EDITIORIAL NOTE

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Journal
EDITORIAL NOTE

The idea for this Journal has come from the graduate students at the Institute of Social Anthropology in Oxford. Papers given at graduate seminars and ideas arising from work for diplomas and higher degrees very often merit wider circulation and discussion without necessarily being ready for formal publication in professional journals. There obviously exists a need in social anthropology for serious critical and theoretical discussion; JASO sees this as its main purpose.

The editors would like to express their thanks to Julia Unwin, John Niespolo, and all others who have helped with the production of this issue.

FORMAT

The journal is published three times per year. Articles are welcome from students of anthropology and from people in other disciplines. It is preferred that the main emphasis should be on analytical discussion rather than on plain description. Papers should be as short as is necessary to get the point over. As a general rule they should not exceed 5,000 words. They should follow the conventions for citations, notes and references used in the A.S.A. monographs. Comments will also be welcome. Communications should be addressed to the Journal Editors, Institute of Social Anthropology, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford.

BACK ISSUES

We have a stock of back issues. Single issues are available at 35p in the U.K. and $1 (45p) abroad. Complete volumes (I(1970), II (1971), III(1972), IV(1973) and V(1974)) are each available at the following rates: U.K. - £1.00 to individuals, £1.50 to institutions; abroad - $3.00 (£1.25p) to individuals, $5 (£2.00) to institutions. The subscription for Vol.VI (1975) is the same. All prices cover postage. Cheques should be made out to J.A.S.O., and sent to the Journal Editors at 51 Banbury Road, Oxford. We regret that we have had to increase some of our rates. This is due to increased production costs, primarily the price of paper.
The present paper is part of a larger essay concerned with the position of women in social anthropology. In this essay I investigate sexual categories in terms of relationship, boundary and content rather than groups or individuals, since this gives us more freedom to make generalizations, and my aim is a very general one indeed. I need not, I think, give this paper any further introduction, since both the aim and the scope will be apparent from the following pages.

Since Douglas (1966) wrote on purity and danger it has become clear that boundaries are very important to order, and indeed all-important to the conception of social and cultural categories, of which the male/female ones constitute one antithetical set.

Douglas herself investigates the implications of her theory in relation to the sexual distinction (1966, especially chapter 9), and although I would have liked to cite many of her arguments at length, I shall abstain from this and turn to a more general use of "boundarism" as such. Although the actual border-line between the sex-categories is somewhere explicit, spatially or linguistically, it may also be covert within other relationships, or it may even seem to be non-existent as a line at all on the level of empirical reality. This is just a preliminary warning that the boundary of this chapter denotes boundarism in general. The purity and danger of the sex-categories thereby become relative not only to the ethnographic context but also to the theoretical level of discussion. This will become clearer in the course of analysis.

The notions of purity and danger are from the outset loaded with implications for both eidos and ethos (cf. Bateson, 1936) since they not only are used metaphorically for structure and anti-structure, but almost by definition simultaneously designate an antithetical set of emotions also. This should be kept in mind at places, where it is not possible to disentangle conceptual from emotional disorder, even not intellectually by the analyst, and of course sympathetically impossible to the natives of our examples, who are sometimes ourselves.

Let us first consider the "normal" order of things, concerning sex-categories. On the level of behaviour, the notion of heterosexuality expresses what to most people and in most situations is considered appropriate sexual behaviour. In this sense, heterosexuality is pure, it is not loaded with emotional ambivalence; it is orderly and proper in any sense of these words. But what is then heterosexuality?

As said, on the level of behaviour there is no ambiguity, since it designates the normal sexual union of a man and a woman. It is a natural relation, when men's and women's reproductive differentiation is considered. On a higher level: namely the cultural, as opposed to the natural of this context, heterosexuality denotes a potential unity through the duality of the conceptual categories of male and female. These categories are everywhere as distinct as are the reproductive functions, although in different ways, and for different reasons the conceptual complementarity of the two categories (yin and yang) leads us with reasonable certainty to presume that there is no conceptual ambiguity on the level of the cognitive structure, as there was no emotional ambivalence towards this kind of sexual relation on the level of behaviour, not as part of the culturally standardized pattern, anyway.
We shall now take one further step and proceed to an investigation of the conceptual definition of the meaning of the sex-categories, that is not only their bounding from each other, but also their different contents, since this can be done very lucidly in terms of boundarism. Till now, we have taken a universal unambiguity and distinctiveness of the two sex-categories for granted, and this holds good at a certain level of conceptual oppositions, formally as well as functionally. But in terms of purity and danger this can no longer remain unchallenged in relation to meaning. Our entry into this subject will be through a rather elaborate empirical example of rare consistency and beauty, and whose potential for wide generalizations may be even greater.

Among the Tewa indians described by Ortiz (1969), the standard phrase of encouragement to a man, who is about to undertake a dangerous or demanding task, is: "be a woman, be a man", while the corresponding remark to a woman simply is: "be a woman". This interesting point has got parallels in other spheres of the socio-cultural reality, most important in connection with the moiety system.

The Tewa moieties are not exogamous units, they are just ritual divisions of the society, reflecting a fundamental dual principle of classification. This of course is not unique to the Tewa, nor is it unique that the moieties are associated with the sex-categories, but it is almost unique that these sex-categories should be so defined as they are among the Tewa. Before discussing this noteworthy sexual classification, I shall give a brief outline of some relevant facts about the Tewa.

As a starting point one may look at the child's gradual growth into a full member of the society, which among other things implies three rites of passage, all of them most appropriately characterized as rites of incorporation. Without a detailed elaboration of the rites and symbols, we note that the child on the fourth day after birth goes through the first of these rites: the naming ritual. This is borne out by the "umbilical cord-cutting mother" and her assistant, who acted as midwives four days earlier. By this rite, throughout which the dualistic theme is repeated, the child is not only bestowed with a name, but is thereby also incorporated into the society at large.

During the first year of life, the child has to go through a second rite of incorporation: the water-giving rite. This time the child is incorporated into a specific moiety. The moieties are named the Winter- and the Summer-moiety, respectively, and it is the Winter-chief who precedes the rite for the Winter-children, during the half-year period in which he holds the responsibility for the whole village. The Summer-chief will take care of the Summer-children in the course of his reign. Apart from other highly interesting differences in the moiety-specific symbolism, there is one difference which is immediately striking when viewed within a sexual context, and this relates to the selection of sponsors to the child: whereas Summer-parents are bound to choose a sponsor of the same sex as their child, the Winter-parents are not.

"A part of the reason for this interesting divergence is that while the Winter and Summer moieties are identified with maleness and femaleness, respectively, the qualities of both sexes are believed to be present in men, while women are only women" (Ortiz, 1969, p. 36). This message was already implicit in the initial citation of the remarks of encouragement, but we are now able to express it in more general terms. The Summer moiety and the female category represent sexual specificity, while the Winter moiety...
and the male category are sexually generalized. At one level the opposition of the antithetical categories of male and female is unambiguous and symmetrical, as in the direct opposition of the two moieties, for instance, but at another level when meaning is considered, the relation turns into an assymmetrical one.

This fact is also expressed in the titulation of the different chiefs: the Winter chief is referred to as father during his ruling period, but as mother during the rest of the year, when the Summer chief is in charge. The latter is, on the other hand, always referred to as mother, never father.

The incorporation of the child into the moieties thus revealed some interesting points concerning the sexual classification, as in fact did the naming rite, when the spirits addressed were requested for help in bringing a boy into womanhood and into manhood, while the wish for a female infant is that she may be brought into womanhood, only.

The third important rite of incorporation for a child consists of the incorporation into a sex-category. Although the two preceding rites did include sexual and sex-specific symbolism, it is only through this last rite that the child is conferred properly to one of the two sex-categories. This third rite actually consists in a couple of separate ceremonies, spaced over several years, but it is nevertheless reasonable to regard it as one rite of incorporation: namely into a sexual category. The spacing of this rite can be seen as an expression of a clash between an analogue and a digital conception of the child/adult contrast, where the analogue concerns roles, rights and duties in the social practice, while the digital concerns conceptual categories.

From the moment of the first part of the rite: the water-pouring rite, the child, who is between 6 and 10 years of age, is given sex-specific duties to carry out. This rite is thus the first one to distinguish the children by sex (socially), and they gradually get heavier and more important tasks from then on. But they are not totally culturally distinguished by sex until another rite, the finishing rite, is held some years later, when the child is definitely included not only into a sex-category, but also into the sex-specific ritual life of his particular moiety.

To summarize, we may see each of these three rites as steps of a binary key, upon each of which one of two possibilities is chosen (not by "free choice", of course). The first choice is Tewa or non-Tewa, the next is Winter moiety or Summer moiety, the third choice concerns male or female.

Not only is the position of the child thus gradually made more specific, but at each new step the previous choices are reinforced. Although the child is a Tewa from the moment of the naming-rite, he is more so when he has been through the water-giving rite, and wholly so when through the finishing rite. This last name alone is revealing. The same cumulative effect holds good for the moiety-incorporation, which is not total, until the child has been through the last rite of sexual incorporation, since it is only then that he can take part in the sex-specific ritual life of the moiety.

Although the incorporation into moieties and sex-categories is not explicitly established until the second and the third rite, respectively, it is implicitly pre-established by the foregoing rites, since e.g. the sexual symbolism indirectly classifies the child sexually already at the first and second rites. We might draw a diagram to express the cumulative
Apart from the joy of finding patterns within good ethnographies, this elaboration of the Tewa example brings a very important contribution to our subject, which at present is to draw a boundary between (or to impose boundarism upon) the categories of male and female. But again, first a glance to the plane of analysis.

In our investigation we have to keep the social reality distinct from the structural reality. The patterns of the two may contradict each other, or at least they need not be direct mirror-images of one another, but they are nevertheless simultaneously present in social interactions and thought. A comparative sketch will illuminate this.

The Mae Enga of New Guinea regard women as highly polluting, even really dangerous (the men do, anyway), but this designation does not directly tell us about the meaning-content of the structural categories of men and women. It tells about an opposition of the social categories: the women are expelled by the social organization to the marginal (or anti-structural, in Douglas' sense) areas of the extreme patrilineal society, the "extremity" of which is partly defined by the conception of highly powerful marginal areas. This sexual opposition, which results in the sexual antagonism of the behaviour, belongs to the social pattern, and although the structural reality is located in the social pattern, it is only through analyses of the total sexual environment, including marriage and bridewealth etc., that we can find the conceptual meaning content of the structural sex-categories.

The Tewa, on the other hand, do not recognize any unilineal principle, which at the level of actually possible conflicts define the sexes in an a priori antagonistic relation to each other. Without social inter-sexual
conflicts and dangers, the Tewa are free to define a sexual opposition, which confines both sexes to the social order, as these are everywhere both represented in the cultural order. The social pattern thereby does not bar the insight into the structural reality of the conceptual categories, as it tends to do for the Mae Enga. But of course, it is rare that the meaning-content of the sexual categories is so overtly expressed as among the Tewa. To conclude: the Tewa have a dualistic social organization, which expresses a social pattern of symmetry between the sexes; but through social and ritual practice we gain insight into a conceptual and structural asymmetry between the sex-categories. We know that this conceptual pattern is shared by the two sexes, and we are thus able to encircle "the hollow shape" (Ardener, 1973) of the Tewa cultural structure much more unambiguously than we are for the Mae Enga, and it is this cultural, or conceptual, structure which is our frame of reference in the following discussion.

Repeating the words phrased by the "umbilical cord-cutting mother" or any other "Mutter Courage" in Tewa society: "be a woman, be a man" to a man, and "be a woman" to a woman, reminds us that maleness is generalized, whereas femaleness is specific, pure, as it were. This is in striking accordance with biology, and we should recall the taxonomic relation between the 'man' and 'woman', which are both included in the notion of 'man' at a next higher level of contrast.

Time has come to draw attention to the fact that biology, or rather genetics, has serious bearings on this specific taxonomic inclusion. Man has the genetic potential of both sexes, while woman has only female x-chromosomes for the next generation. Thus the linguistic precedence of man is in some way founded upon - or at least parallel in genetics. At a certain level of contrast man is opposed to woman in a symmetrical fashion, as in the Tewa social pattern, and more generally in the biologically defined reproductive functions. At another and more covert level asymmetry enters, as in genetic structure in general and in the Tewa conceptual structure in particular.

The Tewa conceptions of the sex-categories, then, strike a universally valid scheme of classification:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Genetics</th>
<th>Tewa</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>male</td>
<td>x + y</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>female</td>
<td>x + x</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus, whereas the experienced model for direct heterosexual relations is one of distinct symmetrical opposition between man and woman, or between male and female, the contents of the distinct categories are not unambiguous opposites. There is a definite and important asymmetry, which to some extent moves the boundary between the two sexes, compared to the experience of heterosexual opposition. This move has become
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accepted within genetics, but it is worth seeing how it is situated there. The recent discoveries of "deviant" chromosomal equipment have caused a series of new interests in finding behavioural anomalies for these genetic deviances. It has been argued that men with an extra y-chromosome \((x + y + y)\) are more "criminal" and violent than "normal" men, and that men with an extra x-chromosome \((x + x + y)\) tend to be homosexual \((1)\). These investigations, whose results cannot be taken seriously, since the correlations established at best are very uncertain, are nevertheless interesting, since they throw light upon the obsession with order, even within Western science. Genetic disorder is thought of as really and socially dangerous (criminality and violence) where it is only metaphorically and conceptually so.

If we should draw the logical relation between the specialized female and the generalized male, this can best be done by the aid of a Venn diagram, which is so constructed that the smaller of two concentric circles is included in the bigger one:

![Venn Diagram](image)

The inner circle is male, since its elements have male qualities in addition to the female qualities shared with all the elements of the big circle.

This assymetrical relationship has a spatial parallel in, for instance, the Berber house (Bourdieu, 1971), which is at first sight divided into a male and a female part, but in which a closer inspection shows that the opposition male/female masks another: male, + female/female+ female. The inner section of the house, above the stable, is exclusively female, whereas the outer section is both male and female. I believe that this pattern of male/female = generalized/specific is a widely distributed pattern of intersexual relationship.

Now, one of Ortiz' arguments in his monograph is that there is nothing like a concentric dualism among the Tewa, let alone a triadic structure, as Lévi-Strauss suggests for any system of dual organization (Lévi-Strauss, 1956). It is tempting to draw attention to the fact that Ortiz, being a Tewa Indian himself, perhaps more easily turns to the everywhere more overt dualist model, than to the covert triadic structure, which is the analyst's model. In any case, Ortiz' disagreement with Lévi-Strauss in this matter is partly facticious, since they operate at different levels of reality. The problem of dual organization is a very large one, and in the present connection I shall just argue that the Venn diagram drawn above (fig. 3) may bring new insight into this discussion.

One point, which Ortiz makes against Lévi-Strauss, is that the Tewa village is not spatially organized with a male center and a female periphery, which is so characteristic of many villages with (as the Bororo)
or without (as the Trobrianders) a dual social organization. This is true, but it is likewise true that the conceptual representation of the sexual categories only could be spatially represented with a male (q-o) center and a female (q) periphery, as the Venn diagram shows it. The Tewa have not chosen to do so in their villages, but they certainly express this asymmetric (triadic) relationship in many other ways, and we are not allowed to expect that the cultural structure is everywhere laid out on the ground.

If we turn the argument upside down, we could reasonably argue that the rather common opposition between male and female, expressed as the opposition between center (or inner circle) and periphery (or outer circle) in the village organization, does everywhere express an opposition between a generalized and a specialized sex. The specialized female sex, which is of course given varying social and cultural attributes, is in general terms specialized for internal purposes in the society. The generalized male sex not only contributes to internal well-being of the society, (whether more or less than the women, in terms of actual contributions to subsistence, does not matter here), but it is also the men who take care of external relations by exchange of women, valuables or hostilities. Thus, internally men are opposed to women in matters of production and reproduction in a symmetrical way, since they fulfill complementary roles, but externally the men alone represent the society as generalized representatives of both sexes.

Although the Tewa case might not have a direct contribution to Levi-Strauss' argument of concentric dualism etc., we must maintain that it somehow adds a hidden dimension to this model anyway, a fact which was especially illuminated by seeing the case from the other side.

This point of the concentric dualism being a sexual dualism in this asymmetrical way is highly illustrative of the potentiality for the two types of relations: hierarchy and equality (or symmetry), the co-existence of which is noted in dual organization by e.g. Crocker, 1969; The primarily antithetical notions of man and woman gives room for symmetry or equality, whereas their synthetic inclusion into a higher level gives substance to hierarchy. The state of relationship is thus potent with both types of relations between the sex-categories. Which one (if either) will dominate when and where is a matter for empirical investigation; but it remains a matter of cultural structure, not of social practice, since the principles of hierarchy and equality belong there.

Some may find that we have left the matter of boundaries and purity very far behind, but the preceding discussion of maleness and femaleness among the Tewa and in more general terms has nevertheless been important for its own sake, and on the question of virginity, which I shall deal with below. Before proceeding to this interesting topic, we shall just summarize that in the most general terms possible, the woman is the pure sex. Establishing boundaries is to establish distinct categories, and on the very general (universal?) level of conception femaleness is distinct and unambiguous, whereas maleness is ambiguous as both/and.

Defining women as pure and men as dangerous sounds partly well-known; in western culture this kind of statement belongs (also) to our conscious models, and as such it is emotionally loaded and not a neutral statement of structural (genetic) classification. However well-known to western ears it is contrary to ethnographic evidence, which more often than not bestows the dangerous powers upon the women, in the conscious models. The
female danger is especially connected with the woman's sexuality and her biology at large. The emotional charter in these cases may be related to the folk-definitions of the women as "in between". If this is the case, we may see the sexual relation as reflecting the principle of hierarchy, which apparently then has been "chosen" in the articulate models. This is true of e.g. the Melpa (Strathern, 1972) and almost any New Guinean society, which on the other hand does not possess an established political hierarchy. The Bemba (Richards, 1956), on the other hand, believe in a mutual sexual pollution, and they do thereby express a principle of symmetry in the intersexual relationship; they have, however, a highly developed political hierarchy. Different spheres of reality may thus express different structural principles, but we must assume that some kind of correspondence between the various levels of experience is established, as Douglas (1970) suggests. This means that both of the principles must exist in the generative structure, which then act as transformer of contradicting experiences, making these mutually comprehensive. Maybe the conceptual categories of male and female and their meaning-content lie at the root of this.

Although danger and disorder is the way for gaining insight into purity and order, we shall try to confine ourselves a bit more to purity, leaving pollution proper (!) aside for the moment. And this means that we look upon the conscious models of this boundary.

Turning back to the articulation of woman as pure, contrary to man, this may well be a reflection of an unconscious classificatory scheme as developed above. In "moral" (articulate emotional) terms, her purity is related to chastity and self-control, both of which express that the woman is defined by and confined to internal functions in the society. A woman's chastity is not only her own virtue, it is part of the society's internal virtues as well. This gets a very tangible expression in some cultures, where it becomes related to a wider scheme of honour and shame, but it may also yield literary rather than literal expressions, as in Victorian England. Here (and then) the woman was fit only as inspiration for poets and painters, since she was far elevated from this-worldly matters such as polluted money and dirty politics.

Romantic love and the dream about the only one loomed large, and made men suffer, because the beloved one was out of reach (together with her dowry, maybe, since Goody (1973) suggests a correlation between dowry and a tendency to monogamy and "love-marriage") If she accidentally was not out of reach, conjugal life might make men suffer anyway, when the wife's purity became a matter of routine. Still, the idealized picture was a pure woman, whose child-births did not destroy her purity, rather added to it. One is led to believe that this conception of purity not only is related to the woman's internal virtues, but especially those among them which confine her to the specificity of her nature, as opposed to the men's societal occupations and obligations. We return to the problem of nature versus culture when considering female symbolism, but why nature should be pure in this case is partly explained by the ever more industrialized culture. It is the purity of Henry D. Thoreau as opposed to the danger of Henry Ford.

Female purity may in some cultures be much more directly expressed in terms of a general concern with the woman's sexual affairs, of which there preferably should be none before or outside marriage in many cases. This may pose no severe problem in societies where girls are married off at the moment of physical maturity or even before, but where this is not
the case the maintenance of virginity will demand much more self-control and investment of female pride, shall the girl not be tempted to unlock her chastity-belt.

The chastity of women is often of concern to a society, since any internal pollution of a woman (that is any illegitimate sexual affair) is an internal pollution of the society. In strongly endogamous groups such as the Indian castes, this is particularly true (Yalman, 1963). The purity of the caste is dependent on the purity of the women, since it is through them that caste-membership is transmitted. Elsewhere it is only particular women, who are bound to remain virgins until marriage. For instance, on Samoa (Head, 1928), it concerns only the daughter of the chief, and her virginity alone becomes a symbol of the integrity of the society.

Whether chastity is demanded for all of the women of the community or only the one superior woman, it always acts as a means of establishing distinct categories. Another example of this is the occurrence of sibling-marriage, which is known especially within royal or chiefly families throughout the world, and which may be interpreted as an expression of extreme concern of the distinctiveness of the group.

Virginity and chastity do not only have a symbolic function in relation to the group or the society, it certainly also has a practical meaning to the persons involved. If virginity is expected at marriage, and it it is the men who exchange women, then the women's virginity becomes part of the deal. The men are the ones to get their exchange spoiled if the woman is not a virgin at marriage, and they are the ones who lose their honour if she is not. Although this of course may lead to sanctions against the woman, who may primarily stay out of illegitimate sexual relations because of the threat of physical sanctions, the woman as a person is, nevertheless, in a key-position. She has to do her part of the play, but if she does not want to do so, the men can do nothing (except beating her, of course). To use van Baal's terms van Baal 1970) women are not only objects, they have to agree to behave like objects, too, and if they don't, men will lose some objects for exchange. The marginality of women in the marriage exchange thus results in a much more powerful position, than the ideological models lead us to believe.

Phrased otherwise, women are not only men's game, they have to play men's game, too. However the content of this statement is evaluated, and radical feminists might not like it, there is at least one obvious reason for introducing the term: game. This immediately expresses ambiguity (cf. Leach, 1964), and thus ambiguity is also characteristic of the position of women in the marriage trade; they are both persons and currency, as Douglas (1966) states, or they are both signs and values, as Levi-Strauss (1949) says.

Playing the game in some societies requires that the women are very conscious about it. The Zulu girls (Krige, 1968), for whom there is a considerable delay of marriage due to the age-grade system, invest a lot of pride in their virginity, most dramatically expressed in their joint militancy towards a seducer.

We may conclude the preceding section on virginity by saying that the purity it represents, apparently always is spoiled by a man. In ideological terms this could be used as a justification for declaring
war on men, as the Zulu girls do, but if we leave the level of conscious
models, then we must admit that this (emotional) reason for sexual warfare
somehow fades away.

Returning to the level of conceptual structure, that is, shows us
that virginity is not classificatorily unambiguous, (although morally so). Women defy categorical specificity until fully female by sexual association
with a man, as the Tewa-case also demonstrates. The Tewa have a third
"sex-category" for virgins, since they are not yet specified as women.
Interestingly enough, the two mythological founders of the Tewa society
are the White Corn Woman and the Blue Corn Maiden, representing the female
Summer moiety and the male Winter moiety, respectively. From this and
from other evidence, as e.g. the colour symbolism, it is clear that the
pure specified woman is opposed to the yet unspecified virgin, potent
of both sexes.

Thus, the moral purity may be transformed into a classificatory danger.
In some cases this gets expressed in a socially powerful position of virgins.
I believe that this was the case of Joan of Arc. "The Virgin of Orleans".
Joan of Arc would never have succeeded her campaign in the first place,
had she not been really or symbolically a virgin. Her power originated
in her ambiguous sexual classification. No men would have followed her
had she been just a woman. Her ambiguity was actually manifold, as
Douglas describes it; although she does not mention the aspect of
virginity, and that this ambiguity in the last place became the sad
fate of Joan of Arc, since she was burnt as a witch, is fully comprehensible.

If virginity at a certain level is ambiguous, virgin birth is certainly
always anomalous. As Leach (1966) states, the anomaly of a mother, who
is also a virgin, makes her apt for a role as symbolic mediator, e.g.
between men and their god. The Virgin Mother of christianity occupies
different positions within the different symbolic systems of catholicism
and protestantism, but this fact just affirms the different social orders
that prevail, as Leach (1966) demonstrates. Her initial and basic
function as a mediator between people and God remains the same.

Due to its greater anomaly, virgin motherhood is an even more potent
symbol, than is just virginity, which is only ambiguous at a certain level.
The case of virgin motherhood is more overtly anomalous, and as a symbol
it may become more consciously manipulated, or at least get more easily
interpreted in the right terms, by the people it concerns, than could be
the case of virginity as such. This interpretation need not actually be
articulate in the present terms, but the very strong folk-adherence
to the symbol of the Virgin Mother, at least in catholic countries, shows
its direct and immediate potency. The difference in potency of these
two symbols of virginity and virgin motherhood can also be read as
follows: the virgin may mediate sexual categories, while the virgin mother
may mediate between humans and non-humans.

Purity has been the central theme of this paper but I have repeatedly
touched upon the problem of danger. The two notions are really two sides of
the same coin, and concentrating on purity only took us halfway along the
sexual boundary. Consequently, danger remains. 1

Kirsten Hastrup.

1. This is the first part of a two-part article. The second part will
appear in the next issue of the Journal.


The Consciousness of Consciousness.

This paper arises from a dissatisfaction with both behavioural psychology and with the present reliance upon structure for our analysis of social phenomena. As long as social anthropologists rely upon structure their work will be determined by that structure. Because of this dependence it is claimed that structuralism provides an essentially impoverished picture of society. The problem with which I am concerned is the exploration of a post-structural field of discourse which allows for the reintroduction of rich personal experience into the arid products of formal structural studies. The solution which I offer to this problem is akin to much of the work undertaken by the philosophers of phenomenology, Husserl; and Sartre, the existentialist.

My concern is with natural language. By this I mean a language of the sort that each one of us learns at infancy; rather than the formal, artificial languages, which might e.g. be used in computer programming. Let us suggest that we are able to claim that natural languages are concerned with a communication process between the producer of an utterance and the receiver of the same utterance. In such an event an utterance is to be regarded as a sensory signal. What can be said about this sensory signal? In the case of natural languages it can be said that it must conform to a rule of well-formedness, i.e. it must be grammatical. If an utterance of a natural language is to be regarded simply as a carrier of information then this model will suffice.

I suggest that the producer of an utterance attempts to objectivize his subjective experience in that utterance. It may be said that subjective experience does not consist of such discrete, well-formed, 'chunks'. Any representation of subjective experience as a discrete, well-formed, 'chunk' must therefore be seen as some form of selective rationalisation of that experience. Rational, in that by producing a statement, verbally or otherwise, regarding this unit it takes on a degree of 'grammaticality' not inherent in that experience. Such a statement may be analysed, communicated, and thought about, in a way in which the primary experience cannot. This last point is of tremendous importance. The ability to select and rationalise from our experience allows us to construct areas of non-behaviouristic knowledge.

Behavioural psychology is concerned only with the experience of an environment, an individual's experience of his environment comprising elements which act as stimuli. On receipt of this element of environmental stimulus the individual might produce the corresponding word as response. For the behavioural psychologists any distinction between the world and the individual's experience of it can be collapsed. Thus it can be seen that it is not regarded as essential that the individual be conscious of his experience of the world. An experience of the bio-physical world is to be credited to each and every occupant of that world. This experience does not, however, pre-suppose a consciousness of this experience. An oak tree experiences leaf-fall each autumn, yet it can hardly be said that the tree is conscious of this experience.

Each one of us is in countless bio-physical relationships with his environment at any given time. It is this set of relationships which I now refer to as the individual's experience of the world. It is obviously impossible for an individual to be conscious of all these relationships concurrently. Only a limited number may be brought to consciousness at any one time. Now I am proposing that before we are able to consider, to think, or to communicate fully, we must be conscious of our experience. I have
already suggested above that any representation of subjective experience must be regarded as some form of selective rationalisation.

In his Discourse on Method Descartes subjected the possibility of objective enquiry to a severe analysis. At the end of this analysis he was led to propose that there were but two things which could be claimed with certainty. They were that we exist and that we are conscious of this existence. Beyond these a priori truths any understanding is the result of the projection of the rational intellect. Husserl suggested, much later, an important implication of this claim by Descartes. If the empirical world is a projection of the intellect, then science, in investigating this world, is to be seen as investigating the human intellect which constructs this world. I suggested, above, how the behavioural psychologists have devised a schema which will not admit to a consciousness 'outside' of causal relationships. Structuralists, as present day representatives of the rational philosophical tradition (which includes Descartes and Husserl) have manufactured for themselves an analogous closed and self-perpetuating system which will not allow for a post-structural subversion.

It was suggested that consciousness depends upon a selective rationalism. By employing such a faculty we are able to construct interpretative frameworks which allow us to gain an 'understanding' of the environment. Either these frameworks themselves, or a more fundamental aptitude of the human intellect which they are said to represent, have been referred to as structures. In either case the result is the same: consciousness is entirely dependent upon structure. However, in my initial paragraph I declared my dissatisfaction with the results of such a procedural claim. This dissatisfaction is due to the inability of structural studies to provide any account of the individual's rich personal experience. In recognising this inability I claim a privileged status for this rich personal experience. Such a recognition evinces a consciousness which is not dependant upon any structure. It is rather a consciousness which recognises the limitations of a structure-dependent consciousness. We are now able to distinguish between a consciousness of experience, and a consciousness of consciousness of experience. I suggest further that this secondary non-structure-dependent consciousness become an essential ingredient of our personal experience. In as much as it is possible to regard the individual's consciousness of his experience as comprising an objective consciousness, the newly proposed consciousness of consciousness is necessarily subjective. Moreover, this subjective consciousness becomes an essential feature in the individual's experience and so any previous claim to an objective experience, or consciousness of experience, must now be forfeited.

It is suggested that the previously mentioned sensory signal might represent part of an individual's subjective experience. Such a selective rationalisation can be taken as an impoverishment of the subjective experience, if only quantitatively. Qualitatively it may be said to enrich that part of experience which is selected, because by objectivising the experience it becomes possible to communicate, to discuss, and to compare alternative individual experiences. As I pointed out, by insisting upon a consciousness of consciousness of one's experiences this secondary, or meta-consciousness may be taken as constituting part of one's experience. Experience is no longer to be regarded as limited to the sensory data of the world, as the consciousness of consciousness is included in the individual's experience. This secondary consciousness allows for the consideration of the consciousness of experience and of that experience. This, in turn, undermines the projected 'concretisation' of the subject of experience. Upon recognising this new consciousness of consciousness we allow for humanity to rise like a phoenix from the ashes to which structuralism has striven to reduce society.
To return to the discussion of natural languages. In order to accommodate the new consciousness of consciousness, I propose a second level of discourse. The first level, or level of structure, is a level of discourse at which the contributors to the discourse accept a common universe of experience. The utterances which comprise such a discourse are to be seen as referential i.e. they refer to some aspect of the accepted universe of experience. By limiting discourse to this level there is no necessity to become conscious of one's consciousness of experience. As a result I am able to suggest that the discourse level of structure is little more than crude behaviourism.

For the second level of discourse, however, such a consciousness of consciousness is an essential prerequisite. We might even concede to the behaviourists that a consciousness of experience has, in itself, some objective basis; the consciousness of consciousness is, however, unquestionably subjective and personal. I can never be conscious of another's experience. By admitting this consciousness of consciousness as part of the individual's experience we allow for the re-introduction of the subjective and personal, as a subvertive agent, into the consciousness of experience.

In terms of the methodology of structuralism, it can be seen that understanding is entirely dependent upon a structure of interpretation. Progress, in structuralist terms, can only be made by discarding the exhausted structures and replacing them with new structures with a greater generative capacity. There is no opportunity to undermine the dependence upon structure. By recognizing the consciousness of consciousness we catch sight of a vantage point 'outside' structure. On gaining this vantage point outside structure we objectivise our consciousness of experience. Having stepped outside our apparently structure-dependent consciousness of experience a position is attained from which this 'object' becomes available for criticism. Such criticism allows for the undermining and subverting of the structure dependency of consciousness. The aspect of criticism which will subvert structure is that element of essential individuality.

A temptation to claim that this discussion is taking place on the second, post-structural, level of discourse must be resisted. The discussion which led to the possibility of making the step to the metaphorical 'vantage point' might well be an example of such a second level discourse. However, once the step is made and we gain a definite 'object' of discourse the discussion reverts to the first, i.e. structural, level. Even so, there is one important difference. The relationship between the consciousness of consciousness and structure differs entirely from that between consciousness of experience and structure. In the latter the consciousness is structure-dependent. Consciousness of experience presupposes structure and is thus determined by it. Being conscious of consciousness makes possible the discarding of structures and their replacement.

Mike Taylor.
In a paper on the use of the metaphor/metonym distinction by Lévi-Strauss, Alan Campbell (1973) expresses his irritation over "the structuralist method which consecrates imprecision and vagueness of terminology as a methodological principle" (p.106).

The alleged imprecision and vagueness of terminology is reflected in the fact that Campbell finds himself able to incorporate under the original distinction between metaphor and metonym a series of 'oppositions' of the most diverse kinds (p.105). Rather than just commenting upon the irritating tendency of certain critics of 'structuralism' to criticize what they believe Lévi-Strauss to be saying instead of trying to understand what he really says, and in what context it is said, I think we should try to determine to what extent distinctions like metaphor/metonym are useful tools of analysis. In other words, to say that the metaphor/metonym distinction has become a trivial one, because a whole range of other distinctions (in some senses and in certain contexts) can be subsumed under it, is just to rely on one's own prejudices and thereby inhibit analysis.

My own opinion (prejudice?) is that the metaphor/metonym distinction is a useful one and far too important to be 'trivialized' by what I take to be misinterpretations of Lévi-Strauss' at places somewhat vague and imprecise statements. I therefore fully agree with Campbell that we should aim at more precise definitions of the terms; but this immediately raises the questions, first to what extent one can ever be 'precise' in the human sciences, and second what we should mean by the word 'definition'. Since social anthropology is no longer a 'natural science of society', we should not expect precision to mean anything like an unambiguous, mathematical-like formulation; we can only hope for 'precision' in the sense that the terms in question aids us in creating a coherent image of the phenomena under consideration.

As for definition, Samuel Butler once remarked that "to define is to surround with a wall of words a jungle of ideas", that is, to create a cultural order (wall) out of natural disorder (jungle). The distinction between metaphor and metonym can indeed be said to be 'walled in' by showing it to be characterized by qualities like resemblance/continuity, to be related to concepts like paradigm/syntagma, synchrony/diachrony and structure/event, to make use of the procedures of classification/segmentation and selection/combination, and in certain respects to characterize phenomena like totemism/sacrifice and myth/ritual.

There is, however, a possibility of obtaining greater precision about the original distinction, and that lies in the interpretation of the binary table set up by Campbell. Two kinds of misinterpretation are possible here, and I suspect that Campbell is to some extent guilty of both. The first is pointed out by Needham (1973) in his treatment of schemes of dual symbolic classification, namely that such a binary table is not about equivalents, but about relations. Just as e.g. the Nyoro diviner is not black, nor odd, nor feminine (p.xxx), one cannot say that totemism is metaphorical; and indeed what Lévi-Strauss says is that "totemism is expressed by means of metaphorical relations" (1969:95), which to my mind is something different.
The second kind of misinterpretation regards the logical status of the concepts of metaphor and metonym themselves. Anthony Wilden has said: "Metaphor and metonym are not entities. They are categories of distinction, not bags to put things in. Neither describes an isolable thing; they describe a relation - which is nowhere" (1972:58). And he continues, "that is to say, this polar distinction itself has signification only in a context, and since everything has everything else as its context, it is up to the commentator to define the context he has decided to talk about. A re-reading of Jakobson's article will surely demonstrate this: if we change perspective, all his metonomies turn out to be metaphors, and vice versa" (ibid.). This latter point was also stressed by Campbell (p.103) who, however, took it as a weakness of the distinction itself.

In order, then, to be still more 'precise', let us look at the distinction as such; that is, the relation between metaphorical and metonymical relations. It is important, I think, to note that "there is...no justification for metonym being taken as the 'polar opposite figure' of metaphor. If anything it is a particular kind of metaphor" (Campbell, p.104). In this connection I find it legitimate to use the concept of polarity (Jakobson's two poles), but the problem lies in the employment of the concept of opposition. Wilden (1972) has, I think rightly, criticized Lévi-Strauss' use of 'opposition' for almost any kind of difference. This criticism has to do not only with the seemingly innocent unawareness of the logical properties of the term opposition, but it is intimately related to the far more serious problem of "the scientific discourse as propaganda", namely that the Lévi-Straussian structuralism "translates a heuristic device into an ontological statement of some supposed fundamental structure of the human mind", that is, by its attributing e.g. the structure of myth to the structure of the mind, 'structuralism' is in effect making propositions about the structure of western scientific ideology (see Wilden 1972:7-12, 413-422).

However, to return to opposition as such, Wilden has suggested "that, at least in communications and in semiotics, we ought to learn to cool the potential violence of our own rhetoric by asking ourselves whether by 'binary opposition' we do not in fact mean a 'digital decision', a 'binary relation', a 'binary difference', or a 'binary distinction', and so on" (1972:421), because in contrast to the latter terms, "opposition requires that the terms opposed be of the same logical type" (ibid:414, emphasis original). The Theory of Logical Types was set forth by Whitehead and Russell in Principia Mathematica, and Gregory Bateson (e.g. 1955, 1964) has applied it with considerable success in the 'behavioural sciences' (Bateson's term), Wilden carrying the Batesonian application still further.

It can be shown, I think, that metaphor and metonym do in fact belong to different logical types. The difference can perhaps best be grasped by noting that metaphor and metonym are relations of paradigmatic/syntagmatic kinds. ... As pointed out by Ardener (1971a:lxviii; 1971b:465-67) paradigm makes use of one further dimension than does syntagm. Furthermore, the higher the logical type, the lower the level of organization (Wilden 1972:239), which is one reason why paradigmatic structures are heuristically superior to syntagmatic ones.

The reason why metonym may still be said to be a particular kind of metaphor lies, as far as I can see, in the fact that in many cases metaphorical relations may relatively easily be transformed into
metonymical ones. (Lévi-Strauss (1966:106) even takes this to be a 'law' of mythical thought). To take one example, the widespread (if, not universal) association between sex and eating is metaphorical, (e.g. marry out of your totem group, do not eat your totem). However, by applying the 'pars pro toto' principle, the relationship between the individual and the species is metonymical; and just as food is the prerequisite for individual survival, sex is the prerequisite for the survival of the species.

Finally, a few words on the metaphor/metonym distinction in relation to myth and ritual. It is of course a gross oversimplification to take Lévi-Strauss to mean, as does Campbell (p.105), that myth is metaphorical and ritual is metonymical. Lévi-Strauss does indeed employ the distinction (1971:607-608), but he does so only after it is understood that he takes the difference between myth and ritual to relate primarily to what is thought as distinct from what is lived: "Au total, l'opposition entre le rite et le mythe est celle du vivre et du penser" (ibid;603). It appears, then, that when Lévi-Strauss distinguishes between myth and ritual, he is actually referring to the 'thought aspects' / 'action aspects' of symbolic representations. This is also clear from his comments on the alleged lack of myth among the Ndembu as reported by Turner (Lévi-Strauss 1971:597-598): instead of restricting the concept of myth to apply only to actual narratives, one should also recognize the 'implicit myth' which is present in the form of 'fragmented notes' in various phases of ritual sequences.

Then, according to Lévi-Strauss, 'ritual' should be taken to mean only the 'actual', observable chain of events, and as such it is only susceptible to analysis on the level of syntagmatic (metonymical) relations, whereas 'myth', of both the explicit and the implicit variety permits, and even requires, an analysis of the 'virtual' (and in empirical terms absent) paradigmatic (metaphorical) relations.

It is perhaps therefore after all unfortunate to employ the word metaphor for conceptual relations of a paradigmatic kind, when metaphor in its common usage (i.e. when not employed in connection with metonym) simply denotes a symbolic figure of speech. As such its semantic richness and creative power is indeed a fruitful field for investigation (e.g. Fernandez 1972; Rosaldo & Atkinson 1973), but I think it is by confusing the two usages that one can take the formal analyses of Lévi-Strauss to result in semantic impoverishment. If therefore we abandon the metaphor/metonym distinction in favour of paradigmatic/ syntagmatic, or more generally p- and s- (Ardener 1973), it is not because it has become trivial; on the contrary, the principle of distinction is too important to permit any misunderstanding because of terminology.

Jan Ovesen.

References

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The aim of this paper is to offer an exegesis and analysis of Castaneda's reports of the teachings of don Juan (Castaneda 1970, 1971, 1972). These reports present anthropology with a number of important theoretical problems. For instance, as Heelas (1972) has shown, the books challenge us to reconsider fundamentally the nature of our discipline as translation by their insusceptibility to either a completely ethnocentric or a completely fideistic analysis.

More important here, however, is that the books raise essential questions as to the status we can accord our texts. A full examination of these questions would be a major task, for which there is no room here; moreover, while the answers we offer to such questions are logically prior to any exegesis, they are pragmatically consequent upon it. This being the case, I have no intention of trying to answer such questions at the moment. But I must make clear the viewpoint from which I initially approached the books.

I have treated the books as though they were literary texts, and the manner of my exposition has more in common with literary criticism than with any other discipline. Of course literary critics differ widely in their approaches, but they share an acceptance of their texts for themselves. They are primarily concerned with what a book has to say to us, rather than with its factuality or fictitiousness. This question of the 'reality' we afford to our material is particularly relevant to this case, partly because don Juan's teachings deny the validity of our ordinary reality, but primarily because his own existence has been doubted. But it is a question which underlies all anthropology, and one which has never received the attention it deserves.

Although the question of the general status we accord our material is important, in the present case it is perfectly valid to argue that whether don Juan actually exists is irrelevant. Leach, reviewing the first of Castaneda's books, has said that,

"Indeed if don Juan had been described as a man from Mars it would have made little difference." (Leach, 1969:12).

Leach may have intended this to carry a rather derogatory tón, but there is no reason why such an assertion should. Evans-Pritchard, dealing with exactly this problem of the status of texts, has argued that,

"Certainly there was a Richard III, but he was not the Richard of Shakespeare's play, who in a sense is more real to us than what we may regard as the more shadowy historical king, unless we are historians, and perhaps even then." (Evans-Pritchard, 1967:24-25).

It is in this light that I shall deal with Castaneda's works; don Juan is important and meaningful, and in this, perhaps the only true sense,

1. Throughout this essay these will be referred to by the numerals I, II, and III respectively.
he is real. I am not concerned here with the possibility that Castaneda may have 'distorted' don Juan. By treating Castaneda as akin to a novelist, such an idea becomes meaningless, for the only don Juan we know or care about is the don Juan seen and presented by Castaneda. Don Juan is 'Castaneda's don Juan', just as Socrates is 'Plato's Socrates'.

Don Juan's teachings make up, derive from, and are inextricably linked with a generalized view of the nature of the world. Since don Juan is a pragmatic teacher of action rather than an intellectual philosopher this view becomes apparent only in the course of those teachings. Although it is the general aim of this paper to elucidate those teachings, and hence to demonstrate what is involved in such a view of the world, the teachings themselves make little sense without some introductory remarks about the philosophy they are drawn from. I shall describe don Juan's epistemology and view of reality more fully later (see section V). It will suffice for the moment merely to point out the essential feature of that epistemology.

"For a sorcerer, the world of everyday life is not real, or out there, as we believe it is. For a sorcerer, reality, or the world we all know, is only a description.... For don Juan, then, the reality of our day-to-day life consists of an endless flow of perceptual interpretations which we, the individuals who share a specific membership, have learned to make in common". (III:8-9).

For don Juan, then, perception is a creative act, and by describing a world (including ourselves) we create the world.

The aim of don Juan's teachings is to introduce Castaneda to his knowledge. The end towards which this strives is to become one or both of two things: a sorcerer or a man of knowledge. This is done through the acquisition of certain techniques, and by adopting certain attitudes to life and the world (and it is in these attitudes that don Juan's philosophy becomes apparent).

Becoming a man of knowledge is not a final affair. This is also to a large extent true of becoming a sorcerer, and the bulk of the following remarks about the nature of men of knowledge will apply, usually in an attenuated form, to sorcerers. Becoming a man of knowledge is not like becoming a doctor. There are two essential differences.

Firstly, although the process of becoming a man of knowledge can indeed be described and taught in terms, at least partly, of the acquisition of certain techniques (such as seeing, dreaming, stopping the world etc.); still these techniques differ in an important way from the techniques of medicine. Significant techniques for a man of knowledge operate in the field of action, rather than of words or thought. Given don Juan's view that language is merely one of the elements in our everyday 'description' of the world this could hardly be otherwise. Thus it does not matter whether one understands what is involved in seeing, nor whether one knows how one does it (just as one does not know how one sees), nor even whether one can be sure of doing it again. The only thing that matters is that one does it. But it is impossible to become
a doctor (and the thought is horrific) if 'one does not know what one is doing'. The techniques of a man of knowledge are at the same level as 'understanding'; hence they replace it and cannot be susceptible to it.

Secondly, 'man of knowledge' is not a status one achieves. It is a constantly renewed affair to become a man of knowledge; except when he is acting appropriately (e.g. by seeing), the 'man-of-knowledge-ness' of an erstwhile man-of-knowledge ceases altogether. It is not kept in a state of inert or uninvoked abeyance. Don Juan expresses it like this:

"'To be a man of knowledge has no permanence... One is never a man of knowledge, not really. Rather, one becomes a man of knowledge for a very brief instant". (I:83, see also I:87).

The attitudes of a man are vital to his attempt to become either sorcerer or man of knowledge. Although specific elements of this attitudinal approach are often discussed with direct reference to their relevance for sorcerers and men of knowledge (and as such they will all be examined in greater detail below), they are loosely grouped together into the ideal life-patterns of the hunter and the warrior. To even begin to discuss and catalogue the elements of each of these idea-clusters here would be to pre-empt the whole paper. This is simply because there is very little which is relevant to becoming a sorcerer or man of knowledge which is not, at one point or another, taught in terms of the life of a hunter or warrior.

Being a hunter or warrior, like being a man of knowledge, has nothing to do with the acquisition of a status. The two are ideals, and as such don Juan uses them as models of behaviour for Castaneda to follow. True, a (not insignificant) amount of hunting (that is, hunting animals rather than power) does take place. But this serves only to bring the ideal directly in front of Castaneda. To be a hunter or a warrior serves as the perfect image with which don Juan can show Castaneda both the requirements and the rewards of his knowledge:

"'Hunters must be exceptionally tight individuals!'" (III:78)

"'Once upon a time hunting was one of the greatest acts a man could perform... At one time everybody knew that a hunter was the best of men.'" (III:79)

"'One goes to knowledge as one goes to war.... One goes to knowledge or to war with fear, with respect, aware that one is going to war, and with absolute confidence in oneself.'" (II:110).

"'To seek the perfection of the warrior's spirit is the only task worthy of our manhood.'" (III:138).

Both the life of a hunter and that of a warrior are lived with prime regard to strategy, survival, and the correct mood of controlled abandon. It would be an oversimplification to assume that the two are identical. However, it would be a mammoth task to detail the variations between the two, and it would add little to our grasp of don Juan's knowledge,
for in their roles as models for behaviour rather than final aims
'hunter' and 'warrior' do not need to be carefully defined or differentiated.
A short summary of don Juan's explicit statements about the relationship
between them will therefore serve our aims quite adequately. A hunter
is not concerned with power; a warrior is, for a warrior is an immaculate
hunter who hunts power (III:118-119). If he succeeds in this hunting,
he may become a man of knowledge (III:136). This suggests that the
concept of warrior includes that of hunter. Such may well be the case,
but I think that to hold such a view would tend to belittle the hunter
more than is justified by don Juan's teachings as a whole - if only because
he often uses the word 'hunter' as an abbreviation for 'hunter of power'.

Lastly, before turning to the detailed consideration of the elements
of the teachings, I must say something about the relationship between the
notions 'sorcerer' and 'man of knowledge'. The exact overlap and difference
between these two cannot be dismissed as was the one between 'hunter' and
'warrior', for they are the final aims of the apprenticeship. However,
a complete discussion of the question would cover the whole subject matter
of the paper, for their similarities and differences lie exactly in their
respective components. So again I must resist the temptation to specify,
and remain in the realm of the general.

The same man can of course be both a sorcerer and a man of knowledge -
as in the case of don Juan himself, or of don Genaro. However, it is
possible to be a sorcerer without ever having become a man of knowledge,
as in the case of don Juan's own benefactor, a reputedly great brujo
(sorcerer), who yet never learned to see. Elsewhere it is implied that
being a man of knowledge runs contrary to sorcery - that is, once a man
has learnt to see, he realizes the futility, the unimportance, of
sorcery (II:204); or that it may be possible to learn to see, and so
become a man of knowledge, without ever having mastered sorcery (II:240).
On balance it appears that a man of knowledge has gone beyond the point
reached by a sorcerer, and that 'man of knowledge' is therefore to some
extent superior to and inclusive of 'sorcerer'. However, the paths
diverge, and in view of don Juan's confessed predilection for seeing
as against the manipulatory powers of sorcery, it is not surprising if he
sees it as a more worthwhile goal, one which can take a man further into the
realms of mystery, and he may be unaware of the full potentiality of
sorcery. (This may also have some bearing on the idea of 'warrior' including
'hunter', but since the two pairs cannot be matched symmetrically no
simple correlation can be drawn.) Further than this little can be said
on such a general level before I have examined the detailed make-up of the
two categories. Let me therefore just summarize the different emphases of
the two: sorcery is more strongly concerned with techniques, and centres
on power; knowledge is more affected by attitudes, and is characterized
by stopping the world.

III

The crux of sorcery is power. Very little is said about what sorcery
is; the nearest don Juan comes to a definition is when he says,

"Sorcery is to apply one's will to a key joint....
Sorcery is interference. A sorcerer searches
and finds the key joint of anything he wants
to affect and then he applies his will to it....
All he has to know is how to use his will."
(II:240).

Don Juan's teachings are concerned with sorcery per se to a comparatively
limited extent, for as we have seen he is somewhat scornful of it, and in fact he seems to know not such a great deal about the specific techniques involved, unless these are to be found in the teachings not yet published by Castaneda.

But insofar as they are so directed, they centre on power. One becomes a sorcerer by living the life of a warrior, by being the "impeccable hunter who hunts power" (III:136). A sorcerer then is the warrior who has hunted power successfully, who has stored personal power, and who knows how to release and apply that power, controlled by his will, to effect the ends he desires. Don Juan's benefactor, an unsurpassable brujo, was capable of making people ill simply by looking at them (III:153). But this case serves only to emphasize the mysterious nature of power, for even though he could perform this remarkable feat, don Juan's benefactor could not properly control it. Such is the nature of power: "It commands you and yet it obeys you." (III:153).

Power is in no way a material form. Yet it can be hunted, and stored. It can be drained away by the night, and it can flow into the body from the earth. It can turn any ordinary material object into a body of unbelievable potency. A sorcerer can give a gift of power, but it takes power to cope with such gifts, and for a man without power their potency may prove fatal (II:42-49). On the other hand, power itself cannot be given, and in the hunt for personal power a benefactor can use his personal power to help his apprentice only by letting that power help the apprentice in his hunting. Power is always dangerous, never to be fobbed around with. Yet it is not malicious - rather it is mindless and available to be harnessed - rather like those things we call power, such as fire, electricity, or the sea. Elemental and fierce, it is to be controlled and not scorned; used and not resented; directed and respected, not taken lightly. For don Juan it is a universal which, in "this awesome and mysterious world" (III:111) affects men at all times.

Power derives from a large number of sources. It is present in many of the elements of the world, but there are a number of specific sources to which don Juan leads Castaneda in his attempts to fill him with power sufficient to stop the world. Power is to be found in a particular way of walking, and of running (the gait of power); in beneficial spots (sitios); in the fighting form; in the twilight; in shadows; in the entities or spirits of the world, and the plants by which some of them are reached; in power objects, such as power food or a spirit catcher.

Power is something which flows through the body, filling it with a glorious ability to perform stupendous feats. One of the very first things which don Juan teaches Castaneda is a specific form for walking (III:38), which Castaneda soon finds amazing him as he is pulled forwards by his hands (III:45). More important, though, is the gait of power (III:204ff), which enables a man to run through the desert in pitch dark night, avoiding all the pitfalls of holes and sharp rocks. The gait of power too requires a specific form, but beyond that it operates because the runner allows power to fill him, and trusts the power to guide him. However, the gait of power does not allow a man to roam the desert with his head in the clouds and a general faith that power will look after him; rather it requires a degree of intense concentration far beyond that required for ordinary tasks. The runner has to keep scanning the ground in front of him (and it is to facilitate this that the posture is designed), and the slightest glance to the side will make him lose his balance. Power, here as always, can be a great aid; but it will help the strong only, bringing harm to the weak.
Sitting on his beneficial spot will harbour and increase a man's personal power as he draws it from the earth. Sitting on the enemy spot, on the other hand, leads to the rapid draining away of any personal power a man may have, and instead of feeling restored and serene he will quickly become exhausted, confused, and ill-tempered. Sitting on the beneficial spot is a form of personal recharging; sitting on the enemy spot a form of discharge and dissipation.

A man has many spots in the world which are beneficial to him, but none so much so as his place of predilection (III:180ff.). It is not clear how one chooses a place of predilection, but the impression is that it depends, like so many things, on omens; Castaneda's place is the spot where he first sees, a place where he unexpectedly finds an omen he was looking for. On his place of predilection a warrior can make a "bed of strings"; that is, a circle of stones where he will always feel an immense contentment and well-being, sustained by their power. A man owns his place of predilection in the sense of being able to use it, and to remember it. He visits it either by walking or by dreaming, filling himself with it until it oozes from him, and he from it. He must go there whenever he taps power, and that is the place where he stores his power. He cares for it and everything on it. It is his responsibility, just as he is its (c.f. below, p.167, on the balance of the world).

But if a man's place of predilection is the most important place in his life, it is also the last, just as it is the first place in his death. For it is at the place of his predilection that the warrior performs his last stand in the presence of his death. A warrior's last dance on earth is composed of steps each set of which derives from one of his life's struggles. The forms are those he adopted in the struggles, which helped him to survive, and so the warrior's last dance is the reliving of the great moments of his life, the tale of his struggles, whether they ended in victory or defeat. Only when he has completed his dance can his death carry him away. The dance is the warrior's last act on earth, in which he uses up all his personal power:

"'If a dying warrior has limited power, his dance is short; if his power is grandiose, his dance is magnificent.'" (III:188).

When death taps the warrior, it carries him to his place of predilection; there he uses his power and will to hold death at bay while he performs his dance. In a final display of the mood of a warrior, his unbending intent and his relentless will combine to defy death while death has this gesture with a man of impeccable spirit.

"'A warrior is only a man... but his impeccable spirit, which has stored power after stupendous hardships, can certainly hold his death for a moment, a moment long enough to let him rejoice for the last time in recalling his power.'" (III:188).

The fighting form is not really a source of power distinct from the last stand, for in fact it merely forms the first set of steps in that dance. But Castaneda has a fighting form which is developed in his first true struggle. This is his battle with 'la Cafalina' (a sorceress), and the steps of his fighting form consist of the imitation of a rabbit's thumping, designed at the time to attract the sorceress out of curiosity (III:259ff.). Although it is designed for that occasion, it is useful on other occasions as a form of power defence (e.g. II:307).
The twilight is a time of power. "The world is a mysterious place. Especially in the twilight." (III:88). At twilight, there is no ordinary wind, there is only power (III:89). This power, like any other, can be used by a hunter. A hunter can make himself accessible to power by exposing himself to the 'wind' of twilight (III:84ff.). By adopting the right attitude to the twilight, the hunter lets it fill him, giving him peace and calmness (II:252). Animals caught at twilight are one source of power food (III:114), and don Juan and Castaneda use the power of the twilight to 'catch' 'la Catalina'. The twilight is the crack between the worlds (I:94) (that is, the world of men and the world of sorcerers). What this means is that at this time the world of sorcerers becomes more apparent to, and hence more obtrusive in, the world of men.

In a sense, the powers of the world are not so much more abundant or stronger in the twilight, rather they are more in evidence. Yet in don Juan's phenomenological view of the world, these two are the same. In the daytime, when the world we all know and share through our mutual and continual reconstruction is predominantly apparent, entities, spirits, power etc. appear to all but a man of knowledge as shadows. But in the twilight, in the darkness of the night, and in the darkness of the day (i.e. those times in the day when a man manages to become aware of the powers as a man of knowledge does (II:36, III:200)), at those times all things lose their customary clarity, all are shadows, and those entities become more obvious for what they are. Not even something as immaterial as shadows can have this close a relationship with power entities and remain impassive; so shadows too are power (e.g. II:280-281, III:229, 234-238).

There are essentially three types of entity (II:280ff.). There are the silent ones, which have no power to give, and which are usually associated with a particular place. Then there are those which only cause fright. They are malicious spirits, which try to frighten men, sometimes to their death. This second type often hang around the haunts of the first type. Lastly there are power entities - those that have something to give. These are also dangerous to men of course, but they are in no way inimical to men; they are simply available. Like the second type, they cannot affect men directly, but can work on or for them through a variety of media. This latter type of entity can be used by men who are hunting power. All that is necessary is that they be pursued and overcome; after that they are at the hunter's mercy, and must, for example, tell him the answer to any question he asks. The technique for locating them is plain if not oversimple - as indeed is the method for overcoming them. All that is required is that the hunter have an unbending intent.

Also among this group are the allies. Allies vary a good deal, or so it would seem, but most of our knowledge of them comes from the two well-known to don Juan. The allies, like the 'helpers' of a diablero (evil sorcerer), are personalized entities or spirits available to a sorcerer who has contacted them. Once a sorcerer has tapped an ally, which he does by overcoming it in a sort of cosmic wrestling match, the ally is always available to him. The sorcerer can then go to the ally for advice on beneficial courses of action in particular situations, especially struggles of power.

The two allies particularly known to don Juan are associated with and reached through the psychotropic plants the devil's weed (jimson weed, Datura inoxia) and humito ('the little smoke', whose main hallucinogenic component is a mushroom of the Psilocybe genus). There is not a great deal I wish to say about these. As he admits he has realized in the introduction to Journey to Ixtlan (III:13), Castaneda has placed a disproportionate
amount of emphasis on the importance of these plants. Certainly don Juan uses them a good deal, but that is because he has to break down the certainty of a "very strange plugged-up fool." (II:128) (see below p.164).

It is sufficient to note here that huimoto, don Juan's ally, is characterized (by him) as essentially 'male', that is, predictable, reliable, undemanding. The little smoke takes one's body away (I:138), and gives one the necessary speed to catch the fleeting other world of seeing (II:138), and also to survive in that world (c.f. Castaneda's experience with the guardian of the other world (II:160-162)).

The devil's weed, on the other hand, is essentially 'female' in character; demanding, fickle, grasping, jealous, petty. It has many uses, from simple curing and causing of diseases, to divination, to flying. The devil's weed is the seat of power (note that it was the ally of don Juan's benefactor) and as such seems to be conducive to all aspects of sorcery.

Mescalito, the spirit reached through the peyote cactus (Lophophora williamsii) is an entity at a different level. He is a far more generalized spirit, unique in that he is the only one of a fairly general category (each ally is unique in its own right, but they have enough in common to be put together in the category 'ally' which is at an equivalent level to the category constituted solely by Mescalito). Mescalito is a benefactor theoretically available to anyone, but in practice available only to those whom he accepts, the qualification being that he be approached in the right spirit by one with a correct will — otherwise he will be terrifying. He differs from the allies in that he is a teacher rather than a power available for use for personal reasons (I:69). He is a benefactor in the sense that he teaches the right way to live — that is, he offers a more fulfilled and fulfilling life to those who follow his lessons. (Note that 'benefactor' is also the term used to describe a human teacher.) Mescalito does not relieve a man of the tasks of everyday life, but he removes the element of drudgery from those tasks. His lesson is a moral, not a moralistic one, given in some ineffable way; he does not talk, nor does he show by example, but the man who encounters him becomes in an almost telepathically direct manner aware of his lesson. He is partially stabilized in appearance; that is, he tends to appear as either a man or a light, and will not vary his appearance to someone he has accepted — but he is capable of appearing in any form. He is decidedly male, referred to as 'he' where the allies are merely 'it' (I:88).

Power objects have power not so much from their intrinsic nature as from their contact with a spirit or other form of power. It is this which imbibes them with power and makes them significant in the world of sorcerers. Certain types of object are more suitable (or more usual) for this purpose — quartz crystals for example — but, as don Juan says,

"If you don't have the crystals but do find the spirit you may put anything in his way to be touched. You could put your dicks in the way if you can't find anything else." (III:246).

Power food is on a par with power objects — it is its deviation from power that makes it powerful. As for instance when a rabbit is 'guided' into Castaneda's trap at twilight (III:113ff).

There is a counter to power, and these are the shields. These are not something which make ready sense until we have some grasp of not-doing,
for all that shields consist of essentially is doing. That is, insisting on the ordinary side of the world, and insisting on relating to the world in an ordinary manner. This may be either inadvertently, as is the case for the vast majority of people, or it may be a deliberately carried out and stressed procedure by which the warrior protects his 'gap' from the powers inimical to it. Suffice it simply to say that if the world is as we create it, it is possible, by stressing the ordinary perception of the world, to hold power at bay; and this is what most people do all the time.

But there is another, and a better, way to fight off the forces of the world. The sorcerer uses his will to guard himself. I noted at the beginning of this section don Juan's statement that sorcery is the application of one's will. He says elsewhere that it is only when a warrior can grab onto things with his will that he can rightfully be considered a sorcerer (II:185). His will, says don Juan, is a sorcerer's only way of balancing against the forces of this world (II:258). It is by exercising his impeccable will that a sorcerer closes his 'gap' (see below), and keeps himself safe from the dangers of the mysterious world in which he moves (II:261, 273). Castaneda himself discovers this when he is confronted by the guardian of the other world, but at that time he has not tuned his will enough to be able to stop it harming him (II:154).

Will can, moreover, accomplish far more stupendous feats than these. Although at times don Juan seems to use 'will' as a synonym for 'unbending intent' (e.g. I:182, 183), it is far more than that. By the use of will it is possible to 'think oneself' into a standing position without using the muscles (I:135); to move, in the same manner (II:155); even to go through a wall or to the moon (II:180). It is with his will that a sorcerer may travel to the 'other world', the world of a diablero's helpers (I:182). In fact the will enables a sorcerer to perform any number of astounding feats, which defy common sense, and this is one of its main elements. Will can make a man succeed when his thoughts say he must be defeated (II:179-180). Will is something very special and mysterious, something clear and powerful which directs a sorcerer's acts so that he can perform these amazing feats (II:178). However, its operation is not easy of exposition, for it is at one and the same time a power, a mode of perceiving, and a control.

I have already discussed the effects of will as a power. As a power it is something which must be controlled, tuned, and developed (II:179, 178). Don Juan defines will as a power over against a thought or an object or a wish or an idea (II:179, 182). The power is a force which comes out of a man's 'gap'. This is a place in his abdomen, the same place from which come the luminous fibres which compose a man as he is seen. The will shoots out of this gap, and when developed can touch anything the sorcerer wants (II:185). This gap is also the place where death enters a man. Death operates by making a man expand beyond control. Since it is with his will that a sorcerer assembles himself, he holds off his death until he becomes enfeebled with age. Indeed a sorcerer tunes his will by letting death enter his gap, then he exercises his will to prevent himself expanding too much, and re-assembles himself (II:239).

But as it shoots out of his gap, a sorcerer's will is far more than simply a force. One part of the relationship entailed in the grabbing of the world by the will is that a sorcerer perceives through it. As such, it is not simply a sixth sense, for the perception offered
by the will shows the world as much less 'real' and 'out there' than the five senses do (II:181). But, just as we cannot describe what is entailed in the process of hearing, don Juan cannot describe the mechanisms of perceiving with the will; he can only say that the perception consists of a relation between a man and the perceived world, a force which attaches itself to the world (II:180), and this is true of all modes of perception in don Juan's epistemology.

Will is also "a kind of control" (II:178). Like any form of power, it is both to be controlled and a method of controlling the world. It is most important as control, however, in the life of a man of knowledge. It is will which controls don Juan's folly, it is his will which makes him go on living, and acting, and acting as though he cared, in the face of the absolute equality he has discovered in all things by seeing the world (II:101, 106; see below pp.167-168 for an exposition of the ideas of absolute equality and controlled folly).

A warrior becomes a sorcerer by the acquisition of will. He develops his will, and yet at the same time it is something he must wait for with patience, knowing that he is waiting for it (II:178). In fact,

"'A warrior has only his will and his patience and with them he builds anything he wants.'" (II:177).

Using the patience he has acquired for himself, and with the advice of his death, a warrior proceeds until he has developed his will; and only then does he become a sorcerer.

IV

I hope I have now given a reasonable idea of what is involved in the concepts 'power' and 'will', and the ways in which a man uses them to become a sorcerer. It is now time to look at the other side of the coin (though remember the coin is a transparent one). The elements of power I have been concerned with so far are, I maintain, the items of the path to sorcery. But it is essential to remember that the path to sorcery and the path to knowledge run parallel or together for much of the way, and a good deal of power is required to stop the world and become a man of knowledge.

Although power is necessary in order to collapse the world there is another, rather more important side to the process. When the world collapses, something stops inside a man and the world rearranges itself. Much of don Juan's teaching is an attempt to lead that "strange plugged-up fool" (II:129) Castaneda to the brink of this, and then push, and to keep doing so until Castaneda takes that final step. It is essential to break Castaneda's certainty that the world is only as he believes it 'really' is, because it is by believing in a different world that one becomes able to perceive it. Don Juan tries to do this not only by constantly telling Castaneda about his gross and monstrously misplaced assurance, but also by trying to disrupt the routines of Castaneda's life, in the widest sense of the term. That is, he tries to prevent, alter, stop or destroy Castaneda's doing. Doing and not-doing are the whole key to stopping the world.

I have already said that for don Juan the world is as it is because we say it is. If the world is to remain like this, we must keep on saying so; it is this constant re-affirmation of the way the world is which is what
is meant by the term doing. The everyday world seems concrete, real, stable, because we all agree on our views of it, we all deliberately share the same perception of it, largely because of the socialization process which turns us from the chaos of childhood into the order of adulthood. Over and over again people tell a child how to look at the world, and because memory of the unordered state is impossible (memory being the allocation to familiar categories of unfamiliar experiences), adults believe that the way they conceive the world is simply the way they perceive it, the way they construct it is merely the way they construe it. In our ordinary doing we keep on saying that the ordinary world is ordinary, and so it stays that way. Not-doing consists in assaulting this ordinary world with extraordinary doings, and by this means turning it into an extraordinary world. It is at this turning point, when the conventional mental blocks have been broken down, that the world collapses; the world is stopped, and can rearrange itself, or be rearranged, in a new pattern.

Don Juan leads his more direct attacks on Castaneda's mental routines with the use of the psychotropic plants. With the aid of these don Juan can confront Castaneda with 'impossible' yet 'real' (in the sense of indisputably perceived) situations, such as his own ability to fly (I:125ff.) or become a crow (I:162ff.), to play and communicate with luminous dogs (I:43ff.) etc. If Castaneda were to accept these experiences as true, he would of course have to slough off his idea of reality. However his view of reality allows for a rationalization of the experiences because of their drug-induced nature.

Don Juan has, however, a series of far more devastating dramatic performances which he throws at Castaneda. Because Castaneda has no ready-made get-out, these events are far more likely to disrupt him. Don Genaro is a past master at this art, and is often roped in by don Juan for this purpose. The absurd and the impossible are his speciality, as when he crosses a 150 foot high waterfall in a series of leaps from one rock to another (II:123-128); as when he moves ten miles in a flash (II:313-314); as when he sits on his head (II:II9-120); as when he takes Castaneda's car away (III:280-290) (which is reminiscent of don Juan preventing Castaneda's car from working by jamming the spark plugs with his will (II:240-242)). Many of these manoeuvres bring Castaneda to the brink of seeing, which really only takes place when one stops the world, but every time he falls back into his rationalist everyday world, seeking to explain (or explain away) and understand. The two men of knowledge also use innumerable lesser devices of the same ilk in their attempt to confound Castaneda with the ridiculous. Don Genaro's clowning, in particular, is hilarious, even in print, but to no avail. Castaneda's encounter with 'la Catalina' (I:175-181) may be another example of this technique - certainly he prefers to believe that don Juan is pretending to be someone trying to impersonate him, rather than accept that a sorcerer might have adopted don Juan's form, but in the light of the other stupendous events taking place in this world there is no reason for rationalization. All this is designed to show Castaneda that the world is a mysterious place, uncomprehended, ultimately incomprehensible. It is now plain why the lesson can only properly be given in terms of action rather than words, and why it is useless to discuss the lessons afterwards; words are inextricably linked with the doing of the ordinary world, indeed they are part of it, serving only to maintain that world, hopelessly incapable of reaching beyond it to other worlds.

Don Juan also employs a number of less direct means to try to snap the chains of Castaneda's reason (II:313). These are the more generalized
procedures he prescribes for Castaneda, which together make up almost the complete ideal of the life of a warrior.

Firstly, Castaneda must break his ordinary routines in the usual sense of that word, i.e. in the sense of simple habits of the body, such as eating at a set time, for which don Juan frequently castigates Castaneda (see especially III:97ff). He does this most effectively by reminding Castaneda that the difference between a hunter and his victim is that the hunter knows his prey's habits. The truly great hunters, by refusing to adopt routines, render themselves unpredictable, and so free of the danger of being hunted in their turn (III:100).

Castaneda must also abolish his personal history. Don Juan has no personal history not because he does not know what and who he is (though he claims (III:32) that he does not), but because no-one else knows (III:29-30). If nobody knows for certain what events and actions go to make up a person's past, then in a very real and important sense they will know nothing of what he is. They will have no idea of him as a (certain type of) individual, and he will have no image of self which can be fed either by himself or by others. The aim therefore is to destroy any stable personal identity, both for oneself and for others, thus becoming unpredictable and free, and preventing people from taking one for granted (III:34). One's own self (identity, selfhood) is created by one's own and others' perceptions of one in the same way as the world is constructed by perception.

One of the ways by which this self is maintained is by internal talk. Men are always naturally talking to themselves when they are not talking to others or acting, and this internal talk is one of the most important ways in which the world is continuously recreated as a stable idea (II:263). To become a man of knowledge it is essential that this internal talk become a controllable factor; this is simply a matter of hard work.

"The art of a hunter is to become inaccessible!" (III:94).
"Therein lies the secret of great hunters. To be available and unavailable at the precise turn of the road!" (III:90). This idea of being inaccessible or unavailable embraces a number of other ideas (many of which also contribute to other idea clusters). One of these is the importance of avoiding routines (in a fairly specific sense, for which see above). All these ideas are fairly closely linked together - even more closely linked than is usually the case in this tightly-meshed world. A consideration of these and their ramifications will take us through all that we need to know about the ways by which Castaneda is led to break free of his encumbering reason. It is perhaps also worth mentioning that all these ideas are closely tied with the idea of living like a hunter and warrior.

Becoming inaccessible is the logical conclusion of the need to erase personal history. Unavailability is not simply a matter of avoiding people, or becoming a recluse, both of which are mere indulgence. Don Juan tries to make the idea simpler by saying that it involves hiding without anyone knowing that one is hiding. It is a kind of detachment, in which one is not at all times on tap to anyone who cares to make use of one.

One way in which a warrior can achieve this detachment is by pondering his death. A hunter knows, from the experience of having played the role himself, that death is always stalking, and may strike at any moment. A hunter focusses on this, and turns it into a profound
conviction rather than mere-intellectual knowledge. By paying death this, its due respect, he imbues his acts with purpose and power (III:109,112). This focus on death leads to a number of further considerations in the life of a warrior. All of these are in a sense dependent on the idea that a warrior assumes responsibility for his actions. Since that idea too derives generally, even if not directly, from the focus on death, this will be the most appropriate place to treat with it.

The assumption of responsibility for all one's acts and decisions denies the warrior the possibility of any feeling of self-pity, or of blaming others for his fate. The world, including other people, can of course impinge on a warrior, but it cannot insult or offend him, for he has put himself beyond its malice, by insisting on a view of the world in which malice is irrelevant. Once he has decided on a course of action, a warrior refuses to have any regrets, accepting that whatever fate befalls him is in a large sense his own doing, and that the decision he made at the time was the best possible in the light of what he knew. He cannot be offended by anything other than his own actions, for anything else is simply the manifestation of external forces. Since the consciousness of those forces is not his own, he cannot be either aware of or responsible for them. Being beyond his control it would be futile for him to moan about them or feel resentment against them. In a sense his own actions also come into this category, for once they are past they are beyond his control.

I have pointed out that being inaccessible requires that one only be lightly tapped by the world (above, p.166). This tenderness is necessarily a reciprocal thing - for if one were to treat the world otherwise, one would automatically be letting, or even making it squeeze one out of shape. A hunter knows that he will always lure game into his traps, so he does not worry. Worry, with its atmosphere of desperate clinging, is exhausting for both the worrier and the world or person to which he clings. And how can a hunter waste his time worrying when he knows that his impending death is always right beside him? A hunter knows too that he must maintain the balance of the world, for he is conscious of the fact that the world is alive, and that if, for example, he does not apologize to the plants and animals he uses for having harmed them, they will turn on him and injure him.

He knows about the necessity of being in balance with the world from another direction too. He knows that all the animals and the plants of this world are his equal, for death is the "irreplaceable partner" (II:182) of them all. This is the realization Castaneda finally comes to in front of a beetle (III:295). Losing all self-importance so that all things become equal - it is only when he has attained this conviction that a warrior can succeed in seeing.

The natural implication of this creates a worry in the mind of anyone with an 'ordinary' view of the world. If all things are equal, and if one is beyond being affected by the world, there is no way in which one can say that anything one does matters. It seems that one cannot avoid the conclusion that all actions are equal, and that everything one ever does is a waste of time. This is true in a sense, yet it is not as devastating as it at first appears. For a warrior is aware of this aspect of his life - indeed without it the life of a warrior would be seriously weakened. The apparent nihilism is turned to a strength through the notion of controlled folly. Every time a man of knowledge acts in relation to his fellow men he is exercising his controlled folly. The world
of men does not matter to him, for having seen he has seen through his fellow men and realized that they are all luminous eggs, whether they be beggars or kings, and nothing can ever change that (II:34). In a vital sense, the world of men is simply no longer real for a man of knowledge, as don Genaro's story of his 'journey to Ixtlan' demonstrates only too poignantly. His journey is not a mere metaphor; it is a real symbol of the fact that he has lost all ties with the world of 'real' men to which he was once so passionately attached. It takes a long time for Castaneda to come to the realization that there are no beginnings to which one can go back, or which one can start from. But this is a universal fact of life made devastatingly obvious by don Genaro's story. Once he has passed into the 'other world' don Genaro discovers that he has become incapable of emotional contact with the world of men. It is not simply that a man of knowledge has become superior to other men - such elitism would be contrary to the whole spirit of the knowledge he has found. He sees all action as folly, but there is a significant difference in the case of his own actions. Because he is aware that his, and everybody's, actions are mere folly; because he has seen men; because he has come to realize that all beings are equal; because of all he has learnt in progressing along the path to knowledge; because of all this he has his actions, his folly, under control. The paradoxical mixture between simultaneous abandon and strategy is present throughout don Juan's teachings, but it is possible to see through it to the fact that the paradox exists only if we are tied to a particular perspective. Shift the perspective and we find, as Castaneda discovered, that the world rearranges itself and the 'illusion' disappears. I can only repeat don Juan's words:

"I am happy that you finally asked me about my controlled folly after so many years, and yet it wouldn't have mattered to me in the least if you had never asked. Yet I have chosen to feel happy, as if I cared, that you asked, as if it would matter that I care. That is controlled folly!" (II:99).

For a man of knowledge exercising his controlled folly all things are unimportant. They are unimportant not because they are all worthless, but because they are all worthy (this is why Castaneda is wrong to get upset about the idea that don Juan does not 'really' care about him (II:100)). So it does not matter how a man of knowledge acts - yet he chooses to act as though it did matter, and that, the exercise of his will, is his element of control.

All that can be said in terms of doing one thing rather than another is that a man of knowledge has predilections. These are not preferences, in the sense of choices deliberately made with some end in view. Rather they are tendencies resulting from the bent of his nature. We would not usually say that men exercise a choice in walking on two legs instead of four - rather we would say that that is the way they are made, and the fact that they could act differently is irrelevant. The same is true of don Juan's predilection for laughing as against crying, for living against dying. He too could act otherwise, but such is not the bent of his nature, and it would be misleading to talk in any other terms. To act as a warrior is to act with simultaneous control and abandon. One does not care about the outcome, yet one acts as though one cared passionately, and strives with all one's might for whatever aim one is following. In the face of his impending death, a warrior is unconcerned about defeat or victory, for he is always fighting his last battle on earth. That is the nature of controlled folly.
Don Juan tries to teach Castaneda one other technique to enable him to stop the world. This is dreaming. Dreaming differs from dreaming in that dreaming is a way of knowing the world, it both requires and leads to power and control (III:142). Thus dreaming is something which helps in stopping the world, yet it is also one of the activities which a man of knowledge can use to know things by after he has succeeded in stopping the world.

This becomes particularly plain in view of the fact that dreaming is an equivalent of seeing. Seeing is just one of the possible ways a man of knowledge can employ to know things. The total number of such possible modes of perception is never delimited by don Juan; but each man of knowledge has his own predilection - for example, don Juan's is seeing, Sacateca's is dancing (II:20). It is impossible to describe to one who has not seen, or danced, or dreamed, what such a way of knowing is like: "There is no point in talking about what seeing is like," (II:174, see also II:50), because "Seeing is not a matter of talk," (II:130). "Seeing is not a matter of looking and keeping quiet...Seeing is a technique one has to learn. Or maybe it is a technique some of us already know," (II:200).

Because it is incapable of description, don Juan's statements on seeing are often contradictory. For a number of reasons, of which this ineffability is just one, I feel it would be of little advantage to say much more here about seeing. Firstly because seeing has, in my opinion, already received a disproportionate degree of attention. The whole of the second book centres on the problem of seeing, and Heelas (1972) too has helped to elucidate the idea. Moreover seeing is, as I have already said, only one of a number of possible ways of perceiving the world anew. And since such a new perception of the world is, for don Juan, the ultimate aim of Castaneda's apprenticeship, its ramifications are present in everything don Juan says, in everything I have said. There is just one problem which I feel I ought to clear up. Don Juan says that when a man sees 'the same thing' it is both the same and different. Castaneda has trouble understanding how this can be so, and in particular how, if things differ they can be identified, and how if things are the same they can be differentiated from each other. I do not see why Castaneda should find this problematic, simply because it is in no way different from the situation involved in ordinary looking.

I have now examined all the elements required to stop the world, and it will be worthwhile at this point re-iterating just what happens when the world collapses. It may seem that the collapse of the world derives from or consists of an illusion; after seeing what was 'really' a dead branch moved by the wind as a dying monstrous beast Castaneda is in a perfect state to stop the world, a state which includes fear, awe, power, and death, control and abandon. Castaneda's reaction is to seek an explanation, and at that point "something in me arranged the world and I knew what the animal was" (III:132). What he should have done was to sustain the sight of the animal, because "That branch was a real animal and it was alive at the moment the power touched it" (III:133). As long as Castaneda insists on seeing the world as he is used to it, (as he all too often does, see e.g. III:222-224) he will never manage to see it. Stopping the world involves stopping our normal perceptual and interpretative flow, and substituting another for it. At this point one can see the 'lines of the world', one can talk to coyotes which talk back, one has discovered an essential yet ineffable secret (III:296-298). In September of 1969 Castaneda encounters

"The first time I did not believe in the final "reality" of my perception. I had been edging toward that feeling and I had perhaps intellecualized it at various times, but never had I been at the brink of a serious doubt" (II:230).
Twenty months later he succeeds in stopping the world; that is he finds an alternative perception of the world to replace, temporarily, his old assured one.

V

Those, then are the ingredients of the teachings as such. To end this analysis, I shall return to don Juan's theory of knowledge and reality. The outline of this should already be plain from what has gone before, but an explicit statement is worthwhile both because that will illuminate the teachings, and because don Juan's epistemology is of great relevance for anthropology (both as a subject matter, as Heelas (1972) has shown, and as a theory equivalent to our own). I have already said, in discussing doing and not-doing (above pp.164-5) and personal history (above p.166) that for don Juan perception is interpretation or description, and that the worlds provided by this creative act are all that there is in 'reality'. I shall now elaborate more fully this phenomenological view of the world.

"The world is such-and-such or so-and-so only because we tell ourselves that that is the way it is. If we stop telling ourselves that the world is so-and-so, the world will stop being so-and-so." (II:264).

For don Juan all that reality consists of is "an endless flow of perceptual interpretations" (III:9). It is the agreed interpretations which go to make up the everyday world of doing. It is possible to hook oneself onto any number of doings, until one realizes that they are all false, that only impending death is real (III:239). We all live together in the same world because as children we are taught the everyday world, a picture is continuously built up for us until we learn to see the world in that way (III:9, 299).

This is remarkably similar to Blake's world view, which is why I have drawn my title from Blake. Thus in The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, Blake says,

"A fool sees not the same tree that a wise man sees" (Plate 7).

"Then I asked: "does a firm persuasion that a thing is so, make it so?"

He replied: "All poets believe that it does, and in ages of imagination this firm persuasion removed mountains."" (Plates 12-13).

Such a view of the world leads to certain irresistible conclusions, for both Blake and don Juan. The first, and in many ways most important of these, is the collapse of the distinction between subject and object. The insistence on the creative nature of perception, and hence on the integration of subject and object, is also a major starting point for phenomenological philosophy:

"...that act of positing the world, that interest in it which delimits us...."(Merleau-Ponty, 1962:xiv).
The collapse comes about for two reasons. Partly because of the realization of the inadequacy of thought, or understanding, hence language (of which more below), as against what Blake termed 'imagination'. But primarily because, in making the world what it is by the way we perceive it, at the same time, in the same process, we make ourselves what we are (see above p.166 on personal history). The 'perceiving self' is never an entity distinct from 'the world' because it too is known, even to itself, only through perception, that is, an interpretative process. Even Descartes' 'cogito ergo sum' falsely separates subject from object; Blake and don Juan are incapable of objectivizing the self sufficiently to allow it to transcend the phenomenological nature of everything, and so become a subject set against others as objects. This is never explicit in don Juan's teachings, for he assumes the integration of the two at all times, and unless the two are first separated the point does not need to be made. However, it shows whenever he answers Castaneda's queries about whether 'unusual' events are real. There are events he says, to think about which in terms of men and crows is false (I:168), as it is false to think of men flying 'like birds' rather than simply as men flying 'as men who have taken the devil's weed' (I:128). Similarly,

"Nothing in the life of a sorcerer is made out of anything else. If something is anything at all, it is the thing itself" (II:273).

Blake argued that,

"But first the notion that man has a body distinct from his soul is to be expunged" (The Marriage of Heaven and Hell, plate 14).

Northrop Frye, analysing Blake's epistemology, has said that

"The acceptance of the esse-est percipli principle unites the subject and object. By introducing the idea of "reflection" we separate them again" (Frye, 1969:16-17).

This leads us to the next consequence of don Juan's world view: the failure of rationality. Don Juan repeatedly tells Castaneda that 'understanding' is only one of the possible ways of apprehending the world (see for example II:310-315, III:233). Understanding the world, the doing of the world, is the categorizing of experiences:

"When you're trying to figure it out, all you're really doing is trying to make the world familiar" (III:168).

For don Juan 'nonsensical things' are those things we see by ourselves, without any guide or direction (I:157). It is in this sense - that one must turn everything from the familiar and categorized to the unknown - that one must overcome everything before one can see(ii:207). Blake too shares this view of the weakness of categorical knowledge:

"The infinite superiority of the distinct perception of things to the attempt of memory to classify them into general principles" (Frye, 1969:16).

"There is no "general nature", therefore nothing is real beyond the imaginative patterns men make of reality" (Frye, 1969:19).
It is but a short step from here to don Juan’s view that language is inadequate. When he tries to explain doing and not-doing, he ends up with a despairing,

"That's the problem with talking...It always makes one confuse the issues" (II:227).

Because language is part of our ordinary doing, because it is an essential element in our maintenance of the world as we know it, there are bound to be situations in the ways of a sorcerer where words will be mute, and only actions will have the power to speak to us.

Two final points about the nature of perception remain to be made. Firstly, men's perceptions of 'the same thing' may differ (I:128-9). The same is true for Blake, who takes this idea to its logical conclusion:

"There are exactly as many kinds of reality as there are men" (Frye, 1969:19).

Secondly, a perception is something which can be either sustained or broken down (see for example III: 133, 169, 222-224). This aspect gives an idea of the kind of attitude which turns an attempted perception into reality. It is not simply a matter of squinting so as to look at something differently with the eyes (II:304); rather it is a question of conviction and faith in the mind of the beholder.

For don Juan there are many worlds, many ways men can hook onto those worlds. There are many things in those worlds which cannot be known, more which cannot be told. The worlds are inherently alive; to be lived in, not acted upon. Ultimately, for all don Juan's knowledge, the world remains "stupendous, awesome, mysterious, unfathomable" (III:107), "incomprehensible ....a sheer mystery". (II:264).

Martin Cantor.

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In this paper I wish to expand on some of the themes hinted at in my earlier paper (Hardman 1973). It will also continue the discussion taken up by Vernon Reynolds (1974), although it is not a direct reply to that article. Some of the points I make here have previously been made, in a much less extensive form, in New Society (Hardman 1974).

To discover for myself what children were like on their own, I spent lunch-hour playtime with the children at St. Barnabas School in Oxford. My intention was to observe and play with them in their own style and idiom. But I wondered whether I could succeed in this as, being a tall grown-up person, the children would naturally regard me as an adult authority figure. The problem that I faced was that children act differently in the presence of an adult; they are reluctant to speak as openly and act as spontaneously as they do among themselves. An adult figure, moreover, commands the attention of a particular type of child; that is the younger children who cling, climb and pull, continually demanding attention, or those children left out of games who are anxious to act like an adult to show that they are above all the play.

It is not easy to explain how I came to be accepted as something other than adult. Gradually eyes were averted less; fewer clinging hands surrounded me; they asked fewer questions; began to tease, trick and hit me; and were not so careful to omit the 'naughty' parts of their rhymes or their 'rude names' for each other. To some I was 'the lady', 'Charlie' or 'skinny'. Others accepted me as an odd student-teacher who only came at play-time and was willing to crawl, balance on bars, play 'tig' and get both dirty and hurt. Whatever my position was, the novelty and awe soon wore off, as I gave neither cues nor reproaches. It was only after holidays or with new pupils that the shyness and submissiveness reappeared.

In consequence of this aim to be accepted by children as something other than adult, I became very aware of those 'mistakes' which plunged me back into the adult image. The contradiction between how I wanted to act as an adult but how I had to act (or not act) in order to be something other than adult confronted me with some important differences in expectations and attitudes between children and adults. Adults tend to restrain physical violence when they are confronted with it; children encourage it, up to the point where the fantasy and excitement of the tussle suddenly are irrelevant at the sight of tears or blood. Any of the children who intervene are scorned by the participants, 'min' yer own business', their means of stopping the fight was to find a teacher. Similarly when there were quarrels about who was the owner of an object, the normal adult response is to find out who it really belongs to, whereas to children what is important is the interest that someone else gives to the object. Henry dropped a penny, but it was Urmla who picked it up. 'Hey, it's mine!' said Henry, 'I was going to buy an apple with it'. 'No, it's mine, said Urmla. The exchange continued. But eventually Henry shrugged his shoulders and turned to someone else. Immediately Urmla returned the penny. It had no more value as soon as Henry lost interest.
On days when I found myself intervening in a particularly pernicious fight, asserting adult tones of disapproval, I was back again with clinging hands, and 'Oh, please, Miss, give me an aeroplane (a 'turne~). But the threats if I refused were also revealing about what children consider will shock, what they know will annoy... 'If you don't, I'll pull your hair', 'I'll pull your trousers down' said Sharon one day struggling to unbutton my belt. As an adult it was the threat of loss of dignity which children thought would persuade. When I was something less than an adult, it was the loss of friendship which was threatened: when I sat secretively with Debbie and Sara playing with old lipsticks and (stinking) eau de cologne, one said, 'You won't tell, will you? We'll go and play with Caroline if you do...'

The limits of my own observations are obviously revealed by the wealth of the material the Opies collected. One particular difficulty might be found in the limited possibilities and observations available in only one playground. The Opies, for example, with their wider studies were able to observe that,

'Two distinct streams of oral lore flow into the unending river of schoolchild chant and chatter, and these two streams are as different from each other as slang and dialect. The slangy superficial lore of comic songs, jokes, catch phrases, fashionable objectives, slick nicknames and crazes, in short that noise which is usually the first that is encountered in playground and street, spreads everywhere but, generally speaking is transitory. The dialectical lore flows quietly but deeper; it is the language of the children's darker doings... belongs to all time but is limited in locality... the language which children use to regulate their relationships with each other.' (Opie and Opie 1959:15).

The implicated restrictions on any one study to know about the 'darker doings' of children is not, however, as serious as might be supposed, if we consider these at a different level from the Opies. That is, if we recognise that although the dialectical lore is limited in locality, varying from county to county, it has a level of meaning which is common, and which may be at least in part understood from one playground alone. Thus, although I was limited to the St. Barnabas type, we may generalise from this and see that it is only the particular form of a general pattern. The deeper lore is limited in locality, but at another level we can say that it spreads everywhere.

When I first started going to the playground of St. Barnabas, I thought it would be a long and perhaps even impossible task to find out anything about the children. How to penetrate such an alien world? The apparent chaos of screaming, running bodies of varying heights and the secret impenetrable huddles momentarily blocked out the material the two Opies had managed to collect. But there was activity everywhere; numerous small groups each seemed to have their own style of interaction and play, one group was playing football, others hung around the sandpit, more congregated round the doors and entrances to the playground, others swung on the bars, and so on. Not even the physical objects of the environment therefore offered any usual protective safety. The brick walls, the door separating
the two play areas all seemed taken over by scrambling or secretive children. Even the sedate park benches were upturned and put to various uses. An almost inevitable comment from one of the teachers, wandering across to get her lunch, 'Just like little savages, aren't they?', re-affirmed my decision to be wary of their help. It was not going to be easy to become an acceptable non-teacher adult figure. How could I get beyond their whispering, giggling behaviour, their shy reserve and restrained manners, or their complete rejection, the usual reaction of many children in the presence of an unknown adult?

I soon found out, however, that the attribution of chaos is the reaction of the outsider, who does not belong and who does not understand the idiom of the playground and the kind of order it contains. To realise its significance and to understand its reality, it is necessary first to contrast the possibilities and activities of the playground with those of the classroom. A considerable portion of children's days are spent cloistered in the classroom, where movement and verbal demonstrations are restricted, where being told what to do within an inert routine is the norm. Adult-type behaviour is imposed in the form of organisation and disciplinary rules, and time is spent preparing for examinations or other scheduled work within a rigid timetable, characterised by the dreaded school bell; a place where there is little room for energetic excitement and risk, but much time for concentration, mental effort, worry, boredom or listlessness. All these aspects are, I think, well recognised, but they come over very clearly in a collection of children's ideas on 'The School that I'd Like' (Blishen 1969).

'Give me the school where discipline, regimentation and good manners are not everything' (Ibid:19),

'There would be a 'screaming room' where anyone could go and make as much noise as they wanted to without anyone hearing and objecting' (Ibid:37),

'free expression, free thought, freedom to work at one's own pace' (Ibid:30),

'If in English you were describing running, fighting, standing on your head, or anything active you have feelings about, you would leave the classroom and do the action in question' (Ibid:68).

Little wonder, then, that activity in the playground is full of movement and noise. It is a world where children are allowed to be free as they would like to be in the classroom; where they can run, chase, jump, throw, shout and shove, without fear of rebuke; where there is freedom limited only by one's own rules or those accepted by the group: the children's own kind of order, by which they can become the characters they aspire to and indulge in the activities they enjoy. In the playground they can relish the atmosphere of their own fantasies, of their own limits, fears and expectations, without the limiting inhibitions of adult 'facts', more of which we shall see as I proceed.

Just as children are made to feel inadequate in the teacher's idiom, so I began to realise the incongruities of an adult in the style of the playground. But what is the idiom of the playground which
makes it so unacceptable to adults? It is, I suggest, an open-ended way of looking at things (see Hardman 1974). Whereas the physical behaviour of adults has conformed to the way their particular culture has bounded the possible from the impossible, the approved from the disapproved, the public from the private, children's play and games may be, in part, interpreted as testing where to place these boundaries. The range of movements which they appreciate is certainly very extensive. As Lévi-Strauss writes, 'every newborn child provides in embryonic form the sum total of possibilities, but each culture and period of history will retain and develop only a chosen few' (1949:93). For children it is as though the 'thresholds of excitement, the limits of resistance, ... different in each culture' had not yet been fixed. "The "impossible" effort, the "unbearable" pain, the "unbounded" pleasure" (Lévi-Strauss 1955:xii) are still open to experimentation.

This physical open-endedness helps to explain the physical extremes that can be seen in the playground. Children slowly stretch their legs as far apart as possible in the effort to reach a knife thrown into the ground, in a game called 'Split the kipper'. The game has meaning by virtue of the exertion and the nerve that it demands. The interest is in seeing who will give in first. "It goes on ... until one of the boys gets scared and gives in", says an 11-year-old. "He is then called Chicken". (Opie and Opie 1969:221). In 'Rumblin Rhinos' three boys are held horizontally on the shoulders of eight others, four linked together in line in front and four behind. The weird, heavy animal, with its rolling, wrinkled flesh, is aptly symbolised by the human monstrosity. But it is the ability to join as many people together as possible, defying all adult restrictions, which is what is valued in this game and makes it so attractive. This can also be seen in 'Hi Jimmy Kracker' a popular form of leapfrog consisting of one long back made of four to six children linked together. The first person jumps over three or four backs landing far enough forward to leave room for the others to mount behind him, a game in which 'players are most frequently hurt, and which requires the greatest amount of stamina, esprit de corps, and indeed fortitude' (Ibid:255). There are many games, too, which involve almost nothing but physical endurance, such as 'knuckles', in which one boy holds up a clenched fist while the second strikes the knuckles as hard as he can before the first can avoid the heavy blow. Physical endurance is the necessary conformity to this game. As one boy explained, 'you mustn't give in - the first to cry is a baby'. The children's values indicate the context in which 'knuckles' is to be understood. Bravery and endurance are here esteemed and these are soon made manifest at St. Barnabas in the bleeding knuckles. The Opies comment on the game, 'some lads seem constitutionally unable to give in, and the game (so-called) continues long after the skin has been torn from their hands. Two 11-year-olds were observed in a playground taking turns at each other; both were in agony, yet they were found to be still at it 10 minutes later' (Ibid:223). But the 'agony' was possibly more an indication of the Opies' limits than a value of importance to the children, who were still testing out what pain was 'unbearable' for each of the participants. This testing out of physical possibilities is later better understood by the Opies, though they call it 'Misplaced Audacity'.

'on the swings ..., children do not merely sit on the seats and see who can swing highest, but try to see who can climb furthest up the chains while swinging,
and who will jump off his seat from the greatest height, and who, by swinging hard, can leap the furthest off the swing ... Yet roller-towels, when children make free with them, can be as dangerous as swings. They put their head in the loop of the towel and wind themselves up until they can lift their feet off the ground. They play 'Dangling Man', a game of extraordinary attraction, twisting the towel tight and letting their neck take the weight of their body until they go blue in the face' (Ibid:273).

I suggest that here we see children testing the limits of excitement and resistance checking the adults' bounded category of the 'impossible' and the 'dangerous'. Part of this propensity for the fantastic, is as the Opies perceive, 'not bravado ... so much as wonder and curiosity, those twin attributes of inexperience which, for instance, prompt a child to turn round and round until he is giddy and can "see the world going round". So it is, when a rumour sweeps through the school that a person who stands on wet blotting-paper, or who puts wet blotting-paper in his shoes, is likely to faint, repeated trials are made'. (Ibid:274). The example that is given is worth including here for it demonstrates the extent to which children will test themselves:

"in a Lancashire primary school ... "We can make a boy faint for a minute, sir," ... "Oh yes?" said Sir, tolerantly. They sat on their hocks, knees bent, arms outstretched, and took ten deep breaths, then stood up holding the tenth breath, and some one from behind squeezed them round their waist. One boy was flat out for a minute'. (Ibid:274).

This interpretation of the physical aspect of children's activities may help to explain why the similarity of children's activities always strikes the ethnographer. Kidd in 1906 commented, 'Nothing makes the European feel his kinship with the Kafirs more than watching the games of the children. Nearly every game we play in Europe that does not require much apparatus, is also known by the Kafirs' (1906:162). Amongst others he describes a game in which 'players pinch the skin on the backs of others' hands, holding it firmly between his first finger and thumb ... (until) ... suddenly, at a given signal, they all jerk their hands away, each one pinching the skin of the hand he is holding as hard as possible. Large pieces of skin are frequently pulled off in this way, but no boy would dream of crying' (Ibid:168). Kidd's final comment on the games that he describes is 'some children do not seem to feel the pain amid the fun of the game' (Ibid:169). Raum too noticed that 'soon the normal performance of the body is found to be an insufficient measure of skill. Boyish ambition concentrates on twisting and distorting the limbs' (1940:266), and he describes other hitting and fighting activities similar to those observed by the Opies and which I have seen in St. Barnabas. Rejecting Kidd's explanation in terms of the 'dull nerves of the Kafirs' and seeing Raum's interpretation as telling us what these games do rather than say, I hope to add some understanding to these physical 'games' by repeating that in children's models of society, their view of themselves, and their physical limitations are not bound by a distinction between the possible and the impossible. There is thus available to them a whole range of physical techniques and activities which they continually test out.
Elsewhere (Hardman 1974), I have tried to show how children's attitudes, aims, motives, and activities do not need a view of the world which makes a strict distinction between fact and fantasy. I now turn to look at the way the children at St. Barnabas viewed their environment, including their bodies, to show what a Protean world it is in which they live.

The possibility that children might be able to say more with things than words was suggested to me by Ardener's ideas on the non-linguistic semiotics of archaic, folk, or 'minority' forms of society. In his hypothetical case of the total absence of the power of speech the semiotic system would, he argues, depend upon the apperception by the human participants of contextually defined logical relations among themselves in space. Let us say: the relative position of each participant to another in a gathering, and to items in a fixed environment (1971:xliv). And working from de Saussure's likening of language to chess, Ardener suggests that we see the elements, including the participants, in a system as containing a certain 'valency' weighting.

'The elements of the semiotic would be stated by their existential presence and would acquire 'meaning' ('value') through the 'relations', which would themselves be apperceptible as some kind of syntax ... Careful structuring of the biophysical environment would be required, for the actors themselves are symbols in the semiotic, and a recognisable set of theatres for action must be provided' (Ibid:xliv).

Here then was a possible means of recognising the significance of the physical and the environment if it could be shown to be part of a meaningful system of communication.

Children are obviously not devoid of speech, as in Ardener's hypothetical case, yet perhaps they cannot be fully appreciated or best interpreted by their speech alone. We may learn more by looking at how the bio-physical environment can be used as an alternative form of communication. As we shall see there is almost no limit to what their bodies and things in the environment may be. What is important is their association with each other in various ways.

The environment as a whole has no intrinsic meaning. Objects of the playground, the children's own bodies, and movements are the main 'elements' as can be seen from the list in Appendix I, which was drawn up from Iona and Peter Opie's book Children's Games in Street and Playground and from my own observations at St. Barnabas.

This list of the main elements of the environment and aspects of the children themselves cannot be exhaustive since all these objects, positions and combinations, which might seem an odd mixture to adults, are constantly being added to by children to vary, lengthen, modernise or increase the excitement of their games. To anthropologists this list should not perhaps seem so odd, for there are certain 'things' which are widely and frequently used as symbols. Leach has mentioned some of the more prominent symbols which occur "in the context of a

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1. Fortes describes how children in Taleland see objects as having multiple uses in their play (1970:61).
ritual sequence" in an article for Hinde's book on Non-Verbal Communication (1972). The symbols which crop up more frequently than others are:

1. Adornments of the body
2. Actual parts of the body
3. Gross differences of posture
4. Relative position
5. Limb movement (gestures)
6. Face
7. Nutrients
8. Bodily excretion
9. Facial expressions

All these are certainly manifest in the context of children's games; and we may also add the following as being categories of elements likely to be meaningful:

10. Movements of progression
11. The immediate environment
12. Boundaries (territorial layout)
13. Family
14. Animals
15. Objects that can be extensions of self (e.g. sticks, ropes).

How does this bio-physical environment, which constitutes the main equipment for the apparent confusion and anarchy, obtain meaning and become important as part of the communication in the playground? At St. Barnabas the specific environment at the mercy of the children's imagination consisted of benches, a main door leading into the ground, the door dividing the two play areas, a pot of sand, some stairs leading down to a shed, two drains in the middle of one play area, and the brick walls. As I have said, each object acquires meaning or value through its relative position with other objects of the specific context. Thus the two drains have value in races in so far as they present different possible starting places. The little ones use the drain nearest the wall, the older ones use the further one. With this view in mind, St. Barnabas playground begins to appear at odds with any values which might be applied by any adult visitor. There are two benches. These are, however, the boxing-ring. This is made explicit by the two upturned benches placed at right angles against one of the brick walls. Inside both boys are standing on one leg with their arms folded. This then is no ordinary fight: it is a cock fight. Hopping all the time each boy tries to butt and unbalance the other. Attention is focused on the exertion and skill involved. Who will be forced to put his foot on the ground first, or worse who will be pushed over and have to face the jeers of the onlookers? Balance and courageous buffeting are the values here esteemed. These values indicate the context in which the activity is to be understood. Thus the boy who is unbalanced must give up his place in the ring and allow another boy to be the 'cock'. The presence of the benches emphasises the dual nature of the combat, and its serious aspect. Nobody outside of the ring may intervene. It is the combination of all these elements which gives the meaning to the whole. Yet hopping, the benches, the presence of two boys only, the folded arms, the attitude of the onlookers all take on different values in other contexts. Hence, on another day, the benches take on the meaning of the basic structure for a house and the greatest value for.
the children is the pleasure of actually making the house, the gathering of jackets and bits of wood or anything else at hand to make the benches domestic. These same benches provide the equipment for whatever is valued at that moment, whether horses, hospitals or army tanks. Likewise other children may be seen hopping around the playground, but no-one would consider that a cock-fight was in progress if there is only one person hopping and many other children acting in a taunting fashion around him or her. In this situation the value of hopping is as a handicap so that the others may represent foolish chickens, trying to escape the fox. The advantage for the chickens on their two legs to get away is so obvious that the children have to act in an artless and scatty way to ever get caught. Sometimes there are several boys surrounded by the benches, but they will rarely be fighting each other. They are a gang. The benches here represent a fortress which has been captured, and which must be protected from rebel invaders, so that the crossed arms demonstrate the strength of the fortified territory. The outsiders are a danger and show it by trying to scramble over the defending benches. All the time there are war-cries, grabs, pushes, taunts, each act conforming to the defending and usurping demands of the game.

This same pattern of changing values continues day after day and in every corner of the playground. The door between the two play areas, in their relation to the two platforms on either side, is valued as a swing over a dangerous moat, as a way of 'showing off' and distracting the attention of a group of girls busy dressing and undressing a model-like doll, whilst on another day the two platforms alone represent the distance between teacher and pupils. The walls are castles for a king to sit upon, or 'safety' in a game of 'chase'. The hands of several children in a ring represent a decision, whilst two hands joined together can be understood as the making of a bargain. From this type of analysis of the environment of the playground in terms of a meaningful system, we indeed find that it reveals a structure of great range. The objects of the environment are incorporated into play not for what they are in themselves but for the meaning given them. But as, Gombrich points out, the objects have to qualify (1963:4).

I shall now go further into this approach adding some of the Opies' material to my own. I hope however to see the 'games' from a point of view different from that of the Opies, and that is the view that I have suggested above, which maintains that the contexts which define the meanings of the biophysical environment are the imaginary or 'fantasy' situations agreed upon by the group. It seems that certain situations are played so often that children know the rules which their behaviour should adhere to. I found myself making many mistakes at St. Barnabus because I often did not possess the know-how of play. All the children know that in 'warfare' you aim your machine gun at others, but occasionally you must fall down dead for a while and then get up and continue as before. You must know the minimum correct procedure or you are not playing correctly. One must know the criteria appropriate for play, but there is nothing absolute about them.

In many activities that one can see in playgrounds, one child's hand and the act of touching are the most important elements. Children know the meaning of these two units from the other elements that are present, and the imaginary situation involved. When one child is identified with the idea of a chaser, all the others focus on avoiding
direct contact with that one hand. The possibility of a touch from the hand is what is significant and all attention is fixed on using space to its utmost to increase the distance between oneself and the hand. As soon as someone has been touched attention turns to avoiding the new hand which has taken over the power of potential touch. The value of the hand is contained in its power to touch which is also transferred by means of touch. However, in another situation, a scarf twisted as tightly as possible with the ends brought together, can be seen to act as an extension of the hand, for it also touches; but it also adds its own value. It does not only touch as the hand does but has the power to 'hit' and therefore also changes another element, accentuating the space available and the need to keep away as far as possible from the extra-potent hand of the pursuing player. When elements are added or substituted, the meaning of the other elements alter too. In a game very similar to the well known 'tig' the power of touching is not contained in one hand but in two hands clasped together in front with two fingers pointing forward. The running in this context has a different value, for now as with the scarf, the children are running away from what for children stands for the dangerous horns of a 'bull'. This allows the 'bull' to make bellowing noises and the children to scream in pretend fear. But also there are specifications about the power contained in the horns. The bull's touch can be seen to be ineffective if the hands are not held properly when he touches, or if he has not held his horns in front of him in the appropriate fashion when chasing. Attention in this activity focuses on how the bull holds his horns as much as on avoiding contact with them. The element of pace, in the chasing and the running is also affected by the change in the type of touch, for no-one can run as fast or as easily with their hands in this awkward 'bull' position. Thus the imaginary element of being chased by a bull may emerge and the aspect of running at all costs is slightly eased.

The idea of constraints and variations may help us to understand other situations in the playground. For example, if children add the element of an area of 'safety' (as in 'Off-Ground He'), we can see that the emphasis on running away from the touch is exchanged for an emphasis on running for 'safe spots'. In addition, other objects in the playground such as flowerpots, railings, walls, or dustbins begin to have a value, that of 'safety', from being 'off-ground', whereas previously they were insignificant. The actions of the chaser change too because now he has some relation with those on the safety areas as well as those running around. He can closely guard an unsteady safety spot until the unfortunate player loses his balance and is touched as soon as he puts a foot on the ground. On the other hand the players also have an advantage; they can taunt the chaser and then suddenly return to a hidden 'safety spot'. We can see again that each element acquires its value in relation to the others.

To understand more fully the significance of these changes it is important to realise that behind all of them lies a chain of elements which is constant. Certain elements follow other elements producing a sequence which conveys the specific context to the children, but in the semantic space of one element there is the possibility of the many alternatives I have been talking about. Table I shows the sequence and the possible substitutes of the activities I have been talking about. From it we can see that the main sequence of the type of activity I have been describing must -

1. Identify and number those 'who are 'it', or 'he' or 'het', i.e. those who take the part that is different from the majority.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>One person</th>
<th>running</th>
<th>touch</th>
<th>others</th>
<th>running</th>
<th>with no safety</th>
<th>if touched...</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>One person with part. character</td>
<td>walking</td>
<td>with hands together</td>
<td>their shadows</td>
<td>walking</td>
<td>safety off-ground</td>
<td>become chaser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bull</td>
<td>hopping</td>
<td>with scarf</td>
<td>specific part</td>
<td>hopping</td>
<td>safe if wearing colour</td>
<td>become chaser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Witch</td>
<td>bunny jumps</td>
<td>with stick</td>
<td>of the body</td>
<td>bunny jumps</td>
<td>safe if touching iron</td>
<td>when 3 lives lost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs</td>
<td>on all fours inside out</td>
<td>with 2 sticks</td>
<td>inside out</td>
<td>on all fours inside out</td>
<td>safe if touching wood</td>
<td>join chaser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs - facing diff. ways</td>
<td>bicycling</td>
<td>with 3 whackings</td>
<td></td>
<td>bicycling</td>
<td>safe if touching colours</td>
<td>beaten &amp; then become chaser</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs - one on back</td>
<td>swinging</td>
<td>with ball</td>
<td>off ground</td>
<td>swinging</td>
<td>green</td>
<td>exclude from game</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pairs - eyes shut</td>
<td>running in a chain</td>
<td>with slipper</td>
<td>on trees</td>
<td>off ground</td>
<td>black</td>
<td>paralysed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No person - Ball</td>
<td>off-ground</td>
<td>pushing to the ground</td>
<td>following lines</td>
<td>on roundabouts</td>
<td>brown</td>
<td>hold part of body touched</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many persons</td>
<td>on trees only</td>
<td></td>
<td>holding parts of the body</td>
<td>holding parts of the body</td>
<td>red</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Many persons + holding hands</td>
<td>following lines</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE I**
2. Specify a movement or boundary or environment which particularise the style of action of 'it'.

3. Decide whether the 'touch' is to be a) person(s) b) extension of person(s) in objects. c) other additional qualifications for the effectiveness of the 'touch'.

4. Indicate what is to be 'touched'.

5. Specify a movement, boundary or environment which particularises the style of general action.

6. Decide what effect the 'touch' will have on its victims and whether there is any possibility of reprieve from it.

Obviously the choice of elements within these categories alters the equilibrium of the game either in favour of the 'it(s)' or in favour of the players in general.

The game of 'touch', as I shall call it, like other children's activities, might be seen as the development, equilibrium and resolution of the values attributed to two opposing sides centred around some activity which for each side has a different meaning. In this view it is the central activity, and the nature and balance of the opposing sides which decides to a large extent what a game will be like and what rules will be involved. Perhaps some diagrams may make this clearer. If we see the simple game of 'touch' in which one person chases the rest, and no sooner has the chaser succeeded in touching someone ... than that person becomes the new chaser (Opie and Opie 1969:62) as follows:

(1)

```
'TOUCH'
  Action Player    Counteraction Player
   Name  Action   Name  Action
    Chaser  Chasing    Chased  Avoiding
     +       +       -      -
```

and the game of 'Whacko', which uses a scarf or a slipper instead of the hand as:

(2)

```
'WHACKO'
  AP          CP
   Name  Action   Name  Action
    Chaser  Hitting    Chased  Avoiding
     +      ++       -      --
```

then we can see that the basic pattern is the same, while the balance is slightly in favour of the 'Action Player'. In 'Bull' the pattern is also the same, but the balance this time is in favour of the 'Counteraction Player', who has no handicaps as does the Action Player. However in the game that is known as 'Off-Ground He', the Counteraction Player has more layers of activity to deal with, ones which are active as well as passive. The game seems to be much more popular than those in which the counteraction is totally negative.
Although each game can be elaborated by adding a relevant supplement from the repertoires of elements, the main attention still focuses on touching and avoiding, on chasing and being chased.

In other games the focus of attention on touching is linked with the idea of specific boundaries. The basic pattern is similar to those we have seen above but the extra focus of attention allows the possibility of an even greater number of variations. A diagrammatic expression of these games might be as follows -

There are considerable possibilities of variations on the number and formation of the actor and counteractor positions, in the kind of boundary, in the form of the AP and CP actions, in the type of balance between the two sides (such as the use of space, direct or indirect contact, type of movement allowed), in the extent of interdependency of the players, in how safety and respite are achieved. What is interesting is that the same variations occur again and again in games which the Opies have divided up into Chasing Games, Catching Games, Seeking Games, Hunting Games, Racing Games, Duelling Games, Exerting Games, Daring Games, Guessing Games, Acting Games and Pretending Games. But since these so-called 'variations' occur so frequently, perhaps they should be seen as the main patterning themes, and those aspects, such as running, hunting etc. which the Opies...
consider the classificatory themes should be seen as the variations. Leach has warned us in Rethinking Anthropology against 'butterfly collecting', that is comparison of the arrangement of things according to their types and subtypes (1961:3). Possibly for children the important aspect of a game, its reference point, is whether a ball is being used, whether the action is hopping, whether they join the 'it' when they have been 'tiggled'. Classification in terms of one almost arbitrary frame of reference is, as Leach says, like arranging your butterflies according to their colour, or their size, or the shape of their wings, according to the whim of the moment but in doing this 'you must realise that your prior arrangement creates an initial bias from which it is later extremely difficult to escape' (Ibid:3).

In spite of this warning Leach himself does not object to the Opies' 'types and sub-types' kind of classification of games. In a review of the Opies' book Children's Games in Street and Playground 1969, Leach accepts the twelve different types of games offered and compares them to grammatical rules in language,

'within the framework of a single set of grammatical rules and a limited vocabulary of words, each of us is capable of making an indefinite number of new utterances. We don't just go on repeatedly saying the same thing. And children's games have this same quality: the basic types (the grammatical rules) are rather limited - the Opies distinguish only 12 - but within these types the capacity for new invention and combinations has no limit' (1969:565).

I have already shown the patterns, variations, and rules which can be derived from the types as related by the Opies. But as I have also tried to indicate the basic elements in the games and the variations occur again and again. Who then is to say which is the basic pattern and which the variation? What are the classificatory types and what should be treated as the 'new invention and combinations'? We should remember the words of Wittgenstein on family resemblances, that is,

'the tendency to look for something in common to all the entities which we commonly subsume under a general term. We are inclined to think that there must be something in common to all games, say, and that this common property is the justification for applying the general term 'game' to the various games; whereas games form a family, the members of which have family likenesses. Some of them have the same nose, others the same eyebrows and others again the same way of walking, and these likenesses overlap' (1954:17).

This perspective leads me to look and see whether there is anything in common rather than accepting the distinctions between 'Chasing', 'Catching', 'Running' and so on, as labels for different classes of games or 'Play' and 'Games' as concepts for different forms of activity. The Opies themselves are aware that there is running through children's games a relationship between those which are 'fanciful', between those which are more 'ritualistic', those which are 'romantic' and those which are 'severely competitive' (see Opie and Opie 1969:4), the child's preferences changing as he matures. And yet if we look again, those which are called 'fanciful' such as 'Mothers and Fathers', 'Playing Schools' or 'Playing Horses' also have
something in common with the supposedly more 'formalized' style of the other games. Rejecting the Opies' distinction 'Play is unrestricted, games have rules' (Ibid:2), I suggest that we may extend our appreciation of children's activities if we see the similarity between 'play' and 'games' as revealed by Vygotsky. He proposes that there is no such thing as play without rules or games without some imaginary situation (see Vygotsky, 1966).

All I want to emphasise here is that the groupings of games as chosen by the Opies is as arbitrary as anyone else's. If we look for example at the games of 'Poison', 'Crusts and Crumbs' or 'What's the Time, Mr. Wolf?', described under the subtype 'Suspense Starts' in the chapter on 'Chasing Games' (Ibid:99), we can see a close relationship with other games described in the chapter on 'Catching Games'. The idea of touching is linked with that of boundaries, and the action involves elements of choosing and capturing, avoiding and reaching a particular place as in those called 'Catching Games', such as 'Farmer, Farmer, May We Cross Your Golden River?' or 'Cigarettes'. However if we wanted to emphasise the choosing and suspense style of the games we would have to admit a close similarity with those called 'Racing Games', such as 'May I?', 'Aunts and Uncles', 'Letters' etc. in which players can only move when a certain letter, relation or instruction has been given.

The problem of which salient features to emphasise has bothered most writers who have tried to classify or find some common order in different games. Should the observer try and find order in terms of some underlying, organising syntax, as Leach has suggested; in terms of certain conspicuous features, as the Opies have done; in terms of different capabilities involved, as Culm has done, with the concepts of chance, dexterity, pure skill, or calculation - (see Culm 1907 or Roberts, Arth and Bush 1959 who followed the same line of approach); or in terms of some general expression, the view taken by Callois (1961), who saw games either dominated by impulse or control or allowed opportunity for human experience? Or perhaps we should try to look at games in terms of children's own classification - the approach I myself prefer?

I would suggest that one of the clues to the children's classification of the games may be found in the names they give them. When they shout 'Let's play sardines', what they are choosing is the fun of squeezing together tightly in a small hidden corner. In 'Strokey Back', the value is the opportunity to thump another player on the back; and in 'Block' the possibility of preventing somebody from making their way back to the starting-place. In 'Tin Can Tommy' it is the clatter of the can which determines the moment for hiding. By looking at the names the same game is given in different parts of the country, we can see that the variations tend to enhance and support one main value. Sardines, for example is also known as 'Sardines in a Tin', 'Sardines and Tomatoes', 'Squashed Sardines', 'Squashed Sardines and Tomatoes'. These could scarcely be more expressive names; the mingling of sardines and tomatoes in a tiny tin accentuates the cramped position the children have to maintain while waiting for the seeker to find them.

From this viewpoint we begin to see more clearly how children evaluate their games and what their main purposes are in playing them. What they seem to enjoy most is identifying themselves or one of their number with some animal (often called "Mr __") or with fairies, witches, ghosts, monsters, Kings, Queens, old men or women, farmers, policemen, mothers.
and fathers and so forth. Or certain old-fashioned names, Jack, Johnny, Polly are used, which again suggest an element of fantasy. Sometimes the pleasure is found in doing things which handicap or restrict movement in some way, like blinding the eyes, or hopping - or movements may be extended by the force of an object such as a ball or even by each other when they link together in a chain. Corners or positions may be endowed with a deciding influence in a game involving such actions as finding, kicking, kissing, knocking somebody, releasing someone, running, or stealing. 'Tig' depends on the importance of touch.

There is almost always the desire for a formal start yet the game itself often restarts almost automatically as though it had a momentum of its own to give everybody a chance. Then there is the allure of luck indicated by the numerous counting out games.

In this paper I have made some attempt to show the problems and possibilities of understanding the activities and values of children in the playground, and of trying to apprehend them in their own idiom. Meanings and values have emerged from what initially appeared in the playground as chaos; but they are meanings and values specific to children, perceptible to them but not to adults.

Charlotte Hardman.

Appendix I.

Person; Two Persons; Many persons; Persons in chains: holding hands; Two persons holding hands; Persons holding hands in a circle; Persons holding hands in a line; Persons sitting piggy-back; Three persons sitting on backs; Four.. six.. eight persons on backs; Persons facing different ways; Person blindfold; Person blindfold and hands behind back; Hands clasped together; Hands holding particular part of the body; Elbows; Person suddenly turning round; Person with one leg tied to partner; Immobile as directed; Immobility of body-part hit by ball; Immobile in posture as pushed; Position of fingers; Clenched fist; Feet running; Running backwards; Running sideways; Hopping; Hopping with both feet together; Hopping with arms folded; Hopping with arms folded and turning around; Walking; Crawling; Creeping; Rolling; Skipping; Crouching; Ducking head; Walking on hands (someone holding feet); Moving forward heel to toe; Jumping; Jumping over another person; Jumping from crouching; Jumping over sticks; Jumping over dice and moving forward as indicated by dice; Jumping over lying down figures; Bob jump; Jumping with legs apart; Slide forward; Dodging; Dancing; Turning somersaults; Spinning around; Stepping through own linked hands; Spitting; Whirling arms; Slapping; Hitting knuckles; Stamping on feet; Hitting back of the neck; On all fours (inside out); Touching; Touching with hands together; Touching special part of the body; Touching the ground; Crawling under someone's legs; Tickling; Seeing; Naming;Particular words (to be elaborated on later); Releasing; Releasing three times; Counting; Hiding; Giving orders; Guessing; Chance; Kissing; Choosing partner; Choosing opponent; Choosing subsequent action; Running between two set lines; Safety; Divided territories; Lampost; Walls; Trees; Drains; Pavement; Kerb; Netball pitch; Corners; Door bells; Colour; Iron; Wood; Green; Yellow; Cigarette Names; Names of relations; Letters; Initials; Film star-names; Comic names; Number of fingers; What was eaten for breakfast; Articles in shop window; Time; Handkerchief; Similarities; Differences; Wet; Dry; Hot; Cold; Shadow; Lines; Off-ground; A tin can; Bicycles; Swings; Roundabout; Scarf; Slipper; Hat; Own clothes; Personal characteristics; Eggs; Birds; Beasts; Flowers; Towns; Lolly-sticks; Flower-heads; Rope; Knife; Ball; Conkers; Sticks; Stones; Manhole; Twigs; Matchstick.
188.

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When a publishing house of the prestige of O.U.P. produces a volume of this size, it is a notable event in the history of the subject covered. Baker, a cytologist by profession, has spent many years culling the literature for evidence of significant differences between what zoologists and others call the races of mankind. His conclusion may be summarised fairly simply. The "Sanids" (variously known elsewhere as "Khoisan", "Capoid" or "Bushmen and Hottentots") as a race retain certain infantile physical characteristics into adulthood. The "Australids" (Australian aboriginees) possess certain significant physical features which are "primitive" in the sense that they are more like ancestral man and the Pongids (anthropoid apes like the chimpanzee and gorilla) than are those same physical features in the "Europids". Significantly, those "races" were, until colonised, still following a way of life essentially pre-neolithic, having made none of the technological or philosophical advances made by the "more advanced" races. Similar in their failure to advance technologically and intellectually were the "Negrids" in their various African cultures, and although in their case definitive morphological characteristics of inferiority are not readily identifiable, evidence shows that their cognitive capacities are inferior to those of the Europids and the Mongolids.

The evidence to support these hypotheses is initially awe-inspiring in its breadth. 1181 references are to be found in the bibliography and rare indeed is a page which does not cite half a dozen of them. But as one skims through the bibliography one is struck by the unusually large proportion of references to pre-1940 works. The text soon makes the reason clear. The historical survey of the analyses of racial differences ends with Hitler, for, after his attempts to apply his analysis, Baker remarks that an academic taboo is placed upon the subject. Similarly, his discussion of the characteristics and culture of the Africans living in the "secluded area" of sub-Saharan Africa i.e. that part presumed to be unaffected by cultural borrowing from the Middle East, is based almost wholly upon the reports of European explorers and missionaries who traversed the continent between 1824 and 1871. These accounts are preferred to the accounts of professional anthropologists of subsequent generations as Baker feels that they were not written from "a point of view". The classification of the races and sub-races of mankind that Baker treats as definitive was compiled in Germany and published there in 1933 and 1937. This is not made clear by the references in the text itself, which are numbers referring to the bibliography, but not to the page referred to. Thus when twenty-eight references are cited on one issue (p.206) it is necessary to read through the bibliography to discover that half of them are to works published before 1914 and a prodigious effort is needed to discover whether they support the writer's point of view.

As is perhaps inevitable in a work which attempts to encompass highly technical and controversial material in the fields of history, zoology and comparative anatomy, genetics, psychology and social
anthropology, there is some unevenness in the quality of the scholarship. There is, however, no doubt as to where the sympathies of the author lie as he quotes with approval Thomas Huxley's assertion "the problems of ethnology are simply those which are presented to the zoologist by every widely distributed animal he studies." (p. 3) The confusion between biological groupings and cultural groupings is thus established in the minds of the author from the outset, and much of the following chapters is merely confusion worse confounded.

The first three chapters are devoted primarily to a summary of the views expressed by a wide range of persons whose works were published up to the time of Hitler. The primary qualification for inclusion appears to have been that the writers believed that significant differences existed between "ethnic taxa", although many were distinguished in other fields. Thus "Kant considered that no other uncivilised people showed such a high degree of intelligence as those of North America." (p. 19), Linnaeus called Europeans "quick witted" but the "Negrid and Khoisanid", "crafty, lazy, careless." (p. 24) One can only ask of such a presentation, what is the value of the opinions of men, however distinguished they may be, who have little or no first-hand knowledge of the peoples whose qualities they compare?

In summarising the views of the specialists in more recent times, his concern is "with the growth of ideas that favoured the belief in the inequality of ethnic taxa, or are supposed - rightly or wrongly - to have favoured such belief." (p. 33) No attempt is made to assess the validity of their views, nor to present the alternative viewpoints - although we learn that "leftists" can readily hold views of racial equality. Referring to "the Jewish problem" we may be grateful to learn that "Only one of the (thirteen) authors, Lapouge, strongly condemns the Jews; Treitschke is moderately anti-Jewish; Chamberlain, Grant and Stoddard mildly so; Gobineau is equivocal." (p. 59) Hitler's account of how the Jews managed to gain control of the dominant institutions in German society is summarised without comment, save to question Hitler's judgement that the Jews were insincere in their espousal of trade union interests. Baker dissociates himself only from certain "exaggerated, untrue and purely abusive remarks that appeal especially to low-grade, vindictive minds." (p. 60)

Thus for Baker, the "historical approach" is to recount without comment (except in the case noted above), the claims, however disreputable their academic pedigree, which have supported the hypothesis of the inequality of "ethnic taxa", regardless of the precision of definition of those categories, the quality of the research or the political aims of the author. If the historical presentation tells us anything to illuminate the "ethnic problem" it is that the "Nordids" have produced from their ranks several pseudo-scientific apologists for prejudice and for oppression on the basis of allegedly measurable physical criteria associated with immeasurable qualities of personality.
When he shifts his focus away from "history" and into his own field of expertise, Baker finds himself on safer ground, and the non-scientific reader, reared in a tradition which assumes a very high degree of precision in the natural sciences may be somewhat bemused to learn that the definition of what constitutes a "species" in a number of cases is by no means unquestionable or simple. Perhaps here it is the emphasis upon taxonomy that is the undoing of the zoologist who tries to argue by analogy and comparison from various other creatures to man. Thus we are invited to note the tendency towards infertility among hybrids of diverse stocks (p. 94) from examples outside man and offered a somewhat tendentious hypothesis to explain the apparent failure of this "tendency" in man. Chapter 6 makes a case for human "ethnic taxa" being categorised as different species on the grounds that the morphological or genetic differences between certain individuals of different ethnic taxa are greater than those between animals which are seen as being of different species and which under natural conditions reject each other as mates, although possibly through domestication, captivity or "straggling" may hybridise. But all men are "domesticated", and given the opportunity, breed across their taxonomic divisions with considerable if varying degrees of success. The argument by analogy from animal to human groups becomes even less credible, to the layman at least, when genetic imprinting of behavioural characteristics among deer, mice and bees is used to justify a hypothesis about environmental preferences and language in man (pp.116-117).

Even a layman might further question the argument that "the ancestral pre-human condition (is) represented today (in a much modified form) by the apes and monkeys" (p. 171). If, as seems generally accepted in academic circles, man (hominids) and the anthropoid apes (pongids) indeed have a common ancestor several million years back, both groups will have evolved for an equal length of time and in differing directions, from the common ancestor. Vagueness is inevitable in view of the broken lines of ancestry in all cases and doubts as to which, if any, of the prehistoric apes hitherto identified might have been that common ancestor. For Baker the argument is important however, and acceptable, for it is by such means that he is able to identify the Australids as having marked "primitive" characteristics. (Ch.16)

Since Baker's argument is based upon assumptions of the validity of taxonomic classification - that each category or item can be fitted into a more inclusive category at a higher level of generalisation in an unambiguous manner - it is appropriate to ask whether, in the case of a taxon (man) whose sub-groups (races and sub-races) are not only capable of interbreeding but have, by common consent, interbred successfully in the biological sense over a very long period of time, the taxonomic approach is not inadequate to explain groupings or categorisation. The paradigm, which identifies precisely the range of qualities associated with each individual or homogeneous group, suggests itself as a more appropriate analytical tool if the object of the exercise is to describe precisely the differences between individuals and groups of men. If, however, the purpose of the exercise is to make a case for a hypothesis, rather than testing that hypothesis, then a taxonomy, with the evidence selected to fit, is the appropriate analytical tool as it is capable of providing the taxonomist with the sort of answer that he wants.
The reader is then led through fairly detailed explanations as to why the Celts and the Jews are not really "sub-races" in the zoological sense, and on to the analysis of the physical or morphological peculiarities of the "Sanids" and "Australids". The explanation of how or why the racial differences have come about, which is fairly basic to Baker's analysis of their significance depends upon an unsubstantiated theory in genetics pertaining to "polygenes". Having confessed that the evidence for this theory comes from a study of flies carried out in 1949 and that "an ingenious start" was made in substantiating the theory in 1953 (p. 111) no further evidence is provided in support of it, but the existence and significance of the "polygenes" is assumed and treated as an unquestionable fact.

It is when Baker reaches his accounts of the "Negrids", that his analysis, arguable as long as he is sticking closely to his professional arena, deteriorates into a tradition of "scholarship" which smacks of the most obscene racism. Evidence of the relative sizes of "Europid" and "Negrid" penises is provided for Baker from "Negresses who had co-habited with both Negrids and Europids" (p. 331). He suggests "Pan 1, 2, 3, 4," as suitable abbreviations for the four sub-races of "Palaeonegrids" that he identifies (need one add that Pan satyrus is the zoological term for the chimpanzee) (p. 333).

We are told that "The Kalahari Desert......stood between the Europeans of the Cape and the Negrids of Central Africa" (p. 340), having already learned that the Hottentots at the Cape when Van Riebeeck arrived were "stragglers" from their race (p. 97). He goes to some length to show that even if domesticated animals existed in the "secluded" part of Africa for thousands of years before colonial penetration, there is no chance that the Africans domesticated them - but he has no difficulty in accepting a 19th century claim that slavery was indigenous to that region, without any reference to possible Egyptian, Arabic or European influence upon that institution (Ch. 19). The superficiality of his 19th century sources, to say nothing of their Victorian prejudices, is manifested in endless examples. "Circular huts were generally grouped without system" (p. 370).

"Although apparently there was nowhere any formulated ethical system transmitted to congregations by persons corresponding to clergymen, bound together as ministers of a church, yet moral ideas must somehow have been inculcated in most of the tribes" (p. 384). Cannibalism is found in various places - among the Azande, for example, according to a report taken from a neighbouring group (p. 392). Baker does not appear to have checked this allegation against Evans-Pritchard's detailed ethnography - which would tend to contradict it. When referring to their cannibalism, the "Monbuttu" (Mangbetu) are clearly "Negrid", but within a few pages, when reference is made to their unusually high intelligence, they are found to have an alleged "Europid" element in their make up (p. 393).

The final section of the book is devoted to an attempt to demonstrate the association between "race" and "cognitive ability" - an exercise which presents no great difficulty if one is intent on presenting such a case. Alas, obstinate facts continue to obtrude, demanding that the simplistic theory advanced by Baker shall be modified far beyond Baker's own interest or ability. The initial weakness is immediately apparent. "It is not to be supposed that genes conferring
genuine 'superiority' of any sort, if such exist, would be easily susceptible to genetic analysis" (p. 426) - but that qualification does not lead Baker to question the thesis of "racial" superiority. "Mongolid" children apparently have less ability in mathematics than "Europids" in their early years at school, but subsequently develop a superior ability. American "Negrid" girls appear to have a higher I.Q. than boys of the same "ethnic taxon", while exceptionally gifted young "Negrids" failed to fulfil the academic expectations of them later in life (p. 499). The elusive "polygenes" which govern intelligence appear to have remarkable political qualities - telling different stories at different times! Even language, that most subtle and complex of intellectual systems, is called in to support the thesis of Europid superiority: "the full and correct use of these (prepositions) is a good indication of intelligence in speakers of the Romance and English languages" (p. 502). The confusion between race and culture could be presented no better than Baker thus presents it. The conclusion of the section smacks of a more calculated dishonesty "....the character of organisms....are the result of interplay between genetic and environmental causes, and (that) in some cases (e.g. eye colour and cognitive ability) the former prevails in a wide variety of circumstances" (p. 503). The association between genes and eye colour is unquestionable, and Baker knows it. The association between "polygenes" and "cognitive ability" depends upon the validity of an unsubstantiated hypothesis and the manner in which "cognitive ability" is defined and measured. To associate eye colour and cognitive ability in the manner in which he has done so in the quotation above, cannot be viewed, from Baker's own explanation of genetics, to be anything other than a calculated effort to deceive.

Baker's final effort to convince us of the superiority of the Europids involves him in a naive acceptance of Victorian social evolutionism as spelled out by L.H. Morgan. "Civilisation" is defined in terms of those aspects of material culture, technology, social organisation, intellectual and artistic traditions associated with late liberal Victorianism and all other societies can then be evaluated in terms of how far they conform to the "civilised" ideal. The less desirable concomitants of "civilisation", such as gross economic inequality and exploitation, militant imperialism and genocide are not included in the list of aspects of civilised society.

One is left at the end of the volume with the sort of questions that might be left with the readers of this review. Why should a reputable zoologist take it upon himself to trespass in fields right outside his competence and so crown his career with notoriety rather than the sober respect of his colleagues? Why should a reputable publisher handle a work so riddled with inaccuracy and prejudice? Why should a reviewer take trouble to refute such nonsense? Perhaps the answer lies in that dialogue which Hitler brought to a temporary end by seizing the political power necessary to translate the theories into practice. The drive to compete, to dominate, to prove oneself superior, is an aspect of much of the northern European culture which is educated into those who have espoused it. For a few generations it seemed to provide the bearers of that culture with major competitive advantages over the rest of mankind. Individuals, social systems, resources, were destroyed with a reckless abandon in pursuit of those cultural goals, and for the winners it was fun - the golden age of European imperialism,
joyous Edwardian decadence for those with the resources to enjoy it. But it is over now, save perhaps in isolated parts of what were the great colonial empires and in parts of southern Africa. Those who seek to maintain or revive the ideological justification for that cultural tradition, however academically innocent their profession, must be aware of what they are doing and the hostility that they will arouse among the victims of that tradition. The hostility should not, of course, deter scholars from making their studies, nor publishers from disseminating them, but the scholarship demanded from those engaged in such exercises must be of the very highest order. Race' falls far short of such a demand and reflects ill upon the responsibility of the publishing house as well as upon the integrity of the author.

M.G. Whisson.

'Alero loro' is a familiar Yoruba saying translated into English as the jingle, 'Health is wealth'. The struggle to keep one's family fit, even to keep infants alive during their critical first years, can be harrowing in this tropical environment ridden with malaria and numerous infectious diseases. A significant contribution to anthropology could be made by a study of the guiding concepts in this search for well-being, the variety of methods and medicines used by Yoruba practitioners, and the complex system of esoteric knowledge transmitted from generation to generation without the written word. Magical Medicine: A Nigerian Case-study appears to make a start in this direction. The author, Una Maclean, a medical doctor (now professor of community medicine at the University of Edinburgh) spent seven years in Ibadan where she conducted research on cancer and traditional medicine as well as writing discerning articles on such topics as the plays of Wole Soyinka. Despite her long professional experience and her sympathy with local culture, this example shows clearly the wide division in theoretical foundations between medical sociology and social anthropology.

Only the surface manifestations of the various types of medical problems and treatments are described. Explanations are offered in "objective" terms, including a sprinkling of phrases from functional anthropology. ('It was stated earlier that in most respects the traditional practitioners' function is to restore social order...') Dr. Maclean states in passing that Yoruba medicine has behind it a body of knowledge, yet she fails to understand the crucial point that an investigation of such inherited wisdom must start with indigenous classifications of disease symptoms, causes, and treatment--classifications which have many dimensions and cannot possibly be charted against those of Western medicine. Her approach, unfortunately, is to consider the data entirely within the conceptual grid of Western scientific categories; hence her title implying 'ours' is science, 'theirs' is magic.

Some of her assertions are misleading:

In Yoruba belief, witches are always female, deriving their power from Eshu. Incorporating all the worst features of their sex, witches emasculate and weaken men, who are dependent upon women for pleasure and for offspring. (41-42).

Witches are always female? Only if the English word is considered to be female gender, in which case the proposition is of the same order as 'heroines are always female'. Although in Yoruba land witchcraft fears and accusations are expressed predominantly in terms of women, there are Yoruba words for both female (aje) and male (ọsọ), often translated as witches and wizards. (An Ifa priest told me the proportion was about 10 women to one man.) And, while evil practices receive by far the greatest attention, those involved in witchcraft are said to be capable of extended powers of both good and evil. Yoruba ideas about witchcraft are thus woven in subtle opposition into a far more complex conceptual framework than Dr. Maclean's discussion allows.

She appears unaware of the importance of indigenous linguistic categories. For example, in the introductory section she describes the role of Shopanna, the god who is said to cause small-pox epidemics and
other serious physical and mental illnesses, yet in her analysis of 'sickness behaviour in the homes of Old Ibadan' she translates the word 'shopanna' literally as 'small-pox'. Although widespread vaccination campaigns have made small-pox rare in Ibadan, she accounts for the dread of this disease by the epidemic in 1957, still within recent memory. But to the Yoruba shopanna is a much wider classification than its literal translation; it includes various skin diseases and madness - all the illnesses attributed to the orisa (god). The intense fear continues, then, not only because there was a devastating outbreak of small-pox in the recent past but also because instances of shopanna in the wider meaning of the word are still occurring.

Dr. Maclean's approach in considering empirical observations as prime evidence rather than examining Yoruba categories is demonstrated in her description of medical practitioners. She points out that there are two classes: the onishegun, who are primarily herbalists, and the babalawo, priests of the Ifa cult 'who specialize in divination followed by a type of psychotherapy'. And she adds the warning:

But it would be wrong to exaggerate the division between the two, since a great deal of overlap in their functions is constantly occurring, the diviners using herbs in most treatments whilst practitioners who deal as a rule in herbal medicine may resort to simple methods of divination upon occasion. (75-76)

However much the treatments and the mud-walled consulting rooms of an onishegun and a babalawo may appear similar, Yoruba classifications place them in separate and distinct categories. The onishegun ('owner of medicine') treats minor illnesses with herbal remedies, while the babalawo ('father of mysteries') is skilled not only in the range of herbal medicines but also in the arduous discipline of the Ifa oracle. The difference is one of kind, not of degree. Like the onishegun, the babalawo is a herbalist; in addition he is doctor, psychiatrist, philosopher, priest and diviner, interpreter of destiny and guardian of the ancient secret knowledge.

The central significance of the Ifa oracle is not recognized. This is the complex system of divination based on a series of mathematical permutations and found in varying forms throughout West Africa. She accurately describes the two methods used in divining, but states, 'there are a total of 256 verses' (33). In fact, there are 16 times that many. The figures during the divining designate 16 principal sections of ritual poetry called odu, which again have 16 subdivisions, each of which has 16 verses (a total of 4,096). Some of these verses of Odu are highly symbolic poems with multiple levels of meaning, others are long narrative prose pieces telling the foundation of particular Yoruba towns or relating the acts of the gods, still others have to do with healing by herbal prescriptions accompanied by appropriate sacrifices. The Ifa oracle thus serves to structure a vast corpus of Yoruba knowledge in a form that can be transmitted through the discipline of memory from one generation of Ifa priests to the next. These thousands of verses of Odu are sometimes called the 'unwritten scriptures' of the Yoruba. At present they are being recorded by the Institute of African Studies, University of Ibadan, and the completed project is expected to be a twenty-volume encyclopaedia of Yoruba religion and medicine, history and philosophy, myths, folktales, proverbs and poetry.

This is undoubtedly a difficult and elusive area of human experience: the quest for health, the warding off of misfortune, the treatment of illness. Dr. Maclean's research was extensive, but her methods
are open to question. For example, she describes one of her surveys (conducted by a Yoruba interpreter):

The hundred healers who were interviewed came from all over Ibadan and they were discovered by a kind of snowball sampling method; when one person had been found and visited in a certain district, inquiries were made as to others practising in the area. In this way an eventual wide sweep of the town was accomplished. (76)

For more than one reason the 'snowball sampling method' would appear to be unsatisfactory in this tropical environment! She gives carefully-wrought statistics about the types of practitioners in the survey, their ages, who they learned from, what proportion were natives of Ibadan and what proportion were migrants; but these percentages cannot be thought of as other than a detailed description of the 'snowballed' group. Had a more sophisticated technique been used, then the sample might be considered representative of the total number of Ibadan's traditional healers. Yet any questionnaire, however expertly devised and executed, has limited scope. Most anthropologists would agree that intensive personal work with a few selected babalawo affords the possibility of deeper insights. For example, by observing traditional specialists in their daily treatment of mental patients and discussing the symptoms, the Canadian psychiatrist Raymond Prince was able to document the Yoruba classification of mental illnesses. (He also found that these traditional healers have been treating psychiatric patients for perhaps centuries with the powerful sedative, rauwolfia, a drug introduced into Western treatment only in 1949).

Two further questionnaires were administered to determine 'sickness behaviour in the homes of Old Ibadan' and 'sickness behaviour in elite Ibadan families'. The first, conducted in spoken Yoruba by university students, reached some 400 men and 106 women who were senior members of traditional households in a ward of Old Ibadan. The second was presented and answered in written English by some 162 boys and 120 girls who were pupils in the highest two forms of the city's secondary schools and whose parents were resident in Ibadan. Each of these surveys can be criticized on independent grounds, but even greater scepticism must be registered on the validity of using such uneven sources as a basis of comparison between traditional and elite families. Still the inevitable quantifications were produced as if somehow the elegance of the computations serves to refine the roughness of the method.

In the final chapter, 'The Tenacity of Traditional Medicine', she points out that it would be wrong to grant a monopoly of magical, irrational and superstitious ideas to those parts of the world called underdeveloped. Despite the general availability of medical facilities in Western societies, patients still consult herbalists, chiropractors, homeopaths, acupuncturists, faith healers and practitioners of various esoteric healing arts. Her argument becomes a criticism of Western medicine: its exaggerated emphasis on the diagnosis and cure of physical symptoms does not give sufficient attention to the social and psychological dimensions of illness. Thus when many Yorubas show a strong adherence to certain types of indigenous medicine in spite of the increasing familiarity with Western medicine, this is because in times of anxieties and stress traditional healers give attention to the spiritual states as well as the physical symptoms of patients. Nigerian medicine is changing with the times 'yet it retains the ability to supply meaningful answers to questions which are perceived as relevant by practitioner and patient alike' (155).

Her conclusions are admirable. But the analysis of the methods and the concepts of Yoruba traditional healing still awaits an anthropological study starting with a scrutiny of the Yoruba ordering of experience.

Helen Callaway.

This book was, we are told, originally presented to the University of London as a Ph.D thesis in 1971. The hardback 1974 version retains the layout of an extended exam answer, produced by an examinee who only realises just how difficult the question is when it's too late to give up and start another.

After an amount of dithering in chapter I over what exactly the book is designed to elucidate, the author sets off with the rather ill-defined intention of not only dealing with Levi-Strauss and Althusser, delineating 'structuralism' and analysing its epistemology but also of providing a case study of structuralism in action while doing so. Unfortunately none of these aims attains fruition.

Glucksmann's remarks on the "meaning and uses of the term structure" in chapter 2 are unexceptionable and the conclusion is reached that there is a considerable difference between the usage of Radcliffe-Brown and that of Levi-Strauss. The list of stock questions and concerns is trotted out, both at this stage and throughout the remainder of the book, but nothing particularly interesting and certainly nothing new is said. An impression is gained of a plan of attack fallen into considerable disrepair, and one becomes irritated by the apparent lack of control over the material in hand. For instance, Levi-Strauss spills over into chapter 2 when he already has the whole of chapter 3 assigned to him and the same questions appear time and time again with scant regard for the professed organisation of the topics.

In dealing with Levi-Strauss, Glucksmann notes that "Levi-Strauss is sometimes interpreted as an idealist .... or as a psychological reductionist without inquiring into how this comes about. Twenty-four pages later she is accusing him of "implicit psychological reductionism" and in the introduction, presumably written well after the bulk of the work, he is a physiological reductionist although one supposes that this last could be some sort of printer's error. Suffice it to say that there is nothing in Glucksmann's discussion that is likely seriously to worry Levi-Strauss.

The Althusser discussed is the one of For Marx and Reading Capital. The contents of Lenin and Philosophy are mentioned but not assimilated. As criticism of 1968-vintage Althusser, that offered by Glucksmann M. follows the path taken by Glucksmann A. (New Left Review) in attempting to highlight apparent contradictions in Althusser's work but, she fails to relate the areas of strain or to examine his key concepts in any depth. The result is a picture of Althusser's work which does make one wonder how he could have the gall to publish. Again a list of stock concerns is produced but answers provided do not go any deeper than was the case in discussing Levi-Strauss.

The chapter on structuralist epistemology is nicely balanced but does not actually have much to say about epistemology; and the final chapter's search for a distinctive structuralist problematic ends in confusion. The questions posed throughout the book could not hope to be answered in the absence of a coherent strategy, and Glucksmann's claim (which appears at the beginning and end of the book) that she is using a structuralist approach capable of dealing with the problem is simply not substantiated by the intervening pages.

The book provides a summary of the stock debates and this alone would justify its inclusion in some departmental library. It does not, however, arrive at any interesting conclusions, and its style and organisation leave a lot to be desired. I would be surprised if anyone felt the need for a personal copy.

Paul Dresch.
When confronted by a book written by someone who claims to have no sociological or anthropological background, but, 'I loved travel. I loved people,' one is inevitably hesitant about what criterion to use in an assessment. Presumably any anthropologist would be able to write an account of his years in the field for general consumption, and to make it entertaining and informative. Joyce Roper has done more than this. She has made use of her specialist training as an artist to portray the visual aspects of her experience, and the details noted are both vivid and unobtrusive. Her impressions of the people with whom she involves the reader, express the same sort of sensitivity, In addition to this the candid honesty of her reactions, her mistakes, disappointments, and criticisms, give the book an objectivity often lacking in ethnographies. The reader gets a double perspective through understanding her, and therefore the filter through which the people and events are conveyed.

The chapter titles suggest that she has arranged her book according to anthropological conventions: Ceremonies; Ramazan; Festivals; Three Clans. It is thus easy for an anthropologist looking for specific observations to make use of her information. Her three years in the village of Nar are not presented chronologically, but the feeling of continuity in rural Turkey offsets the dramatic events which happened to her friends eliminating any affectation of a 'story'.

The book is therefore neither a novel, nor an attempt at field research. As such it does not fall between two stools, but can be used as the reader wishes without any intrusive bias from the author.

As the title indicates, Miss Roper intended to give a picture of the lives of the women in this single village. In a Muslim society this division of the sexes often necessitates a one sided account in ethnographies. Recently Mayer has presented an interesting picture of the economic reorganisation of wealth through associations of women. Miss Roper conveys a much needed balance to male accounts of social and religious organisation. The leadership of certain women in religious events, perpetuating family rivalries, providing bride payments, creating new networks of economic ties with the towns, outsiders and emigrant women working in Germany, indicate a few of the ways in which the study of women's independent initiation of relations is necessary for a more complete picture of the society.

Beyond this she makes us aware of the accepted subservience of women. One schoolgirl was accused of 'improper advances' to the young brother of the female deputy head of the local school by a male teacher who 'hated taking orders from a woman'. 'Her father took the gun off the wall to shoot her'. Another girl was deliberately estranged from her child and husband so that her German earnings could be used for her brother's marriage.

Without sentimentality or ethnocentric feminist zeal Miss Roper presents a clear portrait of those women trying to resolve 'the conflict between the old religion and the new ideal of womanhood'. From the point of view of women's anthropology she succeeds in several ways. She deliberately exposes her subjective ethnocentric responses, and field-work mistakes. Her sympathy for the women and her growing insight into their problems and ideals enables her to observe many apparently unimportant details which later can be traced to reveal complex religious and economic associations which cut across traditional loyalties and hostilities. She deals with emotional problems of polygyny, barrenness, the fear of young brides bleeding to death, and the cruelties of female hierarchies, all of which seldom find a place in male ethnographies. Her involvement is genuine and objective, and permits her to present her people as people. This is important if we are to credit their acceptance of her, and her assessment of their behaviour and beliefs.

J.F. Blair.
This is a book by an eminent Indian author about one of the most illustrious academic figures of the nineteenth century, who in some quarters is still fondly remembered as a personal link between East and West. It is the sort of work which general readers may find very pleasing, and about which those ubiquitous, unqualified, and occasionally impressively ignorant reviewers in newspapers and intellectual weeklies will doubtless write laudatory notices. The book does not contain many inaccuracies, and some would regard it as nicely written, but it is scarcely a gain to the academic world, and Chaudhuri provides us with no justification for its appearance.

Müller was certainly an extraordinary scholar; indeed, he covered such a vast area that contemporaries and later critics have more often than not wished to rob him of entitlement to scholarly status altogether. Those who were looking forward to a revealing intellectual biography will be severely disappointed: Chaudhuri is not 'except incidentally' concerned with discussing or evaluating Müller's ideas. This is just an account of the life of an academic, and this, one would have thought, was totally redundant in view of the Life and Letters produced by Müller's widow in 1902—a work which is not only approximately three times as long as Chaudhuri's, but also far superior in organization. There is virtually nothing new in this recent biography save opinionated outbursts by Chaudhuri on Victorian Oxford, Victorian love affairs, and sundry other remarks that look like afterthoughts on his own autobiography.

The book which Chaudhuri originally wrote was apparently rather fuller than that eventually published. To render it a commercial proposition it has been abridged by another hand. Chaudhuri expresses satisfaction with the manner in which this was carried out, but the result seems awkwardly unbalanced. Some sections strike one as being quite unnecessary and self-indulgent, while several vital episodes in Müller's academic life which Chaudhuri's access to unpublished materials should have illuminated, are passed over very swiftly. This book may have been 'in press' for a longer period of time than is usual, but Chaudhuri seems reluctant to cite recent publications by others on Müller—he may even be unaware of the fact that there is actually considerable contemporary interest precisely in Müller's ideas.

The book contains a bibliographical appendix which not only contains several errors but is also severely deficient. Scholars will find this work the less helpful in view of the fact that Chaudhuri does not normally provide references to the literature he is quoting.

Malcolm Crick.
SHORTER NOTICES


This is the first of three reprints of Mills' Naga ethnographies. The first edition of this work appeared in 1926, so one cannot complain if its anthropological style is rather old-fashioned. Like a number of government anthropologists Mills assembled large amounts of material, and presented them as simply as possible. The results are an excellent source-book, detailed without being pedantic. The reprint will be welcome to all those interested in the area, or anyone looking for raw data on which to base a piece of library research.


Integrating a translation of oral literature with an account of tribal life in general, Archer succeeds more perhaps than any anthropologist in conveying the importance of that literature. Literature is not, or should not be, separated from the process of living, and perhaps only a rather romantic author could provide us with an account in terms of this interpenetration. The book has weaknesses and lacunae, but they are easily forgiven; if for no other reason, then at least for the large number of excellent photographs.


A contribution to the current spate of American slave literature examining the ambiguous role of freedmen in early 19th century Barbados. Strong on politics and demography, not so strong on ideology.


Ardener, Shirley 'A Note on 'Mooning' and 'Streaking' as Forms of Non-violent Protest'. No.1, pp. 54-57.
Blair, Juliet 'An Apparent Paradox in Mental Evolution'. No.2, pp. 118-125.
Cantor, Martin 'The Meaning of Life and the Meaning of Words: The Works of I.A. Richards.' No.1, pp. 49-53.'
Hardman, Charlotte 'Children in the Playground'. No.3, pp. 173-188.
Heelas, Paul 'Meaning and Primitive Religions'. No.2, pp. 80-91.
Maguire, Michael 'Criminology and Social Anthropology'. No.2, pp. 109-117.
Patching, Keith 'Power and the Big Man in New Guinea'. No.2, pp.92-103.
Price, David 'Nor No Witchcraft Charm Thee'. No.1, pp.22-31.
Reynolds, Vernon 'Can There Be an Anthropology of Children? A Reply'. No.1, 32-38.
Taylor, Mike 'The Consciousness of Consciousness'. No.3, pp.148-150.

BOOK REVIEWS
Henson, H. British Social Anthropologists and Language: A History of Separate Development, by Crick, M. no.1, pp.64-5.
Shorter, A. African Culture and the Christian Church: An Introduction to Social and Pastoral Anthropology, by Williams, D. and Steemers, J.C. no.1, pp.61-64.