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© Journal
EDITORIAL NOTE

The idea for this Journal has come from the graduate students at the Institute of Social Anthropology in Oxford. Papers given at graduate seminars and ideas arising from work for diplomas and higher degrees very often merit wider circulation and discussion without necessarily being ready for formal publication in professional journals. There obviously exists a need in social anthropology for serious critical and theoretical discussion; JASO sees this as its main purpose. The Oxford University Anthropological Society established a Journal Subcommittee to organise the venture.

This ninth issue completes the third year of the Journal. Our publication now has an international circulation, and we should like to express our thanks to those who have assisted in its production and those who have given us encouragement in our enterprise.

FORMAT

We shall produce one issue per term (three per year). Articles are welcome from students in all branches of anthropology and from people in other disciplines interested in social anthropology. Comments will also be welcome. For the present, it is preferred that the main emphasis should be on analytical discussion rather than on description or ethnography. Papers should be as short as is necessary to get the point over. As a general rule, they should not exceed 5,000 words. For future issues, papers should be submitted following the conventions for citations, notes and references used in the A.S.A. monographs. Communications should be addressed to the Journal Editors, Institute of Social Anthropology, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford.

BACK ISSUES

We have a stock of back issues still unsold. Single issues are available at 30p. in the U.K. and $1 abroad. Complete volumes (I (1970), II (1971) and III (1972)) are each available at the following rates: U.K. - 75p. to individuals, £1 to institutions; abroad £2.50 to individuals, £3 to institutions. The subscription for Vol. IV (1973) is the same. (All prices cover postage). Cheques should be made out to the Journal of the Anthropological Society of Oxford, and sent to the Journal Editors at 51 Banbury Road.
I suppose that we may regard Marie-Jean-Antoine-Nicolas Caritat, Marquis de Condorcet, born in Picardy, as the last of the 'philosophes'. He wrote much, mostly on mathematics, and on political and social topics, and the only one of his writings which has any particular interest for us is the one I am going to speak about. Condorcet played a considerable part in the public life of France of his time. He was a strong supporter of the Revolution but fell foul of the Jacobins and had to go into hiding. When he emerged from it he was arrested; and he was found dead in his cell on the following morning; it is uncertain whether it was suicide. He was a pupil of Turgot, an 'homme éclairé'; and he supported all the liberal programmes of his time and was a believer in the perfectibility of man. He was especially hostile to religion, and to priests; he would go into a frenzy about them - ignorant, hypocritical, greedy, corrupt, depraved.

Now we come to the Esquisse. There are different versions of this book. I have used that edited by O. H. Prior. In commenting on it, I would like it to be kept in mind that it was written with speed and in the difficult circumstances of his concealment. It is typical of 18th century writers about social institutions; and especially significant for us in that it was a lamp that guided Comte through the dark. All peoples about whom we know, Condorcet tells us, fall somewhere between our present degree of civilization and what we are told about savage tribes. There is a chain which leads from the first peoples known to us and the present nations of Europe. For the earliest period we have to rely on what travellers tell us. There has in fact to be a good measure of conjecture about the cultural steps which mankind took towards a higher state, so we must make theoretical observations of a logical and deductive sort; bearing in mind that the great difference between man and other animals, who are in many respects like him, living in a regular and continuous society, is that man has culture (language especially, also some morality and social order). After this we have historical, documentary, sources. But we have to combine the histories of different peoples to get a general view of the progress of mankind as a whole. So, in the Esquisse he presents to us, in the 18th century manner, a sketch or plan for a universal history, less of events or about individuals, though a few names are scattered here and there, than of the development of ideas and institutions from the beginnings of human society to the French Revolution. It is a history of thought, and he engages in it by a classification of the social and cultural stages, or states, through which man has passed in his progress (and emphasis should be placed on that word). But if the form is historical the content is sociological.

Condorcet, like many of his contemporary writers, was much impressed, as indeed he had a right to be, by the progress of physics, brought about by mathematics; and he advocated the use of quantitative methods in the study of social facts. There was to be a new science, "la mathématique sociale". He thought that knowledge of what he believed to the laws of history would give us the keys to the future. His outlook was I suppose what some people might call more scientific than that of most of the social
philosophers of his time; and he certainly had a good understanding of scientific methods and techniques.

But let us pursue the book. In the first stage, men are united into peoples - small societies of families subsisting by hunting and fishing and with only a simple, crude technology and what he called science, but with language and some moral ideas. Custom had the place of law and there was embryonic government. There was little time for reflection and there was little division of labour. Men at this stage were already corrupted by superstition - he is off on his old horse again - and those with a rudimentary knowledge of arts and religion became leaders. These were the first priests, or claratans or sorcerers. Like most writers of the time Condorcet speculated on the origins of class and government.

The second stage is from pastoralism to agriculture. Pastoralism gave a more abundant and assured food supply and hence greater leisure. So there followed an increase in knowledge and the arts, and also differences in wealth and the employment of labour and slavery (the labour of a man was now worth more than the keeping of him). Also, the greater variety of things used and their unequal distribution produced commerce, which necessitated currency. Increase in the means of life led to increase of population, which in turn led to greater complexity in social life. Some peoples have remained in this stage owing to climate, habit, love of independence, conservatism, laziness, or superstition.

We may here pause to make some comments. (1) He gives no examples of societies in these stages. (2) His classification of social types is on criteria of production and productive relations. (3) He demonstrates logically, if not empirically (or thinks that he does) how certain changes in social institutions inevitably follow changes in modes of production. (4) He gives, as did others of his time, chief place in social evolution to property, from which follow leisure, government, commerce, currency, etc.

The third stage is from the beginnings of agriculture to the invention of alphabetic script - to Condorcet a most important invention, for it more or less rendered, especially when printing was later invented, what he called superstition impossible. Agriculture attached men to the soil and hence there was greater stability and continuity in social life. Ownership became more distinct, as did capital also, in that the yield of cultivation gave a surplus. Division of labour now took place and specialised crafts and economic functions resulted. Commerce was also extended and there was a general cultural development. To the three classes that we can already distinguish in pastoral societies - owners, domestics attached to them, and slaves - we have now to add labourers of all kinds, and merchants, and as new institutions arose or old ones developed, there was need for more extensive legislation; and all sorts of other progressive changes began to creep in at this stage, e.g. in the manner of educating children, in the relation between the sexes, and in political institutions. The power of leading families increased and their excesses and extortions brought about revolutions and the establishment of republics or tyrannies. An agricultural people who had been conquered could not abandon their land but had to work it for their
masters, so we get various forms of domination. He makes another sound observation when he says that communication between peoples much accelerated their progress through cultural borrowing; and, though war and conquest may ultimately lead to cultural decline, they at first often bring about expansion of the arts and serve to improve them. Arts and sciences made slow progress, the progress being due to certain families and castes having made them the foundation of their power to exploit the common people (like St. Simon and Comte, Condorcet recognised the value at a certain time of what he disapproved of, and was later to be inappropriate and become decadent). The other stages are historical ones and Condorcet abandons speculation at this point. He describes the main phases of the history of thought in Europe. They are: stage IV, the progress of human thought in Greece to the division of the sciences about the time of Alexander; stage V, progress of the sciences from their division to their decadence (the period of Aristotle) - the decadence was due, as Gibbon also informs us, to Christianity, which was hostile to all spirit of inquiry, and to the Barbarians; stage VI, the decadence of enlightenment ('lumières') to their restoration about the time of the crusades; stage VII, the first progress of the sciences after their restoration in the west to the invention of printing, which finally made the persistence of superstition impossible, scepticism being spread too far and wide; stage VIII, from the invention of printing to the time when science and philosophy broke the back of authority; stage IX, from Descartes to the formation of the French Republic; stage X, a vision of the future progress of the human mind ('esprit').

There is no need to discuss his comments on these historical changes in detail. We may note, however, that he showed acumen in his selection of them and also in the accidiological features he considered to be most significant of each, e.g. much progress was made in Greece because there the priests had no monopoly of learning; the crusades were favourable to liberty in that they weakened and impoverished the nobles and extended the contacts of European peoples with the Arabs which had already been formed in Spain and through the commerce of Pisa, Genoa and Venice; the invention of printing led to a strong and free public opinion which could not be stifled; the fall of Constantinople to the Turks brought the original writings of Aristotle and Plato to the scholars of Europe; the discovery of America had, among other consequences, the advantage that it was then possible to study many new and different types of society (he did not mention particular primitive societies but it is evident that he had read what had been written about them in his day); the use of vernacular languages in the place of Latin in all branches of philosophy and science rendered them easier for the common people to master but made them more difficult for the savant to follow their general advance.

A few concluding observations may be in place. (1) I would say that Condorcet was primarily a polemical writer and a social reformer who stood up to privilege and exploitation wherever he found them. He talked much about science but as a student of cultural history he was not, I think we may say, a very deep scholar - what he wrote about the Middle Ages displayed bias and left much to be desired in scholarship. Nevertheless, he is rightly regarded as a precursor of sociology and social anthropology in that he was speaking of social institutions and the history of thought rather than of political events in the narrow sense, or of persons, and in a scientific, comparative way. He held that 'The sole foundation of belief in the natural sciences is this idea, that the general
laws, known or not known, which rule the phenomena of the universe, are necessary and constant; and for what reason would this sentiment be less true for the development of the intellectual and moral faculties of man, than for the other operations of nature? (p. 203).

Like his contemporaries he saw these laws as laws of cultural and concomitant social development or progress, and an essential feature of culture is that, in spite of backslidings, it is cumulative — a boy leaving school today knows more of mathematics than Newton knew. The laws have therefore to be formulated in terms of stages ('époques') in each of which various social changes give rise to new needs ('besoins') which in their turn bring about further changes. And though these changes may be associated in our minds with individuals, who may even give their names to an epoch, great social changes make them and not they the changes. Descartes was an important figure no doubt but his importance is in his being a sign and product of, and a link in, a great movement in the history of thought — a way of looking at things akin to that of the Marxists. When Condorcet talks about the invention of printing he does not tell us its date or who the inventor was, for the only interest it has for him is that it was the culmination of social changes in one epoch and the cause of social changes in the next. And all this meant, to him at least, that a general theory could be formulated and furthermore that the history of any particular people could only be understood in the light of such theoretical knowledge based on universal history.

(2) The study of social facts must be by observation of actual relations. The religion of books is not the same as that of the people. Law and its execution are quite different things. So are the principles of government and its actualities. So is any institution as imagined by its creators and how it works in practice. He here foreshadows social surveys and fieldwork.

(3) Social facts must be studied in relation to each other as functioning parts of a total social system ('système social') — e.g. the progress of science in any country depends on natural circumstances, political and social conditions, forms of religion and government, economic circumstances, etc. All parts of a social system are interdependent and necessarily so.

(4) Condorcet was a great believer in applied social science ('art social'), which will derive from a theoretical science of society. 'In the same way as the mathematical and physical sciences serve to make perfect the arts employed for our most elementary needs, is it not equally in the necessary order of nature that the progress of the moral and political sciences should exercise the same action on the motives which control our sentiments and our actions?' (p. 227) In other words greater knowledge invariably and inevitably leads to the cumulative amelioration of mankind. Perhaps he was over-optimistic; but his star 'brille encore. Elle brillera toujours.'

E. E. Evans-Pritchard.
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Social Meaning and the Conditions for its possibility.

My purpose in this paper is to give a general account of social meaning and of the conceptually necessary conditions for its possibility. Because of the time available, I have not been able to argue in a comprehensive fashion for the numerous claims made herein, but have concentrated by attention on the most central theses.

In order to give direction to our enquiries, I shall propose a schema which I shall employ in the analysis of any meaning phenomena. These can be thought of as three components of the meaning act, that is, any act involving the expression, ascription or comprehension of meaning. The empirical basis for this distinction lies in the three senses of the term "meaning" which we distinguish in communication. We speak of (1) the meaning of sentence S, (2) the meaning of the sentence S when uttered in a particular context and (3) what the speaker meant by uttering S. Thus we have meaning characterized as (i) independent of a particular person or context (ii) as dependent on context (iii) as dependent on the particular person. Any adequate theory of meaning must account for these three senses of the term.

My procedure will be to introduce four components of the meaning act and to argue for this categorization partly directly and partly indirectly by relying on its usefulness in explanation. My claim is that everything to which we ascribe meaning can be encompassed in this scheme:

1. The Conceptual component is the primary psychological counterpart of the meaning - it is therefore an essential component of any ascription of meaning, whether this be to "public" phenomena such as utterances or actions or to "private" phenomena such as beliefs. (The cognitive processes which underlie the conceptual component are clearly important but beyond the scope
of this paper. For the moment, we suppose this conceptual component to be basic. Conception is conceived here as intertwined with the psychological process of thinking. The emotive-expressive component becomes important when discussing meaning in such symbols as artistic works or ritual acts. Here, to understand the meaning may involve having certain emotions. Notice that in most cases, we have a conceptual component as well as emotive component when we speak of the meaning of such symbols. I believe that the purely emotive case - if it existed - would not constitute a meaning act. A purely emotional experience to which no conceptual content is ascribed, would not be meaningful.

(2) The symbolization component is the set of symbols which are used to express the conceptual component, that is, the specific thought or judgment. These symbols can be said to signify the conceptual component. I shall argue that the symbol chosen may be individual or social. Note that the symbolization act(s) may also reflect the emotional component of the meaning. This may be done by the use of a particular symbol or by the way that symbol is uttered.

(3) A contextual or referential component: one may understand the meaning of a sentence without thereby understanding what is said - for this may depend on the reference of the demonstratives, both within the context of the account and the objective context of communication. The sentence "The old lady is not very easily fooled" may have different truth conditions according to, for example, the pointing gestures in the communication (i.e. whether the speaker points to herself or someone else) or according to its relations to other sentences in an account, as in a fictional story.

Note that the conceptual and emotional components exist within the person and hence are dependent for their existence on the existence of persons. Thus in the communication situation, the primitive meaning accrues to the speaker and is induced in the hearer, via the mediation of social signs. In other words, the thought or belief in the speaker, after the use of signs, excites similar conceptual pattern in the hearer.

My claim is that all meaning acts involve the conceptual component and therefore this is the primitive component of meaning. However, I do not consider it to be logically necessary, though it may be an empirical fact, that all meaning involves symbolization. The schema, as presented above, is not complete until we have differentiated between types of symbols. Now, various thinkers in this century have argued against the view that meaning is limited to language and have claimed that it extends to a vast array of phenomena. Thus Cassirer says in *Symbolic Forms* -

"When the physical sound, distinguished as such only by pitch and intensity and quality, is formed into a word, it becomes an expression of the finest intellectual and emotional distinctions. What it immediately is, is thrust into the background by what it accomplishes with its mediation, by what it "means". No work of art can be understood as the simple scene of these elements, for in it a definite law, a specific principle of aesthetic formation are at work. The synthesis by which the consciousness combines a series of tones into the unity of a melody, would seem to be
totally different from the synthesis by which a number of syllables is articulated into the unity of a "sentence". But they have one thing in common, that in both cases the sensory particulars do not stand by themselves; they are articulated into a conscious whole, from which they take their qualitative meaning).

Similarly, Saussure in linguistics, Piaget in child psychology, Levi-Strauss in anthropology, Harre and Secord in social psychology (The Explanation of Social Behaviour: 1972) have pointed to disparate phenomena to which meaning extends. Piaget argues in Structuralism -

"since Saussure and many others, we know that verbal signs exhibit only one aspect of the semiotic function and that linguistics is only a limited though especially important segment of that more inclusive discipline which Saussure wanted to establish under the name of "general semiology". The symbolic or semiotic function comprises, besides language, all forms of imitation: mimicking, symbolic play, mental imaging, and so on ... How otherwise could we explain that deaf-mute children (those, that is, whose brain has not been damaged) play-at make believe, invent symbolic games and a language of gestures?"

It has also been generally recognised that the tokens we use in expressing meaning also originate from various sources. Some are conventional signs, having meaning for any member of the linguistic community. Others are totally subjective, signifying meaning only to the individual employing them. Still other tokens have meaning only within a small community of initiates.

Saussure develops three categories of tokens - (i) the index, which is causally connected to that which it signifies. (There is the same ontological priority here as is found in Grice's category of natural meaning.) (ii) the symbol which is individually motivated e.g., as in dream symbolism, and both these are differentiated from (iii) the sign which is arbitrary and conventional. As against this, Piaget offers a distinction between signs (which "depend upon implicit or explicit agreements based on custom") and symbols ("which may be of individual origin as in symbolic play or dreams"). But for Piaget these two are not distinct categories but "the two poles, individual and social of the same elaboration of meanings". I shall take up this suggestion that we think of the plethora of meanings in terms of a continuum.

However, I believe Piaget's characterisation to be inadequate. For, we may ask, where does what Saussure calls the index fit into his dimension of meanings. A more serious problem is that at his individual pole he has lumped together two distinct forms of symbolism, namely, (i) the case where a person chooses an individual symbol to represent his meaning and (ii) the case where a person unconsciously selects a symbol, as in dreams. The difference between the unconscious symbolisation and the conscious choosing of a symbol by the individual is surely critical. Dream symbolisation is mysterious precisely because there are questions of interpretation by the dreamer himself. On the other hand, it is generally the case that the symbolic artist is aware of that which he is symbolizing and of choosing the specific symbols he uses.
This suggests a four-fold distinction which can be represented in terms of a continuum of symbolization thus -

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>objective sign</th>
<th>socially chosen sign</th>
<th>individually chosen symbol</th>
<th>unconsciously selected symbol</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(causally connected to that which is signified)</td>
<td>(e.g. language)</td>
<td>(e.g. aspects of symbolism in art)</td>
<td>(e.g. dreams)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

We can characterize the above continuum in terms of the extent to which it depends on a particular individual for its meaning. Thus the meaning of the objective sign is determined by its objective cause. It is common to many cultures and depends on recognizing the relevant causal conditions. The socially chosen sign depends for its meaning on more than one individual and is, by definition, possible only in a social situation. The individually chosen symbol is consciously selected by the individual, and only has the meaning ascribed to it by that individual. However the conceptual content which the person signifies by use of that symbol may be dependent on other persons in that the individual would not have gained these concepts without other persons. Thus, when an artist uses aspects of nature to represent his thoughts on the social situation, his symbol is individual but the existence of the conceptual content signified depends on the fact that there are other persons. The unconscious symbol has its meaning dependent entirely on the individual. This may also be true of the symbolic play found in young children.

In postulating this categorization, I have not begged the question against such thinkers as Levi-Strauss and Jung who respectively see a social and objective meaning in unconscious symbolism. For I have not rejected the possibility that unconscious symbolism may reflect aspects of conscious symbolism or even some form of innate symbolism. What is important is that the immediate basis of the meaning of the symbol is the unconscious mind, whatever the ultimate source of the symbolism may be. My characterization does, however, seem to rule out Jung's claims regarding the existence of the so-called collective unconscious. In fact, it only rules out the extreme interpretation of this as a suprapersonal entity - and even if this latter claim were to be substantiated, the schema could easily be amended to accommodate this fact.

Notice that the above four are different poles in the continuum - any use of symbols need not fall solely into one of these types but may be at an intermediate point in the continuum. Thus we can have a symbol which is used by a small group of persons and conveys meaning only to them. This would fall at an intermediate point (say P) on the spectrum. The four poles (and intermediate points) along the continuum of symbolization can be represented in terms of our earlier schema. Consider, first, the case of the individually chosen meaning. Here, we have the individual's primitive meaning being symbolized by the use of an individually chosen symbol - one that is not conventionally used to signify that meaning in society. In fact, the symbols used need not, though they may, have meaning for anyone but the individual employing them.
The case of the socially chosen symbol can be represented within the schema. But, in this case, the signs have a meaning which is independent of the individual; this is not to say that their meaning is independent of all persons. On this view, social meaning arises from the use of conventionally agreed signs to represent primitive meaning. Thus we can say: A set of signs has a social meaning only in the case when it is consistently used by a group of persons to signify the same conceptual content (or specific primitive meaning).

We can now give an account of how communication takes place. We can think of this in terms of a series of steps -

(i) the speaker formulates his primitive meaning i.e. a particular thought or conceptual pattern.

(ii) the speaker intends to convey that meaning by uttering the social signs which he believes represent that primitive meaning.

(iii) the relevant set of signs is uttered

(iv) the hearer apprehends the uttered signs

(v) these signs evoke the primitive meaning patterns with which they are associated.

Notice: (a) I am pursuing the principle that whatever is in the speaker which allows him to formulate his meaning must have a counterpart in the hearer which allows him to understand the meaning; (b) it is not a necessary consequence that the same specific meaning of the speaker will be induced in the hearer. This will occur in cases of perfect communication. But the system is liable to break down in at least two places - both involving a disparity between the primitive meaning and the meaning of the uttered signs. These are the case where there is a difference between the speaker's meaning and the meaning of the signs he uses to convey that meaning and the case where there is a difference between the actual social meaning of the signs and the primitive meaning they evoke in that particular hearer. In cases where there is misinterpretation of signs in this way, an appeal to other persons in order to establish the actual social meaning of the signs is likely.

The full meaning of the speech act is given by taking all three components of it into account. In communication, we are all aware of the possibility of what is called misinterpretation. The frequency of clarifications in communication illustrates the importance of making distinctions such as those in our schema. Thus in giving the full meaning of a socially meaningful utterance we must (a) give the conventional meaning of the signs, (b) admit the possibility that the speaker's meaning may differ from the meaning of the uttered signs and take account of this and (c) take account of the role of the context of utterance.

I shall not be able to present arguments for the thesis I shall now propose, but the case - as one similar to it - has been argued by Kant and to a lesser degree by Strawson. It is a necessary condition for the level of conception, which allows a being to think propositionally and to link such propositions
together in thought, to be achieved that that being be self-conscious and hence, in my terms, a person. I am not arguing that self-consciousness is a precondition of all conception, only of the level described above. This level of conception is significant because it is a necessary condition of language. There are two defining characteristics which I use for self-conscious being (i) the being must be capable of ascribing all of its experiences to itself as its experiences (following Kant and Strawson) and (ii) the being must be capable of some action at will (following Hampshire and Shoemaker). It is a necessary condition for self-consciousness as defined that the person's experience represent an objective world and himself as being in that world. This requires that he must consider himself as embodied in those particulars which allow him to act in the world.

We must now turn to the conditions for the possibility of social meaning. I shall say that we have a social meaning situation where we have a set of symbols S being employed by several persons provided that all persons use the same element of S to express similar or the same conceptual content and the adherence to this rule is due, in the most part, to interaction between those persons. We must justify the introduction of the provided that clause above. My argument here is that the two possible ways in which system S can arise and be used as above could not conceivably count as social meaning.

These two cases are (a) Suppose that the whole system S were provided innately or in some pre-programmed way. Further suppose that each individual is programmed so that he always uses the same elements of S to express his meaning. Our schema can accommodate this case as social meaning; but it cannot allow the case where we have the above conditions plus the proviso that the adherence to the above rules for expressing meaning is never due to personal interaction. To see why this would not be social meaning, consider the case where one member of this society is wrongly programmed so that he associates elements of S with meaning content other than its social meaning. In this case, the person is using a private symbolization and he has to be corrected if his utterances are to have social meaning. But in the case where personal interaction has no role in the perpetuation of the system, it would not be possible to correct him and hence he would be using a system of private symbolization. Even if it were never the case that the person needed correction, it would still be dependent on the social situation to ensure that he did not.

Case (b) is where the objective world is such that, as a causal consequence of our apprehension of it, we all come to use the same system of symbols and to employ that system in the same way to represent the same conception. But again here the perpetuation of the system must be due to social interaction - for it must be conceivable that one can be corrected. Otherwise it would not be a system of social meaning at all. All this so far has been concordant with the views of Wittgenstein - except that he wishes to make all meaning, social meaning - a thesis we must now consider.

For it would be a radical objection to our whole procedure that we have denied the private language argument and we must meet it. There are various formulations of the argument; the one which affects us most is that version which claims that no meaning and no symbolization is possible without there being a society of persons. An argument of the following kind could be applied: It is a
necessary condition for the coherent use of symbols that the person
be using that symbol in the same way on different occasions. In
order for the person to actually be using the symbol correctly, it
is necessary that there be other persons who perform the task of
correcting his mistakes. To this it might be replied that a
person could (i) rely on his memory (ii) have innate cognitive
faculties which ensure that he applies the rule correctly.
Wittgenstein could of course maintain that the person's memory is
unreliable or that the cognitive structures may change. But the
availability of other persons does not ensure continuity - for all
the persons in the group could have memory or cognitive failures.
What the group does is to make it more probable that mistakes
will be corrected - but it does not ensure that they will be. All
this is to deny that the availability of other persons speeds
up cognitive development - but this is a far cry from demonstrating
that meaning and symbolism would be impossible without other
persons.

The first condition for social meaning is that each person
represent himself as being in a social meaning situation. It is
a minimum prerequisite for this that the persons uses a set of
symbols $S$ such that each particular element of $S$ is ascribed a
specific primitive meaning and his continued ascription of that
meaning to that element of $S$ is conceived by him as being due to
some entity or entities - themselves capable of the ascription of
meaning - other than himself. For this to be so, the experience
of a person $X$ must be such as to represent entities which evoke a
system of symbols in certain regulated ways such that $X$ conceives
of these entities as themselves capable of thought and symbolization.
This follows from the above statement. In addition to this the
person must conceive of those entities from which the symbols
emanate as persons, as self-conscious being capable of intentional
activity. In order to do this, he must represent the spatio-
temporal (or analogous) particulars from which the symbols emanate
as part of the body of the person.

Notice that it does not necessarily follow that the entities
represented as evoking the symbols be in fact an entity capable
of the ascription of meaning, but only that the person ($X$) represent
him as such. To illustrate this case, consider the situation of
a person who finds himself in a world of robots. These robots are
controlled from a distance by a super-scientist who never appears
on the scene. The robots utter the system of symbols and proceed
to correct the person when he makes mistakes. The person comes
to ascribe to the robots the relevant cognitive ability. Yet he
is wrong in so doing, for the ability lies in one distant person.

If this first condition is necessary, then, in the human
case, a child would not be a member of the social meaning community
until he recognizes that his ascription of particular meanings to
such symbols as linguistic signs is due, at least in part, to the
intentions of other persons that he should adhere to this course.
I am not supposing that this recognition involves the entertaining
of some highly complex proposition, but I am suggesting that a con-
siderable level of cognitive development is required.

But now a form of scepticism arises. Can we ever establish
that the social meaning situation really exists, for it could be
the case that I merely represent it as existing? This is obviously a fundamental metaphysical question of the kind: Are there other persons or merely my experience of other persons? I do not pretend to give an answer here or even that an absolute answer is possible. What is clear, however, is that for purposes of communication and the achievement of ends, we must all ascribe an objectivity to persons; we must hold that they exist. Some philosophers, like Kant, have argued that we must ascribe as much existence to others as we do to ourselves. However, all we require here is that for purposes of understanding and acting in the world in which we live, we must ascribe to it an objective existence. If that world is represented as containing other persons, we must ascribe existence to them also.

Given then that an objective world with persons in interaction is a basic condition for social meaning, can we establish any further conditions or is the above sufficient? To explore this question, we require to consider the different categories of social symbolism. The three intuitively basic distinctions are (i) language (ii) action and (iii) art and other representational symbolism. These areas are different in the human case because they involve different symbols. But is this difference incidental or does it reflect a difference in function? Further, even if these are genuine categories, is it the case that any, or more than one, is necessary for social meaning to be possible?

To cope with these problems, let us consider the situation where we have a group of persons who have not yet employed any system of signs in a coordinated way. Since it is necessary that each person act in the world, we can divide his activities, at the non-personal interaction level, into two categories.

1. Those acts A which X conceives of as causally efficacious in achieving a particular end, provided that the achievement of this end does not require that other people understand that end. In fact, X can achieve this end without there being other persons available to understand it. For example, cutting a piece of wood using an axe or even constructing an axe. Notice that what we have here is a rule which X applies in achieving a particular end. The act is specified in terms of the meaning ascribed to it by X - not in terms of the actual goal achieved. I shall call such acts basic actions.

2. Those acts A' which X employs primarily for communicating his meaning to others and for the interpretation of their meaning, provided that these acts are not conceived as causally efficacious unless they are understood by those others and responded to accordingly. I entitle these "specific communication acts".

Now we must consider what is required for these two types of act to have social meaning. In the communication case, social meaning is only possible when we have X and Y using the same system of symbols in their communication acts and when each symbol has the same, or very similar, primitive meaning for both. The symbols here are specific acts, e.g. the evoking of a specific sound or the use of parts of the body in a particular way. I shall call these communication acts. But how does social meaning arise with regard to basic actions, where there is no requirement of communication.
It is clear that a basic action A has social meaning if and only if it is a rule in the particular society in which A is performed that each person perform A only when that person is attempting to achieve what within that society is conceived as a particular end and this rule is adhered to by the majority of persons in that society. We ascribe the same social meaning to a person's basic action when we suppose that he is following the rule of using that action to achieve the same end as other persons who use it provided that this end is not the communication of meaning. Because these basic actions have a social meaning, they are social symbols and I shall refer to them as "social action symbols".

We have thus explained the conceptual difference between communication symbols and social action symbols. These acts do not correspond exactly to the basic human categories of linguistic act and non-linguistic action. For some non-linguistic activities are purely communicative and therefore have the same function as linguistic acts, for example, in Britain the use by two fingers pointed in a V-sign.

The important question now is whether both these types of social meaning are necessary, or whether we can have one without the other. We can consider two cases –

(1) The hypothetical case in which we have basic action with social meaning but no communicative acts. For instance, where persons adopt a similar mode of action in achieving the same end, as when mushroom pickers adopt the rule of side-stepping to prevent one colliding with the other. Let us suppose that we have a wide range of such rules and even rules in which the participation of other persons in achieving the desired end is essential. The question is: Can we have these rules without a single act of communication being required?

Let us consider the most extraordinary case – the one in which the participation of other persons is not required in performing basic actions. Each person acts according to what he conceives to be the rule for achieving that end and he perceives that others seem to do the same. It may in fact be the case that the others do perform the same action. But can he ever know that the other persons are carrying out the same action in order to achieve the same goal. He can suppose that they are – but without communication he cannot know that they ascribe that meaning to their action. This lack of knowledge is clearly a serious matter – in fact it undermines the claim that he has social meaning. For he would have to be satisfied that their actions were attempts to achieve the same end as the end he is trying to achieve when he performs that action and he would have no way of establishing this. Yet until this is established, the actions cannot be said to have social meaning. He could be projecting his own meaning into them. This claim is reinforced when we consider that the above conditions could be satisfied by entities which were not themselves capable of ascription of meaning. In fact if all attempts to communicate were to break down, he could come to the conclusion that they were not capable of monitoring meaning.

Without communication, then, it seems that the person would have no reason to believe that all persons ascribe the same meaning to the action. It could be objected here that he could gain the
conception that he was following a rule which had been determined by the society if they corrected his misapplication of that rule. Perhaps he performs $A_1$ and is stopped and the other person performs $A_2$ and punishes him until he also performs $A_2$. But even in this primitive situation, he has to differentiate cases where he has received approval from those when there is no approval, cases where an act means "this is the right way" and another meaning "this is the wrong way". But these are communication acts. Notice that even if we admit these kinds of communication acts, we could not establish that there was social meaning until the language learnt was rich enough to allow us to articulate at least basic differences in intention.

What all this shows is that communication acts are necessary conditions for the possibility of social meaning. Further, if our last argument is right, a considerable complexity in the system of communicating symbols is necessary to establish the social meaning of basic actions beyond doubt.

But while communication is a necessary condition for social meaning, is it sufficient? This brings us to the second case - in which we have a group of persons employing the same symbols in conveying meaning but not in achieving any goal to which the same end can be ascribed. The case, as stated, does not ring true - for a very important reason. This reason is that each communication act can be considered, from one point of view, as a basic action. Every act of communication which has social meaning requires not merely the intention of the person to convey a particular meaning, but also the intention of the person to adhere to the rule which prescribes the use of those specific symbols whenever one wishes to convey that meaning. For it is theoretically possible for the person to use a different set of symbols from that which has the social meaning in attempting to communicate his meaning. The individual's adherence to this rule in achieving communication of meaning is an act which itself has meaning. My utterance of the words "the war has ended" is at the same time a communicative symbol and an adherence to the rule that I should use that communicative symbol, instead of some other symbol in communicating my meaning. Thus we can see that each individual communication act is an action having social meaning as well as a communicative symbol to which is ascribed a particular meaning. Hence the communication act is extremely important - for it requires both types of social meaning.

But, now, could it be the case that we have only one social action rule - to employ the required set of symbols when intending to communicate meaning? There are two cases here (1) The case where persons can act in the world of their experience, but yet do not conceive of themselves as acting with others, or ascribing the same meaning to their acts as others, except in the achievement of communication, and (2) the case where persons cannot act in the world as experienced except in the communication context. The latter case can be excluded at the outset - for the person must be capable of changing his point of view at will. Thus he must be capable of some non-communicative actions. Case (1) is important - for it seems that we cannot establish its necessity without considering other necessary features of persons. In fact, if it were the case that these could be a society of persons in which no
conflict arose no matter which course of action one took in attempting to achieve one's end, and in which cooperation was not relevant in achieving one's ends, then perhaps no non-communicative actions would be necessary. But notice that we have already presupposed a certain cooperation in achieving the social meaning of communication symbols. Each person follows the rule of using the specific symbol in conveying a specific meaning. In the light of this, my claim is that the modes of social interaction which are necessary for social meaning in communication are the same as are required for other forms of basic social action.

To establish this, I shall reconsider our condition of social meaning that there be several persons in interaction. Given our characterization of persons, can we say anything a priori about the modes of interaction of these persons? I have said that each person must be able to act, to express his will in the world. We can conceive of three types of limitations to the modes of action available to him in expressing his will:

(i) Limitations due to the nature of the objective world in which he finds himself and to the ways in which he can use his body. In our world, basic physical limitations.

(ii) Limitations due to his psychological powers and states. Thus he may be incapable of conceiving any alternative ways of achieving the required end. Or he may have to postpone or forego the pursuit of that end because he has other basic desires which are more urgent.

(iii) Limitations on his available courses of action which are due to the fact that there are other persons or based on his interaction with those persons. In this plurality of cases, he adjusts his modes of achieving certain ends to accommodate the fact of other persons or their demands on him.

It is this third case that we shall consider in some detail, for it is this that is central to the possibility of social meaning. I shall now introduce a conceptual framework for understanding this third case. We have supposed that each person has his own will which he is free to determine in various ways. Now it is a necessary condition for social meaning that most individuals determine their will so as to conform to a universal rule in that particular group.

I shall divide the ways in which this determination of the person's will (so as to follow the universal rule) into two basic categories, which in turn sub-divide:

(i) Self-determination, where the individual's decision to follow that universal rule is not based on the influence of other persons. There are two cases here (a) the individual decides to follow that rule because he establishes that the course prescribed is morally right or good and (b) the person decides to follow the rule because he has determined, without the influence of others, that this is the best and most appropriate way of achieving the desired ends.
(ii) Other-determination where the individual decides to follow the universal rule because he has been determined by the activities of other persons. I shall divide these into two groups, (a) positive other-determination and (b) negative other-determination.

Case (i) is the moral determination of the will. Some philosophers, like Kant, have argued that all moral decisions involve the determination of the will according to a universal rule. Thus he says in the Critique of Practical Reason: "Practical Principles are propositions which contain a general determination of the will having under it several practical rules." For Kant, these universal rules are prescribed by reason and not by other persons or external desires. Notwithstanding whether all moral decisions involve such universal rules, it is clear that moral decisions are likely to be an important determinant in choosing to follow some universal rules.

Case (ii) in which the individual pursues the universal rule because he has been determined by other persons to pursue that goal involves the exercise of power, in its broadest social sense. This importance of the concept of power has been stressed by many; for example, Bertrand Russell in his book Power says: "I shall be concerned to prove that the fundamental concept in social science is power, in the same sense in which energy is the fundamental concept of physics". I shall define power thus: "An actor A has power over B insofar as A can determine the will of B to carry out an action set down by A, provided that B would not have performed that action at that time and place if A had not determined that he should". This characterization, which applies to groups as well as individuals, is similar to, or encompasses features of, many definitions of power in the literature. Power can be divided into many forms, depending on the means employed or on the level of personal interaction. For my purposes here, I shall divide into persuasive power and coercive power forms, corresponding to positive and negative other-determination. Notice that not all exercises of power over the individual are aimed at determining him to conform to a prevalent universal rule - on the contrary the exercise of power may determine him to break such a rule - e.g. when a gangster forces a bank clerk to hand over money.

The individual can differentiate these cases of other-determination which require him to follow prevalent or newly determined universal rules and those which require him to pursue a different, possibly ad-hoc course. I shall call the group which determine what these rules are, and/or that they continue to apply, the basic power groups of the society. An individual may be a permanent member of some basic power group and hence play a part in determining the universal rules and their perpetuation, or he may be wholly excluded from such groups or he may play some part in the determination of some of the rules.

Given this conceptual framework, can we say anything a priori about which of the above conditions must hold if social meaning is to be possible, that is to say, do we need all four modes of the determination of the universal rule for there to be a social meaning, or do we need only one of these? Various philosophers
such as Rousseau and Hegel have argued that both morality and the exercise of power are necessary. But their argument is not at the same level of generality as our own, in that they are talking about human beings with a particular history whereas I am considering the case of persons in general.

Let us therefore consider the three cases at our level of generality. The first society would be one in which everyone adhered to a set of communication rules and basic action rules not because they had been coerced or persuaded to do so but merely because they felt a moral obligation to pursue those rules. This would be tantamount to a society of angels. Notice that each individual could conceive of alternative courses of action but would never pursue them. Conflicts of interest would either never arise or they would be automatically settled. Can we rule out such a case?

We need to develop it further - we must explain the origin of the rules which are here adhered to. If their origin is not in society, then the case collapses as a case of social meaning - for we require some role for personal interaction. Perhaps then they learn the rules from society and agree to adhere to each and every one because they recognize its moral worth. Further no one ever proposes a rule which is not considered as morally right. This case comes close to certain philosophers conception of utopia e.g. Hegel. What is crucial from our point of view is whether they would feel duty bound to correct someone who had departed from the path, not necessarily coerce him but persuade him to change his mind. Now it is clear that they must feel duty bound to do this; otherwise the situation cannot be said to be a social meaning one in which the social meaning rules are sustained by the participation of others. But if we admit that they would feel bound to correct such a person, then, irrespective as to whether this possibility is actualized, the universal rules can still be said to be sustained by the exercise of power - for it is exercisable in the case where the moral incentive breaks down. Thus either we must suppose that the members of the society would not act to sustain the rules - in which case the system is not a social meaning system - or they would act to exert influence on someone who broke the rules and this requires the exercise of power.

The second case is where we have only other-determination and no self-determination involved. Everyone acts because he has been either persuaded or coerced by others into following the universal rule. But persuasion can only occur when there is an appeal to morality or when there is an appeal to his interests whether these be immediate and practical or long-term and meta-physical. Coercion, on the other hand, presupposes the existence of some agreeable state which he does not wish to forfeit e.g. his life, or some disagreeable state which he does not desire, and that the other person has the ability to revoke or invoke this state. In both cases, it seems that we require either some form of morality or a series of states of affairs in which the person has an interest. If the person were not moral or had no interests at all which the other persons could affect, then it would be impossible for them to exerce power over him and to ensure that
he accords with the universal rules. In fact, it is a necessary condition of social meaning that all persons have an interest or a moral commitment to the perpetuation of communication and hence a commitment to follow the rule of using the same symbols to convey the same meaning content. Thus I wish to argue that it is a necessary condition for social meaning that there be other-determination by various persons in society and that there be either some moral commitment to at least some of the universal rules or some common self-interest factor which underlies their perpetuation.

If our account of the necessity for power relations in the maintenance of the communication system is correct, then we would expect that the set of symbols used in human linguistic communication varies more according to changes in power and prestige in society and is not entirely determined in some innate fashion. This thesis is maintained by several linguists, including Dr. Seuren in Oxford.

Finally is it a necessary condition for social meaning that the society have a history? Let us suppose that there is a series of individuals who are drawn from different English speaking societies and placed together in a geographical group. Is this not a society which has a common language and which yet has no history? The whole of this case rests on the force of the term "society" here. I do not wish to define a society as a group of individuals sharing the same system of communication. Let us call any such group a "linguistic community". Now, it is clear that we could never absolutely determine the limits of such a community, by using the system of communication as the only criterion. For it is always possible that in some other part of the universe there exists persons who use an identical system of symbolization and they would have to be included in the group. Of course, we could determine that a society is all persons in a particular spatial location who use the same system of communication. Such a definition would allow that the "society" could have no history - as in case above. But notice that even in this case it is necessary that each person recognize that the communication system they are employing has a common origin - otherwise they could not be sure that they were employing symbols in the same way and the society would require to develop a history to establish this.

Now, it is partly an arbitrary matter as to what criteria we use in determining what is or is not a society. The social group suggested above does not seem to me to be adequate - for it is possible for such a group to exist quite arbitrarily and for very short periods of time. Thus the people taking a three hour plane journey would form a society in that sense. The reason why I reject the claim that a group of persons whose only mode of interaction was communication is that such a group would be without culture. For culture requires basic social actions in the sense prescribed above. A group of persons who merely communicated but did not interact in other ways would not have the common practices which go to constitute a society. Nor could it be established beyond doubt that they shared the same system of beliefs - metaphysical, moral, political or otherwise if they did not carry out actions which other members of society would interpret.
as a consequence of being said to genuinely hold those beliefs. What this suggests is that the meanings ascribed to social action are interwoven with the conceptual framework of beliefs which persons in that society possess. I think we can define a society as a group of persons who have a set of basic social actions in common and who ascribe the same meaning to such social actions. What this set of social actions is is an empirical question - which will be determined in part by the contingent characteristics of the human being. What is not contingent, however, is that a society so defined must have a history in which the social action forms have evolved and gained their meaning.

A final word on anthropology and sociology. It is clear that the study of the meaning of the action symbols is, on our account, crucial. But what happens when an anthropologist cannot accept the reason provided by the persons in that society for pursuing that particular act? There are two schools of thought here -

(1) the extreme structuralist who maintains that there is a hidden meaning to those acts but who supposes that that meaning must always be found within the conceptual framework of the society involved.

(2) the extreme functionalist who maintains that these acts have a latent function of which the people are not aware and which may not even have a role in their system of concepts.

Both views seem to me dogmatic. It is possible that there are common functions in human societies but that these functions are achieved through complex series of symbolic actions. In that case the social scientist would need to know both the universal functions and the complex system of symbolism before he can give a full explanation.

Andrew C. Theophanous

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1. This is a slightly revised version of a paper read at Rom Harre's Tuesday seminar during Trinity Term 1972.
It may seem difficult at first sight to understand exactly the relationship between the three terms: 'language', 'ethnicity', and 'population' in a conference of the African Studies Association at which the focus is primarily on the third. We are, of course, used to some doubts about the precise application of the first two in African circumstances. For example, as far as 'language' is concerned, even a simple list (let alone a classification) of linguistic units leads to hoary problems of 'language' versus 'dialect', 'cluster', 'family' and the like, or to discussions of criteria of 'genetic' or 'typological' or other sorts. With 'tribe' or 'ethnicity', discussion turns on the overlap with 'race', 'culture', or 'language' itself (however ultimately delineated). We are less used to doubts about the third term - 'population'. As is common in human studies, we confuse different ideas. Thus we imagine that population is a reality, 'infrastructural' to the other two. Population measures have all the earmarks of objectivity and, for many, the reality of the term 'population' is itself an expression of the various indices used by demographers: birth, death, fertility, and nuptiality rates, and enumerations and samplings of various kinds.

Yet what is a population? What is, in each case, the unit to which the demographic measures relate? In a study of the Bakweri of Cameroon, some years ago, for example, a central question began to emerge. Were the Bakweri a declining population? Now the Bakweri tend to think that those of their number who live in modern centres are not quite 'real' Bakweri. The Bakweri picture of themselves made a clear distinction between those inside their village fences (leading a 'Bakweri way of life' as it were) and those outside them. The modern centres (par excellence outside the fence) were ethnically mixed, cosmopolitan, un-Bakweri. There was a sense then in which if the rural heartland was losing population the Bakweri were also declining in toto. The definition of the target population as rural, in an area notorious for a vast 'multitribal' migration to an adjacent plantation industry, moved the question of Bakweri 'decline' out of the realm of demography into that of ideas. For the rural population was not, as it stood, a self-perpetuating population. Demographically it was marked by 'distorted' age-structures and sex ratios - and probably fertility patterns too.

This did not prevent us from usefully wearing out a demographic armoury on the mensurational aspects of the problem, and learning a great deal of value thereby. The most valuable lesson was that in the discussion of the dynamics of a population, your unit - 'the population' - is not merely subject to a statistical determination on the part of the observer, it is dependent on the subjective definition of that population by the human beings concerned. Over time, therefore, population series are continually affected by changing definitions on the
part of both the measurers and the measured. This factor has received less general emphasis than it deserves, in part because of the dogmatic, even ideological, definitions of populations that accompanied the development of the nineteenth and twentieth century nation states.

II

In Africa, the assumption that ethnicities were entities of the type that would yield a 'population', has always been too easily made, in both linguistic and biological studies. For that reason the figures for 'tribal' membership and for language-speakers are really even more difficult to evaluate than we usually suspect them to be. The extreme N.W. corner of the Bantu-speaking area (I adhere for the present to the boundary according to Guthrie 1946) illustrates this problem with remarkable clarity. We are presented with some two dozen entities, usually called 'tribes', but which also form the elements of the linguistic classification of the area. These entities are marked by very small individual populations - from 300 or less to about 30,000, with 6,000 or so being the mode. They are surrounded by 'groups' of quite another scale - Efik, Eko, Banileke, and so on. What are we to make of discrepancies of this sort? We are in a difficult area of analysis, which belongs to a field of wider interest than our more limited regional concerns. The classification of human groups will exhibit features common to the classifying of all phenomena. Some part of the question of the particular scale of the N.W. Bantu ethnicities lies in the criteria of the Bantu classification itself - determined, if you like, in armchairs in Europe.

First, then, the scholars. It is easy to start with the recognition that the tribal and linguistic classifications were not independently arrived at. Even so, in what sense is it true that the speakers of Nigerian 'Ikoid' languages are more linguistically homogeneous than the West Cameroon group of Bantu speakers? We may answer this in different ways, but we should note that any scholarly or scientific classification occupies a specific taxonomic space. Its confines are to some extent coercive and they must be taken into account when problems of relationship within the space are being examined.

The conventional units which make up the taxonomy of the Bantu languages are defined, on the face of it, by fairly clearly determinable criteria (e.g. Guthrie 1946). The N.W. Bantu entities belong, of course, to this taxonomy. If these criteria are strictly applied we shall not be surprised that the taxonomic space of the Bantu classification does not correspond with that independently set up for the W. African languages, since the latter notoriously depends on a much less rigorous set (even a mixture) of criteria, and belongs on a different plane of analysis from that which is feasible in Bantu studies (Ardener 1971: 218-19).
Secondly, the 'people'. We have to consider here the nature of self-classification or self-identification. For the 'people' themselves play the part of theoreticians in this field. Here we touch on the close match of the classifying process with the workings of language itself. It has frequently been noted that the Bantu languages have 'overdetermined', as it were, precisely along the axis of classification. The smallest differentiation of humanity can immediately be linguistically labelled, with a homologous form, homologous with that used for the largest ethnic entities. The Bantu taxonomy is continuously self-amending.

In the interaction between insider and outsider, the Bantuizing tendency has aided the differentiation and discrimination of units. The multiplication of 'separate' Bantu languages was even an overt aim of nineteenth century scholars. For the N.W. Bantu area, it is a fact that many of the divisions now in existence lean on classifications in which the scholar-turned-administrator or the administrator-turned-scholar (German, British and French) played a not insignificant part. There was a feedback to the people, so easily achieved from interpreters and others, to confuse the matter further. After all, one of the more inaccessible 'populations' of the zone is quite content to be called, and to call itself, 'Ngolo-Batanga', a hyphenated form which owes its existence to classifying for the convenience of scholars and foreigners - thus joining the select but expanding company in which are found 'Anglo-Saxon', 'Serbo-Croat' and some others.

The Bantuizing tendency itself belongs to that well-documented domain of structure in which language and reality are intermingled. It is also something of a special case of the more complex phenomenon of 'taxonomic scale'. This is underlined when we consider the neighbouring Ekoi case. The intervention of British-style, ethnically minded, Native Administrations had given by the 'thirties of this century a local reality to general classifications whose autochthonous basis was originally limited and contradictory. The search for one Ekoi ethnicity, rather than a series of ethnicities, must be brought into relation with the particular scale of the main elements of the southern Nigerian ethnic space. Dominated as it was by the entities labelled Yoruba, Edo, Ibo and Ibibio, it became virtually determined that 'Ekoi' would be set up homologously with these - despite the possibility of establishing several Ekoi 'tribes' (Talbot 1926, Crabb 1965).

The effect of two essentially different taxonomic spaces in this zone upon tribal divisions can be seen in the usage of the German and British administrations. The former, 'Bantuizing' in tendency, used three 'ethnic' names to divide up the relatively small Ekoi-speaking area which overlapped into its territory. On the other hand, when West Cameroon came under British administrators, some of the latter (e.g. Talbot), being more at home on the Nigerian scale, classified the whole 'Bantu' group together, for population purposes. This did not become general, but the ethnic 'diversity' of the area always remained a source of classifying malaise to them.
In the colonial period, then, the scale of the units in the prevailing ethnic taxonomies was far from uniform. The accepted scale was, in a sense, a result of arbitration between the foreigners and the politically important groups. The Yoruba and Bini kingdoms set the scale for Southern Nigeria, but this was itself set in some ways by the imperial scale of the Fulani-conquered north. It should not be forgotten that the still unsuccessful search for Eko unity was preceded by the Ibo case, the successful outcome of whose progress from label to population was not self-evident. It is by continuous series of such contrasts and oppositions (to which, I repeat, both foreigners and Africans contributed) that many (and in principle all) populations have defined themselves.

Much of the discomfort of West Cameroonians in the Federation of Nigeria derived from the discrepancy between their 'Bantuizing' taxonomic scale and that of the Federation as a whole. This led to the paradox, noted at the time, of the growth of a new 'Kamerun' ethnicity of Nigerian scale, covering this 'artificial' political unit - which actually, despite its internal diversity, was, while the taxonomic constraints existed, one of the most homogeneous-looking of the units of the Federation. The Bantuizing scale of the new Cameroon state clearly suits West Cameroon better at present. The West Cameroon area nevertheless still preserves elements of the newer and broader 'ethnicity' generated by the Nigerian phase of their experience (Ardener 1967: 293-99).

The position of minority-peoples in a zone of 'large populations' is thus more complicated than it seems. I wish to bring out of the discussion so far these points, as they relate to the African situation. I think they have more general validity.

(1) The ethnic classification is a reflex of self-identification.

(2) Onomastic (or naming) propensities are closely involved in this, and thus have more than a purely linguistic interest.

(3) Identification by others is an important feature in the establishment of self-identification.

(4) The taxonomic space in which self-identification occurs is of over-riding importance.

(5) The effect of foreign classification, 'scientific' and lay, is far from neutral in the establishment of such a space.
'Tribes are not permanent crystalline structures, belonging to one "stage" of historical or social development ... the process of self-classification never ceases'. There is a true sense in which the human populations ascribed to some of these entities do not therefore represent demographic units with purely demographic pasts or futures.

Take an entity such as the Kole, one of the labelled units on the border of the Bantu and Efik linguistic domains. This was ascribed a population in 1953 of hundreds. The Kole, or some of them, speak a dialect of Duala, and are traditionally offshoots of the latter people, who live some 100 miles down the coast. Something corresponding to the Kole entity has been attested for a hundred and thirty years, and on some interpretations of the evidence it could be two hundred, even three hundred years old. This small population always seems to be on the brink of extinction. What is meant by the demographic continuity of populations of this sort? Do we assume they are all the rump remnants of larger groups in the past? For various reasons, the evidence for ethno-linguistic continuity on this coast tends to suggest the opposite — that we are dealing with populations bumping along in exiguous numbers over fifty or a hundred or even several hundred years. With populations of millions, extrapolations back and forward in time using demographic indices may not generate truth, but they contain plausibility. With small hunting and gathering bands an ecological balance is at least a hypothesis (although Douglas, 1956, has called it into question). The populations of the type to which I refer are not at this elementary technological level. In the Kole case, it may well be that the whole dynamic of the 'population' is linguistic or sociolinguistic.

The Kole environmental interest is a border interest — between the Efik and Duala trading zones. The 'Kole' coast probably always had a mixed population. Kole may have always used a trading dialect, whose structure may reflect several neighbouring Bantu languages. Kole as identifiable people under that label were probably those members of the commercial group who maintained some connexions with the Duala and perhaps with the intervening Isu. The category Kole may have been filled according to different criteria at different times. Perhaps sometimes, the Kole were mostly Efik. Perhaps sometimes the Kole speech was learnt by all in the zone. Perhaps sometimes it was spoken by nobody of social importance. In all these coastal areas the expansion and contraction of slave or client communities, and their relationship to their masters and hosts, must also be born in mind. In a case like this the dynamics of a 'population' with a certain label over the centuries are not the dynamics of cohorts, and of fertility or mortality rates. They are the dynamics of an economic, social, and linguistic situation.

Who, or what, however, determines the preservation of the classification itself? We can easily hypothesize a situation in which everyone can point to a Kole, but no one calls himself
Kole. Labels of this sort are fixed to what may be termed 'hollow categories'. In the actual case, the Efik no doubt maintained the category of 'border coastal Bantu people' without much concern for the exact constituents of the category. The Bantu-speaking Duala, Isubu, and others might equally maintain the category of 'those like us, nearest the Efik.' I suspect that the Kole were in part a hollow category, like this. They were fixed as an 'ethnic group' in the British administrative system. No wonder many were puzzled by the tiny number of 'linguistic' Kole among a welter of Efik and other migrants. No wonder too that linguistic Kole itself was so hard to pin down, a language of aberrant idiolects. Perhaps it had never been any different?

In order to summarize the population characteristics of a hollow category we may express the matter so: since the category is filled according to non-demographic criteria the population's survival or extinction, growth or decline, age-structure or fertility, are not determined in demographic space.

A close congenер of the hollow category is the entity maintained by continuous replenishment from a home area. Thus the ethnic map of Cameroon contains stable, growing or declining concentrations of Ibo, Bamileke, Hausa (and the like) which are demographically not necessarily self-perpetuating. This type of unit is familiar now in Africa, as well as in most of the urbanized world. Such concentrations were, however, also known in the past. Nomadic groups such as the Fulani, or economically-defined groups such as the Aro among the Ibo, and others elsewhere shared some of the features of such continuously concentrated but demographically unstable groups.

Their close connexion with hollow categories lies in their tendency to become hollow. Thus the supposed Bali settlers on the Cameroon Plateau are now, in their main settlement, an entity which under close examination turns out to look like a representative sample of all of their neighbours. Their present dominant language is a kind of average Cameroon Bantoid. In Northern Cameroon the category 'Fulbe' has become 'hollow' in this way. In various places and times the categories 'Norman','Fict', 'Jew', 'Gypsy', 'Irishman', and many others may have become, or be becoming hollow - a mere smile surviving from the vanished Cheshire cat. Thus not only can a hollow category become a 'population', a 'population' can become a hollow category. Indeed, this process need never stop: the category may become a population again. Certain peculiar features in the supposed continuity of certain ethnic, even 'national', groups may well be elucidated in this way.

It is essential to make this effort to separate the concept of 'population' from those of language and ethnicity. In the past the separation has been urged in biological terms. A biological population, it has been pointed out, may not coincide in its history with the affiliations of its language or of its culture. I am not repeating this truth, or truism. For we are not able to be so confident about the concept of a biological population. We are concerned with continuities whose processes are only in part biological. Fulbe, Jews and (as we
know) Britons are created by definition as much as by procreation. We are dealing with 'structures' of a clearly recognized type whose transformations may be documented in statistics, but whose dynamics lie outside the field of statistical extrapolation. I have made this assertion of principle without the important modifications and qualifications in order to highlight its importance in African studies. We may, in the West or in the global context, avert our eyes from these contradictions. Our largest units of human classification have reached such a scale that population dynamics now form the tail that violently wags the human dog. This is not so even with smaller Western units or subunits. It was rarely so with African ethnicities.

IV

I have kept these remarks brief. I have not alluded more than sketchily to the topographical, ecological, economic and political elements which enter into identification and self-identification. Ultimately, among the things that society 'is' or 'is like', it 'is' or 'is like' identification. The entities set up may be based upon divisions in empirical reality, or may be set up on reality by the structuring processes of the human mind in society. In such statements 'reality' is, however, frequently only a compendium of 'positivistic' measures and approximations. We experience the structures themselves as reality: they generate events, not merely our experience of events. Anthropologists would argue I think that this process is analogous to language. But all agree that language acquires a position of critical empirical importance in its study.

For population studies, the most impressive advances have occurred in the study of entities of a macrodemographic scale to which statistical and mensurational indices are central. Nevertheless, changes in these indices come back to the differentiation of entities ('minorities', 'classes', 'sects', 'ideologies') within the mass population which redefine, or restructure population 'behaviour' and thus, the population. This differentiating process is of exactly the kind which in our more parochial field of interest is associated with the waxing and waning of 'ethnicities' and the like. I have used only two or three elementary formulations ('the taxonomic space', 'taxonomic scale' and 'hollow category'), but the basic approach is a small part of recent movements which restore scientific validity to the mentalistic framework within which human societies shape and create events. Thereby, population studies themselves may be given back some of the intuitive life and colour that their subject matter deserves.

Edwin Ardener
Notes

1. This was the introductory paper to the Session on 'Language, Ethnicity and Population' (Co-Chairman Dr. D. Dalby) at the Birmingham Conference on 'The Population Factor in African Studies' of the African Studies Association, 11th - 14th September, 1972.


3. To distinguish them from the distant Batanga of the South Cameroon coast.


5. Under the name of 'Romby' - Ardener 1968, 1972b.

References


EXPLORING THE INEXPRESSIBLE:
DON JUAN AND THE LIMITS OF FORMAL ANALYSIS

'it is no good asking what this mystery is apart from the
endeavour itself'.

(I. A. Richards)

I

The ethnography I am going to discuss, Carlos Castaneda's
A Separate Reality (1971), is the record of a confrontation between
two very different ways of approaching the world. Don Juan, a
Yaqui Indian from north western Mexico, is familiar with a
'world view' which appears unintelligible to us westerners.
Castaneda, a young anthropologist from the University of
California, found himself in the following sort of situation.
Under don Juan's guidance and under the influence of a drug called
'the little smoke', he feels that he has changed into a crow; he
even flies. Discussing this experience later, Castaneda asks,
'Did I really become a crow? I mean would anyone seeing me have
thought I was an ordinary crow?' Don Juan replies, 'No. You
can't think that way when dealing with the power of allies.
Such questions make no sense, and yet to become a crow is the
simplest of all matters.' (1969: 183).

This is startling enough, but the possibility of anthropology
becomes even more problematic when we turn to the central activity
of 'seeing'. Don Juan distinguishes 'seeing' from 'looking' (1971: 16).
When we 'look' at the world we perceive and conceptualise
what might be called the everyday world, but when we 'see' the
world we notice a very different type of reality. Though the
practitioner uses drugs he does not 'see' hallucinations. Instead,
he 'sees' real things: 'Men look different when you 'see'. The
little smoke will help you to 'see' men as fibers of light ...
Fibers, like white cobwebs, very fine threads that circulate
from the head to the navel. Thus a man looks like an egg of circul­
ating fibers. And his arms and legs are like luminous bristles,
bursting out in all directions' (33).

Apart from describing 'seeing' in terms of what is 'seen',
don Juan elaborates the distinction by opposing 'thinking' and
'understanding' on the one hand, and 'knowing' on the other. Just
as he uses the word 'looking' in a way which we westerners are
familiar, so does he use the notions 'thinking' and 'understanding'.
But 'knowing' functions analogously with 'seeing'; one can only 'know'
when one is 'seeing'. 'Seeing' cannot be 'understood' (see p. 102,
107, 114, 313). Consequently, when don Juan spots Castaneda
cogitating upon the nature of 'seeing' he chides him: 'You're
thinking ... what 'seeing' would be like. You wanted me to
describe it to you so you could begin to think about it, the way
you do with everything else. In the case of 'seeing', however,
thinking is not the issue at all, so I cannot tell you what it is
like to 'see'.

Anthropology, then, comes face to face with an inexpressible
ethnographic 'fact'. And it cannot be ignored, for a great many
of don Juan's activities revolve around 'seeing'. What are we to
make of such a phenomenon? I want to argue that Castaneda's work presents anthropology as it is currently conceived with a fundamental challenge. Put very bluntly, is our 'anthropological semantic' up to the task of examining modes of constructing the world which taboo our proceeding as we are usually accustomed to do?

The best way to approach this issue is to regard anthropology as an 'additive' discipline. Butler's dictum - 'Everything is what it is and not another thing' - will hardly do as it stands, for it is impossible to make a clear distinction between what something is and how that same thing is to be identified and interpreted. Since interpretation has to be in terms of whatever schema is brought to bear on the subject matter under consideration, we cannot escape the fact that the universe is a relational affair; things are only things relative to other things. Thus all identification and interpretation necessarily involves an additive procedure. It is only when we can locate something within a general framework of ideas that we can say it is one thing and not another. The anthropologist does not trip over 'brute realities'.

So we are inevitably led to the central question of our discipline: what is the nature of the 'something' which we bring to bear on our subject matter? Developing a series of distinctions made by Ferré (1970), we can say that a system of 'mystical' beliefs can be approached in four ways: (a) strongly theory-dependent interpretation, when sociological or psychological theory is applied to say, for instance, that god is society or that ritual symbolises the social order, (b) weakly theory-dependent but ethnocentric interpretation when the aim is to criticise the beliefs by comparing them against the criteria governing science or common sense (this is how logical positivists or intellectualists approach religious beliefs); (c) the same, when the intention is not so much criticism as it is reinterpretation (Braithwaite, MacKinnon, Bultmann and to a lesser extent Leach; all reinterpret religious discourse to emphasise what this discourse has in common with more general modes of thought), and (d) fideistic interpretations of such a kind that will 'preserve a faithful understanding of its own mysterious topic' (Ramsey 1964: 44).

Thus the anthropologist has four options; he can add four schemes comprising scientific theories, the model of scientific discourse, the model of more familiar ways of facing the world, and a model which is somehow part and parcel of the reality under consideration. In its purest form the last solution is probably the most difficult to use (it is all too easy to say that language games are not distinct entities, etc.), but all the other options are demonstrably wrong if the goal is the exegesis or recreation of semantic systems.

Applying this to don Juan, we can easily say how we should not proceed if we want to understand his system. Take Leach, who together with the other 'symbolists' (Beattie, Firth, Douglas) sometimes appears to confuse what ritual and myth mean for the participant with what might be called sociological meaning (1964:14). Whatever the case, it does not really further our understanding of don Juan's universe to be told, for instance, that the ambiguous nature of 'seeing' reflects the dispossessed nature of the people who hold this belief. No doubt this might be an interesting observation, but it presupposes an understanding of 'seeing', and is not really talking about participant meaning.
Even worse, take Spiro. As befits one who finds problems of meaning to be 'intellectually trivial' (1967:5), he attempts to refute the symbolists by employing a crude 'at face value' thesis. Referring to the Trobriand Islanders conception beliefs, he observes that 'in the absence of any evidence which indicates the contrary, it is gratuitous to assume that this cultural belief does not mean what it says so it would seem not unreasonable to assume that it enunciates a theory of Oon~tt'fml' (1968:255). Bharati, who cites Spiro in this context, takes crude scientific ethnocentrism (our second type) so seriously as to claim we might be better off if we jettisoned symbol talk altogether in the investigation of religions that do not use 'symbol' emically - which means all religions except salon Judaeo-Christianity' (1971:262). So much for Nuer Religion, and so much for don Juan, unless we are to assume that he understands everything that he says in a literal and explanatory fashion.

These mistakes are typical of those who do not pay enough attention to conceptual matters. Even Godfrey Lienhardt, infinitely more subtle and fideistic than any of the anthropologists we have mentioned; runs into difficulties. He argues that our distinction between metaphorical and literal discourse cannot adequately be applied to characterise such Dinka assertions as 'Some men are lions' (1954:98, 99). So he applies the notion of analogy to describe this belief (106). 'We need only ask, in what sense is the notion 'analogy' somehow immune from the criticism's directed against 'metaphor'?

Let me now try to state what I take to be the best general way of interpreting don Juan-semantic universe. For various reasons, it seems to me that strong fideism is ill suited for the anthropologist. We have a duty to mediate between different ways of interpreting the world. We have an equally strong duty to grasp and recreate alien modes of expression. For the second reason we have to be fideistic. For the first, we have to be prepared to introduce distinctions and characterisations which the participants might not themselves use. Strong fideism, which does not allow this type of addition, is ruled out because what we want to understand has to be what we can understand. This, of course, is not to deny that we should make an effort to widen our frontiers of understanding to meet the alien. Indeed, it is precisely this operation which gives the type of anthropology of which I am speaking its great value.

Granted all this, where should we find our basis for interpretation? A basis which is faithful to the alien, and yet which is also intelligible to us. One of don Juan's crucial dicta, let us recall, is that reasoning cannot be applied to 'seeing'. Here we have a characteristic clash of language games. I say 'characteristic' because exactly the same clash frequently occurs within our own culture. Think of Blake's disparaging remark: 'I have always found that Angels have the vanity to speak of themselves as the only wise. This they do with a confident insolence sprouting from systematic reasoning'. Or think of Huxley's remark, 'we must preserve, and if necessary, intensify our ability to look at the world directly and not through that half-opaque medium of concepts, which distorts every given fact into the all too familiar likeness of some generic label or explanatory abstraction' (1954:59). Or think of Goethe's characterisation of the intellectual as the man who feels that 'what we perceive by eye is foreign to us as such
and need not impress us deeply. But most of all, notice the Christian tradition. It is true that we do not find the same reliance on the indirect language of sight, and so are not reminded of don Juan in exactly the same way, but the clash is still with us. Christians have to speak and reason, yet if not the crucial dogma of their faith is that the nature of God cannot be expressed in thought. The controversy between those who follow the respective logics of analogy, obedience and encounter (see Ferre), who follow reason, faith and experience, replicates in broad outline aspects of the confrontation between don Juan and Castaneda.

Surely, we can conclude, here is an adequate basis for our interpretation. Philosophers of religion, often drawing on linguistic philosophy for their analytical tools, theologians, who help us by emphasising the necessary de dicto stance, and poets or thinkers ranging from Blake to Huxley and I. A. Richards, have all developed procedures, distinctions and insights which we can appeal to. How have Christians and poets expressed the inexpressible? How have theologians/philosophers of religion and literary critics given accounts of this phenomena? If we are to begin to know what to add to the other worlds of visionaries, mystics, religious communities and magical practitioners in other cultures, it is at this home-based translation-point that we must begin. Unless we can open our eyes within our own cultures, we cannot properly broaden our more strictly anthropological horizons.

Before trying to give these rather outspoken remarks some substance by referring back to don Juan and Castaneda, I should like to make one thing clear. Certain anthropologists, one suspects, might not feel inclined to engage in full scale conceptual analysis. They would probably admit to worrying about defining 'religion' or 'culture', but would appear to feel that examining how we classify our discourse (literal, factual, cognitive, informative, empirically true assertions/fictitious assertions/symbolic, expressive, meditative, imaginative assertions and hybrid forms such as quasi-factual utterances, performative discourse etc), and how we use certain words (belief, religious experience, truth etc), is irrelevant to the task of anthropology. They seem to imply — they ignore these topics — that fieldwork automatically makes the 'armchair' difficulties raised by such notions as 'metaphor', or 'law' irrelevant. Leaving aside the curious concern of such anthropologists with definitional problems (due, no doubt, to their scientism), we have only to recall that there are two sides to the coin of interpretation. Fieldwork should be done in the alien context and in the home environment; the armchair is a red herring.

But there is more to it than this. Having displaced the armchair from its original metaphorical home, we can now reinstate it in a different context. For the anthropologist interested in meaning much work can be done without immediate participation. Analogously, it makes little sense to apply the fieldwork/armchair distinction to those who have tried to interpret the Bible or the Sacred Books of the East. So although I have no first hand knowledge of Mexico, in what follows I shall be trying to demonstrate that much can be achieved by sitting down and thinking about how Castaneda, don Juan and others use their words.
Don Juan belongs to a community of like-minded practitioners. He converses intelligibly with don Genaro in such a way that we have to suppose that they both 'know' about 'seeing' and can somehow follow what we might call the 'grammar' of this activity. But how can this be the case?

When don Juan comes to talk about the 'guardian' (an entity which belongs to the realm of 'seeing'), he is led into contradictions: 'It had to be there and it had, at the same time, to be nothing'. The conversation continues,

C.C. 'How could that be, don Juan? What you say is absurd.'
D.J. 'It is. But that is 'seeing'. There is really no way to talk about it. 'Seeing', as I said before, is learned by 'seeing' (1971:207).

Don Juan cannot talk about 'seeing' for at least two reasons. First, he believes that 'The world is such-and-such or so-and-so only because we tell ourselves that that is the way it is. If we stop telling ourselves that the world is so-and-so, the world will stop being so-and-so' (264). Since 'seeing' is concerned with the 'sheer mystery' (ibid) of the world, the practitioner must stop maintaining his everyday world by ceasing to think and talk.

Secondly, an essential ingredient of 'seeing' is that the practitioner comes to realise it by himself. The 'warrior' or 'man of knowledge' is a man who applies 'will'.

Granted that 'seeing' has to be learnt by 'seeing', how can don Juan's tradition maintain itself? Where is the social aspect of 'seeing', the aspect which allows one practitioner to agree with another on the grammar of the activity? Or are we to say that the social collapses into a series of private experiences?

The best way to answer this question is by describing how don Juan attempts to teach Castaneda to 'see'. His basic technique is to destroy Castaneda's faith in the everyday world of things by introducing states of consciousness which render normal interpretation inapplicable. Castaneda has to take those drugs which are regarded as vital prerequisites for 'seeing'. And don Juan places him in ambiguous situations designed to create a feeling of otherness over and against the everyday world of understanding. For instance, as the two were driving through Mexico during the night, they noticed headlights following them down the lonely road. Don Juan interprets this by saying, 'Those are the lights on the head of death' (64). Castaneda experiences a thrill of the non-natural, turns round, but the lights have disappeared.

Having established these states of altered consciousness, don Juan directs Castaneda to certain patterns and interpretations. On one occasion Castaneda perceives don Juan's face as 'an incredibly fast flickering of something' (192). Even though Castaneda does not speak, don Juan appears to be aware of what is happening because he tells his apprentice to look away. Some hours after the experience, and after Castaneda has given his account, don Juan dismisses it: 'Big deal ... You say a glow, big deal' (194).

Teaching, then, involves verbal instruction, interpretation, and the implicit assumption that don Juan 'knows' a great deal about what is going on in Castaneda's mind. From our point of view, things
are getting even more mysterious: the teaching of 'seeing' appears to involve the idea that the teacher can 'see' into the mind of his pupil (see esp. 204).

But let us stay with the role of words and thought. Although the following dialogue involves a rather odd guide (a lizard), it accurately summarizes the role of verbal instruction in the teaching process:

D.J. 'If the lizard had died while she was on your shoulder, after you had begun the sorcery, you would have had to go ahead with it, and that would truly have been madness.'
C.C. 'Why would it have been madness?'

'Because under such conditions nothing makes sense. You are alone without a guide, seeing terrifying, nonsensical things'. 'What do you mean by nonsensical things?'

'Things we see by ourselves. Things we see when we have no direction' (1969:165).

Without a guide to prepare Castaneda for his experiences, direct him through them and discuss them afterwards, the experiences remain of no value. Instead of filling in the nature of non-ordinary reality they merely jar the everyday world. In short, don Juan interprets and directs the experiences in terms of the criteria of a cultural tradition.

This said, the fact remains that the cultural body of beliefs are of a very curious variety. We can take for our example a notion which operates within the same grammar of things as 'seeing'. 'Will', says don Juan, cannot be talked about. But he then goes on to speak of it: 'There is no real way of telling how one uses it, except that the results of using the will are astounding' (1971:176). We should remember that Wittgenstein's principle - 'the meaning of a word is its use in the language' - must involve a social context, ('forms of life'). Thus the meaning of 'will' cannot be fully understood except by seeing what is involved in the activity of 'willing'. Don Juan can speak of this. He can say what 'will' can do, which allows him to compare the notion with what such things as courage can do: unlike courage, 'will' 'has to do with astonishing feats that defy our common sense' (ibid).

Besides giving us some idea of what 'will' is not and what 'will' can do, don Juan can also describe what we might call the 'anatomy' of the activity. The 'will' 'shoots out, like an arrow' from the abdominal area where the 'luminous fibers' are also attached (179).

We have already seen that don Juan can describe many aspects of non-ordinary reality, ranging from the 'fibers of light' to the 'guardian' which can be 'an awesome beast as high as the sky' (147). When we add the other things which don Juan can talk about; what the activities of 'willing' and 'seeing' are not, and what they entail, we realize the extent to which these activities are culturally defined and expressible. So are we to conclude that don Juan is breaking with his 'seeing is incompatible with talking' thesis?

I think not. First, don Juan says, 'unless you understand the ways of a man who knows, it is impossible to talk about ... seeing' (20). The implication here is that once one has 'seen'
one can talk about certain aspects of the activity. The incomparability thesis is, however, retained: just as we cannot say what love or beauty are in themselves, so don Juan cannot talk about 'seeing' in itself. In these three cases the activities can only be described by appealing to accounts of external events and things. They cannot be got at in any directly internal way, except, of course, in the form of incommunicable experience. Furthermore, don Juan does not claim to be able to say very much about the essentially incomprehensible entities called 'Mescalito' and 'the allies' (114). But what of his talk about the 'external' events and states of affairs? The forms of life specifying the activities of 'seeing' and 'willing' are not 'external' or social in any normal sense. Mescalito might be 'seen' by several practitioners at the same moment of time, but the entity 'speaks' to people privately. The environmental changes which occur when one 'sees' are not publicly observable in the same way as the physical objects of everyday reality. Thus don Juan's talk about the nature of such phenomena is strongly qualified by the grammar of 'seeing'. The publishers of the paper-back edition of A Separate Reality fall into the trap of over-literalism: the cover shows things which can only be 'seen'.

But even if we say that these 'external' phenomena are spoken of in some sort of indirect or 'metaphorical' language, the fact remains that don Juan is talking about 'seeing'. It appears that if don Juan is not to be accused of being contradictory we must somehow reformulate his apparently literal use of words like 'thinking'. Since we do not understand 'seeing' this is an impossible task: unless we can oppose 'thinking' to some known factor, the term cannot be interpreted. All we can say is this: the distinction would appear to function polemically and heuristically. Castaneda has to be told to stop thinking for the same reasons that we might tell someone who is entering a concert with an intellectual problem on his mind that he must relax if he is to enjoy the music. And from the heuristic point of view don Juan has to be able to organise Castaneda's experiences. Another consideration is that if 'seeing' involves a totally alien mental world we are left with the following sorts of problems: psychologically speaking, is it likely that don Juan can stop thinking to quite the degree claimed; what of the fact that when he is 'seeing' he continues to use words and engage in interpretation; if we say that don Juan 'sees' without thinking and then returns from this state to report on some sort of memory basis, what exactly is he remembering; what sort of image is it which can afterwards give him the idea of 'white fiber'; and even if we allow that it might somehow be possible to remember and conceptualise experiences which one did not think about at the time, how can a system of beliefs be established on the basis of a series of curious memory traces?

As I have said, without knowing what 'seeing' is about, these questions cannot be answered. But by applying our common-sense criteria of how a cultural tradition must work we can conclude that since 'seeing' is taught as a cultural event, the activity must be guided by a set of beliefs and ideas. This is born out by several remarks of don Juan's. Talking of 'controlled folly' (another activity of the 'seeing' type), he meets Castaneda's lack of understanding by saying, 'You don't understand me now because of your habit of thinking as you look and thinking as you think' (106). In other words, once you have experienced the activity, the insights which don Juan is trying to express will begin to make sense.
Thus the hints, clues or ciphers have to be given some substance if they are to be fully understood. In don Juan's case this entails moving beyond the manifestly objective realm of public discourse into the separate reality itself. Logically, this existential domain of sheer activity, feeling and naked reality (see 1969:143) has to be construed as 'subjective', for this is the status of experience. But we have tried to show that by regarding much of don Juan's discourse as a series of ciphers it is possible both to say that the ciphers organise the separate reality and gain their full meaning from it. Referring to Ramsay again, the odd nature of don Juan's discourse reflects the nature of non-ordinary reality and so can illuminate its broad outlines. Once the disclosure has occurred and once, in some sense of the word, the non-ordinary reality is accepted, the penny can drop, the music can speak, even Mescalito can speak like music - not to mention the hot wind 'telling' extraordinary things to don Genaro (1971:300) - and meaning is imposed on the entire discourse.

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The trouble with this account of how the tradition maintains itself is that it is easy to argue that we are being too faithful to don Juan. For in order to give an account of how this sector of his discourse operates we seem to have imputed an ontological reality to his separate reality. The best way I can show what I mean by this is to refer to another arch-fideist, D. Z. Phillips. He claims that the 'grammar of... the reality of God' is such that 'To know God is to love Him. There is no theoretical understanding of the reality of God' (1967:66, 75). Phillips, of course, has to conclude, 'This is why understanding religion is incompatible with scepticism' (79) - the equation between knowing God and loving Him means that God can only be understood in terms of loving him. How can one love something (in any properly religious sense) which does not exist?

In much the same way, if 'seeing' and the discourse associated with it is taken as a cipher pointing to a reality which has to be disclosed by taking drugs, bearing the ciphers in mind, and obeying
certain instructions, we have to say that something determinate and objective is disclosed only if there really is a grammar of experience to be articulated. If we deny this, don Juan's discourse can make little sense for instead of teaching people to act in terms of a separate reality we would have to interpret him as a charlatan engaged in indoctrination. Either there is something there to be disclosed and realised, or don Juan is doing something other than what he says he is doing.

But if we say that Castaneda cannot 'see' because 'seeing' does not exist, how are we to account for the cultural tradition and the teaching process? These anthropologists who have called 'symbolists' locate the rationale of ritual and myth in the social order. In this way they relocate the rhyme and reason which is missing at the surface level (expressive talk is notoriously alogical at this level) at a level which really does exist. But in so doing they cease to be fideists. If, on the other hand, we want to remain faithful to don Juan, we cannot do this; we cannot account for his tradition in this way. So we have to say that 'seeing' and ordinary reality exists, and that it is this existential grammar or series of marks which governs the rhyme and reason of the expressive cultural beliefs. In any case, this is not merely a question of the pro's and con's of fideism: at mitote meetings the participants often agree about 'seen' things, particularly those which concern the presence of Nescalito. Castaneda rejects don Juan's explanation - involving 'seeing' - in favour of a sociological theory (covert leader, cues etc). He does not join the other participants when they take their peyote buttons, but his objectivity does him no good. For not only does he fail to spot any form of covert communication; he also fails by seeing Nescalito for himself (59-74). A feature of group psychology encouraged by hallucinogenic drugs and half-remembered beliefs? Perhaps, but when the grammar of 'seeing' works so explicitly, one begins to wonder. Even more forcibly, if we are to believe don Juan when he claims that words can be infused with true meaning, no two practitioners could mean the same thing, or communicate, unless they shared some sort of grammar. They would not be able to use their words properly (i.e., in terms of the tradition). Yet don Juan and don Genaro patently do not talk like madmen; like men with purely subjective grammars or no grammars at all. Their infused language is shared.

We are back to where we began, with the two 'men of knowledge' and the problem of an objective tradition meeting what some people might call subjective realms. I suspect that the most adequate answer to the question is that don Juan's tradition rests on a set of ciphers and a set of experiences. Both are equally indeterminate taken by themselves: the experiences could mean anything, and the beliefs are virtually meaningless. But when the two are conjoined, something happens. The drug/existential world becomes organised, the beliefs become correspondingly meaningful in some sort of expressive sense. There must be some sort of logic or grammar in this synthesis otherwise don Juan and the other practitioners would not be able to use their language correctly. Whether or not this grammar is ontologically real is, in a sense, beside the point: Phillips is talking about Christianity which involves faith, but don Juan's world and its grammar, is not religious in this sense. One has to accept it (as one might accept the challenge of climbing Mt. Everest), but once one has done this the interplay of drugs, instructions, beliefs and altered states of consciousness do their work. Outside a religious system stressing faith, this is the only
way that an inexpressible activity can be maintained. The activity of 'seeing' lies close to experience itself; drugs activate the experiential font, beliefs direct the process. But full verbal expression would miss the point.

III

Understanding don Juan, it seems, involves a degree of participant-observation which many anthropologists would find unacceptable. How many anthropologists of religion have been prepared to sacrifice their normal states of mind? In a normal 'faith' type religion these difficulties of retaining participant-observation do not arise - unless, of course, one is determined to follow archfideists like Phillips. Concluding his Nuer Religion, Evans-Pritchard adopts the only reasonable stance for this 'faith' religion: the social and cultural forms which express the relationship between man and Kwotl are the dramatic representations of an interior state which we as anthropologists cannot grasp. Even though the Nuer cannot speak of this interior state which gives their religious discourse its full meaning, Evans-Pritchard is able to give a comprehensive semantic account of their beliefs and rituals. This is because the Nuer's imaginative constructions form a systematic whole and can be interpreted in terms of one another. The expressiveness of their discourse does not intrude upon its systematic nature. Or put another way, the grammar of Kwotl does not have to be grasped through active participation if the goal is limited to showing the rationale and nature of their symbolic talk. The Winchian approach suffices for this.

But does the same apply to don Juan's universe? 'Seeing' is not like Kwotl. The Nuer experience Kwotl but this does not govern their religious discourse in any direct sense. Their tradition is too systematic for that, and Kwotl is too unmovable to fundamentally constitute religious language usage (this is why we have characterised Nuer religion as a 'faith' religion). 'Seeing', however, is a directly experiential activity and contains its own internal grammar of discourse. Whereas in Nuer religion active experience adds full meaning, experience of 'seeing' adds both full meaning and the ability to use language correctly. This is where system is restored.

It follows that observation alone, in the sense of participating without imbibing, can tell us very little about don Juan's world in the context of 'seeing'. We cannot really understand the grammar of don Juan's discourse in the same way that we can understand Nuer religion, for this logic is so epiphenomenal to and expressive of 'seeing'. Because expression dominates and disrupts logical system, one cannot become a practitioner merely by learning the cultural items. (By practitioner I here mean someone who can use the language).

If this seems far fetched, consider the following example and think of the consequences for a Winchian type understanding. Don Juan is talking about the nature of allies and Meskalito. He says that these two entities are similar in one essential respect. He then says that they are equally essentially different. So the position is, 'a' + 'b' are defined by 'c', but 'a' differs fundamentally from 'b'. Don Juan does not like Castaneda pointing this out, so he opts out from the logical (system) idiom. He tells Castaneda to stop talking, the implication being that he is being forced to talk about something which cannot be put into words (53, see also 179).
We find, then, that whenever we want to connect assertions in order to make them meaningful we run the risk of meeting the grammar of 'seeing'. Contradictions can tell the 'Linchian styled anthropologist a lot, but it is difficult not to conclude that their full meaning, including the reasons for their existence, cannot be grasped until the observer has experienced whatever the underlying reality might be.

Let us take a brief look at what some philosophers have had to say about the relationship between understanding something or somebody and experiencing the same things.

On first sight nothing seems more natural than to say that I don't understand what is meant by the notions 'God', 'pain', 'seeing' etc until I have experienced the phenomena which are supposedly being referred to. On this view, understanding the meaning of something is an essentially mental occurrence: words are taken to refer either to mental states or to phenomenal realities, and until these have been experienced the full meaning of the word has not been grasped.

For the last forty or so years such theories of meaning have come under heavy criticism. Words like 'mental', 'experience', and even 'referential' (as in de Saussure's view of the sign) have become objectionable. MacIntyre is typical. He refutes the position we have seen Evans-Fritchard adopting: 'the suggestion of the liberal theologian that theological expressions have private meaning by referring to private experience is ruled out by the fact that no expressions can derive their meaning in this way' (1970:167). Quite simply, an individual cannot recognize, identify and conceptualise his own experiences in his own private language. It is impossible for us to characterise our experiences unless we appeal to words whose meaning depends upon their being governed by rules. Yet such rules of use or meaning are by their very nature of the public, social order. 'So', continues MacIntyre, 'words like 'pain' and 'sensation' which refer to private experiences, if any words do are words in public language'. If the meaning of religious expressions is totally exhausted by referring to private experiences, communication is impossible: my experiences might tell never coincide with your experiences, which means that our respective languages will never meet.

Meaning therefore, is essentially located in the social realm where rules govern use. Meaning is to be understood by examining the limits of what can and what cannot be said in any given case, not by appealing to some mental penumbra which supposedly lies behind words and sentences. Some philosophers have accordingly excluded experience to what might appear to be an extreme degree. Developing Wittgenstein's remark 'You have learned the concept 'pain' when you learned language', Malcolm asks why this is 'startling'. His reply is, 'it seems to ignore what is most important, namely, one's experience of pain itself' (1972:56). He argues, however, that 'inner exhibition (introspectively observing our experiences) can contribute nothing to the understanding of a concept' (57). Accordingly, 'I do not know how to make a distinction between (someone) being able to use the word correctly and his knowing its meaning' (56).

Malcolm compares the man who has never felt pain with the man who is blind. 'Whereas the first man can use the word 'pain' correctly, and thus has a 'full' understanding of the concept(50),
the blind man inevitably makes mistakes when he comes to use colour words. He lacks the necessary experience. Waismann makes the same point for the man who is colour blind: 'We may call a language unATTAINABLE that cannot be learnt in any way. Of course, this 'unattainability' is not due to the language itself, but to us and our experiences. Thus we cannot learn or translate a language which is used to describe experiences from which we are completely cut off, just as a colour-blind man cannot learn our language' (1968:253). There are, as he puts it, 'no bridges of understanding' between the 'different worlds' and 'different languages' of colour-blind and normal men (250).

Thus far we have covered two positions: (a) the meaning of some concepts is strictly equivalent to learning how to use them; and (b) the meaning of other types of concepts should still be understood in terms of use, but certain experiences have to be present before one can apply the words properly. There is, however, a third category. Talking about words like 'homesickness', Waismann writes 'Someone who feels homesick for the first time will probably say 'So this is what people call 'homesickness'; now for the first time I am beginning to realise all that that word connotes'. It is as if he previously knew the word only from the outside and now suddenly understands its inner meaning' (265). Experience is as important as in our second category, but instead of performing the function of providing the necessary conditions for language use (we can certainly speak of 'homesickness' even if we have never felt it) experience now serves to fill out the full meaning of the word. Thus Waismann continues, 'But what is here called 'understanding' is not only a capacity to react to the word with certain definite feelings, but also the ability to describe imaginatively all the subtle implications of the word' (266).

So understanding the meaning of an assertion is not a clear-cut business. Since Waismann's last remark could also be applied to Malcolm's 'pain' example we must distinguish between 'meaning-use' and 'meaning-existential realisation'. We must also distinguish between those situations in which direct experience is necessary for use and those in which it is not.

We can now develop what we have said about the nature of don Juan's discourse in the context of 'seeing'. Castaneda is early told that 'You must feel everything, otherwise the world loses its sense'. Faced with this, Castaneda replies that one does not 'have to get an electric shock in order to know about electricity' (1971:13). Castaneda soon realises that this will not do. The meaning of don Juan's discourse lies too close to reality and experience for the 'meaning is use cum knowledge' argument implied in Castaneda's electricity example. Thus when don Juan claims 'When I say that the guardian is really blocking your passing and could actually knock the devil out of you, I know what I mean!' (455), we would be missing the point unless we shared don Juan's experiential universe. In this context, correct use signifies correct understanding, but the understanding itself is another matter. It certainly cannot be got at by observing rules of use. To take an analogous example, when someone says 'I love you' this will, in a valid sense of 'mean', mean something different depending on whether one is in love or not. This sort of meaning has something to do with public rules (we can see whether the person really means it by observing future behaviour), but cannot readily be identified in terms of them. In don Juan's case, however, we do not even have
this easy bridgehead unless we experience 'seeing' for ourselves, we are unable either to establish the existential connotations or to specify rules of usage. The expressive nature of the discourse entails that meaning cannot be understood as use when full meaning is merely a matter of full experience. Waismann's 'homesickness' example does not apply. Nor does Malcolm's 'pain' example.

Re-emphasizing our comparison with Nuer religion, we again realize that the Winchian approach is more fundamentally inadequate than its inability to deal with contradiction and paradox might suggest. In the case of the Nuer, Winch stands unthreatened: the inner meaning provided by Kwoth, experience of Kwoth, or belief in Kwoth adds depth and illumination to the public language but need be of no great anthropological significance. But in don Juan's world existential realization is the system. Bearing in mind what we have said about the interplay between culture and individual realization, it is impossible to get away from the fact that the essence of the 'system' veers towards private language and experience.

Referring again to Waismann, we read, 'There are, however, cases especially in dealing with emotions and subjective experiences, where it is doubtful how far language fulfills its purpose, as, for example, in religious and mystical experiences' (264). Later on he construes language 'as a bridge built by the mind to lead from consciousness to consciousness' (268). So we see that a linguistic philosopher working within the Wittgensteinian 'meaning is use' tradition has to admit that in certain situations words have to do with the conveyance (264) of what can loosely be called subjective states.

Language does not function very well in these realms of mystics' talk, 'metaphor', poetry, existential talk and even poetry (See Waismann p. 266-268 for examples). By this I do not mean that, for example, poetry is a misuse of language. For it is perfectly clear that language is performing valid functions within these realms. Given this, it is not even true to say that language being 'stretched': symbolic or indirect discourse is a language game in its own right. What I am saying is that language does not function very well by itself. Malcolm's sui generis concepts have to be relocated within experience, for this is where indirect language is often directly embedded.

The limits of formal analysis are soon met when we try to understand don Juan. Structural analysis is obviously inapplicable, except perhaps when don Juan is specifying concrete spells and other procedures. For the structuralist would destroy the reality which he claims to be examining: don Juan's incompatibility dictum aside, the nature of this semantic universe counts again - at the reification and reductionism consequent upon any 'strong' structuralism. Even the 'weak' structuralism of Winch is not of much use: don Juan's verbal contradictions and utterances are not important in themselves, for it is what they express that is significant. So to learn to use and interpret don Juan's language we must follow Waismann's advice and learn to understand his sentences 'just as we understand a piece of music, entirely from inside' (363). But if 'every language in the end must speak for itself' (ibid) should we not conclude that there must be as many styles of anthropology as there are ways of speaking?
The challenge of don Juan lies precisely in this. As anthropologists and individuals we belong to one tradition. Neither poets, mystics, metaphysicians or 'seers', we are, to use a phrase of don Juan's 'chained to our reason' (1971:313). Many interesting expressions of humanity contain the clause that the types of reasoning with which we are familiar are inappropriate. What are we to do?

I feel that the first thing we have to accept is that when we are faced with universes like don Juan's we must be prepared to adjust our idea's of objectivity. Ferre paraphrases Torrance's position on this as 'True' objectivity is ... the capacity of the mind to be conformed to or behave appropriately before its object' (op cit: 120). We have seen that participant-observation is inadequate; experience is imperative. This entails losing our normal objectivity (as anyone will know who has taken mescaline). It also entails accepting (understanding) that it is possible, for instance, to fly. But, it could be objected, what use are such experiences and grammars of interpretation? If we say that Castaneda was quite right to try and understand from the 'inside', do we not raise the objection that since Castaneda never learned to 'see' he was merely reporting the wrong 'separate reality' - was being positively misleading? Zaehnr, in his Mysticism, Sacred and Profane, runs into trouble by trying to identify equivalences and differences at the level of mystical experience by looking at mystics language. Castaneda is faced with the same problem (unless, of course, he comes to believe that 'seeing' is a self-validating experience or encounter). However, there is one way of claiming that this identification problem is not as bad as it seems: don Juan's tradition is a fait accompli. It could be the case - although it is unlikely - that all the practitioners are talking about different experiences. Assuming this is not so, assuming that the interplay of instruction and experience can more or less automatically extend a valid tradition, there is no reason why any chosen person cannot understand the real thing. Castaneda was 'chosen', so perhaps it was his subjectivity which prevented him from realising the 'objectivity' of don Juan's system.

But even supposing that Castaneda returns to complete his apprenticeship, we still have to face the second major difficulty associated with participant-observation or experience, namely the translation problem. Again, we have to adjust our normal (anthropological) language games of objectivity and understanding. This is very difficult. When don Juan says that once one has control of an ally there is no longer any need to have a human guide (1969:249) he is placing the grammar of interpreting allies on an ontological basis which we can hardly accept or understand. Apart from experiencing don Juan's world, we have to believe in it. But such difficulties aside, the anthropologist can only follow Castaneda's example - or do a little better. It seems that we should move into such systems until we meet ontological barriers. And to translate this movement we should develop what Waisman calls 'a logic of questions' (1960) with all the distinctions and characterisations that this implies.

I began this paper with an example of Castaneda asking a 'really' question and thereby committing a category mistake. Don Juan says, 'That is all there is in reality - what you felt' (op cit:143) One of the reasons why we have a distinction between
metaphor' and literal talk is that we tend to organise our language into two categories: expressive discourse and empirically informative utterances. Don Juan does not live in such a simple universe, so within his grammar of 'feeling' it makes little sense to ask many types of 'really' questions. Castaneda appears to find this out, for towards the end of his apprenticeship he no longer always approaches don Juan with the literal/metaphor paradigm of objectivity in mind. But, we can suggest, if he had read some philosophy of religion before he visited don Juan, he might not have wasted so much time and annoyed don Juan so much. We do not ask a physicist if his 'waves' really exist: he is working with a disclosure model. In the same way, much religious discourse within the Christian tradition has been construed neither as 'really true', (viz. literally applicable to God), nor as 'merely symbolic'. Within the religious language game, the metaphor/literal distinction is out of place. Disclosure discourse 'symbolises' the inexpressible, but just as poetic metaphor somehow signifies real insight, so does the religious model make what have been called 'quasi-factual' claims about the nature of religious reality. However, because religious discourse 'participates' in its divine subject matter in a way which most poems do not aspire to do, we cannot usefully apply the word 'metaphor'. It has literary connotations, and who could seriously contend that it makes sense to ask don Juan if he understands his 'embers of light' in a metaphorical or in a literal manner? His 'metaphors', if such they are, are literally laden.

To conclude, it is not, as I have emphasised, easy to remain fideistic to don Juan. Admitting that understanding the meaning of something is not necessarily equivalent to learning how to use words, we have had to go a step further: in don Juan's case one has to grasp 'seeing' before one can use or existentially realise much of his discourse. We cannot 'see', so any interpretative anthropology must be wrong. Additionally, our training as anthropologists and our duty to our readers mean that we have to apply our criteria of understanding to some extent or another. In this paper we have asked questions about the status of 'seeing' and the possibility of a tradition, questions which don Juan would not approve of. If we read that the existence of 'mental' words depends on the association between subjective experience and bodily symptoms or activities (Jaismann op cit: 258), then it is not at all easy for us to refrain from applying this argument to 'seeing'. Perhaps this is not a bad thing. Such approaches, however, should be combined with attempts to recreate the existential import of don Juan's world. Even if the anthropologist can only partially grasp 'seeing', he can still try to make the weak bell chime as loudly as possible. He can do this, it seems, by turning to those areas in our own culture where roughly the same bells are to be heard. Is anyone going to deny that I. A. Richards' interpretation of Shakespeare's 'The Phoenix and the Turtle' will not help us in the right frame of mind to approach don Juan? Or that Macquarrie's characterisation of the nine different modes of discourse to be found in Saint Athanasius' De Incarnatione is not a useful preparation? (1967). If don Juan is to ring a bell - which is what understanding him is basically about - then these are the territories to explore. And if we are to characterise his universe, instead of turning to the Année Sociologique, it might be more fruitful to use such terms as 'disclosure model'; 'convicational', 'connotation/notation', 'reference range', 'qualifier', and so on.
Clearly, if anthropology is regarded as the vital recreation of how others have conceived their realities, the task of translation can never end. There is always a new balance to be struck between the extension of our ethnocentricity (called understanding) and the atmosphere of our sensitive subject matter. The confrontation is perpetual; but the appeal is tremendous, for what is at stake is the assimilation of alien systems of experience and interpretation. This is why anthropology must adjust itself: in the last resort, what is the use of continually extending our traditional objectivity into other worlds? Don’t we know too much about the functions of religion, and all too little about religion itself? Why, one wonders, have anthropologists been so loathe to accept other realities? Why have they all so frequently reduced them to the canons and ethnocentric circularity of science? So many people try and understand how Christians can think of their God, but how many have extended this activity to other cultures? 'Sociological' explanation is not equivalent to understanding, for does not the all absorbing interest of don Juan lie in his ability to make us aware of the existence of realities which confound our reason? Formal analysis, it seems clear, can tell us very little about the interplay between apparently concrete events of an absurd nature and our western rationality. We need other models of interpretation. Even though the disclosure model cannot really help us understand the nature of things, 'seen', it at least makes some sense of the teaching process, the status of various aspects of don Juan’s discourse, and the balance between cultural objectivity and private experiences.

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There was no 'witch-craze' in England; rather, for a hundred years after 1563, the country knew witchcraft as anthropologists know it. But also as they don't. In the period, in Essex alone, at least seventy-four people were hanged as witches. It was witchcraft without District Officers, feral and consequential. From villages throughout the country, witches were regularly presented to Quarter Sessions and Assize Courts. Thomas Cooper asked in 1617: "Doth not every Assize almost throughout the land, resound of the arraignment and conviction of notorious witches?"

Two new books by academic historians introduce the topic to anthropologists: Witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England by Alan Macfarlane and Religion and the Decline of Magic by Keith Thomas. The two books complement each other: Dr. Macfarlane offers a detailed sociological analysis of patterns of legal prosecution for witchcraft in Essex, and Mr. Thomas offers an ambitious survey of the intellectual context of the English witch-beliefs, with a tentative explanation of the decline of magical ideas in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Both authors have clearly read widely and critically in the anthropological literature, and take their lead from Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft Oracles and Magic among the Azande. And as historians they build on the achievements of Notestein and Ewen. But for both disciplines their work breaks new ground. Historians will recognize an extraordinary difference in their approach from, say, that of Professor Trevor-Roper in his essay: The European Witch-Craze of the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. And anthropologists will be intrigued by all the problems that the authors set up in their analysis of Tudor and Stuart witchcraft through time. (Indeed, they have almost two hundred years to work over.)

In his book, Macfarlane is concerned first to establish the facts of informal suspicion and legal prosecution of witchcraft in Essex during the period in which the witchcraft statutes were in force. He presents his account as a model for future investigations of other areas, and offers a careful evaluation of all the different kinds of source that he has found useful in his task. He writes: "Possibly the most important expansion of sources in the study of witchcraft ... will prove to be in what we may term 'indirect sources'. That is to say, the huge volume of local records which help us to recreate the context of village life within which witchcraft suspicions occurred." The initiative was his own. As a complement to his overall study of prosecutions in Essex, he undertakes a closer analysis of accusations in three sample villages, making full use of his 'indirect sources'. In this exercise he shows that the historical analysis of witchcraft
in England can be taken to a fully anthropological point of focus.

Macfarlane concentrates on the frequency curve for prosecutions and their distribution through Essex, and on other statistics that may possibly relate to these. Also, he traces, as closely as he can, the process of suspicion, accusation and prosecution, looking in particular at the relationship between accused, accusers and village consensus. He is most interested in the questions: why the prosecutions are distributed in time and space as they are, and what determined the evident regularities in the pattern of accusation - in the relative status of accused and accusers, and in the nature of the quarrel between them.

Macfarlane assumes that his two questions are linked, that they may admit of a common explanation; but the point is arguable. A witch was prosecuted at court, but the accusation was a village affair. Different kinds of people were in control of the action in these two theatres - independent juries and judges, and fellow villagers. Given that the society of Tudor and Stuart England was markedly heterogeneous, these simple facts create problems for the historian of witchcraft. The facts of accusation and prosecution will only be fully connected if accusers and prosecutors are in agreement on the nature of witchcraft, and if their accusations and prosecutions are motivated by the same fears and have the same objective. And there is considerable room for doubt on this matter.

To take the question of agreement first, both Thomas and Macfarlane recognize as one of the important features of witchcraft in the period, the fact that among all the different groups of people that acted in conjunction to prosecute witches, there was great variation and confusion in views on the nature of witchcraft. For instance, Sir Edward Coke, who had a part in the drafting of the 1603 statute, defined a witch as "a person, that hath a conference with the Devil, to consult with him or to do some act". (Third Part of the Institutes of Laws of England, 1644). He was referring to the 'myth of Satan and his human servants' that was radical to the tradition of 'hammering' witches on the Continent. (See Cohn's article in A.S.A.9). But it is clear from the English pamphlets and depositions that this idea was only ever marginal to the popular conception of witchcraft in England. In his essay on the European 'witch-craze', Trevor-Roper argues an important distinction between witch-beliefs as used by villagers in their day-to-day social life (practical) witchcraft, to adapt Leach's phrase) and, in his case, "the inflammation of these beliefs, the incorporation of them by educated men into a bizarre but coherent intellectual system, which, at certain socially determined times, gave to otherwise unorganized peasant credulity a centrally directed, officially blessed, persecuting force". The English witch-beliefs, both in their content and use, differed in many important ways from their Continental counterparts. But all the evidence suggests that an equivalent distinction to Trevor-Roper's does need to be drawn for the English material. Macfarlane himself comments in his appendix on English definitions of witchcraft: "Examination of historical definitions ... immediately reveals that there was immense confusion and variation. There are a number of obvious
reasons for this. Some authorities based their definitions on the works of Continental demonologists; others on the opinions of country folk. Opinions of witchcraft changed between 1560 and 1680. Attitudes differed between social and religious groups.

So the legislators, judges and villagers very possibly meant different things by the word 'witch'. Then, insofar as they were talking about different things their accusations and prosecutions cannot have been motivated by the same fears, or directed to the same end. Perhaps those who were hung as witches were killed because they were unfortunate enough to get caught in an intersection of belief-systems, victims of homonymy.

In the analysis of the process of accusation and prosecution, the situations in court and village must surely be kept well apart, and will have to be linked in a complex model, in which people have, as members of different analytical categories, entirely disparate motives for acting in coordination. Macfarlane does not emphasize these distinctions.

For the situation at the courts, Macfarlane offers in his book only six pages on the legal background to secular prosecutions. (In his view, Notestein's work "makes more than a very general survey of the literary and legal controversies unnecessary".) He is unable fully to clarify the situation that held at law before the introduction of the first witchcraft statute in 1542. (In Religion and the Decline of Magic, Mr. Thomas manages little better.) And he describes how, in the seventeenth century, the decline in the number of presentments for witchcraft to the Assize Courts was linked with a growing tendency for Grand Juries to reject presentments with the call: "Ignoramus", and for Petty Juries to acquit the witches brought before them. Thus, on either side of the peak for prosecutions, the reader is left to doubt whether the major features of the curve may not be susceptible of an explanation in terms of the situation at the courts, rather than the situation in the village.

Obviously, further research needs to be done in this area. If any historian takes on the task, anthropologists can look forward with great interest to a focussed account of 'witchcraft at law' in Tudor and Stuart England. The case of English witchcraft is doubly interesting as the topic is constituted (as the game of chess is constituted by its rules) by statutes in a legal system without parallel in the ethnographic record. The witchcraft statutes were easily slotted into a highly formalistic legal framework with an evolved tradition of theory and exegesis, and themselves received commentary, for instance in Richard Bernard's A Guide to Grand Jury Men (1627). Macfarlane's account of the treatment of the problem of proof suggests that the history of the administration of the statutes may offer an ideal case-history for students of the problem of rationality in anthropology. (For instance, from his description, it is quite uncertain what would count as an argument that one was not a witch, once one had been accused at the Assize court).

For the situation in the village, we must remember that Macfarlane's statistics cover only legal prosecutions for witch-
craft. In his statistics he is only catching 'end-games', and again, the events on which he is working—the presentments and depositions—apart from being only terminal were also crucially determined by the fact that they were taking place on an entirely different stage from their antecedents. Macfarlane can only follow the action closely after it has been translated from the village to the court. He has only the hints and generalizations of contemporary writers on witchcraft as further evidence for the pattern of events before an accusation of witchcraft was taken to law, with other scattered references, for instance in diaries and astrologers' case-books.

So Macfarlane cannot manage a full account of witchcraft at the village level, by the nature of his material. But in his account of those suspicions and accusations that were taken to the point of legal prosecution, he does reveal very striking regularities in the pattern of accusation. He is refreshingly sceptical of the explanatory power of the idea that witchcraft 'explains' and offers a means of reaction to misfortune, and he considers the accusations instead as motivated by recurring tensions in social life. He argues, very forcefully, that the accusations were commonly related to problems of 'neighbourhood' (the clearly charged relationship between 'neighbours'). He shows how the image of the witch was, in certain important respects, simply a transformation of that of the ideal neighbour, how, when the suspected witch wished exactly to assert her neighbourliness, her conduct could be directly reclassified as 'witchcraft', as a repudiation of neighbourhood.

He observes, on the small quarrels about gifts, loans and invitations that were believed to motivate the maleficium, that it was always the victim who had made the open breach in neighbourly conduct, rather than the witch. And on the triviality of the issues, "the object of dispute was merely the final stage in the severing of the relationship". In the quarrel, and the following accusation, it was the total relationship, not the particular item, that was at stake. Those accused of witchcraft were commonly old women, wives or widows, and moderately poor, though not necessarily receiving poor relief. The accusers were commonly younger and better off, yeomen as against husbandmen and labourers.

From these findings and others, Macfarlane develops a very attractive argument about the pattern of accusation. He suggests that in a period of economic and social change, the witch-beliefs were used as a radical force effecting a transition from a neighbourly, highly integrated and mutually interdependent village society to a more individualistic pattern of life. It is a new, and rather terrible slant on the old 'dissolution of redundant relationships' idea. He suggests that the witch-beliefs were used in covert denial of the older values of neighbourhood, at a time when Christians could quote Exodus 22.23-24, with Thomas Ady, against those who withheld their charity from the poor: "If thou any way afflict widows, and fatherless, and they at all cry unto me, I will surely hear their cry, and my wrath shall wax hot against thee". In the period the traditional informal institutions dealing with the old and poor were coming
under strain, as the ideals of neighbourly conduct, to which
they were tied, were losing out to a new way of life. And in
an overtly Christian community, only through accusations of witch-
craft could the links be broken.

There are two difficulties with Macfarlane's argument about
witchcraft accusations at the village level. First, in his initial
discussion of "witchcraft prosecutions and economic problems", he
concludes that "no direct connection can be drawn between poverty
and accusations". This does seem clear from his findings. But
the connection in his final argument is surely direct, and it is
not clear how he can square this argument fully with his earlier
conclusion. And then there is a problem about the interpretation
of the gifts and loans that appear to be the crux of the matter.
Macfarlane sees the witch's request as the 'last straw', and the
refusal as the point at which the victim decides finally to with-
hold his charitable support from the indigent witch. But one can
doubt whether economic support was at all important in the
relationship, whether it was not simply Habsian exchange that
was refused, rather than charity (in the modern meaning of the
word). Macfarlane quotes a "classic instance of the neglected
neighbour at neighbourly celebrations" which surely invites the
first rather than the second interpretation: a man "having a sheep-
shearing about that time, and not inviting her thereto, being his
neighbour, she, as he supposed, bewitched two of his sheep". All
the other objects of dispute could be interpreted in the same
way. If you accept the possibility, then at once, unhappily,
the argument about charity crumbles. The quarrels can no longer
be seen as traces of the grounds for the accusations. They appear
instead as preliminary acts in the process of exclusion from the
village community, to which end the accusations may have been
directed. The witch was resentful at being 'cut' by the neigh-
bourhood (Macfarlane emphasizes that a developed suspicion was a
social, village affair), and the accusers could fully recognise
this. The grounds for the refusal cannot then be traced directly,
and in the task of explaining the accusations, we would be back
to square one.

I mention the possibility only because it does not seem to
have occurred to Dr. Macfarlane, and because I cannot see how to
rule it out. He presents his explanation as provisional, and
suggests that further work is needed on all aspects of the general
topic of witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England. He concludes:
"Attempts directly to correlate prosecutions, either in time, area,
or personnel, with economic, religious, medical, or social factors
have only been partially successful. But the attempt has suggested,
that the society of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is as
susceptible to sociological and anthropological analysis as any
modern housing estate or African tribe". Macfarlane's book has
achieved all this, very clearly. It stands also as one of the
most useful and intriguing of all ethnographies of witchcraft in
the literature.

Those who want to read Macfarlane's book seriously, should
also read at least the large section on witchcraft in Keith Thomas'
Religion and the Decline of Magic. If they have the time, they
will find the whole book endlessly fascinating. Mr. Thomas offers his account of the witch-beliefs as part of a general survey of a number of "systems of belief which were current in sixteenth and seventeenth century England, but which no longer enjoy much recognition today". After a preliminary discussion of the ideological changes involved in the English Reformation, he surveys the practice of magic and astrology, the appeal in political action to ancient prophecies, witch-beliefs, beliefs in ghosts and fairies, times and omens. The book is intended as a contribution "to our knowledge of the mental climate of early modern England". Mr. Thomas aims first to elucidate the beliefs, and then to establish the nature of their relations with each other, and with the system of organised religion. He works generally on the theme of misfortune and reaction to misfortune. He is careful always to consider the beliefs in relation to their daily use. He presents us not with a catalogue of superstitions, but with an intricate portrayal of a series of whole ways of life.

Mr. Thomas' complete argument has an extraordinary range and depth, and is quite beyond the scope of this review. I can at least allay one fear about the work as a whole, generated by the phrasing of its title: that its terms of reference are 'Frazerian'. Mr. Thomas does use the terms 'religion', 'science' and 'magic', as Frazer might have done, but he does so because it was in such terms that the intellectual issues were defined in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. Lollards in the fourteenth century would have clearly understood Mr. Thomas' title. It was Frazer's terms of reference that were antique.

Mr. Thomas is faced with a very great difficulty in the definition of his topic, when ideas of what was magical, and indeed what magic was, shifted, considerably and were confused throughout the period. Throughout the book, Mr. Thomas distinguishes between religion, magic and science according to the eighteenth century map, progress towards which he reckons was direct, if halting, from the time of the Reformation. His argument would have been more complicated, but might have gained in clarity, had he chosen instead to work through time on the changing meaning and boundaries of the terms 'superstition', 'magic', 'religion', 'scientific', and so on. Consider the following quotations: "If the distinction between magic and religion had been blurred by the medieval Church, it was strongly reasserted by the propagandists of the Protestant Reformation". (p. 51). "There is little more reason for asking why the wizards were able to retain their prestige than for inquiring how it was that the pretensions of Galenic physicians remained so long unchallenged". (p. 207). "The (weapon-salve), said Robert Fludd, was not 'cacomagical, but only naturally magical". (p. 224 What is the distinction?) "In the last resort, the only means of telling whether a cure was magical or not was to refer it to the authorities - the church, the law and the Royal College of Physicians". (p. 192) And on page 640: "At the end of our period we can draw a distinction between religion and magic which would not have been possible at the beginning". Certainly a closer account of the development of the three-way opposition between magic, religion and science across the Reformation and through the Scientific Revolution would have been helpful to Mr. Thomas'
argument. If ever there was a call for the nominalist approach in anthropology, it is here.

Otherwise, Mr. Thomas was perhaps overbold in his decision on the task of explanation: "Astrology, witchcraft, magical healing, divination, ancient prophecies, ghosts and fairies, are all now rightly disdained by intelligent persons. But they were taken seriously by equally intelligent persons in the past, and it is the historian's business to explain why this was so." Anthropologists, who have been working on similar problems for years, are still far from agreement on the most basic questions of procedure for the explanation of 'belief'. Mr. Thomas has too great a confidence in the explanatory power of a relatively simple functional approach.

In his section on witchcraft, Mr. Thomas offers a wide-ranging survey of the English witch-beliefs, of their relation to other systems of belief that could be used in explanation of misfortune, the situation at law, the situation of the witch in the village community, of the controversy on the reality of witchcraft, and on its legal treatment. He shows how the English witch-beliefs could make sense in relation to the contemporary conception of Satan, and of his powers of intervention in human affairs, and he offers an explanation of why, in England, witch-prosecutions and the Reformation arrived together. (Which makes the situation on the Continent problematical, where the initiative for prosecution clearly came from the Catholics with the Halieus Maleficarum and the Papal Bull 'Summis Desiderantes Affectibus'.)

Mr. Thomas' accounts of "the making of a witch" and "witchcraft in its social environment" are particularly striking. He discusses in detail how attitudes to ritual cursing were retained or modified across the Reformation, and shows how, deviously, they were tied in with the witch-beliefs. Exodus 22.23-4 (quoted above) and other texts supported a popular belief that the curses of beggars and the unjustly treated were especially potent. And yet, "when a bad-tongued woman shall curse a party, and death shall shortly follow, this is a shrewd token that she is a witch" (Thomas Cooper: The Mystery of Witchcraft, 1617). Legally, successful cursing constituted a 'strong presumption' of witchcraft. We are faced here with another of those deft and devastating reclassifications of conduct that are so characteristic of the English witch-beliefs. Mr. Thomas considers also 'the temptation to witchcraft', an issue that is not often raised with such force in the anthropological literature. And he discusses the isolation of the witch as a nonconformist in a tightly bound and tyrannically inquisitive local community.

At the end of his survey, Mr. Thomas takes up the question of the decline in the number of prosecutions and the final repeal of the witchcraft statute. He is surely correct in his insistence that the decline in prosecution can only reflect changes in "the intellectual assumptions of the educated classes who controlled the machinery of the law-courts". Then, any questions that we might like to raise about the decline of witchcraft accusations and suspicions at the village level, will probably be unanswerable. There is clear and general evidence for the survival of witch-
beliefs at a popular level long after the repeal of the witchcraft statute. But the situation cannot be monitored adequately. For traces we only have isolated reports of village lynchings, and scattered references in diaries and the like. (This point is obviously important for Dr. Macfarlane’s argument about witchcraft at the village level. His argument cannot be tested in the matter of the decline of witch-beliefs, and what should we make of the survivals?)

On the shift of educated opinion, Mr. Thomas observes that it was as silent as the shift of opinion on astrology. That is to say, the arguments for scepticism had been in circulation for a long time. (Scot’s The Discovery of Witchcraft was published in 1584.) In the second half of the seventeenth century, they just came to be accepted, by an apparently free choice. Mr. Thomas suggests that the shift in view may have been related to a change in the conception of the Devil and of his temporal powers. And he refers also, more tentatively to the growing acceptance of the assumption of an "orderly, regular universe, unlikely to be upset by the capricious intervention of God or Devil". He sees Newton’s mechanical philosophy as the consummation of this movement. He writes: "Accusations of diabolical witchcraft were thus rejected not because they had been closely scrutinized and found defective in some particular respect", (a reference to the growing diffidence in the legal treatment of witchcraft) "but because they implied a conception of nature which now appeared inherently absurd". This very same idea was taken up at the time by J. G. (Glanvill), a member of the Royal Society in his Philosophical Considerations Touching the Being of Witches and Witchcraft (1667). (In this book, the system of belief attempted a last, desperate self-confirmation. Glanvill says, of scepticism of the reality of witchcraft: "So confident an opinion could only be held (against the evidence) by some kind of witchcraft and fascination in the fancy". The Devil encourages the belief that there is no such thing as himself - the sceptics are themselves an argument of what they deny!) Mr. Thomas does not refer to the essay, but in it, Glanvill argues confidently and clearly, exactly against scepticism of the plausibility of witchcraft, leaving to authors like Baxter the task of "fully evincing" "the certainty of the worlds of spirits ... by unquestionable histories of apparitions and witchcraft" (the phrases are taken from the title of a book published in 1691). (And remember that Robert Boyle reckoned that all that was needed to confound the sceptics was "one circumstantial narrative fully verified"). Glanvill’s essay is certainly a witness to the fact that simple arguments against the plausibility of the idea of witchcraft were current. But then it also shows that the idea was not necessarily absurd to all educated men of the time. Glanvill was presumably a competent natural philosopher. He must surely have been more familiar with the developments in scientific thought to which Mr. Thomas refers in his argument than the "looser gentry (or) small pretenders to philosophy and wit" who were generally "deriders of the belief in witches" (Glanvill, quoted by Thomas). May not the choice for the argument from absurdity have been as ‘free’ as the choices for the other arguments? If we decide that it could have been, then, again, we will be back to square one.
Anthropologists should be deeply grateful to Mr. Thomas and Dr. Macfarlane for their two excellent introductions to the topic of witchcraft in Tudor and Stuart England. Perhaps, by their success, they will encourage anthropologists and historians to active collaboration, at last. They would be the first to recognize that their accounts can only be provisional in the present state of knowledge. Their achievement was not to explain, but to explore the topic in a new way. The situation that they have revealed is very much more complex than those that anthropologists are accustomed to handling. It offers an important challenge to anthropology, and with the work of Thomas and Macfarlane, we can hope for the future that we may come to a full understanding of the problem, expressed by Montaigne after witnessing a witch-burning on the Continent: "It is rather our conjectures highly to roast people alive for them."

Randal Keynes
One Father, One Blood: Descent and Group Structure among the Nelpa People. Andrew Strathern. £3.80.
London: Tavistock Publications, 1972

This is a technical work dealing with a technical argument. Let alone not being a book for beginners, it is not even one for more advanced students who are unfamiliar with the discussion to which it contributes. Even as a straight ethnography the work barely stands alone and, as the author admits, it really needs to be read in conjunction with his earlier volume, The Rope of Noka (Cambridge: 1971).

In this present work Andrew Strathern continues his account of the Nelpa-speaking people who live near Mount Hagen in the New Guinea Highlands. On this occasion he has chosen to concentrate on the internal constitution and composition of these people, taking as his example of them the Kawelka tribe. A start is made with an examination of the local idioms and ideology of kinship relations, and in this first chapter the title of the book is explained. It is an expression of the opposition between patrilineal descent (one father) and cognatic ties (one blood - this substance being regarded as derived from the mother). In the second chapter is revealed the discrepancy between ideology and the actual composition of groups among the Kawelka, and after that are considered certain factors which influence and help explain this discrepancy; the settlement pattern and co-residence (Chapter 3) and warfare which is now mainly a thing of the past (Chapter 4).

In Chapters 5 and 6 are considered respectively actual case histories of affiliation and choice in selecting group membership. In Chapter 7 the question of whether members of clan-groups who are non-agnates suffer from lower status than full agnates is discussed, and it is concluded that these categories are too gross to be useful since individual examples indicate a variety of complications and qualifications which cannot be explained in terms of descent. In the final chapter Strathern reviews the main concepts which he and other New Guinea ethnographers have employed and suggests certain further lines of advance in the study of Highland societies.

Andrew Strathern has once again exhibited his great knowledge of the area. The book is a substantial addition to New Guinea ethnography and is essential reading for all those concerned with the area. For those not so interested in the area the book may appear dull and difficult, and a bit of localised anthropological in-fighting (of a rather genteel sort). The only more general problem that is raised relates to the question put forward by J. A. Barnes in 1962 as to whether or not models derived from the study of accephalous African societies with corporate lineage structures are applicable to New Guinea Highland societies. That in some features they are, that in others they are not is barely surprising. As an outsider (in the sense that I am certainly no specialist in the area) I would like to stick my neck out and suggest that someone should look very hard and make certain that the most enormous red herring has not been drawn across New Guinea.

Peter Rivière
An Introduction to Social Anthropology. Lucy Nair, 1972.
£2.00 hardback; £1 paperback.

Lucy Nair, who taught for many years at the L.S.E., has reissued her introductory book, first published in 1965. She claims to have extended the discussion of aspects of social anthropology which are receiving more attention today than they were five years ago. But this second edition does not read like a modern introduction to a discipline that has changed considerably in that period. Her view of the subject as a branch of sociology certainly no longer commands universal assent and what she regards as 'Some Matters of Current Discussion' (the comparative method, anthropology as history or science, 'function') may have been important a decade ago but are simply no longer the crucial areas of debate. She speaks of Malinowski's and Radcliffe-Brown's theories as 'so much a part of the body or thought of contemporary anthropology that they are better dealt with in the context of current problems'. In departments less important than that with which she is associated teaching surely no longer reflects this. The last three chapters on the 'Related Subjects' of social change, applied anthropology and race relations look decidedly odd.

There are two chapters on religion, but we miss a section on that area called 'symbolism' or 'classification' in which much of the most exciting recent work has been done. This book belies a recent statement that Lévi-Strauss' vision 'imposes itself as the inevitable landscape', a man whose work in different fields has been so largely responsible for most of the important recent developments. And of kinship, law and economics, she makes the amazing statement that these differ from religion because the latter 'is concerned with systems of belief as well as systems of relationship and action'. On kinship in particular, that technical area in which some of the biggest issues have of late been fought out, Nair provides no real indication of any of the chief ways in which progress has been made since 1960. There is no adequate discussion of 'alliance' theory and she seems to have no greater idea than Fortes or Radcliffe-Brown of the nature of the dissent involved in the work of Dumont, Leach and Needham. Leach did not simply 'comment' on Fortes' work, as she puts it!

There are 'suggestions for reading' at the end of each chapter. And here whole ranges of that literature which has produced the changes of our discipline in recent years is missing. Thus, after the chapter entitled 'What is Religion?' there are no references to works written in the last decade, and after that on 'Law', of the nineteen items recommended, only two have been published since 1960. In a work intended for consumption by those beginning their study of anthropology, this is astonishing.

Some have expressed the view that a textbook of our subject is not possible. This is certainly true in view of the magnitude of recent changes, and the existence of deep differences of opinion. And Nair has merely 'tinkered' with rather than thoroughly revised a book written nearly a decade ago. Some of the changes in this time have virtually given anthropology a new identity and by the nature of her treatment and omissions, Nair seems to indicate that an intelligent consideration of this newer anthropology is not of
great importance. She, perhaps the most loyal to Malinowski of a generation, few of whom were really rebels, seems to have deliberately excluded from her book any remark on the significance of these developments. (But strangely enough she agrees with the opinion of a reviewer who claimed that Jarvie, the author of The Revolution in Anthropology, trained at the L.S.E., was not fully aware of the developments in theory since Malinowski's time. Mair herself seems to regard these developments merely as 'refinements', but this in many cases is a real misperception.)

This book reads like a summation of the achievements of Malinowski's pupils, in many ways. And, no doubt, such a tribute is fitting, for (if I may borrow from Matthew Arnold) he was our talented and energetic protestant, our 'philistine of genius'. He will do well to remember that there were two aspects to the man. The trouble has been perhaps that his followers did not dissent sufficiently, and possessed, in some cases, only one of his qualities. There has been a surfeit of 'Hebraism' which has impaired our growth, and no text book issued now should ignore, as Mair's does, the 'Hellenism' which has transformed major areas of the subject. It has not been possible to dispel the dim consensus and redress the imbalance by spreading both sweetness and light. But it ought to be remembered, too, that: 'He most honours my style who learns under it to destroy the teacher' (Whitman).

Malcolm Crick
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