribal areas, is misapplied. For Swat is neither tribal nor acephalous. It is an anomaly in this region: a centralised State. In denying the importance of this framework, and of its all-powerful apex, the Wali, Professor Barth was forced into a curious 'ethnographic present'. The critical contracts of his 'independent' Khans over their tenants relate to an institution (the wesh realtment system) which was possibly defunct in most areas even at the time of its abolition by the Wali, one generation before Barth arrived on the scene. Tied tenants can have title choice as to their overlord. Similarly, many of the crucial cases cited by Barth in support of his argument relate to quite different periods, between which, as is well illustrated here, the structure of power relations was being radically transformed as the role of the Wali developed and expanded its influence. Besides such instances of temporal confusion (and Mr. Ahmed shows us that they apply to most of the important institutions described there) there is a curious spatial confusion which may have missed until now: Barth's focal description of Alliances and Political Blocs (Ch. 9) relates to an area outside that circumscribed for the rest of his analysis. It is not in Swat at all, but in tribal Malakand.

This book therefore corrects many inaccuracies and misrepresentations which have, unfortunately, been propagated by others referring to this classic material in their own work. But Mr. Ahmed makes important analytical contributions of his own. He gives us a survey (in itself, a model of how long-term 'models of process' can be effectively used) of the structural transformation of Swat during the last century, showing how the religious ideal of the State conceived by the Saintly Akhund was employed, as was his charisma, by increasingly worldly-oriented successors, eager to legitimate their despotism. This turns out to be a much more fruitful application of Weberology in Swat. The Khana, after a short and treacherous
must now consider a return to the less lucid but more exact ethnography of analytical methods. This we may expect from Mr. Ahmed himself, now conducting field-work among the tribal Mohmand Pathans: a comprehensive study of a type of social organisation about which much is known but very little understood. I am not entirely convinced by his typologizing (we have yet more - Pathan - labels for those ancient centralised-decentralised polarities) but it should stimulate other scholars in this area to look at these constructs more critically.

My initial suspicions in reading this book were that Ahmed, like Barth, emphasises only one field of the complex arena of Swat political life: the apparati of state. His would be a 'Wali's-eye view' to complement (as Ernest Gellner expresses it in his preface) the 'Khan's-eye view' of Barth. Indeed I still feel that more space could have been given to an examination of some of the material issues that the Khans were fighting over amongst themselves; for they are the primary leaders, however small their initiative, which Barth explicitly defined as the focus for his analysis (note the change of title from doctoral thesis to monograph). Perhaps space could have been taken away from some of those cross-cultural comparisons (of states and of Sufic leadership) which are more tangential to the argument. But I have been in the position of being able to check upon these impressions by visiting Swat and talking to its Khans and I find confirmation for every major point of his critique and for his own re-analysis.

Mr. Ahmed’s account of Swat approximates to social reality, as far as any man can judge it. Professor Barth’s can, at best, be construed as an unintentional misrepresentation of that reality. I must state that Mr. Ahmed himself, although he must have had access to much more inside information, faces Barth squarely on his own ground and with his own (Barth’s) data. Future ‘native scholars’ may not be so genteel; and their replications may more ruthlessly undermine our reputations: our right to impose startling models that distort the reality of their social life, however forgivable in terms of our professional needs.

My disenchantment with a mentor, to whom I still feel greatly indebted theoretically, will be shared by many others reading this book. I think we must now consider a return to the less lucid but more exact ethnography of the past, at least before we dare apply such refined and sophisticated analytical methods. This we may expect from Mr. Ahmed himself; now conducting field-work among the tribal Mohmand Pathans: a comprehensive study of a type of social organisation about which much is known but very little understood. Others will be angered by the arrogance of this attack on our classic. Up here, in the neighbouring hills of Chitral, I relish the controversy that must follow.

Peter Parkes.
In the eight essays in this book Professor Davis ranges from the economic and religious aims of Lyon printers in the 1560's to proverb collections in England and France over four centuries. The essays are united, however, by a concentration on "the lives of the 'modest' - the peasants, the artisans, and the meuppeuple of the cities. These are people who have left little direct evidence for the historian. Professor Davis seeks to overcome this by asking new questions of the existing, indirect evidence. To do so she has moved outside her discipline to make use of the works of sociologists, of literary critics, of linguists and, above all, of anthropologists.

The study of popular culture is only feasible when the possibility of its autonomy is recognised. What for the anthropologist is a presupposition serves as a vital tool of analysis for the historian. Professor Davis occasionally retreats without explanation to the law, to religious writers and to philosophers, but in general she upholds the integrity of her subject matter. She also sees that the values of a group may be articulated by means other than writing: "It was... a matter of recognizing that forms of associational life and collective behaviour... could be 'read' as fruitfully as a diary, a political tract, a sermon or a body of laws".

The result is a fascinating book that both manifests and advances the useful rapprochement between anthropology and history. Where historians have previously found chaos and irrelevance Professor Davis discovers order and sense; in the 'mindless' butchery of religious riots she finds attempts to redraw the boundary between the sacred and the profane; in the 'wildness' of popular festivals she detects "a rule and a rationale" in close touch with social reality. She goes beyond previous historical studies which have stressed the conservative nature of popular recreations, to show that they "can act both to reinforce order and to suggest alternatives to the existing order". She also notes "the social creativity of the so-called inarticulate... the way in which they seize upon older social forms and change them to fit their needs". Ritual and ceremony is not opposed to political action as conservatism to radicalism; they are inextricably mixed.

There is much here for the historian, but there is also much for the anthropologist. Two essays concern the position of women; two examine the relationship between religion and economic change; one takes up anthropological work on literacy in the context of sixteenth century western Europe; and one deals with the study of 'man' in Europe and further afield. The book as a whole bears interesting relation to the Ardeners' work on 'muted groups' (though the two essays on women deal mainly with their representation in ceremony and in religious thought).

Anthropologists have been reluctant to see the history of Western Europe as a valid area of operations. This may be a function of a purely administrative division and of the intellectual debate which has enshrined it. The consequences have been unfortunate. Historians have looked to anthropology for coherent theories that they can treat as definitive guides to their own subject matter. Yet such theories only seem coherent when they become fossilized in the history of the subject. Professor Davis does not entirely avoid this. Her use of the language of functionalism is indiscriminate and sometimes misleading, and at one point she implies too ready a faith in the power of anthropological theory: "I left the works of historians with their literary or political bias, and went to those of the anthropologists".
It may be more advantageous to see history as a context for the social sciences rather than as a separate science in itself. Both by its considerable merits and by its occasional limitations, Professor Davis' book is an encouragement to anthropologists to do just this.

Roger Rouse

Books Received.


