Formulating a Linguistic Analogy for Society

It has become somewhat fashionable in recent years for those engaged in social studies to make frequent allusions to linguistics, to the study of language, to language itself. The three principal articles in the last issue of this journal were devoted to one aspect or other of the significance of language; there does seem to be a feeling in the air that whatever society 'is', it is something 'like language'. One gets the impression that scholars tend to think that once a social process or structure has been equated with language in this way, some sort of 'explanation' for that phenomenon has been given, or perhaps at least that the phrase 'like language' is a metaphor appropriate to convey the mystery, the depth, the importance, of the matter under consideration. Edwin Ardener, who has written extensively on the subject of language and its significance for social anthropologists, had this to say in his penultimate paragraph of an article which appeared in this journal three years ago with the title 'Language, Ethnicity and Population':

'Ultimately, among the things that society 'is' or 'is like', it 'is' or 'is like' identification. The entities set up may be based upon divisions in empirical reality, or may be set up on reality by the structuring process of the human mind in society. In such statements 'reality' is, however, frequently only a compendium of 'positivistic' measures and approximations. We experience the structures themselves as reality: they generate events, not merely our experience of events. Anthropologists would argue I think that this process is analogous to language, possibly subsuming language, rather than a process of language. But all agree that language acquires a position of critical empirical importance in its study.'

The subject of this paper is to try to explore this language analogy, to try to ascertain the implications of regarding the 'structuring processes of the human mind in society' as being 'analogous to language', to try, with the aid of some reference to ethnographic aspects of the city of Jerusalem and the contemporary Palestine conflict, to simply comment on the nature of language itself as a result of its now fashionable use as a model for understanding society.

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It would seem at first glance that just about anything can be explained as being 'like language', 'analogous to language'. Just as many things were explained in the 19th century with reference to the concept of 'evolution' - everything then had an 'evolution' - so today nothing can be denied a priori as not being somehow a mirror of something linguistic. The obvious truism here would be to say that language today explains
everything, but in so doing it explains nothing. I love humanity, but I love nobody in particular.

In a sense it could be said that if this is the great weakness of the humanities, it is also its great strength — anything can be said about anything. This is perhaps what freedom means for the poet. And indeed if we were to see our job here at the university as a matter of writing poetry, then there would be little further left to say why the analogy of language may be problematic. But in fact what I am concerned with could be described as the problem of testing the innocence of a relationship between two disciplines. Within the confines of one discipline there is clearly a great amount of freedom concerning the way in which new light can be cast on old problems; it is really at the moment of inter-disciplinary contact that the possible absurdities become all too apparent.

What sort of absurdities do I mean? There are a number of absurdities: one kind of absurdity arises when it becomes clear that the analogy is being simply pushed too far, in other words when the author really believes that a given social form is so much 'like language' that he (or she) pushes the 'fit' so tight that the evidence itself may eventually become distorted for the benefit of this 'fit'. Another kind of absurdity arises when it becomes clear that the possibility of creating a parallel or homologous terminology simply leads to confusing what should be different levels of analysis, such as for example the celebrated case of phonemes in kinship or myth. Another kind of absurdity concerns the reversibility of the analogy. An example of this, drawn from the Palestine material, is the story about the two great guide books to Palestine printed before the First World War, Murray's Guide Book and Baedeker's Guide Book: the frontispiece of the one bore the aphorism 'Palestine is the best guide-book to the Bible'; the other, with equal truth, declared 'The Bible is the best guide-book to Palestine'.

Perhaps the most interesting evidence for the view that X is analogous to language comes from what one might call the extreme view, which simply argues that problem X is nothing but an essentially linguistic problem. Such a view is well-known in philosophy, in linguistic philosophy ('all philosophical problems are nothing but problems of language'); but it also appears in a lot of recent work done in the sociology of education ('Many teachers in schools and in colleges of Further Education see... that educational failure is primarily linguistic failure') ; teachers have thus been turning to Linguistic Science for some kind of practical guidance. But,

"We were conscious of the wide divergence between the aims of the linguist, primarily interested in language as a system for organising 'meanings', and the needs of those who now wanted to gain access to the insights that resulted from that interest. In particular, we were aware of the wide gap that separated the literature
of academic linguistics from the majority of those who wished to find out what Linguistic Science might have to say about language and the use of language."4

Naturally there is a 'wide gap', a 'wide divergence': there are two separate disciplines involved. But what is the proposal here? The proposal is to publish a sort of linguistics for the layman, linguistics for the teacher in the polytechnic, linguistics for the non-linguist. In short, what is proposed is to set up a model of linguistics, a model of language, which could be 'useful' to those who would need it for their own purposes. The important point here is that the wide gap is recognized at the outset even despite the fact that it is argued that educational failure is linguistic failure. Even in this extreme case the proposal is to set up a model of what language is. Anthropologists who do not argue that society is language, merely that it is like language, similarly rely on setting up a model of what language is. It is to these models of language that we now turn. In the course of my argument below I wish to suggest why language is the fashionable analogy today, but for the moment it is perhaps worth noting that whenever Society as such is under discussion the one thing which virtually all commentators agree on is that apart from rules of kinship perhaps, it is language which is common and basic. When Malcolm Crick, in an article published in the last issue of this journal, attempts to pinpoint what is characteristic about Society that makes the ethological analogy inappropriate, he rightly says 'language is really the crucial test here', and that human language, containing possibilities for meta-language, is another level altogether from animal communication.5 And George Steiner puts the same point too, with his characteristic turn of phrase:

"It may well be that our love-making does not differ very much from the great apes. But this is to say little. Through its verbalized imaginings, through the rich context of pre-physical and para-physical erotic exchange in which it takes place, human intercourse (a term obviously akin to 'discourse') has a profoundly linguistic character."6

And,

"Nothing destroys us more surely than the silence of another human being."7

I agree that language is the crucial test, and I propose to use language as a model for describing the society of Jerusalem, in particular the kind of Jerusalem as presented here:

"Few scenes in the East remain more distinctly printed in the memory than do those connected with life in Jerusalem. The motley crowd in its lanes, where every race of Europe and of Western Asia meets; the gloomy churches; the beauty of the Arab chapel of the Rock;
the strange fanaticism of the Greek Festival of the Holy Fire; the dervish processions issuing from the old Temple area; the pathetic wailing at the Temple wall; the Jewish Passover; the horns blown at the feast of Tabernacles; Russian, Armenian, Greek and Georgian pilgrims; the Christ crucified by Franciscan monks in the gilded chapel of Calvary; the poor whose feet are washed by a crowned bishop - all remain in the memory with the mighty ramparts of the city as seen by Christ and His disciples, and the blue goggles of the tourist from the West. No other town presents such an epitome of history, or gathers such a crowd so representative of East and West.

The image of Jerusalem as a highly heterogeneous city is perhaps further emphasized by contemporary Arab propaganda that seeks to condemn the government of Israel for trying to 'judaize' it; there are many linguistic, religious and ethnic realities there, many paths to God in His Holy City. It is this diversity of Jerusalem onto which I wish to pose the question Is it 'like language'? Would an emphasis on the multi-lingual character of Jerusalem be appropriate at all?

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But first it is necessary to look at those models of language itself which are to be found in the literature. Mary Douglas, in her book Rules and Meanings, includes an excerpt from an essay on the novelist William Golding by Michael Halliday, and blithely entitles it 'Syntax Enunciates the Theme' - and this, in the section of the book she calls 'Formal Correspondences'. The notion that culture possesses a 'syntax' seems quite common, yet syntax is merely one part of grammar and may have little meaning as a concept outside a theory which would describe the part it plays in the grammar. This is not simply a case of wrenching terms from linguistics; rather, it seems to create a travesty of language itself. If there is no attempt to think through the notion that culture is 'like language', to follow out that language and linguistic meta-language have their own internal relations, then what we are left with is a spoof of language and a spoof of linguistics.

It is thus with a certain amount of reserve that one must greet the efforts of Lacan to link psycho-analysis with language, as expounded by Martin Thom in the last issue of this journal. It is indeed proper that psychology should cross-reference with language - I would find it hard to visualise a psychology which could be separate from how a specific linguistic world-image conditions the life of the mind - and to that extent Lacan is surely on the right track. Interestingly, he emphasises the minimal aspect of language that Malcolm Crick also emphasises in his article in the same issue, namely the capacity that human beings, as distinct from animals, possess in creating and using metaphor. But this is a minimum of language, it represents a starting-point from which one begins a study of language. It must be therefore quite inadequate as a model of what language is.
Moreover Martin Thom in his article concedes that the distinction between metaphor and metonymy, a distinction which we learn Lacan leans on so heavily, is not even specific to language. This he concedes; he says it is 'undeniable'. But if so, how can it be acceptable to study phenomena at a level below which the specific meaning resides? How can Lacan meaningfully speak about the Unconscious structured 'like a language' when he apparently relies on a model of language as deficient as this? And as for the idea that the Signifie does not undergo change, Thom himself says that Lacan's reading of de Saussure is 'highly idiosyncratic'. But still, Lacan speaks about the Unconscious being structured 'like a language'.

Examples of this sort of approach could be multiplied, but for the sake of a comparison let us look briefly at some models of language that linguists themselves have. The school of transformational-generative grammar (TG) associated with the name of Chomsky has come under a good deal of criticism for being too ethnocentric, for forcing all languages into the mould of English just as 17th-century grammar tried to enclose all speech into the mould of classical Latin, for pontificating about the existence and nature of universals in language when only a few dozen have been studied out of the thousands that exist even today, let alone all the thousands that are now dead. George Steiner criticises TG just because it is a formal model and not a representation of actual living language. Chomsky cuts out of his formal model how people actually speak; his model of linguistic competence shows how language would work optimally, given the kind of frictionless, homogeneous, perfectly measurable reality in which the laws of physics, such as we learn them in school books, are said to operate. But it is the langage donne in which we conduct our lives, whether as ordinary human beings or as linguists. We have no other.

The fascination that Chomsky has with the universal attributes of language seems to Steiner to be a modern version of the Ursprache myth, the language of all mankind before the great event at the Tower of Babel. Indeed, he says TG reflects a profound bias towards mono-lingualism. But empirically linguistic reality is quite different. 'Most of language begins where abstract universals leave off.' If I criticise the anthropologist for his non-proven claim that his subject-matter is 'like language', it is also true to say that one may criticise Chomskyan linguistics for claiming that its 'deep structures' are 'like language'. Some feel, indeed, that they are not 'like language' at all.

For George Steiner the crucial fact about language is its huge multiplicity. Chomsky's model might well be acceptable if the whole world spoke one language - but why are there 1000 times more languages than blood-groups, asks Steiner.
The model of language for linguistic philosophy is a question of words, the arrangements of words, and their truth or falsity - but words, says Steiner, cannot be about truth at all, for if they were there would not be so many languages. Steiner's model of what language is he calls 'alternities': each human being is a post-Babel universe in miniature, carrying in his head all sorts of alternative worlds, worlds other than the world, and inventing new worlds at the time. Language is for Steiner a theory of translation between these worlds.15

Steiner's work is undoubtedly highly imaginative and stimulating, but I am not convinced that the details of his debate with Chomsky16 need detain us here; I find it significant that there is one feature of language which they both regard as its minimum feature and which they both use as their starting-point for analysis, and that feature is the creativity of language, its inventiveness, its open-endedness. Chomsky has rightly been praised for stressing the human being's capacity for infinite linguistic creativity, and I believe Steiner will be praised for re-opening the question, Why Babel? And indeed it is this model of language which I think is the crucial one for anthropologists, for prima facie it is linguistic variation that encodes, encapsulates, crystallises, generates cultural differentiation, whether between cultures or within a single culture. Hence it is through the perspective of linguistic alternities that I shall be looking at the Jerusalem material.

There are a number of implications that follow from this position. The first point concerns the question of style. Information theory, or at least a model of language that treats language as being essentially the transmitting of information or the expressing of propositions, does not generally take account of the fact that languages possess a multiplicity of styles. But part of the meaning of a linguistic utterance is contained in the way in which it is said. If language is information, why is there such an anti-economic multiplicity of different ways of speaking? This fallacy is found in many places: Lacan speaks about the language spoken by the mass of human beings; the translators of the New English Bible tried to 'render the Greek, as we understood it, into the English of the present day, that is, into the natural vocabulary, constructions and rhythms of contemporary speech',17 and, it seems, appointed a panel of literary advisors, but this is to show a blank unawareness that different modes of discourse require different styles; how can 'English of the present day' be the same as 'contemporary speech'? And how can they arrive at the idea that style is some sort of decorative addition, not essentially concerned with the meaning? They appointed their panel of literary advisors because, as they explained, 'sound scholarship does not always carry with it a delicate sense of style.'18 But surely sound scholarship here would be precisely the saying in English with all the possible delicacy what the original says in Greek. If the scholarship does not emerge in the
translation itself, where is it? This is a very common position - in the acknowledgements to the Jerusalem Bible there is also a separation between 'translation' and 'revision'. And in the anthropological literature it is unfortunately all too common to come across apologies for a poor translation, as if anthropology was about something else instead.

Another implication of a model of language which uses alternaties as its integrating theory is to raise the problem of context. The notion of context has had a somewhat vexed history: in linguistic anthropology it took its first substantial roots in the writings of Malinowski, who seemed to be reducing linguistic meaning totally to its context of utterance. In many important ways, important for anthropologists, this is a very fertile idea, but of course it can lead to absurdities. If I say, for example, 'Mary did it for John's sake', an unsophisticated theory of context - and there are enough of them about - might argue that from this we can infer that John has a sake. However if I say, 'She did it for his sake', the presence of the pronouns may indicate a context, and we might wish therefore to distinguish these two sentences.

We have seen, albeit briefly, some of the difficulties which attend the use of the expression or model 'English of the present day', in that it overlooks the multiplicity of alternaties that exist at a given moment in time. But the phrase 'English of the present day' also implies a decision on time, on its diachronic relations into the past. The notion that certain linguistic styles, such as religious English, become 'outmoded' or 'out of date' is somewhat misleading: it concerns not some mysteriously inevitable process of linguistic development but rather a question of usage which is conceptualised in terms of a diachronic image. Part of the context of a use of language is its setting in the history of itself. Language is capable of patina, as we can see by the commonly used device of translators to make use of archaic forms of the language to gain special effects. The use of religious English, of the type generally associated with the 1611 Authorised Version of the Bible, has often been described by Christians in this country as a form of identification with the generations of Christians who expressed their lives through that form of language. The model 'English of the present day' does not capture this kind of context; it does not take alternaties into account, just as the model 'ordinary speech' fails in this respect.

We use the word 'cliche' to refer to a use of language that is repeatedly ripped from a context and appears to survive without context at all. It is the classic example of 'dead stretch' in language. A dead stretch is the slaughtering of the experience, sometimes done in order to analyse it, and it is something increasingly common in our own culture, like for example the reduction of the experience of going to an art gallery to flipping over the photographs of a glossy album, or the reluctance to go to a concert but rather listen to the
gramophone record. An appeal for context, therefore, whether context of a diachronic or synchronic kind, is an appeal to re-create the experience in order to understand it. And even studies of the myth are, as Levi-Strauss reminds us, part of the myth itself. Without context, we are left with a dead stretch. A model of language, especially when it will be used to help us in understanding society, should search after all the contextual rhythms it can find, and rebuild their patina. In other words, what is needed is a theory of context.

Parallel with that, what is needed is a theory for anthropologists which should concern itself with what a model of language should look like. My criticisms till now have tried to show that only certain selected aspects of language or linguistics have been selected by anthropologists, often in a highly idiosyncratic and arbitrary way, and then we have been told that the phenomenon under discussion is 'like language'.

But anthropologists who use the old term from linguistics, such as transformation, rule, lexicon, syntax, etc. are saying as little about language as an anthropologist who merely lists the ingredients - or perhaps even only some of them - of a soup. Language itself can be approached in a number of ways - to extrapolate one aspect and hence argue that the society or social form thus functions 'like language' is surely a case of a syllogism that is arguing from minor to major. Analysis of language seems possible on an indefinite number of levels; consider, for example, etymological, the functional, the structural, the synchronic, the diachronic, the phonetic, the phonemic, the morphological, the syntactic, the sociolinguistic, the psycholinguistic, the metalinguistic, even the grammatical. To what is the reference to 'language' made? Some might argue that it should be to all these things together, other might prefer to see a conscious selection or shaping of aspects in order to describe language, similar perhaps to the shaping of a historiographic approach as practised by the historian. What I am arguing for is a consciousness by anthropologists in constructing the linguistic analogy, that one may learn from the process of model-building itself.

Consider the following passage from Michael Halliday in a discussion on language acquisition by children:

"The question 'what is language?', in whatever guise it appears, is as diffuse and, at times, disingenuous as other formulations of its kind, for example 'what is literature?' Such questions, which are wisely excluded from examinations, demand the privilege of a qualified and perhaps circuitous answer.

"In a sense the only satisfactory response is 'why do you want to know?' since unless we know what lies beneath the question we cannot hope to answer it in a way which will suit the questioner. Is he interested in language planning in multilingual communities? Or in aphasia and language disorders? Or in words and their histories? Or in dialects and those who speak
them? Or in how one language differs from another? Or in the formal properties of language as a system? Or in the functions of language and the demands that we make on it? Or in language as an art medium? Or in the information and redundancy of writing systems? Each one of these and other such questions is a possible context for a definition of language. In each case language 'is' something different.

"The criterion is one of relevance; we want to understand, and to highlight, those facets of language which bear on the investigation or the task in hand. In an educational context the problem for linguistics is to elaborate some account of language that is relevant to the work of the English teacher. What constitutes a relevant notion of language from his point of view, and by what criteria can this be decided? Much of what has recently been objected to, among the attitudes and approaches to language that are current in the profession, arouses criticism not so much because it is false as because it is irrelevant. When, for example, the authors of The Linguistic Sciences and Language Teaching suggested that teaching the do's and don'ts of grammar to a child who is linguistically unsuccessful is like teaching a starving man how to hold a knife and fork, they were not denying that there is a ritual element in our use of language, with rules of conduct to which everyone is expected to conform; they were simply asserting that the view of language as primarily good manners was of little relevance to educational needs." 19

Hence Halliday argues that what is relevant to the teacher is that model of language that a child has. He says the child has a number of models of language: An Instrumental model, a Regulatory model, an Interactional model, a Personal model, a Heuristic model, an Imaginative model, and a Representational model. His comments on the last one of these, the Representational model, are worth quoting:

"So we come finally to the REPRESENTATIONAL model. Language (in this model) is, in addition to all its other guises, a means of communicating about something, of expressing propositions. The child is aware that he can convey a message in language, a message which has specific reference to the processes, persons, objects, abstractions, qualities, states and relations of the real world around him.

"This is the model of language that many adults have; and a very inadequate model it is, from the point of view of the child. There is no need to go so far as to suggest that the transmission of content is, for the child, the least important function of language; we have no way of evaluating the various functions relatively to one another. It is certainly
not, however, one of the earliest to come into prominence; and it does not become a dominant function until a much later stage in the development towards maturity. Perhaps it never become in any real sense the dominant function; but it does, in later years, tend to become the dominant model. It is very easy for the adult, when he attempts to formulate his ideas about the nature of language, to be simply unaware of most of what language means to the child; this is not because he no longer uses language in the same variety of different functions (one or two may have atrophied, but not all), but because only one of these functions, in general, is the subject of conscious attention, so that the corresponding model is the only one to be externalized. But this presents what is, for the child, a quite unrealistic picture of language, since it accounts for only a small fragment of his total awareness of what language is about. 20

Halliday is here perfectly explicit in distinguishing between what language is, and what language is for the child. He is clear on what he is leaving out from the former in order to describe the latter. He specifies the heuristic purpose of his model. But in addition to its interest as an example of conscious model-building of the nature of language, this text also shows a crucial point for anthropologists, namely that there is no a priori reason whatsoever to suppose that another culture will have the same model of language as we have of ours, just as a child does not possess the same model of language that an adult has.

In other words, a theory of context which would be part of a model of language for anthropologists would have to include how different cultures use language, and how we use language too. A theory is needed, for without a theory there is no way to assess the status of any one particular analysis or any one reference to the linguistic analogy.

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In an important introduction to a discussion of the problem of ethnicity, Fredrik Barth has outlined for us some of the limitations of taxonomic approaches. 21 Indeed, ethnic identity may very well be a contextual matter and not a matter for a priori judgment, despite a long tradition of the latter on the part of the colonial or republican administrator as also on the part of the anthropologist. Rather, in order to understand ethnic perceptions of inclusion and exclusion, it is necessary to make ad hoc analyses of the world structure or the total way of thinking of the particular society under discussion.

In many ways language is remarkably similar to these problems of ethnicity; it is even possible to read whole paragraphs of Barth's text substituting the word 'language' for 'ethnic group' and 'dialect' for 'sub-culture', and the argument
would remain valid and indeed strong. A question then that I
would pose about language could also be posed about ethnicity,
and the question is this: if context is the issue at stake,
how do people preserve in their heads the complexity of their
shifting identities, styles or languages? We are all multi-
lingual, in the narrow sense of the term - what theory of
context do we have in our heads, quite apart from the theory
of context that the anthropologist should have in his head?
Is there not a situation of entropy, of conflicting energies,
latent here? Why do we look for explanations when violence
erupts, instead of wondering all the time when it does not?
I think there is something here that needs explanation, that
a theory of context must explain, namely how states of entropy
are avoided. If I may for a moment recall the story of Maxwell's
Demon, there was just such a similar situation: how was it
possible for entropy to be avoided? What was this Demon that
could prevent entropy? And the answer which was found was
this: in order to keep the hot gas and the cold gas apart,
the Demon had to be itself consuming energy. The analogy is
this: I should like to posit a linguistic form perhaps unseen
or unobserved which itself represents the native theory of
context by virtue of its singular capacity to prevent linguis-
tic entropy. That energy is the sense of the human being of
his own linguistic wholeness, whatever his multi-faceted
capacity for making alternities. It is a native theory of
unity. I shall come back to it again under the name lingua
franca.

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At this stage it might perhaps be desirable to see where
we have got to. Let me summarise the argument so far: models
of language are frequently used to illustrate social phenomena,
but generally these models reveal only a certain aspect of
language within a certain context, and also are not sufficiently
self-conscious in an analysis; however the truth about language
is that it does operate in a variety of contexts, multipli-
cities and histories simultaneously - and the question that
arises is whether a certain entropy is not generated internally
as a result, to which I have suggested that there is an inherent
lingua franca machinery that welds the alternities together.

However an enormous problem confronts us here immediately.
If, as I have argued earlier, the way in which things are said
is in fact part of the meaning of the thing said, then we are
faced with the difficulty that it is through language that we
are in fact talking about language. This human capacity for
meta-language (language about language) is, as Malcolm Crick
points out in his article in this journal mentioned above,
central to the question of what human society rests on, but
meta-language can also be used falsely, as Crick also points
out. He says that ethologists speak — incorrectly — of the
'language' of animals, and he complains that their use of the
term 'language' is to 'semantically violate' and to involve a
'linguistic confusion'.22 I agree totally that the word
'language' is being used differently by ethologists, but
although Crick sees that language can be used by humans to lie, he does not draw out the idea that language can also be used by humans to create false meta-languages. It is right to complain of the eclectic use of notions such as transformation, deep structure, surface structure, etc; he is right to criticise the ethologist model of animal communication being 'like language' or even being 'language'. But the problem is more complex than that. We know how to talk about the 'language of love' or the 'language of music' - indeed, one of our alternatives is to talk about the language of anything or the syntax of a bumble bee. The capacity for meta-language may be universal - but specific meta-languages are, on the other hand, deeply rooted in culture. George Steiner puts it tellingly - that meta-languages have no extra-territorial immunity; and he would wonder whether the implication of that is that a genuine science of language is thereby rendered impossible. Robinson's recent book on TG puts a similar point, though in somewhat more polemical fashion: TG postulates a scientific, culture-free, universal meta-language but this is arrogant nonsense - 'All the efforts to show us what underlies natural language ... are themselves language-dependent'; Chomsky's TG meta-language would 'attribute to the child a quite advanced theoretical knowledge'; Chomsky is confusing what the grammarian does with what the speaker does; just as syntax is only one part of grammar, so 'sentences are a rather small part of language. Chomsky never gives any account of paragraphs, chapters, books or any other of the larger units of which sentences are a kind of atom. But it is the larger unit which decides what the sentence is doing in language, not vice versa', yet 'There is no reason to suppose that speakers of English have acquired a concept 'sentence of English'.

In other words, the assumption that it is possible to set up a meta-language for linguistics that is not itself ethnocentric may well turn out to be suspect. Certainly a good deal of 'objective observations' about language may stem from our own perception of our own language, especially in the absence of a contemporary neuro-chemical theory of human language. Moreover a perfect theory, a perfect meta-language, a perfect translation, is something we would never know about, even if it were possible - there is no way of proving a perfect fit when it comes to the question of the nature of understanding itself.

So what of our own meta-languages? The problem of the false meta-language extends beyond simply a criticism of work in ethology or TG. George Steiner has argued in a number of well-known books and articles how we live today in what he calls a 'post-culture' the chief distinguishing characteristic of which is what he calls 'the retreat from the word'. Our contemporary English language is simply debased. Robinson (in an earlier book) describes how the New English Bible in no way gives the sense, the strange and savage sense, of the original; the miracles of the new Bible all seem gross
impostures, superstitions as reported by the modern journalist. One now encounters attempts to judge moral questions according to common sense or utility rather than according to Christian or any other absolute standards. The Ten Commandments are now glossed in the new Anglican liturgy: 'You shall not commit adultery. Know that your body is a temple of the Holy Spirit', it now says. But the commandment was clear and not dependent on this gloss: 'thou shall not commit adultery', it said, namely, regardless of your beliefs and opinions. Robinson is convinced that our language today reveals that we are not concerned with the meaningfulness of our actions, and he discusses extensively texts from books about the so-called 'science of sex' to demonstrate his point: 'Turn to page 55 for an assessment of your love-making talents' - sexologists are proud to tell us that they exclude subjective criteria, but surely as Robinson says,

The sense, the reality of the 'same' sexual act varies with the language, and context in which it takes place. This is what the biologist qua biologist cannot observe... The sexologists are up to the old trick of trying to get the event without the meaning, just like the old-fashioned linguists trying to understand languages by concentrating only on sound.31

This kind of writing about sex is what Robinson would call pornography - but the failure of the New English Bible as a translation is evidence for him of a lack of sincerity in the use of language: 'translators who cannot show the Bible to be the word of God cannot produce a sincere translation'.32 And he quotes Collingwood: 'To express it badly is not one way of expressing it... it is failing to express it.'33

The substance of Robinson's argument is that if, to put the matter crudely, style is an integral part of content, then the style of contemporary influential texts yields evidence for the debasement of our language and by inference of the status and scope of our meta-languages. The implications for anthropologists are very important, if it is true that

Ours is a time when... the capacities of English-speaking people to contemplate the mysterious and metaphysical through the word are weakened and unexercised...34

Or consider this passage from Wittgenstein, talking about Frazer's 'Golden Bough':

What narrowness of spiritual life we find in Frazer; And as a result: how impossible for him to understand a different way of life from the English one of his time! ...Frazer is much more savage than most of his savages, for these savages will not be so far from any understanding of spiritual matters as an Englishman of the twentieth century. His explanations
of the primitive observances are much cruder than the sense of the observances themselves.35

These are all controversial questions, which could be argued at length. To argue that even on the basis of the evidence that our language is 'debased' implies a value judgement which does not have meaning outside a theory of culture, such as that proposed by Toynbee or Spengler. But the relevance of these arguments here is this: traditional socio-linguistics, and the traditional view that society or culture may be occasionally 'like language', contain the implication that what language does is somehow external to language - but the idea that 'social reality' is essentially separable from language is defective, since, as we have seen above, there cannot be (be definition) a social or even a human without language. Language is more to society than just another cultural form. In many ways it denotes society, represents it at home and abroad. But in many ways it shapes and is shaped by society, and our perception of society too. Thus it may well be that within our own culture since the retreat from the word, we may be using false or inappropriate meta-languages in dictionaries, in linguistics, in literary criticism, in the social sciences - far more extensively than what one might have first imagined; in popular language this would be called 'paying lip-service' to conceptual or value systems that we are not linguistically sincere about. In other words, if some anthropological studies fail to convey adequately the mystery, the strangeness, the reality of another culture, it could be because of a defect in the meta-language involved, particularly since, as Malcolm Crick has explained, anthropology is an exercise in translation.36 Cargo cults, to quote Steiner's remark, 'provide an uncannily exact, ramified image of the risks' involved here.37

* * *

At this point perhaps some comments on the Palestine problem may throw a little light on the general points that have been raised so far. I started this paper by asking what sort of model of language could or should anthropologists be using if they are interested in the linguistic analogy, if they feel that society is in some way 'like language', and the discussion has led to the problem of meta-languages. So now I can put the question: what sort of language is used to describe the Palestine problem, and what suggestions can be made for an appropriate anthropological meta-language for Jerusalem?

It is remarkable, when one surveys the literature on the contemporary Middle East, quite how many adherents there are to the extreme view which has been discussed above, that a particular problem is nothing but a problem in language. Professor Walter Lacqueur, in a article in The Times (November 13, 1975) condemning the recent vote at the United National General Assembly which described Zionism as a form of 'racism', tried to explain the linguistic absurdity of such a position
on Zionism. Perhaps the United Nations vote was 'nothing but' an exercise in political warfare, but it is interesting to see how the attempt is to create a suitable mode of discourse in which to discuss what Zionism is. We are all familiar nowadays with meta-linguistic discussions concerning the definitional differences between a freedom fighter and a guerrilla and a terrorist, and the conflict in the Middle East is presented in the mass media in the terminology associated largely with political science: 'The 1973 war brought a great change in the Middle East situation'; 'Most of the standard Israeli perceptions of its situation have been demonstrated to be no longer valid - if ever they were'; 'The studies on political and economic development in the Middle East countries, published in an earlier volume in this research program, were all written in or before 1970, and were based on assumptions that today appear not only optimistic but entirely unrealistic'. This kind of language, which seems also to rely on metaphors derivable from a number of diverse styles and meta-languages, is what Robinson might call 'insincere'. Language which describes the Middle East as a 'powder keg' which can at any time be 'ignited', language which purports to grip reality through such notions as 'violations', 'lessons', 'rights', 'burning issue', and so on, language of this sort is cliche because it is a dead-stretch use of language - terms such as these are bandied about, ripped from their respective registers. But it is still one of the altermeries, further evidence for human linguistic inventiveness, yet a clue thereby to our perception of the complexity of the Middle Eastern reality.

I do not wish to dwell further on this kind of language that is generally used in our society to conceptualise the Middle East conflict, but turn instead to a language model of Jerusalem itself. Different civilizations work differently with words, use language differently, as we have seen earlier; or, to put it the other way around, by isolating different ways in which language is used to grip reality we may have an a priori case for being able to recognise different cultures. After all, we cannot have a thing without having a way to see it or conceptualise it, and in that sense all real knowledge is subjective, rooted in the individual experience. Hence we need to know how societies use language - we cannot force our own notions or model of language or meta-language onto another society. Jack Goody's work on literacy in traditional societies attempts this, although he is essentially asking an a priori question about the social consequences of a predetermined category, namely literacy. The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, which, broadly speaking, attributed all thought to the structures of the language in question, neglected the question of literacy and writing, and in so doing used a model of language that was defective. It does seem necessary therefore to emphasise the importance of building a model of the native awareness of language and to study the mode in which this native awareness is conceptualised.

I referred at the head of this paper to the immense ethnic heterogeneity of Jerusalem and the linguistic
heterogeneity that accompanies it. It would of course be a relatively simple matter to give lists and set up a taxonomy, and in a sense one could set up a working definition of the political models of the Palestine problem in terms of their exclusive use of taxonomic criteria. In other words, a political approach to the demography of Palestine would perceive four religions, viz. Moslems, Jews, Christians and others, and three races, viz. Arabs, Jews and others. The number of languages used in Palestine seems to be something no demographer has felt comfortable to speculate on, since the model Hebrew, Arabic and others is clearly not conforming with the facts because of the huge foreign Jewish immigration into Palestine during the last ninety years.

Some mention of the problem of ethnicity has been made above; it is true that the taxonomic approach produces, as Professor Fredrik Barth calls it, a 'world of separate peoples' and takes the question of boundary maintenance for granted. But, as suggested above, replacing the word 'people' with the word 'language' reveals an interesting and related problem. Listing languages is arguably an approach to language which carries all the defects of a taxonomic approach to ethnicity. Just as ethnicity or ethnic identification is, as Barth suggests, a matter of ascription, and also a matter of shifting contexts and roles, so too a functional or etymological analysis of precisely which language is being spoken by a particular person at a particular time begs the question of the native model of language through all its alternities. The notion 'Semitic language', for example, which links into one language - family Arabic, Hebrew, Amharic and others, is an 18th century construct of a scholar called Eichhorn; it is not necessarily part of the native model at all. Moreover there is no reason to suppose whatsoever that people who are polyglot 'know' which language they are using at any particular time: George Steiner says he cannot remember which language he cursed in when he had a traffic accident. Still, it is possible to trace the deliberate use of language choice; consider for example this excerpt from Jacob Landau's study of the Arabs in Israel: Arab members of the Israeli Parliament when making speeches frequently employ Arabic even when they know Hebrew. Examples are Diyab

'Ubayd... who learnt Hebrew in a Berlitz language school; and Yusuf Khamis... who often speaks in... Hebrew, but at other times in Arabic - to remind his potential electorate of his indentification with them.'

In other words there is evidence for a model of conscious language choice where it would be used to assert ethnic identity. Indeed, scholars have documented the importance of Hebrew for the Zionist movement; modern Hebrew is an interesting case in fact for its tendency in the modern Hebrew novel or poem toward a kind of language which identifies with past Hebrew and Jewish tradition but also reaches out for a new Israeli kind of Hebrew language where words of Biblical or specifically religious origin
are distanced quite deliberately. 'Language riots' in Palestine have been known: there was a famous case in 1847 in Bethlehem; in the church of the Nativity there, the church built over the spot where Christ is believed to have been born, there was a marble slab with the Latin inscription 'Here Jesus Christ was born of the Virgin Mary' - the Greek Church, backed by the Russian government, stole this slab; the Latin Church, backed by the French government, reacted badly - and the ensuing conflict is supposed by many historians to be an important cause of the outbreak of the Crimean War six years later.\footnote{41}

If, then, language is not the only way in which ethnicity is conceptualised, it is nevertheless an important and critical way. It is by no means 'the issue' in the Palestine problem, which semantically could perhaps be best described in terms of competing native concepts of the distinction between 'native' and 'foreign' with regard to the territory of Palestine itself. Israelis and Palestinian Arabs both claim that they are respectively 'native' to Palestine, and that the other group is respectively 'foreign' to it. Consider the phrase 'Jesus was one of us'.

Yet, Jerusalem the Holy City is not consistently religious; there is a huge heterogeneity of ethnic approaches to God. In that sense it is a city of alterities, and in that sense it is 'like language'. The annual cycle of pilgrimages, pilgrimages both religious and secular, can be described in terms of language: 'Easter is the time when Greek is spoken on the streets'. But what is it that threads the alterities together? How do the people who live there thread their own theory of shifting contexts of ethnicity together? How is the entropy avoided? Can language really be used as a model to describe all this? What sort of meta-language can be suggested here? If Palestine, like Northern Ireland, is described as 'a problem', what methods do we have to find 'a solution'?

Balancing cultural and/or linguistic energies itself requires energy, as we saw before in the case of Maxwell's Demon. There is in Jerusalem a long tradition of a lingua franca which is neutral with respect to ethnicity: it was fascinating to watch after the Israelis occupied the Jordanian part of the city in 1967 (I was living there for a year after the war), how Jews and Arabs communicated with each other in the English language in the shops, markets, neighbourhood and youth clubs, discotheques, and university. The use of English as a lingua franca to mediate tensions between ethnicities can be dated precisely: in the closing years of the 1840's, when James Finn, who was to be the British Consul in Jerusalem in the 1850's, set up his Jerusalem Cultural Society with an expressly ecumenical purpose. Later, however, English was 'replaced' during various periods by other languages, such as French and German, but it 're-emerged' in 1967 and it is to a great extent still in active use in Jerusalem. In a way somewhat similar to the position that writing has on literate societies, one can speak of a lingua franca that provides the
basis for the potential, latent, unity between men, between ethnicities, within a single ethnicity, that gives a thread to the alternities of language, that negates entropy.

A lingua franca is generally understood as being a linguistic form that brings people together, unites them in what would be otherwise an impossible situation. So it does, but, like the very working of language itself, it keeps people apart. The Israelis would like to think of the Arabs in Jerusalem as a minority; the Arabs in Jerusalem would like to think of themselves as a self-contained society under military occupation. If all Arabs learnt to speak Hebrew, the Israeli perception would be greatly strengthened, and indeed, for economic reasons, this is becoming increasingly the case. But the existence of and the use of and the capacity to draw upon a lingua franca marks the boundaries between Hebrew-speaking Jew and Arabic-speaking Arab. I am not arguing at all that language itself creates this situation; I am arguing that language here epitomises and itself expresses the situation. I am arguing that language here is a good model for the situation. I am saying that in this sense Jerusalem, with all its alternities, can be said to be 'like language'.

Fredrik Barth was puzzled not why ethnicities persist, but how ethnicities persist, in a situation of inter-ethnic contact. I would like to suggest that lingua franca is one answer for a model, in language, of how ethnicities persist. The crucial point here is that a lingua franca does not carry with it an ethnicity. There is a considerable amount of confusion on this point. Of course there is an English ethnicity, but it is not qua English ethnicity that I am speaking about the use of the English language. And therefore to search for distinguishing linguistic features of Palestinian English or Jerusalem English would be to misrepresent the issue, for it would imply that such a form of English is a variety of 'real English' in the areas where it differs from the 'real English'.

What I am trying to do here is to put forward the suggestion that it might be through the notion of lingua franca that a meta-language for the Palestine problem itself be presented, that through the use of English (it is perhaps a hollow category, for any other language could fill its place) one could suggest a model of the problem, one could suggest a specific example of following out the thought that a society or a social form is 'like language'. The phrase 'like language' is misleading, for language does not reflect extra-linguistic features, it expresses them. But notice George Steiner's derogatory comments about the use of 'international English' spreading across the globe: he says it lacks a 'natural semantics of remembrance' which in turn 'disqualifies [it]... from any but trivial or ad hoc usage'. This is perfectly true; the English of Jerusalem, for example, is not to be seen in context of the history of the English Language in its native usage. But the reason for this is that the English of Jerusalem has its context with its own lingua franca past;
it does have nothing to do with Milton or Dryden. Steiner's point is an excellent example of how to describe a language in terms of one level of analysis alone; but this is totally inadequate for a model of language as such.

One final point. George Steiner criticised Chomsky for his emphasis on linguistic universals, an emphasis which, as we saw above, reminded Steiner of modern versions of the myth of Babel. Before Babel, as the Bible says, 'The whole earth was of one language and of one speech' (the New English Bible has it 'All the world spoke a single language and used the same words'). The late Arnold Toynbee, in a fascinating monograph of linguae francae describes the Babel myth as the myth put out by a disintegrating civilisation as a lament for a past when people were, as it were, all of one mind. The suggestion to use a lingua franca as a model for conceptualising Jerusalem could also therefore be regarded as appropriate for being symbolic of Jerusalem's ultimate apocalypse in the end of days, when, as the prophet says, nation shall not lift up sword against nation and the wolf shall lie down with the lamb. Indeed, Toynbee's view is that Lingua Franca is the goal of history, rather than its past. Our own difficulty with meta-languages, our own retreat from the word, our own dis-integrating civilisation, our own job as anthropologists, all of it is bound up with an obsession with language after Babel. Perhaps it is this reason why language is such a fashionable subject these days, perhaps it is why it is so commonly felt that society is in some way 'like language', and perhaps it would in some measure justify the notion of lingua franca as a model of language for Jerusalem and the problems of Palestine.

* * *

And what of the unconscious model, the hidden Maxwell's Demon? The lingua franca that has no ethnicity? Is this the way to search for a 'solution'? For this we turn to Conan Doyle:

'Is there any point', the Inspector asked, 'to which you would wish to draw my attention?'

'To the curious incident of the dog in the night-time.'

'The dog did nothing in the night-time.'

'That,' Sherlock Holmes replied, 'was the curious incident.'

Jonathan Webber
Notes


4. Ibid.


7. Steiner, op. cit., p. 64.


12. It would no doubt be possible to provide a historical explanation to account for the appearance of such notions of 'language' in works of psycho-analysis. 'Language' is surely a fertile idea there, and it would be pointless to criticise Lacan for not practising linguistics. Indeed, any sweeping criticism of work in another discipline may be little more than a tilting at windmills. Yet it remains noteworthy that many linguists themselves today try to measure the depth of linguistics by its closeness to physics or formal logic, whereas ultimately the only final test of linguistics is the depth of understanding of language that it can offer. Hence in this context it is the presence of the linguistic analogy in other disciplines that attracts attention, rather than its implications for those disciplines.


15. See Steiner, *After Babel*, pp. 220 ff. He introduces the notion 'alternity' at p.222: 'We need a word which will designate the power, the compulsion of language to posit 'otherness'... Perhaps 'alternity' will do: to define the 'other than the case', the counter-factual propositions, images, shapes of will and evasion with which we charge our mental being and by means of which we build the changing, rather fictive milieu of our somatic and our social existence. 'We invent for ourselves the major part of experience,' says Nietzsche...'

16. The two men exchanged correspondence, excerpts of which are reproduced with an interesting commentary by Steiner in his article *Tongues of Men*, reprinted in *Extra-Territorial*, pp. 102-125.


18. Ibid.


24. Ian Robinson, *The New Grammarians' Funeral: A Critique of Noam Chomsky's Linguistics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1975). This new book received scathing reviews in the New Statesman and the *Times literary Supplement* on November 21, 1975: the TLS reviewer saw fit to comment 'In what must set some kind of record for inaccuracy in publishers' blurbs, the dust-jacket proclaims "This is a rigorous argument, without polemic".' John Sturrock in the New Statesman writes 'Robinson's belief is that Chomskyan linguistics... are... so riddled with elementary fallacies it is a wonder Chomsky has ever recruited a single disciple. This overkill first spoils Robinson's case, then invalidates it.'


35. From Wittgenstein's Remarks on Frazer's 'Golden Bough', translated by A.C. Miles and Rush Rhees in *The Human World*, no. 3 (1971), quoted in Robinson, *The Survival of English*, pp. 116-7 fn. Robinson is one of the three editors of this quarterly review; he states that he was there publishing the first English translation of that text.
38. Barth, op. cit., p. 11.
39. Steiner, *After Babel*, pp. 115-6. The idea is reminiscent of the lines in Lewis Carroll in *The Hunting of the Snark*:

    I said it in Hebrew - I said it in Dutch -
    I said it in German and Greek -
    But I wholly forgot (and it vexes me much)
    That English is what you speak!

41. See James Finn, *Stirring Times, or Records from Jerusalem Consular Chronicles of 1853 to 1856* (2 vols) (London 1878), vol. 1, pp. 10-11. 'All the world knows that the Russian war of 1853 to 1856 sprang from a controversy about the rights of guardianship at the Christian Sanctuaries of Jerusalem and Bethlehem, as claimed by the convents respectively of Latin and Greek rite.

    'The near connection in which the Latin and Greek communities stand as either joint or part guardians of the Sanctuaries which belong to our Lord's history... soon degenerated into hostility and strife, not for a dogma or creed, as Christendom has in other places so often witnessed, but for possession or custody of locality, inch by inch; and this state of things was perpetuated through the lapse of several centuries. The animosity ripened into personal violence, to the scandal of other Christians who heard
of such doings from a distance, and the ridicule or contempt of unbelievers.' (Finn, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 5).

42. Consider in this connection a letter to The Times on December 1, 1973 from one Professor Harry J. Lipkin, of the Weizmann Institute of Science at Rehovot, Israel: 'Sir, most people in Britain are probably unaware of the great British contribution to the Egyptian-Israeli talks at kilometer 101 on the Suez-Cairo road. The English language has enabled both sides to communicate freely without the tower of Babel of interpreters, translations and mistranslations. When both sides are ready to admit that free and efficient communication is more important than the prestige of speaking one's own national language, it is already a great step forward.

'As long as the Egyptians and Israelis are free to speak to one another in English, there may be some hope for peace. But as soon as the Tower of Babel of the United Nations enters the picture, there will be difficulties. The French translation of the United Nations Security Council resolution 242 differs crucially from the original English version, and each side can be expected to insist on the version most favourable to itself.

'One might ask why it was necessary to have a translation at all. At many international scientific conferences I have seen French physicists react with relief and enthusiasm to regulations requiring them to speak in English because French is not recognized as an official language.

'These scientists are more interested in communicating their new ideas to the world than in vainly attempting to revive the past grandeur of France. The scientists have already decided that there is only one language needed for international communications in the Western World and that this language is English. The politicians would do well to follow their example.

'Sincerely yours,

Harry J. Lipkin.'

Notice his use of the phrase 'great British contribution' to describe the use of the English language, and 'vainly attempting to revive the past grandeur of France' to describe the use of the French language, despite the fact that he is speaking about 'free and efficient communication' as such. This sort of confusion seems not uncommon.

43. Steiner, After Babel, p. 470.

44. A study of the distinctiveness of the approach of a linguistics obsessed with universals of language to contemporary political questions presumably remains to be written. Chomsky's own concern with the peace movement, with a universal and fundamental political philosophy that stresses the brotherhood of man and the dignity of human life, is not altogether separable from his well-known rejection of Skinner's stimulus-and-response view
of human language behaviour. 'Habits' and 'conditioning' are not, in Chomsky's view, to be used to describe human behaviour at all, whatever their appropriateness for studying rats in the laboratory. Human beings are different from animals or machines - this difference should be respected in science as it should be in government; it is this conviction which underlies and unifies his politics, his linguistics and his philosophy. (See John Lyons, Chomsky, (London: Fontana/Collins 1970), pp. 13-15). His notion of 'socialist internationalism' leads him, interestingly, to advocate a federal solution to the problems of Palestine which would be based on separate social and political institutions for Jews and Arabs, alongside national institutions embracing both. The concept of lingua franca as advanced in this paper similarly emphasizes a continued and continuing separation of ethnic identities, Jewish and Arab, though leaning specifically on a model of language alone to express that. (cf Noam Chomsky, Israel and the Palestinians, in Uri Davis, Andrew Mack, Nira Yuval-Davis (eds), Israel and the Palestinians, (London: Ithaca Press 1975), pp. 368-409; and notice his view that 'It is unrealistic (sic) to dismiss long-range proposals as 'utopian'. They may provide the only basis for the simpler and more immediate steps that will reduce tension, permit the growth of mutual trust and the expression of common interests that cross national lines...'. (Chomsky, op. cit., p.397).)