CONTENTS

Obituary
Louis Dumont (1911–1998)
by N. J. Allen ........................................ 1–4

DINA KHAN
Mixed Marriages in Islam: An Anthropological Perspective
on Pakistan ........................................ 5–28

JOANNA PFAFF-CZARNECKA
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie! Non-Christian Religious Minorities
in Switzerland Today ............................ 29–51

BONANI SAMALL
Appliqué Craft in Orissa, India: Continuity, Change,
and Commercialization ....................... 53–70

Review Article
PAUL HENLEY
Homage to the Arakmût .......................... 71–79

From the Archives
‘From Science to Action’: Durkheimian Engagement with Activists in
the Groupe d’Études Socialistes
by Robert Parkin .................................. 81–90

Book Reviews
THOMAS R. TRAUTMANN, Aryans and British India
Reviewed by David N. Gellner .................... 91–93

FELIX PADEL, Sacrifice of Human Being: British Rule
and the Konds of Orissa
Reviewed by Robert Parkin ...................... 93–94

BEATRIX HEINTZE, Ethnographische Aneignungen: deutsche
Forschungsreisende in Angola
Reviewed by Robert Parkin ...................... 95–96

NIGEL RAPPORT and ANDREW DAWSON (eds.), Migrants of Identity:
Perceptions of Home in a World of Movement
Reviewed by Janette Davies ...................... 96–98
Contents

Book Reviews (continued)

LUCIO V. MANSILLA, A Visit to the Ranquel Indian
Reviewed by Peter Rivière ......................... 98–100
Publications Received ................................ 101–102
Contributors to this Issue ......................... inside back cover
LOUIS DUMONT
(1911–1998)

LOUIS DUMONT, who died on 19th November 1998, was born in Salonika in 1911, where his engineer father ran a French railway construction firm. At the age of 18, in juvenile revulsion from the bourgeois life ahead of him, he impulsively abandoned his studies at a top Parisian lycée. Thrown out by his widowed mother, who had sacrificed much to educate him, he went through a variety of jobs before being taken on for menial work in the Musée des Arts et Traditions Populaires. It was from the museum staff that he first gained a sense of vocation, appreciating their collective dedication to the humanistic task of preserving and recording French culture. Encouraged by the director, Georges-Henri Rivière, he returned to academic life and was particularly inspired by the lectures of Mauss.

In 1939 he was planning a history-of-art thesis on Celtic survivals in contemporary French tools when war broke out, and he soon found himself a prisoner of war. He developed his German and, after a spell as farm hand, was employed in a factory on the outskirts of Hamburg. Recalling the teaching of Mauss, he had his wife Jenny send him a Sanskrit manual and ended up receiving private weekly


I met Dumont some four or five times from 1969 onwards. Our last contact was when he wrote apologetically declining an invitation to give a keynote address at the conference on Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life held in Oxford in July 1995.

Dumont maintained a personal subscription to JASO from 1973 onwards.
Sanskrit lessons from an Indologist, Walther Schubring, a specialist on the Jains. One would love to know more about this curious wartime relationship, from both sides (it was to Schubring that Dumont dedicated his semi-popular *La civilisation indienne et nous* in 1964).

In 1945 he resumed work at the museum and toyed with undertaking an Indo-European comparative study of dragons. Dissuaded by Dumézil, he devoted his first book instead to an ethnographic and historical study of a folkloristic festival on the lower Rhône—*La Tarasque* (1951), dedicated to the memory of Mauss. Meanwhile he was preparing himself for fieldwork in South India, working 'like one possessed' at Tamil, Hinar, and the regional ethnographic literature. In late 1948, with the support of the great Sanskritist Renou, he set off for two years in Tamilnad.

He chose south India partly because of a culture-historical hypothesis—the shift from Indo-European Vedism to classical Hinduism was sometimes attributed to the effect of the Dravidian substratum, and similarly, the Pramulai Kallar, the martial caste with whom he spent eight months, were chosen partly for their cultural distance from sanskritized Brahmans. But although the Aryan–Dravidian dichotomy was, and still is, important for students of kinship and marriage, Dumont came rather to emphasize the oneness of India. This he located particularly in the pervasive effect of caste, which, as is well known, he interpreted in terms of its underlying ideology. Perhaps we shall one day have a full intellectual biography assessing the various elements that contributed to Dumont's brand of structuralism. Among them were surely the *Année sociologique* background and Lévi-Strauss's gift of manuscript chapters of the *Elementary Structures of Kinship*; but no less important was the formal 'crystalline beauty' that he perceived in the culture of the Tamils—those 'born sociologists'.

After six months back at the museum, he was encouraged to move by Furer-Haimendorf at SOAS, and he came to Oxford to the Lecturership in Indian Sociology in succession to Srinivas, the first holder. His years in Evans-Pritchard's department (1951–5) familiarized him with a third European intellectual tradition, after the French and German, and prepared him for his introduction to the French translation of *The Nuer* (1968) and for his valuable *Introduction à deux théories d’anthropologie sociale* (1971).

By 1958 he had given his inaugural lecture as Directeur d’études at the École Pratique des Hautes Études in Paris, published his two theses on Tamilnad, and founded with David Pocock (his former pupil and successor at Oxford) the journal *Contributions to Indian Sociology*, which is still going strong. In addition he had followed up his original fieldwork with a fifteen-month spell in north India. Though he was scarcely to write it up, this second fieldwork experience was important since it introduced him to the figure of the samnyāśī, thus stimulating his magnificent Frazer Lecture on world renunciation in Indian religions (1958). *Homo Hierarchicus*, his classic analysis of caste and the book for which he is best known, followed in 1966–7 and marked a turning-point in his research. Having gained comparative perspective from his work on India, he now turned back to Europe, concentrating on the rise of economics as an autonomous domain, on the
nature of Western individualism, and on the specificity of the German variant of
modern ideology. The opposition of purity and impurity, basic to the Indian work,
gives way to individualism versus holism (foreshadowed in the renouncer versus
the man-in-the-world), and the early interest in diffusion and acculturation that had
once led him to the Dravidians resurfaces in an interest in the eastward spread of
enlightenment values into Germany and Russia.

But his life was not simply that of a lone researcher, such as French academic
institutions at that time made possible. He founded a still active multi-disciplinary
centre for Indian studies and worked with it until 1970. Later (1976–82) he
initiated and inspired a small social anthropology research seminar called Erasmus,
in which his ideas were often applied to fieldwork outside India (he strongly
emphasized the need for reliable ethnography). Just occasionally he publicly took
took a position on a political issue, for instance the New Caledonia referendum in 1988.
However, he came nowhere near achieving the celebrity of a figure like Lévi­
Strauss, and in 1979 he himself looked back on the post-Oxford period of his life
as ‘a time of many disappointments’. He recognized that his own personality
might have had something to do with this, that he might be judged ‘awkward and
maladroit in social life’; and it is true that he lacked the bonhomie of a Mauss.
But there was more to it than that. His vision of science, based on the pre-First
World War Durkheimian movement as well as on his museum experience, was of
a collective and collaborative enterprise to which each worker humbly and con­
scientiously contributed what he could. Instead, he found himself in an anthropo­
logical community governed by the individualism so characteristic of modern
ideology, where each researcher was expected to try and maximize his own stand­
ing in an arena dominated by personality cults and passing fashions such as
Marxism. There is some truth in this: enthusiasm for the dernier cri all too easily
leads to ignorance and neglect of less popular forms of achievement. Dumont
treasured the memory of the occasion in 1986 when Dumézil came to his apart­
ment and conferred on him the Légion d’honneur with the words: ‘You are like
me, you did not pursue a career, you pursued your work’ (vous n’avez pas fait de
carrière, vous avez fait votre travail).

Looking back, one can see Dumont as one branch, perhaps the most central,
of the intellectual tradition that runs from Comte and Fustel de Coulanges to
Durkheim and on to Mauss, but one should not overlook other influences such as
Weber and Evans-Pritchard, or even Talcott Parsons.

Among his contemporaries one sees a somewhat isolated and austere scholar,
above all serious, someone little inclined to rejoice in the ludic component of our
adventures among cultures and ideas. Domestically, though childless, he was
happily married for forty years to Jenny until her death, then to Suzanne Tardieu­
Dumont, a Director of Research at the museum where he had begun his anthropo­
logical life; but outside the home, in spite of his many successes, distinctions, and
trips abroad, he was essentially an embattled figure. Reading his account of the
friendship of Goethe and Schiller in L’idéologie allemande (1991), one senses a
wish that it had been otherwise.
For the future, a number of young scholars will benefit from the trust fund that he established, and although it is difficult to anticipate future evaluations of his contribution, very likely its status will rise rather than fall. *Homo Hierarchicus*, with its grand theoretical ambition, its grasp of facts both Indological and ethno­graphic, and its probing judgements on a massive literature, will surely be difficult to equal or replace, and will continue for some time to stimulate and provoke, as it has done for more than thirty years. One hopes that judgements will not treat it in isolation from his lesser-known texts, which cover not only ethnography but also the history of the Raj (in UNESCO’s *History of Mankind*, vol. 5, ed. C. Morazé, 1976). The precise value of his ideas on hierarchy and hierarchical opposition may need further testing and clarification, and the binary form that he often gave to his analyses is characteristic of the period in which he wrote and may appear dated. On the other hand, some of his oppositions may at least turn out to be partial apprehensions subsumable within richer and more dynamic notions of structure, to whose formulation they themselves will have contributed. As for his later work, one cannot but admire its boldness and the depth of its reflexivity. We should remember that posterity will judge not only his own œuvre but also those who choose to ignore or dismiss it.

N. J. ALLEN
MIXED MARRIAGES IN ISLAM:
AN ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE ON PAKISTAN

DINA KHAN

Introduction

With increasing multiculturalism it seems inevitable that there will be a corresponding increase in inter-cultural marriages—a topic fundamental to social anthropology. However, a review of the current literature shows a dearth of material on mixed marriages as a whole, and particularly as regards the social implications and consequences of marriage between non-Muslim women and Muslim men. Yet this type of relationship is not unknown; on the contrary, a substantial number of such marriages occur within the Islamic world. This article focuses on the dynamics of mixed marriages in Pakistan and their implications for current debates about personal and cultural identity.¹

Observations of mixed couples known to me personally indicate that there is a marked variation in the way foreign wives adapt to life in Pakistan. This ranges from complete acceptance of the local norms and culture through to total rejection of everything Pakistani. Even the children have different perspectives on their mixed heritage, depending on the attitude of their mother. It appears to me that there must be some factor which determines to a large extent how and why a

¹. The article is based on doctoral research carried out in Islamabad in 1992–3.
foreign wife makes the choices she does, and what the consequences of these choices are.

Current statistics show that mixed marriages are more likely to fail than non-mixed ones. This is especially true in situations where the husband and wife come from different religious backgrounds. New cultural and religious norms have to be assimilated, and new notions of identity must be juxtaposed with existing ones. I would argue that all mixed marriages raise questions of identity, and that this is especially true for the partner who is leaving his or her native culture and environment. Specifically, it seems that identity may be challenged and even threatened.

This article will accordingly address issues of self-identity raised by Laing, Bateson, and Ewing and apply them in this context. In particular, Laing’s notions of ontological insecurity and Gregory Bateson’s theory of the double-bind will be discussed as the basis for formulating a model which explains the identity crisis experienced by all foreign wives, and the subsequent behaviour patterns which follow on from this. Key notions of systemic power and investments will be introduced and used to argue that the double-bind is constitutive of relational systems other than those usually construed as pathological, and that ontological security is taken to be a condition that is continually re-achieved and defended. This theme is then expanded to produce a model which explains the behaviour of foreign wives in the context of both their social situation and their individual perceptions. This model is based on the premise that ontological insecurity is not merely a psychiatric affliction, but that it can be used to analyse other displacement contexts.

Identity Crisis and the Problem of Ontological Security

The focus of this research is a group of foreign wives in Pakistan. However, the critical issue in any consideration of such a unique and dynamic social phenomenon is the question of what it means to be a ‘foreign wife’, indeed of what it means ‘to be’. Psychoanalytic studies have been extremely valuable in explaining the link between culture and the individual’s notions of self and identity. Although previously it was argued that identity was culturally specific, it would appear that this is not the case. Early theories which emphasized cultures as being unique historical creations have little relevance today. Instead, close attention must be paid to the socialisation of individuals, in relation both to one another, and to their environment.

Since the emergence of systems theory, a considerable body of theory and practice has evolved from the mid-fifties onwards in the field of family therapy, at the core of which lies what has become known as the ‘systemic approach’. Although the family therapy movement developed through the practice of various groups, it is with the approach of Bateson and others that this discussion will most-
Mixed Marriages in Islam

niques applying concepts derived from systems theory, with its emphasis on the
circulation of information, were introduced by the Palo Alto team into what was
initially a research context. In particular, work on schizophrenogenic families was
predicated on the identification of the double-bind, a particular communication pat­
tern which characteristically led to schizophrenic behaviour. The central theme of
this work was that schizophrenia could be understood only systemically, not as an
internal condition existing outside systemically determined behaviour patterns.

This approach to schizophrenia became well known in the 1960s in the work
of R. D. Laing and his associates (see Laing 1990, Laing and Esterson 1964).
Although this approach is largely discounted in psychiatry as a means of providing
a causal account of such clinical conditions, the approach as it has developed up
to the 1990s continues to provide a way of framing and thinking about relations
between family members and people in general, rather than just cases involving
a specific ‘pathology’. Laing’s notion of ontological security provides a powerful
framework for construing the situated and contested domain of identity. With its
emphasis on the effects of ontological insecurity, Laing’s discussion provides
insights into people’s perceptions of themselves and the world. Their sense of
displacement and lack of identity causes them to seek the preservation of self.
However, although their coping strategies give them the illusion of being in
control, the reality is that they cannot function in any other way. Their ontological
insecurity ensures that they remain trapped in specific patterns of interaction. In
other words, they are caught in a Batesonian double-bind. Such people are unable
to discriminate between various communication signals. Their communication
systems cannot identify the kind of message that is being conveyed to them, with
the result that they have difficulty in making accurate judgements about what the
other person meant. As a result, the patterns of negation continue, and a sense of
ontological insecurity remains.

In this context the work of Ewing is also particularly relevant. Her focus on
the psychological dimensions of family relationships among Pakistani women
illustrates the importance of intrapsychic autonomy to the working of relationships
within the extended family, especially between a new bride and her mother-in-law.
Ewing’s argument indicates that ontological security is a necessity for normal
family relationships and that it influences the assimilation of newcomers, here the
bride, into the family.

The Batesonian approach is usually perceived as having been developed by the
Milan Systemic Approach which arose in the work of Palazzoli, Boscolo, Cecchin,
and Prata during the 1970s. This approach continued to be subject to continual
reflection and criticism during the ‘second-order’ thinking which arose in the
following decade. Running throughout this critical reflection has been the issue
of power:

Saying that the behaviour of one individual is the cause of the behaviour of other
individuals is an epistemological error. This error derives from the arbitrary
punctuation which isolates such behaviour from the pragmatic context of preceding
behaviours which can be traced back to infinity. Even a behaviour which, in various ways, reduces its apparent victim to impotence is not a ‘behaviour-power’, but rather a ‘behaviour-response’. And yet, whoever thinks of himself as being in the ‘superior’ position believes himself the one with power, just as the one with the ‘inferior’ position thinks of himself as the one without it. We know, however, these convictions to be wrong: the power belongs to neither the one nor the other. *The power is only in the rules of the game*, which cannot be changed by the people involved in it. (Palazzoli *et al.* 1978: 5-6, my emphasis).

This statement echoes the legendary assertions of Bateson concerning the ‘pernicious epistemology of power’ (cited in Palazzoli *et al.*: ibid.). Heated debates about the status of victims and perpetrators, and about gender and intergenerational relations, which often refer to the Bateson/Haley debate (Hoffman 1981) have sought to locate the individual’s relations in wider political and social contexts.

It could be argued that an individual may have an investment in a particular representation of power which she or he may experience as both empowering and disempowering. By this I mean that the bind situation which appears paradoxical is precisely the nexus in which identity is established and preserved, and in which power is maintained or negotiated (see Anderson *et al.* 1986, Anderson and Goolishian 1988).

Individual development thus occurs in a matrix of culturally shaped situations which are often embedded in inconsistent, often incompatible, symbolic systems. This means that self-representations are highly contextual, and shift rapidly as the actors negotiate status and seek to specify specific goals, implicitly redefining themselves and each other during the course of the interaction. Where these existing self-representations become inadequate due to non-resolution of conflict, new strategies are followed, and identities renegotiated. These symbolic systems and associated self-images are therefore always experienced in the context of particular behaviour. Children learn not only this set of systems and images, but also how to shift from one to the other, when to juxtapose them, and when to keep them distinct (Palazzoli *et al.*: 273). It would thus appear that as long as an individual is able to maintain self-representations which are contextually appropriate, he or she may experience a sense of continuity despite several integrated (or non-integrated, as the case may be) self-representations.

I would argue that it is not only in situations of extreme neurosis that ontological insecurity comes into play, but rather that it is an integral part of many situations. The double-bind exists not only in cases of psychological disorder, but also in day-to-day interactions. Ontological insecurity exists whenever a person’s sense of self is questioned. Thus it does not necessarily indicate a state of mental disorder; rather, it is an indicator of a questioning of notions of identity. This crisis can arise in many situations of stress or displacement, including the move from one country to another and, even more importantly, from one culture to another. For this reason I propose that theories of ontological insecurity and the double-bind can serve as useful tools in examining the dynamics of mixed-race marriage in Pakistan.
In this context, Holloway’s discussion of ‘investments’ might also be useful. Investment is not just an economic term: it can also be used to describe the link between questions of power and identity. Holloway argues that people take up certain positions in order to gain power. The extent of this power is determined by the relationship each individual has with others. Consequently, interpersonal relationships are of great importance in maintaining or increasing one’s prestige. Investment is thus not merely a matter of emotional satisfaction, but also provides material, economic, and social benefits.

I would argue that this notion of investment also manifests itself in the relationship of a foreign wife with her husband and his family. By marrying someone from a different culture, a foreign wife has moved away from her own cultural tradition. She has to integrate into, or at least partially accept, her husband’s culture. This requires investments on her part. Often these take place long before the wife even comes to Pakistan. In fact such a process begins from the moment the couple gets together, but it is especially noticeable in cases where the foreign wife has had to move to Pakistan. She renegotiates her identity in order to gain a more favourable position within the in-law family structure. Her social standing and position within the family hierarchy can thus be altered, depending on what position she takes.

Foreign Wives

The Foreign Wives Group of Islamabad, Pakistan, came into existence in 1985 with twenty-eight members. Since then it has grown considerably and at present has more than one hundred women listed as members, although they do not all attend meetings. Since 1989 the Group has also produced a monthly newsletter providing information about current members and their activities.

For this research attention was focused on individual members of the group. I introduced myself through the monthly newsletter and asked for volunteers willing to answer my questions and discuss their lives. This was followed by recorded interviews. The wives interviewed represent as diverse a range of nationalities and age groups as possible.

Having interviewed over forty women, it soon became apparent that there are several factors which influence the integration of a foreign wife into Pakistani society. In other words, how and why she acts is partially determined by certain key relationships and issues which repeatedly arise in the mixed-marriage setting. Before proceeding any further, therefore, I would like to examine these factors in more detail.
Relationship with in-laws

The relationship between a foreign wife and her in-laws is a complex one: both parties need to evolve an understanding of each other’s expectations and points of view. A harmonious relationship can greatly ease a wife’s entry into Pakistani society. Although there are obvious exceptions, by and large foreign wives in Islamabad find that their relationship with their in-laws is a good one, providing them with much needed support. Mary, for example, was able to leave her children with her mother-in-law for three years while she and her husband were in the USA. The same is true for Marinette, whose children lived with their grandmother while their parents were in Paris.

However, in order for this relationship to work, a wife’s in-laws must have been willing to welcome her into their family, and this proves to be the case among most foreign wives in Islamabad. Andrea has a very good relationship with her in-laws. Her husband’s family was happy to welcome her, and nowadays, despite owning a house of their own, the couple prefer to share a house with his elder brother and wife. The family is close (but not suffocating) and supportive.

In families where such acceptance does not occur, the relationship between a wife and her in-laws is difficult and often unpleasant. Selma has been particularly unfortunate in this respect. When she arrived in Islamabad to marry, her in-laws wanted to send her back home, claiming that her husband’s sister had to be married off first. The fact that Selma refused to convert to Islam did not help either. The couple got married despite the opposition, living first in a hotel, then with friends. Only after seven months did her husband admit to his parents that they were married, and the family had another quiet wedding at home. Thereafter they moved in with his parents.

Although this is an extreme case, it serves to highlight the importance of the wife/in-law relationship and its contribution to the success of a marriage. Of the women I interviewed the number who live with their in-laws and say that they are happy in Pakistan was much higher than those women who purport to be happy and are living independently. In fact, just 25% of wives who live independently say that they are happy, as compared to 37.5% who live in an extended family set-up.

This statistic is hardly surprising. I would argue that the support of in-laws is crucial for a foreign wife. She is ontologically insecure when she arrives in Pakistan, having given up both family and friends. Her identity is lost, and she has to re-establish some sense of self. Until a network of friends has been established, the only people a wife can legitimately and easily turn to are her in-laws. They act as a buffer, protecting her from society until she is ready to stand on her own. The relationship between a wife and her in-laws is therefore of great importance, one which can determine, to a certain degree, how well a wife adapts to Pakistan.
Return to the fold

When children are sent abroad for higher education the family link is sometimes temporarily weakened. This is especially true for men since they have a lot more freedom when they go abroad than women do. Women are usually sent abroad only if they have relatives there who can watch over them. Men, on the other hand, reside in hostels. They are free to go out and meet whom they want, and no one questions what they do. This behaviour ties in with the idea of izzat or family honour, whose essential message is that women need to be protected and that men are their only protectors (Engineer 1992: 5). Because a man cannot compromise the family’s izzat he is free to act as he chooses. A woman, however, can shame her entire family by her behaviour, so she must be strictly controlled. As a result, very few women study overseas, compared to the large number of men.

The men who go abroad soon find that they can easily meet women. Although a man would have difficulty in taking a woman out in Pakistan, abroad everything is much simpler. He does not have to worry about family pressure or the scandal he might cause. As a result men are much freer to have relationships, some of which ultimately result in marriage. However, although many Pakistani men seem quite liberal and broad-minded abroad, this often changes when they return to Pakistan. While living abroad they know that they are entirely independent. The same is not true at home. Once again they rejoin the family and all its pressures. Now the reputation of the entire family must be considered.

The result is a return to the conservative ideas of Pakistani society. Faced with the choice between conforming or being ostracized by the community, the husband almost always returns to the fold. What was previously considered acceptable behaviour for his wife and children now becomes a cause for disagreement. This has happened to many foreign wives. One wife described how she manages to get around her husband’s conservative ideas by initiating plans, then telling him about them—at which stage he can no longer refuse to go along. For example, when her daughter wanted to study medicine in a co-educational college away from home, she organized everything first and then told him.

Sometimes the wife does not know what she has let herself in for until she arrives in Pakistan. Several women who met their husbands abroad and then moved to Pakistan discovered that their husbands had previously been married and had a wife and children living there already. They were expected to accept this situation without question.

When it comes to raising daughters abroad, Pakistani fathers are very quick to revert to conservative ideas. While it is accepted for a man to marry a foreigner and live abroad, it would be unthinkable for his daughter to do the same. Pakistani families settled in England often send their daughters back to Pakistan once they are fifteen or sixteen years old in order to have them married off. In doing so they hope to avoid later conflicts when the daughters start seeing unsuitable boys and begin to want more freedom. Exactly the same is true for mixed couples. Many have moved back to Pakistan specifically for the purpose of raising their
daughters in an environment which they can control. At times this move has been made when the children have already reached their early teens, and such an upheaval can be very traumatic for them.

So why do these men choose to marry foreign women in the first place? The answer seems to be that they too did not realize what they were getting into. In the first enthusiasm of 'love', such a union seems ideal. Both husband and wife share idealistic expectations that they can overcome any problems which they might encounter, and while living abroad that is often the case.

However, the situation is different in Pakistan. By returning to his home environment, the husband automatically places himself under the influence of his family and society, and is under pressure to conform to what is expected of him. Part of that expectation relates to the kind of wife he brings home, and therein lies the contradiction. Although Pakistanis like to have fair wives, they are also expected to bring home a woman from a similar background with the same system of values and beliefs. Pakistani wives know how to access the existing social network in a way that foreigners can never hope to achieve: they have the same cultural traditions behind them. When a foreign wife comes into this situation she disrupts the entire family structure. Her presence calls into question the fundamental relationship between men and women. Because of her upbringing she inserts a totally different set of expectations into the marriage equation. If the couple lives in Pakistan, the husband has to reconcile her ideas with those of his family—and the family usually wins out.

The children

This decision has repercussions for the children. Every foreign wife has to decide how she will raise her children. Does she want them to grow up learning about both cultures, or is it better for them to grow up feeling a strong identity with one culture alone? Which religion will they follow? Will they be sent abroad for higher education? Will she let them choose their own spouses or will she prefer to arrange their marriages in more typical Pakistani fashion?

The prevailing view of the children of mixed marriages is that they have identity problems because of their ambiguous social position; they are regarded as a psychologically disadvantaged group. This is not the case in Pakistan. Although the children have foreign mothers, by and large this does not present them with an identity crisis. This can be attributed to the fact that women who marry Pakistani men make a conscious decision to raise their children as Pakistanis. Many of the women I interviewed stressed the fact that they felt their children were better off having strong roots in one country and culture, rather than being torn between two. As a result they are very much a part of Pakistani society. They attend local schools, and consequently have local friends with whom they share similar interests and follow the same codes of behaviour. For example, one mother discussed how her daughter refuses to swim when there are boys in the pool and prays five
times a day. Her mother has never instructed her about these things, but she has picked up the attitudes of her local friends, and wants to behave as they do.

Most literature on the children of mixed marriages mentions the problems they have with their skin colour. Because they are not 'white', they automatically become classified as 'coloured', even though they share characteristics of both cultures. The opposite holds true in Pakistan. Since Pakistanis are extremely colour-conscious, they prefer their children to appear fair. As mentioned previously, fair is considered beautiful, so mixed-race children are sought after. This is especially true of girls, whose fairness is an asset in the marriage market. However, sometimes their colour can work against them. Such children are sometimes the target of jealousy, and they are teased or picked on at school. One girl who has to walk past a boy's college on her way to the bus stop is continuously harassed by boys calling her angrez (foreigner). Such cases are unusual, though, and this type of attitude is uncommon. For the most part these children have no problems being accepted into Pakistani society.

In fact, many of these children go through life having the same experiences as any Pakistani child of similar economic standing with the same kind of education and, eventually, similar marriages. Several foreign wives have agreed to some form of arranged marriage for their children. In some cases this consists in allowing their daughter to meet family friends and make her choice, but in other cases she is simply told whom to marry. The main reason behind this decision is that Islam passes on religion through the father. Consequently, if a Muslim girl marries a non-Muslim, her children will be non-Muslim too. Such a disgrace is to be avoided at all costs.

Often family pressure also plays a big role in this decision. The wife's in-laws want to ensure that the children are not removed from their Pakistani heritage, so they look for good Pakistani families to marry into. Like it or not, the wives have to comply.

Individual Case-studies

An examination of the data shows that there appear to be certain behavioural patterns which can be used to divide the group into four distinct categories, each demonstrating the dynamics of the relationship between family and society. All the wives interviewed could be placed in one of these groups, although some were easier to place than others. Since the women within each group all demonstrate the same behaviour to various degrees, it is possible to select one person who typifies the behaviour associated with that group. These four respondents thus provide a good representation of the different strategies employed and the dynamics of the family–society relationship at work.
Aliya Habib is English by birth. She met her husband when they were both studying in the UK and moved to Pakistan a few years later. She has three children, a son and two daughters. All three were born in the UK but have never lived there (for reasons of nationality, Aliya wanted the children born in the UK). The family lives in a lower-middle-class neighbourhood and share a house with the husband’s parents. Aliya and her family live upstairs, while her parents-in-law live downstairs. Since the relationship between Aliya and her mother-in-law is quite hostile, they maintain separate entrances for each part of the house. In fact, this relationship was so bad at one point that Aliya had a nervous breakdown. However, she insists that with the help of psychiatric counselling and medication she has now recovered.

Jane Hashmi lives in an affluent sector of Islamabad, in her own house. Even though her sisters-in-law live right next door, the family is able to maintain its privacy and independence. Jane has two children, a boy and a girl, who attend one of the private English schools which abound in Islamabad. Her husband is a doctor twenty years older than herself, who came back to Pakistan with the purpose of establishing a private clinic. Business is not going well, and Jane has misgivings about what will happen to them in the future. Prior to moving to Islamabad, the family lived in Canada. Although Jane was wearing Western clothes when I met her, the overall impression she gives is of being quite conservative. Her husband is extremely religious, and this has had a definite effect on her. He dislikes her having any friends, and as a couple they seldom socialize. As a result, Jane projects the image of a woman living under strain, and even though she attempted to dispel this idea, her feelings came through clearly in the way she kept refuting statements she had made earlier about her relationship with her husband and her life in Pakistan.

Karin is Danish. She and her husband met in Denmark and married there, then moved to Pakistan after three or four years. She lives in an affluent neighbourhood and runs a hairdressing business from her home. Karin has two children who attend a private school. They live independently, but Karin’s mother-in-law comes to visit them quite often. Although Karin told me that she got on quite well with her mother-in-law, she admitted that they sometimes disagreed.

Jean is a doctor. She met her husband, also a doctor, in the UK. After a five-year courtship they decided to marry. Although Jean had visited Pakistan before the marriage to get an idea of what it was like, living there proved to be quite different. The family first lived in Multan, a conservative town in southern Punjab, before moving north to Rawalpindi and then Islamabad. Her in-laws were originally quite upset at the thought of their son marrying a foreigner, but later accepted the idea. The family has an extended living arrangement, sharing the house with her husband’s two sisters and his mother. Jean keeps herself busy through contacts with the foreign community. She has deliberately refrained from learning Urdu well, in the belief that this maintains a distance between herself and her in-laws. The family has two children, a boy and a girl, who attend the International School in Islamabad. Despite the fact that they are half-Pakistani, the
children consider themselves English. The son especially is vehemently opposed to anything Pakistani and refuses to learn Urdu. Jean has maintained a lifestyle similar to that which she would have had in the UK, and her marriage to a Pakistani has had little impact on her behaviour.

The four wives discussed here represent a cross-section of those interviewed. Their life-styles and observations are not unique. On the contrary, their experiences reflect the issues which foreign wives in Pakistan have to come to terms with in one way or another. The difference lies in how they cope and the strategy they follow.

Religion

One of the main factors affecting mixed marriages in Pakistan is religion. Whether or not the wife converts to Islam, and whether, if so, it is a true conversion, has an enormous impact on the dynamics of her relationship with her husband and his family. In some instances where the wife had already embraced another religion before marriage, the effect on the marriage is even more pronounced. A wife must choose either to retain her own religion or to become a Muslim. The attitude of her partner is vital to this decision, as his acceptance or rejection of her religious identity plays a key role in determining how well she will be received by his family. Among the foreign wives of Islamabad, both situations exist. Some wives chose to convert to Islam of their own free will, while others have retained their own religion. Quite a number are registered as Muslims on their marriage documents but do not practise it.

Aliya converted to Islam when she and her husband decided to get married. She argues that conversion is necessary in order to avoid trouble in the marriage:

I’m glad that I changed from the beginning. I’ve seen some girls here, they are still Christians, and it’s caused a lot of trouble with their husbands. I mean, they don’t care when they are abroad, but when they come back here with the parents and all, they start saying “don’t do this any more, don’t do that any more”. They are under pressure themselves, so they pressure their wives.

Aliya sees her conversion as a logical move guaranteed to remove a possible source of friction from the marriage.

Although Jane is also a Muslim, her conversion was not made out of conviction but rather as a concession to her husband and for the sake of the children.

Jean had initially converted to Catholicism, so did not want to convert again.

I have had a great deal of difficulty along the years practising my religion because, unfortunately, I discovered that whereas Javed was very happy for me to practise before we got married, without telling me that this would be so, he was much less happy after we got married.
Jean’s decision to remain a Catholic forms a part of the choices she has made about her life in Pakistan. In retaining her own religion, she has taken a step which influences other decisions, most importantly, her notions about her own sense of self. She has rejected the idea of gaining social acceptability by embracing Islam, thus reinforcing her identity as a foreigner and outsider.

Karin never converted and says that she was never pressurized to do so.

The choice of whether or not to convert has other implications. To a certain degree, accepting Islam is an indication that a wife has decided to make some sort of adjustment and/or compromise with the values and norms of Pakistani society. The extent of this step varies between individuals, but the mere fact of consciously accepting a new religion already shows a predisposition for, and recognition of, a new lifestyle more compatible with Pakistani norms.

It is interesting to note that, without exception, the children of all the foreign wives I interviewed are Muslim. Social and family pressures appear to have a great influence in this area, with fathers insisting that their children are raised in the religion appropriate to their (local) culture and beliefs. However, this raises the question of identity. Which cultural values do the children identify with? Are they raised as Pakistanis, or do they grow up learning about both cultures? Whatever the decision, it has far-reaching consequences. If a couple agrees to raise their children in the local (Pakistani) culture, then the wife has to behave accordingly. Therefore, the decision made will affect not only the children but their parents too, and thus the marriage.

Cultural identity of children

The notion of raising children in a religion which will guarantee their acceptance by society prevails in the foreign wives’ community. However, even though these wives have all agreed to raise their children as Muslims, they differ in the importance which they have attached to imparting aspects of their own culture to their offspring. Aliya, for example, firmly believes that her children should be taught only about Pakistani culture, since that is the society they are growing up in. She says:

I think it puts confusion in their heads. They know nothing about Christianity or anything, and they are definitely true Pakistanis in every way—religion, even their thought, because they have never known anything except Pakistan. When we got to England they didn’t like it.

Jean’s children, on the other hand, have had limited contact with Pakistani culture. They attend an American school and have little in common with their father’s family. In fact Jean encourages this barrier:

I’m certainly the kind of parent who would take my children to softball or soccer or plays, or whatever activities they’re involved in. And these are a range of
activities absolutely beyond their [the family's] understanding, so it's a part of keeping my children with me, separately with me.

Karin's children have a similar mixed heritage. Although at present they are studying at a local school, they are more Western than Pakistani and consider themselves to be Danish. Even Jane's children have had problems adjusting to Pakistan because their initial schooling took place in Canada.

Although all these children are Muslims, they do not all consider themselves to be Pakistanis. Their outlook is very much dependent on the attitude of their mothers. When a foreign wife decides that she is better off adopting a Pakistani way of life, her children do so as well. If, on the other hand, she is not able or willing to do so, then her children find themselves in a conflict, caught between identities. Their notions of self are interlinked with, and influenced by, their mothers. Therefore, whatever choice a foreign wife makes with regard to her life in Pakistan will have a knock-on effect on her children.

Living arrangements

The living arrangements of a couple also contribute to their relationship. The type of living arrangement a foreign wife finds herself in often influences other aspects of her life. Living with in-laws, for example, can have a major impact on the marriage, even making or breaking the relationship. Karin, Jean, Jane, and Aliya have all had to cope with this situation, but they have tackled it in different ways, and with differing outcomes. When Jean first arrived in Pakistan she moved in with her in-laws. At first she found the situation quite acceptable, but it has now become a problem:

I find that in a family as large as this in terms of numbers, in a house as small as this, we're all passing up the duties and generally speaking the jobs fall between us somewhere. You can't make decisions because they will get reversed—things like that.

Jane's in-laws live next door to her now, but initially they all shared a house:

Generally adjusting and living with relatives in a small house in Pindi is not easy. At least it's not too bad here, they're next door. He swore to me we would never go and live with his relatives and then we get here. All of a sudden we end up in his house with his relatives. I get on with them all right but I wouldn't go out and choose them as friends.

When Karin's family first arrived in Pakistan, they shared a house with her mother-in-law. This relationship was uneasy at best, and when they moved to Islamabad, Karin insisted that they live on their own.
Aliya has lived with her in-laws since she arrived in Pakistan, and she too has had a difficult relationship with her mother-in-law:

I never got on with his mum, never, from the beginning. I mean, even small things. You used to wash the clothes—it wasn’t right. She used to go and get her maid to get it off the line and wash it all over again. She just wants to have her own way, which is common here for mothers-in-law.

Despite all their problems, Aliya and her mother-in-law are forced to remain in close proximity due to financial constraints. However, Aliya has succeeded in gaining some independence by dividing their house into two separate sections, one occupied by her and the other by her mother-in-law. This set-up is not ideal, but it gives her some much needed freedom and the opportunity to remove herself from her mother-in-law’s sphere of influence.

Although individual circumstances differ, it would appear that residence arrangements have some part to play in the role a foreign wife adopts when she comes to Pakistan. Those wives who share an extended family set-up seem to be more predisposed to accepting a Pakistani way of life—i.e., they conform to the norms of Pakistani society and culture. On the other hand, women who live independently appear to have more freedom to maintain their own way of life, and consequently their identity as a foreigner remains stronger. Of course, relationships within individual families have an important influence too. The bond between a husband and his parents to a certain extent determines how much leeway a wife has in her behaviour. The more constrained she is, the more likely it is that she will adopt a Pakistani identity to facilitate her acceptance.

Children’s marriages

A dilemma which frequently causes problems for mixed-marriage couples in Pakistan is the issue of children’s marriages. Do they get to choose their own spouse, or will they have a traditional arranged marriage instead? The answer varies from family to family and is largely dependent on the outlook of the father. If he is conservative, then the chances are that he will prefer to select a partner for his children. In most cases religion plays an important role, as Muslims do not like to see their members marry outside the community. Jane, Karin, and Aliya all agree that it is important for their children to marry Muslims. They hope that the children will have a semi-arranged marriage—that is, that they will be introduced to suitable candidates and be allowed to make a choice from there.

However, Jean sees things differently. Since her children are being educated at an international school, and their father has little input where religion is concerned, she feels that the choice is up to them:

I would not expect anybody going through a Western education to accept an arranged marriage. What about experience? You know, I read the figures, and
just from reading sociology books I know that the success rate for arranged marriages is quite low, as seen in this family, and therefore I’m not going to think about it for my own children.

It would thus appear that the type of marriage undertaken by the children of mixed marriages is at least in part a reflection of their mother’s attitude towards Pakistan and her new life. If she accepts the Pakistani life-style, then the chances of her children having an arranged marriage are far greater. If, on the other hand, she chooses to retain her own identity, then her children are more likely to have ‘love’ marriages.

The ‘happiness’ factor

Although on the face of it the problems confronting foreign wives might not be insurmountable, they can have serious consequences. If a wife is made to feel alien in her environment, she cannot be happy with the choices she has made, and it is these choices which ultimately shape her life. Jean says:

I’ve learnt a lot here and I’ve made some very good friends here. I’ve got a very good job [that] I’ve practically been able to tailor to my own interests. To me, I’ve grown up here. It’s not what I expected though, and it wasn’t a normal happiness. It wasn’t, for instance, a normal family happiness. I didn’t find that, but I found so many other things instead.

Despite her problems with her mother-in-law, Aliya also agrees that she has found happiness and regards Pakistan as her home. She says:

Actually, every time we go back there [to the UK], I feel stranger and stranger, I mean, not always comfortable. Every time you go you know that you’ll be coming back here, and this is more like home. I don’t think I’d like to live in England now that I’ve got settled and everything. I still say that I’m English, but I like Pakistan.

Jane has also made efforts to adapt to her new life, although it does not appear to have made her much happier.

However, other wives have found it impossible to come to terms with their life, and given a choice, many would leave the country as soon as they could. Karin is a prime example. She was always adamant that she could never live in Pakistan permanently and would return to Denmark should anything happen to her husband. Ultimately she did so. Having found it impossible to reconcile herself to the increasing interference of her mother-in-law, she packed her bags and left.

Jane’s father is dead, and her mother is living with a sister. Even if she wanted to move back to the UK, she has no place to go. The same is true for
many foreign wives. Only a few know that they can leave Pakistan whenever they choose: the rest must make the best of an unsatisfactory situation.

These comments illustrate just how difficult it can be to adjust to a new society and way of life, particularly if a different religion is involved. Foreign wives, who are already in an insecure position due to their lack of contacts and knowledge of the local culture, find that their problems are heightened by the apparent need to be accepted by society. If a wife decides to integrate herself, then she follows the Pakistani life-style as far as she can, wearing the local clothes, converting to Islam, and raising her children to be 'good' Pakistanis. Yet despite all her efforts, ultimately she remains a foreigner. She might be accepted to a certain degree, but she can never be Pakistani, and people will always be quick to point out any deficiencies in her, or, more importantly, in the upbringing of her children. However, it would appear that the majority of foreign wives choose the middle ground, searching for a compromise between their own culture and that of Pakistan, and hoping to achieve a balance which will not only please their husbands and those around him, but bring them happiness at the same time.

It must be emphasized that the factors discussed here do not in themselves give rise to an identity: rather, they form a framework of reference for foreign wives. Whatever action they follow is a reflection of the decision they have made regarding how best to cope with a new life in Pakistan. We can thus make certain assumptions about how a wife will behave based on what strategy she follows, and use this information to create a model which explains the dynamics of mixed relationships.

Preserving Identity: The Ontological Security Model

The assimilation/ontological security model is based on a continuum of behaviour which follows Durkheim's assertion that 'madness is merely an exaggeration of normal behaviour'. Bateson pursued a similar vein in his consideration of people labelled 'schizophrenics'. He perceived them to be normal people who, through circumstance, are placed in a double-bind resulting in their denial of the world around them. Their environment has put them in a position of ontological insecurity; they lack a sense of identity, a sense of self.

However, this loss of identity does not occur only among schizophrenics. It could be argued that any relocation to a new environment by definition entails a considerable degree of ontological insecurity and indeed a lack of assimilation which, in extreme cases, either becomes exaggerated to the point of severe ontological insecurity and dislocation, or, through a process of assertion or alienation, leads to the re-establishment of ontological security, with or without assimilation. In other words, some people reject their new culture while others embrace it, albeit under coercion or by submission. By creating a matrix which portrays four loose
but fundamental categories of greater or lesser assimilation and ontological security, one is able to consider these varying continua in a manner which allows certain correlations to be made between a foreign wife's ontological security and her behaviour. Below is a basic diagram of the model divided into the four quadrants of assimilation and security.

```

ONTLOGICALLY SECURE

mand

ASSIMILATED

JANE

KARIN

(Entry point for all foreign wives)

ONTLOGICALLY INSECURE

It is important to note that all foreign wives will experience a greater or lesser degree of ontological insecurity and are thus, by definition, unassimilated. This is true for anybody entering into an alien environment with a view to staying there long-term. Although in time they will make a decision as to what degree of assimilation they find appropriate and acceptable, at the initial stage it seems reasonable to assert that their identity and sense of self is threatened.

Every foreign wife undergoes an identity crisis when she first arrives in Pakistan. She is confronted with a culture alien to her, and a society with values and beliefs often different to her own. At this point she is 'ontologically insecure'. Laing says that such individuals feel 'precariously differentiated from the rest of the world, so that their identity and autonomy is always in question' (1990: 42). They are occupied with 'preserving rather than gratifying' themselves, and struggle to find something familiar to hold on to (ibid.). This is very much the case for women coming to Pakistan. Since this initial period of non-adjustment is experienced by all foreign wives, it seems appropriate to consider this the first stage of an assimilation/ontological security model. Of the four wives described earlier,
Jane Hashmi represents this category. Although she has lived in Pakistan for some time, she has not yet come to terms with her situation. At first sight she appears quite well settled, if somewhat conservative and conventional, but in fact she is in a predicament. Members of this group are unsure about their identity and sense of self. They question the values and behaviour of the indigenous population, and despite occasional statements to the contrary are unhappy with their situation. Throughout her interview Jane made comments about her dissatisfaction with her present life. Similarly, an American wife commented on the pressures of being a foreign wife. She gets blamed for any mistakes her children make and wishes that she had brought her children to Pakistan at an earlier age so that they could have fitted in more easily. Although these wives might very well prefer to leave Pakistan, they are often halted by financial constraints. Many women are dependent on their husbands for money, and in certain cases even their passports are kept from them. As a result they are forced to remain, whether they like it or not.

Wives in this category find themselves torn between the need to fit into a new life and a fear of giving up the old one. Their identity and sense of security are threatened. And yet, no matter what they do, they are in a no-win situation. They are caught in a double-bind. No matter how they choose to cope with life in Pakistan, they have to compromise, either in their marriage or with their identity. Bateson theorized that the double-bind arises in all relationships, and it is how a person resolves this conflict which determines her consequent behaviour. Although all foreign wives initially find themselves in the first category, they can either choose to remain there (in which case they remain ontologically insecure) or pursue one of the following options: (1) assimilate entirely; (2) compromise; or (3) reject Pakistan outright.

When confronted with an overwhelming array of new experiences, some people find it simpler to become immersed in the new culture, rather than struggle to find a niche for themselves. Certainly this is true for some foreign wives. Whereas previously they followed the customs and traditions of their own countries, on coming to Pakistan they make a conscious decision to adapt to local ways. They argue that since they have chosen to marry a Pakistani and live in Pakistan, they should behave accordingly. Aliya is a prime example of this type of foreign wife. Her actions could be those of any middle-class Pakistani woman. The key aspect to this category of foreign wives is their acceptance of Pakistani culture and all it entails. This includes language, clothes, and religious beliefs, as well as other traditions and customs. It is not unusual to find that, among this group, the wives, despite being foreign, profess themselves willing to arrange the marriages of their children themselves. They raise the point that in Pakistani society it is difficult for boys and girls to meet and get to know each other, and that parents often know better who will be suitable marriage material.

These adaptations by foreign wives are attempts to ensure acceptance by both their husbands’ family and local society as a whole. Ayesha says, ‘Changing my religion made me more acceptable to his family.’ That is the crux of the matter. It is not individual identity which is important here, but rather the sense of belong-
ing to a community. The philosophy underlying the actions of these women is that since they have consciously chosen to marry into a different culture, it is now up to them to make the necessary adjustments. Their happiness lies in assimilation.

At the opposite end of the scale are the foreign wives who reject anything and everything to do with Pakistan. They are determined to remain true to themselves and resent any efforts to integrate them into local society. Karin is one of them. Although at first she was able to tolerate the atmosphere around her, after undergoing some surgery the problems became too much for her to bear, and she left—walking out on her husband and children and going back to Denmark. This solution might seem rather extreme, but it is not that unusual. There are several other foreign wives living in Pakistan who would leave if they were financially independent and did not risk losing their children. Not only are they unable to get money for the fare out of Pakistan, but often their passports are kept by their husbands, so they cannot travel. The legal status of these wives is often questionable at best. Alice, for example, has been living in Pakistan for years and has raised her children there, yet she holds a tourist visa which has never been changed. As a result she does not officially exist as a local person, and should the need ever arise, will have no legal protection whatsoever.

These foreign wives have chosen to regain their ontological security by holding on to the identity which they had previously. Their answer to the problem posed by moving to Pakistan is to remain steadfast to their former identity. No matter where they go their actions will not change, because their sense of self remains the same. By maintaining their identity as foreigners they have resolved their double-bind; they are unassimilated but ontologically secure.

However, there are many foreign wives who choose a middle way. These are the individuals who retain key aspects of their own culture, but add certain Pakistani values and traditions. The women in this category vary quite substantially in the degree to which they have maintained a separate identity. Some have blended the ideas of East and West to produce a new identity for themselves which incorporates both worlds, while others are far more militant in their outlook and refuse to give up much of their culture of origin. Jean is a prime example of this type of foreign wife. Despite being married to a Pakistani, she has not let this fact influence her behaviour. She continues to do what she wants.

Women in this category frequently do not convert to Islam, even though their children are raised as Muslims. In fact, maintaining their own religion is one of the factors most noticeable in this group. They are keen to retain that part of their upbringing which defines who they are. Since religion is a major component of a person’s sense of self, it remains an integral aspect of their identity. Katerina, for example, is a born-again Christian, who discovered her religion after getting married. Despite this, her children are Muslims. She says that she found life in Pakistan very difficult in the beginning, but that life became much better after she rediscovered Jesus. She no longer suffers from depression and has found peace in her heart.
Women in this group are much more willing for their children to choose their own marriage partners, even though in a way this contradicts other aspects of their upbringing. In most cases the offspring of these foreign wives, girls especially, are raised in a protective environment, attending local all-girl schools and having Pakistani friends, thus developing a very strong sense of Pakistani identity. Although a small minority of the children see themselves as the product of two cultures, by and large they consider themselves to be wholly Pakistani.

These foreign wives are relatively assimilated and have accepted their new lives. They have found that the best way of adapting to Pakistan is by reaching a compromise. Their happiness lies in being able to meld certain characteristics of their own culture and their adopted one. This strategy enables them to retain the greater portion of the identity already assigned to them by the environment in which they were raised, and by their family.

On the other hand, their adoption of certain aspects of Pakistani culture provides a means of ensuring acceptance by their in-laws and local society. Such acceptance is a definite asset in establishing a family arrangement which is both stable and workable. Without parental support the chances of a marriage succeeding are greatly reduced. Since Pakistani society still places strong emphasis on the family, any occurrences within the domestic sphere tend to engender involvement and/or interference from all. Parents are regarded with great respect and their judgement is deferred to, so obtaining their good wishes and seal of approval can go a long way in ensuring the success of the marriage. In some cases the relationship between a foreign wife and her mother-in-law is what makes or breaks the marriage. Mary was able to leave her children behind in the care of her mother-in-law when she accompanied her husband to the United States. His mother looked after the children for four years. On the other hand, Selma’s mother-in-law disapproved of their marriage and repeatedly tried to convince her son to leave his wife. She used to take away all her money, and at one point even threw the couple out of the house.

The foreign wives who have chosen to reach a compromise between the two cultures are selecting a course of action which is less threatening (for them) than the other options available. In retaining parts of their own culture and upbringing they reduce the stress placed upon them in terms of their identity. They solve the problem of ontological insecurity by holding on to their sense of self, of who they are, and where they come from. However, in order to placate their in-laws and fit into the local society, these wives make the effort of adapting to certain customs which do not contradict their own. The biggest compromise they make is in terms of their children, who very often grow up knowing little if anything of their mother’s culture and instead are fully socialized into Pakistani culture, both by religious beliefs and behaviour. As Pakistanis, their incorporation into the mainstream is guaranteed, their identity unquestioned.

It is clear that the situation facing foreign wives in Pakistan is not simple. Their identity is thrown into a state of crisis by the shock of having to interact within an unfamiliar society. As strangers in a ‘traditional’ land, they are necessar-
ily forced into a state of ontological insecurity. They have to establish a new identity—a sense of self which integrates that which they were with what is expected of them now. This situation places them in a classic double-bind, a no-win scenario. Whatever course of action they follow, their decision to migrate has already brought into play a sequence of events which brings into question their fundamental existence. They have to resolve this ontological insecurity in order to make any sort of success of their life in Pakistan.

Conclusion

It has often been argued that Pakistani women are nothing more than second-class citizens, primarily because of the traditional kinship structure and the Islamic gender discourse within which they are situated. Women are expected to behave in a manner which safeguards family izzat, or honour. This entails maintaining a demarcation between domestic and public spheres of life, and, more conservatively, wearing a veil. The popular concept of Islam which prevails in Pakistan stresses the need for female virtue and chastity, a need which can only be attained by controlling access to, and the movements of, women in public life. Women could be argued to be doubly oppressed in the sense that they are subject not only to an overarching Islamic discourse, but also to constraints and limitations imposed by institutional and social, as well as economic structures constitutive of Pakistani society.

At the outset of this research it seemed plausible to assume that the position of incoming foreign wives would be much the same. Not only do they have to deal with the problems confronting Pakistani women, but they have the additional burden of having to negotiate and accommodate themselves to a new culture. Their identity is challenged and threatened, and they are apparently ontologically insecure, unless they concede a position of disempowerment. Within this position, of course, it can be demonstrated that they can operate with a range of strategies and tactics which consolidate a woman's domain of power.

The contemporary Muslim world is facing unprecedented changes, both internal and external. Many Muslim societies are struggling to confront enormous cultural dilemmas and are having to rethink, renegotiate, indeed reinvent their traditions. Where women fit into this struggle is crucial, since the Muslim social order in Pakistan and elsewhere is intricately connected to institutions such as izzat, in which a woman's role is pivotal. Conflicting notions regarding the position of women in the new social order have therefore resulted in profound social, economic, and political consequences. However, this has led to Muslims reasserting, in various ways, what they take to be a Muslim identity. Women find themselves both asserting their identity as women, with rights etc., and as Mus-
lims. Many, especially those in urban middle-class situations, are involved in negotiating a complex identity as ‘new Muslim women’.

As ‘white’ women, foreign wives bring status to their husbands and in-laws. Yet this status is ambiguous. By marrying a Pakistani, they have placed themselves in the position of having to negotiate local kin structures and mediating networks in the context of the prevailing Islamic discourse. In practical terms this means that foreign wives must establish themselves within the kin group of their husbands’ families. If they cannot successfully establish themselves as bona fide members of their family’s networks, then they stand little chance of being accepted. Their identity as foreign women will override their identity as wives, and they will remain outsiders. In addition, their presentation of self must involve some positioning in relation to the discourse of Muslim women.

Such a dilemma can lead to ontological insecurity and a re-evaluation of perceptions of self. This insecurity is fostered by the inherent power struggles which continue to exist between individual members of the family.

Identity is always relational. However, at the same time it is also mediated by internal structures of personality. Katherine Ewing’s work on the ‘intrapsychic autonomy’ of Pakistani women clearly shows that their sense of identity is connected to, and dependent on, their ability to establish object-consistency and separation of the self. Only when this occurs is it possible to form satisfactory relationships within the extended family of their husbands. This is especially true with regard to the relationship between a new bride and her mother-in-law. Intrapsychic autonomy is therefore necessary to ontological security. What we have seen, however, is that while intrapsychic autonomy can be undermined, it can also be consolidated.

Power and identity are systemically linked: that is, they are interconnected so that one constantly affects the other. A wife’s sense of self—her ontological security—cannot be established unless she perceives herself to be in control, in power. But this power is never absolute. In fact, it is constantly being renegotiated. As a result, foreign wives are caught in a Batesonian double-bind which appears to be a no-win situation. Although the Palo Alto team used the theory of the double-bind to explain schizophrenia, I have demonstrated that double-bind situations are not pathological but an integral part of normal relationships.

This means that a double-bind situation exists not only for the wife, but also for other members of the family, including her husband and in-laws. Ideally we would need to investigate all members’ perceptions of their situation to disclose their own experiences of these double-binds. The shifting patterns of coalition in mixed marriages reflect this. Relationships are continuously being renegotiated in terms of symmetry and complementarity. Whereas power sometimes appears to lie with the wife, in that she has the choice of whether or not to integrate into Pakistani society, at other times she experiences herself to be totally disempowered, incapable of achieving an integrated sense of self because her in-laws
and society insist on keeping her alienated. This insistence may give her some hold on power relations within the family group.

The power situation *vis-à-vis* the wives may not actually be that different from women in the UK, for example, but the Pakistani context, where women have to negotiate a Pakistani identity, is bound to produce double-bind situations because whatever the actual personalities involved, the demands of the new rules of the game place them in the sort of dilemma referred to above. Yet because of their social and financial position within Pakistani society, foreign wives have a far greater capacity to exploit and/or negotiate coalitions than Pakistani women might have. As a result, they are in the contradictory position of having power, yet not having it. They can play the game and thus find themselves locked in to ongoing systemic paradoxical communication. No one wins, but no one loses either. Power is in the system, not the individuals. The case-studies I have described demonstrate this. It was originally argued that one condition of a double-bind was that the ‘victim’ could not leave the situation. In the case of the foreign wives this condition may not be completely operative.

Double-bind situations probably arise in every mixed-race marriage. As suggested above, further research would require an analysis of the version of the game held by each participating member. For example, a complementary study of the husbands would place the position of the foreign wives into a broader framework. What differentiates individual couples is the way in which they ‘play the game’.

The issues of power and identity are also taken up in Islamic discourse. Wives must negotiate their identity *vis-à-vis* Islam, and this requires on their part a subtle reading of the shifting perceptions of gender within Islam. Refusal to convert can empower a woman in that she rejects the values and norms being imposed on her, thus retaining a certain leeway and freedom of behaviour. On the other hand, conversion may also lead to empowerment. A foreign wife who becomes a Muslim creates a stronger bond between herself and the family. She has, in effect, joined their clique and assured her in-laws of her intention to assimilate.

This article has sought to address some key issues of identity using the systemic approach. In particular, it has examined the problem in relation to specific issues of culture and ethnicity. I hope to have shown how an existential condition may be embedded in a particular cultural context.

The research leaves many serious and important questions unanswered. Can a mixed marriage ever be secure? What cultural conditions might help foster this security? It could be suggested that the emergence of a global urban culture predicated on multiculturalism might remove some of the obvious impediments. Yet the retrenchment of many people into identities more exclusive than ever leads one to doubt this. Hence my conclusions are not wholly pessimistic. It is true that the position of the foreign wife can easily be construed as one in which she is inevitably reactive—this does involve a negative connotation of her situation. But I hope I have demonstrated that her position is much more proactive and that it has positive connotations. She is, in fact, an agent of social change.
REFERENCES


LET SLEEPING DOGS LIE!
NON-CHRISTIAN RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN SWITZERLAND TODAY

JOANNA PFAFF-CZARNECKA

Introduction

In Switzerland, as in most European countries, non-Christian religious communities are growing in size. For over two decades, Swiss citizens have had to cope with an increasing number of people with other faiths and ways of life. Swiss institutions and the Swiss public are increasingly confronted with the demands of minority groups—individually and/or collectively—for acknowledgement of their rights to particular cultural-religious forms and to their own social goals. Swiss institutions and the value systems they represent are therefore compelled to respond to pressures which are new to them. On the other hand, members of immigrant minorities strive for the recognition of particular objectives, which many members of the 'host' society consider incompatible with established notions. Despite the bewilderment expressed by some citizens, partly in the form of forceful reactions to minority action, one thing is certain: collective demands and the politics of identity are, by and large, acquiring legitimacy, at least in the sense that they are being considered (for instance, by government bodies), even if, more often than not, they continue to cause tensions and embarrassment. Consequently, new, and

also not so new processes of minority accommodation within national societies are
tending to reshape ingrained notions of justice.2

The endeavours of religious minorities to pursue their goals and objectives
publicly have an impact on the intersections of major societal sub-systems, such
as judicial, educational, religious, and civic institutions, thus casting doubt on
traditional central value systems and questioning the validity of established pro­
cedures. This is shown, for example, by the small avalanche of articles that fol­
lowed the Swiss Supreme Court’s verdict regarding dispensation from swimming
lessons for a Muslim schoolgirl (see below). The demands put on Swiss society
and its infrastructure are by no means unique. On the contrary, similar social
dynamics are being faced by other societies in Europe, as well as in other countries
with high rates of immigration.3

It is not only in Switzerland that citizens are also increasingly confronted with
an ever-expanding industry of symbols, production of which is aimed at gaining
attention within the public sphere. Very often, these symbols are identity markers
providing for subtle, and sometimes not so subtle networks of dividing lines within
and across societies. Such industrious endeavours to define particular cultural­
religious goals and to promote them in the public sphere show, among other
things, that cultures can build bridges as well as erect formidable barriers between
groups of people (Pfaff-Czarnecka 1996). The members of the core societies shape
and reshape their cultural politics as much as the immigrants—seeking mutual
accommodation, but also being prepared to demonstrate dissent (Werbner 1997).
Such negotiations reveal the processual nature of such accommodation, which
either render the ethnic boundaries porous or firmly close them.4 Furthermore, in
such moments we witness the striking diversity in the accommodation of difference
when we compare recent developments within Western societies alone.5

This article is based on ongoing research into religious minorities in S witzer­
land, seeking to analyse the claims to collective rights put forward by members of
non-Christian religious groups and to understand the logics of their collective

2. This type of debate is entirely new in the Swiss context. On related debates in other Western
countries, see especially Kymlicka 1995 and, of course, the discussion surrounding Charles

3. As documented for England by, for example, Parekh 1996, Poulter 1998, and Vertovec
1996a, 1996b, 1996c; for France by Kepel 1993 and Amiraux 1995; and for Germany by
Amiraux 1997 and Leggewie 1993; etc.

4. Even though Barth (1969) is invariably quoted wherever the issue of ‘ethnic boundaries’
arises, his illuminating remarks on the shifting nature of these boundaries are hardly ever taken
up. At the same time, Barth’s insistence upon the dynamics within ethnic boundaries has
unfortunately diverted the attention of scholars eager not to fall into the primordialist trap of
social dynamics within collectivities.

5. As documented in the collection by Vertovec and Peach (1997), as well as in that by
Bauböck et al. (1996).
action. It takes up the currently ubiquitous theme of accommodation within multicultural societies, stressing the dynamic and changing character of negotiations between the state, the different sections of Swiss society, and the minorities. Unlike other Western countries, in Switzerland religious minorities are only now—and increasingly—becoming visible within the public sphere in which new kinds of objectives are being put forward by Muslims, Hindus, and Buddhists. Swiss experiences with the increase in public minority action during the last decade reveal minorities’ rather low profile in addressing the Swiss public. Given the relative scarcity of attempts to address state institutions and/or the public sphere, one cannot help but ask why, so far, members of non-Christian minorities in Switzerland have been so docile in their negotiations.

As will be shown below, members of foreign faiths in Switzerland have been denied a wide range of rights and entitlements which, in other parts of the Western world, have been considered if not self-evident, then at least acceptable or as a public issue to be debated (France provides the most striking exception). The question is, then, why religious minorities in Switzerland have so far hardly addressed Swiss legal and political institutions with similar demands, as has been the case in, for instance, Great Britain and Canada. So far in Switzerland, it has been possible to manage difference in such a way as to accommodate diversity within the existing legal, political, and social framework, endorsing the principles of equality and individualism while not having to respond to minority pressures. For decades, the entire Western world has been facing the multiculturalist challenge, more often than not endorsing special provisions for minorities and partly succumbing to the need to reformulate at least some of the existing legal norms. In order to find an answer to the peculiarities of minority accommodation in Switzerland one needs to examine, among other things, the social environment of religious minorities’ activities in the country. By linking dynamics within national frameworks with processes of minority mobilization, we immediately touch upon a very embattled terrain for negotiations, namely that involving the public–private divide within state societies.

It is not surprising that growing numbers of immigrant minorities who are increasingly becoming better acquainted with their new political and social environment should take upon themselves the task of formulating their objectives and making them public. In view of the manifold attempts to do so by minorities in other Western countries, it is also not a coincidence that encouraging examples of successful action emerge, or that Swiss minorities also find themselves under some pressure to follow the examples set in other countries. The public character of these endeavours manifests itself in several ways: within and among minorities—who scrutinize their own actions—within international networks, and at the interfaces between the minorities on the one hand and the actors and institutions of the 'host' society on the other.
Within current debates on multicultural accommodation, the most striking issues appear to be the many forms of trespass between the public and private domains. It goes without saying, first, that the activities of religious minority groups pertain to needs and objectives which are largely confined to the private domain, though this is also subject to state interference. At the same time, some of the religious projects pursued within the ‘alien territory’ can only be solved or accommodated when they involve state or public institutions. In such endeavours, the public–private divide does not merely appear as an ordering principle, but above all as a very embattled terrain. Secondly, in Switzerland as in other Western countries, the public spheres are increasingly approached by collective actors pursuing collective goals and/or striving to influence the distribution of collective goods. The problem of collective rights within national societies nowadays confronts many Western polities with many practical and ideological problems. In many cases collective actors are involved in struggles for rights, struggles combating the lack of dignity they experience in the ‘host’ society (see Taylor 1992), as well as seeking the satisfaction of common goals through collective action. In such struggles for recognition, collective experiences of violated integrity and the quest to find preventive and regulatory norms are articulated in a variety of ways. Hence, since needs and objectives pertain to cultural-religious forms, public spheres are necessarily confronted with collective categories. However, Swiss procedures and institutions are strongly geared towards individualist notions, especially when it comes to accommodating difference brought into the country by immigrants. Indeed, among the major problems that minorities currently face is the attempt by public authorities to keep collective religious objectives out of the public domain by pointing to the primacy of an individualist framework.

So far, the Swiss legal-political system has successfully resisted pressures from ‘alien minorities’ for the creation of binding legal categories. Still, there is a widely perceived need among minorities to discuss the requirements for successful accommodation. Certainly collective rights exist in Switzerland with regard to political units, to property held by collectivities, and in the form of collective provisions on linguistic grounds (on the distinction between ‘indigenous’ [i.e. Swiss] and ‘foreign’ minorities in the Swiss context, see Wicker 1997); but the provisions granted to the ‘indigenous’ minorities (cantons, the communes as administrative units, speakers of Romance languages, namely French, Italian, and Rhaeto-Romansch) are not at issue here. Instead I am focusing on the ‘alien’ minorities, arguing that so far, in most cases, the collective categories they have brought into Switzerland can be reconciled with the individualist framework of the legal system, though at the expense of immigrant minorities not being able to observe some of their cultural practices (see below).

The specificities of the Swiss case become apparent especially when we analyse the potential for conflict and the solutions applicable here in a comparative perspective—that is, when comparing the modes of action and models underlying
the state's measures in other countries. I also suggest that we examine specific measures to accommodate minorities in comparison with other national contexts because in recent decades different national solutions (more often than not partial ones) have emerged regarding the accommodation of minorities which cannot simply be replicated in other national contexts. The idea here is that particular solutions which have proven successful in some countries may or may not hold under circumstances of a different national setting. Indeed, as I shall argue below, we are today witnessing a striking variety of national practices regarding ways of dealing with minorities in both private and public spheres. In order to outline these major differences in practices of accommodation, let me introduce the oversimplified but useful distinction between the public-political and the private domains. I draw here upon Rex’s (1986) concept of two domains, later adopted by Wicker (1997) in relation to the Swiss national framework. Rex presents four basic types of society operating within the distinction 'public-private', seeking to establish how the two principles of universalism and particularism can coexist, though possibly excluding one another in different social settings.

The main dimensions of these two principles have been widely discussed. The universalist principle places a high value on tolerance, expressed in terms of individualism and equality, and endorsing the most common kinds of civic freedoms, such as the religious freedom (including the right to pursue religious cults), freedom of organization, and freedom of expression. In this case, the legal norms, institutions, and procedures have a holistic outlook: organizations, normative orientations, and justifications are geared towards the total social body, fitting the minorities, or attempting to do so, into the received individualist framework. However, as the discussion below will indicate, this approach is nowadays clearly under pressure from legitimate minority demands which put the universalist-individualist framework under great pressure.

The particularist principle endorses the model of collective protection and support of minorities, as formulated especially by Taylor (1992). By paying special attention to identity politics and endorsing a rather fragmented view of national societies divided into minority communities, Taylor implicitly argues for a somewhat static, homogenous notion of culture and identity, as well as for restrictions upon individual freedom within communities. This predilection for collective solutions probably stems from the specific Canadian context, with its more or less clear-cut spatial distributional patterns of linguistically differentiated populations ('indigenous minorities' providing a model of accommodation for immigrant minorities who eventually acquire Canadian citizenship). Many views have been put forward opposing this position, of which two stand out. The cultural argument contests the idea of clear-cut cultural distinctions producing single identities: Taylor’s critics stress multiplicity and hybridity as well as the processual character of cultures which are opposed, for instance, to bureaucratic categories

6. Again, the collection in Gutmann 1992, especially its revised and expanded update (1994, including Habermas’s response), provides the most interesting point of departure.
geared towards clear-cut distinctions. The political argument draws our attention to the strong probability that practices within the state and within civil society dedicated to maintaining collective borders are likely to buttress particularist interests rather than enhance solidary structures across the dividing lines within a given society.

Taylor's particularist approach displays a rigidity which suggests that the accommodation of minorities necessarily requires a departure from the established policies of many countries. In many national contexts, therefore, this would be an impossible solution. That accommodating difference within state societies does not necessarily entail the creation of divisive distinctions within pre-existing flexible arrangements has been forcefully argued by Kymlicka (1996). The Canadian experience informs his approach too, but he rejects Taylor's thesis regarding the primacy of collective over individual rights. In Kymlicka's significantly more moderate position the question of what is to be understood as a 'collective minority right' is seen as having various possibilities. Among the accommodation measures proposed are such far-reaching solutions as decentralization, autonomy (granted, for instance, on territorial grounds), and consociational models of representation structuring the public-political domain.7

Let us come back to the four types designated by Rex as discussed by Wicker (1997: 148):

Type A guarantees equal opportunity (universalism) in the public-political domain and allows for multiculturalism (particularism) in the private domain; Type B imposes the equality principle in both the public-political and the private domain and leads to monoculture; Type C allows for ethnic differences and ethnic lobbying in the public-political domain and combines these with multiculturalism in the private domain; Type D, finally, imposes a monoculture in the private but not in the public-political.

Nowadays, the assimilationist Type B in Rex's scheme appears in Western contexts as an impossible option. However, as Wicker and many other authors argue, in the first half of this century, Switzerland underwent a unifying nation-building process strongly geared to assimilationist policies. Given Swiss multiculturalism in the form of the multilingual and multireligious character of Swiss society, this statement must sound surprising. However, during this period, internal cultural differences were played down, while Swiss unity was assumed and promoted by defining the Swiss national character in terms of uniform civil rights and, above all, civic duties—that is, through the creation of an effective instrument making not only Swiss citizens but also foreigners assimilate to Swiss norms and values. We encounter here the genuine Swiss notion of a Willensnation ('nation of will'), which highlights adherence to procedural elements rather than to a putative unity provided by cultural elements. Among the major agencies aiming at

7. For an excellent overview of prevailing collective solutions, see Levy 1997.
such adjustments and their promotion, which reached deeply into the private lives of the citizens, were the federal administration, the army (see Wicker ibid.: 149), and the system of education.

Some elements of Type A have persisted in Switzerland, of course, given the linguistic and religious diversity of the country. From the middle of this century onwards, not only was the private domain freed from the imperative of uniformity, the public-political domain also gradually adopted elements allowing for particularist solutions. An important step here was the new language article in the Constitution, granted, however, to citizens, or more precisely, to citizens belonging to the 'indigenous' minorities, not to immigrant 'aliens'. Nevertheless, from the 1960s onwards, Switzerland experienced an influx of immigrants, either political refugees or labourers—the latter forming a clear majority. National ideology shifted at the same time. The assimilationist imperative gave way to the notion of 'integration'. Foreign immigrants were made to comply with rules and regulations within the socio-economic domain (labour market, social insurance), but their religions, languages, and customs were given more recognition, as long as they were confined to the private domain.

Thus, since the 1960s, Switzerland has undergone a process of moving away from the universalist formula towards providing more and more space for differences within the private domain. In the course of the last decade, this opening up has become increasingly noticed by the wider public, as 'alien' private forms of Muslim, Hindu, and Buddhist immigrants (and also some Swiss converts) have become more and more visible. Let us not forget that, in course of time, members of minority religious communities will gradually become Swiss citizens, thus acquiring the means to exert their own political voice, depending on their numbers, their distribution throughout the country, incentives, and organizational skills. Therefore, a gradual process away from Type B towards Type C, via Type A, seems to be on the way in Switzerland. We can expect that Switzerland will undergo a process towards modes of accommodation similar to those in Canada or, in a slightly less accentuated form, in Great Britain. This process would basically consist in moving away from strict assimilationist policies within a unifying national framework, through the current politics of integration, towards a model of multicultural accommodation, asserting collective identities, using quotas, embracing striking cultural measures (striking by the standards of the 'host' society), and designing many particular provisions for collectivities. We could even go one step further and expect that countries confronted with an increasing influx of religious groups such as Muslims, Hindus, or Buddhists would gradually move away from assimilationist policies towards a politics-of-recognition model.

There are simple reasons why this prediction could hold. With growing numbers of 'aliens' eventually acquiring Swiss citizenship, electorates are being formed of diverse cultural backgrounds, meaning that diverse political interests are likely to form a process that may eventually bring about an increasingly well-designed organization of difference, leading to shifting power structures, at least at the local level. Every day one can observe an increase in the organizational
capacities of transnational diasporas (see, for example, Cohen 1997) gaining and exchanging information about developments in different countries in acknowledging and accommodating various types of demands. Disposing of such strategic information can place pressures on national and local governments. Moreover, members of particular religious minorities can themselves come under pressure to assert their rights within the national societies of the 'host' countries when other countries are more advanced in accommodating difference. The mutual exchanges—of information, of encouragement, of organizational skills—within religious diasporas suggest that we should anticipate a uniform process of minority formation. However, it is doubtful whether the quite uniform demands of religious minorities will eventually lead to uniform solutions in the 'host' countries. Though it is difficult to predict future developments, right now we face a rather striking diversity in respect of multicultural accommodation in different Western countries. For reasons discussed below, it is certainly not possible to perceive national styles of accommodation in various Western countries in terms of a linear process of transition from Type B to Type C.

Indeed, when observing the ways in which difference is dealt with in Western countries, the variety of accommodation measures is striking. The reason, in my view, is that the two very distinct paradigms of accommodation discerned above—the universalist and the particularistic model—are significantly shaped by existing national modes of integration, consisting of legal provisions, the structure of political organization, and institutional settings, as well as how a national society defines its cohesion. Therefore, modes of accommodation materialize themselves in a multifaceted form, depending on the opportunity structures (a concept used by Ireland 1994) that exist within any national setting. By 'opportunity structures' I mean the institutional channels responding to the values and norms that are endorsed within a polity. Chances to integrate and to gain recognition strongly depend upon the opportunities provided by the structure of the political system and of public institutions. These structures may also affect the scope of assistance the minorities can obtain in seeking greater participation and in striving to promote their sectional interests within the social setting. Opportunity structures are determined by (a) the legal structure and the legal tradition; (b) the complex body of policies, rules, and organizational practices; (c) the political culture, that is, the cultural bias put forward by resourceful sections of a society towards the political system, containing elements strongly related to cultural orientations in other domains of social life, and including salient definitions of what constitutes the particular nation; and (d) modes of interaction and communication within civil society that operate in the public and private domains. How these structures affect minority action will become apparent after a short discussion of four cases of relevance to Switzerland.
Transcending the Private-Public Divide: Claims to Collective Accommodation of Minority Demands

Given the idea that for decades most foreigners were expected to make themselves useful in the 'host' countries but otherwise keep quiet, recent public statements by minorities caught the attention of the Swiss public. In this section, the main instances of minority demands put forward in Switzerland will be discussed in order to assess the kinds of stresses or conflicts their public-political domain is currently facing. Admittedly, this overview only relates to cases which have reached the public domain: many more grievances exist in private. What has not yet become a public issue can be indicated by the scope of minority activity in other countries, such as Great Britain and Canada. Among the most striking demands in those countries, unthinkable as yet in the Swiss context, have been the establishment of publicly funded Muslim schools. The Jewish community in Switzerland, which has been granted the right to separate religious schools, has never received financial support, and the community itself therefore has to support poor families. So far, there have been no demands from minorities for the public recognition of specific religious symbols such as lighting the mosques and allowing the muezzin to call to prayer. There have also been no attempts to achieve the legal recognition of collectivities as ethnic groups. Hence, no claims for protection against discrimination by the state on the grounds of belonging to a particular group (only granted in Switzerland on an individual basis) can be made. For instance, in England, the Law Lords established in 1983 that Sikhs are an ethnic group and thus fall under the protection of the 1976 Race Relations Act. Notwithstanding the fact that many goals and grievances have been kept from the Swiss public so far, those demands which have been placed in the public domain have created deep conflicts within the public and tensions within public institutions in all four sets of circumstances considered here.

The first of these circumstances relates to the accommodation of specific religious observances, such as food rules and the requirement to pray within institutional settings. These issues relate to realizing the right to religious freedom, which may conflict with specific organizational structures in institutions such as the workplace, schools, and prisons. One issue here is the flexibility of work time (e.g. Ramadan, breaks for prayer, holidays on ritual occasions) and special menus in canteens. In such cases, interestingly, existing legal provisions and actual practice differ: it often happens that members of minorities do not even exploit existing provisions. It seems that there is still little knowledge of what can be enforced. So far, wherever new cases come up, the authorities act quickly: in prisons, for instance, allowing Friday prayers for Muslims, rooms for ecumenical worship, and providing special foods, in line with the principle of religious tolerance. Such practices of accommodation take collective demands into consider-

8. Even in England, however, a country with long-standing exposure to minority politics, their public incorporation is a quite new phenomenon (see especially Vertovec 1996a).
ation, but they are individually oriented, displaying a rather high degree of flexibility in accommodating difference. Obviously, this group of minority demands does not seriously conflict with the pre-existing institutional settings.

The second set of issues is more problematic. Certain cultural-religious practices, such as ritual methods of slaughtering animals (shedding of blood) or funeral rites (the use of cloth rather than coffins), conflict with federal law (Article 125 bis of the Swiss Constitution) and/or individual cantonal prescriptions. So far, however, members of minorities have largely accommodated themselves to binding regulations and practices. Thus, for instance, Jews and Muslims import ritually acceptable meat from other countries. This causes uneasiness among many Swiss legal scientists and practitioners, but no claims have been brought before the courts by members of these minorities in recent years. Muslims usually accept the prohibition of cloth for burying the dead, as well as the requirement to wait 48 hours before burial. Muslims who have entered into negotiations in order to set up Muslim cemeteries usually also comply with the rule to remove a grave after 25 years, which clearly conflicts with their notion of the eternity of the grave. On the other hand, Jews who are required to bury their dead before the onset of the sabbath normally obtain permission to do so on grounds of religious tolerance, which are endorsed by the authorities. Hence, this group of cases reveals some flexibility in mutual accommodation. However, members of minorities have shown much more flexibility so far, removing from the authorities the burden of providing solutions more suited to the former.

The third type of case relates to claims that public land be used for the erection of religious structures such as cemeteries, temples, monasteries, or mosques. It must be stressed from the outset that claims put forward by religious minorities thus far have not been geared towards receiving public funds or the grant of public property, but rather to acquiring permission to erect structures, using funds collected by the religious communities themselves. Up to now, claims regarding the use of public land for religious purposes have created fierce public debates and necessitated responses from municipal authorities, political parties, and public commissions. While public debates highlight issues of local as well as national interest, institutional negotiations mainly take place at the cantonal, municipal, or community levels. Such cases are especially intriguing in light of the differing constellations within local interest groups, which oppose or favour such endeavours.

The emerging problems are best examined by looking at the creation of a Muslim cemetery in Zurich, repeatedly requested by different Muslim organizations. From the very beginning, these organizations have referred to the existence of Jewish cemeteries as constituting a precedent. However, Swiss Jewish communities have borne all the costs themselves so far, including the purchase of land from municipalities. Currently in Switzerland, only Muslims in Geneva have their own cemetery. Recently, an agreement was reached with the authorities in Berne, but the cemetery has not yet been created. Over ninety per cent of deceased in the
Muslim community are shipped to their countries of origin for burial, which places many hardships upon relatives.

After initial reluctance, the municipal government of the city of Zurich came to the conclusion that without a Muslim cemetery, the minority’s freedom of religious observance was being threatened. Making Muslims send their dead back home, the authorities argued, was acting against the principle of a dignified burial for all (Raselli 1996). But there was a problem relating to Swiss legal norms concerning deaths. Since 1874, public institutions have been in charge of burying the dead, ensuring that everybody finds a place at a public cemetery, that burials are dignified (schickliche Beerdigung), and generally that equal treatment for all deceased is observed. But what does equal treatment mean? When it comes to allotting plots in Swiss cemeteries, the graves are dug in order of registration of the dead person, one after the other in a row. From the point of view of the authorities, the principle of ‘burial in a row’ highlights equality, not discrimination. However, this particular principle of equality conflicts with the principle of religious freedom. The Muslim prescription that the dead should face Mecca is in conflict with the Swiss authorities’ idea of maintaining order.

When the claims of Muslim organizations began reaching public institutions and the public sphere generally over the last three years, the authorities acted quickly. Local bodies in Zurich were first faced with the cantonal ban against dividing cemeteries into separate sections—an old provision against discrimination. This was solved by allotting the Muslim committee a plot of land just next to one of the public cemeteries in the city, on the condition that the Muslim organizations would pay for it. Another provision was that all people claiming to be Muslim could be buried there; here the Swiss authorities were using their knowledge of the tensions existing between the various Muslim communities—an issue otherwise not known to the public. Up to the present time, the Muslims of Zurich have still been unable to collect the necessary funds.

Several principles are in conflict in this case. Three of them are of special interest in the context of this article. First, in Zurich collective demands collide not only with individualist notions, but also with a particular notion of equality. The problematic regulation has historical roots: it was designed a hundred years ago in order to reverse a trend towards separating people of different faiths, in this case Protestants and Catholics. The Muslim wish for separate provision means reversing that decision—that a minority must not be separated against its will. Hence, some of the problems Swiss Muslims are confronted with do not arise from provisions drawn up specifically against their aims. Rather, the prevailing legal and institutional settings, geared towards equality and individual freedom within the ‘host’ society itself, are ill-suited to the special requirements introduced into Switzerland by immigrant minorities. There is some irony in the fact that Muslims in Switzerland today endure hardships relating to rules and regulations which were originally designed to accommodate successfully the various minorities considered ‘indigenous’. The second issue is currently emerging in legal debates: is the provision to ensure religious freedom by allowing exemption from the requirement
to bury the dead in rows a case of granting a privilege to collectivities? Those lawyers who endorse the granting of a special provision to Muslims seek to justify it in terms of protection from discrimination on individual grounds, not of granting privileges to collectivities.

One further, very broad, implication that arose during these debates was a general trend in the argument put forward by minorities. This runs as follows: death cannot be left entirely to the state authorities. Niccolo Raselli, a judge in the Supreme Court, formulated this as follows: in order to ensure freedom of religion, it is enough that, in any community, just one cemetery is provided and managed by the communal and/or municipal bodies. The need for further cemeteries can be managed privately. Minorities tend to consider the state's interference in the religious sphere as unwanted, although the state's obligation to ensure the protection of religious freedom is widely acknowledged. Hence, another interesting question arises from this debate: does the provision to ensure religious freedom by granting exemptions (e.g. from burying the dead in rows) mean that a privilege is being granted? Again, also in this case, the major purpose of the discussion is to establish whether allowing religious minorities to set up their own cemeteries is to be interpreted in terms of minority protection or as granting a privilege to a religious collectivity.

It is the last group of cases that puts individualist orientations under the greatest stress. To this group belongs, first of all, the prescription to wear a helmet while riding on a motorcycle. The Swiss Supreme Court ruled that Sikhs must wear helmets, arguing that exchanging a turban for a helmet does not entail undue hardship. Another case, concerning whether a girl from a Turkish Islamic community could be excused swimming lessons in a coeducational class, proved more complicated because it touched, first, upon conflicting values inherent in the constitution (gender equality versus freedom of religion) and, secondly, on norms and prescriptions within the educational system. What both cases have in common is the fact that wearing a helmet and attending schools approved by the state is considered a civic duty in Switzerland, something that is loaded with connotations. The Supreme Court's ruling, which upheld the exemption, was justified by arguing that not attending swimming lessons would not seriously affect the girl's educational course and would be a minor failing in her performance of her civic duties.

This course of argument was pragmatic, seeking to adapt existing provisions to new circumstances and trying to incorporate them within the existing body of law. The problem is that the major issue here was sidestepped—that is, that a person can be exempted from performing civic duties on religious grounds. Jurists commenting upon this case have gone to great pains to assess the importance of the swimming lessons (see especially Hangartner 1994, Wyss 1994). However, a broader context to this problem is provided by the fact that members of the Jewish community may be exempted from attending school on Saturdays, a practice that would fall under the rubric of a minor exemption from civic duties. The comparison has not (yet?) entered the public debate. One very good excuse, though it is no more than an excuse, for considering these two examples separately is that
exempting Jews from school has been managed so far only within cantonal rules and regulations (case of exemption), whereas the case of the swimming lessons was taken to the Supreme Court on the grounds that religious freedom was being threatened. Should this debate come into the open, exemption from civic duties on religious grounds will certainly come close to what can be described as the collective right of ‘foreign minorities’ in the Swiss context. However, what is important to note here is that, contrary to collective rights granted, for instance, in terms of political autonomy, exemptions usually refer to just one particular dimension in the life of a minority (see, for example, Levy 1997). We must therefore acknowledge a crucial distinction between collective rights which ‘carve collectivities out of societies’, and collective rights which relate to only one aspect of the private/public life of minorities, the members of which are otherwise incorporated into society according to individualist principles.

The wide response that the case of dispensation from swimming lessons found in the Swiss mass media indicates the future potential for conflict within the public sphere. Critics of the Supreme Court’s verdict have adopted cultural shortcuts. Their arguments equate gender segregation with female oppression, and adherence to traditional norms (as displayed by the father of the girl) with fundamentalism. Here we have an example of the practice of othering religious minorities and attributing to them (pejorative) collective identities.

**Religious Minorities’ Demands and Swiss Opportunity Structures**

The above examples indicate that non-Christian religious minorities living in Switzerland can identify needs regarding their religious practices which they would consider to be threatened by the Swiss legal framework. Though still keeping a low profile, they are increasingly addressing their claims, goals, and grievances to Swiss public and state institutions. Minority action therefore calls for re-adjustments within the Swiss polity. Earlier, I suggested that all over the Western world, governments and citizens in ‘host’ societies usually orient themselves by placing particular stress on one of two incorporation models when coping with the multicultural challenge. But these orientations are also shaped by the established modes of accommodation or incorporation prevailing in each respective society. National modes of integration consist of legal provisions, the institutional settings designed to accommodate foreigners, the dynamics within civil society, and the cultural orientations of the polity, as well as the means whereby a national society defines and maintains its cohesion. Let us therefore examine how the strong Swiss emphasis upon the universalist model of accommodation is supported by established opportunity structures, and how these structures shape the orientations of the minority population.
The legal system

The brief discussion of the four examples given above shows that members of religious minorities increasingly challenge Swiss principles of tolerance, religious freedom, and individualism, questioning existing endorsements of equality through their actions. With these new types of religious claim, conflicts of value emerge within the Swiss legal system—conflicts, in other words, between notions of equality and the strong emphasis upon religious freedom: religious freedom in conflict with the norm of gender equality, or religious freedom and duties in conflict with the highly valued notion of civic duties. Switzerland may be an extreme but not unique example of how complex, differentiated, and layered the legal and institutional system—through which the universalist/individualist principle is endorsed—can be. Due to the far-reaching political and legal autonomy of the twenty-six cantons, minority action may touch upon legislation and procedures at federal, cantonal, or even communal levels. In the short run, this complexity seems to enhance the necessary flexibility in dealing with new types of demands, while possibly temporarily postponing important debates and decisions. The case of the Muslim girl’s dispensation from swimming lessons that was decided by the Supreme Court of Switzerland has—not surprisingly—provoked a storm of public criticism, but also made heard the many voices which were supporting the verdict. Despite substantial public disapproval, the verdict was enforced; a fundamental decision was made. At the same time, the dispensation of Jewish children wishing to stay away from school on Saturdays continues to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis by the cantonal bodies.

Regulations impeding religious groups from performing ritual practices have a historical logic of their own. Historical processes are ingrained in the legal structure. As the example of the cemetery indicates, most of the regulations currently impeding the performance of such practices came into being prior to the influx of ‘foreign’ faiths into the country. If, for example, the regulation against the division of cemeteries were to be abolished in the canton of Zurich, no rule endorsing collective provisions regarding burials would be necessary. In using the space allotted to them within public cemeteries, Muslims would again be taking advantage of the universal principle of tolerance. Sometimes, as in this case of Muslim cemeteries, legal provisions regarding the ‘indigenous’ minorities, such as non-discrimination between Catholics and Protestants in public cemeteries, may prevent special solutions being created for ‘alien’ minorities. Here, Switzerland clearly lacks the century-long experience in accommodating difference shared by many other Western countries, for instance, Great Britain and Austria. And what about the long-established Jewish diaspora? Jewish communities, which have been living on Swiss territory for centuries, are a special case. Granted political rights only comparatively recently (in 1874; but cf. Picard 1994: 34f.), and only under international pressure, the special requirements of Jewish citizens have either been accommodated at the cantonal level (in respect of the education system) or communal level (in respect of creating cemeteries), or opposed at the federal level (in
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie! 43

respect of animal slaughter through the shedding of blood). The most common approach to their particular needs has been to tolerate them pragmatically rather than recognize them officially. Few attempts at the public recognition of Jewish objectives have been recorded in Swiss history.

Policies geared towards immigrants and integration practices

The low profile of members of minorities is certainly reinforced by policies which accord the majority of immigrants a low status and which are especially restrictive (in comparison to other Western countries) when it comes to acquiring Swiss citizenship and, subsequently, political rights. Another impeding factor is the significant gap between insiders (with Swiss passports) and outsiders (those without one) living on Swiss territory. The high degree of Swiss decentralization has allowed ‘indigenous’ Swiss minorities (defined through their language) to acquire a substantial basis for preserving their own identity and pursuing their aims through the formal political process. Since linguistic boundaries largely coincide with territorial units—and since, due to the decentralized structure of the political and administrative systems, the ‘indigenous’ minorities have to a large extent been ‘carved out of Swiss society’—they are able to manage multiple dimensions of their life on their own. At the same time, members of immigrant minorities, even if they have already obtained Swiss citizenship, are usually able to pursue just one dimension of their goals—for example, interests relating to religion or language. The Swiss situation is totally different from, say, Great Britain: the number of immigrants and their concentration in particular localities has not of itself led to the development of successful lobbying in Switzerland (compare the successful attempt of Sikhs in Great Britain to obtain exemption from wearing helmets (Poulter 1998: 277ff.)). The uniquely Swiss direct democracy—facilitating the endeavours of the ‘indigenous’ minorities—tends to exert a negative impact upon immigrant minorities’ goals, rendering politicians especially susceptible to xenophobic public opinion (see Sciarini et al. 1998).

The low profile displayed by the minorities is also significantly affected by the habitus of incorporation of immigrant labour in Switzerland. By habitus I mean internalized attitudes informing action. This materializes itself especially in two sets of attitudes towards immigrants. First, they are generally perceived as low class. Indeed, especially during the 1960s and the 1970s, foreign workers (Gastarbeiters) pouring into Switzerland were in demand especially, though by no means exclusively, as non-skilled labour. The analysts of the time coined the term Unterschichtung (creating a lower class), referring to the fact that foreigners were entering Swiss society from below (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1973). This intuitive picture corresponds with actual divisions in so far as specific occupations were identified with the immigrants. However, we must not forget that there is a very high demand for skilled foreign labour in the form of scientists, managers, sportsmen, etc. But the low prestige accorded to immigrants in general has worked as
a strategic device, keeping them out of the public sphere, as well as constructing an exaggerated picture of cultural distance. Until recently, the official ‘three-circles model’, defining the right to work in Switzerland through criteria of geopolitical distance (west European countries, then Southeast Europe, then the rest of the world), clearly followed a cultural leitmotif prevailing within the sphere of labour. Consequently, minorities are still affected by a ‘subaltern habitus’—an attitude that has also contributed to the reluctance of members of alien cultures to enter public arenas.

The second set of ideas relates to the widespread opinion among the Swiss majority, which has been proved totally wrong, that foreigners will come today and go tomorrow (cf. Georg Simmel). The well-known Swiss writer Max Frisch has remarked that those who invited labour to come and work in Switzerland did not expect to receive human beings. The Swiss public thus perceived foreigners, of whatever faith, as temporary visitors without a voice: there was no expectation of ‘alien’ demands being put forward to the general public and to Swiss institutions. But paradoxically, though many Swiss people feel that minorities are currently causing trouble, their attempts to express their objectives publicly have gained them prestige. Hence, entering the public sphere has been a long learning process for the minorities as much as for their Swiss ‘hosts’. The entrance of minorities into the public arena reveals, among other things, their readiness to operate within Swiss public settings. It is impossible to answer here the question whether obtaining collective rights (dignity, identity) enhances opportunities in the labour market. But there is evidence that going public requires skills in cultural adaptation through schooling and networking, buttressing the very strong predilection for enhancing communication across industrial societies (as claimed by Gellner (1983)). This predilection has a strong basis in Swiss perceptions of what are the constitutive elements of national unity.

The political culture and cultural orientations

Switzerland has often been depicted as coming closest to Habermas’s model of ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Verfassungspatriotismus), that is, to the idea of a nation defining itself through acknowledgment of and adherence to the validity of institutions and procedures within the polity (see Sciarini et al. 1998). This idea probably arises through a process of elimination. Being divided along linguistic and religious lines, the national unity of the Swiss cannot possibly be based on a common cultural denominator. The case is more complicated, of course. The question as to what creates Swiss national unity is the subject of frequent inquiries, some proposing the all-embracing symbolism of the cow, while others highlight the brave spirit of mountain people surviving (rather well, in recent decades) in
difficult surroundings. Such approaches reveal, of course, the sometimes ridiculous nature of attempts to define the cultural elements at the roots of collectivities. In the Swiss context especially, the question cannot be solved in any simple way. Hence, when the far right demands that immigrants wishing to stay in the country undergo a successful assimilation process, one cannot help but ask what kind of cultural content would be at the heart of this assimilation. Habermas's approach certainly expresses a very salient feature of the unifying Swiss political culture, understood here as the citizens' attitudes towards the political system which relate to their perceptions of their own place within the polity. Swiss unity is strongly defined by citizens' rights (e.g. of participation in institutions of direct democracy) and, at the same time, maybe even more by civic duties such as military service and following rules and regulations regarding educational curricula.

The notion of participation in public life requires a far-reaching exposure to Swiss values and norms, and indicates a willingness to undergo a learning process which would entail the adoption of many dispositions simultaneously: above all, acquiring the skills of a citizen without the external pressure to undergo assimilation. The left-wing model of 'integration through participation' (Ossipow 1996; see also Wicker 1997) is perceived rather in terms of learning by doing. In some areas rights and duties merge: participation in public life certainly entails both elements. Among the highlights of Swiss unity that are often stressed are civic autonomy as well as the existence of a very strong network of civic organizations (the pride of many Swiss), and also the quest for self-organization supported by a strong emphasis upon the successful management of self-help. These elements make for strong pressure upon minorities to endorse the Swiss normative framework: the endorsement of the central values and norms of the 'host' society is necessary in order to put forward valid arguments when entering the public sphere. At the same time, it becomes all the more problematic for minorities to ask for too many concessions when such a highly valued issue as endorsement of the notion of civic duty is at stake.

The comparative perspective of this inquiry provides us with interesting insights regarding prevailing dispositions towards self-organization and towards 'going public'. By examining the problems and actions of Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus simultaneously, striking similarities as well as differences emerge regarding goals as well as courses of action undertaken. One rather striking convergence comes to light in comparison with the situation of the Jewish community which—certainly unwillingly—currently provides an implicit role model for other non-Christian religious minorities. At the beginning of this inquiry I expected the particular 'rights' of the Jewish community to be referred to by other minorities as a precedent. This expectation was confirmed, but another observation is probably more striking, namely the low profile of Jewish communities in Switzerland, their efficient forms of self-organization, and especially their successful strategies in solving their problems themselves, which are largely replicated by other minority organizations. It is noteworthy that in view of the restrictive funding policies of public bodies, Jewish communities have so far been compelled
and able to provide their own financial support for their religious schools and cemeteries.

We are confronted with an ambivalent situation here. On the one hand, the other religious minorities express the desire to be treated the same as Jewish communities. But depicting Swiss Jews as a precedent may put the Jewish population into a difficult position, because they have managed to keep their special provisions outside public scrutiny. There is some danger that Jews, currently considered by and large in Switzerland as an indigenous minority, could become more distant in public perceptions than they have been in recent decades. At the same time, the reluctance of Jewish organizations or public figures to address the Swiss public sphere with their objectives, aims, and grievances has certainly affected basic attitudes concerning how other minorities should deal with the Swiss public and with governmental institutions. The very private character of the Jewish way of solving their problems, the tendency not to make demands but to look after themselves, guides other minorities to some extent, who seem to adopt this attitude in their turn. Consequently, Swiss public institutions are less affected by minority demands than those in many other Western countries (especially England, Holland, Norway, or Canada). Nevertheless there is a clear-cut, increasing tendency to address public institutions in Switzerland as well, which is enhanced by the nature of the civic society movement involved in minority action.

At the interface between minorities, civil society, and public institutions

This inference addresses the increasingly embattled public–private dividing line. The Swiss non-state sector provides a widely developed network of supporting agencies. Minorities are not the only actors in the public sphere. Minority interests are formed within a broader context of organizations and groups pursuing different goals and objectives in relation to strangers (or foreigners). Minority organizations operate within a dense social field, orienting themselves and appealing to the same opportunity structures within the ‘host society’ that their opponents and supporters do.

So far, few organizations within the ‘host’ society have attempted to capitalize on specific situations when minority organizations make their specific claims. The debate surrounding the establishment of the Muslim cemetery in Zurich is one exception. Here, the local branch of the SVP (a right-wing conservative party) has actively opposed the municipality’s provisions to make the cemetery possible. Its fierce opposition created a counter-movement: most political parties decided to support approval for a cemetery, positioning themselves as ‘foreigner-friendly’ and capitalizing upon this position. The involvement of religious minorities in Switzerland in the very diverse and extensive network of organizations has importantly contributed not only to their welfare, but also to generally enhancing their chances to interact, enter into prolonged dialogue, and shape cultural meanings in mutual exchange. The examples discussed indicate that it is no longer possible to contain
collective demands within the realm of the private domain. Religious activists address numerous public and semi-public institutions and committees, they appeal to courts, asking at least for the reinterpretation of existing laws, which makes legislators reconsider binding provisions. However, my examples also reveal that various exponents of public institutions go to great pains in order to find private solutions, such as granting Muslims in Zurich a plot of land for which they must pay. Making Muslims pay for their cemetery indeed means keeping the problem private. Only after Muslim communities failed to collect sufficient funds for their own cemetery were the political authorities approached with a demand that they loosen the strict rule that no special plots be granted to members of different faiths. That this is a hot issue in Zurich now is indicated by the political authorities' insistence on postponing a solution until after the 1999 elections.

The support and co-operation of the various governmental as well as non-governmental organizations in other countries can arguably enhance the visibility of minority demands in the public sphere and contribute to their confinement within the private sphere. In Switzerland, the latter occurred. Extensive co-operation between different organizations and interest groups appears to have had an important effect upon how minorities have so far managed a variety of problems on their own. But they have paid a price in assisting various Swiss interest groups to 'let sleeping dogs lie'—the current Swiss leitmotif—hence agreeing to various cultural compromises, which have proved problematic for minorities in the long run. At the same time, with minorities mostly expressing their needs and grievances within the private domain, the Swiss principle of universal tolerance is hardly ever questioned in public.

Conclusion

Despite its binding character, the principle of universal tolerance has repeatedly been questioned in the course of negotiations brought into Swiss society by religious minorities. Two interrelated dynamics emerge. First, the examples given above indicate that this principle is inscribed, even ingrained, in institutional and procedural settings. The accommodation of minority demands therefore requires far-reaching readjustments which go way beyond mere reorientations towards values and norms. Because these ideas are ingrained within numerous rules and regulations, any demands for their readjustment are likely to be confronted with mostly stabilized institutional responses, prone to immobility. Hence, it is not just attitudes within Swiss society but existing opportunity structures which impede collective action by religious minorities.

The second inference is more general in nature. What do we learn by studying the processes of minority accommodation in a given national context? I suggest that, above all, it is the salience of those contexts in embracing general principles
that becomes apparent. While endorsing the central values attached to it in current debates, which are carried out independently of national contexts, the widespread notion of universalism tends to acquire the national characteristics of any particular country. Hence, in Switzerland, universalism is interpreted through the prism of Swiss procedural arrangements. To give some examples: the Swiss policies are by and large less oriented towards assimilation than in French ones; the principle of belonging is, unlike in Germany, defined by the *ius soli* rather than by the *ius sanguini*; and it also coexists with a variety of particularist provisions designed to accommodate differences within the society. How the universalist principle is endorsed in Switzerland will therefore affect processes of accommodating the particularist goals of the minorities. Without doubt, certain collective provisions will be necessary in the near future in order to satisfy minority demands. However, what will be understood as a collective provision or even a collective right will have a definitely Swiss aspect.

My focus upon the Swiss national context is, therefore, not only provided by the necessity to debate the obvious potential conflicts and to design practical solutions applicable there. I also suggest that we examine specific measures concerning minority accommodation in a comparative national perspective, because particular solutions may or may not hold in a particular national context. This argument is based on a number of assumptions. Above all, it is important to set aside two lines of debate. While the conceptualization of human rights, including collective minority rights, is carried out mainly at the international level—seeking, for instance, to define the scope of cultural rights or to design generally binding minimal anti-discrimination measures (see, for example, Bröllmann et al. 1993, Eide 1998)—these are usually too broad in scope to solve all the major legal and political problems involved in minority accommodation at the national level. I concur, therefore, with Walzer’s (1997) observation that international society lacks a common history and culture, but that every domestic society inevitably develops a ‘common moral standpoint’, however disputed or even embattled, which comes about as a result of a shared history and experiences and reflects power relations within a given society. The ‘common moral standpoint’, always biased towards the positions of influential sections within a given society, tends sometimes to develop and sometimes to ossify when addressed and challenged by new members of a given society in seeking to pursue their goals as a minority. Such a moral standpoint is closely interrelated with the value systems underlying state institutions and state practices (the legal system, integration policies), at the same time responding to notions embraced within civil society and itself affecting so-called ‘political culture’.

During the last decade, it has been national contexts—in Canada, the Netherlands, Great Britain—that have mostly been discussed in relation to the particularist principle of the accommodation of minorities within state societies. Central Europe has joined these debates at a rather late stage, providing a very different framework, crucial in our context. In the first place, the emerging clashes of values and negotiations address the problem of accommodating difference
within an individualist framework. Let me repeat here one question formulated by Habermas (1994: 108), who defends the individualist-universalist principle against the 'collective challenge':

While modern law establishes a basis for state-sanctioned relations of intersubjective recognition, the rights derived from them protect the vulnerable integrity of legal subjects who are in every case individuals. Can a theory of rights that is so individualistically constructed deal adequately with struggles for recognition in which it is the articulation and assertion of collective identities that seems to be at stake?

This question reveals a series of problems. First, we can sense an uneasy acknowledgment of the existence of collective categories, as well as detect the expectation that they are likely to pose a problem in the near future. Secondly, we witness Habermas's readiness immediately to set out to reconcile collective notions with individualist categories, by reducing the former to the latter. Such reconciliation is envisaged by having resort to legal interpretative frameworks such as anti-discriminatory practices or protection measures formulated in idioms of individualism. And it is, finally, obvious that the individualist position strives to restrict collective demands, grievances, and solutions to the private sphere, thus keeping them out of the public domain. Habermas's question, and the avalanche of debates it has provoked, open up a wide space for further investigations.

REFERENCES


1997. 'Turkish Islamic Associations in Germany and the Issue of European Citizenship', in Vertovec and Peach (eds.), Islam in Europe.


APPLIQUÉ CRAFT IN ORISSA, INDIA: CONTINUITY, CHANGE, AND COMMERCIALIZATION

BONANI SAMALL

Introduction

The term ‘appliqué’, of French origin, describes a technique whose decorative effect is obtained by superimposing patches of coloured fabric on a base fabric, the edges of the patches being sewn on with some form of stitching. The appliqué technique has been adopted by people all over the world to provide bold, brightly coloured, sometimes three-dimensional designs for use in various situations. The work is generally done by hand.

Many places in India are renowned for producing such appliqué work, the important regions being northern Gujarat, Bihar, Orissa, Tanjore and its surrounding areas, and Rajasthan. In Orissa, appliqué work is carried out at Pipili, Puri, and other places connected with religious festivals and processions.¹ It is the development of appliqué work in this area up to the present day that I want to concentrate on here.

In the past, such work was confined to the Darji or tailor caste, whose surnames are mostly Mahapatra and Maharana. ‘Darji’ is an Urdu word for professional tailor and indicates that a group of people who previously earned their living by tailoring came to be recognized in the course of time as a caste of the

1. Pipili is a small town situated on state highway 8, on the Jagannath trunk road, nearly twenty kilometres from Bhubaneswar, the state capital, and forty kilometres from Puri, site of the famous temple of Lord Jagannath on the coast.
name ‘Darji’. The development and maintenance of appliqué work in Puri and Pipili has to a great extent been due to the presence of the Jagannath temple at Puri. The Rajas or kings of Puri appointed artisans as sevak (servants) for the regular supply of articles required for the day-to-day seva (rituals) performed in the temple. There is written evidence to show that appliqué craft was present in the Jagannath temple as far back as AD 1054, as sevak were appointed by the king at that time (Mohanty 1980). The duty of members of the Darji caste in Puri to supply the requirements of stitched articles for Lord Jagannath and for festivals was later laid down in the Record of Rights for Shri Jagannath Temple, Puri, under the Orissa Act of 1952. This link with the temple is a very close one and is supported by much written evidence, as well as figuring in legend and folklore. Here I shall deal with the most famous legend, which relates to the origin of appliqué craft in Pipili.2

It is said that a Badshah (Muslim emperor) of Delhi (the people do not remember the name) once ordered a resident Darji to make him two pillows. The result pleased the tailor so much that he thought it would be better if the pillows were given to Lord Jagannath of Puri, as only he ought to own things of such exotic beauty. The next morning, when the Darji came to resume his work, he was surprised to find that one of the pillows was missing. When the emperor was informed about the missing pillow he immediately imprisoned the Darji, thinking he had stolen it. But Lord Jagannath appeared before him in a dream and told him that the Darji was innocent and that he, Jagannath, had performed the miracle in which the pillow had transported itself overnight to Puri. The next day, the man was released and resumed his work. After completing it he came to Pipili and taught his craft to the people of his caste, so that the art spread to many other parts. Ultimately, good artisans were selected to render service to Lord Jagannath at Puri.

It was common practice for kings and rulers in India to patronize traditional craft and skills, selecting renowned and talented artists from various fields and housing them in their respective capitals. Similarly, when temples, mosques, and other places of worship were constructed, these crafts and skills were exploited to endow them too with religious merit. Over time, these craftsmen from different places, housed in the precincts of a temple or mosque, helped preserve the autonomy and sanctity of religious traditions. This is thought to have happened too in the case of appliqué craft artisans. There is a popular belief that appliqué craft started or rather originated in Pipili, which is famous for it today, and that itinerant craftsmen carried it to Puri. This is only an assumption, as opinions vary: informants are not certain about their place of origin. Pipili was later seized by Muslim rulers, and some Muslims settled there. In the course of time the essentially Islamic word ‘Darji’ seems to have been applied to the Hindu Suchika caste. As affinal relations gradually developed between the Suchika of Puri and Pipili, the artisans were influenced by the outstanding work of Muslims residing in and

2. Editors' note: a companion article, by Mamata Tripathi on the patta painting of Orissa, will appear in a future issue of JASO.
around Pipili. These craft items were subsequently added to local appliqué designs, thus making the craft more attractive and commercially significant.

Appliqué Techniques

Technically, appliqué is based mainly on three items: stitches, strips, and patchwork. The motifs that are cut out and patched on to the base cloth can also be divided into three categories, depending on shape and appearance: (i) plants, (ii) animals, and (iii) celestial bodies and symbols. The arrangement of structural patterns and the combination of different colours form the main theme.

A. Stitches

Appliqué craft is mainly based upon the chikana or chain stitch (see 10, below), but other stitches are also used, as listed below:

1. **Bakhia** (stem stitch)
The stem stitch is a simple running stitch used to fix patches temporarily on to the base cloth. Several stitches can be picked up at each insertion of the needle. It is one of the most important stitches in appliqué work.

2. **Taropa** (hem stitch)
The taropa stitch is like a hemming stitch and is used for stitching appliqué patches on to the base cloth, where the edges of the patches are turned in and then stitched, the stitch being almost concealed beneath the patch. It is one of the stitches used to provide a neat finish.

3. **Guntha** (run stitch)
Here the needle passes above and below the fabric, making stitches of equal length. The stitches below should also be of equal length, but generally they are half the size or even less of the upper stitches.

4. **Khanja** (tag stitch)
This stitch is used to keep the motif in position on a piece of fabric. It is applied to the base cloth in appliqué, a primary stitch that is taken out after the main stitches have been inserted.

5. **Button-hole stitch**
This stitch is used for the mudi or rings that are attached to large canopies in order to fix tiny round mirrors to them. Here the needle passes over the edge of the inner surface of the cloth.
6. **Ganthi** (similar to button-hole stitch)
This stitch is worked in almost the same manner as the button-hole stitch, with the
difference that in the latter the stitches are close together, whereas in the *ganthi*
stitch they are somewhat apart and not as uniform. The thread is brought out on
the lower line, the needle being inserted in position on the upper line, taking a
downward stitch with the thread under the needle point, then pulling the stitch up
to form a loop and repeating the process. This stitch is used to produce attractive
embroidered motifs.

7. **Kitikitia** (variation on button-hole stitch)
This stitch is a variation on the button-hole stitch. Here, after two regular stitches,
one half-stitch is inserted.

8. **Baiganomangia Kitikitia**
This is a combination of *kitikitia* with a grouped button-hole stitch and is used in
a similar fashion to *kitikitia*, with a variation in the half-stitch, which is taken in.

9. **Ruching** (running stitch)
This is an essential stitch in appliqué craft in which the stitch is used to gather a
strip of cloth to make an appliqué motif. These stitches are generally circular in form.

10. **Chikana** (chain stitch)
As already noted, the most important stitch in appliqué work is the chain stitch,
an embroidery stitch built up by looping threads and used to bind the edges of the
appliqué patch without turning. It is also used for textural and ornamental effects
on motifs.

B. **Strips**

Types of *patti* (strips) are described below along with their colour combinations
and measurements.

1. **Phula patti** (flower motif): black background with flower of red, yellow, white,
or green, 7–9 inches.

2. **Sadha patti** or **naali patti** (plain red strip): always red, 5–6 inches.

3. **Nahara patti** (right-facing cone pattern): white, red, and black combination, 5–6
inches.

4. **Kalaso patti** (pitcher strip): black background, white pitcher pattern, 6 inches.

5. **Beliri patti** (strip from left to right): white and red strip, 4–4½ inches.
6. **Mooda patti** (strip from right to left): white, red, and black or blue combination, 5–6 inches.

7. **Gula patti** (wavy strip): black background, chain stitch with red or white thread, 5–6 inches.

8. **Hirana patti** (**mogra** flower strip): red background, flower of white cloth, 3 inches.


10. **Khandiylal patti** (diamond-shaped strip): red and black square (**chauka**) **pania** (triangular strip on top and bottom edge) cloth, 5–6 inches.

11. **Chauka patti** (square strip): background of black and blue, with chain of white thread, 5–6 inches.

12. **Sua patti** (swan strip): background of red with green **sua**, 5–7 inches.

13. **Hansa patti** (swan strip): black background, with red and yellow **hansa**, 5–7 inches.

14. **Chidiya patti** (**chubs** strip): black background with **chidiya** of red and yellow or red background **chidiya** of black and yellow, 4 inches.

C. **Patchwork**

Motifs used in appliqué include trees, creepers, leaves, flowers, birds, animals, fish, celestial bodies, symbols and other motifs, which are given in detail below:

1. Tree: **belagaccha** (tree of Bael or Aegle marmelos correa).

2. Leaves (**patra**): **bela** (leaf of Bael); **banka**; **pana** (betel leaf); **suji**.

3. Flowers: **malli** (**mogra**); **padma**, **tarup**, **guntha** (types of lotus); **suryo mukhi** (sunflower); **utha phula** (raised flower); **sunsuniya**.

4. Birds: **sua** (parrot); **bataka** (duck); **hansa** (swan); **mayur** (peacock); **ganda maurya** or **bhairaba** (double-headed peacock).

5. Creeper: **tohi** or **dali**.

6. Animals: **hati** (elephant); **singho** (lion).
7. Fish: *matsha*.

8. Heavenly bodies: *surya* (sun); *chandra* (moon).

9. Other: Rahu (demon who swallows the sun and moon during eclipses); *kongula* (triangular-shaped motif); flag.

**Appliqué and Religious Traditions**

Hindu religious texts prescribe different festivals for different times of the year, which prepare devotees for encountering and experiencing the divine. When *yatra* or festivals are being performed, people come from remote parts of the country to glimpse the deities in procession. Sometimes devotees express a lifelong desire to see the deities, especially if they are barred from the shrine on account of old age, disease, or disability. Festivals are accordingly provided for those who cannot witness the deities in the temple precincts themselves. The performance of festivals in the temples is said to remove fear of fire, famine, floods, and epidemics, as well as saving devotees from other acts of nature.

The appliqué craft is closely connected with these religious traditions. A canopy and flag are essential for every temple. In every village at the Dola ('to play with colours') festival, where the images of Devi Radha and Lord Krishna are led in procession, the divine chariots are covered with appliqué work, and ritual umbrellas, *rash* (fans), etc. are also carried before the deities. The temple of Lord Jagannath (the 'Lord of the Universe') at Puri\(^3\) sees many festivals around the year, during which images of the *archa* (representative deities) are often taken out in procession. The taking out of the deities is called *mulabera* and is especially associated with this temple. The important festivals where appliqué items are required are listed below.

1. **Devasnana Purnima**

The name of this festival is derived from *deva* (God), *snana* (bathing), and *purnima* (full moon). It is celebrated at the *purnima* of the month of *jyestha* (May–June), in which Lord Balabhadra was born. The *Snana Yatra* (bathing festival) is performed on this day. The images of Lord Jagannath, Lord Balabhadra, and Devi Subhadra, along with Lord Sudarshana and Lord Madanmohan, are brought in procession to the *snana vedi* (bathing platform). The procession is called *pahandi* or *pahandivijaya*. A canopy called *indragovinda chandua* (from Indra, king of heaven, rain and thunder, plus Govinda, an alternative designation

3. The word Puri may be a shortened form of Jagannath Puri, literally 'the abode of the Lord of the Universe'.
for Lord Jagannath) is tied on to the snana vedi. The name of this chandua also makes reference to its minute pores: Lord Indra showers rain in such a manner that it falls on the chandua, which is tied over the trinity of deities, providing protection from rain and only allowing the required amount of water to percolate through. In this way, water is sent from Indra to Govinda. A new canopy is made only after the old one has become torn. Formerly the raw material was donated by devotees, but now the temple administration provides it, and the canopy is tied on every year on this occasion. The platform is decorated with pictures of jewel trees, flower gardens, flags, and a toran (an appliqué panel over the doorway, which is a good omen). The images are all decorated with beautiful flowers, and dhupa (incense) and perfumes of many kinds are offered. This famous pahandi of the deities takes place accompanied by music and the beating of various types of indigenous musical instruments, in the midst of thousands of people jostling to obtain a glimpse of them.

The day before the festival, 108 gold and copper pots are filled with water from the suka kuan (golden well) and kept on the bhoga mandap (offering platform). These vessels are brought to the snana vedi on the day of the Snana Purnima in a ritual called Jalad Hibasa. The deities are first offered red powder and then taken to the snana vedi, their bodies being covered with silk clothes. This is the only occasion when water is poured on the images themselves; at other times it is poured on the copper mirror the deities use. Along with the rituals, the pouring of water is accompanied by the chanting of a pavamana (a Sanskrit hymn). After the bathing ceremony, the deities are dressed up as Ganesha (the god of learning and wealth) in a ritual called Gajanana Vesa (vesa meaning 'dress'). For Lord Jagannath this is the first annual yatra. Generally Ganesha is worshipped at the beginning of every rite, the reason for the deities being dressed up as Ganesha at this time.

Following the Snana Yatra, the images are kept on the ratna vedi (the throne of the Trinity in the inner sanctum of Lord Jagannath's temple) for fifteen days, away from public view, without any proper daily worship. This period is called anabasara ('improper time for worship'). For these fifteen days the daita (descendants of Visvabasu, the savar chief) paint the images with original colours, since they have been washed clean by the bathing festival. On the sixteenth day, the deities are taken out for worship, following their renovation. The festival of Lord Jagannath's first appearance to his devotees is called Navayauvan ('new life').

During this period they are considered to be ill and resting, and the Raja Vaidya, the king's physician, gives them a specific medicine.

2. Rukmini Harana

The name of this festival is derived from Rukumini (the wife of Lord Krishna) and harana ('abduction'). It is celebrated on the eleventh day of the bright fortnight of jyestha (May–June). A particular sebayat (servant) dresses as Sisupal (a mythical king who was a suitor of Rukumini), while Madan Mohan, sitting on a rath
Bonani Samall

(car) in the temple, fights with Sisupal. The entire rath is covered with appliqué craft. Madan Mohan wears juddha posaka (war attire). Ultimately, Sisupal is defeated and Rukumini elopes with Madan Mohan.

3. Rath Yatra, or Car Festival

The world-famous Car Festival of Lord Jagannath is held at Puri on ashadha sukla dwitiya, that is, the second day of the bright fortnight of ashadha (June–July), every year. It attracts people from all over the world. A legend about the origin of the rath (car) tells that the Lord’s car was in heaven for a long time. It originated on earth from the battle between Indra and the demon Bhuturasura, during which Indra violently flung lightning on to the body of the demon. This weapon broke into four parts, the third of which took the shape of the rath. From that day on, the name rath was heard on earth, and gradually its construction was undertaken. In Hindu mythology Indra is the king of heaven, rain, and thunder. As the rath originated as a part of his weapon, the fact that the Car Festival takes place at the beginning of the rainy season is mythically justified.

Great religious significance is always attributed to the construction and final consecration of the raths. The colour of the cloth covering the raths is similar to that of the dresses the deities wear. Some regard Jagannath as a manifestation of Lord Krishna, who wears pitambara or yellow cloth. The corresponding covering cloth is made of red and yellow appliqué, the design near the entrance being originally of rupa (silver) and later of pittala (brass), but now it is done in zari (gold or silver thread). Here, in front of the deity, a canopy called uda chandra (‘canopy which flies’) is tied, displaying the appliqué work of the Darjis. Lord Balabhadra’s rath is covered with red and blue appliqué work. The blue colour represents Lord Balabhadra, who is also called Nilamber (‘clothed in blue’). Devi Subhadra is conceived as Sakti (the red-robed mother goddess). The covering of her rath is of appliqué on red- and black-coloured fabric. The deities, decorated with golden garments, which are also prepared by the appliqué craftsmen, are installed inside these cars.

Afterwards, the deities are given a particular kind of bhog (offering) and are brought to the raths one by one. The raths are kept ready in front of the singhadwar (lion’s gate) facing north the day before Rath Yatra. The cars are placed in a row, that of Lord Balabhadra being in front, followed by those of Devi Subhadra and Lord Jagannath. Just before the deities are carried from the temple to the raths they are adorned with floral crowns. The cars do not start immediately after the deities have been installed. The Raja (king) of Puri, who is said to be the descendant of the builders of the Jagannath temple, comes in a palanquin to pay homage to them by sweeping the platform of each car in turn. This is called Chhiera Panhara (‘sweeping the floor of the raths’) and is done using a gilded broomstick after holy water mixed with sandalwood paste has been sprinkled on the floor. Then follows the most auspicious moment, when thousands of people seize the ropes and begin to pull the cars. The motion should be slow along the bada danda (the main road) till the journey ends at Gundicha Mandir (Lord
Jagannath’s summer house). Since Lord Balabhadra is the eldest, his car moves first, followed by Devi Subhadra and Lord Jagannath. If the cars do not move in a slow, punctuated motion, and if any part of a car is damaged, it will lead to disaster for the country and for humanity in general.

After seven days at Gundicha Mandir, the deities return to Bahuda Yatra. On the ekadasi or eleventh day in the bright fortnight of ashadha (June–July), the deities are ceremonially dressed in a rite called Suna Vesa (‘golden dress’).

4. Shayan Yatra
Shayan Yatra (the ‘sleeping festival’), is also celebrated on ashadha shukla ekadasi. The representative images (small golden images) of Laksminarayan, Anantabasudeva and Bhubaneswar, representing Lord Jagannath, Lord Balabhadra, and Devi Subhadra respectively, are taken into a well-decorated sleeping chamber made of wood and decorated with different types of appliqué work, such as sejo (three mattresses) and mandi (twelve pillows), which are made by the Darji in different colours. The Darji also provide, well in advance, the dresses which the deities wear at the time of going to bed. This festival displays different appliqué items in association with the different Lords. They are then laid on their respective cots till kartika shukla ekadasi, the eleventh day of the bright fortnight of the month of kartika (October–November).

5. Jhulan Yatra
The Jhulan Yatra (swing festival) is celebrated for seven days from srabona shukla dashami, the tenth day of the bright fortnight of srabana (July–August) up to purnima (full-moon day) in the same month, in the precincts of Lord Jagannath’s temple. Here Madan Mohan, an image of Jagannath, along with the goddesses Lakshmi and Viswadhatri, is placed in a swing on the mukti mandap (‘platform for learned Brahmans’) called jhulan mandap. The Darji have an important role in the Jhulan Yatra, supplying decorated saris with pleats for Lakshmi and clothes with pleats and shawls for Lord Madan Mohan.

6. Krishna Janma
Krishna Janma, the birthday of Lord Krishna, is celebrated on the eighth day of the dark fortnight of bhadra (August–September). The deities put on new garments, such as pleated clothes and shawls made in different types of appliqué craft by the Darji, who supply the temple administration with these articles at least one week before the festival.

7. Saptapuri Amabasya
This takes place on the new-moon day of bhadra (August–September). On this occasion the different items which are offered to the deities are placed on a taato (tray for offerings made of bamboo), which is covered by a piece of appliqué cloth made by the Darji.
8. **Radhastami**

The birthday of the goddess Radha (the fiancée of Lord Krishna) is celebrated on the eighth day of the bright fortnight of *bhadra* (August–September). The new garments for the goddess are supplied by the Darji. This includes a small pleated sari and a shawl decorated in different colours with appliqué work. The different colour combinations and the sizes of all items are laid down in different sacred texts of the temple.

9. **Sahasra Kumbha Abhisek**

This festival, the coronation (*abhisek*) of the goddess Durga, is carried out on the eighth day of the dark fortnight of *aswina* (September–October), on which day Shola Puja (worship for sixteen days) of the goddess Bimala also begins. A small canopy is made for this purpose by the Darji.

10. **Kumar Purnima**

This is held on the full-moon day of *aswina* (September–October). For this festival a *luga* (covering for the lower part of the body), *chador* (covering for the upper part of the body) and *khandua* (raw silk) are provided for the deities. The colour of Lord Balabhadra’s attire is green, of Lord Jagannath’s yellow, and of Devi Subhadra’s red. Again these garments are made by the Darji and supplied to the temple administration well before the festival. On this occasion the goddess Lakshmi and Lord Vishnu play *jua* (gambling with cards).

11. **Odhanasasthi**

This takes place on the sixth day of the bright fortnight of *margasira* (November–December). From this day *ghodalagi* (‘the Lords wear their winter garments’) is observed, as this festival is celebrated at the onset of winter. These clothes, made of raw silk and called *chador*, are prepared by the Darji and supplied to the temple before the festival. The size of the *chador* for Lord Jagannath is seven metres, for Lord Balabhadra eight metres, and for Devi Subhadra six metres.

12. **Pushyabhiseka**

This takes place on the full-moon day in the month of *pausa* (December–January). Pots filled with perfumed water are taken from *bhoga mandap* (the offering platform) to the *ratna vedi*, and sacred water is sprinkled for the well-being of the deities. This *abhiseka* is performed for different deities such as Lord Ram, Devi Sita, and Lord Lakshmana, the festival therefore being called Ramabhiseka. On this occasion Lord Jagannath is worshipped as Lord Ramachandra, the epic hero of the Ramayana, along with his brother Laksmana and consort Sita. The Darji make *chhati* and *ularo* (types of umbrella) for this occasion.

13. **Makara Sankranti**

This is celebrated in the month of *pausa* (December–January). Boiled rice mixed with candy and some fruit juice are offered to the deities. For this purpose the
Darji make the *makara taato*, the cloth covering on the tray meant for the offerings, along with a *makara chhati* (type of umbrella).

14. *Dola Yatra*
This is celebrated from the tenth day of the bright fortnight of *phalguna* (February–March) up to the full-moon day of the same month. The *arcabera* (deities) are taken out to the *dola vedi* (swing), and the swinging festival is performed. The goddess Lakshmi and Lord Madan Mohan play *holi* (spraying of colours). For this purpose a *dola chandua* (type of canopy) is made.

**Besha**

*Besha* means dress or adornment. Daily, from Mangala Arati (the earliest ritual in the morning) to Ratri Pahuda ('to retire at night'), the deities on the *ratna vedi* wear different types of dress, decorated with cotton and silk fabrics, gold ornaments studded with precious stones, flowers of different varieties, *tulsi* (basil or *occimum sanctum*) leaves etc., while sandalwood paste, camphor, and sometimes musk are used in the rituals. Some important *beshas* are described below.

1. *Abakasha* or *Tadapa Uttari Besha*
*Abakasha* is the term for the teeth-brushing and bathing rituals of the deities. *Tadapa* is the clothing for the lower part of the body of the deities, while *uttariya* is the clothing for the upper part. This *besha* is carried out every day after the Mangala Arati for the Abakasha rituals.

2. *Chandana Besha*
This *besha* ritual is performed for 42 days starting from *akshya trutiya* (third day of the bright fortnight of *baisakha* (April–May). In this *besha* the deities Lord Rama and Lord Krishna travel to the tank in a palanquin, while Lord Madan Mohan, Devi Saraswati, and Devi Lakshmi travel on a *moni fiman* ('divine vehicle'), the covering of which is newly made each year of cloth and *zari* (gold). They *chapo* ('go boating'). This boat has a *chan dan bento* (sandalwood handle) and five *alata* (hand-fans for religious use) with *bento* (handles of silver). A *hati ghoda* ('elephant covering') of *zari* work is also used. From this day onwards, construction of the deities' *raths* for the Car Festival begins. Chandan Yatra is celebrated for 42 days, divided into two periods of 21 days each. The first period is known as *bahar chandan* ('outer chandan'). During this period, the representative images of Rama, Krishna, Madan, Lakshmi, and Biswadhatriare are taken in procession to Narendra tank. Images of Siva from five Siva temples—Jameswar, Lokanath, Markundeswar, Nilakantha, and Kapaloms Chano—also go on *biman*. The five Sivas are known as the *panch pandavas* ('five Pandavas', the famous
brothers in the Mahabharata). The procession makes use of chhāti (umbrellas used in religious functions and processions) with a chandra (moon) and surya (sun), which were formerly made of silver, later of pitalo (brass), and are now of cloth. The cloth used to be made of makhamal and now is of velvet. The chhāti of Lord Balabhadra is black, of Devi Subhadra red, while Lord Jagannath has a white ularo (a type of chhāti) and a red, yellow, and white alata (fan). In the Narendra tank, the images play in well-decorated chapo (boats) and are worshipped. The second period of 21 days, known as bhitar chandan (‘inner chandan’), is celebrated inside the temple.

3. Suna Besha
This besha, whose name derives from suna (gold) and besha (dress), is also known as raja besha (‘king’s dress’). It is worn on the eleventh day in the bright fortnight of ashadha (June–July), when the deities are in their respective raths near the singhadwar (lion’s gate) of the Jagannath temple. In this besha, fahada (Terminalia bellerica) and padma (lotus) of gold are tagged into the cloth of the goddess Subhadra. This work is done in the bhandaro gharo (the treasure room of the temple). The deities are adorned with many gold ornaments. Lord Balabhadra appears with hands and feet made of gold, Lord Jagannath holds a gold chakra (disc) in his right hand and a silver conch in his left hand, and both Lord Balabhadra and Lord Jagannath hold a plough in their left hand and a gold mace in their right hand.

4. Kaliyadalan Besha
This besha is worn on the eleventh day of the dark fortnight of the month of bhadra (August–September), when Lord Jagannath is dressed like Lord Krishna for killing Kaliya (a large serpent). For this besha a cane and wooden frame are required. The snake has seven phona (hoods), and the Darji make its scales out of cloth in order to cover the snake. The deities’ hands and legs are of wood and are coloured every year. Lord Jagannath and Lord Balabhadra wear a kiriti (crown). Here Lord Jagannath as Lord Krishna stands on the snake while Lord Balabhadra as Lord Balaram stands cross-legged. They wear luga, chador, and kuncha (pleated material) of silk made by the Darji. Lord Jagannath as Krishna is dressed in yellow, Balaram in blue, and Subhadra in red.

5. Pralambasura Badha Besha
This besha is held on the twelfth day of the dark fortnight of the month of bhadra (August–September). It depicts Lord Balabhadra’s killing of Pralambasura (the demon). Lord Balabhadra is dressed as Balaram and Lord Jagannath as Krishna. Lord Jagannath’s hands and legs are made of cane covered in appliqué work.

6. Krishna–Balaram Besha
This besha is associated with an important rite held on the thirteenth day of the dark fortnight of the month of bhadra (August–September). Lord Jagannath and
Lord Balabhadra are dressed like Lord Krishna and his brother Lord Balaram. The *posako* (dress) they wear is included in the services (*seva*) owed by the Darji. Every year new *posaka* are made on this occasion. One of the *zamindars* (landlords) of Cuttack District used to donate the necessary raw material for the preparation of these dresses, but today it is provided by the temple administration.

7. **Nagarjuna (Parsurama) Besha**

This *besha* is held only rarely. It is performed in the month of *kartika* (October–November), when there are six days of *panchuka* (fasting) in place of the usual five days. The Lords are dressed as warriors, with the *handia* (headdress) and *dhanu* (bow) worn by the Nagas, a tribe of north-east India. They also wear the traditional dress of *dhoti*, *lungi*, and *chadar*.

8. **Ghodaagi Besha**

This is observed from the sixth day of the bright fortnight of the month of *marg-asira* (November–December) to the fifth day of the bright fortnight of the month of *magha* (January–February). The deities wear winter cloths and *ghoda* (covering). Every year new clothes are made for them and for Sudarshan. Formerly the materials were supplied by the king, but now they are provided by the temple administration.

9. **Jamalagi Besha**

This is observed on *basanta panchami*, the fifth day of the bright fortnight of *magha* (January–February), and continues until *dola purnima*, the full-moon day of *phalguna* (February–March). The deities wear a new *jama* (shirt), *kuncha* (pleated cloth), and *chador* (shawl).

10. **Padma Besha**

On any Saturday or Wednesday between the new-moon day of the month of *magha* (January–February) and *basanta panchami*, the clothes worn by the deities are decorated with *padma phula* (lotus flower) made of *solo* (cork). Lace, *zari*, and paper are supplied by Bada Chhata Matha, a monastery in Puri.

From the material presented above it is clear that the Darji and their appliqué craft make a major contribution towards the Jagannath cult and have a close ritual relationship with the Jagannath temple. All apparel, from daily wear to dress for ritual occasions, is supplied by the Darji, together with other appliqué work, such as canopies, *chhati*, and *trasa* (heart-shaped banners), which are used on different ritual occasions and form a part of the ritual traditions of this major temple.
66 *Bonani Samall*

*Change within the Craft*

Originally, appliqué craft was undertaken to provide items of religious and ceremonial importance only. The main items are listed below:

1. **Chandua (canopy)**
   Originally all the deities were stored with a piece of cloth over their heads for protection. This piece of decorated cloth is called a *chandua* and is a sign of respect to the deity. Huge *chandua* also feature in large gatherings such as weddings and meetings.

2. **Chhati (ritual umbrella)**
   As the name indicates, this item is used for ritual journeys and royal outings. These umbrellas are not allowed inside the Jagannath temple precincts. In earlier times a procession, whether religious or royal, was unthinkable without this article, but today its use has become limited to the former context. The *chhati* has also evolved new, more commercial and secular uses, such as garden umbrellas and decorative ladies’ umbrellas.

3. **Trasa (banner)**
   In the past this was used frequently for religious purposes and in royal processions, but at present it is restricted to the former, being seen in royal processions only rarely. Specific categories of people carried this item, and without its presence a procession was not considered complete.

4. **Alata (hand-fan for religious use)**
   When the deities are in procession, *alatas* give them protection from the heat. Originally these may have been of plain cloth, but gradually decorated *alatas* were made for this purpose.

5. **Adheni (banner)**
   From traditional to modern times this article has been very much in use in both religious and, more rarely, royal processions.

6. **Dola Mandani (covering for celestial vehicle)**
   Originally meant for ritual use, this covered the top of the divine wooden chariot or *bimano* (vehicle). In its present form it has been modified as a door decoration or *jhalar* (literally ‘frill’) and is used as such in domestic households.

7. **Tilaka Kothali (letter-holder)**
   In earlier times, when travelling from village to village by foot, bullock cart, etc., a *tilaka kothali* was used for storing sandalwood, vermilion, money etc., these being essential when staying somewhere overnight. With the faster modes of communication of modern times, the *tilaka kothali* has lost this function. In
modern households it has found a new function as a letter-holder, as well as continuing to be a piece of decoration.

8. **Bairakha** (flag)
The presence of a flag at the pinnacle of a temple signified that it was a Hindu temple. Originally these flags were made mainly for Lord Jagannath, Lord Balabhadra, and Devi Subhadra, gradually coming to be used too in other temples and shrines in Orissa.

9. **Bachkani** (a garment for men covering the upper portion of the body)
Also called *phatei*, this was normally used by kings and *zamindars* (landlords) but is no longer in fashion, due to the availability of milled cloth and changes in dress design. Formerly people wore a *dhoti* or *chador*, the *bachkani* being attire for an outing. On formal occasions, a *dhoti* or *chador* along with a *bachkani* or *phatei* were worn.

10. **Batua** (cloth bag of semi-circular shape)
Formerly, when money was scarce, it was kept in a container called a *batua*. Initially *batua* had no designs and were of plain cloth, but gradually embroidery and figures were added to them. From this model a variety of ladies’ bags have developed.

11. **Sujini** (embroidered quilt)
This is said to be an artefact belonging to the remote past. Present-day artisans just talk about it and none of them possesses one. Since ordinary people could not afford them, its use was restricted to the *zamindars*.

   Formerly only religious items were made, but slowly, due to its magnificent craftsmanship, appliqué craft has grown in demand and is now patronized by pilgrims and tourists, thus starting to flourish commercially. As a result, it has ceased to be restricted to religious purposes alone and has gradually given way to articles such as the *bachhani*, *batua*, *sujini*, and *kothalimuni* (letter-holder) for day-to-day use. To meet this growing demand the Darji, mainly those of Pipili and Puri, started making modern items, some deriving from traditional forms and functions, others being created for specific purposes. For example, at some point the idea arose of converting the age-old *chandua* into wall hangings. The central flower underwent a number of changes in this process. Originally a *tikili* (plain round shape cut out of cloth) was placed at the centre. Later this was replaced with a *bhundi* (raised centre made of cloth). Later still a *kancha* (mirror) was used instead, which now has a plastic frame. In the medieval period the *utha phula* (raised flower) and *gaddi* (miniature *utha phula singada* or stuffed triangular motif) were all made of cotton, covered on both sides with cloth. The place of the *utha phula* has been taken by the *suryamukhi* (sunflower), which takes less time and has proved more fashionable. Similarly, beautifully embroidered appliqué
Fig. 1 Adheni (banner), traditional item

doors hangings may be seen generally in traditional Oriya households. The success of the *batua* in former times has given an impetus to the production of various types of ladies’ bags in appliqué, which are very much in demand and circulate widely in India as well as abroad. The garden umbrella has an immense demand around the world and can be seen decorating beaches and the lawns of private houses both in India and abroad. It provides protection from the sun but not the rain. Fancy appliqué hand-fans are also made.

Other items owe nothing to tradition. Cushion covers are thoroughly modern items, on which the use of appliqué work is a most recent development. Many people have a complete drawing-room set made of appliqué. Other items include tablecloths, door screens and *toran* (embroidered appliqué door hangings, both used to provide privacy), sari borders, fancy shopping bags, purses, television covers, lampshades and file carriers (these days it has become traditional to present
appliqué file covers and filebags to invitees to seminars and meetings). In modern times this craft has therefore gained fame worldwide, and from having a purely ritual purpose it has become highly commercial in nature. It is also in a state of flux, as new items are frequently added to the range.

The production and marketing of appliqué is controlled by the Government of Orissa Directorate of Handicraft and Cottage Industries. There is also the Orissa State Co-operative Handicraft Corporation Ltd., which was established in 1959 to market the products of the artisans in the state. There are two main objectives. The first is procurement of the products of the artisans, and the second is to expose them to market channels in different areas through its sales emporia known as utkalika. The Pipili Appliqué Works Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd., a registered organization of the Directorate of Handicraft and Cottage Industries, came into existence in 1957. Presently its main function is to secure orders and to market products. Members of the craft use both traditional and modern skills.
and methods of production. This has been facilitated by the training programmes conducted from 1970 onwards. Members of the society are given preference by financial institutions when they apply for short- or long-term loans. The marketing of the products is done through the society's showroom directly to the Orissa State Handicraft Board. Other channels for marketing are exhibitions and selling to middlemen and traders. To keep up with the growing demand for the craft, the government has accorded privileges to artisans in borrowing from financial institutions such as the Orissa State Financial Corporation, the Puri Gramya Bank, and the State Bank of India.

Appliqué craft, intended initially for purely religious use, has thus, with the passage of time, become modernized and commercialized in nature, due to its attractions to a wider clientele. Religious uses have been maintained, but this further development has led to a growing national and international as well as local market for the products of the craft.

REFERENCE

HOMAGE TO THE ARAKMBUT

PAUL HENLEY

ANDREW GRAY, *The Arakmbut of Amazonian Peru*, Providence and Oxford: Berg-hahn, 3 volumes:

Although the quality of the ethnography of indigenous Amazonia has improved immensely over the last thirty years in relation to all parts of the region, the main geographical focus of interest, in the anglophone literature at least, has been moving progressively southwards during this period. In the 1960s and 1970s, most of the stimulating new work was emerging from the Guianas and the Northwest Amazon. By the 1980s, it was Central Brazil and the Xingu that appeared to be receiving most attention, while by the 1990s it was the turn of the Upper Amazon, as a series of important new books and doctoral theses on the Jivaroan, Arawakan,

Editors' note: Andrew Gray, whose work is being reviewed here, is believed to have been lost at sea following an aircraft accident in the Pacific on 7 May 1999. It is hoped to publish an obituary in a future issue of *JASO.*
and Panoan peoples entered general circulation. Now, in the late 1990s, the focus has shifted even further south to the ethnography of the Brazilian state of Rondonia, the Bolivian lowlands, and the Madre de Dios region in the extreme southeastern corner of Peru.

This trilogy by Andrew Gray is dedicated to the Arakmbut, who number roughly a thousand people, making them the largest of the six small Harakmbut groups living in and around the Madre de Dios river basin. From an estimated population of 30,000 in the late nineteenth century, the Harakmbut have been reduced by the effects of disease, slave-raiding, the rubber boom, gold-mining, and missionization to about 2,000 at the present time. There are at least a dozen other indigenous groups in the region, mostly Panoans and Arawakans, who bring the indigenous population up to roughly 10,000, but even this total represents no more than about 25 per cent of the population of the Madre de Dios. However, despite the reduction of their population by 95 per cent in the course of this century, the local political and economic dominance of outsiders, and the abandonment of many traditional cultural features of dress, house lay-out, and ceremonial life, the Arakmbut retain a strong sense of their distinctive indigenous identity and continue to be centrally concerned with their relations with the spirit world.

Often misleadingly lumped together in the literature with culturally distinct groups under the vague generic term 'Mashco' or referred to by the term 'Amarak-aeri', which later turned out to be derogatory, the Arakmbut have not previously been the subject of such a comprehensive ethnography as the present trilogy. The range of topics covered is very broad, and at a length of over a thousand pages in total, it is surely unique in the modern Amazonian literature. Whereas there are a number of modern authors who have produced more than one volume of ethnography on the same indigenous group over a period of several years, I know of no other case of the consecutive publication of three volumes relating to the same group. Indeed, the most recent comparable case that comes to mind is Koch-Grünberg's classic account of his journey from Roraima to the Orinoco before the First World War, and even that had an area focus rather than being dedicated to a single indigenous group (see Koch-Grünberg 1981-2).

However, this work is not only a major contribution to the ethnographic literature on a hitherto poorly described part of indigenous Amazonia. It also incorporates the first substantial attempt to think through in detail the application of grand international human rights ideas to the often harsh local realities of a small indigenous people within Amazonia. Moreover, the analysis is carried out from a distinctively anthropological perspective: that is, not only are indigenous beliefs about the spirit world treated seriously as the bedrock of Arakmbut claims to a distinctive social identity, territorial security, and cultural autonomy, but also, currently fashionable ideas about human rights are not taken at face value but rather traced to their own cultural and political roots.

The author brings a broad range of experience to the task. His first encounter with the Arakmbut was from 1979 to 1981, when he was carrying out fieldwork as a doctoral student of the then Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford,
supervised by Dr (now Professor) Peter Rivière. He returned for a second stint funded by the Danish government development agency DANIDA in 1985, and again from 1991 to 1992, while working with IWGIA, the Danish NGO. While the first fieldwork had primarily academic objectives, the second was more applied in focus and the third formed part of a project to assist the Harakmbut make their case before the UN Working Party on Indigenous Populations which was then meeting annually in Geneva. However, despite some thirty months of fieldwork and many years working in conjunction with and on behalf of the Harakmbut to secure their political rights, Gray considers his work to be no more than an outsider’s account and at best a partial truth, since he believes it is impossible to escape the unequal power relations of the fieldwork encounter which inevitably vitiate understanding.

Nor can one ever overcome, he suggests, the cultural distance separating the metropolitan anthropologist from his subjects. This is particularly true with regard to religious belief. Gray states that his intention is to preserve the ‘mystery embedded in the Arakmbut universe’ and to avoid any attempt to explain away their ideas about the spirit world in a reductionist manner. While it is common enough in anthropological monographs to find pious expressions of such intentions, Gray honours this commitment to the extent of giving credence to such matters as the effectiveness of Arakmbut fishing spells, their ability to predict his arrival, and the belief that the spirit of a deceased shaman continues to influence affairs in the community. But perhaps the most graphic example of his openness to the Arakmbut world-view is his description of the occasion when he discovered that he had the ability to leave his sleeping body, fly across the village, and, by means of sparks flying from his fingers, apparently bring about a cure in an old man who had been bleeding profusely. Rather than rationalize this intense experience as a ‘vivid dream’, Gray prefers to use it as a basis for understanding Arakmbut ideas about dreaming as a means of access to an invisible world of spirits where the space and time boundaries of the normal world do not apply.

Gray’s respect for Arakmbut cultural practice also extends to the way in which he has chosen to present his ethnography in the form of a trilogy. Arakmbut mythological narratives are also divided conventionally into three parts, described as the ‘head word’, ‘centre word’, and ‘whole word’. Although sequential in presentation and deriving their meaning from this order to some degree, each part may be detached and developed into a new narrative which casts a different light on the whole. In this manner, Gray argues, the meaning of an Arakmbut mythological narrative can be said to derive from the superimposition of layers of meaning rather than simply from linear sequences. He further suggests that this is how the three volumes of his trilogy should be read.

The first volume is itself triadic in structure in presenting three key Arakmbut myths: if you understand these, a young Arakmbut man told him, then you will have found the key to understanding us. Gray analyses these myths in both a Lévi-Straussian and a Malinowskian manner. That is, he both subjects them to a structural, symbological analysis, and treats them as ‘charter myths’, thus allowing
Paul Henley

him to introduce many of the principal sociological and cultural themes of Arakmbut life, including the tragic history of their relations with local non-Indians. He returns to these themes in the second volume, dealing with them in much greater detail and using particular case-studies as a means of showing how they articulate with one another. The most lengthy of these case-studies concerns the traumatic events which surrounded the death of a leading shaman, though perhaps the most striking one is the account of the attempts to use shamanic means to cure a man on the point of death and the associated discussion of the politics of this event. The third volume also features a number of case-studies but is generally rather different in character, being primarily concerned with the implications for the Arakmbut and similar indigenous groups of the human rights policies which international agencies such as the UN and the International Labour Organization have been seeking to implement over the last thirty years or so. The sociological and cultural themes are still present and there is even some reference to the three key charter myths, but these are introduced simply by way of background.

Throughout the three volumes, Gray repeatedly stresses the importance to the Arakmbut of their relations with the invisible world of spirits. Their ideas about this world echo a number of pan-Amazonian themes. This is a world where materialist ideas of space and time are transcended, and in which the past, present, and future are simultaneously present. It is a world of 'potentia', which contains knowledge and understanding of all the possible events which could happen and which have ever happened. It is from here that the potential souls of human beings derive and to which they will return after death. It is also the domain of the spirits of game animals and of their controllers, as well as of various non-human, non-animal spirits which are for the most part malignant. This account of Arakmbut ideas clearly echoes the work of other Amazonist authors. Gray himself alludes to Christopher Crocker’s account of the Bororo (1985) on a number of occasions, while his discussion of the role of spirit relationships in hunting provides another interesting permutation on the series analysed by Philippe Descola (1992). It also provides ethnographic support for the recent arguments of Eduardo Viveiros de Castro concerning ‘perspectivism’ in Amazonian indigenous thought (1998).

Relations with the spirit world are valued in a number of respects, but on a day-to-day basis the most important pertain to subsistence activities, particularly hunting and fishing, and to curing. Success in hunting and fishing depends on the development of close relationships with the spirits that are thought to control the availability of game and fish so that they can be persuaded to release the animals for living human beings to capture. Similarly, success at curing depends on being able to persuade or oblige beings from the spirit world to release the soul of a patient, since the majority of serious illnesses are attributed to soul-capture by such beings. Access to the world of spirits is achieved by two principal means: through chanting and through dreaming, the latter being regarded as the more effective. Recently the taking of ayahuasca, copied from neighbouring indigenous groups, has become another recognized way of entering the world of spirits. Most Arakm-
but have some ability to gain access by these means, but those who achieve the
greatest recognition as shamans are both expert chanters and accomplished
dreamers who have learnt to communicate directly with the spirits. In order to do
so, it is essential to take on board the fact that human beings have a vision of the
universe which is not shared by other beings of the forest. Thus in order to be an
effective shaman, one has to learn how to view the world from the perspectives of
both animals and spirits.

Less central to the work, but also a recurrent feature, is the analysis of kinship
and social organization. This begins to emerge as a major focus of the second
volume, though a concern with shamanism and relations with the spirit world
remains prominent as well. The principal means by which relationships are
categorized, which in effect determines the internal limits of endogamy, is a
terminology of the kind found very widely throughout Amazonia, particularly in
headwater regions such as where the Arakmbut live. Gray refers to this terminol­
ogy as ‘two-lined’ but which, for reasons explained elsewhere, I would prefer to
call ‘dravidianate’ (see Henley 1996). This terminology is associated with a
positive marriage prescription which requires an individual to marry a category of
relative which includes his or her cross cousins genealogically defined, though
sister’s daughter—mother’s brother’s unions are also considered acceptable.

More distinctive in a general Amazonian context is the associated system of
patrilineal clans. There are seven in total, with a possibility that an eighth clan
may have existed in the past. Although these clans are exogamous and some of
them are said to be further related as kin, this does not appear to be an obstacle
to intermarriage, and there is no suggestion that the Arakmbut ever had an
exogamous moiety system such as one finds among the neighbouring Panoans (see
Kensinger 1984, Townsley 1987). Each clan has a main name, as well as a
number of supplementary names, sometimes associated with animal species. But
these animal names are not linked to any notion of consubstantiality with the
animals in question, nor to taboos, nor to hunting specialization, though the
members of a given clan may be thought to be more likely to have success in
hunting associated species because of a common connection to certain spirits.

Although the clans themselves are named, they do not appear to be corporate
owners of stocks of personal names, as among Panoan groups. None the less, clan
identity is important in everyday life, and clan rivalries often come to a head
between men during drinking parties. The clan is associated with a strong
patrilineal ideology of conception. Both body and soul are said to derive from the
male line, with women’s wombs doing no more than moulding the shape of the
child. Post-marital residence appears to be primarily virilocal, since men will do
their best to avoid marrying out. If a man cannot find a woman in his own
community, he may steal or elope with one from another community. Intercommunity disputes surrounding such abductions are common.

But despite the importance of the clan in other contexts, Gray reports that it
is not the principal collectivity involved in marriage exchanges. Rather, he claims
that the principal ‘alliance arranging unit’ is the *wambet*, a social entity whose
boundaries are only very vaguely defined. In some contexts, the term may be applied to a cognatic grouping that could be described as a ‘kindred’ as conventionally defined in the anthropological literature, i.e. one that includes all ego’s siblings and direct lineal relatives, as well as his or her parents’ siblings. But in other contexts, parents’ cross-sex siblings are excluded on account of their affinal status in the underlying relationship terminology. These *wambet* are unnamed, more readily identified by women than by men, and are reported to be more influential in marriage alliances now than they were in the past. Their relative importance compared to the clan system is also said to vary from one Arakmbut community to another. Gray discusses *wambet* at some length, but I have to say that I found the alliance role that he ascribes to these seemingly highly permeable entities to be the least convincing aspect of his discussion of Arakmbut social organization.

In contrast, I was readily persuaded of the potential value of his regrettably brief comparative discussion at the end of vol. 2, in which he considers the social organization of the various peoples of the Madre de Dios region as so many permutations on an underlying set of sociological and cultural variables. Thus, for example, comparing a number of groups who share an underlying dravidianate terminology and positive marriage prescription, Gray suggests that the Arakmbut case, in which both patrilineal descent and a kindred-like collectivity are important, represents a midway permutation between, on the one hand, the neighbouring Arawakan-speaking Matisgenka, who have a kindred-like organization similar to the *wambet* but no kind of clan-based system, and on the other, the Ese’eja, also neighbours of the Arakmbut, who have no trace of a kindred-based organization but who place strong emphasis on clans.

With regard to the neighbouring Panoan groups, Gray refers to another dimension of contrast, namely that while they share with the Arakmbut and the Ese’eja a recognition of descent-based groups, they do not place as much emphasis on shamanic connections with the animal world and on male initiation. Instead, like the Matisgenka, they emphasize a female initiation ceremony ‘which appears to be connected to their considerable knowledge of plants’. I am not sure that Panoan and Arawakan specialists would necessarily agree with all the details of Gray’s analysis, but the approach is interesting, with possible applications elsewhere in Amazonia.

The third major focus of the trilogy is social change. Present throughout the book, it becomes predominant in the third volume. As a general theoretical point, Gray is keen to stress that the Arakmbut do not and never have lived in a static world. Indeed, it is their ability to adjust and adapt to contact with powerful outsiders, be it the Incas, the colonial Spanish, or the various fronts of expansion during the twentieth century, which explains their capacity to survive and maintain their independence. However, there seems to be no doubt that the Arakmbut are now under pressure to a degree that they have never been before, not only through the recent extensive invasion of their territory by gold-miners and lumber extractors, but also as a result of more internal factors, such as intermarriage with
Quechua incomers and other non-Arakmbut, the abandonment of male initiation and other ceremonies as a result of missionization, the undermining of the oral tradition through literacy, and the corrosive effect of a market economy on internal mechanisms of distribution, including the division of labour between men and women. These changes have been associated with the disappearance of a long-house-based settlement pattern and its replacement by scattered clusters of smaller family dwellings. Gray attempts to put a brave face on these changes by arguing that there is no theoretical reason why they should not be reversible. Sadly, this proposition, though logically correct, does not carry much conviction, since there would appear to be many practical reasons why a return to the patterns of the past is impossible.

This process of change is taking place all over indigenous Amazonia and has been described and analysed many times before. The unique contribution of Gray's treatment is his detailed discussion of the political philosophy in whose name indigenous groups such as the Arakmbut are being dispossessed. By means of a summary history of ideas, he reminds us that the claims of modern South American states to jurisdiction over indigenous areas is neither more nor less than an inheritance of the right to conquest and evangelization claimed by the first colonial powers. Even those who have opposed the violation of indigenous rights by modern states—for example, the forward-thinking indigenists who helped to frame the progressive Ley de Comunidades Nativas in Peru in 1974—have tended to seek solutions and reclamations within the context of a state-based political regime that in the last analysis tends to promote full social, economic, and political integration.

Against this conventional view, the indigenous groups who made representations to the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) argued that they were autonomous peoples with a distinctive cultural identity, who therefore had a right under international law to freedom of cultural expression and political self-determination. In practical terms, they argued, this should result in their own self-governance, territorial integrity, and control over all the natural resources within that territory. Clauses to this general effect were eventually incorporated into the Declaration produced by the WGIP in 1994. Since then, the Declaration has been under consideration by another UN Working Party, this time one that will report to the influential Commission on Human Rights.

Gray points out that a number of obstacles, both legal and practical, have to be overcome before the ambitious provisions of the WGIP can be implemented. First, it seems probable that a majority of states represented in the UN will oppose the degree of autonomy claimed by indigenous peoples. Secondly, since it is impractical in the majority of instances for indigenous groups to be entirely independent politically, they will rely on state authorities to guarantee their boundaries and to police them. Thirdly, protecting the rights of indigenous peoples and providing them with the kinds of specialized services they are seeking is a costly business. Bilingual education, health programmes, and appropriately conceived programmes of economic development that allow indigenous groups to produce the
surplus they need to acquire externally produced goods and services are all ex­
ensive when considered on a per capita basis, and in the last analysis there are very
few votes to be garnered from providing them. In many instances, including on
past record the case of Peru, as reported by Gray, the state is simply incapable of
providing such guarantees in the remote hinterland areas where indigenous peoples
typically live, even where there may be the political will to do so.

Despite the difficulties, Gray adopts an optimistic position and discusses how
Arakmbut self-governance could actually work out in practice. He argues that they
should be seeking sovereignty rather than independence and self-development
aimed at self-sufficiency rather than economic autonomy. In the political sphere,
he points to encouraging signs such as the development of local indigenous federa­
tions that suggest that the Arakmbut themselves are determined to resist the
further erosion of their territorial and other rights. But the sceptical reader will
note the powerful interests ranged against the Arakmbut, as well as various signs
of the potential fragmentation of indigenous resistance. Recently the Mobil oil
company has joined those with designs on Arakmbut lands at the very time that
a schism has developed in the local indigenous federation. Even within Arakmbut
communities, there is no consensus as to how external threats should be handled,
with the result that often nothing will be done to resist them until it is too late.

But however the future turns out for the Arakmbut, this work will stand as a
sensitive, respectful, and committed testimony to the richness of their cultural
traditions even when subjected to immense pressures from outside. If it has a
weakness, it derives from the fact that the Arakmbut technique of developing a
narrative through 'the superimposition of layers of meaning' lends to itself to a
significant degree of redundancy. While the use of three key myths to introduce
the principles underlying Arakmbut life in vol. 1 is an ingenious narrative device
and the case-study approach of vol. 2 an effective means of showing how these
principles are played out in practice, there is considerable overlap between the two
books that could perhaps have been reduced. Vol. 3 is very different from the
other two volumes, but here too there is some redundancy. At times it reads as
if it started life as a series of independent articles which have not been sufficiently
shorn of their general background remarks, now that they are articulated as con­
secutive chapters of a book.

However, these are relatively minor criticisms of a largely editorial nature to
be set against the monumental accomplishment of the work as a whole. There is
no doubting the breadth and quality of the primary ethnographic account, as well
as the many suggestive intellectual paths leading off from it, whether in relation
to the comparative ethnography of the region as whole or to the politics of indig­
enous self-determination. It will undoubtedly come to be regarded as a milestone
in the literature of the south-west Amazon, signifying the moment when the
anthropological understanding of the indigenous peoples of this area first began to
emulate the sophistication achieved elsewhere in Amazonia over the last thirty
years.
REFERENCES


JASO
OCCASIONAL PAPERS SERIES


AVAILABLE FROM THE EDITORS, JASO, 51 BANBURY ROAD, OXFORD OX2 6PE, ENGLAND. Tel. 01865-274682
ALL PRICES INCLUDE POSTAGE. PREPAYMENT REQUESTED.
In a recent article (Parkin 1997), I described the genesis and activities of the Groupe d’Études Socialistes (GES) in the years immediately before the First World War, which brought its existence to an end. This Parisian debating society gathered together a number of Durkheimians with political activists of socialist persuasion to discuss policy in the area of social and political reform. Key activities were monthly talks given by one of the members, leading in many cases to publication in the GES’s own series, the Cahiers du Socialiste. As we shall see towards the end, there was a clear difference of perspective between the scholars drawn from the circle around Émile Durkheim (the master himself was never involved in their activities) and the political activists, who had a more hands-on approach to policy questions. Nevertheless there was never any rift, and after a number of ups and downs the GES actually seems to have been gaining in strength when the First World War intervened to put an end to it. That war not only took the lives of many of its members, it also radically altered the political circumstances they were addressing. An attempt by Mauss to revive it in 1936 came to nothing (Fournier 1994: 680).

In this article, I would like to concentrate on the content of the talks given and the discussions that inevitably followed. As in the earlier article, data come from the reports of meetings drawn up mostly by Robert Hertz, copies of which are held
with his papers (the Fonds Robert Hertz, hereafter FRH) in the Laboratoire d'Anthropologie Sociale, Collège de France. It is not possible to give full details of the talks presented to the GES, copies of which are not known to have survived, but a pretty clear idea of their nature and quality can be discerned from Hertz's reports. These characteristically consist of a summary of the talk, often written by Hertz rather than the speaker himself, followed by a summary of the ensuing discussion where this was sufficiently interesting. Sometimes there is no account at all, just a bare mention that the talk had been given. In what follows, all the quotes are from these reports and are of the summary (i.e. they are usually not the speaker's or discussant's actual words; translations from the original French are mine). A list of the talks given appears in Appendix 1. Committee members for each year of the GES's activities for which we have information are listed in Appendix 2.

II

No particular subject stands out, but there was much discussion of co-operatives in this period, four talks being devoted to it. Ernest Poisson's talk on the history of the French co-operative movement (25 Feb. 1913) has the most extensive recorded discussion, with interventions from Marcel Mauss, Louis Héliès, André Bruckère, Henri Gans, and Alfred Bonnet. All of them concentrated on its future rather than its past, as Poisson had done. As for Mauss, 'he sees a serious danger that, under the pretext of autonomy and neutrality, co-operation will shut itself up in isolation and lose its proletarian ideal.' Bruckère argued against this: 'Co-operation is a purely economic movement, not at all philanthropic. It has nothing specifically working class about it. It is not a class institution but a social function, [namely] the control of trade and production by consumers in association with

1. As before, I am grateful to Mme Françoise Heritier for permission to view the FRH archive and draw on it in published work.

2. For example, the account of Hubert Bourgin's talk on 27 Jan. 1914 was apparently written by himself (a draft not in Hertz's handwriting is in the GES file in the FRH), while those of Ernest Poisson (25 Feb. 1913) and G. Fauquet (29 Apr. 1913) were composed by Hertz (existing drafts are in the latter's hand).

3. For example, of André Bruckère, 31 Oct. 1911, and Maurice Halbwachs, 30 June 1913 (though the report tells us that the latter's talk arose out of Halbwachs' research on the social determinants of standards of living; see Lukes 1973: 401).

4. I hope at a future date to examine the versions of talks that were published in the Cahiers series, a list of which was given at the end of the earlier article (Parkin 1997: 56–7). For Hertz's pamphlet on depopulation, see Parkin 1995: 51–6.
one another.' Héliès too felt that the co-operative movement was autonomous from all other social, political, or economic movements, whose claims on it could only do it damage; it had its own rationale and interests. Poisson also opposed Mauss in arguing that the movement had value in its own right and not only in any potential it might be thought to have in aiding the rest of the working-class movement. But in opposition to Brückère he agreed with Mauss that it was, in France at least, very definitely a working-class movement.

Bonnet, on the other hand, supported Mauss in arguing that a view of the co-operative movement as something purely economic would inevitably lead to their development into department stores, like the capitalist ones that were already in existence: 'Even though the essential function of co-operation may be a purely economic one, an extra-economic ideal is required to keep the working-class consumers who constitute the force behind co-operation united.' In an earlier talk (31 Jan. 1911), C. Mutschler discussed the problems that had arisen between the co-operatives and their own employees. He had advocated 'the victory of the co-operative principle over syndicalist preoccupations' as a solution, his argument apparently being that the unions should adopt the support of co-operatives into their own programme. A talk by Alfred Nast (26 Mar. 1912), which pointed out that co-operatives have no legal standing in France, led to disagreement in discussion between Brückère and Mauss on whether this was necessary. Brückère argued that it was not, while Mauss countered that lack of legal recognition was precisely what was restricting their further development. Mauss's reluctance to see the co-operative movement as something purely economic can, of course, be traced back to the usual Durkheimian resistance to reducing the social to the economic.

Disagreement was also prompted by Sidney and Beatrice Webb's brochure on syndicalism, which Hertz read out (at the meeting of 8 Oct. 1912) in a translation into French made by himself. Among other things, it deplored the intrusion of French practices into British trade unionism, which was always wary of the continental syndicalist movement. According to some of the discussants, such as André Morizet and Brückère, the Webbs were attacking a fantasy syndicalism and were making serious errors of fact on the subject of the doctrine and tactics of the French trade unionism they were criticizing. According to others, like Laskine, this was a fine bourgeois and liberal brochure, dissolving any revolutionary hope, socialist or syndicalist. According to others, finally, such as Bourgin, Félicien Challaye, and Mauss, it was a critique of syndicalism, quite English in certain respects, but on the whole sound, penetrating, and perfectly socialist.

Of special interest is Challaye's talk on colonialism (at the meeting of 30 Jan. 1912), a question that socialists found quite problematic, since they did not like the institution in principle but were loath to abandon it entirely. The attitude to subject peoples here shows little trace of that feeling of solidarity in opposition to capitalist exploitation that characterized their Marxist rivals and that they themselves were to adopt later. The account of this meeting is given here in full (emphases in the original):
Although most socialists may be opposed to ‘colonial adventures’, that is, to the acquisition of new colonies, they are not seriously proposing the abandonment of the old colonies. Such abandonment would certainly damage the metropolitan power and will not profit the natives [indigènes], who, being incapable of defending their independence, will fall into another form of domination, which will probably prove harsher. Besides, although our doctrine obliges us to respect the rights of the natives, it also demands the development of all the world’s natural powers. It is therefore impossible for us to avoid the colonial problem: in this matter, as in all others, socialists are obliged to formulate a positive and concrete policy.

This policy is opposed on the one hand to the policy of exploitation which characterizes colonial capitalism, which consists in refusing any humanity to the natives and regards them solely as freely available labour, not hesitating to get rid of them through extermination in the case of bad returns. But nor will socialists construct a policy of assimilation inspiring an abstract humanitarianism and desiring to treat the natives as if they resembled the civilized, an ideal condemned to remain platonic and whose realization will be disastrous to the natives themselves. Socialist policy, simultaneously taking principles and realities into account, is to be a policy of tutelage, regarding the natives as minors and it will endeavour to protect them from the evils which the unavoidable and legitimate introduction of a civilized economy into their domain will bring with it. At the same time, it will patiently and modestly introduce civilization to them, in the respects where this is accessible to them. In particular, it will organize adequate health services, intended above all to prevent the fatal epidemics that contact with Europeans tends to give rise to; it will develop education, which, in order to be effective, must be neither theological nor metaphysical but above all technical; it will protect their collective property, the basis of their economic existence, from both the temptations of the capitalists and the lack of foresight of the natives themselves; it will provide the natives with freedom to buy and sell where they wish; finally, as far as possible it will respect the natives’ customs and self-government.

The comrades who intervened in the discussion in support of Challaye as regards matters of principle insisted on the difficulties in formulating a distinctive colonial policy, given the very different levels of civilization of native peoples. There is also the fact that the policy of assimilation, rightly rejected by Challaye as regards the Negroes of the Congo, might be applied perfectly, if one wished to do so, to the peoples of the Mediterranean. Finally, freedom of trade, suggested by Challaye, will doubtless not protect the weak in the colonies any more than it does in the metropolitan power; there too, it will be necessary to organize controls, promulgate tariffs, etc.

Two talks of late 1913 and early 1914 are of interest in respect of contemporary views towards the changing role of the state in a situation of social reform. These were given by Henri Lévy-Bruhl on public law, taking a recent book by Léon Duguit, Les transformations du droit public, as his starting-point (28 Oct. 1913), and by Hubert Bourgin, on the socialist concept of the state (two meetings, 27 Jan. 1914, and 3 Mar. 1914). Bourgin, Bruckère, G. Fauquet, and Mauss all
Duguit’s style is still formal and dialectic. Fundamentally, although it has very well brought to light an aspect of the evolution of public law—regression towards the State becoming an end in itself, transcending the sacred, the assimilation of the State to the private person in cases where it acts as such—he completely neglects an aspect which is at least as characteristic: the growing importance of the notion of public order, which confers on the State acting as such (for example, in its relations with its functionaries) specific duties and powers, and above all the immense development of the constraining power of the State, as shown by its laws concerning conditions of work. The fundamental object of Socialists is not to protect the individual against the State but to make the public power—preserved and if necessary reinforced—serve the complicated and growing needs of collective life in the state of civilization in which we are now.

Bourgin’s talk drew a critical response from Mauss at the first of the two meetings devoted to it (on 27 Jan. 1914). Bourgin had defined the State as ‘a collection of specialized services of public interest’ and said that ‘the State has no proper or intrinsic sovereignty’. The report continued:

Mauss considers that the notion of public service to which Hubert Bourgin is forced to reduce any activity by the State is a confused notion. It embraces two quite distinct realities: on the one hand, economic enterprises (railways, postal services), functioning under a regime of direct control; on the other hand, institutions necessary for the existence of any large social body, such as the army and justice. Between these two extremes there is room for intermediaries such as state education, public health, etc.... Hubert Bourgin bases his definition of the State on services of the first type. As a result, the notion of sovereignty appears to him to be a survival destined for infinite regress. But these services have a private character, and socialists are the first to hope that State controls will fall under common economic law and lose all immunity and privilege in respect of the individual and consumers. In order to follow a positivist method, the characteristics of the State must be sought in the services devolving on the State qua State; and this characteristic is precisely sovereignty. Hubert Bourgin wants to reduce this notion to one of public interest; but this is an experimental construction. In fact, the general will of political society communicates to people things and decisions in which it expresses itself an imperative character, a majesty, a holiness, whose violation constitutes a crime (by opposition to the simple contravention of ‘public services’) and calls forth punishment. Nothing authorizes us to see survivals or primitive [simples] symbols in the distinctive traits of the State acting qua State. Simiand showed us at the last meeting that there exists a Voltaireian attitude with regard to economic facts; will not some economists lapse into a sort of political Voltaireianism too?
Mauss's concern here seems to be to distinguish the state as particular from the state as sovereign in order to ensure that its powers in the latter sense, though not the former, may be subject to privilege. Moreover, the state as sovereign is not a survival but a living force.

Hertz and François Simiand spoke at the second meeting (3 Mar. 1914):

Hertz recalls that, for many socialists, 'the sovereignty of the whole society' is a democratic fiction and that in reality the State exists in order to represent and defend the interests of the class that is strongest economically and socially. What does H. Bourgin think of that?

No direct reply to Hertz is recorded. Simiand supported Mauss in pointing to the neglect of the notion of sovereignty in Bourgin’s account of the state:

Simiand, like Mauss, thinks that there is a difference between the economic services proper with which the State is charged and other public services, not in degree but in kind. The first are, to some extent, secularized and disengaged from the juridical element of sovereignty. We are not tied here by any respect, any deference, any obligation [e.g. as regards the running of the railways]. On the contrary, in so far as there is something called justice...it represents something respectable and imposes itself on the conscience of the citizens. The generality of the interest to which a public service corresponds is therefore not enough to characterize the State as such: it is still necessary to consider the quality of that interest.

In his final reply, Bourgin, who had earlier said that the state has no sovereignty, now agreed with Mauss that the state represented the sovereignty of the people.

Hubert Bourgin replied that he had not intended to provide a complete theory of the State.... The State is not homogeneous: although it is in certain respects the representative of the dominant class, it is in other respects the representative of society as a whole. Socialist policy tends to neutralize the first of these tendencies and to develop the second unceasingly. He therefore agrees with Mauss in recognizing an absolute character in the sovereignty of Society represented by the State....

Durkheimian orthodoxy is therefore often discernible, and on occasion it gave rise to some rather strange comments. Thus Simiand and Marcel Granet thought that alcoholism could be combated only by encouraging an ersatz passion of some sort—a Durkheimian 'effervescence', perhaps, for sports, cinema, trade unions, etc. (meeting of 30 May 1911). And on the occasion of Simiand's own talk on strikes in the public service (meeting of 28 Mar. 1911), 'Mutschler and Hertz confirm[ed] the right of the collectivity, whose interest appears to them to be morally superior to that of the producers.' As we have seen, Simiand, like Mauss, frequently intervened in debates, often at considerable length. He was prominent at the meeting
of 23 December 1913, at which Edmond Laskine spoke on customs policy, and made ten different points in the discussion. He also spoke at length to Roger Picard's talk on the possibility of introducing minimum wages (27 May 1913), arguing that this might impede wage rises in times of economic growth. As the economist of the Durkheimian circle and a particularly outspoken defender of Durkheimianism (see Besnard 1983: 248), he must have felt in his element in many of these talks.

Simiand and Mauss both tended to oppose the singling out of particular classes to take all the blame for the country's ills, always preferring sociological analysis to the less nuanced tirades of some of their non-academic colleagues. Bruckère, for example, in his talk of 8 April 1913 on small property owners, spoke of the 'parasitism' of the petty bourgeoisie, whose ideals have nevertheless come to invade all classes; it is against them that socialists should be fighting. This was too sweeping for Simiand, and also for Mauss, though the latter suggested diplomatically that 'Bruckère's criticisms are in large part well founded: but they bear less on the characteristic of an economic class that on our national temperament'. Mauss spoke in a similar vein to Lévy-Bruhl's talk on the law and the right to strike (25 Apr. 1911), saying that in such cases magistrates are actuated not by fear of the powerful or by class interest so much as by their own 'fanaticism to preserve themselves and the caste prejudices which lead them to regard every strike as a quasi-criminal rebellion'. These prejudices were born of their position in society and could not be reduced to mere economics. Society had its own moral force, which was not simply the epiphenomenon of economic activity, as it was in the Marxist view that influenced many of the activist, non-scholarly wing of the GES directly or indirectly.

III

There is thus evidence of some differences, if not actually tensions, between the academics and the activists in the GES. Years later, between the wars, one of the GES's founders, Hubert Bourgin, freely recognized this and expanded on it. Bourgin, originally a Durkheimian, spent the war under Albert Thomas in the Ministry of Munitions, a disillusioning experience which turned him first into a pacifist and then, in the 1930s, into a supporter of the far right and an antisemite who, in Clark's words, 'spent the rest of his life as a proto-fascist penning diatribes against his former colleagues' (1968: 90; also Lukes 1973: 321 n. 4). But whatever his motives in writing then as he did, whatever the exaggeration, what he has to say on the tensions within the GES has a ring of truth that is missing from Hertz's often rather bland memoranda.

Bourgin's chief regret seems to have been that the intellectualism of the GES did not act more as a brake on the demagoguery and anarchism which, in his view,
had increasingly threatened to take over the pre-war Parti Socialiste (1970: 482–3).
But it had always been difficult to persuade the activist wing of the need for
reflection and study:

...although I conceded the Cahiers du Socialiste an element of useful co-operation,
like my friends, my peers, I remained incapable of improving what we could never
be, of sanitising our work and our political combinations, of encouraging the faint­
hearted, of moralizing to backsliding consciences, of purifying plans poisoned by
trickery and fraud. These men, who despite everything were our party comrades,
kaew the world in which they acted better than we: they did not feel the need to
perfect themselves intellectually or morally that we felt they should....

From science to action: we tried to develop science for action; but were we
capable of giving the activists the taste for science, the desire to ‘purge’ them­selves of errors and passion? (1925: 86–7)

As with all rhetorical questions, Bourgin must have intended this to contain its
own answer.

REFERENCES

Besnard (ed.), The Sociological Domain: The Durkheimians and the Foundations
of French Sociology, Cambridge and Paris: Cambridge University Press and
Maison des Sciences de l’Homme.

Bourgin, Hubert 1925. Cinquante ans d’expérience démocratique, Paris: Nouvelle
Librairie Nationale.

Gordon and Breach.

Clark, Terry N. 1968. ‘The Structure and Functions of a Research Institute: The An­


Lukes, Steven 1973. Émile Durkheim, His Life and Work: A Historical and Critical

Legacy, Amsterdam etc.: Harwood Publishers.

. . . 1997. ‘Durkheimians and the Groupe d’Études Socialistes’, Durkheimian Studies,
APPENDIX 1: TALKS GIVEN TO THE GES, 1910–1914
(Some of these talks were published in the Cahiers du Socialiste Series
as indicated below)

Undated (presumably 1910)
C. Mutschler, on co-operation.
G. Fauquet, on industrial hygiene.
Georges Gelly, 'Le socialisme et l'agriculture'.

1911
31 Jan.: C. Mutschler, on the relationship between consumer co-operatives and their
employees.
28 Feb.: Jacques Ferninand-Dreyfus, 'Etude critique de la mutualité (après un livre de
Weber)'.
28 Mar.: François Simiand, 'La grève dans les services publics'.
30 May: Marcel Granet, 'Le problème de l'alcool' (Cahiers du Socialiste, no. 11).
27 June: Robert Sexe, 'Retraites ouvrières et assurances sociales en Angleterre: quelles
leçons en tirer pour la France?'
25 July: Unknown (report for meeting missing, but see under 26 Dec. 1911 below).
31 Oct.: André Bruckère, 'Le travail à domicile'.
28 Nov.: Sidney Webb, 'La base nécessaire de l'organisation sociale' (read in a transla­
tion from the English by Robert Hertz, made by himself).
26 Dec.: Hubert Bourgin, 'Un programme de lutte préventive contre la misère, en
Angleterre: le rapport des Webb à la Commission de la loi des pauvres' (postponed
from previous meeting [25 July?] on account of Bourgin's health).

1912
30 Jan.: Félicien Challaye, 'Le socialisme et la politique coloniale'.
27 Feb.: Ernest Poisson, 'Le fonctionnement de la démocratie politique: une élection
législative en 1912 (Elbeuf, Seine-Inférieure)'.
26 Mar.: Alfred Nast, 'Le problème juridique de la coopération'.
30 Apr.: Max Lazard, 'L'organisation du marché du travail: le placement'.
4 June: François Simiand, 'La théorie de la valeur économique et le socialisme' (post­
poned from 28 May because of public holiday).
2 July: Continuation of the topic of the previous meeting.
8 Oct.: Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 'Le syndicalisme revolutionnaire: sa raison d'être et
sa valeur sociale' (read in a translation from the English by Robert Hertz, made by
himself; Cahiers du Socialiste, nos. 14/15).
29 Oct.: Henri Sellier, 'Paris et la banlieue: la réorganisation administrative de la Seine'.
26 Nov.: Jacques Ferninand-Dreyfus, 'L'État assureur'.
20 Dec.: Henri Gans, 'La distribution de la force électrique en France: vers l'organ­
isation d'un réseau national'.

1913

28 Jan.: Louis Héliès, ‘La concentration coopérative’ (ms. of either this or following talk [probably former] in FRH).
25 Feb.: Ernest Poisson, ‘Histoire de l’unité coopérative en France’ (see previous talk).
8 Apr.: André Bruckère, ‘La petite propriété comme danger social et danger national’ (postponed from late March because of Easter).
29 Apr.: G. Fauquet, ‘L’application de la loi des retraites ouvrières’.
27 May: Roger Picard, ‘Le minimum légal de salaire’ (Cahiers du Socialiste, nos. 16/17).
30 June: Maurice Halbwachs, ‘La définition de la classe ouvrière’.

1914

27 Jan.: Hubert Bourgin, ‘La notion de l’État dans le socialisme’ (discussion continued in next meeting).
3 Mar.: Bourgin (continued) plus Henri Sellier, ‘Le développement des banlieues urbaines et la réorganisation administrative du département de la Seine’ (postponed from late February because of Mardi Gras).
26 May: Henri Gans, ‘Le problème financier: les mesures fiscales qui s’imposent’.
30 June: Paul Ramadier, ‘La fonction des Syndicats d’après la législation et la jurisprudence’ (no report exists of this meeting, which was the last, but there is no reason to think that the talk did not take place, only that it was not written up later).

APPENDIX 2: COMMITTEE MEMBERS

1910: Robert Hertz, Marcel Granet, Henri Lévy-Bruhl, André Prudhomme, François Simiand.
1911: Robert Hertz, Henri Lévy-Bruhl, François Simiand, Marc Bloch, Alfred Bonnet.
1912: Robert Hertz, Henri Lévy-Bruhl, Alfred Bonnet, François Simiand, Georges Gelly.
   (Lévy-Bruhl in fact resigned at the meeting of 30th January and was replaced by Gelly, but he is mentioned in the end-of-year report as being a member of the committee.)
1913: Robert Hertz, Henri Lévy-Bruhl, François Simiand, Alfred Bonnet.
1914: Unclear, but certainly including Robert Hertz.
BOOK REVIEWS


Thomas Trautmann’s latest book successfully and readably manages to keep several historical balls in the air at once: the discovery of Indian languages and culture by Western scholars, the place of India in early attempts to write world history (i.e. the beginnings of anthropology), the development and eventual abandonment of biblical genealogy, and the construction of the racial theory of Indian history, which even today is alive and well, as much in the subcontinent as in the West. As he himself notes, it is also a love story, a story of kinship between Britain and India, and eventually—as race theory raised its ugly head—of kinship denied.

This is intellectual history at its best, with the numerous ironies of conventional subject histories brought to the fore. Historical linguists give pride of place to Sir William Jones as an intellectual forebear, but there has been ‘wilful collective amnesia’ (p. 56) about the fact that Jones was working within the Mosaic ethnological framework. This meant that, as far he was concerned, the point of his brilliant linguistic discoveries was to assign all the known peoples of the world to one of three classes: the descendants of Ham (Hamites); the descendants of Shem (Semitic); and the descendants of Japhet (Japhetites, later known as Caucasians). According to Jones, Africans, Egyptians, Romans, Greeks, Persians, Indians, and Goths were all Hamites, and the flood story found in the Padma Purana confirmed the truth of the biblical account.

The early scholars of India were part of what Trautmann calls ‘Indomania...a phenomenon with a structure, which is to say both an internal organization and boundaries’ (p. 97). The Indophiles were enthusiastic about Hindu learning and tended to be anti-Muslim. They rejected the immense cycles of time posited in Hindu texts, but otherwise they sought to use Hindu learning to corroborate the Bible and to construct a coherent history of the world. The Indophiles had many enormous scholarly achievements to their credit, but they could also be gullible, as the example of Captain Francis Wilford showed: his Sanskrit pandit, working for good money and having been given explicit instructions on what to look for, produced for him scriptures including a Hindu version of the Noah story (which took in Sir William Jones) and copious references to svetadvipa (‘the white island’, i.e. Albion or England).

The Indophobes, who partially overlapped in time but came to dominate later in the century, were very different. They were anti-Hindu and correspondingly pro-Muslim. There was James Mill’s well-known and much-cited contempt for Indian learning in his highly successful History of British India, and the even more quoted recommendation of Macaulay in his Minute on Indian Education (1835) that teaching be in English in order to produce an élite class that was ‘Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect’. The Indophobes were
either modernizing utilitarians or evangelical Christians, who equally constructed Hindus as morally depraved, duped by crafty priests and oriental despots. Many prominent Indophobes had never been to India. Those who had deplored the common Indophile practice of having Indian wives. For the Indophobes, Indians were supposed to assimilate to British ways, but not vice versa. Trautmann suggests that this be called 'one-way asexual assimilation. It became the official creed of nineteenth-century British India' (p. 110).

The book works up to a climax, which is the appearance of race theory after the arrival of Darwinism on the intellectual scene. Suddenly biblical chronology, with the whole of history beginning in 4004 BC, collapses, as does biblical genealogy. Suddenly it dawns on people that there is no necessary connection between race and language. At this point the race theorists attack the Sanskritists and assert that the linguistic affinity of Indian languages is irrelevant: it does not make Indians akin to Europeans. Trautmann remarks, 'I do not wish to leave the impression that the race science crowd were the bad guys and the Sanskritists were the good guys' (p. 191). But every story needs a hero, and this one had at least two, both Sanskritists: William Jones and Friedrich Max Müller. However, even Max Müller, despite his sympathy for Indians, and his inclusive understanding of the term 'Aryan race', for which he was responsible, could not but be part of the emerging racial theory of Indian history. This was the idea that the whole of Indian history is to be explained by the meeting and interaction of a fair-skinned Aryan race of invaders and 'primitive', 'uncivilized' dark aborigines. It led to the influential absurdity of Risley's racial theory of caste in which social position is inversely related to nasal index.

A recurring theme of Trautmann's book is the fact that, after the mid-nineteenth century, India was felt to be boring by the British who controlled it, but remained of passionate interest to continental intellectuals, particularly the Germans. Britain repeatedly had to import foreigners to fill its posts in Sanskrit. This makes it hard to maintain any crude anti-Orientalist thesis of the Saidian sort, since the country with the Empire showed little enthusiasm for supporting or producing knowledge of India, while the country with no strategic interests in India produced far more Sanskritists (as it still does). Furthermore, as we have just seen, those Orientalists who knew most about their subject, such as Sir William Jones or Max Müller, were often attacked by those who sought to propagate negative stereotypes about India, such as James Mill or the ethnologists Robert Latham and John Crawfurd.

Ultimately, as Trautmann makes clear, a moral polemic such as Said's is incompatible with a reasoned assessment of Orientalism. 'We cannot do without a critical and expert winnowing of [the Orientalists'] work' (p. 25). To his great credit, Trautmann does just that. Rather than leaving us with intimations that the racial theory is false while at the same time insinuating that all views are relative, he actually examines the postulated evidence for mentions of race in the Rig Veda and finds it very thin.

_Aryans and British India_ is not only complex and enthralling intellectual history. It is also, in its understated and wryly humorous way, a polemic of its own against a still influential way of thinking about Indian history, against binary thinking and for segmentary models, against anti-Orientalism and for reflexive Orientalism. That all South Asianists should read this book should be obvious; but given what Trautmann
has to say about the origins of anthropology and the role of South Asia in early ethnological speculations, all anthropologists should read it too.

DAVID N. GELLNER


This book can be read on a number of different levels. In one sense it is a critical ethnography of the experience of colonialism by both colonized and colonizers in one corner of the once mighty British Empire, the subject people being the Kond, a tribe of Orissa, central India. In another sense it is a critique of anthropology's conventional methods of working, arguing that these methods appropriate knowledge for unforeseen and often deleterious ends, however well-meaning individual researchers might be. Finally, it is a disquisition on the notion of sacrifice. Indeed, the theme of sacrifice runs right through the book. The text revolves around the Konds' alleged former sacrifice of human servants called meriah. For the record, the author believes that these did take place occasionally, in other words by no means as frequently as British colonial officers alleged on the basis of hearsay (none of them ever witnessed such events). For the record too, informants of my own in Orissa would attribute the meriah sacrifices to fighting with weapons between feuding clans at ritual events, at which blood is frequently spilled. In one of these views, sacrifices made by certain Kshatriyan castes to the deity Durga are more likely to involve humans, as the author himself comes close to admitting. At all events, any previous human sacrifices among the Konds themselves have long been replaced with buffalo sacrifices, though as with other long illegal and supposedly redundant practices such widow-burning and female infanticide, instances are still rumoured to take place from time to time.

However, the theme of sacrifice is exploited much more deeply than this. Administrators' and missionaries' efforts to 'civilize' the Konds also involved a notion of self-sacrifice, in the service of both empire and humanity. As Padé points out, those who are prepared to sacrifice themselves are often also prepared to sacrifice others, in this case the Konds, whose way of life has been seriously disrupted since contact by the interference of well-meaning but often oppressive and always powerful outsiders. This entailed a crisis in role-management for the Konds, who had hitherto enjoyed a more symbiotic ritual relationship with local rajas as part of a common social and ritual system—this was not the case with Europeans. Other activities are also likened to these human sacrifices, such as medieval punishments involving execution and other operations performed on the body, and the collection of human heads and other 'tribal' exhibits in the early days of a more 'scientific' anthropology. Here museums are a general target, from the Pitt Rivers in Oxford to the state anthropology museum in Bhubaneswar, Orissa's capital.
While not regretting the disappearance of human sacrifice, Padel argues that it was not the irrational superstition administrators and missionaries saw it to be, but an integral part of a wider system of belief and practice. This system valued the sustainability of nature above its relentless exploitation at the present time, but it also had to incorporate satisfaction of the demands of the earth goddess, who appears to be the local version of a demanding and often terrifying female deity found across India, among tribes and Hindu castes alike. There is also the possibility that human sacrifice is linked to the growth of the trade in turmeric, which had become the Konds’ most important cash crop by the time of European involvement with them. Both considerations indicate that, far from being a ‘primitive’ practice, human sacrifice is linked very much to the arrival of ‘civilization’, in the form of both Hindu landlords and traders and European empire-builders. But it is the sacrifice of a way of life on the altar of ‘progress’ that is Padel’s chief theme—hence the title, Sacrifice of Human Being. This distorted sense of progress is especially evident today, as the modern Indian state, born out of opposition to British rule, has none the less proved to be the continuator of that rule in many ways, in arguing that tribal welfare demands interference in tribal culture. The most important change is that whereas the British tried in their clumsy way to protect tribals against Hindu intrusions, the government of the republic feels justified in pursuing tribal assimilation into the mainstream of Indian society—something which only gives tribals a low status which is anything but attractive to most of them, even if they do manage to keep their land in the process.

This is an unconventional text which expressly eschews conventional modes of anthropological writing as treating Kond subjects too much like academic objects and as masking a failure in truly understanding other cultures, which no ‘scientific’ or even conventionally descriptive and analytical approach is ever likely to master. It is none the less outside the mainstream of current deconstructionist work in anthropology, though its overall approach is similar (one of the few concessions it makes to anthropological theory is actually structuralist in form, being a Needhamite list of oppositions between aspects of colonial interpretations of Kond society and the latter’s reality). It is also most sensitively written by someone who has made many trips to tribal areas in this part of India and who knows many tribes extremely well. Not everyone will agree with the approach chosen, but few will be able to argue that the plight of tribals in most parts of India is not a serious one, with loss of rights over land to mining and dam-building projects, and the reduction of many from relatively free agriculturalists to poorly paid wage-labourers or industrial scavengers. It is in tracing the origins of this process back to the self-appointed civilizing mission of the British Empire, with its concomitant devaluation of subject peoples’ ways of life, that the book has its chief value.

ROBERT PARKIN

Although this book can be attached to the school of historical ethnology associated with the University of Frankfurt, where the author is based, it is none the less a fundamentally modern piece of work, being concerned above all to examine the history of German exploration in Angola towards the end of the nineteenth century and the relationships between the explorers and the indigenous inhabitants they encountered, as well as their perceptions of one another. Much of this exploration took place in the wake of the journeys undertaken by Livingstone and Stanley in central Africa, which had an impact in Germany, as elsewhere, as a model for later expeditions. Who were to be the colonial masters in this part of Africa had still not been entirely settled, and there were competing claims from the British in east and south Africa, the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique (both powers wanted to join up their respective bits) and the Belgians in the Congo. The arrival of the Germans therefore considerably raised fears not only among African chiefdoms but also with rival European powers, especially the Portuguese, of interference and quite possibly conquest. The Germans managed to deflect such fears for a time by stressing the scientific (including anthropological) nature of their expeditions, though as Heintze points out, most of them were also actuated, in varying degrees, by the fever for colonies that came to characterize German policy in this period. She also rightly stresses the climate of domination and violence that was involved in these activities, in which stereotypes of Africa and Africans were taken out on expedition along with personal baggage and scientific equipment, not meeting much in the way of subsequent modification through the steady assembling of knowledge. None the less, not all the travellers were gung-ho imperialists, and some showed themselves quite sensitive to the problems of Europeans living and working in such areas, and of the alternative of getting Africans to labour in their stead, if only in the practical sense.

Following a comprehensive history of these activities and a list of the main expeditions with their participants, the bulk of the book consists of short biographies of the thirty leading travellers. The most famous for the anthropologist is undoubtedly Adolf Bastian, who virtually founded anthropology as a separate academic discipline in Germany, is best known intellectually for his stress on ‘elementary’ forms of thought and ‘mentality’, and is generally recognized as having influenced both Boas and Frazer, and, through them, Lévi-Strauss. He made two journeys to Angola, in 1857 and 1873, but he was clearly less significant as an explorer in Angola than some other travellers, like Max Buchner, Paul Pogge or Eduard Pechuel-Loesche. These other travellers were mainly doctors, military officers, or academics in other disciplines, such as geography and natural science, only Hermann Baumann and the even more obscure Alfred Schachtzabel joining Bastian among the anthropologists. Not all expeditions were carried out on behalf of Germany: Hermann von Wissmann was for a time in the service of King Leopold of Belgium, who was mainly responsible for the more or less violent opening up of the Congo basin to European colonialism. Expeditions had varying degrees of success, many having to be aborted because of sickness, death, or problems with porters or supplies. Some, however, more or less achieved their objectives, going
from coast to coast in an easterly direction without major obstacles. Heintze highlights the exaggerated claims that were made of what could be achieved in order to secure funding, much of it private, making a degree of failure almost inevitable.

Attached to each biography are some extracts from the writings that its particular subject almost inevitably composed after his return to Germany. The book is illustrated with thirteen plates of art collected on these expeditions and has comprehensive bibliographies of what are today often very obscure works that are difficult to find, as well as a couple of useful maps. Thus although the author’s introduction can be regarded as an important contribution in its own right to the history of exploration and its connections with both colonial policy-making and academia, the work as a whole will also be a useful tool for other researchers wishing to examining this topic in respect of Angola and south-central Africa generally.

ROBERT PARKIN


In their introduction to this volume, Nigel Rapport and Andrew Dawson clearly state that its focus is on contemporary identity, which is treated as a search. This contemporary identity is evident throughout the volume, and the search for it is nowhere more apparent than in the poignant account of the struggle for post-Yugoslav identities being undertaken by three women writers.

As the words of the deftly written subtitle suggest, the concept of home is considered an anthropological construct, and a useful analytical construct. In their discussion revolving round a world of movement, they give an example of anthropological fieldwork in which one traditionally goes to a place, becomes absorbed in it, and then returns. The metaphor of the rite of passage is without meaning if ‘cultures are not seen as separate entities that can be entered and exited’ (p. 5). The editors say that movement has become fundamental to modern identity, and this concept is encountered in all the papers, each of which considers the ‘attainment of home as an individual search, involving either or both physical and cognitive movement’ (p. 11). The editors’ definition of home, namely as ‘where one best knows oneself’ (p. 9), is helpful in respect of the various descriptions of home encountered in the book. They suggest that its suitability comes from its demonstration of ‘the ambiguities and fluidities, the migrancies and paradoxes of identity in the world today’ (ibid.).

An introductory chapter sets the scene for the other authors in the volume and considers the relationship between movement and identity within the concept of home. The editors suggest that people today choose from the behaviours and beliefs of other cultures in forming their own identities, ‘moving amongst a global inventory of ideas and modes of expression’ (p. 25). In their discussion of movement and home, they say that ‘in a world of travellers and journeymen, home comes to be found more usually
in a set of practices' and not dwelling in a 'fixed physical structure' (p. 27). They conclude by saying that anthropology has just woken up to the idea of there being a correlation between identity and movement and that it is 'through the continuity of movement that human beings continue to make themselves at home' (p. 33).

Vered Amit-Talai analyses the lives of temporary residents on the Cayman Islands and highlights aspects of protectionism on the part of the authorities as well as the globalization resulting from its status as an offshore banking centre attracting an international labour force. As case-histories of temporary residents show, access to residence rights is seen to be denied them and only offered to 'true' Cayman Islanders. Old ways of being 'at home' become redundant in the light of precarious border crossings and shaky legal statuses.

Using case-histories of newcomers to a settlement in Israel, Nigel Rapport explores the ways in which settlers manage their status as immigrants, suggesting that there are cognitive as well as physical homes. This is seen in the ties that are preserved with the USA, as well as in how, through their past as Americans, they begin to live the 'dream' of settling in Israel. In their immigrant identity, 'David and Rachel had not moved out of “America”': in fact, through the 'old selves', new identities were being created (p. 81).

Stef Jansen uses the narratives of three women writers to highlight ideas of home and identity in Yugoslavia. He says that the disintegration of Yugoslavia was realized not only through the destruction of lives, villages and cities, it also constituted a break in a number of narratives, such as a 'never again' belief in 'civilization' (p. 94). One of the results is what Jansen describes as being 'homeless at home' powerfully featuring in the women writers' narratives.

Ladislav Holy also writes of new nation, namely the new Czech Republic, and how 'home' is equated with 'homeland' within it. Czechs are able to forge the idea of a 'homeland' between those of 'nation' and 'state'. This notion of a homeland allows for a patriotism that is culturally specific. When looking at the idea of home and 'foreignness', Holy highlights the category of tourist and writes of the Czech's ambivalent attitude toward them. On the one hand they bring in much needed income and jobs in the tourist sector, while on the other hand they 'treat as a hotel the same space that the Czechs see as their home', forcing the Czechs to 'act as if they were hotel guests in the space that they conceptualize as their home' (p. 132).

The metaphor of being a child in Britain is explored by Alison James. Included here are the ideas of 'home' and 'family', which effectively provide the stage for the dependency of the child today. Using the suggested definition of home as where one best knows oneself, she then suggests that 'the child might be ideologically at home in the family' (p. 142). Describing pre-school visits and children's first weeks at school, James shows the role of home and family in the social construction of childhood and how they can position a child as 'passively dependent' (p. 158).

Using case-studies, Eric Hirsch examines the role of information and communication technology. He makes a significant distinction between 'home' and 'house' and shows how the acceptance of computers into the home alters these notions. In one of the case-studies, the woman of the household did not want exposed computers or VCRs in the sitting-room (p. 173). Hirsch shows that what happens is 'domestic appropriat-
Sandra Wallman looks at different London settings from the idea of ‘home’ as a ‘proxy for belonging somewhere’ and shows how urban dwellers construct this idea of belonging. The relationship between people and place is looked at in terms of identity. Three identities emerge from the case-studies of urban settings: those who had moved into a district to stay, therefore creating new identities; those in a neighbourhood who refused to move under threat of demolition and were therefore seen to be defending old identities; and those who changed identity as they continually moved. She notes the distinction between a home being a conceptual place and a dwelling being a material place (p. 203).

Andrew Dawson’s paper is set in the industrial north-east of England and features a club for elderly people in a coal mining area. Notions of community incorporate addresses, namely working-class groups’ right to define community on the basis of their strong links with mining, and middle-class groups defining community on the basis that they had resided in the area for a long time. Dawson looks at the setting up of a heritage museum and describes ‘a situation where the imagination of other places and times informs images of community constructed in the here and now....’ This construction was seen in the continuity of life portrayed in the heritage museum as opposed to the approaching discontinuity caused by the death of club members.

In a review of the book overall, Karen Fog Olwig highlights the way in which the papers stress the relationship between home and movement, migrancy and identity. However, she points out that some of the authors choose to ‘examine home as a space of self-knowledge and identity rather than as a space of social relations’ and expresses the hope for a different kind of analysis in the future. This, she says, might focus on the ‘interrelationship between home as a conceptual space of identification and home as a nodal point in social relations’ (p. 236).

As the introductory chapter promises, the papers in this book have much to say about contemporary identity within the context of home and the fluidity of ‘home’ for many people at the end of the twentieth century. The volume will be of value to anthropologists and others addressing issues of identity and home in the context of some of the great migrations of this era.

JANETTE DAVIES


In 1870 Argentina was a far from settled country. Externally, the Paraguayan War was just ending, while internally there was still an Indian frontier, for it was not until the end of that decade that General Julio Recal’s so-called ‘conquest of the wilderness’ effectively wiped out the native population. In that year, 1870, an Argentinian army
officer, Lucio Mansilla, made a visit from a frontier fort on the Rio Quinto to the Ranquel Indians in the modern province of La Pampa. The account of his journey, almost certainly penned back in Buenos Aires after the event, appeared in serial form in the newspaper *La Tribuna*. By the end of the year, the various pieces were brought together and published as a book, which, in Spanish, has been in print ever since. This—oddly enough, given the high esteem in which it is held—is the first English translation of a work which is undoubtedly one of the great descriptions of an Indian frontier, for either North or South America.

The Ranquel Indians are very similar to the better-known Araucanians, who, even back in the days of the Inca Empire, had a reputation as warriors. The Ranquel, like the Plains Indians of North America, had fully appreciated, and turned to good effect, all the advantages of mobility that the horse, introduced by the Spaniards, offered for subsistence and warfare. They represented a considerable obstacle to Argentinian expansion and more than a threat to those living on the ‘civilized’ side of the frontier. This could not be demonstrated more clearly than in the epilogue, where Mansilla attempts to estimate how many Ranquel there were. His estimate is of some eight to ten thousand, a figure which includes around six to eight hundred Christian captives, or perhaps as many as 10 per cent, who had presumably been picked up in raids across the frontier. This is a remarkable suggestion, but I know of no work on the impact of the absorption of relatively large numbers of non-Amerindians by native populations, a topic that would certainly reward examination.

Lucio Mansilla was well connected—he was nephew of President Rosas—well read and well travelled, having visited India, the Middle East and Europe as a young man. He had become a soldier and fought in the Paraguayan War, and in an effort to forward his own political career had actively supported Domingo Sarmiento’s bid for the presidency. Sarmiento was successful and, like Rosas, had a hatred of the Indians, but unlike Rosas he preferred to settle their future by treaty rather than with the bullet. It may have been because of this that when, in the late 1860s, Mansilla found himself serving on the Indian frontier, he felt free to undertake some freelance treaty-making with the Ranquel (it was as part of this process that his visit to the Ranquel was undertaken). He was successful in obtaining the Indians’ agreement, but unfortunately the Argentinian government never got round to ratifying the treaty.

In order to demonstrate his trust in the Indians, Mansilla travelled with a small and lightly armed party. Even so, the eighteen-day journey that was required to meet the Ranquel chief was filled with excitement and dangers, many of the latter emanating as much from the internal factionalism of the Ranquel themselves as from any direct antagonism towards the Argentinians. In this respect Mansilla’s account reads very genuinely, and there is also a great deal of ethnographic information about the Ranquel in these pages, though it has to be picked out. Unlike a modern ethnography, which it was not intended to be, the material is not on the surface but mixed in with descriptions of the countryside, philosophical musings, literary quotations, soldiers’ tales from other campaigns, even an account of the fate of his dog. The last gives rise to the following contemplation: ‘Will ethics one day be an exact science? Where shall we ever stop, if comparative anatomy, philosophy, phrenology, biology itself begin to progress in as extraordinary a fashion as physics and chemistry do every day, so that there are beginning to be no secrets left for man in the material world?’ In other
words, it is one of those physical journeys that is also a philosophical voyage, Lévi-Strauss’s *Tristes Tropiques* being a more recent South American example of the genre.

Eva Gillies, an Argentinian by birth and a former member of the Institute at Oxford, has produced an excellent and readable translation. Her introduction succinctly locates Mansilla’s visit in the political context of the period, and the annotation is useful and instructive, even if on occasion the expectations concerning the general knowledge of readers seem dismally low. The work has been nicely produced and there are some fascinating illustrations. Nebraska is to be congratulated on publishing the sort of work university presses ought to publish but increasingly shrink from doing.

PETER RIVIÈRE
PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED


*Anthropology and Medicine*, Vol. 5, nos. 2 and 3 (August and December 1998); and Vol. 6, no. 1 (April 1999).


GODELIER, MAURICE, and MICHEL PANOFF (eds.), *La Production du Corps: Approches Anthropologiques et Historiques* (Ordres Sociaux), Amsterdam: Editions des Archives Contemporaines 1998. xxv, 374 pp. References, Illustrations. ECU 46/300 FF.


SPECIAL ISSUE CELEBRATING THE CENTENARY OF 
L'ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE

CONTENTS

ROBERT PARKIN
Introduction .................................. 103–104

MICHAEL McGOVERN
Durkheim and Heidegger: Two Social Ontologies and
Some Implications ............................. 105–120

KNUT CHRISTIAN MYHRE
The Anthropological Concept of Action and its Problems:
A ‘New’ Approach based on Marcel Mauss and Aristotle ... 121–134

DOMINIQUE LUSSIER
Durkheim on Respect: Modern Echoes of a
‘Naïve Introspective Guess’ ........................ 135–157

ROBERT PARKIN
The Legacy of the Anneé Sociologique as a Journal .....  159–164

Oxford Research in Social and Cultural Anthropology
Abstracts of Theses in Social and Cultural Anthropology
for which Higher Degrees were Awarded by the University
of Oxford in 1997 ..................................... 165–172

Book Reviews

POLLY HILL, The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana:
A Study in Rural Capitalism
Reviewed by Stefano Boni .......................... 173–174

POLLY WEISSNER and WULF SCHIEFENHÖVEL, Food and
the Status Quest: An Interdisciplinary Perspective
Reviewed by Stefano Boni .......................... 174–176

MICHAEL EUGENE HARKIN, The Heiltsuks: Dialogues of
Culture and History on the Northwest Coast
Reviewed by Alx Dark ............................ 176–178
Book Reviews (continued)

VEIT ERLMANN, Nightsong: Performance, Power and Practice in South Africa
Reviewed by Karen Lüdtke ........................................ 178–180

W. S. F. PICKERING and W. WATTS MILLER (eds.), On Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life
Reviewed by Philip A. Mellor ........................................ 181–182

MARTHA MUNDY, Domestic Government: Kinship, Community and Polity in North Yemen
Reviewed by W. Flagg Miller ........................................ 182–185

CAROLYN NORDESTROM, A Different Kind of War Story
Reviewed by Joann McGregor ........................................ 185–186

JEFF FERRELL and MARK HAMM (eds.), Ethnography at the Edge: Crime, Deviance and Field Research
Reviewed by Ian O’Donnell ........................................ 187–188

ANN DAIYAI Usher (ed.), Dams as Aid: A Political Anatomy of Nordic Development Thinking
Reviewed by Barrie Sharpe ........................................ 188–190

SIMON SINCLAIR, Making Doctors: An Institutional Apprenticeship
Reviewed by Helen Sweet ........................................ 190–192

Reviewed by Stefano Boni ........................................ 192–194

Publications Received ........................................ 195–196

Contributors to this Issue ........................................ inside back cover

Copyright © JASO 1999. All rights reserved.
ISSN UK 0044-8370
Typeset in Times Roman at
Oxford University Computing Service
Printed in Great Britain by
Antony Rowe Ltd., Chippenham, Wiltshire
This collection of papers celebrates the centenary of *L'Année Sociologique*, one of the most influential journals in the social sciences, which was founded by Émile Durkheim in 1898 as a vehicle for the development of his own approach and for his criticism of others.

Of the four papers presented here, three were given as talks to a workshop held on 16 May 1998 at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology at Oxford, in conjunction with the British Centre for Durkheimian Studies (the fourth paper, by Knut Myhre, was written subsequently, especially for this issue). The idea of the workshop was to attract students to say something about how they responded to Durkheim’s insights a century and more after his most active period, and whether they felt that these insights could be developed in any way. In the event, this often emerged as a matter of comparison between Durkheim or one of his followers and other figures not a part of that tradition in the formal, intellectual, or chronological sense. Thus in the papers as published here, Michael McGovern seeks to compare social ontology in the work of Durkheim and Heidegger; Knut Myhre sees precedents for Mauss’s approach to action in the work of Aristotle; and Dominique Lussier traces the ramifications of Durkheim’s notion of respect in the master’s own work and in those of two sympathetic critics of the later British school, Evans-Pritchard and Godfrey Lienhardt. My own contribution, very much bringing up the rear both in the order of papers and in terms of intellectual penetration, focuses on how the leading characteristics of *L'Année Sociologique* as a journal appear to have been captured by a later endeavour, equally influential in
its own field, launched by Louis Dumont, a leading scion of the Durkheimian tendency.

The original idea was that the workshop should be organized jointly by myself and Professor Wendy James. In the event, we found ourselves resorting to a very organic and Durkheimian division of labour, she doing the organizing, while I concentrated on editing the results for publication. In addition to thanking her, I would also like to express my gratitude to those students and others present who contributed to the discussion at the workshop, as well as to the authors of the papers presented here. Bill Pickering, secretary and founding member of the British Centre for Durkheimian Studies, contributed greatly by his presence and his unparalleled ability to guide the discussion of any Durkheimian subject in fruitful directions.

In celebrating the centenary of *L'Année Sociologique*, I believe all those present felt that they were honouring not only a journal, but also an intellectual tendency of continuing interest to anthropology, and one which has always, perhaps, found greater resonance at ISCA and its institutional predecessors than in many other departments, right from the days of Radcliffe-Brown. While the reception of Durkheim at Oxford has certainly not been uncritical, his influence has been remarkably persistent, supported not only by writing but also by translation (in this latter respect, Oxford can be seen as a major contributor over the years). The Institute now houses the British Centre for Durkheimian Studies, founded at the initiative of Bill Pickering, and close links have also developed with the Maison Française, which hosted an important recent conference on Marcel Mauss and provided support in other ways. It was therefore felt appropriate to mark this important centenary at the Institute with both the original workshop and this special section of *JASO*. It is hoped that the contributions presented here will carry the critical engagement with Durkheim forward as well as celebrating its past achievements.
DURKHEIM AND HEIDEGGER:
TWO SOCIAL ONTOLOGIES AND SOME IMPLICATIONS

MICHAEL McGOVERN

The writings of Émile Durkheim and Martin Heidegger are marked by many unexpected similarities. This is especially true in the area of each thinker’s social ontology. By this term I mean the author’s definition of social existence and the set of ramifications that emerge out of that definition. Each wrote in his own way against a perceived background of malaise within the context of capitalist, nationalist Europe. Durkheim’s category of anomie has its correlate in Heidegger’s Angst, while Heidegger’s philosophical analysis of finitude and mortality echoes Durkheim’s interest in suicide. Both men were also adamant that the monadic self—posited both in post-Cartesian philosophy as an epistemological given and in popular sociological understanding as a social and moral fact—was a fiction. In both Durkheim’s sociology and Heidegger’s philosophy, we are reminded, in ways still fresh, that human existence takes shape only as the result of a series of relations and interactions.

Despite the similarities between Heidegger’s and Durkheim’s descriptions of the relational nature of what we might today call subject formation, the conclusions they reached from their analyses could hardly be more different. This essay aims to examine why that might be, bearing in mind the paradox that these two figures have exerted an enormous and simultaneous influence on much post-Second World War social thought, especially through the writings of the French structuralists and post-structuralists. The essay begins with a synopsis of Durkheim’s essay, ‘The Dualism of Human Nature and its Social Conditions’ (in Wolff 1960), in which he
106 Michael McGovern

outlines his theory of *homo duplex,*⁠¹ and Division I of Heidegger’s *Being and Time,* in which he lays out his formulation of Being-in-the-World. In the second part of the discussion, I try to link the arguments to their political implications in two ways: first, by describing the social, historical, and political contexts of their production; and second, by tracing some of the logical entailments of each social ontology.

In this regard Heidegger’s involvement with the Nazi party becomes neither determinative of nor inconsequential to the merits of his philosophical system, the same being true of Durkheim’s involvement in secular pedagogy in the wake of the Dreyfus affair.² However, the links between the logical trajectories of each argument and their historical contexts take on a far greater significance.

**Durkheim’s Homo Duplex**

At the end of his oral examination³ of M. Pradines’ 1910 doctoral thesis, ‘The Principles of Every Philosophy of Action’, Durkheim challenged the student’s attempt to do away with the distinction between laws and rules. I quote at length from their exchange, partly because it gives a fascinating view of Durkheim the pedagogue:

D: I say that the moralists have distinguished the generalization of what is from what ought to be, laws from the ideals.... A rule does not exist any the less merely because of men’s actions: and the criminal who disobeys it shows that it is an ideal. In brief, there is a sense in which ‘we’ are subject to physical laws, and another in which ‘we’ perform the moral law: we are double.

P: I wanted to put an end to this dualism.

D: You have not succeeded. Reason, you say, unifies the tendencies in the moral law just as in the physical law it unifies natural phenomena, but do you not see that this antagonism is in us, ourselves? What difficulty is there here? How can one imagine that a dialectical trick will unify this dualism, which all thinkers

1. This notion was central to Durkheim’s later work and is explicated more fully in his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* (1965).

2. Alfred Dreyfus (1859–1935), a French-Jewish army officer, was accused and convicted of spying for the German government. Despite evidence showing his innocence, he was found guilty again in an 1899 retrial which was skewed by strong antisemitic biases in the French military and which bitterly divided French society. Dreyfus was found innocent by the French high court in 1906.

before you have expressed, each in his own language.... You who claim to have
so keen an apprehension of complexity, how is it that you have not felt that there
is always in us something which is elevating while another part of us draws us in
an opposite direction?

P: It has seemed to me that classical rationalism was wrong not to put an end to
this undeniable dualism.

D: Such a solution is impossible. You have found in all systems an internal
opposition. You have denounced this as a contradiction; you should have seen that
this contradiction is in life itself.

According to Durkheim, the student had tried to legislate out of existence a basic
aspect of the human condition. As biological individuals4 we are partly selfish,
willful, and inherently anti-social. As social beings, we are forced to take others
into account. Society is a place where moral evaluations are made, and the tension
between the desires of an individual and the expectations of society provides an
inerradicable poignancy for our life-courses. Durkheim puts forward this argument
originally published in 1914 in the journal Scientia (reprinted in Wolff 1960). In
it, he gives his own, somewhat more schematic interpretation of the meaning of
The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life. He begins by stating that although
sociology is the science of societies, it cannot help but study the individuals of
which every society is composed. ‘For society can only exist if it penetrates the
consciousness of individuals and fashions it in “its image and resemblance”’ (ibid.:
325). He continues in this vein, noting the transcultural and transhistorical belief
in the separateness of body and soul, material and spiritual, sacred and profane.
This notion, he continues, too universal to be purely illusory, is the result of
humans’ (often inarticulate) understanding that individual, biological appetites and
the demands of social life are often at odds. He summarizes this insight in a
sentence: ‘Morality begins with disinterest, with attachment to something other
than ourselves’ (ibid.: 327).

Morality is communicated by means of concepts, which are representations
shared within a group and which can be experienced in a manner entirely different
from sensory perceptions, which are distinctive to each person. ‘Far from being
simple,’ Durkheim argues, ‘our inner life has something that is like a double center
of gravity. On the one hand is our individuality—and more particularly, our body
in which it is based; on the other is everything in us that expresses something
other than ourselves’ (ibid.: 328). This formulation builds on the schema of
Cartesian mind—body dualism. Indeed, Durkheim was strongly influenced by
Kant’s reinterpretation of Descartes. Student that he was of categories and classifi-
cation, the late Durkheim did not accept the claim that mental categories or con-

4. ‘Individual’, as used in this essay, indicates only a biologically distinct human being.
cepts were immanent, already given in the mind, waiting only to be discovered. Thus he sociologized Kant, emphasizing that the categories that organized thought were specific to societies, just as are languages. Even though Durkheim locates the collective in the realm of the social rather than in ‘spirit’ or some other part of the mind, he does retain strong traces of Kantian dualism in his notion of homo duplex.

The essay continues by considering several solutions that have been proposed for the problem of our experience of this duality. He dismisses what he calls empirical monism (everything is really sensation) and idealistic monism (everything is really concepts), which deny that any such duality exists. If duality is an illusion, why, after so many millennia of human existence, do we still experience it so acutely? As he writes later in the essay, ‘if society were only the natural and spontaneous development of the individual, these two parts of ourselves would harmonize and adjust to each other without clashing and without friction’ (ibid.: 338).

Durkheim also considers and rejects explanations offered by Plato and Kant to explain this antimony. He closes the argument by taking up the theme of religion and gives a synopsis of his explanation of how communication of the conscience collective occurs during heightened moments of ritual, festivals, and ceremonies. Through participation in the effervescent activities of a society’s sacred realm, the individual is imprinted with a template of that society’s ideals. Consciousness of these ideals may fade with time, but it does not disappear, and it is the frictions between these (social) ideals and the individual’s own desires that underlie the experience of ‘the dualism of human nature’.

I will not comment extensively on Durkheim’s resolution of the problem of dualism, as my focus here is on its constitution as such, i.e. as a question of ontology. Here I would like to draw attention to three aspects of Durkheim’s argument. First, he emphasizes the fact that even in our innermost feelings and experiences, we only belong partly to ourselves. The intrusion of the social into our inner worlds is a source of pain and conflict. Secondly, he stresses the simultaneity of the two aspects of human nature. He asks, ‘How can we belong entirely to ourselves and entirely to others at one and the same time?’ (ibid.: 328, my emphasis; see also ibid.: 334, 337). A third aspect of his account is the argument that each individual is embedded in, and takes part of her or his significance from, a social and moral system. The system both constitutes and is constituted by each individual in such a way that it becomes meaningless to talk about an individual’s ‘meaning’, ‘intentionality’, or ‘agency’ separately from the framework of the system (i.e. the other individuals to whom the individual is related in various ways). This model of relationality, similar to the notion of signification developed

5. Developed with greater subtlety in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life.
by Ferdinand de Saussure,\(^6\) posits society (like Saussure's *langue*) as an identifiable whole. This whole can change and shift over time, but as it is an aggregate, no individual can effect a significant shift, and the system always exists before and after any constituent member.

Heidegger and the Problem of Dasein

There are three reasons why a comparison of Heidegger can be useful in drawing out some of the significance of Durkheim's social ontology. First, Heidegger's notions of the individual in society represent a second major stream in European thought on this subject. While Durkheim's later work resembles the Judaeo-Christian notion of degraded man kept in check by the strictures of society (a model that has its apotheosis in Hobbes' analysis of the social contract), Heidegger's system has affinities with the biblical myth of the Edenic fall from grace (rearticulated by Rousseau).\(^7\) This narrative of organic purity sullied by worldliness links Heidegger's philosophy to many of its strongest (yet subtly encoded) influences, such as the folkloric cultural nationalism of Herder and Ernst Junger, and the rise-and-fall historiography of Oswald Spengler.

Secondly, as noted above, Heidegger's work has exerted an enormous influence on twentieth-century continental thought. Interpretations of his work have been interposed between the Saussurean-Durkheimian roots of structuralism and a hybrid end-product, as is notably the case in the work of Lacan and Derrida. Heidegger also helped shape the development of two of the twentieth-century philosophical schools that have been of greatest interest to anthropologists: French phenomenology (Sartre, Merleau-Ponty) and hermeneutics (Gadamer, Ricoeur). Thus he has paradoxically been invoked by both the most anti-humanist and the most individualist-humanist currents in twentieth-century European thinking about society and history.

Finally, Heidegger provides us with a particularly good example of what may be the political entailments of a theory of ontology. The politics (namely his involvement with the Nazi party) and the philosophy are by no means reducible one to the other, but we can trace a series of links, as I will try to do in the next part of the essay, between a particular line of argument about the nature of human ontology and the sort of politics that may logically follow from it.

---

6. *Saussure's Cours de linguistique générale* was published in Geneva in 1915 (thus immediately after the publication of Durkheim's article), but was a posthumous reconstruction of his students' lecture notes from the period 1906–11.

7. I thank Professor David Parkin for this insight.
Heidegger believed that the discipline of philosophy had only one genuine problematic: understanding the meaning, or the being, of Being. This branch of philosophy is known as ontology, and ontological studies have been permanently transformed by Heidegger’s work. Heidegger’s exegesis of Being is best known from his first book, *Sein und Zeit* (1927), published in English in 1962 as *Being and Time*. This book is comprised of only the first two of what were meant to be six divisions. Division I is the analysis of Dasein, while Division II explores the relations between Dasein and temporality.

*Dasein* literally means ‘being there’, but for Heidegger it tends to mean self-aware human existence or being. This reflexive existence, characteristic of humans only, naturally seeks the answer to the only question Heidegger deems fundamental: ‘why is there something (or anything), and not nothing?’ This question, deceptively naïve-sounding, has been shunted aside not only by ‘common sense’, but also by the whole history of philosophical thought which has, according to Heidegger, followed a wrong path—that is, the path of metaphysical inquiry—and ended up in a philosophical cul-de-sac. Indeed, the last three (unpublished) divisions of the work were intended to serve as what he called the ‘destruction of the history of ontology’, with a chapter each deconstructing the philosophical systems of Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle.

Given Heidegger’s claim that every other philosopher in history had missed the ontological boat, how does he propose that we come to an understanding of our existence? I will give below a very brief outline of that part of *Being and Time* of greatest interest to us here. As well as being partial, my reading will also be paraphrased, as Heidegger’s language is very nearly impenetrable.

In Division I, entitled ‘Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein’, Heidegger sets out to understand the nature of human, (potentially) reflexive being—Dasein—both because it is a privileged type of general Being, and because it is the only means we have of gaining knowledge about more general Being. I would break Division I into three parts: (1) the preliminary discussion of ‘Being-in-the-World’ (sections 9–24); (2) the problematic of ‘everyday Being’ (sections 25–38); and (3) the attribution of ‘Care’ as the nature of Dasein (sections 39–44).

---

8. Although his use of the term often verges on the connotations we might attribute to ‘consciousness’ he was careful to avoid this term because of the very Cartesian notions of subject and object that have typically been affiliated with it.

9. To the Heideggerian faithful, the notion of translating his work, let alone paraphrasing it, has about as much validity as the idea of translating the Koran has for religious Muslims. For those who doubt the advisability of a paraphrase, I will simply offer a taste (in translation) of the authentic text. These are the last six lines of the 500-page work:

The existential-ontological constitution of Dasein’s totality is grounded in temporality. Hence the ecstatical projection of Being must be made possible by some primordial way in which ecstatical temporality temporalizes. How is this mode of the temporalizing of temporality to be interpreted? Is there a way that leads from primordial time to the meaning of Being? Does time itself manifest itself as the horizon of Being? (Heidegger 1962).
In sections 9–24, the primary distinctions are between the ‘ontic’ and the ‘ontological’, and between ‘presentness-at-hand’ (Vorhandenheit) and ‘readiness-to-hand’ (Zuhandenheit). That which is present-at-hand may be contemplated, known about, and identified, resulting in the kind of ‘ontic’ knowledge that scientists, for instance, have about things in the world. The kind of knowledge that emerges from our ready-to-hand relations with the world around us is exemplified by one of Heidegger’s favourite metaphors: the carpenter and his hammer. For the person who uses it as a tool, the hammer becomes almost invisible as a thing, though it is an essential part of that person’s projects in shaping the surrounding world. Readiness-to-hand, then, is defined by organic, instrumental relations between Dasein and the object, as well as the kind of practical knowledge we would recognize as ‘techniques of the body’ in Mauss, habitus in Mauss and Bourdieu, or ‘practical consciousness’ in Giddens.

Such embodied, instrumental knowledge is pre-ontological or pre-theoretical to begin with, but is also the necessary basis for properly ontological (as opposed to ontic) knowledge. This happens, for instance, when the head of the hammer comes loose, compromising its transparent usefulness to the carpenter. The carpenter could now make a series of statements about ‘hammer-ness’ that could never result from a dictionary definition, a detailed description of the hammer’s shape and dimensions, or information about how it was manufactured (all ‘ontic’ descriptions for Heidegger). In this way, both the practices of the community into which we are ‘dropped’ and our daily projects and habits overdetermine all our ways of seeing/interpreting the world. Heidegger’s interpretation of this point encompasses both Durkheim and Mauss’s notions of cognitive categories and Mauss’s analysis of techniques. Heidegger emphasizes that we can build a picture of the world from the knowledge we derive from the ready-to-hand, later inserting second-hand, or ontic, knowledge. However, we cannot work in the other direction, from the ontic toward the ontological.

He develops this distinction in sections 25–38, where he describes the problematic of ‘everyday Being’. Our Being-in-the-world is characterized by ‘being withness’ (mit-sein), which we could gloss as sociality, and the sayings and actions of ‘das Man’. This latter term has been translated ‘the They’ in Being and Time, but also carries the multiple connotations of the French pronoun on, which can mean we, one, or they, according to usage. Mit-sein and das Man are neutral in themselves but represent, in Heidegger, the perils of ‘everyday Being’. In the course of ordinary life, authentic,10 ontological, and ready-to-hand knowledge and

10. Authenticity is a key concept for Heidegger, as it became for existentialism in general. Like many of the other terms and metaphors he uses (e.g. ‘natural’, ‘organic’), this term would be considered highly problematic by most anthropologists. Heidegger’s usage is never simply an uncritical reproduction of contemporary folk theories, and he renders many terms idiosyncratic via arcane etymologies and wordplay. Nevertheless, his terms always operate in tandem with the folk categories of their twins and feed parasitically on them. First Adorno (1973) and later Bourdieu (1991) have explored the complex politics of language in Heidegger’s work.
relations tend to become sedimented over by the common sense of ‘the They’. When one follows everyday practices unthinkingly, they are neutral. However, when one does something because it is ‘the done thing’, one has started slipping into inauthenticity. Of course, when faced with a conscious decision, Dasein’s authentic choice is to ‘Be-one-self’. Heidegger describes myriad pitfalls in the way of authentic Dasein: ‘idle talk’ and gossip, ‘curiosity’, which he describes as a kind of frivolous lust for novelty, and generally ‘fallenness’, which results from becoming caught up with the past and what ‘the They’ are doing.

In sections 39–44, Heidegger describes Care (Sorge) as the Being (we could say, ‘true nature’) of Dasein. This care, concern, or interest that Dasein takes in everything around it can be manifested as a reflexivity about its own existence, but it can also take the form of ‘solicitude’ for others or instrumental interest, for instance in the tools one requires to be ready-to-hand. This care is also neutral: it is simply Dasein’s natural relation to the world. However, it too can lead to inauthenticity. For instance, solicitude for others (which some of Heidegger’s interpreters have read as a euphemism for social welfare and the welfare state) robs them of their authenticity.

Division II of the book is entitled ‘Dasein and Temporality’. Having sketched his description of Dasein, Heidegger goes on to analyze its relation to time and temporality. This relationship was meant to give the clue that would allow Heidegger to decode the nature of all Being, but that part of the book was never written. I will trace this section much more quickly, as it is less important for our present argument. Authentic Dasein, according to Heidegger, has an intimate relationship with temporality. Temporality is not time for Heidegger. As he notes, ‘now’ can be the instantaneity of snapped fingers, or it can be the hour-long period during which we share a meal. Similarly, what we commonly understand as the separate realms of past, present, and future are also relative, each one constituting the others. What is important to Heidegger is that care, as the natural attitude of Dasein, has differing aspects in relation to temporality. Most important to note is the fact that because of its basis in subjectivity and thus the human life-span, each individual’s Dasein has objective limits, beginning some time after birth and disappearing at death. Acknowledging this fact (namely that of one’s mortality) is the basis for all sorts of good Heideggerian things: ‘Being-a-whole’, the sense of totality, and ultimately ‘resoluteness’.

‘Resoluteness’, for Heidegger, denotes an openness toward temporality (the mutually-constituting past-present-future), with an emphasis on open anticipation of the future. Care, which is Dasein’s nature, may be divided into three interrelated parts, each of which has a temporal correlate:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CARE</th>
<th>TEMPORALITY/RESOLUTENESS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>‘projectiveness’/existence</td>
<td>‘Being-ahead-of-itself’/future</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘thrownness’/discourse</td>
<td>‘Being alongside’/present</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>‘fallenness’</td>
<td>‘already-Being-in’/past</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
According to Heidegger, it is the intermeshing of these three forms of care with their temporal modes that gives us the key to understanding the totality of human Being.

I hope I have conveyed the ambivalent, cautious, but ultimately disdainful position Heidegger takes toward the ‘everydayness’ of ‘the They’. It would be inconceivable for an individual to live in any way other than ‘Being-in-the-world’, yet that individual’s important—and moreover transcendent—decisions and discoveries will come from her own struggle to come to terms with her relation to authentic temporality, especially as embodied in the totality of her mortality. The person interacts with others in her everyday modes, but is inward-looking when she is most authentic (though in Heidegger’s terminology, this introspective state is termed ‘openness’). As for the notion of society that emerges in Being and Time, it is implicitly bounded and distinct from other societies, thus providing the specificity of the individual’s ‘thrown’ circumstances. Heidegger’s views on the distinctiveness of societies emerges more clearly from comments scattered throughout his works, particularly in his condemnation of ‘rootlessness’ and ‘cosmopolitanism’, two qualities of modern urban society that he seems to have considered characteristic of Jewishness.11

The Politics of Ontology

Turning from the theoretical formulations of the last two sections, I would now like to consider both the context of production and some of the political implications of the work of the early Heidegger and the late Durkheim. A theory of being, or ontology, is significant because of its ramifying entailments. Because all humans are inextricably part of the world around them, any theory of human ontology implies, through its definition of what human existence is and is not, a theory of subject formation and of society. I will begin by outlining what I feel to be the relevant points of similarity and difference in each author’s social ontology, then continue by looking at aspects of fin-de-siècle French and inter-war German societies for information that may add to our understanding of the mutual influence of theories of society and their historical context.

I suggested above that Durkheim’s notion of homo duplex is related to the need for society to place restrictions on ‘naturally’ anti-social individuals. Christopher Herbert, in his Culture and Anomie (1991), has refined this notion in such a way that we can see more clearly the relation between Durkheim’s concept and some of his wider concerns regarding the French society of his day. Herbert suggests that a primary impetus behind the nineteenth-century formulation of what has become known as ‘the culture concept’ was the doctrine of eighteenth- and

11. This point is brought out clearly by Adorno (1973).
nineteenth-century evangelical Christianity. During this period, John Wesley described original sin as a state of boundless, destructive desire. He accompanied this picture with a call for restrictive social-religious control. Herbert argues that Victorian English ambivalence toward desire was a crucial catalyst in the development of proto-cultural theory (as one reaction, along with the development of political economy) which was to crystallize in Durkheim's model of society, solidarity, and religion.

Regardless of the lines of influence, we should make a distinction between the unreconstructed narrative of a fall from grace into moral degradation checked only by vigilant Protestant discipline and the model Durkheim proposed. In the latter, the work of socialization—mediated by collective representations, classificatory categories, and ritual—installs a moral conscience (in both senses that the French term retains) that largely bypasses the need for strict control of individual life by church or state.¹²

In this regard, it may be useful to consider the influence of the Dreyfus affair on the formation of Durkheim’s practical and theoretical sociology. As Lukes and others have argued, Durkheim’s activities alongside the Dreyfusards was restrained but concerted. The more important consequence was a strengthening of his commitment to scientific sociology and to a pedagogy of secular morality in France. Durkheim’s importance in the training of teachers in the Third Republic (especially through his courses on the history of French pedagogy at the École Normale Supérieure) was closely connected with the French movement toward secularization.¹³

Durkheim’s thought emerges more clearly against this background. The rifts in French society highlighted by the Dreyfus affair must be seen as a crucial historical setting for the development of Durkheim’s later work. Homo duplex appears as the problematic that has most preoccupied French thinkers in the twentieth century: in a fragmented society, how is it possible to make the individual want to do what he or she must do in order for the society to keep limping along? In this light, the practical consequences of Durkheim’s life’s work seem both massive and poignant. With the memory of defeat in the Franco-Prussian War still vivid, and the internal splits attested by the Commune and the Dreyfus affair even more so, his reification of society seems to be as much the work of wish-fulfillment as a heuristic device.

The concern with explaining how the individual subject is inserted into an implicitly fragmentary society has continued in France with Mauss (consideration of the history of the notion of the person and of bodily techniques), Lévi-Strauss (deep structures), Lacan (the symbolic realm and the ‘Word of the Father’), Alt-

¹². There are striking parallels between Durkheim’s notion of the conscience collective and Freud’s late development of the agency of the superego—another internalized mechanism of control—interposed between unconscious drives and the conscious ego.

¹³. This culminated in the Loi Combes of 1905, officially separating church and state.
husser (ideological interpellation), Foucault (episteme and disciplinary practices), and Bourdieu (habitus), right up through the Derridean shift to turn structuralism on its head.

The reticence of many of these academics to insert their work into the socio-political public sphere—again following Durkheim’s lead—becomes more comprehensible when we consider the underlying notion of the relation between the system and its constituents. For the notion of homo duplex is, as I have noted above, based on a distinction similar to the Saussurean one between langue and parole. As Durkheim writes in his essay, ‘neither the vocabulary nor the grammar of a language is the work or product of one particular person’ (Wolff 1960: 327). Thus individual political gestures are unlikely to have a significant effect on objective relations in the world. Each individual, like each signifier in a system of communication, takes on most of his or her meaning through relations with other individuals within the total system. The fact that we are not phonemes but self-conscious beings is the basis of the dualism of human experience. This notion (particularly as it has been mobilized against the Sartrean conception of radical free will) links much of French twentieth-century social thought, along with social anthropology, to Durkheim’s insight.

We must also consider the logical entailments of Durkheim’s model of social existence. What might be its political ramifications? Because Durkheim, in his essay, locates the origin of social existence in the recognition of other persons, he takes the next step to argue that this recognition involves not just agreeing to their existence, but also taking account of them morally. Because he also emphasizes the pathos of this recognition and the tensions it institutes with our selfish desires, we understand that the recognition is not simply intellectual or jural, but affective as well (a point brought out yet more clearly in The Elementary Forms). Like the baby who, in Lacan’s psycho-social model, enters the realm of language, or the mirror stage, the person who sees himself as he is seen, has entered a de facto understanding of the bundle of social and ethical responsibilities that accompany membership of a social group. We now recognize the potentially reactionary political content in the late Durkheim’s notion of ritual and society, perhaps better than Durkheim himself did—as Mauss said, were not the Nuremberg rallies the apotheosis of a society’s worship of itself through public rituals? Nevertheless, ‘The Dualism of Human Nature’, while it presents much of the argument of The Elementary Forms in telescopic form, is intent on bringing this ethical element into the foreground: the social is equated with the morally evaluative, and thus no practice, no matter how functional or solidary, would be exempted from such evaluation.

As for Heidegger, the facts of his political life are fairly clear, but their proper interpretation is not. Heidegger was a member of the Nazi party in 1933–4, an affiliation that was coterminous with his rectorship at the University of Freiburg. During that time, he made a number of ideologically loaded speeches, curtailed academic freedom in some respects, and defended it in others. Privately, he acted at times as a Nazi informer, expressed a piquant antisemitism and anti-democratic
elitism, and showed himself to be personally opportunistic. After the war he was banned from teaching during the denazification hearings but reinstated as professor emeritus in 1951. Most significantly, during his politically active period, he explicitly connected many of his abstract philosophical concepts to the political events of the period and the ideology of National Socialism. This has led many to interpret both his pre- and post-war work as containing an encoded political content which is reactionary if not fully fascistic. Others (including Heidegger himself, but also Richard Rorty and other professional philosophers) insist on the work’s radical separateness from its author’s biography and dismiss such readings as spurious.

It seems that there are two lines of argument one can take in analyzing the links (or lack of them) between Heidegger’s philosophy and his politics. One can carry out a close reading of Heidegger’s texts in relation to the vocabulary and tropes of Nazi rhetoric, executing a kind of discourse analysis. This method has been combined with a social-historical contextualization by a number of authors, including Adorno (1973) and Bourdieu (1991). They make a powerful argument, especially in their discussions of the connections between *Being and Time* and the writings of such ‘conservative revolutionaries’ as Spengler and Junger.

In this regard, it seems highly probable that the anti-technological nostalgia and the romantic pastoralism of much of Heidegger’s writing were influenced by and part of this proto-fascistic rhetoric. These aspects of his thought were combined with a stiff and unrepentant nationalist pride. Philosophy, he said and wrote on a number of occasions, could only be thought in ancient Greek or German. With regard to the Nazi period, then, it seems that his affiliation was not so much *Blubo-ist*, or biological, as culturalist (though the two clearly intermingle). The nation that produced Kant and Nietzsche, Bach and Beethoven, Goethe and Holderlin, must not allow itself to be dragged down by the cultural mixing exemplified by urban cosmopolitanism (a term of scorn for Heidegger), nor by the ‘levelling-down’ resulting from democracy.

The second line of argument seems to me possibly more fruitful. Following our approach above, what can we say about the logical entailments of a system such as Heidegger’s interrogation of Being that might tell us something about the kind of politics that would necessarily follow from a set of ‘ontological’ premises? Here I think it is Heidegger’s discomfort with the relation of the individual’s *Dasein* to the world around that is of central importance. Heidegger argues that the individual is inextricably connected to surrounding people and things and that

14. For instance, he attributed ‘authenticity’ to a German-Alsatian patriot who was killed for refusing to acknowledge the French authorities’ claim to sovereignty over his village, but ‘inauthenticity’ to academic colleagues’ calls for a reinstatement of academic freedom of expression under the Nazi government. He praised Hitler’s ‘resoluteness’ in his withdrawal from the League of Nations, and claimed that the Nazi youth labour service would introduce German youth to proper modes of *mit-sein* and *mit Dasein*.

15. From *Blut und Boden*, or ‘blood and soil’.
Dasein emerges authentically through—indeed is—the interaction between the subject and the things 'out there' in the world. However, the 'things' that facilitate authentic Dasein are always either inanimate objects (like hammers) or abstract psychological-philosophical entities, like temporality, mortality, and nature. Other humans are invariably the source of impurity and existential degradation. For Heidegger, the recognition of the Other is both a necessary precondition for our being-in-the-world and the immanent source of inauthenticity. Ultimately, the Other seems to elicit horror (think of the picture of Hell painted by Heidegger's disciple Sartre in his play Huis Clos—an eternity spent with average, alienated others, engaging in 'idle chatter').

The comparison with Durkheim is stark. For Durkheim, the recognition of the Other is the very origin of morality. Though he, too, had misgivings about modernity and the social relations it had spawned, this anxiety seems to have been balanced by the tragic acceptance of the dualism of the human condition. This outlook seems to me to be the basis for his mistrust of politics and any easy or 'final' solutions it might propose.

Conclusion: Theories of Being and the View from Nowhere

What seems to me to be significant about both Durkheim's and Heidegger's models of human existence is that they strike profound blows against foundationalist notions of meaning. Durkheim emphasizes, as Saussure did, the relational nature of all meaning. Locating his description in the realm of society rather than language, he also emphasizes that meaning-making (one possible gloss on 'solidarity') requires constant and precarious work. Heidegger's attention to Dasein's interaction with and appropriation of the phenomenal world also emphasizes the dual processes of relationality and work. Yet both aim at an elegant closure that relies on different uses of the notion of boundedness. In both cases, as suggested above, we can trace rather clear lines between this move and aspects of the political context of its production.

I have presented the problematic in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein as originating in the move from the notions of 'readiness-to-hand', 'being-withness', and 'everyday Dasein' in Division I of Being and Time to the 'totality' of 'authentic' being in Division II. This constitutes Heidegger's attempt to encompass Dasein within temporality and thus reconstitute the messy and imperfectly limited phenomenal world within a bounded whole (that is, the self-aware passage of Dasein between birth and death). Emmanuel Levinas has criticized this latter move toward totalization because of what he calls the 'egotism' of Being's preoccupation with itself and the grasping, appropriating, and assimilating practices through which 'authentic' Heideggerian Dasein experiences the world. What Levinas describes as 'ontological imperialism'—the reduction of otherness to the sameness
of the self—is a philosophical and phenomenological critique, but its wider application in the human sciences will not be lost on anthropologists.\(^{16}\)

Thus Heidegger's attempt to transcend the everydayness of Being is just the problem. His emphasis on care, curiosity, readiness-to-hand, and the phenomenology of (social) Being in Division I might have been developed rather than dismissed. I have already pointed to the parallels between these notions and those of techniques of the body, habitus, and practical consciousness. Yet the move from phenomenology to *transcendental* phenomenology, the virtual equation of everydayness with inauthenticity, and the drive toward totality foreclose the possibility of such a project. We can imagine a conversation between Durkheim and Heidegger in which Durkheim corrects the philosopher, as he did the graduate student: 'Such a solution is impossible. You have found in all systems an internal opposition. You have denounced this as a contradiction; you should have seen that this contradiction is in life itself' (in Lukes 1973: 654).

If we prefer Durkheim's unbounded, always already ambivalent individual, must we then pay the price of the society cognitively and affectively bounded by a shared set of collective representations?\(^{17}\) I think Durkheim would again caution us against simply banishing the latter notion by edict. The logical entailment of *homo duplex* is that there must be a coherent system of representations—a comprehensible basis for intersubjectivity—in order for that side of the individual's dual nature to have a hold on him.

Heidegger gives us a clue as to how we may find our way out of his problem: he persistently reminds us that there is no way to get outside the phenomena that impinge on us; there is no 'view from nowhere'. This has been a persistent theme of twentieth-century philosophy which has continually come up against the problem that however encompassing the frame of reference (the text, the historical era, the language, the domain of descriptive terms), there is always a supplement. Whether figured as desire, *différence*, or *anomie*, it seems to extend just beyond the limits of the posited system. This insight has been applied only spottily to our notions of culture and society.

Perhaps we, both as analysts of and participants in Being-withness (or sociality, as Simmel called it), are to some extent always incapable of accounting for this excess. Yet we feel ourselves always to be located between intentions and identities that are 'our own' and others that derive from the expectations and demands of other people. How, then, can we reformulate our analyses so as to acknowledge the dualism of human nature\(^{18}\) without reifying the cultural?

---

\(^{16}\) This argument is elaborated in Young 1990.

\(^{17}\) The late Durkheim's resolution is the turn toward the sacred, a move formally similar to, though conceptually quite different from Heidegger's turn to finitude and temporality.

\(^{18}\) Perhaps now replacing the term 'dualism' with the idea of 'doubleness', as in W. E. B. DuBois's 'double consciousness'.

That is a topic for another essay. It is a paradox we are left with after mining Durkheim and Heidegger's writings. But we might make two observations in closing. First, we may take a cue from Mauss's relatively open conception of societies, one that emphasizes the movement of techniques and practices across space and time. We can well appreciate his insights and methods without necessarily utilizing them to construct total systems at still higher levels of organization, à la Lévi-Strauss. From a completely different angle, we may find it useful to focus on the **dialogic** interaction among individuals and social forms. Bakhtin's concept of the dialogic interposes an intermediate level between the dialectically interacting *langue* and *parole*, structure and process, speech community and utterance.\(^{19}\) The notions of voice and of speech genre, as potentially migratory as Mauss's techniques and just as ready-to-hand as Heidegger's 'equipment', move through and across both individuals and groups. They may be ventriloquized,\(^{20}\) channelled unconsciously, or utilized intentionally to create and invoke intersubjective understanding. Yet they are not rooted 'primordially' to specific places and times. There is much work yet to be done in extending this useful linguistic metaphor to further empirical research.

19. See, for example, his *The Dialogic Imagination* (1981); also Mannheim and Tedlock 1995.

20. Durkheim himself recognizes the aptness of this metaphor, as evidenced by his observation about collective ideals: 'Although they are our own, they speak in us with a tone and an accent that are entirely different from those of our other states of consciousness' (Wolff 1960: 337, my emphasis). Durkheim's usage here, as opposed to Bakhtin's, is explicitly figurative.

**REFERENCES**


THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONCEPT OF ACTION AND ITS PROBLEMS: A ‘NEW’ APPROACH BASED ON MARCEL MAUSS AND ARISTOTLE

KNUT CHRISTIAN MYHRE

Introduction

The concept of action as an explanatory principle and analytical concept has had a short history in social anthropology. For the British structural-functionalists, action was a functional instrument for maintaining the social structure. The former was thus conceived as being determined by the latter. According to this approach, social structure was the key concept in terms of which action was to be accounted for. In the 1950s, the structural-functionalists came under increasing attack for over-emphasizing the extent to which social structure took the form of a stable equilibrium. As an alternative, a concept of social structure arose that was not a given, stable entity, but the processual outcome and aggregate of social agents’ actions. In this way, the concept of action was introduced in order to account for the existence and form of the present social structure. Action had been introduced into social anthropology as an explanatory principle and analytical concept.

In this article I shall investigate the concept of action that was introduced as an alternative to structural-functionalism. By tracing it through some of its manifestations since the 1950s, we shall see that it has essentially remained the same and has thus continued to be the prevalent concept of action in social anthropology since its introduction. Since every concept of action involves a relationship between means and ends, I shall enquire into the conceptual relationship between these elements as they occur in the anthropological concept of action. Against this
background some fundamental problems will be raised, in order to show the need for a different approach. By consulting Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics* (1980) and Mauss’s *The Gift* (1990), I shall try to outline a new concept of action, namely communicative action, which is fundamental to, and a precondition for, the traditional concept of action as instrumental action.

The Anthropological Concept of Action as Instrumental Action and its Problems

The demise of structural-functionalism and the introduction of action as an analytical concept was inaugurated by Leach’s *Political Systems of Highland Burma* (1964). In his historical study of the changing social organization of the Kachin of north-east Burma, Leach focuses on the oscillation between the egalitarian form of organization, *gumlao*, and the hierarchical form, Shan. This oscillation, which leaves most Kachin groups in the intermediate form *gumsa*, is brought about by the tension between the egalitarian kinship ideology of the Kachin and the hierarchical implications of their practice of classificatory cross-cousin marriage. This tension is accommodated by the ambiguity and openness of the social structure. The conceptual structure regarding social statuses and approved relations between these statuses is, according to Leach, compatible with both the egalitarian ideal of the Kachin and the hierarchical ideal of their neighbouring Shan. It is this ambiguity which enables historical change in Kachin social organization:

> The overall process of structural change comes about through the manipulation of these alternatives [presented by the social structure] as a means of social advancement. Every individual of a society, each in his own interest, endeavours to exploit the situation as he perceives it and in so doing the collectivity of individuals alters the structure of the society itself. (1964: 8)

Historical change in Kachin society is the unintended outcome of the actions of the individuals making it up. The end in this form of action is the individuals’ social advancement, or, as Leach says, power, prestige, and esteem. The means is the ambiguous conceptual matrix of the social structure.

Leach’s analysis did not arise *ex nihilo* but was part of an intellectual trend. Firth’s (1954) distinction between ‘social structure’ as a formal arrangement of relationships and ‘social organization’ as the actual relationships enacted by social agents resonates well with Leach’s approach. The so-called Manchester School’s emphasis on conflict and the contestation of norms arising from individuals pursuing their interests, and on how these conflicts and their resolutions are constitutive of society, is an analogous example of such thinking (Gluckman 1955, Turner 1957, Van Velsen 1967). Finally, Barth’s analysis of the Swat Pathans (1959) builds directly on his mentor Leach’s approach to social life. In the post-war era, the term ‘methodological individualism’ came to be used to refer to conceptions
of social reality as the aggregate outcome of agents' actions for the achievement of social and material goods.

Since its inception in the early 1950s, methodological individualism has been under attack from various angles. From a Marxist perspective, Asad (1972) criticizes Barth for over-emphasizing the degree to which Pathan individuals have freedom of choice rather than being structurally constrained and disempowered, the latter assumption making them analysable in terms of the concept of class. From a more relativist perspective, Ortner (1984) criticizes methodological individualists for operating with an overly one-sided concept of motivation as selfish interest at the expense of other, more emotional factors in motivation. Ardener (1989), for his part, historicizes, deconstructs, and thus shows the social specificity of the notion of 'behaviour', a notion which others have unproblematically placed at the foundation of methodological individualism. And, finally, James (1973) shows the logical contradiction inherent in Barth's notion of free human agents whose actions can still be scientifically predicted. Some of these criticisms were acknowledged and an attempt was made to accommodate them in a collection of papers appearing under the auspices of the ASA (Kapferer 1976). However, in addressing some of these criticisms, the writers failed to question the fundamental tenets of methodological individualism.

Without disregarding the validity of the above critiques, it may be remarked that they do not address the main problem concerning methodological individualism, namely the relationship between means and ends in the conception of human action that it advocates. Leach claims that all action can be interpreted as a freely chosen attempt to maximize personal advantage, wherein human agents conceive of goals and choose expedient means for their realization. In this account, human action is conceived as instrumental action, a form of action which attempts to realize an end which is preconceived and which thus precedes the actual action. Since the end is preconceived and precedes the action, instrumental action involves a conceptual distinction between ends and means, between planning and execution. That Leach's conception of social action involves such a conceptual separation of ends and means is clear when he says that 'the structure of the situation is largely independent of its cultural form' (1964: 16). 'Cultural form' is the expression of the conceptual matrix of social statuses, which is claimed to be independent of the social situation. The ideal social structure is thus conceptually independent of social action. Social organization, or Kachin sociality, is the unintended by-product of this action and therefore an independent end of this form of action.

The problem with this concept of human action is that the ends and means of instrumental action lead a conceptually dependent existence. In order for an agent to conceive of some end and the means to realize it, these ends and means must already be meaningful to the agent. The conceptualization of ends and of the means appropriate to realize these ends are therefore dependent upon meaningfulness for their existence—that is, the ends and the means must be part of the agent's reality. Instrumental action, as a form of action seeking to realize a preconceived and preceding end, is therefore dependent upon some notion of social reality for its existence. Social reality can therefore not be the unintended by-product of
instrumental action: rather, the ends and means of the instrumental action are the products of social reality. In other words, instrumental action is conceptually and temporally dependent upon social reality for its existence, not vice versa.

Leach in fact acknowledges this when he says: ‘Esteem is a cultural product. What is admired in one society may be deplored in another’ (1964: 10). Since, for Leach, power and esteem are defined by the conceptual social structure which is culturally expressed in ritual action, power and esteem are dependent upon ritual action for their existence. That being so, it follows that the instrumental action for power is parasitic upon the meaningfulness of ritual action. The ‘cultural form’ which is expressed in ritual action and which Leach claims to be independent of social action is reduced to what he calls an ‘aesthetic frill’ (ibid.: 12). Leach claims these frills to be the primary data of social anthropology, but in his analysis of instrumental action he fails to account for them or to explain how they are expressed in ritual action. In reducing the social structure and ritual action to means for obtaining power, he reduces all social action to a form of instrumental action, a form of action which is dependent upon ritual action for its existence.

Attempts to Solve the Problem

Several social scientists have acknowledged this problem and proposed solutions. Bourdieu (1977), for one, tries to avoid it by introducing the notion of ‘habitus’, understood as a generative principle of thought and action, which itself is practically constituted and embodied as habitual ways of acting. As constitutive of thought and action, habitus is foundational of our social reality, and Bourdieu is able to account for the dual social constitution and structural constraints on choice of action. However, as a practical phenomenon, habitus itself is a form of action, and the question arises of how Bourdieu conceives of it as a form of action. He claims that ‘practice never ceases to conform to economic calculation even when it gives every appearance of disinterestedness...’ (1977: 177). Due to the all-pervasive economic character of practice, Bourdieu recommends that we ‘extend economic calculation to all the goods, material and symbolic, without distinction, that present themselves as rare and worthy of being sought after in a particular social formation...’ (ibid.: 178). That all practice and calculations are of an interested and economic kind can only mean that habitus itself must be regarded as falling within this category. Inasmuch as economic calculation and practice must mean the kind of thinking and action aimed at social or material advancement in the most expedient way possible, this form of calculation and practice falls within the scope of instrumentality. Habitus itself is therefore conceived of in instrumental terms by Bourdieu. Habitus, which was introduced in order to solve the problem of the social constitution of instrumental action, is thus itself a form of instrumental action, and the problem we raised above remains unsolved.
Giddens (1979) also attempts to solve what he calls the most pressing problem in the social sciences, namely that of coming up with an adequate theory of action. Giddens claims that a solution to this problem is required in order to transcend the false opposition between structure and agency. However, despite his refinement of previous action theories by introducing notions such as ‘rules’ and ‘resources’, and his conceptual distinction between practical and discursive consciousness, he is unable to conceive of action in any other way than instrumental action, or of social reality as anything else than the unintended outcome of this instrumental action. That Giddens remains wedded to the same paradigm as Leach is evident from his description of what he calls the ‘duality of structure’, which is supposed to weld together the notions of structure and agency: it consists in analysing social systems both as strategic conduct and as institutions:

To examine the constitution of social systems as strategic conduct is to study the mode in which actors draw upon structural elements—rules and resources—in their social relations. Institutional analysis, on the other hand, places an époche upon strategic conduct, treating rules and resources as chronically reproduced features of social systems... these are not two sides of a dualism, they express a duality, the duality of structure. (1979: 80)

It is evident from this that in Giddens’ first mode of analysis, rules and resources are conceived as means to the social agent’s ends. In the second case, on the other hand, the very same rules and resources are conceived as the unintended outcome, or end, of the social agents’ interaction. Although Giddens distances himself from methodological individualism, he remains locked in the same concept of action as instrumental action and of social reality as the unintended by-product of this instrumental action, as in the earlier accounts we have investigated.

These, more modern approaches to practice, attempting to refine the conception of action proposed in the earlier versions of methodological individualism, are hence still caught up in the concept of instrumental action. We can therefore say that instrumental action still prevails as the anthropological concept of action, just as it has done since the 1950s. In order to solve the problem, it is necessary to develop a different concept of action—to try to conceive of the relationship between ends and means in human action in terms other than those of instrumentality. There are at least two sources to turn to here, the first of which I shall consider is Aristotle’s *Nichomachean Ethics* (1980).

*Aristotle’s Account of the Good Life as a Life of Virtuous Action*

Aristotle starts his mature ethical treatise by pointing out that ‘Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at some good...’ (ibid.: 1). By aiming at some good, all our endeavours have an end, and
must also concern means for obtaining this end. All human endeavours are therefore goal-oriented activities entailing means–end relationships and can thus be characterized as a form of action. The question which occupies Aristotle in his ethics is what is eudaimonia, happiness, or the good life for humankind. According to Aristotle, the goods, or ends, we aim at in our actions are of various kinds and stand in different relationships to each other, so that some goods are subordinated to others. Because some ends are the means for further ends, the former ends are dependent upon the latter for their existence. The end we seek in happiness, however, must be the highest good. If happiness is subordinated to another end, this superior end would be more valuable and we would choose happiness for the sake of this higher end. However, we do not choose happiness for something else, but rather seek it in all our multifarious activities. Happiness is therefore not something we choose as a means towards something else, but rather something we choose for its own sake. Furthermore, if happiness was a means to a further end, it would be dependent upon this further end for its existence. This runs contrary to our intuition, since we tend to say that happiness is the superior end of life. Aristotle therefore claims that ‘Happiness, then, is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of action’ (ibid.: 12). The superior end of action, the good life, must therefore be something self-sufficient, and something we regard as an end in itself.

In order to determine this superior end and the activity consisting in pursuing it, Aristotle proceeds to enquire into the human ergon, or the characteristic activity for humankind. According to Aristotle, for any being, that being’s good life is a life according to its characteristic activity. He finds that the ergon of humankind cannot be the activity of nutrition and growth, since we have this in common with plants. Nor can it be perception, since this activity is shared by all animals. Neither of these activities can express what is specifically human. After discarding growth and perception, Aristotle says that ‘There remains, then, an active life of the element that has a rational principle...’ (ibid.: 13). The characteristic activity is a life of action which is determined by a rational principle. The rational principle of action consists in a choice based on a deliberation of what the situation calls for. In all actions there is a danger of doing too much or too little, and we must therefore avoid the two vices of excess and deficiency, and seek the mean between them. Action which is based on a deliberation of the particular circumstances of the situation, which avoids the extreme vices and hits the mean, is virtuous action. Since virtuous action is

1. I would like to thank Dr N. J. Allen for reading and commenting on a previous draft of this article. I would also like to thank Professor Wendy James, who supervised my M. Phil thesis, in which some of the arguments rehearsed here were presented for the first time. Needless to say, the author is solely accountable for any errors that may remain.

action determined by a rational principle, i.e. choice and deliberation, it fulfils the human *ergon*. Moreover, since a being's happiness is life according to its *ergon*, virtuous action must be an intrinsic part of human happiness. Such action, which accords with our characteristic activity, is not merely expedient, it is good in itself, and therefore an end in itself. These virtuous actions are good in themselves because they are actions according to our characteristic activity, and as such are constitutive of *eudaemonia*. Virtuous action is therefore chosen not as a means to an end, but because it is good in itself, that is, an end in itself. The good life is a life of virtuous action, but since the good life is inseparable from these actions, they are not means to happiness, but rather constitutive of happiness. Since happiness is inseparable from virtuous action, in this form of action, the end is inseparable from the means that bring it about.

Regardless of the value of Aristotle's substantial account of human virtues, what is of interest to us is that Aristotle gives a description of a form of action which is different in its means–end relationship from instrumental action. Virtuous action, praxis, is not a mere means to the good life: the good life consists in nothing but a life of virtuous action. The good life as an end is hence intrinsic, not extrinsic, to virtuous action. Virtuous action is therefore a form of autotelic action, a form of action which is an end in itself, in which the ends and the means are conceptually interdependent. Opposed to praxis is *poiesis*, production or instrumental action, where the end is separated from the means that bring it about. In *poiesis*, the maker possesses an idea, *eidos*, of what he or she wants to make, and then proceeds to choose a means of accomplishing it, in the same way as a carpenter has an idea of the table he or she wants to make before starting to act in order to realize it. When taking the form of an end, an idea is preconceived and precedes the action, which is chosen merely for its expediency and instrumentality in accomplishing the end. Since the end precedes the action, the end is conceptually independent of the action which brings it about.

It is clear that the anthropological concept of action owes more to Aristotle's concept of *poiesis* than to his concept of praxis. Furthermore, it is precisely the inability to conceive of action in terms other than those of instrumentality and expediency which creates the problems we saw characterizing methodological individualism. However, the idea of a form of action that is more fundamental than, and indeed opposed to instrumental action is not entirely absent from anthropological analysis, but is to be found in one of the foundational texts of our discipline, namely Mauss's *The Gift* of 1925 (Mauss 1990).

---

3. It is worth noting that some of the more modern approaches in the social sciences, such as those of Bourdieu and Giddens, have become known as 'praxis theories'. However, since these authors do not clarify what they mean by the notion of praxis, nor refer to Aristotle's works, and are also unable to free themselves from the paradigm of instrumental action, I am unable to understand what they mean by the notion of 'praxis' as opposed to 'action' in general. Cf. Giddens 1979, Ortner 1984.
Mauss’s essay on gift exchange can to a large extent be read as a reaction to Malinowski’s interpretation of gift exchange in *Argonauts of the Western Pacific* (1922). Malinowski’s aim is to challenge the prevailing idea of ‘Primitive Economic Man’ as a creature living in material abundance and thus having no need to develop the concepts of ‘value’, ‘wealth’, and ‘exchange’. In opposition to this, Malinowski wants to show how the gift exchanges of the Trobrianders fulfil the definition of economic behaviour, as long as the concepts of value and wealth are given a sufficiently broad definition. His analysis is meant to show how universal and strict is the idea that every social obligation or duty, though it may not on any account be evaded, has yet to be re-paid by a ceremonial gift. The function of these ceremonial re-payments is, on the surface of it, to thicken the social ties from which arise the obligation. (1922: 182)

Social relationships can thus be defined in terms of economic transactions. Malinowski’s claim is that gift exchange is a form of action where social relationships, and the economic duties they entail, are utilized in order to maximize valuable objects. In the case of the *kula*, Malinowski’s main example, the valuables consist of necklaces and bracelets made of shell, vaygu’a. Social relationships are created by participating in the exchange of gifts, but these relationships are solely means for obtaining socially defined valuable objects. In Malinowski’s conception, gift exchange has as its end the obtaining of valuable objects and is therefore a way of maximizing economic behaviour. Malinowski can therefore say that ‘the Kula is concerned with the exchange of wealth and utilities, and therefore is an economic institution...’ (1922: 84). Since social relationships are merely means for this end, in Malinowski’s conception gift exchange becomes a form of instrumental action. Malinowski’s gift exchange is therefore a form of instrumental action in which social relationships take part as means to an extrinsic end, namely the maximization of valuable objects. In this respect, there is a similarity between Malinowski’s interpretation of gift exchange and the dominant anthropological concept of action, in that the practice is conceived in purely instrumental terms.

Mauss acknowledges that gift exchange creates social relationships, but he does not regard these as being merely means to an extrinsic end. Gift exchange is, in his view, not a free practice which has as its aim the maximization of util-

4. When reading Mauss’s essay, it is important to keep in mind that he is analysing the exchange of *dons*, not of *cadeaux*. *Le don* refers to major and significant transfers, such as a transfer of land or a divine bestowal, not the exchange of Christmas cards or boxes of chocolates, which are *cadeaux*. The exchange of *dons* is socially of a highly significant nature, where lives are literally at stake. English makes no corresponding distinction between gifts of different kinds, which can easily mislead one into thinking that Mauss’s gift exchange is on a par with minor transfers of valuables.
Action and its Problems 129

entities, but an obligatory kind of practice. According to Mauss, the gift carries with it three obligations: to give, to receive, and to reciprocate. These three obligations follow from what he calls the ‘force of the gift’, which stems from the fact that the giver and the gift are intermingled, that the person and the thing are not completely separated. The gift contains a part of the person giving it, which puts the recipient under an obligation to reciprocate the gift. Since the gift and the giver are intermingled, one cannot refuse to accept a gift without also refusing to engage in social relationships, a refusal which amounts to a declaration of war. A gift must, in other words, always be received and reciprocated. Gift exchange, in which agents seem to engage freely, is actually an obligatory and compulsory practice.

The obligations to receive and reciprocate mean that the gift has the power to create social relationships. Moreover, since there must be some period of time between the initial gift and the return gift, between the service and the counter-service, the gift cannot be reciprocated immediately, and it has the ability to create social relationships lasting over time. In describing rules of generosity among the Andaman Islanders, Mauss claims:

In short, this represents an intermingling. Souls are mixed with things; things with souls. Lives are mingled together, and this is how, among persons and things so intermingled, each emerges from their own sphere and mixes together. This is precisely what contract and exchange are. (1990: 20)

Since gift exchange logically involves more than one agent, it is a relational phenomenon. By intermingling people, it makes social relationships possible, and we can say that gift exchange is constitutive of sociality.

However, the social relationships neither precede the exchange, as Malinowski argues, nor are they an incidental by-product of the exchange, as Leach contends, but rather intrinsic to the exchange itself. When considering classical Hindu law, Mauss says:

It is all a matter of etiquette; it is not like the market where, objectively, and for a price, one takes something. Nothing is unimportant. Contracts, alliances, the passing on of goods, the bonds created by these goods passing between those giving and receiving—this form of economic morality takes account of all this. The nature and intentions of the contracting parties, the nature of the thing given, are all indivisible. (1990: 59–60)

Mauss suggests that the nature of the agents participating in the exchange, their intentions in doing so, and the nature of the objects which are exchanged, are all indivisible. This means that the agents, their relationships, and the exchanged objects are inseparable. Two important points follow from this. First, if the agents’ intentions are inseparable from the exchange, then the end of the gift exchange must be intrinsic to the exchange, and not something extrinsic, as, for instance, the maximization of wealth, as Malinowski contends. Secondly, if the
agents and their relationships are inseparable from the exchange, they cannot be means which are utilized in the exchange for the achievement of an extrinsic end—another point made by Malinowski. If these two points are put together, it follows that the intrinsic end of gift exchange is the creation of social relationships and that social relationships are conceptually interdependent with gift exchange. Sociality is thus not a means in a form of instrumental action, as Malinowski asserts, but rather an end in itself, an end which is intrinsic to the practice of gift exchange. This much is clear when Mauss says in his general conclusion:

Two groups of men who meet can only either draw apart, and, if they show mistrust towards one another or issue a challenge, fight—or they can negotiate.... Societies have progressed in so far as they themselves, their subgroups, and lastly, the individuals in them, have succeeded in stabilizing relationships, giving, receiving, and finally, giving in return. (Ibid.: 82)

The only way to create stable relationships between individuals or groups is by exchanging gifts. Relationality and sociality are hence mutually interdependent ends, which are inseparable from, and interdependent with gift exchange as a practice. As a practice where the end is inseparable from the activity, gift exchange resembles Aristotle’s concept of virtuous action, where the end is immanent in the practice. If gift exchange is a form of action which has sociality as its immanent end, then Mauss’s account of gift exchange exemplifies a conceptualization of sociality as a form of practice where the end is interdependent with—in the sense of partaking in—and is immanent in the means. As such, Mauss’s account is devoted to the portrayal of a form of action akin to Aristotle’s praxis.

At this point, it is possible to say that Mauss ‘agrees’ with our account in his dismissal of sociality’s foundation in instrumental action and its foundation in a different form of action. Earlier I argued that instrumental action was logically secondary to this form of action, due to the fact that the conceptualization of ends, and of means in order to achieve these ends, is parasitic upon the meaningfulness of social reality. Mauss makes a similar point when he considers the evolution of more modern modes of exchange: ‘On the one hand, barter has arisen through a system of presents given and reciprocated according to a time limit.... On the other hand, buying and selling arose in the same way, with the latter according to a fixed time limit, or by cash, as well as by lending’ (ibid.: 36). Without taking into account the correctness or validity of Mauss’s evolutionary arguments, we can say that he regards economic behaviour as derived from, and hence dependent and parasitic upon, the more fundamental gift exchange. I said earlier that economic behaviour is a form of instrumental action and that gift exchange is a different form of action. My account therefore accords with Mauss’s in that instrumental action is parasitic upon a more fundamental form of action.

The question arises how sociality can be an intrinsic end of gift exchange, how social reality can be the immanent and intrinsic end of gift exchange as a form of social practice. Mauss hints at this in several places, as when he says of the Melanesian kula traders: ‘They have an extensive economic life, going beyond the
confines of the islands and their dialects... (ibid.: 32). Gift exchange connects not only people within one region, or even just one language, but creates relationships and alliances between people over a greater area. Gift exchange has the ability to include people and thus has a transcending and open-ended character. However, Mauss touches upon what the foundation of this open-endedness consists in when he says of Germanic law that:

all lived to a fairly large extent morally and economically outside the closed confines of the family group. Thus, it was by the form of the gift and the alliance, by pledges and hostages, by feasts and presents that were as generous as possible, that they communicated, helped, and allied themselves to one another. (Ibid.: 60)

This shows that gift exchange not only creates relationships and alliances between people, it also serves as a means of communication between people. If gift exchange is a form of communication, gifts must be a communicative medium, and the actual exchange of them must be a form of communicative action. As a form of communicative action, gift exchange has an open-ended character and serves to bring people into contact and dialogue. One can say that the gift is constitutive of sociality and of social reality, because it is expressive and communicative.

Exchange, Kinship, and the Origin of Society

The opposition between autotelic and heterotelic, or communicative and instrumental action can be illustrated by means of the writings of those anthropologists who have applied Mauss's insights to kinship theory, in order to say something about the origin of human society. Starting from the universality of the incest prohibition understood as a negative rule prohibiting marriage between close relatives, Lévi-Strauss (1969) argues that the crossing of the threshold between nature and culture, and the origin of human society, are to be located in the meeting between two men to exchange their sisters as wives. The dawn of humanity is located in the necessity to separate marriageable from unmarriageable women, arranged in its simplest form by two men exchanging their sisters as wives. Following a similar line of argument, Allen (1998a) argues that the logically simplest form of social organization with an actual ethnographical counterpart is the four-section system frequently reported from Australia.\(^5\) In this form of organization, it is not sisters who are exchanged as wives, but rather children who are exchanged between

\(^5\) Allen shows that Mauss must have had knowledge of four-section systems through his work with Durkheim on *Primitive Classification* (1963), originally printed in 1903.
Allen goes on to argue that the origin of society can be located in the effervescent gatherings of initiation rituals, where children are ceremonially exchanged between the generation moieties. Disregarding the question of the logical primacy of child exchange over sister exchange, the upshot of Lévi-Strauss’s and Allen’s arguments is that sociality is not an independent end for which the described exchanges are an expedient means. Rather, sociality is an intrinsic end of these exchanges. In Lévi-Strauss’s and Allen’s accounts, the exchange of sisters or children as wives is hence a form of action where the end is intrinsic to the means. Instrumental action is only possible, both logically and temporally, against the background of these sociality-constituting exchanges of children or sisters. Instrumental action is therefore parasitic upon this form of communicative action.

The arguments of Allen and Lévi-Strauss can be contrasted with those of Blau (1964). Blau argues that human society has its origin in the exchange of services between two individuals, and that higher order social forms and associations can be derived from these initial exchanges. However, in contrast to Lévi-Strauss and Allen, Blau argues that counter services are performed, and reciprocity ensured, not because the original service compels us to do this, but rather because it is in our own self-interest to do so. The origin of society is hence founded in the self-interested instrumental action of the agents. This line of reasoning reintroduces the question of how these agents are able to conceive of their self-interest and the instrumental actions needed to obtain it, prior to a social context. In other words, how can instrumental action precede communicative action?

**Conclusion:**

*Communicative Action as the Solution to the Problem of Instrumentality*

We have now considered several accounts of a form of action where the end is intrinsic, as opposed to extrinsic, to the means. Following Mauss, we can call the former communicative action and the latter instrumental action. Communicative and instrumental action, moreover, correspond to Aristotle’s praxis and *poiesis* respectively. According to Mauss, the intrinsic end of communicative action is social reality. Being constitutive of social reality, communicative action preconditions instrumental action, or rather, instrumental action is parasitic upon communicative action. The concept of communicative action as a form of action more fundamental to, and different from, instrumental action has thus saved us from the problems raised at the beginning.

6. Mauss in fact lists both women and children, together with effervescent gatherings, such as banquets, rituals, military services, dances, festivals, and fairs, as examples of exchange between collectivities (1990: 5).
A word of warning here. To argue for the salience of a concept of action over and above that of instrumental action is not, of course, to say that instrumental action, or maximizing behaviour, is not an important part of social life, only that it is not the whole of it. Most of our actions are done for the sake of something, and hence with a clear goal in mind. However, concomitantly with choosing means to obtain some extrinsic end, we represent reality in a socially constituted way. This social constitution of reality is the intrinsic end of our action, an end which cannot be accounted for in instrumental terms. The distinction between communicative and instrumental action is therefore a conceptual distinction, and best thought of as empirically conjoined aspects of any given action.

The last point I shall consider is whether Mauss’s description of gift-exchange can, in any way, have been influenced by Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. As we have seen, Mauss’s account of gift-exchange corresponds to Aristotle’s account of virtuous action, both being descriptions of a form of autotelic action, a form of action where the end is intrinsic to the means. We know that Mauss studied philosophy under Durkheim in Bordeaux in the late 1890s, and he himself tells us that he had a taste for it (Mauss 1998: 35). Moreover, in his 1938 essay ‘A Category of the Human Mind: The Notion of Person, the Notion of “Self”’, Mauss describes the efforts of the Année Sociologique school thus: ‘We have applied ourselves particularly to the social history of the categories of the human mind. We are trying to explain them one by one, starting quite simply and provisionally from the list of Aristotelian categories’ (1975: 59). This shows that Mauss not only had knowledge of philosophy in general, but also of Aristotle’s work in particular, at least his *Metaphysics*. Allen argues cogently for the fact that Mauss’s overall intellectual project can be interpreted as the empirical study of the world-historical evolution of the categories of the human mind, and that the starting-point for this endeavour was the Aristotelian table of categories:

what I hope to have shown is that Aristotle’s categories offer an approach to understanding not only the orientation of the Durkheimian enterprise in general but also the personal thinking of that member of the school who, at least to some of us, is the most interesting and inspiring of them all. (1998b: 48)

Mauss’s scattered references to Aristotle, and Allen’s convincing arguments regarding the latter’s influence on the former, warrant in my view the conjecture that Mauss’s account of gift exchange is influenced by, if not modelled on, Aristotle’s investigation of virtuous action in the *Nicomachean Ethics*. Regardless of the justification of this conclusion, the main conclusion is that Aristotle’s and Mauss’s accounts are by no means outdated or exhausted, but rather contain important descriptions and conceptions which can be used to solve contemporary problems in the social sciences in general and social anthropology in particular.
REFERENCES


GLUCKMAN, MAX 1955. The Judicial Process among the Barotse of Northern Rhodesia, Manchester: Manchester University Press.


DURKHEIM ON RESPECT: MODERN ECHOES OF A 'NAÍVE INTROSPECTIVE GUESS'

DOMINIQUE LUSSIER

DURKHEIM's thinking on the subject of respect in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1912) reveals highly original aspects that have not hitherto been given proper critical assessment. His analytical focus on the concept pervades the theory of the sacred in this, his last major work. This theory derives especially from one insuperable difficulty in simultaneously conceptualizing complementary mental attitudes in relation to transgression. At a distance, in every sense of the word, Durkheim developed his own insights into the evidence of things which lie beyond observation by the senses. In this article, I shall examine some of the reasons why Durkheim's epistemological contribution to the analysis of respect can still benefit modern-day ethnography. Social anthropological explorations of emotions—as opposed to the emotionalist theories of old—have received new impetus lately (see James 1997), and Durkheim may well be capable of bringing a fresh contribution to the field, despite the period when he was writing. I shall therefore also seek to explain the nature of this contribution. On the one hand, I show the contrast between his intellectual attitude towards the study of religious experience and that of Evans-Pritchard, while on the other hand I develop a comparison with Godfrey Lienhardt's own interpretation of the Dinka concept of thiek, which he translated as respect. I also briefly consider aspects of David Parkin's more recent reflections on the topic of the sacred.

I would like to thank Dr N. J. Allen for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
In tracing aspects of the evolution of the theory of the sacred in relation to respect, I shall confine myself to *The Elementary Forms*.\(^1\) I argue that Durkheim's conceptualization of the sacred is partly determined by his struggle to find the proper choice of definition for a specific kind of emotion which lies close to fear and for which there is no equivalent phrasing in either English or French.\(^2\) Durkheim was interested in the structuring of respect in relation to fear. The problem with language comes to the fore, but contrary to modern-day methods of anthropological investigation, Durkheim is not primarily concerned with elucidating local concepts according to the specificity of their contexts. The difficulty is therefore not merely one of translation or the analysis of the language, but of the history of engagement with a concept ridden with Old Testament connotations and pertaining to a logic of morality based on ambivalence. There was ambiguity in Durkheim's thinking which nevertheless was to prove of great epistemological value. That the ambiguity should remain after all these years is an altogether different problem, creating a situation that would not be tolerated elsewhere in the humanities.

Attempts to derive the origin of religious attitudes from the notion of awe, understood as holy dread or reverential fear, have been widely discredited among social anthropologists. The work of Marett in that regard, for instance, long ago failed to impress and might be regarded as crude. Similarly, the centrality of awe in the work of the theologian Otto has not drawn much support inside the discipline (see Parkin 1991: 222). Furthermore, an exploration of the anthropological literature suggests that the driving force of awe is not the only aspect that has been brought into discredit. Investigations of religious forms of action still tend to reject the role of emotions in favour of intellectualist approaches. I suggest that the separation, if not the dichotomy, between intellectualist and emotionalist positions, especially on the subject of religious life, is not warranted. The distinction between emotions and ideas can be arbitrary and is not necessarily more relevant than the distinction between science and art (cf. Durkheim's comments on the continuum between science and religion, e.g. 1912: 17, n. 3).

*Naming the Elementary Forms: Inside Fear*

Durkheim was among the first to challenge the dominant focus on authority in the interpretation of religious phenomena (see Pickering 1984). But rather than

\(^1\) When quoting Durkheim below I present the original French version followed by my own English translation, in preference to existing published translations. Most scholars of Durkheim's work will be familiar with Swain's translation (1915), which is often inaccurate.

\(^2\) Readers may find it interesting to compare the gist of this paper with David Parkin's 'Towards an Apprehension of Fear' in *Sociophobics: The Anthropology of Fear* (1986).
neglecting the role of awe or similar affects, Durkheim works a shift in the definition of its analytical significance by connecting it with other spheres of mental action. He is faithful to his own guiding principle: 'Aujourd'hui comme autrefois, expliquer, c'est montrer comment une chose participe d'une ou de plusieurs autres' (1912: 341; ‘Today as yesterday, to explain is to show how one thing partakes in one or many other things’). Durkheim uses the word crainte in French, which is not rendered accurately in English by either ‘awe’ or ‘dread’: he never uses the word peur, which in English would unequivocally be translated as ‘fear’. La crainte in French is a diffuse notion closely associated with a psychological state, while the word peur is more in keeping with a less abstract bodily emotion associated with tangible objects identified unambiguously, with a strong sense of the immediacy of threat. A complete separation between the two concepts cannot be maintained in everyday life, even though the movements of thoughts and emotions correspond to different realities. I translate the word crainte in Durkheim’s usage with the English word ‘fear’ for a number of reasons that will become clearer as I proceed, but above all because the noun ‘awe’ has no intransitive verb form and is therefore ill suited to expressing the kind of mental action Durkheim is describing. The concept of crainte—hereafter ‘fear’—is essential for an understanding of the concept of the sacred in Durkheim, something I will demonstrate while drawing attention to its links with the concept of respect.

Durkheim introduces the notion of fear for the first time while attempting to undermine Tylor’s theory of the ‘double’, namely his idea of a disembodied soul that can cause harm or be benevolent to the living according to the ways in which it is being treated. There is a gap, says Durkheim, a logical and psychological void, between the idea of a double set free in motion and that of a spirit which is the object of a cult:

(...)it is not enough for a being to produce anxiety around him to be seen as partaking of a different nature than those whose peace he threatens. Undoubtedly, in the emotion the faithful feels for the things he adores, there is always some reserve and some fear; but this fear is sui generis, composed more of respect than of fright, and in it there dominates that very particular emotion which is prompted in people by majesty. The idea of majesty is essentially a religious one.)

This passage can be regarded as one of the keystones in the intellectual architecture of *The Elementary Forms*. A compound experience is being reduced to its constituent elements according to the following logical steps. Anxiety in its own right is not an emotion conducive to religious activity; the faithful always feels cautious (a qualified caution) and fearful in relation to the objects held in veneration; this fear has its own stamp, and among the component elements of it, respect is more prominent than fright; this feeling of fear is itself subordinate to another emotion that remains unnamed; the unnamed emotion, theoretically dominant, is a response to ‘majesty’; and majesty is the essence of religion. Durkheim’s dense writing succeeds in integrating into one single conceptual frame of reference what many authors would keep as separate entities. Furthermore, he introduces a new element—majesty—without which there would be no grounds for distinguishing his approach to fear, and consequently to religion, from those of many authors preceding and following him. The response to majesty differs from awe inasmuch as it has none of its passive connotations and does not lead to derivatives (such as ‘awful’ in this case). Majesty is ‘out there’: it is not an experience of the individual in the sense that awe is. Perhaps a king or an emperor would provide an exception. This substitution of the poetic and hence obscure notion of majesty for that of awe has far-reaching consequences, opening wide the doors for an appreciation of the place of aesthetic ideas and emotions in religious life—a leitmotiv of *The Elementary Forms*. Durkheim was to say no more on the subject of majesty, and its origins remain shrouded in mystery.

There are grounds for assuming that all collective representations fall under the category of majesty, and society as Durkheim conceives of it is inescapably majestic, especially society as effervescence. For Durkheim, the world of social effervescence is the realm of the sacred: ‘C’est...dans ces milieux sociaux effervescents et de cette effervescence même que paraît être née l’idée religieuse’ (ibid.: 313; ‘...the idea of religion seems to have been born out of such effervescent social contexts and of effervescence in its own right’). But there are seeming paradoxes here. In almost all of his ethnographic examples, effervescence derives from circumstances already defined as religious (see especially ibid.: 312 n. 1, 313): the motives for which crowds gather and reach a state of effervescence are the ceremonies whose religious nature effervescence is purported to have created. But for Durkheim, synchronic (psychological) causality is not on a par with diachronic (historical) causality: he can reverse cause and effect in a feedback motion according to the different levels of observation and abstraction. Indeed, he does so repeatedly. But the fact that the direction of causality varies according to shifts in context does not mean intellectual anarchy: effervescence leads to religious emotions, and the purpose of ceremonies with a religious stamp is to re-create effervescence. This Durkheimian idea of effervescence is greatly influenced by images of the French revolutionary mobs, and the French Revolution is the single instance in the book where Durkheim is prepared to conceive of a cult towards ‘society and its essential ideas’ (ibid.: 306) without any transfiguration at all, contrary to his main thesis on collective representations—a cult without moral
imperatives. The concept of majesty remains potentially close to that of effervescence, in the sense that both involve a quantum of energy and intensity.

Durkheim thus set in motion the analysis of a particular constellation of ideas and emotions. He will systematically come back to this chain of thoughts, building linkages between fear and respect, experimenting with different vantage-points, looking for new avenues, sometimes going round in circles—the impression can be quite labyrinthine. Two hundred pages or so later, he resumes his investigation into this territory:

Si telle espece animale ou végétale est l'objet d'une crainte révérentielle, ce n'est pas en raison de ses propriétés spécifiques, puisque les membres humains du clan jouissent, quoique à un degré légèrement inférieur, du même privilège, et que la simple image de cette même plante ou de ce même animal inspire un respect encore plus prononcé. Les sentiments semblables, que ces différentes sortes de choses éveillent dans la conscience du fidèle et qui font leur nature sacrée, ne peuvent évidemment venir que d'un principe qui leur est commun à toutes indistinctement, aux emblèmes totemiques comme aux gens du clan et aux individus de l'espèce qui sert de totem. (Ibid.: 268-9; my emphases)

(If a certain species of animal or plant is the object of a reverential fear, this is not because of its peculiar qualities, since the human members of the clan enjoy this same privilege, albeit to a slightly lower degree, and since the mere image of this very plant or animal prompts respect to an even greater degree. The similar emotions these various kinds of things arouse in the consciousness of the believer, which determine their sacred character, can obviously derive only from some principle that they all possess indiscriminately, be they the totemic emblems, the members of the clan or the individuals of the species serving as totem.)

A range of objects, namely the totemic emblems, the human members of the clan, and the individual of the totemic species, cause feelings of one kind, namely reverential fear or respect (which are here equated). These feelings are evidence of the sacredness of the objects: the objects are sacred because of the feelings they cause. What gives unity to these feelings is a principle they share in common. Durkheim then proceeds to give a formal description of this principle:

Quand nous disons de ces principes que ce sont des forces, nous ne prenons pas le mot dans une acception métaphorique; ils agissent comme des forces véritables. Ce sont même, en un sens, des forces matérielles qui engendrent mécaniquement des effets physiques....

Mais en même temps qu'un aspect physique, elles ont un caractère moral. Quand on demande à l'indigène pourquoi il observe ces rites, il répond que les ancêtres les ont toujours observés et qu'il doit suivre leur exemple. Si donc il se comporte de telle ou telle manière avec les êtres totemiques, ce n'est pas seulement parce que les forces qui y résident sont d'un abord physiquement redoutable, c'est qu'il se sent moralement obligé de se comporter ainsi; il a le sentiment qu'il obéit
à une sorte d'imperatif, qu'il remplit un devoir. *Il n'a pas seulement pour les être sacrés de la crainte, mais du respect.* (Ibid.: 270-1; my emphases)

(When we say these principles are forces, we are not using the word in a metaphorical sense; they act like real forces. In a way, they even are material forces mechanically producing physical effects....

But *coincidentally* with this physical aspect, they possess a moral character. When asked why he observes such rites, the native replies that his ancestors have always done so, and he ought to follow their example. So if he behaves in a certain way towards the totemic beings, it is not merely because the forces residing in them are physically dangerous to approach, but rather that he feels himself morally obliged to behave in this way; he has the feeling he is obeying an imperative as it were, and he is fulfilling a duty. *What he feels with regard to the sacred beings is not only fear, but also respect.*)

Fear and respect correspond to different realities with separate representatives. Fear is the emotion felt when people are confronted with powers seen from the vantage-point of their physical might. Respect is what they feel towards these same powers when seen from the vantage-point of human legacy and continuity—what has been inherited from the dead forebears. Moral representations are linked to the fear of rupturing identity with the dead. Durkheim will later on write in that regard: ‘...le seul moyen que nous ayons de nous libérer des forces physiques est de leur opposer des forces collectives’ (ibid.: 389; ‘...the only means we have at our disposal to free ourselves from physical forces is to confront them with collective ones’). Durkheim's concern with the origins of religious life justifies the speculative movement from fear to respect which is left unexplained by the juxtaposition of the two ideas in the phrase 'reverential fear'. In a time-space picture, respect follows fear, but in real life and in causal terms, both are lived at the same time. There is complementarity in the mental forces at work on the same object. I now turn to this notion, which requires some explanation.

*Complementarity*

The revolutionary discoveries in quantum physics at the beginning of the century had repercussions far beyond the field of physics. Although Durkheim had embarked upon his course of intellectual action in pursuit of social anthropological problems prior to such discoveries, the elaboration of *The Elementary Forms* cannot be seen in isolation from the major scientific upheaval occurring at that time. There is no reason to suppose that Durkheim was directly influenced by the theory of relativity and its impact on rational thought, but the difficulties he encounters in the analysis of his object of study show striking parallels worthy of attention.
In 1927, the physicist Niels Bohr propounded his theory of complementarity, which was to put to rest one epistemological problem which had previously been considered insurmountable and which had appeared at the beginning of the century, when the concept of relativity was introduced in quantum physics. Bohr’s revolutionary approach to the theory of knowledge brought about new ways of conceiving phenomena and of rational thinking at a time when the boundaries of classical causality had become too narrow. The problem appears with the identification of elementary particles which can be observed individually. The laws of classical physics can only apply to structures made of an almost unlimited number of atoms. At the level of observation, it is impossible in quantum physics to dissociate isolated elements and the instrumental apparatus that determines observation. The light which is necessary to identify a particle causes changes to occur in the position of that particle, and it is impossible to determine both the speed of the particle and its position at the same time. The theory of light in quantum physics which explains this phenomenon is at once a wave and a particle theory. Both views are correct, but they cannot be reconciled. The theory of complementarity brought a solution to this problem. It is unavoidable that the observer should modify what he is observing in the very process of observation, and the observer and the phenomenon cannot be separated. There is no other way of perceiving the phenomenon, and an elementary particle such as an electron cannot be observed without interfering with its state or its behaviour. A different apparatus is required in order to observe either state or behaviour, and this can never be done at the same time. In classical physics, the phenomenon always behaves in the same fashion whether it is observed or not, and objectivity can be achieved. But the objects of quantum physics are beyond its reach. Complementarity is the strange result of a peculiar problem of observation which does not take place only in the realm of quantum physics, but each time observation deals with objects beyond the reach of sensory perception. According to Bohr, the word complementarity is used ‘to characterize the relationship between experiences obtained by different experimental arrangements and capable of visualization only by mutually exclusive ideas’ (Bohr 1939: 271). Nevertheless, we have no other choice but to use the terms of classical causality in order to describe the results of observation (Levin 1979).

I believe this to be the situation confronting Durkheim. The forces he describes are at once physical and moral forces (it is important to stress that they are the same forces). But he was not a reductionist and did not attempt to reduce either sort of force to the other. Rather, he was striving to describe complementary mental objects at a level of abstraction for which no language was available at that time. His theory of the sacred is not unified, but complementary. This should suffice to explain why the problem of simultaneity is such a dominant analytical theme of the book: ‘...des forces qui les dominant et qui en même temps les

4. This section relies on ideas developed by Levin in relation to Freud’s work and the problem of observation in psychoanalysis.
soutiennent, c’est-à-dire en somme, des forces religieuses’ (1912: 306, my emphasis; ‘...forces that dominate them and support them at the same time, i.e. in brief, religious forces.’) And: ‘...l’esprit se refuse à les [ choses sacrées et choses profanes] penser en même temps’ (ibid.: 342, my emphasis; ‘...the mind refuses to conceive of them [sacred things and profane things] at the same time.’) Similar examples abound. In two important footnotes, where he answers accusations of having paid undue attention to aspects of constraint in social life, Durkheim finds himself caught between Old and New Testament themes. The significance of the problem of simultaneity comes to the fore:

Parce que nous avons fait de la contrainte le signe extérieur auquel les faits sociaux peuvent le plus aisément se reconnaître et se distinguer des faits de psychologie individuelle, on a cru que, pour nous, la contrainte physique était tout l’essentiel de la vie sociale. En réalité, nous n’y avons jamais vu que l’expression matérielle et apparente d’un fait intérieur et profond qui, lui, est tout idéal; c’est l’autorité morale. Le problème sociologique—si l’on peut dire qu’il a y a un problème sociologique—consiste à chercher, à travers les différentes formes de contrainte extérieure, les différentes sortes d’autorité morale qui y correspondent, et à découvrir les causes qui ont déterminé ces dernières. En particulier, la question que nous traitons dans le présent ouvrage a pour principal object de trouver sous quelle forme cette espèce particulière d’autorité morale qui est inhérente à tout ce qui est religieux a pris naissance et de quoi elle est formée. On verra d’ailleurs plus loin que, si nous faisons de la pression sociale un des caractères distinctifs des phénomènes sociologiques, nous n’entendons pas dire que ce soit le seul. Nous montrerons un autre aspect de la vie collective, presque opposé au précédent, mais non moins réel. (Ibid.: 298, n. 2, original emphases)

(Because I saw in constraint the external sign by which social facts can most readily be identified as such and be distinguished from the facts of individual psychology, some have understood this to mean that, in my view, physical constraint was the complete essence of social life. In truth, I never saw in it more than the concrete and visible expression of an internal and deep fact which itself is entirely ideal, namely moral authority. The sociological problem—if one can say that there is one sociological problem—consists in finding the different kinds of moral authority that correspond to the different forms of external constraint, and to discover the causes that have determined the former. In particular, the main object of the issue I address in the present work is to find out the form under which the particular type of moral authority inherent in all that is religious has originated and what constitutes it. In fact it will become possible later on to see that, if I regard social pressure as one of the distinctive features of sociological phenomena, by no means do I intend to say it is the only one. I will eventually show another aspect of collective life, almost the opposite of the former, but no less real.)
Some parallels with what I have been discussing above in relation to complementarity are also apparent in another footnote, where Durkheim refers to the benevolent powers that sustain and protect man:

Tel est l'autre aspect de la société qui, \textit{en même temps} qu’impérative, nous apparaît, comme bonne et bienveillante. Elle nous domine et elle nous assiste. Si nous avons défini le fait social par le premier de ces caractères plutôt que par le second, c’est qu’il est \textit{plus facilement observable parce qu’il se traduit par des signes extérieurs et visibles}; mais il s’en faut que nous ayons jamais songé à nier la réalité du second. (Ibid.: 303, n. 1, my emphases)

(Such is the other side of society which, \textit{at the same time} as being imperative, also appears to us as good and benevolent. It dominates us, and it assists us. If I have defined social facts by the first of these features rather than by the second, this is because it is \textit{easier to observe since it is manifest in external and visible signs}; but by no means have I ever thought of denying the reality of the second.)

Durkheim needs to elaborate this issue further, and here lies the main point of disagreement between himself and other writers on the subject: he grants analytical priority to respect over fear by focusing on the moral dilemmas of religious life rather than the unrivalled authority and power with which it is usually associated. But he will not abandon fear altogether in the process:

...si la société n'obtenait de nous ces concessions et ces sacrifices que par une contrainte matérielle, elle ne pourrait éveiller en nous que l'idée d'une force physique à laquelle il nous faut céder par nécessité, non d'une puissance morale comme celles que les religions adorent. Mais en réalité, l'empire qu'elle exerce sur les consciences tient beaucoup moins à la suprématie physique dont elle a le privilège qu'à l'autorité morale dont elle est investie. Si nous déferons à ses ordres, ce n'est pas seulement parce qu'elle est armée de manière à triompher de nos résistances; c'est, avant tout, parce qu'elle est l'objet d'un véritable respect. (Ibid.: 296)

(...were society to secure these renunciations and sacrifices on our part merely through physical constraint, it could only give rise within us to the idea of a physical might to which we must yield out of sheer necessity, and not that of a moral power such as those which religions adore. But in reality, the power society holds over our consciousness owes much less to the physical supremacy to which it has the right than to the moral authority vested in it. If we comply with its orders, it is not merely because it has the power to crush our defenses; it is primarily because it is the object of genuine respect.)

5. Swain translates \textit{véritable respect} as 'venerable respect' (1915: 207).
Respect is seen in connection with moral and collective forces, not physical ones. Immediately following this passage, for the first time in three hundred pages, Durkheim presents his first definition of respect:

On dit d’un sujet, individuel ou collectif, qu’il inspire le respect quand la représentation qui l’exprime dans les consciences est douée d’une telle force que, automatiquement, elle suscite ou inhibe des actes, abstraction faite de toute considération relative aux effets utiles ou nuisibles des uns et des autres.... Le respect est l’émotion que nous éprouvons quand nous sentons cette pression intérieure et toute spirituelle se produire en nous. Ce qui nous détermine alors, ce ne sont pas les avantages ou les inconvénients de l’attitude qui nous est prescrite ou recommandée; c’est la façon dont nous nous représentons celui qui nous la recommande ou qui nous la prescrit. (Ibid., original emphasis)

(We say that a subject, whether individual or collective, inspires respect when the representation expressing the subject in the realm of consciousness is endowed with such a force as automatically to cause or inhibit actions, any consideration of their useful or harmful effects notwithstanding.... Respect is the emotion we experience when we feel this pressure which is internal and entirely spiritual taking place inside us. Our decisions in such circumstances are not determined by the benefits or drawbacks of the attitude prescribed or recommended to us, but rather by the ways in which we represent to ourselves the person recommending or prescribing it.)

Much further on, some hundred and fifty pages later, as he seeks to trace the causes of the system of prohibitions, Durkheim propounds his second definition of respect, which is almost identical with the first, though he is now concerned with prohibitions, not injunctions:

[Le système des interdits] est logiquement impliqué dans la notion même du sacré. Tout ce qui est sacré est objet de respect et tout sentiment de respect se traduit, chez celui qui l’éprouve, par des mouvements d’inhibitions. (Ibid.: 453)....

([The system of prohibitions] is logically implied in the very notion of sacredness. All that is sacred is the object of respect, and every emotion of respect finds expression, in the person who feels it, in a tendency towards inhibition.)

He hastens to add that this is not sufficient, for there are beings which are the objects of respect, yet without being protected by strict systematic prohibitions. The reason for the powerful ritual precautions must lie with ‘the extraordinary contagiousness of sacredness’ (l’extraordinaire contagiosité du caractère sacré; ibid.: 455). And further, ‘if the contagiousness of sacredness helps to explain the system of prohibitions, how is it to be accounted for?’ (si la contagiosité du sacré contribue à expliquer le système des interdits, comme s’explique-t-elle elle-même?; ibid.: 459). Durkheim dismisses the association of ideas as a causal source of
His interpretation leaves no doubt as to the absolute priority of emotions:

Ce n’est pas parce que l’animal totemique a tel aspect ou telle propriete qu’il inspire des sentiments religieux; ceux-ci resultent de causes tout a fait etrangères à la nature de l'objet sur lequel ils viennent se fixer. Ce qui les constitue, ce sont les impressions de réconfort et de dépendance, que l'action de la société provoque dans les consciences. Par elles-mêmes, ces émotions ne sont liées à l'idée d’aucun objet déterminé: mais, parce que ce sont des émotions et qu’elles sont particulièrement intenses, elles sont aussi éminemment contagieuses.... La contagion n’est donc pas une sorte de procédé secondaire par lequel le caractère sacré, une fois acquis, se propage; c’est le procédé même par lequel il s’acquit. (Ibid.: 462-3, my emphasis)

(It is not because the totemic animal has a certain aspect or property that it inspires religious sentiments; these result from causes wholly alien to the nature of the object to which they become attached. What fashions them are the feelings of support and dependence which the working of society triggers at the level of moral conscience. Of themselves, these emotions are not linked to the idea of any particular object; but since these are emotions, and furthermore since they are especially intense emotions, they are also eminently contagious.... Hence contagion is not a kind of secondary process whereby sacredness spreads once it has been acquired: it is the very process by which it is acquired.)

Having stated the importance of emotions as creative forces, however, Durkheim ventures into a dim interpretation of the mechanism of contagion which seems to be based on a model of fission. The emotions cannot be contained because of their intensity, which explains their contagious character. Durkheim heavily relies on the contagiousness of sacred things in order to account for many aspects of his dichotomy between the sacred and the profane: ‘elle explique aisément [sic] l’extrême rigueur des interdits qui séparent le sacré du profane’ (‘it easily [sic] explains the extreme strictness of the prohibitions that keeps the sacred apart from the profane’; ibid.: 457). In spite of the explanatory powers that he ascribes to contagion, it is remarkable that such an important notion should escape analysis. In the realm of philosophical speculation, Durkheim’s main analytic tool—deduction—can be seen as the equivalent of contagion. The notion is left unexamined for this very reason: it cannot account for itself.

In his Lectures on the Religion of the Semites, written well before The Elementary Forms, Robertson Smith has one passage that, in other circumstances, might well address Durkheim’s methods of investigation by way of criticism:

The word ‘holy’ has had a long and complicated history, and has various shades of meaning according to the connection in which it is used. It is not possible, by mere analysis of the modern use of the word, to arrive at a single definite conception of the meaning of holiness; nor is it possible to fix on any one of the modern
aspects of the conception, and say that it represents the fundamental idea from
which all other modifications of the idea can be deduced. The primitive concep-
tion of holiness, to which the modern variations of the idea must be traced back,
belonged to a habit of thought with which we have lost touch, and we cannot hope
to understand it by the aid of logical discussion, but only by studying it on its own
ground as it is exhibited in the actual working of early religion. (1927 [1889]: 91)

Side by side with the evolutionist assumption is a rejection of logical deduction as
a means of exploring contrasted mental attitudes, one of the very dynamic prin-
ciples at the foundation of Durkheim’s analysis. To this day, there is a timeless
quality to The Elementary Forms which makes anthropologists uneasy.

In discussing Robertson Smith and the ambiguity of the sacred, Durkheim
introduces yet another side to respect, this time with the emphasis on love, but the
linkage with fear persists. Religious forces, he writes, are of two kinds. On the
one hand, there are beneficent forces, guardians of the physical and moral order,
Sources of life and of all qualities men hold dear; on the other hand there are evil
and impure powers generating disorder, causing death, driving people to sacrilege.
The respect which the former inspire is mixed with love and gratitude, while the
only emotions men have concerning the latter are fear: ‘une crainte où il entre
généralement de l’horreur’ (‘a fear in which there is usually some horror’; 1912:
585). Durkheim concludes that religious life revolves around two opposite poles
between which there exists the same opposition as between the pure and the
impure, the saintly and the sacrilegious, the divine and the diabolical (ibid.: 586).

But most importantly, he adds:

Mais en même temps que ces deux aspects de la vie religieuse s’opposent l’un à
l’autre, il existe entre eux une étroite parenté. D’abord, ils soutiennent tous deux
le même rapport avec les êtres profanes: ceux-ci doivent s’abstenir de tout rapport
avec les choses impures comme avec les choses très saintes. Les premières ne
sont pas moins interdites que les secondes; elles sont également retirées de la
circulation. C’est dire qu’elles sont aussi sacrées. Sans doute les sentiments
qu’inspirent les unes et les autres ne sont pas identiques: autre chose est le respect,
autre chose le dégoût et l’horreur. Cependant, pour que les gestes soient les
mêmes dans les deux cas, il faut que les sentiments exprimés ne diffèrent pas en
nature. Et en effet, il y a de l’horreur dans le respect religieux, surtout quant il
est très intense, et la crainte qu’inspirent les puissances malignes n’est générale-
ment pas sans avoir quelque caractère révérentiel. (Ibid., my emphasis)

(But if these two aspects of the religious life oppose one another, there is at the
same time a close kinship between them. In the first place, both are in a similar
position with regard to profane beings: these must equally abstain from any form
of contact with things impure as with things most holy. The former are no less
forbidden than the latter: they are equally withdrawn from circulation. That is to
say, they are sacred too. Surely the emotions that both inspire are not identical:
respect is one thing, disgust and horror another. Yet, for the behaviour to be the
same in both cases, the emotions expressed must not differ in nature. And in
effect, there is horror in religious respect, especially when it is very intense, and
the fear inspired by malign powers is generally not without a certain reverential character.)

This was a daring interpretation at the time. Durkheim reaches this fundamental conclusion, with its stress on the importance of emotional intensity, on the basis of his interpretation of what he calls 'piacular rites'. He had earlier stated his concern to undermine the idea that primitive religious conceptions must be traced back to feelings of weakness and dependence, awe and anxiety, that took hold of humans when they entered into a relationship with the world. Such an interpretation depicts humans as the victim of a kind of nightmare they themselves created, whereby they would see themselves surrounded by hostile and fearsome powers which the purpose of rites was to appease (ibid.: 320). Durkheim had then submitted this representation to the test of an antithetic reality:

Ce qui est à la racine du totemisme, ce sont, en définitive, des sentiments de joyeuse confiance plus que de terreur et de compression. Si l'on fait abstraction des rites funéraires—côté sombre de toute religion—le culte totemique se célèbre au milieu de chants, de danses, de représentations dramatiques.... Les dieux jaloux et terribles n'apparaissent que plus tard dans l'évolution religieuse. C'est que les sociétés primitives ne sont pas des sortes de Léviathan qui accabilent l'homme de l'énormité de leur pouvoir et le soumettent à une rude discipline; il se donne à elles spontanément et sans résistance. (Ibid.: 320-1)

(In fine, what lie at the root of totemism are feelings of joyful trust rather than terror and crushing. If one abstracts from funerary rites—the dark side of every religion—the totemic cult is a celebration in the midst of songs, dances, and dramatic performances.... Awful and jealous gods appear later in the evolution of religious life. The point is that primitive societies are not some sort of Leviathan which overwhelm man by their awful power and submit him to a most severe discipline; he gives himself to them of his own free will and without resistance.)

He then goes back to the same theme once more:

On voit combien il s'en faut que les religions primitives soient filles de l'angoisse et de la crainte, puisque les rites qui traduisent des émotions douleureuses y sont relativement rares. (Ibid.: 580)

(We see how far primitive religions are from being the products [lit. the daughters] of anxiety and fear, since rites expressing painful emotions are relatively rare.)

6. Swain translates côté sombre de toute religion as 'the sober side of every religion' (1915: 224).

7. Here, Swain translates angoisse as 'agony' (1915: 406).
Durkheim seems to have lost from sight the balance of feelings that informs his core argument, and this poses problems. Mourning is not a rare occurrence, and furthermore, Durkheim deduces his theory of the sacred and the profane from his reading of the ethnography of rites which are emblematic of what he himself describes in terms of fear:

Tout malheur, tout ce qui est de mauvais augure, tout ce qui inspire des sentiments d’angoisse ou de crainte nécessite un *piaculum* et, par conséquent, est appelé *piacular*. (Ibid.: 557)

(Every misfortune, everything which is a bad omen, everything that inspires feelings of anxiety\(^8\) or fear requires a *piaculum*: hence we call it *piacular*.)

One sentence in particular expresses in no uncertain terms the direction of the causal link Durkheim privileges: ‘On ne pleure pas le mort parce qu’on le craint, on le craint parce qu’on le pleure’ (‘Men do not weep for the dead because they fear them; they fear them because they weep for them’; ibid.: 573). This *technique du corps* analysis forms an attempt to derive fear from respect, contrary to several other attempts in the opposite direction. It amounts to a dismissal of fear as a driving force. There is evidence of some intense intellectual struggle here, and the lack of clarity in the overall picture does not necessarily imply a lack of consistency. Attention may be deflected by the shifting lines of enquiry owing to the nature of the multifaceted demonstration, but there is no doubt that Durkheim is moving away from the primary impact of emotions. In doing so, he is also abandoning the elementary forms. Admittedly, it is not easy to present this kind of argument in text-book fashion.

Forty years later, Evans-Pritchard himself was not immune from contradiction when he came to tackle similar issues. With regard to explanations of primitive religions, he wrote:

Intellectualist interpretations were succeeded by emotionalist interpretations and they by psychoanalytical interpretations. Religion was discussed and explained in terms of association of ideas, of personification of natural phenomena, of awe, of thrill, of fear, anxiety and frustration, of projection, and so forth. Most of these theories have long ago been discredited as naïve introspective guesses. Certainly one cannot speak of any specifically religious emotion for the Nuer. (1956: 312)

It would be an over-simplification and a misunderstanding to say, like some missionaries who live among them, that Nuer religion is a religion of fear:

It is true that Nuer, like everyone else, fear death, bereavement, sickness, and other troubles, and that it is precisely in such situations that they so often pray and

---

8. Here, Swain translates *angoisse* as ‘sorrow’ (1915: 389).
sacrifice.... But we cannot say that their religion is simply one of fear, which is, moreover, a very complex state of mind, and one not easy to define or assess. On the contrary, it is because Nuer are afraid of these misfortunes that one might speak of their religion as one of hope and comfort. But I think what fits the facts best is to say that it is a religion of both fear and trust, which may be opposites but are not contraries, or that the Nuer attitude towards Spirit might be described as ambiguous, and perhaps as ambivalent. (Ibid.)

So we come back ultimately to a psychoanalytic notion, ambivalence, which Evans-Pritchard does not subject to analysis. Also, the statement concerning fear and trust as opposites but not contraries is confusing when left unexplained. There are many points of agreement here with Durkheim, who none the less, as we saw, took a different position when he ventured into this ‘very complex state of mind...not easy to define or assess’ (ibid.). Evans-Pritchard goes on to discuss the sense of guilt, which is ‘not just fear, but a complex psychological state’ (ibid.: 313), pointing at its moral significance:

It is then not so much regarded as a natural crisis which can be overcome by spiritual aid as a moral crisis brought about by human action, and of which the outcome, it is thought, may depend on so delicate and indiscernible a factor as intention. Faced with so complex and variable a problem, to speak of Nuer religion simply as one of fear or awe, or as a projection or as cathartic, and so forth, must be a distortion, and one that does not greatly help us to understand it. All emotions enter into it; they blend; and there is nothing constant that we can say is characteristic of the religious life, which is rather to be defined in terms of disposition than of emotion. (Ibid.)

The separability of emotions from dispositions is questionable. I will not determine whether Evans-Pritchard was the wiser for abandoning the difficulty he so clearly identified. For his part, Durkheim was determined to untangle this web of emotions, and while his endeavour has fascinated generations of scholars, it is too easily forgotten that he was most concerned with the borderline between emotions and ideas and its implications. His theory of respect is equally an ethnography of respect. It was a different kind of ethnography, and there certainly remains much to be done in that direction.

_Beyond Dualisms: The Principle of Integration_

What follows is an attempt to show that the integration of opposite spheres of experience and their corresponding realities is one analytical principle that plays a far greater role in Durkheim’s thinking than the separation brought about by the
dualisms he builds on. The integration of fear and respect is emblematic of an intellectual attitude in Durkheim that extends to almost any topic he explores.

As a writer, Durkheim can be quite emotional (in sharp contrast to Mauss), something which does not come across in the various English translations of *The Elementary Forms*. He is literally immersed in his material. His own translation of some passages in Spencer and Gillen has an emotional ring which is clearly added on top of the original when one pays close attention to details. He is far from a passionate writer, like Lucien Fèvre for instance: he shows restraint, yet one can feel a quantum of ‘effervescence’ in every other page of *The Elementary Forms* running like a thread through the carefully crafted arguments. In the philosophical tradition—responsible for his greater freedom of action as a writer—his style of writing in *The Elementary Forms* comes closest to Rousseau in *Le Discours sur l’origine de l’inégalité parmi les hommes*.

Throughout *The Elementary Forms*, Durkheim rarely keeps the words ‘idea’ and ‘emotion’ separate, oscillating between them, as it were, with the odd exception that Lévi-Strauss chose to cite (1962: p. 142) in *Le Totémisme Aujourd’hui*:

Une opposition encore plus marquée est celle qui existe entre les choses sacrées et les choses profanes. Elles se repoussent et se contredisent avec une telle force que l’esprit se refuse à les penser en même temps. Elles se chassent mutuellement de la conscience.

Ainsi, entre la logique de la pensée religieuse et la logique de la pensée scientifique il n’y a pas un abîme. L’une et l’autre sont faites des mêmes éléments essentiels, mais inégalement et différemment développés. Ce qui paraît surtout caractériser la première, c’est un goût naturel aussi bien pour les confusions intemperantes que pour les contrastes heurtés. Elle est volontiers excessive dans les deux sens. Quand elle rapproche, elle confond; quand elle distingue, elle oppose. Elle ne connaît pas la mesure et les nuances, elle recherche les extrêmes; elle emploie, par suite, les mécanismes logiques avec une sorte de gaucherie, mais elle n’en ignore aucun. (Durkheim 1912: 342)

(The contrast between sacred and profane things is even more acute. They repel and contradict each other with such a force that the mind refuses to conceive of them at the same time. They mutually banish each other from consciousness.

Thus, there is no gulf between the logic of religious thought and that of scientific thought. Both are made of the same core elements, yet developed in unequal and different fashion. What most seems to characterize the former is a natural inclination towards both intemperate conflations and clashing contrasts. Religious thought is readily prone to excess in both directions. When it brings together, it conflates; when it distinguishes, it opposes. It ignores moderation and nuances, it strives towards extremes; hence it is awkward when it applies the mechanisms of logic, but there are none it is unaware of.)

Durkheim saw in the elementary forms of religious life he was striving to identify much more than a ‘logic’. The remarkable language in the passage just quoted
sounds alien to his whole approach. On the other hand, Durkheim could offer no better illustration of his own way of thinking were he to apply such reflections to his own reasoning. Here is a good example of the confusion between subject and object. This is a rare gift in the great conceptual thinkers, who are able to espouse for their own purposes the very dynamic principles they seek to understand and thus reveal untold aspects. It is in the true sense of the word a communion—which does not mean that it lies beyond criticism.

Durkheim thinks in terms of dualisms, but, unlike Lévi-Strauss he is not a dialectical thinker (see Pickering 1984: 148). One cannot read his *Elementary Forms* as the dialectics of love and constraint or of authority and desire. Rather, Durkheim\(^9\) is constantly aiming at unity between the opposites he creates. His most precious legacy is his principle of integration; witness what he says of his theory of knowledge:

Ainsi renouvelée, la théorie de la connaissance semble donc appelée à réunir les avantages contraires des deux théories rivales.... Elle affirme, comme réelle, la dualité de notre vie intellectuelle, mais elle l’explique, et par des causes naturelles. (1912: 26–7)

(Thus renewed, the theory of knowledge seems therefore destined to bring together the contrary benefits of the two rival theories [empiricism and apriorism].... It affirms as a reality the dual nature of our intellectual life, but it accounts for it, and what’s more, it accounts for it by natural causes.)

Rather than belabouring the separation of opposites, Durkheim is engaging in systematic attempts to find some form of integration between them. Here is yet another good illustration:

Cette dualité [corps et âme] n’exclut pas, mais, au contraire, implique une unité profonde et une pénétration intime des deux êtres ainsi différenciés. (Ibid.: 79; see also ibid.: 319 n. 1)

(Such dualism [body and soul] does not preclude a profound unity and an intimate penetration of the two entities thus differentiated; on the contrary, it implies it.)

Only when he introduces the idea of force will Durkheim provide a reason for this last statement:

Il n’est peut-être pas une religion où le mana originel, qu’il soit unique ou plural, se soit résolu tout entier en un nombre bien défini d’êtres discrets et incommunicables les uns aux autres; chacun d’eux garde toujours un nimbe d’impersonnalisme qui le rend apte à entrer dans des combinaisons nouvelles, et cela non par suite

9. I must stress that, throughout this paper, I am only concerned with the Durkheim of *The Elementary Forms*; I cannot speak for what he may have said elsewhere.
d'une simple survivance, mais parce qu'il est dans la nature des forces religieuses de ne pouvoir s'individuer complètement. (Ibid.: 287)

(There is perhaps no religion where the original mana, be it single or plural, has been entirely resolved into a well-defined number of beings which are discrete and without mutual communication; each one of them always retains a halo of impersonality which makes it well suited to enter into new combinations, not as a result of mere survival, but because it is in the nature of religious forces that they cannot be perfectly individualized.)

The situation equally applies to respect and fear, which cannot be construed separately. Durkheim says of the sacred and the profane: 'Il faut d’autant plus de précautions pour les tenir séparés que, tout en s’opposant l’un à l’autre, ils tendent à se confondre l’un dans l’autre' (ibid.: 457; ‘Precautions to keep them apart are all the more necessary, since, while they stand opposed one to the other, they also tend to merge one into the other’).

Reverential life

Several passages of The Elementary Forms provide evidence that Durkheim is equating religion with respect—never with fear—and the two are even confounded:

Ainsi, le milieu dans lequel nous vivons nous apparaît comme peuplé de forces à la fois impérieuses et secourables, augustes et bienfaisantes, avec lesquelles nous sommes en rapports. Puisqu’elles exercent sur nous une pression dont nous avons conscience, nous sommes nécessités à les localiser hors de nous, comme nous faisons pour les causes objectives de nos sensations. Mais d’un autre côté, les sentiments qu’elles nous inspirent diffèrent en nature de ceux que nous avons pour de simples choses sensibles. Tant que celles-ci sont réduites à leurs caractères empiriques tels qu’ils se manifestent dans l’expérience vulgaire, tant que l’imagination religieuse n’est pas venue les métamorphoser, nous n’avons pour elles rien qui ressemble à du respect et elles n’ont rien de ce qu’il faut pour nous élever au-dessus de nous-mêmes. (Ibid.: 303–4)

(The environment in which we live appears to us to be peopled by powers [forces] at once imperious and helpful, majestic and benevolent, to which we relate. These forces exert pressure on us, and being conscious of this, we have no choice but to locate them outside us, just as we do for the objective causes of our sensations. However, the emotions they foster in us differ in nature from those we have for simple tangible things. As long as the latter remain reduced to their empirical characteristics as manifest in everyday experience, as long as the religious imagination has not transformed them, we feel nothing concerning them which comes
close to respect, and they possess nothing of what would be necessary to raise us towards transcendence.)

By analogy, Durkheim extends this line of reasoning to ideas and men, monarchs who were perceived as the direct representatives of divinity: ‘la simple déférence qu’inspirent les hommes investis de hautes fonctions sociales n’est pas d’une autre nature que le respect religieux’ (ibid.: 304; ‘the nature of the very respect shown towards men vested with high social office is in no way different from religious respect’). And: ‘Le sentiment que l’on éprouve dans ces circonstances est si proche parent du sentiment religieux que bien des peuples les ont confondus’ (ibid.: 305; ‘The emotion one feels in those circumstances is so closely related to the religious emotion that many peoples have confused them’). Applying a similar line of reasoning to the totemic emblem, Durkheim states that this is the clan thought of under its concrete form, and since this form also includes the physical beings whose name the clan bears, these would also have provoked the same emotions as those attached to the emblem itself: ‘puisque ce dernier est l’objet d’un respect religieux, ils devaient inspirer un respect du même genre et apparaître comme sacrés’ (ibid.: 317; ‘since the emblem is the object of religious respect, individual beings must have inspired respect of a similar kind and hence appear as sacred’). Here is clear evidence of a chain of thoughts linking religious sentiments, respect, and sacredness. More strongly stated, perhaps: ‘une chose est sacrée parce qu’elle inspire, à un titre quelconque, un sentiment collectif de respect qui la soustrait aux choses profanes’ (p. 380; ‘a thing becomes sacred because it inspires, one way or the other, a collective feeling of respect which separates it from profane things’). And finally: ‘l’interdit religieux implique nécessairement la notion du sacré; il vient du respect que l’objet sacré inspire et il a pour but d’empêcher qu’il soit manqué à ce respect’ (ibid.: 480; ‘the religious prohibition necessarily implies the notion of the sacred; it derives from the respect the sacred object inspires and its aim is to prevent a lack of respect for it’). Religious life becomes almost synonymous with reverential life.

I turn next to Godfrey Lienhardt, whose *Divinity and Experience* (1961) is an undisputed masterpiece in the social anthropology of religion.

Thek, *Divinity and Experience*

*Divinity and Experience* builds on aspects of Durkheim’s work in *The Elementary Forms*. Lienhardt’s analysis of a Dinka concept which he translated as respect may help to understand the relevance of Durkheim’s position. I merely point to similar difficulties in language analysis on both sides of the fence, as it were, and stress the different solutions to the problem after a fifty-year gap.

Durkheim was striving to shed light on one particular emotion, respect, within a set of mental attitudes constituted as a system, and his struggle was with his own
conceptual language: there was no problem of translation involved. Lienhardt engages in a dialogue with the Dinka concept of thek, the difficulty lying in part with conversion into the English language. But nevertheless similar problems come to the fore involving the same objects. The following statement may have some bearing on the reasons for this:

No social phenomenon can be adequately studied merely in the language and categories of thought in which the people among whom it is found represent it to themselves. (1964: 123)

*Thek*, ‘respect’, is ‘a word which in Dinka has two strands of meaning, related to each other in that language, but which, in English, we are forced to tease apart’ (ibid.: 124–5). ‘Only one of these strands is conveyed by the word “respect”... what we should call “good manners”. It involves particularly a firm control of personal self-assertiveness, and to a greater or lesser degree a conspicuous self-effacement which demonstrates that aggressive intentions are absent’ (ibid.: 125). This is what Durkheim called the inhibition of action, but the definition of what kind of action receives more qualification here:

It is from the element of demonstrated unaggressiveness in respectful behaviour that the word thek derives its second range of meanings, which may be summed up as ‘avoidance’. In this sense a man is required to thek his wife’s mother, and to a smaller extent her father... In the sense of avoidance, they may be used where no respectfulness in our sense is present. (Ibid.: 125)

Let us consider how Lienhardt addresses the problem of complementarity in comparison to Durkheim:

It is difficult to discover to what extent the Dinka regard the various senses of a word as related to each other.... *Thek* is thus a compound of behaviour which shows unaggressiveness and deference to its object, and of behaviour which shows esteem for it. The ‘respect’ which it denotes is also connected with a formal shyness which the Dinka call *ryoc* (a verb which also has the senses of ‘to fear’, or ‘to be shamefaced’ in the original sense), [in a footnote at this point: As the virtue, that is, of being ‘shamefast’, bashful or modest.] and which indicates a measure of withdrawal and reticence in those who are said to feel it. As the most extreme expression of unaggressiveness and self-effacement which can be made is a deliberate shrinking from contact, so the extreme expression of formal thek is formal avoidance. (Ibid.: 126)

Lienhardt then goes on to analyse what the formal respect relationships have in common. Creating subtle linkages in a very Durkheimian fashion, he is led to the following:
If, as we suggest, 'respect' goes with this gratitude for life, we may see why 'respect' is not expected between coeval clansmen and women, for by the rules of exogamy they must not provide each other with children.

The clan-divinity is respected as the source of life of the clan.... a generative power in each clan is represented by its clan-divinity, and respect for the clan-divinity is related to this representation. Hence husbands respect the clan-divinity of their wives, who will bear their children, and wives respect those of their husbands on account of the children they bear to them' (Ibid.: 129-30).

This carries conviction. It goes much further than Durkheim ever did on the subject, but there remain noteworthy parallels between Lienhardt's notion of 'gratitude for life' and Durkheim's concept of majesty. One telling remark in a footnote provides yet another parallel:

It must again be emphasized, however, that it is not possession of a common clan-divinity which makes intercourse incestuous. It is a human relationship, genealogically counted or, in some cases, strongly suspected. Consequently it is rather that the knowledge or suspicion of incest evokes in the guilty parties the notion of the anger of the clan-divinity, than that the notion of the clan-divinity evokes the notion of the guilt of incest. (Ibid.: 130, n. 1, my emphasis)

In terms of the new directions in causality, this last statement is akin to Durkheim saying that 'men do not weep for the dead because they fear them; they fear them because they weep for them' (see above). But closer to our point of our comparison is the fact that the anger of the clan-divinity is here left unexamined. The closest we come to in that direction is this ethnographic detail:

The respect and even awe, as it would appear from descriptions, with which masters of the fishing-spear eat their small pieces of raw flesh, and which the women certainly show when venerating the [divinity] Flesh in the bodies of men, is an extreme form of the thek already described as 'respect' for the emblems of other clan-divinities. The masters of the fishing-spear are said to be 'afraid' or 'shy'...when they eat it. (Ibid.: 144, my emphasis)

Lienhardt's interpretation focuses on the ostentatious display of unaggressiveness, but he does not address the issue of why this should be so. Painstaking efforts in that direction must surely be grounded in a propensity to feel aggressive towards certain objects. Attempts to tame or reverse the aggressive feelings must obey a reason and entertain possible connections with fear. Lienhardt had already suggested that 'it cannot be observed that the Dinka have any desire to use those emblems [of clan-divinities] in ways which are prohibited' (ibid.: 131). Lienhardt is not interested in displacement—if he were, his last statement would demand more explanation.

Something of the kind occurs in David Parkin's Sacred Void (1991). Part of his concluding chapter is a discussion of problems similar to those discussed in
this paper (see ibid.: 218–19), but using a different approach. I will restrict my remarks to the topic of fear proper. Parkin writes:

The ambivalence in which the Vaya [secret association of elders] are held reflects the attitude towards the animal with which they are associated. While the sheep is characterized as an animal of peace, the hyena is both feared and revered (ibid.: 152, my emphasis). ... People’s apprehension of the Vaya merges with that of the hyena itself: together the Vaya and the hyena embody and evoke in people a respectful fear. (Ibid.: 154, my emphasis)

He adds elsewhere:

The [Kaya elders including the Vaya] are certainly sometimes feared...but it is not a fear which is based on their being sacred or divine figures. It is very much a practical fear of them as ordinary mortals who have access to powers which their own human frailties may tempt them to abuse. (Ibid.: 224)

While not denying this, the extent to which these elders can be deemed ordinary while having access to extraordinary powers remains ambiguous. Parkin clearly states that fear plays a role in this context, but he suggests that cleansing/expulsion rather than awe informs what he translates as the Giriama notion (or version?) of the sacred. Here, once again, it seems difficult to conceive of a concern for purification without making fear a motive for it. This kind of fear requires conceptualization.

Some eighty years after the publication of The Elementary Forms in its original French version, ethnographers who choose to do so remain confronted with problems defined in terms similar to those Durkheim first laid out. The decision to grant analytical priority to either respect or fear has often been determined by personal judgement and by the need for balance in the literature. If at one time more weight was given to authoritarian motives in the interpretation of religious phenomena, the reaction has been a tendency to favour more introspective humanist approaches. Each time a contribution has been made in that direction, tremendous progress was achieved. I have tried to argue that the need for balance lies not only with an internal dialogue with the discipline, but with the unfragmented object itself. If there were no correspondence between ideas and emotions, the former would have no foothold in reality. The arbitrary separation between the two can only lead to an incomplete picture of the complementary mental attitudes that often constitute the moral core of religious life. In this sense, the paths along which emotions travel, evolve, and are subject to transformation still pose formidable problems of ethnographic description and analysis.
REFERENCES


LEVIN, D. C. 1979. 'Complementarity'. Unpublished manuscript.


AVAILABLE FROM THE EDITORS, JASO, 51 BANBURY ROAD, OXFORD OX2 6PE, ENGLAND. Tel. 01865-274682
ALL PRICES INCLUDE POSTAGE. PREPAYMENT REQUESTED.
THE LEGACY OF THE ANNÉE SOCIOLOGIQUE AS A JOURNAL

ROBERT PARKIN

I

In this brief comment, I wish to offer some reflections on the influence the Année Sociologique has had as a journal—explicitly, as a model for how a journal might be used in the dissemination of particular points of view by a group of scholars who, in the main, have theoretical tendencies in common. I cannot be comprehensive here and I shall not undertake a detailed review of its contents, which for some aspects is available elsewhere (recent examples include Parkin 1996: ch. 3; Llobera 1996, on Durkheimian reviews of anthroposociological writings). However, I shall say something about the circumstances of its founding by Durkheim, its rationale as he himself viewed it, and its impact on how the work of one neo-Durkheimian anthropologist in the second half of the twentieth century was organized for a limited period and purpose. For the Année Sociologique itself, I shall draw freely on others’ work, especially Lukes (1973: 289–95) and Fournier (1994: 133–50, 482–99, 532–41).

I suppose no journal is launched without its founders having identified some niche or other in the academic market, though in some cases a very small one or one which may not prove to have a viable long-term future: many journals fade out of existence after a few issues, even one. In the case of the Année Sociologique the rationale was simple enough. Durkheim and his colleagues were engaged in the task of establishing academic sociology in French universities, a task which involved both intellectual effort and political battles with rival disciplines, especially philosophy, psychology and, a little further afield, the ‘English school’ of anthropology.
Actually, despite the fact that he had precursors in academic sociology like Auguste Comte and Frédéric Le Play, Durkheim was creating rather than identifying a niche, with the *Année Sociologique* as a tool, though from our perspective the format was unusual. Lukes suggests (1973: 248) that Durkheim gave up the work he was then doing on socialism in 1896 to concentrate on founding the journal because he felt a great need to systematize sociology, in order to make it more specialized and give it firm boundaries from other subjects—in his own words from *Volume IV*, ‘gradually to work out the natural divisions of sociology’, rather than extend them at this stage (Lukes ibid.: 289, n. 1; 290).

Although the decision to found the journal was taken in 1896, the first volume was published only in 1898, and it never appeared on time. One problem to begin with was that Durkheim was still, till 1902, in Bordeaux, his colleagues in Paris or elsewhere, the publishers Alcan in Paris. In the intervening two years (1896–8) there was correspondence with both leading colleagues (Bougé, Simiand, Lapie) and Alcan about setting it up, some of which has been published (in Besnard 1983). According to Fournier (1994: 134–5), one of the inspirations was the journal *L’Année Psychologique*, also published by Alcan (from 1895); the title *Année Sociologique* was actually taken from a rubric in the *Revue de métaphysique et de morale*, founded in 1893 by the ‘social philosopher’ Xavier Léon.

When one thinks of the early *Année Sociologique*, probably two things stand out: its co-operative nature, its teamwork; and the fact that although it did produce substantive (and substantial) articles, its main effort was devoted to discussing the work of other schools and disciplines in often extensive reviews, showing where they were right or, more usually, wrong from the Durkheimian point of view. They must be among the least ephemeral reviews in the whole social-science corpus. There can be no doubt as to their importance. Fournier calculates (1994: 145) that by the end of the first series, in 1913, 4,800 books and articles had been discussed and 4,200 further items listed, as compared with 18 ‘mémoires’ (actually 22 by my reckoning). Of the 10–11,000 pages in the series, Mauss alone contributed about 25 per cent.

There was also a concentration on issues rather than authors, on showing what was being produced in sociology or of relevance to it and on drawing lessons from bad or indifferent as well as good work, while always bringing out what was most useful and could be built on. In the preface to the first volume, Durkheim states: ‘The critic must be the collaborator of the author, his grateful collaborator, for whatever little remains of a book after critical evaluation, that much is gained for science...’ (cited in Lukes 1973: 290). And according to Bouglé, writing in 1907, a basic task was ‘to develop lasting frameworks for future analyses and syntheses’ (cited in Lukes ibid.: 292). As regards the teamwork, Durkheim appears to have been influenced by Wundt’s psychological laboratory in Leipzig, which he had visited shortly after *agrégation* (in 1885–6) and which was also arranged cooperatively (Lukes ibid.).

A third principle laid down by Durkheim was the impersonal, because collective, nature of the work. However, this was hardly observed in practice. Durk-
heim's early colleagues, like Simiand, Bouglé, and Lapie, were no ciphers and felt free to express misgivings in print about aspects of Durkheim's own work, often in reviews for other journals. Parodi and Muffang (whom Durkheim later got rid of because of his lukewarmness to the project) are two other names that appear early on. The early volumes also had contributions from such luminaries as Simmel, Ratzel, and Steinmetz, later ones being restricted to the Durkheimian core. Later, Hubert and Mauss were key collaborators, with Fauconnet and others also well represented; Hertz's contribution was relatively modest, with about twenty reviews in all. Their work is noticeably more conformist on the whole. In Lukes's view (ibid.: 294-5), it was not until the fourth volume that Durkheim was really able to impose his stamp on the journal, making it less 'eclectic' (Lukes's word) and imposing the imprint of the great man rather than that of a truly collective effort.

The first series ended in 1913, not continuing because of the war, which also ended the Durkheimian group itself as originally constituted. Mauss revived it briefly in the 1920s on the same basis, ultimately unsuccessfully, partly, according to Fournier (1994: 532), because of difficulties in obtaining contributions. The tremendous burden of work that the Année Sociologique had meant for both Durkheim and his colleagues (and also his wife: see Lukes 1973: 99, n. 4), did not go away, and Mauss may have been less efficient at such things—he had led his uncle into despair over his tardiness in presenting reviews for the first series (Fournier 1994: 148). Mauss managed to produce a very fat volume in 1925, followed by a very thin one in 1927 (i.e. a year late), then gave up. The third series, launched in 1940 with the co-operation of others, among them some late Durkheimians, bears the imprint of its origins in having a number of reviews, but there are also more articles by a wider spectrum of scholars. Today, though a leading journal, it is no longer the Durkheimian house journal. It is also now purely sociological: the interest in anthropology has long since died. This, of course, reflects the respective fates of the two subjects by mid-century. Both as school and journal, the Année Sociologique was founded at least in part in opposition to an older, ethnological anthropology associated in the Durkheimian mind chiefly with England, which was mostly killed off by the Durkheimization of anthropology under Malinowski and especially Radcliffe-Brown. This deprived the Année Sociologique school of one rival through its own absorption of it, and its successor journal of any real need to discuss it.

II

If we turn to the possible impact of the Année Sociologique as a journal on later work, one plausible imitator, at least in part, is Contributions to Indian Sociology, launched in 1957 with Mouton as its publisher. It was also initially an annual
publication, though published in English in order to ensure itself of a readership in India itself. Also, although it discussed some contemporary literature, its format was one of articles rather than reviews (Vol. III is a partial exception). It contains no specific acknowledgement of the *Année Sociologique*, but its co-founder Louis Dumont had been one of Mauss’s students and, like Durkheim sixty years earlier, he had an agenda. As a model, therefore, the *Année Sociologique* is a likely candidate for what was also a somewhat unusual format to begin with. None the less, Dumont’s purpose was much more modest and restricted in that he was not trying to institutionalize a new discipline on a global scale but to revamp an old one on a regional scale. Although David Pocock’s name is to be associated with at least the early issues, these are routinely taken to bear Dumont’s own intellectual stamp.

Dumont’s agenda related to the anthropology (in the post-Maussian sense) of India. He advocated a shift away from the hitherto predominant study of tribes, who formed a very small percentage (under five per cent) of the population, in favour of giving more attention to caste, as well as drawing on Indology and history rather than on just anthropological fieldwork. The aim was also to professionalize the anthropology of India, many of whose existing practitioners were strictly amateur in status—administrators, missionaries, and the like—as they had been for decades. Theoretically, their work was old-fashioned ethnology rather than the more sociological anthropology Dumont had learned from Mauss. Although Kathleen Gough was working in South India at about the time Dumont was there, few of the others had even managed to catch up with functionalism: Dumont soon learned that structuralism was the only way to make sense of Indian ethnography, whether on kinship or on the caste system itself.

Despite the criticism that has greeted the ideas about caste that Dumont first began to work out in *Contributions to Indian Sociology* and which were to bear fruit ultimately in his influential *Homo Hierarchicus* (1966), there is no doubt that the journal has contributed to and largely determined the direction of the professionalization that has taken place in South Asian anthropology in the last forty years. Although reviews were never as big a part of *Contributions* as to the *Année Sociologique*, the idea was still to examine critically current work on India, again with a view to showing its defects, and to produce new themes, approaches, and directions out of this endeavour—especially, as far as Dumont himself was concerned, in a more structuralist direction. Much of it was written by Dumont and Pocock themselves, especially the former. Indeed, the first three volumes consisted entirely of unsigned articles under their joint responsibility as authors and editors of the journal. From Volume IV other authors were invited to contribute, and there was some critical correspondence (e.g. with Bailey, Berreman). Among topics addressed by Dumont himself were the nature of the village community, kinship and marriage, caste and racism, kingship (including a study of Hocart’s views), communalism, and renunciation. Other contributors, apart from the critics, discussed law, dharma, time, the *jajmani* system (Pocock on the last two), neighbouring states, etc., the whole being a co-operative effort, but more loosely than
with the *Année Sociologique*. Passages from Bouglé and de Tocqueville were also reissued in translation.

By 1966, Dumont had come to the conclusion that the original *Contributions* had done all it could to turn the anthropology of India in a more professional, caste-oriented, and structuralist direction. He gave up the editorship after Volume IX, but still continued to contribute to the anthropology of India. Pocock had had less and less to do even with the first series, and eventually turned away from India in favour of the *Mass Observation Project* in the UK. However, others decided to launch a new series from 1967 (so there was continuity, unlike with the *Année Sociologique*), which eventually appeared twice yearly (from 1973). In 1980 it acquired a still more conventional format by published reviews, a format it still follows. The new series has always been published in Delhi with a mostly Indian editorial team and is now one of Sage’s growing inventory of academic journals.\(^1\)

### III

A further comparison with the present journal is hard to resist. Launched in 1970 as a vehicle for Edwin Ardener’s student seminars, *JASO* too had an agenda, not followed absolutely, but for many who were involved one of deconstructing Lévi-Straussian structuralism, often with the aid of other, then fashionable French intellectuals. It can claim to have contributed to the development of semantic anthropology, which although short-lived urged a reflexivity about personhood which ‘pomo’ tendencies have since absorbed as a necessary part of how researcher-informant relations should be conducted. It was also a co-operative effort in terms of how it was physically produced on a stencil machine, if not in the actual writing. It appears, in its turn, to have been an inspiration for other local anthropological journals in many parts of the world (see Ardener 1980 on its early history). Like the two other journals discussed here, however, it has become more conventional in time, with more book reviews, a more stable editorial team and a professional printer. This is perhaps the destiny of every journal—which may be why new ones continue to be launched, despite a very crowded field. Routinization is evidently not limited to forms of governance but is also the fate of academic charismatics, if the fate of the journals some of them have founded is anything to go by.

---

1. It is interesting to note that some of Dumont’s followers in the *équipe ERASME* in Paris have also published jointly; see Barraud *et al.* 1994.
REFERENCES


MONISHA AHMED, 'We are Warp and Weft': Nomadic Pastoralism and the Tradition of Weaving in Rupshu (Eastern Ladakh). D.Phil.

This thesis, based on twelve months of fieldwork and archival research undertaken in Ladakh, explores the place of wool and weaving in the life of Rupshu. It attempts to trace the nexus between livestock, fibres, textiles, social and symbolic structures in Rupshu in order to understand the multitude of contexts within which wool-oriented activities exist. The craft of weaving was bestowed upon Rupshu by the gods, and thus all acts related to it have a close connection to the sublime.

Rupshu lies in the easternmost part of Ladakh in North India, in a Restricted Areas Zone, and is accessible only to Indian citizens. Hence, extensive fieldwork has not been carried out in this area. Further, though there is a little documentation on the craft of weaving in Ladakh, none exists on the nomadic tradition of weaving.

The first two chapters introduce the region of Rupshu and explore the historical context. They include a discussion of the origin and development of weaving and textiles in the area, and of the old trade routes in fibres.
The next two chapters examine the connections between livestock, the source of fibres in Rupshu, and the Ladakhi pantheon. The relationship between the two is reflected in the manner in which livestock are revered and treated in Rupshu. Further, this affinity is widely expressed in Rupshu, and one such occasion is the harvesting of the fibres.

The next four chapters look specifically at the craft of weaving, and local representations of the tradition. Using examples of particular pieces woven in Rupshu, I examine the gender, spatial and hierarchical relations that they express and perpetuate.

Not all the fibres harvested in Rupshu are used there, and the final chapter examines their distribution through trade. While woven articles are not traded, specific containers are woven for the transport of fibres, and their characteristics are looked at here.

The concluding remarks include a discussion of the future of wool and weaving activities in Rupshu, and address the dangers posed by re-settlement schemes, and a shortage of pasture and overgrazing. These trends would eventually lead to a decrease in the number of livestock, and cause the people of Rupshu to abandon their tradition of nomadic pastoralism.


This thesis examines the changing family patterns in contemporary Japan in the light of a new housing phenomenon known as the nisetai jutaku. An analysis of the spread of the nisetai jutaku—prefabricated detached houses shared by a parent couple and an adult child's family—reveals the consequence this has had on changing the predominant kinship model of post-war Japan because the principles embodied in the nisetai jutaku separate the practice of succession and inheritance. This is achieved through introducing the concept that the inheritance (the land on which the nisetai jutaku is standing) is part of an exchange of land (to the younger generation) for services (to the older generation). Thus, a non-successor may be chosen; furthermore, increasing numbers are living with their daughter's family, which means that the inheritance passes to another descent group (the daughter's husband's).

The analysis of the nisetai jutaku phenomenon demonstrates that kinship structures are dynamic and can be changed by the members of the society (in this case the government and housing companies) through the conscious manipulation of the kinship model. However, the families themselves are shown to use it to express their changing concepts of the family structure and social order. The importance of the historical, political, economic, and social environment that provided the context from which the nisetai jutaku phenomenon emerged illustrates
the interrelated influences that the various aspects of society have on each other, but particularly on the kinship model, so that a change in one is soon demonstrated by a change in another. This type of analysis, which embodies the many concepts of the house in anthropology, has not been conducted on Japan before.

The analysis of the changing family patterns is based on ethnographic data collected between 1992 and 1994 from within the three main factors involved: the housing companies, the families, and the government, so that the creation, supply, and consumption of the new model was followed at every stage of the process. Thus, the thesis includes both sides of the consumption process in its analysis of the nisetai jutaku phenomenon.


The introduction presents the fieldwork methodology.

Ch. 1 introduces the geographical history of the area, as well as the political and socioeconomic background.

Ch. 2 describes the social setting of Ese-eja communities, with a brief introduction to the kinship, marriage, residence/household, and moiety relationships. It is argued that the Ese-eja are not 'assimilated' by national society but rather, the Ese-eja assimilate mestizo elements into their lives.

Ch. 3. The mythology and psychology of dying is argued to be constitutive of identity. Elements from psychoanalysis and phenomenology are argued to be important for the analysis of Ese-eja conceptions of humanness, thought, and perception.

Ch. 4 presents Bewihaha as a myth of origin about sibling-in-law conflict and implicitly communicates the primordial, intersubjective dynamics of libido, mortido-apetido. Mythic formation of edosikiana, and diverging realms of human and ultra-human are predicated on a predatorial reciprocity.

Ch. 5 presents the edosikiana (spirit people) as agents of affliction. The relationship between the shaman (eyámikekwa) and edosikiana is discussed in terms of the assimilation of death and the continuity of living-and-dying. The chapter examines eshawa correspondence and the realm of mythopoeia that constellates an intimate and efficacious configuration of person and cosmos, through life-and-death.

Ch. 6 presents the myth of Dokwei, the stag, and argues that the libido-mortido-apetido complex lies at the centre of sibling-in-law relations, male-female interactions of myth, and everyday life. The hidden/masked nature of edosikiana is contrasted with be'o vultures—always seen circling skies and surrounding a meat carcass. Between edosikiana and be'o vulture is the Ese-eja life-world
precipitated by a nexus of intersubjective kinship relations and an existential mythopoeia.


Based on twelve months' fieldwork in Rajasthan, this thesis focuses upon supernatural affliction—illness and misfortune ascribed to malevolent spirits and to other mystical agents or forces—and examines the rituals to which it is thought to be amenable as well as the practices of ritual specialists.

The introductory chapter outlines the main theoretical concerns of the thesis as well as its structure, its aims and objectives. Details of how the research was carried out and a note on languages and transcriptions are given here too. Chapter one provides historical and other relevant information on Mehndipur village and Ajmer city, the two research locations. A preliminary account of particular curing ceremonies and the role of priests and healers in connection with them is also given. In chapter two, affliction by capricious spirits, sorcerers, deities, and ancestor spirits is explored in terms of three major themes, namely causation, attribution, and vulnerability. Traditional ethnomedical practices are discussed, and most of the quantitative data crucial to arguments articulated in this and other parts of the thesis are presented, as are a number of different case-studies. The principal themes introduced in chapter two are developed further in chapter three, and the latter provides a number of case-studies as well. In chapter three, sorcery is analyzed in more depth, as are sorcery accusations, and it examines witchcraft and the evil eye, as well as the links between mystical forces believed to be directed by human agents. Chapter four focuses upon exorcism commonly performed both for banishing spirits and for treating those harmed by other supernaturals or mystical agents. Attention is given to emotional display, which is a central feature of exorcist rituals in Mehndipur and Ajmer and in other parts of India. The alleged experience of emotion and the therapeutic qualities that they are thought to have are also assessed. Chapter five provides a comparative examination of priests and healers, with its specific focus upon the power or authority that they possess. Moreover, the complementary relationship between these two types of religious specialist is analyzed. Finally, the thesis concludes with a synopsis of the major arguments developed in it and a résumé of its achievements.
CAMILLA C. T. GIBB, In the City of Saints: Religion, Politics and Gender in Harar, Ethiopia. D.Phil. (BLLD 46–12470)

In this thesis I am concerned with the identity of a particular community who refer to themselves as Ge usu’, or ‘people of the city’, the original inhabitants of a walled Muslim city in the highlands of eastern Ethiopia.

I argue in this thesis that interethnic co-operation in Harar has been in evidence for centuries, necessitated by interaction through trade, shared religious faith, and common residence, and facilitated through cultural assimilation and common oppression. Marked cleavage within the Ge usu’ community has, however, arisen in response to the dramatic changes in the political structure of the country since 1991. While I illustrate the effect of this division in social, spatial, and temporal terms, in one domain, that of the saints around which religious life is structured, a level of continuity and cohesion persists within the group and between groups in Harar.

I argue that the inclusiveness which characterizes popular thinking about the saints and activities at their shrines absorbs political differences in much the same way as it has historically accommodated and admitted ethnic, economic, and gender differences. Local religious experience, largely shrine-based, thus goes some way toward neutralizing current political conflict while also indirectly challenging a politics which calls for the reconstruction of borders between groups resident in Harar.

The observations and analysis presented here are based on fieldwork conducted in the city between August 1994 and August 1995. In order to contextualize my own work I consider in Part I external definitions of the group by Western travellers and historians and existing ethnographic literature on the Ge usu’ and offer evidence to challenge a portrayal of the exclusivity and boundedness of the group. I then focus upon prevalent symbols in contemporary local reconstructions of historical events and the location of saints in such reconstructions.

In Part II I look at how primary spatial, temporal, and religious aspects through which life in the city is organized are structured around the saints and their shrines. These dimensions are not static, however, and I emphasize here ways in which they are experienced as processes and are responsive to changes in the political climate. In my final section, I look at how principles of Ge’ada, ‘the culture of the city’, are applied in the changing circumstances of individuals and the community.

M. D. JAKOBSEN, Shamanism: Traditional and Contemporary Approaches to Mastery of Spirits and Healing. D.Phil.

Initially, this thesis considers the various meanings of the term ‘shamanism’, relating it particularly to S. M. Shirogoroff’s view that it involves the mastery of
spirits, rather than Mircea Eliade's description of shamanism as techniques of ecstasy.

From this general treatment of definitions, the thesis falls into two main parts. First, the traditional practices of shamanism described by missionaries and other explorers, especially among the Eskimos of Greenland. This material, little known in the English-speaking world, is largely derived from Danish accounts. A major benefit of the examination of these Danish sources is that they deal with shamanism in a relatively pristine state, as there was little external influence on Greenlandic society before these accounts were produced in the eighteenth century and even as late as the twentieth. The purpose of this first part is to extract from these sources the material related to shamanism and to locate it within the general world picture of the Greenlanders.

In the second part, contained mainly in the final chapter and appendixes, shamanism in this traditional religious context is then contrasted with the resurgence of shamanism today. The fieldwork describes and analyses the mode of shamanic training at basic and several advanced courses with a number of interviews with participants and course organizers, conducted to ascertain the kind of expectations and desires people have of shamanism today. The emphasis is not on the mastery of spirits but on co-operation with them in both personal healing and the healing of society, whether by recognition of Nature through ecological awareness or of coming to terms with death and dying. Shamanism is, it is suggested, fast-growing and presents a sense of personal empowerment for individuals who feel alienated in the urban environment of today.


The aim of this thesis is twofold. First, it aims to present the discrepancies between the ideal and the practice in Korean kinship and examines how people react to these discrepancies. Second, it attempts to identify the discrepancies between chokpo (written genealogies) and 'reality' and suggests a new perspective on the interrelationship between genealogy and people.

The uniqueness of the Korean kinship system lies in its adherence to the most rigid patriliny in its norms, which is reflected in every sphere of the system. The strong association between social status and kinship has motivated the Korean people to put these strict kinship norms into practice as much as possible. The tradition of keeping written genealogies has helped the people to maintain the patrilineal principles in practice.

Nevertheless, actual situations surrounding the Korean people do not necessarily allow them to follow the ideal norms. The recent trend towards industrialization and urbanization has become one of the strongest factors breaking down the
ideal Korean family and kinship patterns in rural areas. Under these difficult circumstances, people choose what should be maintained, what accommodations should be made, and what should be given up in their kin practice.

This thesis also identifies the discrepancies between written genealogies and ‘reality’. Studies hitherto have only dealt with how people retrospectively manipulate genealogy so that it accords with the present reality. However, this thesis shows that written genealogy sometimes forces people to manipulate their kinship relations so as to produce a desirable record. Written genealogy thus functions not only as a historical record or as a charter to justify the present social relationships but also as a driving force to make people rebuild and reshouette their kinship relationships, and change the direction of future kinship.


This thesis explores the ideology of rural Korean women in the 1960s, the first decade of Korea’s phenomenal economic development. The thesis examines the paradox between the Confucian ethic, which defines women’s role as passive, subordinate, and obedient, and the independent-minded resilience, strong determination, and influential mode in which women operated. It is based upon three phases of research: (1) 1967–8: eighteen-month ethnographic study of a Korean village; two-month research projects in four other villages, study of three neighbourhoods in Seoul; (2) 1978–9: two-month restudy of two villages; (3) 1995: two weeks of interviews with Myongjun, a village woman.

Part One delineates the social and scholastic setting of the study, describes the research and topic of the thesis.

Part Two opens with the life-story of Myongjun, a woman who considers herself to be ‘ordinary’. Her natal village was a purely residential, subsistence farming village with multiple lineages, none dominant. A day in the life of the women in Myongjun’s household shows the women to be reflecting individuals whose behaviour was not determined wholly by culture or social structure. They were capable of innovatively applying Confucian ideals to specific situations to achieve their own ends.

In the early years of national development the ideology of women was not altered: women’s strategy to obtain and maintain their strong personal identity, sense of personhood, and security was modified as more options became available. My postulate is that women’s knowledgeability affected dominance-dependence, enabling them to achieve influence and control while maintaining their formal status as subservient. The ideology of rural Korean women includes two levels: the principal frontstage, consciously expressed ideology based upon Confucian ethics; and the hidden, private, backstage, often unspoken ideology, allowing
women to manoeuvre, manipulate, and be effective, balancing the factors of social strength and dependence. Korean women’s role in the social process is subtle and far greater than has been emphasized in ethnographic studies.

**JOHN PALMER, Wichí Goodwill: Ethnographic Allusions. D.Phil.**

This ethnography of the Wichí of northern Argentina centres on a pivotal feature of their social life, which is their theory and practice of goodwill. Goodwill is the social will of the Wichí people—in Durkheimian terms, their âme sociale. It is a spiritualized (though not deified) agency whose principal mode of transmission is the Wichí language, making it, like the language, an ancestral heritage. Its paradigmatic exponent is the headman, but it is equally the hallmark of personhood for all alike, since it is a faculty of the will (which is here synonymous with the ‘soul’, as the metaphysical principle of being). Through socialization, the will of the individual is tempered by this âme sociale, or social will, making his/her membership of the group possible and at the same time sustaining the group’s existence. Goodwill is thus the medium through which the individual and society are integrated, and the integrity of their respective bodies preserved.

Wichí goodwill is a sociostructural principle, in the sense that it is most closely associated with the kinship system: having its maximum expression in the figure of the headman, it ideally radiates throughout the cognatic kindred of which he is the focus; and, to the extent that they are incorporated within this kinship structure as associated kin, affines too participate in the exchange of goodwill that unites and animates the collectivity. As such, Wichí goodwill might be construed as a Durkheimian sacred principle symbolizing the society, but this is to deny the transcendant reality in terms of which it is conceived—and lived—by the Wichí. Wichí goodwill is sacred precisely because it is not circumscribed by the interests of the descent group. Although, like language, it manifests itself above all in the collective ego (‘us’), the moral attributes in which it is made apparent are only more or less approximately exemplified by that collective ego. Were it not accorded independent status—the status, in Wichí terms, of a spirit-being for which ‘we’ at best act as host bodies—then goodwill would be the handmaid of the profane entities that ‘we’ without it are. It would no longer be goodwill, but casuistry. As it is, it occupies a superior space—the spirit-world—where it symbolizes the Wichí’s ultimate value.
BOOK REVIEWS


Polly Hill’s material on migrant southern Ghanaian cocoa farmers was first published in 1963. The main thesis of this work was that a large number of these farmers ran their enterprises according to a successful capitalist logic during the first decades of the twentieth century. An assimilated market consciousness regulated their acquisition of land rights, labour employment and use of profits.

Hill’s work was highly innovative. It pointed out the importance of immigrant farmers’ companies in the process of land acquisition. Patrilineal and matrilineal groups were compared in their establishment of farms and transfers of plots. The delicate issue of land alienation was addressed. Finally the migration process was described. An economic perspective was integrated with a methodology comprising genealogies, local surveys, territorial histories, family biographies, an insightful use of maps, and a glossary of economic terms. The ethnographic evidence presented in the appendices revealed both thorough fieldwork and outstanding anthropological competence. The success of Hill’s study rested on an interdisciplinary approach which rendered it relevant to different approaches, its ability to explain the success of enterprises run by indigenous initiative with little or no support from either government or European agents, and its refutation of dominant ideas concerning the irrationality of African peasants. The International African Institute’s decision to reprint this masterpiece in its ‘Classics in African Anthropology’ series is therefore most welcome.

As Austin points out in his introduction, Hill’s conclusions were widely accepted and influenced many subsequent works. Current studies on cocoa production largely adopt Hill’s propositions and often openly acknowledge their intellectual debt to her path-breaking study. Hill’s work may therefore be valued for its effect on the literature which followed. Two concepts discussed by Hill were subsequently developed: the importance of migration in the spread of the cocoa industry, and the use of the term ‘capitalists’ to refer to cocoa farmers.

Following Hill’s work, migration became a relevant theme in studies of cocoa production both in Ghana and elsewhere in West Africa. Since the early 1970s, scholars examined the relevance of migration to the spread of a capitalist-oriented cocoa industry. As both landlords and workers travelled to turn new forest areas into cocoa farms, the relationships they established in offering and acquiring land and labour were centred on monetary exchanges rather than social obligations. The migration process linked to cocoa production was seen as more specifically market-oriented and as a partial liberation from family and community constraints. These studies are valuable, as they concentrate on the migration of labourers as well as landlords, an
issue that Hill did not fully explore. They lack, however, Hill’s ethnographic insights, which are not convincingly replaced by the use of quantitative data.

Hill’s use of the term ‘capitalist’ preceded the Marxist literature on cocoa production, which, in the late 1970s and 1980s, made use of the same term with a slightly different meaning. For Hill, cocoa farmers were capitalist because they had a business outlook, besides the fact that they re-invested their profits through market enterprises. Later, the term was used in a more orthodox Marxist fashion. Migrant farmers were termed ‘capitalists’ and were thought of as forming a class monopolizing land and labour. The Marxist framework impoverished Hill’s insights in many ways, the use of a predetermined theory and the stress on the monetized aspects of relationships producing a neglect of the cultural specificities of the cocoa industry and its wider social context.

Hill’s study stands out in comparison to both of these subsequent bodies of literature. Not only did it precede trends which were developed in later decades, it also remains exceptional for its thorough methodology, its attention to detail, and its profound understanding of local dynamics, which are at times overlooked by later works. It is perhaps the fate of the great monographs to anticipate future research trends without sharing their flaws.

STEFANO BONI


Since 1978, the European Commission on the Anthropology of Food and Nutrition of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological Sciences has organized sixteen symposia on food and nutrition, considered from the viewpoint of both the social and biological sciences. This edited volume is the outcome of the symposium held in 1991, sponsored by the Max Planck Society and convened by the two editors. The topic of the meeting was the use of food to enhance status.

Most of the papers in this collection share the strong interdisciplinary and cross-cultural stance defended by the editors. The thirteen chapters forming the core of the volume may be viewed as divided into three sections: the first comprises ethological and primatological studies; the second is composed of archaeological analyses; the last includes works of social and cultural anthropology. In the first chapter, which precedes the ethological section, Weissner presents the various contributions and justifies the interdisciplinary approach, linking biological and sociocultural perspectives. In the last chapter, which follows the anthropological section, Gross and Dreßer discuss the issue of food intervention programmes in developing countries.

The ethological section comprises two chapters on primates (by McGrew, and Hohmann and Fruth) centred on issues of status, food, and mating success. The remaining three chapters of this section (Hold-Cavell, Eibl-Eibesfeldt, and Grammer)
link ethological observations of animals (mostly primates) and humans (particularly children), focusing on attention structures, food transfers, and mate choices. The methodology adopted is predominantly that of the natural sciences, and the aim is to present the status quest as a ‘natural’ and ‘universal’ feature of both primates and humans.

The archaeological section is composed of three papers (Dietler, Hayden, and Damerow). The first two examine the use of feasts and prestige foods in prehistoric Europe to enhance status, often referring to the anthropological literature to suggest possible interpretations of the archaeological evidence. The other chapter discusses patterns of food and work transactions in 2250-2000 BC Mesopotamia by deciphering cuneiform texts. The three authors consider the relationship between food and status as crucial in both identifying stages of human development and understanding possible causes of cultural evolution from one stage to the next.

The anthropological section of this book comprises five papers. Weissner provides a cross-cultural overview of ways in which egalitarian foraging societies manage to control the status quest, which is viewed as ‘a current that runs through all societies’ (p. 187). De Garine’s chapter focuses on the use of food in feasts and ceremonies in five societies in Cameroon and Chad to argue that ‘symbolic advantages may be sought even at the expense of biological fitness’: thus not all human behaviors towards food can be explained with reference to its ‘positive biological role’ (p. 215). Lemonnier’s work is concerned with the role of pigs in festive competitions and compensation for human loss caused by marriage or homicide in New Guinea. Schiefenhövel and Bell-Kranthals discuss ceremonial food exchanges in a Trobriand village with particular reference to the ‘reproductive success’ of individuals. Finally, the paper by Panter-Brick focuses on the relationship between household status and the quest for food, intra-household status and food allocation, and caste membership and nutritional well-being in Nepal.

All chapters deserve praise for the originality of the analyses and the fascinating ethnographic evidence produced. However, an appraisal of the volume as a whole must rest on its attempt to link biological and sociocultural aspects of the relationship between food and status. Although the introductory chapter provides insights into possible complementary contributions of natural sciences and sociocultural anthropology to the examination of the nexus between food and status, one is left doubting the latter discipline’s capacity to address biological concerns while maintaining its characteristic methodological and theoretical features. The anthropological section of the volume manages to maintain a link with the first part—centred on ethology and primatology—only by examining specific societies and adopting certain theoretical assumptions. The objects of study consist of—or are presented as—‘simple’ societies with a low technological level. The role of food and status in complex societies is not discussed, and scant attention is paid to the pervasive economic dynamics of the last century that must have influenced at least some of the groups studied. Moreover, the link between primates and humans is achieved by a partial elimination of human diversity and social complexity: the focus is often on children and on cross-cultural features. The link between natural sciences and sociocultural anthropology ultimately rests on certain debatable theoretical assumptions. Most authors, including some of the anthropologists, assume ‘universal’ patterns of human behavior and view the status
quest as one of these natural human features. This stance should have been supported further by empirical evidence, as some anthropologists, rather than placing the status quest in the realm of human nature, explain the diverse expressions of status across societies and history by referring to specific economic and political strategies of dominance. This naturalization leads some of the anthropological analyses to discuss issues such as the universality of the status quest, the biological fitness of certain behaviours, and their reproductive success, while paying scant attention to the material bases of status and its justifications. Status is often defined in this volume as a position individually ascribed or attained rather than as the product of a relational form of dominance. The interdisciplinary approach adopted here to the study of the relationship between food and status proves insightful but leaves the volume’s fundamental assumption unresolved. The work offers a range of methodological perspectives which suggest possible links between humans and primates, points out recurrent historical patterns of food use to enhance status, and discusses the biological significance of the status quest cross-culturally. The universality of certain human features is, however, presented as an axiom rather than critically discussed.

STEFANO BONI


In a series of related essays, Harkin provides a sophisticated ethnohistory of the early contact and missionization of the Heiltsuk (Bella Bella) Indians of the Pacific Northwest of North America. The better portion of Harkin’s work describes the arrival of Methodist missionaries in 1880 and their subsequent missionization of the Heiltsuk, until the time when they were effectively alienated from their land in the early twentieth century. Harkin brings a new perspective to Northwest Coast studies by utilizing recent anthropology on colonialism and the indigenous experience of missionization. This is similar in some respects to Sergei Kan’s study of Tlingit missionization and mindful of other ethnohistorical works on identity in the colonial encounter (particularly the work of Karen Blu, Julie Cruikshank, and Jean and John Comaroff). In addition, Harkin contributes to a sparse literature on the Heiltsuk and reopens the door on their culture by re-examining the assumptions of Ronald Olson and other ethnographers that they had all but forgotten their traditional culture well before 1935.

Harkin describes the colonial relationship between Eurocanadians and the Heiltsuk as a Bakhtinian ‘dialogue’ of accommodation and resistance. He also draws on Foucault’s theories about ‘technologies of power’ to argue that Methodist missionaries used illness, mortuary practices, sexuality, labour, and other practices to mould the Heiltsuk into a ‘modern’ people. In each domain of knowledge and activity, the Heiltsuk struggled to retain their ideas about interpersonal, spiritual, and social power
against the missionary attempt to impose a 'monological' discourse about the proper conduct of the soul and the body.

Through innovative interpretations of Heiltsuk–Eurocanadian interactions, Harkin draws out an intriguing paradox: the Heiltsuk maintained many aspects of their cultural identity in these encounters by becoming paragons of the Methodist virtues of industry and discipline. Harkin suggests that a basic theme of traditional Heiltsuk society was 'the dialectical relationship between external, uncontrolled, negative forces and internal, structured power' (p. 22), expressed in the symbolism of winter dancing and the mortuary cycle. To understand the cultural importance of this theme in the early contact period, Harkin analyzes the structure and symbolism of a contact narrative provided to him by a Heiltsuk elder during a year of fieldwork in the Heiltsuk community of Waglisla (Bella Bella). He argues that the narrative serves as an 'epitomizing event' (following Fogelson), a moment which symbolically encapsulates the Heiltsuk incorporation and control of European technology and historicity. He also finds this theme later, in the Heiltsuk response to the arrival of Methodist missionaries in 1880. The latter were outsiders with powers that the Heiltsuk also hoped to incorporate into their society, such as education and industrial knowledge.

While missionization was successful in turning the Heiltsuk into a 'progressive' people, the Heiltsuk also used the missionaries to achieve several critical ends: as a means to address the disruption of disease and colonial trade; as a means for local chiefs to expand their influence; and as a means to organize the Heiltsuk peoples as a collective political entity. It is a notable historical irony that the missionaries established a council of chiefs to undertake collective projects (such as building a new church) that not only established the Heiltsuk as paragons of moral progress, but also inadvertently set the social foundations for a new ethnic identity among the Heiltsuk peoples. Harkin concludes that 'progress' and 'discipline' were not only central to Heiltsuk identity at the end of the nineteenth century, they were also at times a means to contest Eurocanadian domination.

The Heiltsuks has an unusual organization (a preface substitutes for an introductory chapter, and the conclusion, only five pages in length, offers no summation of the book) that prevents the reader from gaining a sufficient perspective on the overall scope of the work. The first three chapters discuss much of the theoretical and contextual material that might have been covered in an introductory chapter. As a result, Harkin’s chapter on the contemporary Heiltsuk community of Waglisla and his apparent interest in the relationship of traditional culture to contemporary belief and practice fall by the wayside as the book pursues its central ethnohistorical subject. For example, Harkin notes that dances remain an important part of the community's 'historical culture', dances that have been 'skillfully reconstructed through the study of texts and through contact with the earlier revival among the Kwaguls, as well as from the memories of Heiltsuk elders' (p. 33). This interest in tradition, Harkin argues, demonstrates a rejection of the progressive ideology that was once so much a part of Heiltsuk identity. He concludes that 'this paradox is a key element of contemporary Heiltsuk identity' (p. 35), but unfortunately does not elaborate on this paradox or its significance for the Heiltsuk.

In his concluding remarks, Harkin suggests that two themes increasingly dominate the ethnohistory of North America, the first being genocide, the second the 'middle
ground’ first proposed by Richard White in his history of the Great Lakes fur trade. Harkin wishes to distinguish his ethnohistorical work from these two interpretations, for the Heiltsuk were not culturally annihilated, nor did they experience an egalitarian relationship vis-à-vis Eurocanadians. In contrast to White, who suggests that colonial relations formed a ‘middle ground’ of cultural interaction and mutual reinvention, Harkin argues that missionization involved a ‘fundamentally negative process of the suffusion of techniques of power throughout the Heiltsuk life world’, which eroded Heiltsuk control over their community (p. 156). Despite this pessimism, Harkin replaces earlier portraits of Heiltsuk ‘assimilation’ with a more nuanced view of their history, in which the Heiltsuk underwent enormous changes, of which they accommodated some, resisted others, and always interpreted these events in terms of their cultural experiences and their desire to maintain a unique identity and way of life.

ALX DARK


Nightsong explores the competitive performances of male a cappella choirs in South Africa. These flourish at night time and are embedded in the world of migrant labour. More recently they have become known as isicathamiya, from the Zulu word catham, to walk like a cat.

Erlmann’s study, completed in the 1980s prior to the collapse of the apartheid system, is at once a highly theoretical and empirically founded analysis. It aims to explore the ‘dialectic of individual creativity and cultural constraint, by linking intensely studied individual and local performance practices with global networks’ (p. 307), while employing an approach which ‘takes the post-structural critique seriously, and yet does not dissolve into so many stories and viewpoints’ (p. 1). The work supposedly includes a detailed discography of isicathamiya recordings up to 1990 and is complemented by a sixty-minute video of different choirs’ songs, not made available to this reviewer. The focus of this review is therefore on Erlmann’s written chapters, which circle around isicathamiya’s most common performance settings: its all-night competitions.

These events are generally held in halls of migrant hostels, where different choirs of one musical association practise and present set pieces. Performances are characterized by striking uniforms such as ‘white suits, black shirts, red ties, pocket handkerchiefs and stunning red gloves’ (p. 34), as well as choreographic elements ranging from marching steps to tap-dancing or moments of standing still punctuated by ‘hands folded in operatic fashion’ (p. 37). Similarly, these occasions are marked by poetic lyrics of struggle and heroic self-representation:
Basibiza lonk’ilizwe.
We are invited all over the country.
Sizokufa yindlala.
We’ll die of starvation.
Ngoba laphe basibiza khona asazi bantu.
Because where we are invited to, we don’t know anybody.
(‘Evening Birds’, cited on p. 234)

The girlfriends of choir members make up the majority of the audience, although some groups have large male followings. A judge decides on the winners, whose prizes range from considerable amounts of money to goats or blankets. In addition, a fund-raising rota ensures a regular income for all competitors, as profits made at these events go to each of the participating choirs in turn.

Erlmann looks beyond the night-time performance platform into the daily lives of the performers. The isicathamiya stage is scanned for the particularities of its actors’ creativity, as well as for the impacts of the South African migrant world and wide-reaching international orbits. A multifaceted portrayal of isicathamiya as ‘a forcefield of conflicting and intersecting interests, aesthetics and ideologies’ (p. xxii) is skilfully embedded and framed within the introductory and concluding words of Joseph Shabalala. His group, Ladysmith Black Mambazo, collaborated with Paul Simon to produce ‘Graceland’ and has become the most renowned in the world of isicathamiya.

Shabalala’s autobiography, although in many ways unique, stands as an example of the lives of many migrant labourers engaged in isicathamiya. Born into a poverty-stricken family of manual workers on a white landlord’s farm, Shabalala’s love of music developed at a young age and became the driving force in his life. Having left home to live in the cities, he sang in different choirs. Success came when he founded his own musical groups, which eventually allowed him to live entirely off his music. The accomplishments of Ladysmith Black Mambazo have been unmatched by others, and yet the experiences of these singers parallel those of other choir members in significant ways. All belong to South Africa’s migrant population, accounting for over seventy per cent of the overall labour force, hovering in a hazy zone between a rural life-style to which most ties have been cut and the urban communities in which few ties can be found. According to Erlmann, the lives of these workers, although highly heterogeneous, are linked by an ‘all-pervasive state of off-centredness, of fractured identities, and perpetual displacement’ (p. 107).

It is at this interstice of diverse worlds that isicathamiya exists. Two world-views clash and complement each other, as white gloves, ultimate icons of freedom from menial manual labour, and leopard-skin designs embodying the supreme power of Zulu warfare, appear on the same stage. Diverse ideologies collide, as aesthetic criteria from the rural context are thrown together with those of the dominant white order of the urban centres. The influence of recording industries and broadcasting stations, for example, moulds the songs of isicathamiya choirs according to white ideals of the ‘black civilized native’. At the same time, Erlmann underlines the creativity of migrants in shaping their own experiences. The incorporation of elements from the hegemonic order allows performers to reappropriate the logic of this order in a way that contradicts the reality of apartheid laws.
\textit{isicathamiya} provides a means for the definition of a positive self-image in a world where a ‘black person encountering a white pedestrian on a sidewalk has to step aside and use the street’ (p. 192). The silent decrees of the apartheid regime tinge every aspect of migrants’ lives. Yet, in the spotlights of a competition, enclaves of power and pride are polished out of the hardship and humiliation of urban life, as performances cross-reference the diverse fragments of migrant life, evoking experiences of bounded, collective, and rooted identities.

Critical eyes, looking for evidence of incoherence and a lack of direction supporting critiques of post-structuralism, may censure Erlmann for not always providing a clear line of argument to shed light on to the complexity of his diverse approaches to the phenomenon of \textit{isicathamiya}. However, the attentive reader will have to acknowledge the author’s deftness in interweaving a profound knowledge of contemporary anthropological theory with extensively researched South African data by providing finely sown explanations of his hypotheses and objectives at every step of argumentation.

Part 1, ‘Texts’, begins with a speech delivered by Joseph Shabalala at the University of Cape Town. Its threads are taken up in a theoretical discussion of contemporary performance studies, positioning \textit{Nightsong} among efforts ‘to insert agency and performativity into anthropology’ (p. xxiii). Three descriptive texts referring to an \textit{isicathamiya} competition add to these ideas, as does an in-depth summary of the history of this performance genre.

Part 2, ‘Spaces’, demystifies the notion of space by defining it as the ‘embodiment of an imagined order’ (p. 98) whose meaning is socially produced and therefore transformable. The following issues are explored: ‘the complex and heterogeneous life-worlds \textit{isicathamiya} performers live in; the crucial spaces: home, family, and nation constructed in and through performance; the dancing and clad body as a site and agent of aesthetic experience and as a signifier of an idealized community; the intertextuality of poetic genres; the enactment and formalization of spatial strategies within the context of competitions articulated in an aesthetics of power; the impact on \textit{isicathamiya} of the mass media, the government, the broadcasting industry, and other agents of the hegemonic order; and, finally, the ability of performers to maintain their autonomy in self-supporting associations’ (p. xxiv).

Part 3, ‘Self’, knits together aspects of Shabalala’s autobiography with theoretical issues of music history, autobiographical narrative, and anthropological analysis.

It is \textit{Nightsong}'s focus on the experiential level of migrant life, attempting to portray South Africa’s landscape and performance practices as embodiments of experiences, which most strongly induces the magnetic pull of this book. ‘Unhomeliness’ is identified as the norm of migrant life experience, ‘a condition in which the border between home and world becomes confused, in which the private and the public become part of each other...the shock of recognition of the world-in-the-home, the home-in-the-world’ (p. 103), leaving the individual with an acute sense of disorientation and lack of collective identity. In this context, Erlmann identifies \textit{isicathamiya} as a key force in revitalizing the ‘homely’ epitomized in a bounded sense of the self and its community. In short, ‘to sing \textit{isicathamiya} is to be at home’ (p. 133).

KAREN LÜDTKE

Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* is arguably the greatest book ever written on the relationship between religion, culture, and society. Since its publication in 1912, it has had an immense and varied influence on sociology, anthropology, and the modern study of religion. The book has, it is true, been subjected to many criticisms, particularly over Durkheim’s use of ethnography. Its enduring influence rests not on its ethnography, however, but on its ambitious and imaginative exploration of the social basis of beliefs, rituals, and modes of thought. As is well known, this influence has been evident in various forms of functionalism and structuralism, but it is also apparent in the work of philosophers and social theorists such as Bataille, Foucault, Baudrillard, and Girard. This influence is one source of an evident renewal of interest in the book among contemporary scholars of culture and society, a renewal also encouraged by the publication of Karen E. Field’s new translation in 1995. This new collection of essays adds to this resurgence of interest, with contributions from anthropologists, sociologists, and philosophers, whose essays are characterized by a sensitive exploration of Durkheim’s text, a serious concern with its historical context, and a desire to assess its relevance to contemporary social, philosophical, and moral questions.

The book arises from a conference organized by the British Centre for Durkheimian Studies. Such collections can make unsatisfactory books, but it is to the credit of the editors that they have produced a well-structured, coherent set of essays of a uniformly high standard. They are loosely structured into the themes of methodology, beliefs, rituals, and epistemology—a structure mirroring that of Durkheim’s book, though there is plenty of crossover between the essays. The methodological essays are characterized by the exploration of the influence of a number of Durkheim’s contemporaries and predecessors. Morphy’s examination of the influence of Spencer and Gillen is sensitive and illuminating, while Merllie’s account of Durkheim’s disagreement with Lévy-Bruhl concerning the distinction between modern and ‘primitive’ modes of thought demonstrates that Lévy-Bruhl’s arguments were a great deal more subtle than has often been understood. Jones’s essay is also a detailed and valuable account of how significant developments in Durkheim’s sociology of religion emerged through his responses to the arguments of Boutroux. It is in relation to issues of belief, ritual, and epistemology, however, that a series of disagreements between the various authors become apparent.

The debate about whether Durkheim prioritizes belief or ritual in his study of religion and society has a long history, and is very much evident in some of the papers here. Steadman Jones and Watts Miller argue that Durkheim prioritizes belief, while Ruel attacks anthropologists such as Radcliffe-Brown and Victor Turner for their focus upon ritual, which he believes they treat independently of religious beliefs. Strenski, however, in his impressive examination of the influence of the Indologist Sylvain Lévi, argues that for Durkheim, as for Guyau, ritual is the privileged mode of religious life. A similar suggestion is implicit in Thompson’s elaboration of a theory of sacred identity in relation to modern and postmodern social forms. Making the sort of
association between beliefs, symbols, and ritual to which Ruel objects, Thompson treats beliefs as ideologies, which he relates to symbolic communities. His account of Durkheim's discussion of tattooing in *The Elementary Forms*, for example, emphasizes how tattoos are a symbolic representation of belonging to emotionally grounded communities. Paoletti's account of Durkheim's theory of social symbolism rests on similar arguments.

The essays also reflect a series of significant disagreements over the philosophical characteristics and implications of Durkheim's arguments. Watts Miller, for example, offers a Kantian reading of Durkheim, while the influence of Kant is questioned in papers by Godlove and Schmaus. The subject of 'collective effervescence' produces a particularly interesting series of interpretations and assessments. As Pickering notes in his introduction, effervescence has been a relatively neglected subject among scholars of Durkheim. It is raised in many of the papers here, however, such as Morphy's essay on Durkheim's relationship with Spencer and Gillen, and is the central subject of a number of the chapters. Ramp's essay discusses effervescence as the arousal of a 'liminal energy' that not only binds individuals together, as functionalist interpreters of Durkheim emphasize, but also calls individuals out of themselves, stimulating the individual's experience of transcendence, and the social body's renewal of its collective energy. Allen's account of effervescence examines it in terms of helping to explain the origins of human society. Beginning with a sensitive account of Durkheim's evolutionism, Allen notes that primate descriptions of 'chimp carnivals' suggest the pre-human origin of effervescent gatherings. He goes on to argue that it is such gatherings that help explain the creative beginnings of early patterns of human sociality, which makes them greatly relevant to tetradic theory and palaeoanthropology. Németh's essay is more critical of the concept, accusing Durkheim of a 'fatal circularity' of argument dependent on a 'dubious theory of creativity'; but his attempts to elucidate the 'shaky edifice' of Durkheim's theory are not entirely convincing.

It is the diversity of interpretations of the *Elementary Forms*, however, and the high standard of scholarship supporting these interpretations, that makes this such an illuminating book to read. It will be of particular interest to students of Durkheim, but should also be of value to a broader range of scholars interested in the role of religion in relation to society and culture, as well as to those concerned with questions about the origins of sociality and social creativity.

PHILIP A. MELLOR


In this monograph, Mundy uses detailed statistical and ethnographic material to provide fresh and provocative insight into the political organization of Middle Eastern agricul-
tourists. Locating her study in a fertile agricultural valley outside Sana'a, the Yemeni capital, Mundy draws on extensive questionnaires, personal life histories, and written legal documents to argue that analyses of social polity must begin not with abstract notions of 'tribe', but with the economic and social organization of house and households. Her documentation is most impressive. Particularly suggestive is her notion that tribal identity emerges from practical negotiations over land alliances between families. By focusing on the strategic decisions that individuals make, her work provides valuable perspectives on the roles women play in establishing the terms of local identity and the boundaries of community.

In the introductory chapter, Mundy outlines some of her general criticisms of ethnographies of Middle Eastern tribes. She begins chapter two by presenting emic models of community and place, outlining three common idioms of membership that relate to (a) interpretations of the past, (b) notions of social status, and (c) the constitution of the local political community. These distinctions position her nicely to articulate transformations in identity not only historically, but also in terms of status hierarchies. Her attention to the ways members of various status and occupational groups view the community differently offers a challenge to analytical perspectives that rely on a single informing idiom such as patrilineal descent or segmentalism.

There are two essential points to the third chapter. First, the household is a central arena for litigation: at least half of the disputes in the community occur between close relatives or members of the same household. Acknowledgement of such a site of negotiation helps turn the ethnographic lens from disputes and mitigation between analytically segmentable communities to the ongoing transformations made within the community. Secondly, the state has long been present in such domestic litigation through the application of Islamic law in disputes over property transfer and inheritance. Legal traditions can legitimately be theorised beyond the analytic confines of state and tribe.

Chapter four lays out the basic issues of land ownership as it relates to households, professions, and transformations induced by oil revenues and migrant remittances. This general background provides a context for the detailed statistical analysis of houses and households in the following chapter. Mundy’s skill in identifying the patterned differences in structure and social life of families with land and those without makes this one of her strongest chapters. Her attention to the cases of several women heads of households reveals particularly well the power that women can exercise through conjugal strategies, bargaining, and solidarity. Moreover, a concise review of Middle Eastern kinship studies as developed by Western and Arab scholars introduces this chapter in a way that frames the material as especially germane.

Chapters six and seven focus on marriage transactions and patterns among differently privileged groups. One of the most salient arguments in these chapters is that alliance, rather than descent, is the most important idiom for political solidarity. In the practices of daily negotiations over resources, people are most often concerned with active relations rather than ideal, schematic models. This is particularly true for women, as is shown in a number of case-studies. In chapter seven, Mundy argues for a holistic approach to kinship and marriage that views alliance in relation to land, status, class, language, and Islamic legal tradition rather than to any single imperative. While this is not a new idea, Mundy provides extensive documentation suggesting why
and how certain alliances—especially those between the landed—tend to be more
durable than others. Unfortunately, these points tend to be buried in extremely dense
description and diagrams that only a few persistent readers are likely to follow.
Greater narrative imagination here would certainly have made the material more
accessible.

Having reviewed some of the more valuable points of the book, I would like to
consider critically Mundy’s admonitions against analyses of social and political com-

munity that begin with notions of ‘tribe’. Her main target is, of course, segmentary
lineage logic. Summarizing the thesis of her book in the introduction, she writes: ‘we
need to build a corpus of documentation in terms other than the segmentary problem-
ic, in terms not of tribes against the state, but of village alliances, regional systems
and nationalist leadership’ (pp. 5–6). Her focus on alliance rather than descent is an
important step towards acknowledging the agency of individuals in the community and
recognizing individuals as differently positioned and advantaged. However, the
segmentary as it has been reworked does not preclude recognition of cross-cutting
alliances, networks, or alternative models; it is importantly one among a number of
models that can be utilized. While more relevant at the broader, public levels of
politics, it has been one of the most durable conceptual maps in Yemen and can only
be systematically marginalized through exercising a degree of oversight.

Mundy rightly calls attention to the existence of distinctive regional patterns of
economic exchange and historical experience that have received little attention in
studies of the relation between the local and translocal. However, she gives no indica-
tion of what these regional zones might be. Moreover, her theory of regionalism is
sparsely developed. She makes only fleeting reference to it in the first chapter—as a
collection of myths about place (pp. 27–8)—and, as if in apology, in the conclusion,
where it appears as a distinct product of economic geography and state centralization
(pp. 202–3). The power of the concept of regionalism, however, lies in its deep-rooted
existence as an ideology that predates the modern nation-state and is institutionally as
well as morally inscribed.

Finally, Mundy’s interest in theorizing the relations of nationalist leadership to
locality would suggest she consider how discourses of community are used by leaders
and to what effect. Such an approach could not fail to acknowledge ‘the tribe’ (al-
quabilah) as a mode of representation that is pragmatically and discursively variable.
Mundy clings to a notion of tribe as a legal unit that is somehow beyond local practice.
Juxtaposing ‘the tribe’ to the local, she explains that ‘the higher-level rural political
unit, the qabilah...is a different kind of social framework, one that has long been the
unit of administration for the government’ (p. 201). Her monograph is principally
concerned with the legal, social, and economic underpinnings of community. However,
a recollection of Fortes and Evans-Pritchard’s early emphasis on the importance of the
moral—and in particular the symbolic—to political relations is in order. Mundy’s
persistent efforts to render the ‘tribe’ epiphenomenal to more material imperatives
prevents her from coming to terms with political discourses and events that may not
map neatly on to statistically derived demographic patterns.

Despite these shortcomings, Mundy has produced an extremely suggestive and
meticulously documented argument for resituating the ethnography of what have often
too readily been labelled ‘tribal’ areas of Yemen. Her attention to the social fissures,
hierarchies, and networks of community, and their accompanying economic and legal contexts, offers a more agent-centred approach to alliance and identity than has been developed by previous ethnographers of the Yemeni social polity. Her monograph is an all-too-rare testimony to the value of closely interrogating analytic models of community through empirical methods and cautious inference.

W. FLAGG MILLER


Carolyn Nordstrom initially designed the research for A Different Kind of War Story as a 'comparative study of warfare' which would relate findings on war in Mozambique to her earlier work on Sri Lanka. The approach she takes is unconventional, in terms of both the discipline of anthropology and academic studies of war. Nordstrom describes her book as an 'ethnography of a warzone', an 'experimental methodology based on studying a process (political violence and creative resistance) rather than a...circumscribed locale.... [It] is grounded in a topic and a process rather than a place' (p. 10). She gives a coherence to the war stories she has collected from different parts of the huge and diverse country of Mozambique through a notion of 'cultures of violence, survival and creative resistance', which she defines as 'shared information on war and surviving war linking people war-wide' (pp. 10-11). Nordstrom hopes her work 'will suggest theories of human behaviour' and frames her discussion of Mozambique in a moral context 'intended to instruct' and to help us 'to do something about the atrocities of war' (p. 29).

Nordstrom did her fieldwork in Mozambique between 1988 and 1996, with the greater part conducted during the course of the war itself. Her reflexive discussion of the ethical and practical problems involved in studying a war while it is actually happening is both extended and frank. When she began her first study of the war in Sri Lanka in 1983, she relates how she 'did not really understand the dangers possible—both to me and to people with me.... While the data I collected were invaluable, hindsight has led me to conclude that our discipline would well be advised to provide its researchers with a more realistic and critical methodology than I first took with me to the field' (p. xvii). Doing research during a war 'involves a number of responsibilities above and beyond those associated with more traditional ethnography: responsibilities to the fieldworker's safety, to that of her or his informants' (pp. 8-9).

Nordstrom based herself somewhere in Zambézia province in northern Mozambique (she decides not to tell the reader exactly where), but she also includes material from her fairly extensive travels throughout the country. According to her own description, she worked mainly in government-controlled areas, moving around mostly by airlift and armed convoy thanks to travel permits from the Ministry of Health. Nordstrom describes visiting 'a fairly representative sample of “runway” locations',
often only for a day at a time; she did not travel to 'extremely remote no man’s lands', though she did try to interview people displaced from them (pp. 42–3). But moving around was not the only problem she faced: Nordstrom discusses the difficulty of interpreting the information she collected under the heading ‘factx’, a term she creates ‘to underscore the observation that, at least in the context of war, something is always wrong with the facts that one is given. The facts of war emerge as essentially contested figures and representations everyone agrees are important, and no one agrees on’ (p. 43). Nor were the challenges of wartime research over when Nordstrom left Mozambique: on her return, she faced audiences who repeatedly questioned her motivation. ‘People want to know why I do this research. Do I get some kind of thrill from it? Have I become addicted to the excitement of the frontlines? Is there some kind of inescapable perverse fascination in horror?’ (p. 19).

By aiming to focus on process rather than place, on common war stories and the practice of research in a war zone rather than attempting specific historical reconstructions, *A Different Kind of War Story* will inevitably disappoint those wanting to know more about the local dynamics of Mozambique’s complicated war. The personal testimonies and wartime vignettes that Nordstrom relates are often only vaguely linked to particular places. For example, we are told several stories from the turbulent history of a ‘fairly inaccessible’ town in Zambezia which Nordstrom fictitiously names ‘Ekani’. Ekani was occupied by Renamo, who allowed ‘white men’ to exploit its ‘rich mines of precious metals and gems’ and subsequently ‘left all the mines and equipment smashed on their departure’. The town was later reclaimed for the government by Parama forces (pp. 89–95). Ekani’s war is compared to the ‘quiet war’ of parts of Niassa Province and accounts of the war in other parts of the country drawn from the existing literature. The book has some interesting detail about the Parama forces that were so important in wartime Zambézia, including an interview with their leader Manual António before his death in 1991. Nordstrom recounts the legendary tales of Parama magic and discusses the Paramas’ changing role, tactics, and reputation, as they became ‘a force to be reckoned with’ in a number of unspecified places in Zambézia.

Nordstrom uses war stories from different parts of Mozambique to make points about common experiences throughout the country. In a discussion of coping with violence, healing, and social reintegration, for example, she chooses to emphasize what is shared over diversity and argues for ‘the truly national extent of this system of resisting and resolving violence’. She elaborates: ‘From the south of Maputo to the north of Niassa, from urban centres to rural outposts, from refugee camps to burned-out villages, every place I visited hosted people who shared a similar view about dealing with violence’ (p. 147). By asserting the importance of common responses, specific healing, religious and political traditions become merely ‘coded’ forms of a universal Mozambican response, unworthy of much elaboration.

Yet it would be unfair to judge the book for something it did not intend to do. Nordstrom’s book is valuable reading for anyone contemplating the academic investigation of political violence and wrestling with the problems of how to do so from within a discipline that demands participant observation.

JOANN McGREGOR

This is an exciting collection of essays about the seductive power of deviant activity. The ethnographer’s tools are brought to bear on deviance in its shifting social context, resulting in a rich and engaging understanding. The investigations reported in the book conjure up a world far removed from most academic criminology, which, in its search for objectivity, often becomes turgid and sterile. This work, by contrast, is fertile and pulsating. The lifeblood of the subject flows. The criminological expertise is made vivid and stimulating.

As with any ambitious project, a number of methodological and analytical limitations emerge. The technique of criminal *Verstehen*, and the blurring of distinction between researcher and research subject which it allows, form the conceptual core of this work. The dialectical nature of the research enterprise is drawn out and itself becomes a focus of inquiry. This approach is a useful route into the meaning of lives lived on the margins of society. However, it is not well suited to the study of serious crimes such as rape, murder, and child abuse, where the ethical objections to participant observation, confidentiality, and amorality would be insuperable. Furthermore, although we are given tantalizing glimpses into criminal decision-making, this deep appreciative understanding is not always accompanied by wide generalizability—changing contexts require new explanations. None the less, there is plenty here to whet the appetites of quantitatively oriented criminologists.

The human consequences of the research process are central to this work. Every author has a tale to tell. Some of the activities covered are legal (the training of police gun teams, telephone sex work, and skydiving). Others rank low in the crime hierarchy (graffiti art and marijuana-growing). Some of what we read is obvious but rarely articulated, and there are also some genuine insights. The real dilemmas which sometimes confront field researchers are laid bare. As Tunnell puts it in his contribution on property offenders, ‘This chapter is my confessional of participating in illegalities, intentionally taking sides, withholding information, deceiving, and lying to authorities’.

The subject-matter is wide. Hamm relates his attempt to understand what drove Timothy McViegh to bomb Oklahoma City, causing 167 deaths. Mattley describes the ‘stigma by association’ she encountered as a result of her research with telephone sex workers: her colleagues extended her little academic credibility, but exhibited a high level of salacious interest in the detail of her work; interactions with male colleagues became sexually charged. Jacobs analyses the emotional toll of being robbed at gunpoint and then harassed at home by a ‘trusted’ informant. Kraska realises, to his alarm, that as he spends time shooting with police paramilitary units, he begins to enjoy the experience of militarism, which he abhors on intellectual grounds.

Fleisher’s fieldwork with youth gangs angers him. His comments are hard hitting and he is not afraid to point the finger: ‘I despise the parents...for perverting and transforming children into teenage urban predators.... Kids who are beaten need security, protection and treatment. Adults who beat kids need to be in a prison cell,
not on a therapist's couch. It's that simple.' Such directness makes a refreshing change from the stilted prose of traditional criminology.

Lyng's research took him over the edge. His adoption of extreme skydiving led to significant shifts in his own behaviour and self-concept which culminated in a near-fatal motorcycle accident. As the web of deviant activities was spun, so the motif of Lyng's life became voluntary risk-taking. As dangerous activities were mastered, new risks were introduced so that participants could once again approach the 'edge' separating life from death. Closeness to the edge made life worth living. The risks associated with skydiving were artificially raised by jumping in dangerous weather conditions or under the influence of intoxicating substances. Success at skydiving led to a search for other methods of demonstrating one's survival skills. This included motorcycling riding at speed.

Lyng charts how he moved towards the edge and then pulled it closer as it drifted away. His experience of dancing at the edge led to a personal transformation: '...what had started as an intellectual quest to understand the edgework phenomenon became a sensual attraction to the experience itself. The impulse nexus, which had constituted only a small part of my self-concept in the years before I began this research project, grew in relation to the other dimensions of self as I became increasingly addicted to edgework.' Lyng's essay outlines the personal risks of field research. It shows how experiential change can have bone-splitting consequences, and how the ethnographer's craft can shape his life.

A measure of the success of this collection is its pace and readability. Readers will be pulled through the chapters by the intrinsic worth of the subject-matter, the lively style of writing, and the coherence of the intellectual argument. The book's focus on the dangers and pleasures of the criminal moment provides a nuanced account of deviant activity. The authors have managed to reintroduce themselves into their research stories, and by doing so, make a valuable contribution to criminological knowledge.

IAN O'DONNELL


In paying close attention to the dynamics of development funding, Dams as Aid is a useful companion volume to an earlier generation of critiques of Nordic countries' aid programmes (e.g. O. Therkildsen, Watering White Elephants?, Uppsala: Scandinavian Institute of African Studies 1988). That said, however, the current volume does demonstrate important changes in critical concerns about development aims since the 1980s, from poverty and primary health care to environmentalism. The basic thesis of Dams as Aid is that dams and hydropower technologies have become increasingly unpopular in the West, in terms of both their environmental impact and the political
mobilization of the populations affected by flooding. With the declining market for
dam-building projects in-country, argues Usher, major Nordic companies and para­
statals have increasingly relied upon building infrastructure in the Third World for their
profits. At the same time, Nordic development agencies have found dam-building
projects a relatively straightforward means for disbursing aid, even though such projects
are characterized by frequent cost overruns, well-known technical problems such as
siltation, and basically unsustainable maintenance costs for electricity-generating
equipment. Accordingly, an alliance has been forged between dam-builders and
development bureaucracies through which donor-funded projects provide major support
for Nordic industry. Perhaps this is controversial in the context of Scandinavian aid,
but to British observers it comes as no great surprise, given the ‘development’ policies
of the previous UK government.

That said, the editor and contributors do extensively document the intimate net­
works of links between companies and developers, in Norway and Sweden as well as
in three case-studies (Theun Hinboun, Laos; Pangani, Tanzania; Bio-bio, Chile). One
of the strengths of the analysis is the ‘triangulation’ the authors achieve through the
detailed study of the reality of dam-building on the ground and interviews with devel­
opment bureaucrats, industrialists, and environmental campaigners in Scandinavia. This
‘triangulation’ is made possible through systematic contributions from local social
scientists (Mung’ong’o in Tanzania; Silva in Chile), environmental/indigenous rights
activists (Lovgren, Vedin in Sweden; Dalland in Norway) and journalists (Ryder on
Theun Pangoun, and Usher herself, who contributes five of the eleven chapters). The
analysis provides extensive evidence of (at least passive) collusion to promote dams by
governments, policy-makers, development agencies, and industrialists; and it documents
the secrecy surrounding decisions to fund dams. Chapter 6 in particular describes the
atmosphere of ‘pervasive appraisal optimism’, in which the positive outcomes of dam­
projects are emphasized while their negative potential and environmental-impact
assessments are systematically denied, concealed, or ignored. As a brief account of the
internal workings of aid bureaucracies (and their different institutional cultures regard­
ing official secrecy), this chapter is essential reading for tyros to the aid game or for
development workers gaining their first experience of working with Norad, Sida, and
the other Nordic agencies. Whether civil society is the vehicle through which this
culture of appraisal optimism can be countered (as the book argues) is, however, a
debatable point. In this connection, it will be interesting to see how the forthcoming
Freedom of Information Bill squares with the emphasis on ethical development policy
over the next few years in Britain.

As readers will have gathered, this is a worthy and important set of case-studies
of the workings of development agencies in one sector of donor aid. It exhaustively
catalogues the ecological and social consequences of dams (both large and relatively
small). In its concern with the rights of indigenous people and smallholder farmers,
it supports the crying need for more socially aware development policy and practice.
It shows how development is situated in structures of (neo-?) colonialism, not least in
the Arctic north of Sweden and Norway. The solutions it offers, of greater democratic
debate on infrastructural development projects and the complete cessation of dam­
building in the South, are certainly environmentally worthwhile. But the book fails to
address the question of whether environmental concerns are so pervasive in the South
that dams would cease to be built (see G. Chapman, *Environmentalism, the Mass Media and the Global Silent Majority*, University of Sussex and ESRC 1997), or whether dam-building is any different from other aid sectoral programmes in its combination of appraisal optimism and technical incapacity. The search for ‘Modernity’ and ‘Development’ are just as attractive to the elites and electorates of the South as they were to the citizens of post-war Europe, and it is just as difficult to achieve a balance between economic growth and environmental sustainability.

BARRIE SHARPE


This book evolved from three years’ research undertaken by Simon Sinclair at the Department of Anthropology at the London School of Economics and Political Science. It incorporates the results of a one-year field study he carried out at the University College London Medical School between 1993 and 1994, and forms one volume in a series entitled ‘Explorations in Anthropology’. Sinclair addresses a number of complex notions based on concepts of ‘disposition’ and ‘medical habitus’, and relates these to the changes that have occurred between student entry to the institution through to the final pre-registration year of the qualified houseman. He makes considerable use of the extended metaphor of the theatre as applied to the construction of the institution to medicine’s ‘social stage’, the pre-clinical student being seen as a member of an ‘audience’ progressing through clinical experience to doctor or full member of the ‘acting’ cast. The analogy of this transition is extended to the ‘frontstage idealistic’ presentation and performances of clinical students and housemen and their ‘backstage’ preparatory and ‘economic’ work, showing how these parameters change in the course of training. Sinclair describes how the dispositions of professional medicine, namely competition and co-operation, knowledge, experience, responsibility, status, and (personal and professional) idealism, can be seen to change in conjunction with the changing perspectives described by Howard S. Becker et al. (*Boys in White: Student Culture in Medical School*, University of Chicago Press 1961).

In *Making Doctors*, Sinclair has written an ‘insider’s’ account of medical students’ official and unofficial activities from the benefit of personal experience (as a medical doctor) and as a trained anthropologist, although this introduces problems of the subjectivity of personal experience rather than objective observation into his study that are never fully confronted or resolved. In particular, he states that his research was largely concentrated upon the particular areas into which he was drawn by his own colour, sex, and social background (pp. 97–8, 127). This would seem more acceptable had the book not claimed to provide ‘an examination of the current state of medical training in the UK’, looking ‘not only at medical students’ “official activities” [i.e. what they need to do to qualify] but also their “unofficial” ones’ (as it says in the
publisher's blurb). However, the study's reference base seems to focus on rather too narrow a field of students. Sinclair might, for example, have benefited from considering other comparable student experiences, such as those of veterinary, nursing, or law students, or by widening the London-centred view based on one large teaching hospital to consider provincial medical schools.

The book is organized thematically with an introduction, nine subsequent chapters, and a brief final chapter or epilogue for concluding remarks. Chapter 1 introduces Sinclair's personal background and place in the study, describes the methodology used for the field research element, and outlines his aims. The book is claimed to be 'unusual in two respects, geographical and ethnographic' in representing the 'first anthropological or sociological study of basic medical training in England' (p. 3). His intention is to understand more fully the way the training collectively transforms individuals and thus the effect of training on students' mental well-being (p. 4).

Chapter 2, entitled 'Deriving Medical Dispositions', begins by discussing the role of the training institution and compares it with other institutions such as prisons or asylums. This chapter briefly examines the reasons for and effects of learning the rituals and language of medicine, citing their importance in examinations and assessments—a theme developed further and in greater depth in subsequent chapters.

Chapter 3 presents a brief historical overview of medical training, looking particularly at the development of the professional dispositions of knowledge, experience, and responsibility from a system based on a 'one-to-one master-to-apprentice relationship' to a university and hospital-based system with multiple students and, later, multiple masters under the 'firm' system of medical training. Sinclair adds valuable professional insight to the significance of the anatomical approach central to Foucault's concept of the 'medical gaze', observing that 'the common-sense perception of seeing and touching gives rise to a personal certainty through such combined sensory experience'. He suggests that in addition to the professional (public) disposition of knowledge, this 'combined sensory experience' (particularly a sensory combination of oral instruction, sight, touch, hearing, and smell) developed the personal professional disposition of experience.

Chapter 4, 'Medical Status: getting into Medical School', looks at the background to application and entrance to medical school but disappointingly imparts an impression of generalization and stereotyping.

Chapter 5 looks particularly at co-operation and the importance of the 'team' and the effect of segregation (and aggregation) on the new students during 'Freshers' Week'. Again, Sinclair appears to overstress the significance of events that are recognisably part of a wider student culture.

Chapter 6 examines the pre-clinical acquisition of knowledge firstly through the group scenario of lecture theatres and secondly through private study. In addition to obvious dramatic associations, Sinclair demonstrates the role of the attending audience with particular patterns of behaviour and response to specific subjects and lecturers. The nature of medical knowledge is examined, especially the tenacious assumptions of Western medicine and the significance of language, learning a medical vocabulary and its correct usage, and the resultant 'loss' of lay meanings.

Chapter 7 examines the pre-clinical learning experience further through the role of the dissecting room interpreted as representing a 'rite of passage to be endured' (p.
194) as a practical first approach to a 'patient'. Theatrical metaphors are developed further, depicting the dissection room as a stage set, and a rehearsal for the operating theatre as well as the ward, for developing new roles of clinical detachment and contrasting demeanours, while the importance for status purposes of costume and 'props', e.g. white coats and surgical instruments, is demonstrated.

Chapter 8 moves to the clinical setting, where the key disposition becomes 'experience'. Ward rounds and the importance of the 'team' are the central themes. Hierarchical status of specialties, in being explained in terms of their relative contribution to the dispositions and the pressures of clinical teaching methods, are represented as societal rituals with significance in enforcing institutional conformity—with the fear of humiliation providing added pressure—which is justified by the profession's moral idealistic aims.

Chapter 9 focuses on the new doctor's one-year compulsory pre-registration experience through house jobs, in which there is a particular emphasis on the relationship between responsibility, experience, and idealism. Observance of status within the 'firm' deserves greater analysis from the wider intra-professional and lay viewpoints, although inter-professional rivalries and competition are shown to represent the move from horizontal co-operation between students to vertical co-operation within the medical 'team'.

Chapter 10, 'The Medical Habitus and Mental Illness', describes the trainees' experience of scientizing and pathologizing the world as representing a 'major cognitive shift in their aggregation to the profession' (p. 297). Chapter 11 is a short conclusion which makes several recommendations for a new basic form of medical training system based initially more on general practice than hospital specialization, resulting in a reversion to the earlier system of a 'more personal and less institutional apprenticeship' in the formative years of training.

Apart from some assumed medical and anthropological knowledge and background reading, this has a clearly written, relaxed style, well illustrated with pictorial evidence, examples taken from the field study, and well chosen diagrammatic representations. Sinclair's choice not to explore the comparative dimension must, however, to some extent reduce the book's broader significance to medical anthropology. Nevertheless, Making Doctors is both informative and thought-provoking, and offers the reader an opportunity to consider anthropological concepts in training and ritual in the medical institution generally.

HELEN SWEET


Babatunde's work explores the notions of the 'good' and 'successful' person amongst two Nigerian groups: the Bini and the Yoruba. An introduction to the Bini and Yoruba
is offered at the beginning of the volume. The second chapter is centred on metaphysical beliefs, ranging from ancestors to divinities. Chapter three focuses on some of the most important qualities of the ‘good person’ among the two groups. In the following section, the notions of personality and individual destiny are explored. Chapter five is an autobiographical account of a Yoruba man, in which key notions concerning the attribution of social value emerge. Chapter six is centred on the role of women in marriage and religious rituals. In the last chapter, the importance of social change on the value system is discussed with special reference to the oil boom and the civil war of the 1960s and 1970s.

The author’s in-depth knowledge of Nigerian society enables him to search for insights on the value systems in cosmology, reincarnation, chieftaincy, kinship, and physiology, just to mention some of the related issues covered in the text. Reference is occasionally made to colonial and post-colonial history. The vastness of the material used to support the description of what makes a ‘good’ person is fascinating. Each chapter, and indeed each page, contains valuable ethnographic material. Constant reference is made to Bini and Yoruba expressions of their value system. The work contains quotations from folk-tales, songs, prayers, proverbs, plays, and interviews. A number of customs and rituals are discussed vividly. To a non-specialist of the area as the reviewer, the ethnographic material seems extremely rich and detailed. The book represent an encyclopaedic approach to the system of Nigerian social values. Moreover a comparative perspective is adopted successfully throughout the work: Bini and Yoruba value systems are compared, pointing out similarities and stressing differences.

A few critical points should, however, be raised. The ethnography pays little attention to value negotiation and differentiation. It appears as if all Yoruba and Bini share an identical value system. Ethnic groups are often presented as juxtaposed sets of identical persons. At one point the author’s pushes the generalisation even further and speaks of cultural features of the ‘African’ (pp. 228–9) and of a ‘neo-African value system’ (p. 234). It might have helped to look at differences within groups, instead of considering ethnic and continental groups as internally homogeneous. Gender roles are briefly discussed only in one chapter. Little attention is paid to other social differences which may have relevance to the value system such as the political and parental status of individuals, or their age. The emphasis on the ‘good person’ does not enable the writer to fully address the issue of the ‘good youth’ or of the ‘good commoner’.

A related methodological critique is the lack of a dialectic approach to the relationship between the presentation of ideal cultural values and their practical application. The rich ethnographic material used seems to rely exclusively on official knowledge. Babatunde presents a clear picture of what is the normative ‘good person’. Besides leaving out differences between social groups within society, Babatunde’s approach leaves out practice. The reviewer has sought in vain for observations by the author on how values are actually set to work, negotiated, and contested in everyday life.

The presentation of Yoruba and Bini values is not static over time. Babatunde describes—with some regret—the degradation of customary values over the last decades. The set of values described throughout the book—kindness, truthfulness, bravery and respect—are termed ‘traditional’, while ‘modern’ values consist of greed, unfaithfulness, and selfishness. The latter seem to have swept away the former—
notwithstanding the author’s final appeal for a return to a unitary African tradition. The degeneration is explained with particular reference to the monetization of society, the oil boom, and military rule. The historical perspective, however, consists more of the author’s moral stance rather than an examination of the complexity of social change. The rigid dichotomy between traditional (good) and modern (bad) appears unconvincing.

A last remark on the bibliography. The work is presented as a ‘revision’ (page xiii) of the doctoral thesis accepted by the University of Oxford in 1982. However, the references in the bibliography, with very few exceptions, pre-date the achievement of the doctoral degree. More adjourned references would have certainly helped the author to insert the excellent ethnographic material in the methodological and theoretical framework it deserves.

STEFANO BONI
PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED

/S50.00/$20.00


SLOANE, PATRICIA, Islam, Modernity and Entrepreneurship among the Malays (St. Antony's Series), Basingstoke: Macmillan 1999. xi, 233 pp. References, Index. £50.00.


L’Uomo, Nos. 1 and 2, 1997.


CONTENTS

MAMATA TRIPATHY
Folk Art at the Crossroads of Tradition and Modernity:
A Study of Patta Painting in Orissa ........................................ 197–211

DONALD MACLEOD
Office Politics: Power in the London Salesroom ....................... 213–229

BRUCE CONNELL
Lexicography, Linguistics, and Minority Languages .................. 231–242

SHIRLEY ARDENER
The Funding of Social Anthropological Research: A Preliminary
Note to a Fragment of History Written by E. M. Chilver in 1955 . . . 243–250

From the Archives
E. M. CHILVER
The Organization of Social and Economic Research in the
British Colonial Territories .......................................................... 251–262

Review Article
PETER PELS
Religion, Consumerism, and the Modernity of the New Age ........... 263–272

Book Reviews
WILFRIED VAN DAMME, Beauty in Context:
Towards an Anthropological Approach to Aesthetics
Reviewed by Ed Carter ................................................................. 273–275

EKKEHART MALOTKI (ed.), The Bedbug’s Night Dance and Other
Hopi Sexual Tales
Reviewed by R. H. Barnes .......................................................... 275

THOMAS K. KAVANAGH, Comanche Political History:
An Ethnohistorical Perspective 1706–1875
Reviewed by R. H. Barnes .......................................................... 276–277
Book Reviews (continued)

ROBERT HERTZ, Sin and Expiation in Primitive Societies and
ROBERT PARKIN, The Dark Side of Humanity: The Work of Robert Hertz and its Legacy
Reviewed by Charles Stewart ........................................ 277–279

GÍSLI PÁLSSON and E. PAUL DURRENBERGER (eds.), Images of Contemporary Iceland: Everyday Lives and Global Contexts
Reviewed by Donald Macleod ..................................... 279–281

CRISCA BIERWERT (ed.), Lushootseed Texts: An Introduction to Puget Sound Narrative Aesthetics
Reviewed by Dorothy Kennedy .................................. 281–283

DAWN CHATTY, Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman
Reviewed by Jonathan Rae ........................................... 283–284

NADIA ABU-ZAHRA, The Pure and the Powerful: Studies in Contemporary Muslim Society
Reviewed by Penelope Johnstone ................................. 284–286

MALGORZATA IREK, Der Schmugglerzug Warschau–Berlin–Warschau: Materialien einer Feldforschung
Reviewed by Stefan Senders ...................................... 286–287

PENNY VAN ESTERIK, Materializing Thailand
Reviewed by Heather Montgomery ......................... 287–289

MUKULIKA BANERJEE, The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North-West Frontier
Reviewed by Steven Lyon ........................................... 289–291

Publications Received ................................................. 292–294

Index to Volume XXIX .................................................. 295–298

Contributors to this Issue ........................................... inside back cover

Copyright © JASO 2001. All rights reserved.
ISSN UK 0044-8370

Typeset in Times New Roman
Printed in Great Britain by Antony Rowe Ltd., Chippenham, Wiltshire
FOLK ART AT THE CROSSROADS OF TRADITION AND MODERNITY: A STUDY OF PATTA PAINTING IN ORISSA

MAMATA TRIPATHY

PATTA painting, or patta chitra, is one of the typical regional arts of the coastal state of Orissa in eastern India. Like any other form of painting, irrespective of time and space, it possesses its own set of meanings and purposes. In particular, it expresses some of the religious and mythological aspects of Oriya culture, focusing on the Hindu epics in general, the Mahabharata and the Ramayana, and the Jagannath cult in particular.

Patta painting is of linear design, vegetable pigments being applied to a specially prepared cloth using a brush. Although overtly religious, it does not simply express a set of religious ideas or values and is much more than a merely visual art to be looked at and be appreciated: it expresses a whole set of beliefs and practices relating to life and death held by the artisans themselves. Traditionally it was practised only by the Chitrakara caste as their caste occupation. However, although it has retained its basic characteristics, it has been affected by the advent of science and technology as well as other aspects of modernization in the twentieth century. This has had an impact in terms of technology, the materials used, commercialization, and the use of the craft. To some extent, therefore, patta painting is at the
crossroads of tradition and modernity, a situation that heralds an uncertain future for the craft. My paper is a brief discussion of this situation.

Although Chitrakaras are found at many places in Orissa, like Sonepur, Parlakhemundi and Cuttack, their major concentration is at Raghurajpur and Puri. I have taken Raghurajpur as my study area. This hamlet, in Malatipatpur gram-panchayat of Puri Sadar tehsil in the district of Puri, 13 km away from the nearest bus stop at Chandanpur and 46 km from the state capital, Bhubaneswar, along state highway 8, has 106 Chitrakaras, that is, 21.41% of the local population. The data used in my paper were collected empirically through observation, interviews, group discussions, and case-study methods.

Patta Painting

_Patta_ painting is done on a piece of primed paper or cloth called a _patta_. The term has other meanings. According to the artists themselves, in the remote past painting was done with a brush prepared from locally available screw-pine wood called _patta_. Others say that the style of painting was traditionally done on a piece of wood called a _patta_. However, the first explanation seems more authentic and is universally accepted by both artists and commentators. The use of cloth as the base on which the painting is carried out dates mythologically back to a period long in the past, the age of Dwapara, when Radha drew a picture on her letter to Krishna. Yet others argue that this style of painting is only as old as the introduction of paper in the world. In this view, in the remote past walls were the only medium of painting, on which were depicted various Hindu or tribal gods and goddesses. With the introduction of paper, however, these paintings were transcribed on to it, which the artists carried from place to place. These paintings were called _patta chitras_, and the groups who adopted this form of painting as their caste occupation became known as Chitrakaras.

Ritual Aspects of _Patta_ Painting

In Orissa, _patta_ painting owes its popularity to the Jagannath cult, with which it has long been intimately associated. The image of Jagannath is carved out of _margosa_ wood and painted by members of the Chitrakara caste, who were brought to Puri from various places as the servants of Jagannath. Besides painting the walls and images, they also provide various other paintings, also called _patta_, for the temple on various occasions. Since it is believed that all the thirty-six crore (360

---

1 Editorial note: a companion article on appliqué work in Orissa appeared in an earlier issue of _JASO_; see Samall 1998.
millions) deities of the Hindus are worshipped in the Jagannath temple complex at Puri, the number of festivals celebrated there is very considerable.

_Patta_ paintings of different deities are worshipped on a number of occasions in the Jagannath temple complex. One popular type of _patta_ painting is the _anasa-patti_. From the celestial bath on Snana Purnima (the full-moon day in the month of _jyestha_ (May–June) until the day of the famous _Ratha Yatra_, the Car festival (held on the new-moon day in the month of _ashadha_ (June–July), the supreme triad (Jagannath, Balabhadra, and Subhadra) are believed to suffer from fever and are ‘treated’ in a separate room called the _anasara ghara_. During this celestial bath, 108 pots of water are poured over each deity. As a result, the painted colours on the images are washed away, so that the images are kept in the _anasara ghara_ for repainting for fifteen days. During this period, when the images are absent from the _ratna singhasana_ (the inner sanctuary), three large _patta_ paintings of the trinity are kept inside the main shrine, as proxies of them which can be worshipped. These paintings are called _anasara patti_.

Besides the _anasara patti_, other _patta_ paintings worshipped in the temple on various occasions include the _krishna patti_, _patta_ paintings of Krishna worshipped on his birthday, the twelfth day of ‘dark fortnight’ in the month of _bhadrav_ (August–September); the _bamana patti_, a painting of Bamana, the tenth incarnation of Vishnu, worshipped on his birthday, the twelfth day of dark fortnight in the month of _bhadrav_ (August–September); and the _kandarpa patti_, paintings of Kandarpa worshipped on the twelfth and thirteen days of the bright fortnight in the month of _chaitra_ (March–April) for the welfare of the state. Thus, _patta_ painting is an important part of the Jagannath cult and is required in one form or other for temple rituals throughout the year. Other _patta_ paintings, like _yama patti_, a painting of Yama, the god of death, and _usha kothi_, depicting the story of the Goddess Mangala, are worshipped by Hindu women at other places in Orissa on the occasion of Sabitri Amabasya, the new-moon day in the month of _jyestha_ (May–June), and Mangala Puja, on each Thursday of the dark fortnight of _aswina_ (September–October) respectively. This shows that the tradition of _patta_ painting is general to the religious traditions of Orissa, even though its origin can be traced back to the Jagannath cult specifically.

The main colours used in _patta_ painting are same as those used for painting the trinity, namely _sankha_ (white), _hengula_ (red), _neli_ (blue), _pocha_ (green), _haritala_ (yellow), _kala_ (black), and _geru_ (ochre). The sequence and technique involved in the application of colours are the same for both the trinity and _patta_ paintings.

The paintings are usually based on myths in chronological order. The theme of the painting is usually dominated by Jagannath in his different postures in the Jagannath temple at Puri or Krishna and his different sacred activities. In case of the _jatripattis_, which are the earliest form of _patta_ painting, the motifs associated with the trinity always occur at the centre of the smaller paintings, while the trinity
themselves are found inside the temple in comparatively larger paintings. Apart from the *jatripattis*, there are also other paintings showing Vishnu in his various incarnations, Shiva and Ganesha, the goddesses Durga and Kali, etc. Sometimes episodes from the *Ramayana* are also painted. However, the most popular motif found in *patta* painting is Krishna in his different postures and in different activities and episodes from his life, usually accompanied by his fiancée Radha in the smaller paintings. Krishna is also painted as a child, called Bala Gopala or Bala Krishna. Smaller paintings also depict different incarnations of Vishnu (of whom Krishna is himself actually one) and episodes from the *Mahabharata* and another popular sacred text, the *Gita*. These details show that *patta* painting is largely associated with the god Vishnu.

The Sociocultural Context: The Chitrakaras as a Caste

Mythologically the Chitrakaras are believed to be the descendants of Biswakarma, the celestial architect of the Hindus, as described in the *Bramhavaibarta Purana*. They are put in the Shudra category in another Sanskrit text, the *Jatibhaskara*, which describes the Hindu caste system. While Sterling (1846: 305–38) puts Chitrakaras under the Shudra varna, Dasa (1982) says that even among Shudras they hold a low position. The Chitrakaras place themselves fourth in the local caste hierarchy. Being closely associated with the Jagannath cult, the Chitrakara population is found all over the 24 Godjats (feudatory states) of Orissa, wherever there is a Jagannath temple. Apart from Sonepur, Cuttack, Athagarh, Chikiti, and Parlakhemundi, the highest concentrations of Chitrakaras are at Raghurajpur and Puri. According to the Jagannath temple chronicle, they were first brought to Puri by the emperor Anangabhima Deva II to carry out all the painting required for the temple, which gave Chitrakara families tax-free lands. In addition, they also earn their livelihood by selling *patta* paintings of different sizes depicting the trinity of Jagannath, Balabhadra, and Subhadra to devotees and tourists visiting Puri. Apart from its association with the Jagannath cult, the style and artistic expression of *patta* painting is fostered and maintained by the social and cultural environment of the Chitrakaras. There exists a strong nexus between the social life of the Chitrakaras and their caste occupation of *patta* painting. The craft pervades all the aspects of their lives, to such an extent that the social system of the caste group is very much dependent on the craft.

*Patta* painting, being religious in origin and the main source of the caste’s livelihood, is fundamental in terms of caste solidarity. Traditionally the artists used to collect raw materials in nearby forests in groups, for protection as well as for mutual support in doing the work. Caste activities among the women act to ensure solidarity and as a medium for circulating news inside and outside the village. Women rely on men to learn about different episodes from the various epics, partly because they do not have access to the temple itself. The marketing of the
Craft also calls for group co-operation. In the past, due to poor communications, the artists used to take their products to far-off places either by bullock cart or carried on the head. In the case of the bullock cart, usually one cart was shared by a group of artisans to transport their products. While going by foot with head-loads of paintings too, they preferred to go in groups. Thus, patta painting has always been a collective effort.

Chitrakara society is subdivided into three groups or badas named after the deities of the trinity: Jagannath bada, Balabhadra or Badathakura (meaning ‘eldest deity’) bada, and Subhadra bada. The members of each group, under a separate chief, shoulder the responsibility for taking care of their respective deities by, for example, supplying the respective anasara pattis, colouring the images and their cars on the occasion of the Car festival, and painting the deities throughout the year as necessary. Marriage in Chitrakara society is also directly governed by the craft. In the past, in order to safeguard the religious sanctity of the craft, marriage was not allowed outside Puri town. In course of time, even though marriage ties have been formed outside Puri, knowledge of patta painting was considered one of the major criteria for selecting a spouse. One of the main features informing the uniqueness of the craft is that patta painting is a family or household craft. All of the procedures involved in patta painting are carried out by different members of the same household. Every member of the Chitrakara family, irrespective of sex, contributes to the painting work under the guidance of the family head or senior adult male member. All the major prerequisites for the painting, like the canvas, colour, brushes etc., were traditionally prepared within the Chitrakara family.

Canvas

In the remote past, primed paper was used as the base of the painting. Then paintings of different sizes were produced, which were basically meant for the devotees or jatris coming from far and wide, who used to take these paintings back with them as souvenirs of the pilgrimage. They also used to worship these at home as representatives of the trinity. These paintings are called jatri pattis (from jatri ‘pilgrim’, plus patti ‘painting’).

In course of time, the Chitrakaras used primed cloth as the base or canvas for the painting work. This canvas was prepared by applying tamarind glue (prepared from tamarind seeds) and chalk solution on clean cotton saris or dhotis in two or three layers. The preparation of such canvases requires skilled knowledge.

The process has the following four stages: (1) preparation of glue from tamarind seed; (2) preparation of chalk power solution; (3) application of glue and chalk powder over the cloth; and (4) polishing the surface of the primed cloth by rubbing it with a stone, which makes it very smooth for painting.

In order to prepare the canvas further, a clean cotton sari or cloth about 5–5.5 metres in length is taken and the thin borders cut off. Then the sari or cloth is cut
into two equal halves and spread lengthways over a plain mat. Tamarind glue is thickly and uniformly applied to the cloth with the help of another piece of cloth. The other half is then spread over the first by two people. Utmost care is taken so that no crease is left between the two layers of cloth. Another thick coat of tamarind glue is applied on this second layer and left to dry. After it has dried thoroughly, the cloth is gently taken away from the mat. This primed cloth, locally called a *patti*, is kept under the sun for a day or two to dry better. Sometimes three layers of cloth are used to make the *patti* stronger and more durable. Once the *patti* has dried thoroughly, a solution of chalk powder is applied on both the sides with a piece of cloth and left to dry. Two or three such coatings of chalk solution are applied, with an interval for drying each time, to make the canvas more perfect and thus reduce the amount of colour consumed in painting.

After this the last phase of preparation begins, that is, smoothing the canvas, which is locally called a *pattighasa*. The canvas or *patti* with chalk solution on it has a white but rough surface which needs polishing properly to be rendered suitable for being painted. For this the canvas is spread on the cleaned floor and rubbed in two phases, first with a rough surfaced stone called *bagada barada*, and then with a comparatively smooth and polished stone called *chikkana barada*, till the surface of the canvas becomes completely polished and fit to be painted. A small amount of chalk-powder solution is applied with tamarind glue to give the *patti* a more glazed effect. This preparation of the canvas takes quite a long time and is carried out by both male and female members of the Chitrakara family. Preparation of the tamarind glue and the chalk-powder solution, as well as smoothing the surface, are usually done by the women. while the preparation of the canvas itself, that is, the application of tamarind glue and chalk-powder solution to the cotton cloth, is carried out by the men.

In preparing the tamarind glue, insect-free, good-quality seeds are soaked in water overnight and are then made into pulp by grinding. The pulp is then mixed with water in a 1:2 ratio and is kept on the hearth for 30–45 minutes until it becomes sticky and semi-solid. In preparing the chalk solution, a white chalk locally called *khadi pathara* is ground to a fine powder and mixed well with water in a 1:2 ratio. To make it sticky 400 gm of tamarind glue is mixed together with 1 kg of chalk powder.

Colour

The colours used in *patta* painting have their own symbolic associations. All the basic colours are prepared by the artisans themselves at their home. Since *patta* painting was traditionally exclusively sacred in nature and owes its birth to the Jagannath cult, there seems to be a coherent correlation between the colour scheme used in *patta* painting and the colours used for the Jagannath trinity. The way the Chitrakaras analyse the colours centred round the Jagannath cult. Instead of the
three primary colours in the scientific sense, namely red, blue, and yellow, there are six in the tradition of *patta* painting, which are directly used for the supreme triad. These are (i) white (*sankha*), (ii) black (*kola*), (iii) cinnabar (*hengula*), (iv) yellow (*haritala*), (v) ochre (*geru*), and (vi) green (*pacha*).

These colours are all prepared at home from natural resources, like conch shells, leaves, or mineral stones, following processing. White is prepared from conch shells, which are ground into very tiny pieces and soaked with water. This pulp is then boiled twice or more to obtain the white colour. Black is prepared by mixing the soot of a kerosene lamp with locally available *polanga* or coconut oil. Cinnabar, yellow, and ochre are prepared from different minerals, which are ground to fine powder before water is added, along with a little extract from the elephant-apple tree in different proportions for the different colours, the whole being mixed well until it becomes even and uniform. All these colours are stored in the form of capsules. Apart from these six basic colours, all the compound colours are prepared by mixing the basic colours in specific proportions.

**Application of Colour**

Chitrakaras strictly follow the Hindu *sastras* and *puranas* while applying colours to the motifs of gods and goddesses. Generally, all goddesses are painted yellow, while the gods are painted white. However, in an individual painting, i.e., a painting depicting only one god or goddess, he or she is coloured according to the descriptions given by the Hindu scriptures. For example, Krishna is always painted blue, Ramachandra white or light blue, Ganesha white or off-white, and the goddess Saraswati white. Balabhadra, Jagannath, Devi Subhadra, and the goddesses Lakshmi and Sabitri are always painted white, while the goddesses Mangala, Radha, and sometimes Sita are painted yellow, which represents their fairness.

Regarding the colour of the garments worn by the deities, the artist is free to exercise his discretion in colour schemes, barring a few provisions. For example, the clothes of *rishis* and *sanyasis* who have renounced the material world is usually ochre or orange. The yellow cloth or *pitta basana* is always associated with Krishna. Since, like Krishna, Ramachandra is considered to be another incarnation of Vishnu, the usual colour used for his garment is also yellow. Similarly, as, according to Hindu scriptures, Shiva used a tiger's skin for his attire, his garment is dark yellow with dark brown or black spots.

The colour of the garments of Brahma and Vishnu is usually white. However, in Hindu mythology, all male deities are painted with the upper half of their bodies bare except for the long folded cloth on their shoulder called *uttari*. There is no strict colour scheme for the *uttari*, except those of Bramha and Vishnu, who are never painted without an *uttari*. The dress colour of almost all court attendants in a court scene is usually found to be white.
Except for Saraswati, who is always attired in white, the Chitrakara displays his artistry by painting the sari and blouse of female deities or figures in various bright colours. Usually, to make paintings attractive and colourful, deep red is used with any brightly coloured border in painting these saris. Red saris with a gold or other bright colour print over it wrapped round the yellow body of female figures are used, as well as other bright colours, like maroon, yellow, green, or blue—but never black—to paint the attire of any female figures. Deep yellow is used to paint various ornaments of both male and female figures. Colours like red and green are used to represent precious stones in their ornaments. Traditionally cinnabar was the usual colour for the background.

As the number of colours was limited and the Chitrakaras were less exposed to Hindu scriptures as well as to the outer world, due to their lack of education and difficulties of communication, there was little variation in the colour schemes of patta painting. Traditional patta paintings exhibit a high degree of homogeneity in their colour schemes.

Brushes

Unlike other paintings, patta painting is done with a special kind of brush. Traditionally the brushes were made by crushing a portion of the root of the screw-pine, locally called kia kathi. The body hair of different animals, like the buffalo, mongoose, and farm rat, was also used. The body hairs of the buffalo are used for thick brushes, while those of the mongoose and farm rat are used for thin brushes. First of all hairs 2.5–3 inches long are collected from the body of animals, from the ears or the end of the tail of the buffalo, and from the back of farm rats or field rats and mongooses, where the hairs are smoother. After cleaning the hairs thoroughly, the required quantity, i.e. 30–40 for thick brushes and 8–10 for thin brushes, are tied with thread at one end. A very little tamarind glue is applied to the hairs to make them strong. Then one bamboo stick is split up to 1.5 inches of its length and the tied end of the hairs inserted into it. The bamboo stick is then tied up tightly by thread from the outside so that the hairs are held tightly inside the bamboo. To make the whole more tight and permanent, the outer part of the stick is coated with glue from the elephant-apple tree.

The brush tips are placed carefully in fire to sharpen them. Different brushes are used for different colours and purposes. For example, a thick brush is used to colour the background of the canvas and body of the figures. Thin brushes are used for ornamentation, primary thick black lining etc. The thinnest brush, made of five or six hairs of the farm rat, is used for the final black thin lining. It is difficult to handle the latter type, which requires much expertise.

Traditionally the brushes were kept inside a bamboo container, locally called a nala. This was prepared from a hollow bamboo stem. A section from a bamboo
tree, open only at one end, is collected and dried for nearly a week. Then the outside is polished and it is used as a brush container.

Traditional Items and Types of Patta Painting

Jatripatti (painting meant exclusively for pilgrims)
In the past the only form of patta painting available on the market were jatripattis, painted on both primed paper and cloth of various shapes and sizes. It basically depicts the trinity in different postures and the architecture of the Jagannath temple at Puri.

These jatripattis are named differently according to their shape and size, for example, anguthi (circular shape of finger-tip size), gola (circular type), pancha mandiria (depicting five temples), and sankhanavi (depicting the temple's architecture on a conch-shell painting).

Ganjapa
These are circular paintings 1.2–2 cm in diameter, used as playing cards in earlier times. They were first adopted exclusively by royal or aristocratic families but later became very popular among rural people.

One set of ganjapa usually consists of 96 cards, sometimes 108 or 112. Each card is an original creation, with lively and diverse illustrations and motifs, which are supposedly never repeated.

Jautuka pedi (dowry box)
In earlier times, brides were given various household items and clothes at the time of their departure from their parents after the marriage ceremony. All these things were placed in an wooden box called a jautuka (dowry) pedi (box), painted with patta paintings. It was customary among the Chitrakaras to give such boxes of various sizes to their brides. It was also popular among other people, though not customary. Patta paintings of small size with single figures of gods and goddess were also common. Large paintings depicting various mythological stories were usually acquired by kings, emperors, and zamindars (landlords).

Marketing
Traditionally, the marketing of patta paintings was exclusively under the control of the adult or elderly male members of the Chitrakara family, who dealt with orders and fixed prices. In those days they had to go to the main road to Puri or to the Jagannath temple to sell their products to the pilgrims, and sometimes to people's homes. Sometimes they also used to sell the paintings in nearby mela (religious fairs) or markets. In the past, they used to go from place to place on foot or
by bullock cart, staying for days on end, selling their products. However, since then the craft has become modernized in almost all respects.

*Modernity in Patta Painting*

Nowadays canvases do not always have to be prepared at home, as they are available in the market or from other artisans. Chitrakaras now also use various other materials for the base of the *patta* painting, to widen their appeal to their customers. *Patta* painting these days takes different forms, and different items are produced for different purposes. The most commonly used bases are:

- **Tassar cloth.** This is one of the most popular alternatives for traditional primed cloth and refers to the painting base. The cloth is prepared from silk cocoons by weavers and is very costly. The same stories are painted in the same patterns as in the traditional primed cloth, and in different sizes. The cloth is first fixed tightly and evenly on a wooden slate or slab with the help of glue around its border, after which it is painted. On completion, two narrow wooden rods are sometimes fixed to both sides of the painting to hang it onto walls. *Tassar* paintings are lighter and occupy comparatively less space than traditional *patta* paintings on primed cloth, making them easier to carry from place to place.

- **Wood and conch shells.** These are also used as base on which *patta* paintings are made. Such articles take the form of various modern appliances, such as pen-stands, letter-stands, ashtrays, glass- and cup-covers, paperweights, etc., whether of wood or conch shells. In the case of both wood and conch shells, one or two coatings of chalk-powder solution are first applied to make the surface fit for painting. As the pieces are small, either small single motifs or floral motifs are painted.

- **Paper.** Traditionally primed paper was used only for *jatripattis* (one of the crude forms of traditional *patta* paintings meant for pilgrims), but nowadays paper bases are used in a different way. Painting is done on sheets of different sizes in the form of greeting cards and invitation cards, which have a great demand and value in the modern market. Large pieces of cardboard are also painted for use in fashionable hotels and restaurants as decorative partitions.

- **Coconuts.** Artists have also started to paint on coconuts, both skinned and unskinned, because of their durability. In the case of skinned coconuts, all the coir is carefully removed from the outer cover and made smooth enough to apply the colour. For both skinned and unskinned coconuts, the inside is first dried out by leaving them out in the sun, after which the painting process may start. The mode of painting and application of colours follow the same procedures as those used in traditional *patta* painting.

Colours are no longer prepared at home, since the traditional methods of preparing colours are very time-consuming. Artists now prefer to use the large variety
of modern colours (enamels or watercolours), which have also increased the range of colour schemes used in *patta* painting. However, paints bought in the market are sometimes mixed at home, increasing the range available still further. Education and increased access to printed and other media has also had an impact in providing a better understanding of the meaning and symbolism of the different colours. Accordingly artists have begun to use different colours for different situations, depending on their own understanding of them. For example, previously the sari of the goddess Sita (the wife of Ramachandra) was usually painted in a number of bright colours. But nowadays she is sometimes painted white to represent Sita in her sorrowful days of separation at Ashoka Bana (the forest where the demon king Ravana kept her after her abduction). Similarly, traditionally the body colour of Ganesh varied from off-white to white. Nowadays he is sometimes painted pink or light pink instead, an idea apparently borrowed from south Indian painting.

Finally, customer demands are another source of change. Traditionally *patta* painting was exclusively connected with the religious traditions of Orissa and was appreciated only by devotees and pilgrims, in the days when paintings were the only means of representing the deity apart from the images themselves. Besides the pilgrims, the devotees usually began their day’s work by worshipping them in their homes. Nowadays, however, the number of tourists exceeds that of pilgrims. At the same time, the range of customers for *patta* painting has changed from lower and lower-middle income groups (pilgrims) to upper-middle or upper-income groups (tourists), who value the paintings exclusively from an artistic, not a religious point of view, treating them as ethnic decoration for their homes. They are also generally willing to pay a higher price for them, which increases artists’ incomes. Gradually many artists almost ceased painting *jatypattis* and started satisfying tourists’ demands, which influence, among other things, the use of colour. Nowadays colours like light blue, pink, light green, and blue etc. are used as background instead of the traditional cinnabar, and whereas the borders were formerly painted black, white, ochre, or blue, nowadays black and white have largely given way to yellow, green, red, or maroon in order to attract the new type of customer. Changes are also noticeable in the colours used for the garments of the figures, which sometimes deviate from those described in the Hindu scriptures. For example, the figure of Krishna is not always decorated with yellow cloth, nor Ganesh with his usual white cloth: these can vary according to the choice and demand of the customers. The traditional polished coconut shell has also practically disappeared as a colour container, no longer being needed, as paints are now produced commercially, and bought, in tins. The use of a home-made brush has also become rare. Instead, synthetic or machine-made brushes of different sizes are used, according to purpose. The brush container or *naia*, which was previously made of bamboo, has also been replaced by any tin or plastic container that is available on the market.
Types of Painting

Some of the traditional items like jatripattis (paintings for pilgrims), ganjapa, and the dowry box are now disappearing from the market. On the other hand a large number of new paintings and items have been added to this type of art. Paintings
of various scenes from the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* now dominate. Now the figures of all the gods and goddesses may be painted, even in new designs. For example, Ganesha was traditionally painted with four hands in a sitting or standing posture. Now he is often painted with six or eight hands in various postures and colours. Participation in a number of training and workshop programmes and a
sharing of ideas with other Chitrakara and artisans from other states have helped enrich skill and knowledge and obtain new design ideas.

Marketing

Modernization has opened a wide door for the marketing of the paintings. Modern communications means being able to sell them easily in more remote places, as well as obtaining market information through the mass media. Both the union and state governments have aided marketing by organizing various exhibition-cum-sales programmes, both inside and outside the state, sponsoring artisans to go to different exhibitions outside the state, procuring products from artisans and selling them to outsiders, and organizing co-operative societies both at block and district levels. The change in the trend of production and use has also influenced the marketing of the paintings by increasing both the extent of the market and price levels.

Over the years, patta painting has gained in popularity around the world. Demand has exceeded supply, which opened the door for members of other castes to enter the field of production to bridge the gap. In fact the number of non-Chitrakara practising the craft as a source of livelihood is more than twice the number of Chitrakara. Besides the Chitrakara, other caste groups practising the craft at Raghurajpur now include Padhana (cultivators), Khandayat (warriors), Bania (goldsmiths), Badhei (carpenters), Siala (toddy-tappers), Teli (oilmen), and Brahmans. Gradually production has come to exceed demand. As a result, competition has developed between artisans, both within and outside the Chitrakara, and middlemen have become involved, often to the disadvantage of the artisans.

Changes in Sociocultural Context

The sociocultural setting of the craft has also been influenced by modernization. The availability of modern ingredients in respect of colour, brushes, etc., the improved education system, and the changed mode of marketing have had a great impact on the social life of the Chitrakaras. They no longer need to go far for the collection of raw materials: instead they buy colours and brushes from nearby markets individually (not in groups) and at their own convenience. And as customers come to them to buy their products, they need not go to far-off places. Improved education also enables artists to go through books and magazines to enrich their knowledge of Hindu mythology and other information required for painting. The modern competitive market increases competition and thus tensions among Chitrakaras as well as with respect to artists in other caste groups, which has an effect on their social relationships. Nor is marriage among Chitrakaras any longer restricted to the boundary of Puri town. Since members of other castes have also taken up the craft, there is less homogeneity in the style and presentation of present-day paintings.
But in spite of all this, other artists are very reluctant to lose the skills of the traditional type of painting and are not interested in adapting to a purely modern style of painting. Despite the opportunities provided them, they still try to collect and make the traditional raw materials and equipment used for painting the anasa patti, which is worshipped in the inner sanctum during the absence of the trinity. This indicates that the traditional values are still followed in part.

Conclusion

The age-old tradition of painting has entered a transitional phase, where it is experiencing the existence of both traditional and modern trends. Although the preparation of basic equipment and materials, like the canvas, paints, and brushes, are now greatly influenced by modern technology, the overall context of the style is still the Hindu religious tradition. Not a single painting, irrespective of its use, can be seen as 'modern art'. Paintings continue to be embellished with myths referring to Rama Yatra, Ratha Yatra, etc. and to depict mainly themes from Hindu mythological epics, reflecting Hindu religious philosophy and traditional Hindu social structure in their cultural setting. Patta paintings were undertaken by the Chitrakaras with a view to preserving the cultural and religious tradition of the society, which is not the same at the present day. The artists now regard their work as a source of income rather than a pious way to exhibit their artistic skills or preach the Hindu religion. Quality and durability, which were not compromised earlier, no longer entirely prevail in the face of the opportunities to earn money. And with the striking increase in the popularity of the craft, there has been an influx of other enterprising castes, who, in picking it up, have opened the door further to a customer-oriented market. As a result, to keep pace, the traditional artists have had to compromise with the original colour combination and quality. The quality and durability of the painting are continually becoming diluted, while use, demand, and popularity among a different public are increasing.

However, as we saw, although the craft is much influenced by modernization, some of the traditional characteristics are still deeply rooted in it. This makes for a somewhat uncertain future.

REFERENCES


AVAILABLE FROM THE EDITORS, JASO, 51 BANBURY ROAD, OXFORD OX2 6PE, ENGLAND. Tel. 01865-274682
ALL PRICES INCLUDE POSTAGE. PREPAYMENT REQUESTED.
OFFICE POLITICS: POWER IN THE LONDON SALESROOM

DONALD MACLEOD

Introduction

This article explores the concept of power, its characteristics and its manifestation in two London offices. It seeks to understand how power is utilized in the workplace and what this can tell us about the world of business and values in the industrialized West. The office is regarded as a microculture. The two organizations examined exhibit different political structures, though they share many characteristics. The research, based on participant observation, provides insight into the experiences of employees in a flexible labour market and the daily realities of work in the publishing sales industry as part of a global network of organizations.

The rapid turnover of staff in the two companies and the volume and breadth of communication are indicative of current trends in business within metropolitan centres. Certain features recur, such as managerial composition and attitudes, business target pressures and the coercive use of power. This leads us to examine the daily exercise of power and its various guises, specifically the uses of control and the reproduction of attitudes and behaviour patterns. The relationship between the metropolitan centre and the periphery is also explored, relating the use of power...

Research involved a comparative study of two sales-driven companies producing business-to-business publications and selling advertising space by telephone. Fieldwork was undertaken in central London over a period of eleven months during 1998. This work forms part of a broader project which explores political economy, globalization, and the relationship between people and their physical environment.
within the micro-culture of the office to that utilized between the office and outside clients and thereafter within the global arena. Control is differentiated into primary, secondary, and tertiary areas for purposes of analytical rigour.

Both companies worked on sociopolitical and telecommunications books, producing titles that were sponsored or edited by global organizations such as the United Nations, the International Telecommunications Union, and the Commonwealth Secretariat. These organizations require the companies to print the books and sell advertising space to finance them. Books are expected to make substantial sums in advertising fees, and the companies employ salesmen to sell space over the phone to potential clients as varied as telecommunication companies, car firms, lawyers, educational establishments, and exporters. It is with the sales department and sales process that this article is concerned.

Power, People, and Work

In her introduction to the ASA monograph *The Social Anthropology of Work*, the editor, Sandra Wallman, considers the concept of work in a cross-cultural context and declares: ‘work is “about” control—physical and psychological, social and symbolic’ (1979: 1). Further, she sees the ‘primeval purpose of work in the human need to control nature, to wrest a living from it and impose culture on it’ (ibid.). This theme is elaborated as follows:

Central to the rubric of this volume is the fact that the working relationship between man and nature is never unembroidered; and that much of the socio-cultural embroidery on work tends to be concerned with the control of one person or category of people over another—whether direct control by means of command over the actions of others, or indirect control achieved either by limiting their access to resources and benefits (cf. Nadel 1957) or by devaluing the resources and benefits which they have. These resources may pertain to any or all aspects of work. (ibid.)

Using a broader canvas for his analysis of power, Roger Keesing observes that it is conceptually ‘fuzzy’, but nevertheless feels able to write: ‘Power, virtually all analysts agree, is a matter of relationships between individuals (or units such as corporations or governments) who exert control and those who are controlled by them’ (1981: 299).

For further definitions of power, Keesing refers to R. N. Adams (as does Seymour-Smith, 1986: 230, in a dictionary of anthropology). Adams defines power as:

The ability of a person or social unit to influence the conduct and decision-making of another through the control over energetic forms in the latter's en-
In a conclusive statement, Keesing writes:

We can assume that imposing constraints on one another—being ‘powerful’—is a basic and pervasive motive in all human societies. Building up the means and resources that enable one to exercise more constraints over more people in regard to more things in a wider range of contexts is everywhere one of the dynamics of social life. To understand any society—not simply what appears as its ‘political system’, but kinship and religion as well—we must explore these dynamics. If we understand ‘power’ as a shorthand for these relationships and processes it will serve us well. (1981: 300)

This article concentrates on power which is validated through the organizational apparatus, the formal arrangement of offices of authority (management), in the sense of socially acknowledged rights to take decisions and exercise power. It looks at the way this power becomes manifest primarily through the use of control, thus maintaining existing social relationships. Through this micro-analysis of a face-to-face situation, we will be able to observe the operation of power in the workplace, which will have relevance for all comparable circumstances. The analytical framework will enable us to consider the types of control, their interconnections, and their variety.

Before I examine the concept and application of power in detail, an outline of the two companies’ formal power structures will be useful. Company A (Co. A) had a power structure consisting of a managerial pyramid, with the managing director (MD) at the top, devolving power through the following ranks: the sales director (SD), the floor managers (FM), the book managers (BM), down to the salespeople (SP). At the base of the organization, the primary producers of wealth were the sales teams, which were built around the book managers, who had recognized authority enabling them to hire and fire SPs and decide on their daily activities.

Company B (Co. B) was organized more loosely, with an MD who was effectively a dictator surrounded by a coterie of senior salespeople, some of whom had the power to hire and fire SPs. Over time a more rigid regime was implemented with managers emerging, and at one stage a new sales director was appointed (and subsequently fired after six weeks). Paradoxically, this company had advertised itself in national newspapers as being ‘without office politics’, whereas in fact there was an informal network of long-term employees who had the ear of the MD and strongly influenced his decisions, as well as an emerging managerial hierar-

2 These models relate to the office staff only and do not include the owners of the companies, who exercise powers beyond the scope of this enquiry.
ch. Status in this company was achieved through proven sales ability and long service.

The vast majority of staff in the two companies were under forty, with men providing over 75% of the workforce, many of whom had recently graduated from university. Ethnic minorities (Asian, Afro-Caribbean, East European) were well represented, making up over half the employees on occasion. Because of the extremely high rate of staff turnover it is difficult to supply statistics which provide an idea of constant levels, but despite rapid changes some patterns predominated, especially in the case of managers, the majority of whom were young, white, British males.

The Manifestation of Power

If we use Adams's definition of power, we shall understand the companies as being able to influence the conduct and decision-making of the workforce through their control over energetic forms. I shall expand on this definition by concentrating on the manifestation of such 'influence'—which may be described as 'control' over the physical (energetic) environment and also the intellectual and social environment (in the broadest sense of the term). In this article I shall distinguish between (i) 'primary' areas of control, in this case the employment contract and financial rewards (commission and salary), these being the fundamental reasons why the relationship exists; (ii) 'secondary' areas arising from the primary relationships, which appear as constraints on the physical environment (including the dimension of time); and (iii) 'tertiary' areas: the social organization and intellectual activities of the staff. Specific areas under which employees found themselves controlled are described below.

Primary Areas of Control

The commission or basic salary is to be regarded as a primary area of control, as is the employment contract. They are the fundamental reasons why the social relationship of control exists and are areas supported by legal rights and obligations enshrined in law surrounding property and employment. The payment of monies due was calculated and authorized by managerial staff, with specific deductions being made for taxation purposes and 'retainers'—a way of securing loyalty and insurance against clients defaulting on debts. The deductions are taken off the basic commission due to the SP, which is normally 15% of the deal’s value. Consequently the company retains at least 85% of the fees due from clients to cover its costs and remunerate management and shareholders.

Co. A provided a contract after the initial training period (six weeks). The contract reserved the right of the employers to sack employees with one week’s no-
tice. In Co. B no such contract was offered: usually the SPs were given a verbal agreement by the MD during the job interview and were dependent upon his decision and assessment for their continued employment. There was undoubtedly a sense of insecurity throughout the staff, even though many were employed on a commission-only basis (i.e. no basic pay): those in receipt of a basic salary were continually reminded that they had to sell more to justify this remuneration.

In the eyes of the sales force, arbitrary dismissals seemed to take place. They believed that if management disliked a salesperson then an excuse would be found to sack that person. Also, the threat of being fired was regularly used indirectly, e.g. in floor meetings managers would say, 'If you don't like it you know where the door is' or 'There are over three million people looking for a job; we can easily replace you.' The usual method of dismissal was to give an employee an ultimatum to sell a certain amount over the following week or lose their job. In Co. B the new Sales Director sacked two people in his first week, one of whom was notoriously hard-working, which was generally regarded as unfair by the sales team.

The real possibility of being fired was the ultimate sanction used by management, and it ensured a sense of insecurity throughout the company. Managers themselves frequently spoke of the insecurity of their own jobs, and indeed in Co. A all three managers on the floor lost their jobs within three months. Furthermore, the sales director and two senior directors also lost their jobs (or resigned), being replaced by a new SD and MD. More striking was the turnover of salespeople: during a three-month period, an entire floor of SPs (twenty people) disappeared through being sacked or resigning. The majority of new salesmen left the company after the first six weeks, and the managers were the only, somewhat tenuous group with historical continuity in the company. In Co. B the turnover of managers was almost as high as Co. A, 30% losing their jobs within a four-month period.

Secondary Areas of Control

These are areas of control which follow on from the primary areas, being dependent on the initial relationship (employment) for the reward of access to the primary resource (money). As such they are more derivative, abstract, and flexible in their forms and are more open to contestation than primary areas, which tend to be clearly defined as contractual arrangements defended by legal rights. The secondary and tertiary areas are therefore of equal, if not more interest to the social scientist because of their malleable and negotiable qualities. It is here that the right to exercise power becomes truly 'fuzzy', but affording an insight into the particular microculture under examination, as it deals with and manages control. Secondary areas are 'physical' in that they form part of the material world and include time as

---

3 This piece of data refers to the period of fieldwork, although sources claimed that it reflected previous patterns of dismissal.
a quantifiable resource, as well as information which is usually available in a physically accessible format.

Time
There were numerous ways of exercising power over an employee’s time, the most important of which were the office hours between 8.45 a.m. and 5.30 p.m. (varying within and between companies), during which everyone should be present. Those staff who were repeatedly late were threatened by managers and occasionally fired at the whim of the manager, depending on discretion and attitude. On the other hand, workers enduring long office hours (sometimes until 10 p.m.) were acknowledged and praised by the MD. Taking time off from office hours was frowned upon by senior management, but was particularly abused by book managers in Co. A, who would regularly do so for personal pleasure (fishing and sporting trips etc.). In doing so, they were exercising their power to thwart the regulations on the use of time and indirectly emphasizing the constraints on conscientious SPs.

During office hours time use was surveyed, and telephone calls monitored and timed: ideally the SP should be making calls consistently during working hours. Co. A had a specific period during which calls must be made, and another period when research was to be done. These timed calls were analysed and used in assessing SPs’ performance. More broadly, within the framework of the working week, there were certain times when staff were required to be at sales training sessions or end-of-month sales meetings.

Space
The layout of the office is indicative of placement in the hierarchy of power, with greater status usually being denoted by having more physical space in which to operate (larger office, more desk space) and occupation of a higher floor (the top floor was occupied by senior managerial staff). Managers also had complete freedom in choosing where they themselves sat and in determining the seating arrangements of their staff. In addition, actual furniture also denoted status through size and amount: large chairs, numerous desks, filing racks, telephones, and other equipment were part of the manager’s accoutrements.

Seating arrangements were under the direct control of book managers. In Co. A they moved workers regularly (known as ‘hot-desking’ in some fashionable offices). Some SPs were instructed to change desks, face the wall, face one another, face the centre, remove desk screens, erect them, or sit together, with moves occurring almost every week. Each new manager imposed his own seating pattern on the staff. These moves were always annoying and disconcerting, disrupting for staff, and often involving the necessity to change phones and numbers. a real disadvantage, wasting up to half a day’s working time. Inevitably the manager would be seated in a central or commanding position in which he could watch his team
and supervise them, exercising the power of observation—an event comparable to the panopticon surveillance system analysed by Foucault (see Rabinow 1991).

Managers also had some control over the physical body of the salesperson. They might demand a salesperson to stand up when talking to a client on the phone (thus in theory becoming more energized, enthusiastic, and aggressive) and would sometimes remove the SP’s chair to encourage this. They also had freedom to use office space in terms of walking around at will, sometimes to instruct staff who were expected to remain at their desks unless pursuing a recognized activity.

Resources
Managers might take the telephone from a salesperson if they desired to talk to the client, in the expectation of winning a deal. Sometimes they forcibly wrenched the phone out of the hand of the SP or shouted at them to hand over the phone. When the MD in Co. B entered the salesroom to give a brief talk, the managers would shout, ‘Lose the phones!’, even though this meant the possibility of losing a deal. In Co. A the stationery cupboard was opened weekly for general access (pencils, paper etc.). In Co. B staff had to obtain pens from the receptionist and provide the rest of their equipment themselves. This apparently insignificant control reinforced the SPs subordinate status and demonstrated the company’s distrust of their integrity.

Information regarding clients and potential ‘leads’ (possible customers) is vital to a sale. Managers have access to good leads through experience and knowledge (via library, magazines, the Internet, past advertisements). They could withhold this information at will, giving leads to favoured staff, or keep information to themselves and gain commission. Information on office events or changes, such as new projects, future plans, and managerial or book changes, could be withheld or used to the manager’s advantage. This is especially pertinent given the staff’s state of anxiety over their employment prospects and income.

Tertiary areas of control
Tertiary areas of control concern the social organization and intellectual activities of the staff. This is perhaps the area of constraint which shows the greatest variance between different companies. It embraces the arrangement of social groupings—teams, competing groups, authority structures—as well as the individual activity of the staff, including business and private communications, company rhetoric, and other qualities occasionally referred to as office ‘culture’. As such it

---

4 Susan Wright states that ‘the culture concept’ is used in four ways in organizational studies. Of these, the fourth definition is most appropriate to this article: “company culture” can refer to the formal organizational values and practices imposed by management as a
also embraces the values and ideology of the office as espoused by the senior management.

The Sales Process
The basic working tool of the salesperson is the ‘pitch’, the message communicated to the client, originating as a scripted speech. This may develop into a relatively spontaneous delivery involving use of key phrases or bullet points by the experienced SP. Management exhorted SPs to establish control over the conversation, persuading and leading the client into giving the required response. At the same time the SP’s intellectual freedom is restricted by the intentions of the manager, as the SP’s mind is directed towards achieving the company’s (and, usually, the SP’s) goal. The process is analysed below, highlighting areas in which the exercise of control is paramount.

The Pitch. The salesperson is expected to phone up potential purchasers of advertising space in the book and persuade them that they should advertise their product. A particularly successful call is one where the SP ‘takes the client off the phone’, that is, sells on the first call. Given that most capable SPs can expect to make only one sale a fortnight, this is unusual. The SP makes a ‘pitch’ to the client, initially a written script which s/he is expected to learn by heart and repeat without deviation down the phone. It is composed of an introduction to the product, reasons to purchase advertising (the ‘angle’), and the offer (the ‘close’). The SP is therefore a sort of actor, speaking the script, often knowing very little about the product, the book, or the client, let alone the advantages of advertising in the book.5

The Angle. The ‘angle’ is important for those more advanced in their sales experience. In essence this is the reason why the client should be advertising in the book. The SP researches the company and works out the advantages for them in advertising in the book, such as increasing visibility, competition, income growth, or establishing their brand. These reasons are then inserted into the pitch. Co. B placed great emphasis on the angle and encouraged SPs to research companies with a view to creating a strong angle with which to persuade the key decision-maker to advertise.

The Close. This is where the salesman might conceivably clinch the deal. It may confirm the client’s involvement, which is satisfied by faxing him a contract which is signed and returned. An example is the ‘assumptive close’, i.e. the final part of a pitch which asks what type of advertisement the client wants: ‘Will you be taking a single-page, full-colour, or a double-page spread?’ (known as the ‘double assumptive close’, theoretically giving the client no room to answer, ‘No’). Co. A

5 Salespeople were expected to make eight full pitches per day, often necessitating over forty enquiry calls.
encouraged neophyte SPs to reach the close during their initial pitches—sometimes 600 words in length—in which reciting the close often became an embarrassing procedure leading to a negative response. Co. B was more wary of the close being used by inexperienced SPs and sometimes insisted that SPs should let managers close, usually on a second call, after the client had received faxed information about the book. In these cases, therefore, senior personnel took responsibility for the final sale. At one stage Co. B restructured its sales force by introducing a formal managerial system, so that only the most senior managers ‘closed’ the deal, SPs simply ‘fronting’ the deal by explaining the book and angle without attempting to obtain a sale.

The SPs were always supposed to communicate directly with the ‘decision-maker’ of a company or organization. This may be the chief executive officer, MD, or a government minister. Co. A told SPs, many of whom were in their early twenties and inexperienced in the world of work, that they should consider themselves the equal of MDs when talking to them and be dismissive towards any obstructive secretaries, asking for the MD by name without explaining who they were or why they were making the call. Some SPs were advised to alter their accents to appear more ‘upmarket’ or ‘professional’, and even styled themselves ‘Doctor’. Many used pseudonyms, especially at Co B., where the majority did so, sometimes disguising awkward or foreign names they regarded as a liability. Others believed that they adopted a different persona with a different name, becoming more assertive, vibrant, and confident: the pseudonym and attached personality became a mask. Given free reign to assert themselves through a stage personality, it is worth considering the poetic licence that was also given to the SPs regarding the constituent elements of the pitch itself.

Euphemism and Mendacity: Controlling the Truth
In the salesroom the practice of ‘larging it’ (exaggeration) and ‘bullshitting’ (exaggerating, lying) during the pitch were regularly encouraged, and successful salesmen would boast of their ability to bullshit. One senior manager in Co. B regularly exhorted his staff to ‘Large it!’, effectively make untrue claims about other clients who have supposedly already booked a space: ‘We’ve got company X in already, we’ve got company Y as well’, and so on. Or: ‘This is the best book of its kind; I can guarantee you will increase your sales.’ They were also encouraged to put pressure on a client by insinuating that booking time and available space were running out: ‘I’m having a meeting with the editor this afternoon and we only have one space left in that section. Can I tell him that you will be included?’; or, more simply, to state: ‘You’ve got to do this; everyone else has.’ In conversation to staff, managers justified the use of false claims regarding the involvement of other clients by saying that they would eventually be persuaded to advertise in the book (sometimes this materialized, as a general trend was drastically to reduce the prices of advertising space in the books in the last weeks of the campaign, thereby
ensuring the inclusion of some famous companies and covering the cost of publication).

Euphemism was also employed heavily. Salespeople were advised to avoid the word ‘advertising’ in their pitch, and never to introduce themselves as someone selling advertising space. Instead the pitch would concentrate on aspects of the book or the conference or the organization backing it, maintaining the client’s interest and enthusiasm. The SP would seek to involve the client in a ‘project’ and avoid mentioning the word ‘publication’: ‘We are working on a project with the UN on development issues; would you be interested in coming on board?’ The names of the actual publishing companies were also chosen to reflect prestige, class, pedigree, and security, qualities deemed attractive to prospective clients: an example might be the use of ‘Westminster Publications’ (actually fictitious) as a name, when in fact the company would have no connection with the area.

One MD preferred salespeople to be thought of as ‘business strategists’ but became blunt when under pressure, stressing that only devious workers would be successful. He lauded the quality of mendacity, saying that Asians were notoriously mendacious and that one particular salesman, an Indian, ought to be more successful because of this. Salespeople were encouraged to enthuse about the projects as if the client would seriously lose out if not involved. Therefore constant and, over time, unselfconscious exaggeration and false enthusiasm about the project was voiced over the phone. Calls were taped at Co. B so that the managers could listen in and analyse a tape after the conversation, pointing out weaknesses to the SP.

Many previous clients complained that their advertisements had poor responses, but this knowledge did not hinder the superficial enthusiasm of the SPs, although they were aware of the weaknesses of their products. One company (X) had a particularly bad reputation, and a rumour circulated that it did not actually send out the books in which it had sold space. Managers, and therefore SPs, in Co. A regularly agreed with clients that the business was full of crooked companies, especially Co. X, while stressing that Co. A was redeeming the industry’s image and would ensure that the client had no future problems. Amusingly, managers in Co. B continually referred to Co. A as the rogue company, an example of bad practice in the industry which put out poor-quality books, cheated clients, and produced bad salespeople. Each company referred to competitors in derogatory terms in order to make its own work appear more attractive and to sympathise with wary clients, thus increasing trust and the potential for a deal.

As we can see, the salesperson’s communications with clients are controlled through their use of the pitch, recommendations on how to interact with other business employees, and encouragement to exaggerate and misrepresent the truth. To ensure this, the SPs are regularly listened to during their telephone conversations (telephones have multiple ear pieces fitted to allow this), and in some companies all conversations are tape-recorded. The intellectual arena is therefore
bounded by the management’s desires: controls over communication are strict and enforced by the possibility of a sacking. It would seem that there is also control over morality, relating to falsehoods propagated over the phone—salespeople are encouraged to distort the truth. Thus the individual SP’s desire to be honest is not only challenged, it is positively denied.  

Competition
To maintain a continual sense of urgency and excitement, aggression and determination, the companies organized competitions to reward individual salespeople for success in sales on a monthly basis. Co. A ran a league of salespeople, which was constructed to show where someone was placed in terms of sales for the month, highlighting both successes and failures. Managers would continually comment on an individual’s placing in the chart. Managers were also placed against one another, as were floors (run by the floor managers, responsible for up to six books each). There was a tiered structure of oppositions, starting with the individual SPs and rising to floor managers. In addition, the company as a whole was expected to meet a weekly target. Targets were ever-present for all employees. Managers continually set targets for their workforce to meet and pressed salesmen to achieve them, asking each one what he expected to make over the following week.

In this manner, the relative placings of SPs were controlled and presented in a fashion so as to emphasize their selling success over a given period, usually within a short time-frame (one month), thus ignoring previous sales. Thus success is seen in the context of a social relationship, individuals being pitched against individuals within a given time-frame, with peer performance constantly changing. ‘Blanking’ (periods of no sales) was recognized as something that most SPs experience; nevertheless last month’s best salesman may have had a poor record this month and appear as a loser in the competition. As a consequence, historical trends for individuals were not made clear; performances were interpreted at the management’s discretion. There was no way for SPs to avoid inclusion within this competitive group, and its existence had a permanent impact on performance and staff morale.

Co. B had only one floor, and the sales force was divided between experienced and new staff, all of whom were in competition within their own groups. A visual display recorded the sales of each person, and competitions were run over periods of time with money prizes for the winners. Importantly, books themselves were not placed in competition, thus denying their relative merits and placing the onus of selling on to the individual SPs, despite the effort put into building sales teams around the books. Team mates and book managers often socialized together and

6 Eric Wolf, when considering the concepts of ‘culture’ and ‘meaning’, writes: ‘The ability to bestow meanings—to “name” things, acts and ideas—is a source of power. Control of communication allows the manager of ideology to lay down the categories through which reality is to be perceived’ (1982: 388).
formed strong bonds, though given the short duration of the projects (three to six months) and the high staff turnover, such groups soon dissolved.

In both companies managers continually maintained that it was the salesperson who mattered, not the product. ‘If an SP is good s/he can sell any product.’ Sales training consistently placed the burden of success on the SPs and promoted various techniques to enhance their performance, especially concentrating on the individual’s ‘confidence’. Nevertheless certain books were informally recognized by all as being bad products, and some were temporarily abandoned following difficult initial periods (after only one month in the case of Co. B).

Office Values
In terms of speech, physical action, and verbal imagery, violence was ever-present. Managers would make humorous remarks about what they might do to a worker in terms of physical damage if he did not perform a task well, or simply because they did not like him. In Co. A one worker was victimized and bullied due to his unusual personality. Notices were displayed on computer screen-savers, such as, ‘The first person to put an axe in Dave’s head gets a prize.’ Managers joked in the pub about how they would ‘kick Dave in, given the chance’. The sales director was particularly prone to using violent language and would finish an argument by threatening a salesman—humorously but nevertheless in an intimidating fashion: ‘Do you want to be hit on the nose and have to clean up the carpet?’

The MD of Co. B regularly used violent imagery and blue language, occasionally completely losing control of himself in anger when criticizing what he thought was a bad pitch. He generated an atmosphere of physical menace and insulted people by using homophobic imagery to suggest that they were submissive, occasionally flaring up with a diatribe consisting of swearwords and belittling comments. Such comments were used to denigrate or tease workers in the office and were arbitrarily aimed at anyone he chose to ridicule, whether over appearance, personality, or performance. This role model was imitated by his subordinates, and senior managers aped his general attitude to the extent of shouting orders and behaving aggressively. Bullying went hand-in-hand with the violence, and certain salespeople were the continual butt of verbal or practical jokes, comments, and aggression. One manager claimed that he was not racist but continually made racist jokes and even used racist remarks while sitting next to an Indian salesman. He sacked a black and an Asian salesman within the first two weeks of joining the company.

An observation by Schultz and Lavenda on the view of power in state societies is particularly relevant to the findings of this research: ‘Power is something that individuals as free agents can accumulate from their attempts to coerce other people to yield to their will. From this perspective, violence is a common and effective means to increase the power of individuals and groups’ (1995: 372).
Violence and bullying were not always so physically blatant but came in more subtle, psychological forms. Thus managers played on the continual insecurity over employment by using threats about job losses or project failures, implying that targets must be met or penalties would be applied. The MD of Co. B was a promoter of selfish and competitive values, and regularly reminded staff that his was not an altruistic business, that he was out to get to the top, and that he had no room for anyone who would not work hard for him. Loyalty would be rewarded.

Both companies were subsidiaries of large holding companies, major players in the publishing and media industries. As such they were representative of a thriving sector of business in London, comparable to similar companies world-wide. They give an insight into how the flexible labour market actually operates, as well as the use of power within such companies. It would appear that potential workers are not highly respected. One manager expressed this by saying, ‘If you throw enough shit against the wall, some of it will stick’, implying that out of the crowd of people passing through the company doors, some will prove worthy of long-term employment. This is an illustration of an ‘employer’s market’, where the supply of labour and demand for work is in their favour. One MD stated: ‘The cream will rise to the top’. In both companies, new employees were placed on various assignments, usually very difficult, and expected to sink or swim; it was generally acknowledged to be a tough industry, and the attitude of ‘survival of the fittest’ also served to support the general disdain shown towards caring values. This would-be ‘evolutionary’ philosophy (currently very popular in the media and advertising), with its ‘law of the jungle’ mentality, served the process of brutalizing management into treating staff and clients with disdain. Clients who were easily booked were regarded as ‘soft’ and termed ‘pussycats’. Office values are thus appropriately summed up by the clichés, ‘Win at all costs’ and ‘Only the strong survive’, which capture the stereotyped approach of management, both blasé and ruthless.

**Geopolitical Advantage**

During a day’s work a salesperson might communicate with someone in over twenty different countries in various continents. A company’s sales force may be in touch with every country in the world, with individuals talking to people in Saudi Arabia, Russia, India, and France within the space of an hour. Communication is truly global, the same message being reiterated world-wide. Many times a salesperson has been in a conversation and forgotten which country he is calling. Managers have been known to close deals unaware of the country the client is in.

A huge network of telecommunications supports conversations world-wide, involving business and political bodies in the communications and advertising projects that originate in the UK. A company in Africa can advertise in a book pub-
lished in England, distributed around the world with articles from politicians throughout the UN. In this example those people involved in the process who benefit most from it are élites—senior businessmen, politicians, and global organizations—while engaging the labour of workers who operate the wheels of this global industry.8

In these examples, companies and books gain great prestige from being based in London and being supported by notable organizations such as the Commonwealth Secretariat, the UN, and the ITU. It is these organizations that provide editors and most of the contributors to the books, and it is the publishing company’s duty to find the financial support through advertising, making a profit in the process. Most books are expected to earn around £250,000 from advertising and are usually distributed free to about 5–10,000 recipients.

With the qualified backing of a world-famous organization, salespeople are able to say that they are working on behalf of or with the UN or Commonwealth or ITU, giving themselves a sense of importance, power and influence, and obtaining the ear of a decision-maker. The most successful books are those attached to a conference, where a captive audience will be in receipt of the book (the conference catalogue, for example). Thanks to the support of such organizations, the words of the SP carry more weight, in this way exercising geopolitical power relationships between the West and the rest of the world. Thus, in the case of books dealing with ‘development’, the SP, ensconced in London and with the backing of the UN, is able to talk with apparent confidence and knowledge about the importance of development issues to potential advertisers around the world, in Africa, Asia, the Caribbean, and eastern Europe. Power, in terms of geopolitical, economic, and cultural advantage, bears on the relationship between salesperson and client.

The concept of ‘development’ is particularly popular, and numerous books circulate with this word in the title. Books were usually connected to a specific conference or project—perhaps ‘Sustainable Development and Investment’—and backed by the Commonwealth Secretariat and finance organizations, or the UN. The term ‘development’ was rarely regarded as problematic by the SP in phone conversations, and the pitch would outline the goals in a straightforward fashion, with the assumption that everything was understood and agreed upon, and such terms as ‘Third World’ were accepted uncritically. This blind faith has repercussions, not least amongst the salespeople, with their weak grasp of sociological jargon—for it is in such daily activities that simplistic and generalizing notions are repeated and reaffirmed in the operating world of business and politics, creating a diluted hegemony. In this sense Wolf’s observation is relevant:

8 Few salespeople were genuinely interested in the issues addressed in the books being published. In general terms they were not cosmopolitan businessmen with ‘a certain metacultural position’ but London-based clerical workers, ‘locals, representatives of more circumscribed territorial cultures’ (Hannerz 1992: 252), who happened to interact with influential people from around the world on a daily basis.
The development of an overall hegemonic pattern or 'design for living' is not so much the victory of a collective logic or aesthetic impulse as the development of redundancy—the continuous repetition, in diverse instrumental domains, of the same basic propositions regarding the nature of constructed reality. (Wolf 1982: 388)

Equally, the manner and attitude of the salespeople from the metropolitan core came with the apparent support of these powerful groups: 'Good morning Mr Client, this is John Smart calling on behalf of the United Nations in London. How are you today?'

Conclusions

This research has drawn attention to global connections which are increasing in number and influence, part of the links between global political organizations and business communities. Stereotypical images of the power relationships between the industrialized West and the rest of the world seem to be maintained in the rhetoric of the sales pitch, but apparently supported by powerful organizations, and serve to imprint themselves on the minds of recipients overseas. Development as an issue is discussed without analysis, and large sums of money change hands in the pursuit of wealth through a persuasive concept. Patterns of behaviour, relationships of dependence, and political hierarchies are all suggested and repeated in conversations spanning the globe which involve business and political interests. There is a direct connection between the microculture of the London office and the macroculture of international organizations and business.

Power in the office has been found to rest on the control of various areas, usually backed by coercion in all its forms, and apparently supported by the rule of law enshrined in the employment contract and property rights. Public discussion of bullying, exploitation, and stress count for very little in the competitive workplace, where economic hardship is the bottom line, and workers tolerate abusive conditions to earn money. The link between the individual company (in terms of values and social organization) and the wider political economy is a direct one, but it may manifest itself in diverse ways according to different situations.

By dividing areas of control into primary, secondary, and tertiary, I have been able to analyse power within the office with greater precision than Adams's original definition allows, gaining a rich understanding of the existence and exercise of control, the comparative difference between companies, and the diversity of range within which constraints operate. Consequently this research has allowed a coming to terms with the various sources of power, and it labels specific areas of control which can be compared across companies and potentially across different social groupings.
As a model, the relationship between the primary and tertiary areas of control within the company is analogous with the base and superstructure models used by some Marxist approaches. Within anthropology, there has been a continuous debate as to which area forms the base of the larger society—the economic or the ideological. However, for the purposes of this method of microcultural analysis, the primary area does not absolutely determine the tertiary area but is simply the most fundamental area of control bonding employee to employer, whereas it is the dominant social groups within society (in business, politics, and the law) which determine the nature of this initial, primary relationship.

In examining the secondary and tertiary areas, we see how far the constraints of control may be exercised, what values predominate within the specific company, and the diversity of ways in which power becomes manifest based on a social relationship. The extent to which the office is a microcosm of broader society is a moot point, but as an indicator and occasional broadcaster of social values it is strong, and as a reflection of contemporary political and economic policies it is revealing.

9 Notable participants in this debate include Godelier (1978) and Meillassoux (1978).

10 Compare this with Foucault, who observes a similar relationship when considering the panoptic modality of power: ‘The real, corporal disciplines contributed the foundation of the formal, juridical liberties. The contract may have been regarded as the ideal foundation of law and political order; panopticism constituted the technique, universally widespread, of coercion’ (Foucault on ‘Panopticism’, from ‘Discipline and Punish’, in Rabinow 1991: 211).

REFERENCES


LEXICOGRAPHY, LINGUISTICS, AND MINORITY LANGUAGES

BRUCE CONNELL

Introduction

There is a tendency to assume that anything and everything to do with language comes within the purview of linguistics, which is often characterized as the scientific study of language in all its aspects. For the professional linguist today, this perhaps needs to be amended, as there seem to be many aspects of language, or its scientific study, which are of little concern to linguistics. This could be interpreted in two ways: one, as a signal that some aspects of language are not of sufficient importance to warrant the attention of the trained linguist; or two, as a recognition of the limitations of the discipline, that there exist important aspects of language which we don’t yet have the tools to investigate properly. Compiling and editing dictionaries—lexicography—certainly has to do with language, but judging by the lack of attention devoted to this practice in linguistics programmes and textbooks, one might be forgiven for concluding that it is either relatively insignificant or a task of such monumental complexity that it is still beyond our grasp. For example, no definition or discussion of lexicography is found in standard introductory textbooks in linguistics, such as Hockett (1954), Robins (1971) or O’Grady et al. (1992), and only passing mention is made in Fromkin and Rodman (1988: 124), who define lexicography simply as ‘the editing or making of a dictionary’, the aim of which is to prescribe rather than describe the words of a language. (They add, however, that Samuel Johnson, in the preface to his dictionary, tells us that he was not able to construct, but only to ‘register the language’: thus this prescriptive atti-
tude, even if it does exist now among lexicographers, did not always.) Similarly, in works such as *Linguistics: The Cambridge Survey* (Newmeyer 1988), or Crystal’s (1991) *Dictionary of Linguistics and Phonetics*, there is no entry for lexicography: in the latter, in fact, lexicography doesn’t even warrant mention as an allied discipline of linguistics. In his *Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language* (1987), which is oriented towards the general public, Crystal does include some discussion of ‘dictionaries’, but this is largely just a synopsis of the history of dictionary-writing. He tells us, for example, that the earliest dictionaries were bi- or multilingual word lists aimed at the traveller or missionary, or dialectal or technical vocabularies. The absence of any serious discussion of lexicography in linguistics is also reflected in the fact that the presence of lexicography in linguistics programmes is negligible.

This suggests that there is a gulf between the concerns of the linguist and those of the lexicographer. It might help to convince the sceptic, as well as establish a foundation for the second part of this paper, to look at how each side—linguist and lexicographer—views language, especially the lexicon and its make-up. In exploring the nature of this gulf, my thinking closely follows that of Pawley (especially 1986, 1996). The second part of the paper looks at the importance of lexicography with respect to minority or endangered languages and the new capabilities offered to lexicography by computational technology; it is illustrated by my own work editing dictionaries of Môkpê, a language spoken in south-west Cameroon, and Cambap, spoken in the Mambila region of the Nigeria–Cameroon borderland. I look first at how both the lexicographer and the mainstream linguist view the object of the lexicographer’s task—‘words’, or more precisely, lexical items, or lexemes, and the lexicon.

Grammar and grammaticality have always been central to the study of language within linguistics; this may be obvious from the high importance placed on syntax in contemporary linguistics, while the lexicon has generally been accorded low status, being thought to contain those elements which cannot be predicted by the grammar. While the importance of the lexicon varies somewhat depending on who one reads or which theory one prefers, this low status goes back at least to Bloomfield, if not further. For him, ‘The lexicon is really an appendix of the grammar, a list of basic irregularities’ (1933: 274). Within most versions of current mainstream (generative) linguistic theory, the lexicon is comprised of lexical items together with a specification of their behaviour within the grammar. Compound words, phrases, and the like are in some views handled by the syntax, that is, they are treated as sentences; in other approaches they are handled within the morphological component of the grammar, together with the results of inflectional and other productive processes.

1 The current increase in interest in the mental lexicon within mainstream linguistics does not change the essential view presented here.
In either case, whether treated by the syntactic or the morphological component, these are not housed within the lexicon. For example, we assume words such as *dictionary*, *novel* and *write* to be listed in the lexicon, but not *dictionary-writer* or *novel-writer*, which can be constructed through entirely regular processes in English. Similarly, *edit*, but not *edited, editing, editor, editorial*, and *editorialize*. Other information assumed to be contained in the (linguist's) lexicon includes semantic information (though the amount and types of detail vary from theory to theory); grammatical information, for example, a list of complements permitted by a particular lexical item; rules that a form undergoes, for example, pluralization; and some form of phonological/phonetic information. It is not usually assumed that 'pronunciations' are stored, but rather that there is an abstract representation and that pronunciations are generated by interpretive rules.

The mental lexicon, then, is assumed to be restricted with respect to the number of entries it contains, but relatively rich with respect to the information associated with each entry. The actual bounds on both aspects of the lexicon are not clear-cut, and are subject to considerable debate.

Lexicographers, on the other hand, are not concerned first and foremost with issues of grammaticality. The standard dictionary typically provides definitions, spellings, and information as to the part of speech and the pronunciation of its entries. It may also include etymological information, illustrative quotations, and dialectal information. What lexicographers are interested in when determining which lexical items should be included in a dictionary are, first of all, comprehensiveness, as well as issues such as whether an item is of standard use, and its frequency of use. We might expect certain lexical items to be excluded under the criterion of standard use: for example, we may find *novel-writer* excluded in favour of the more standard *novelist*. Frequency is a consideration in that rarely used words may be excluded if the size of the dictionary is to be limited, for example, for commercial reasons. Comprehensiveness is a concern in that ideally all words in the language will be included, whether or not they result from productive processes. Thus, in a dictionary aiming at comprehensiveness, we might reasonably expect to include all of the words cited above, though *edited* and *editing* might not necessarily be listed as headwords. The notion of comprehensiveness will, of course, be limited by the purpose of the dictionary: dictionaries of specific or limited scope will aim to be comprehensive within that scope.

The ideal lexicographer's dictionary, then, will be considerably larger than the ideal mental lexicon with respect to the number of entries contained, but will presumably not contain much of the grammatical information assumed to be housed in the mental lexicon. Put differently, all speakers know more about the lexical items in their mental dictionary than can be found in any written dictionary; but any written dictionary (potentially) contains more lexical items than any speaker's assumed mental dictionary.
These different views of the lexicon do not simply mirror the different needs of, or pressures on, linguists and lexicographers—for example, the scientific orientation of linguistics as opposed to the commercial aspect of lexicography—though these clearly play a defining role. Rather, they seem to reflect two different views of language. As Pawley (1996) argues (following Grace, e.g. 1987), these two views represent different approaches to the relation between language and culture. For the lexicographer, language encodes culture; for the linguist, language is primarily a code which expresses the relationship between form and meaning and contains the conventions used in expressing these meanings.

The difference is illustrated in terms of intertranslatability. Within linguistics, the view is generally held that anything that can be said in one language can also be said in any other language. A corollary of this (at least in a strong version of the hypothesis) is that languages are fully intertranslatable. If this is true, it means that a language can in principle be viewed as an autonomous system distinct from the culture of its speakers. This is essentially the view that we find in mainstream contemporary linguistics, with its insistence on the autonomy of linguistic knowledge, and that differences between languages are of minor importance (e.g. basically lexical) relative to their underlying commonality (i.e. Universal Grammar). The implications for understanding the lexicon should be clear—it becomes exactly what Bloomfield, quoted above, described it to be.

However, it is obvious that, even with a loose interpretation of the notion, languages are not always intertranslatable except through recourse to long-winded paraphrase. One need only consider the difficulties involved in explaining culturally specific phenomena to someone totally ignorant of the culture in question. In the view that language encodes culture, there is no one-to-one mapping between language and reality: on the contrary, there is much that is conventional, and part of linguistic (and cultural) competence is knowing what to say, and when and how to say it. The lexicographer’s task in compiling the lexical items, phrases, idioms, and expressions used in a given language/culture is based essentially on the cultural encoder view. In other words, the gap between lexicography and linguistics can arguably be seen as a dichotomy of language as cultural encoder versus language as universal encoder.

Despite this gulf, there is perhaps one characteristic that both lexicographers and linguists share in their work, and that is a concern for standard varieties of language, or the standard variety of a language. This not to deny dialect dictionaries, jargon dictionaries, etc., on the one hand, and interest on the part of the linguist in language variation on the other. For lexicographers, in cases where no standard exists, the concern is at least implicitly, but often explicitly, to help create a standard and to relegate variants to non- (or sub-) standard status. For linguists, particularly those concerned with ‘the idealized speaker/hearer’, the tendency is to avoid questions of variation—not to mention the fact, of course, that linguists typi-
cally work with a written form of whatever language they are studying, and therefore are by default working with a standard variety.

**Minority and Moribund Languages, Linguistics, and Lexicography**

So where does this leave non-standard varieties or dialects and unwritten languages (i.e., the majority of the world’s languages), especially those spoken by small and isolated groups of people? With regard to non-standard varieties of a language, we can, in a few cases, find examples where dictionaries have been written (‘proper’ dictionaries, i.e. in the sense of the standard works done for European languages), but in almost all of these instances we find that the non-standard variety is in a sense actually a standard in its own context. A dictionary of Quebec French, for example, is not one of standard, metropolitan French; rather, Quebec French (in fact one variety of Quebec French) is taken as standard in the Canadian context (more precisely, one of several varieties of French spoken in Quebec has become the Canadian standard). We have yet to see a dictionary of French as spoken, for example, on the Port-au-Port peninsula of Newfoundland or the Cheticamp area of Cape Breton. A similar story could be told with respect to regional varieties of other languages, including English.

The situation for languages which remain unwritten, as well as those spoken by small and isolated groups of people, is a subject of growing awareness and concern among both linguists and anthropologists. These constitute the world’s linguistic heritage. Conservative estimates by concerned linguists suggest that of the approximately 6,000 languages in the world, only half will survive the next century (Hale et al. 1992). Less optimistic views suggest this figure may be reduced to 300. There is increasing recognition that this loss represents a loss of cultural and intellectual diversity, as well as linguistic diversity, and that linguistic and cultural diversity should be considered a form of biodiversity and valued as such. Yet when compared with concern for the biological world, relatively little attention is paid to questions of language contraction and death. Admittedly there is controversy among those concerned with questions of language endangerment as to what steps should be taken, particularly whether, and if so to what extent, linguists should intervene or even instigate attempts to reverse the process of language death. However, an important goal which all accept is to document wherever possible, and to as great an extent as possible, endangered languages before they become extinct. One of the primary tasks of linguistics is to produce a universal theory of language. This requires input from as broad a base of languages as possible—it is impossible to know what contribution unstudied languages might have made to the development of such a theory should they disappear. Similarly, to the extent that language encodes culture, the disappearance of a language represents a
loss to anthropology. Lexicography, then, assumes greater importance to both linguistics and anthropology than has perhaps been previously recognized.

The last few years have seen increasing development of the potential of lexicography, with the advent of more sophisticated and information technology and computer software. Dictionaries can now be prepared that are, in effect, searchable databases that are readily updatable, whose organization can be changed according to need, and which can generate sub-dictionaries of a specified size/scope (e.g. all words relating to a particular cultural domain or all nouns of a given semantic area).

Semantics and Lexicography

To take an example of the latter, semantics is, in part, concerned with how people 'relate words to each other within the framework of their language', i.e. to discover the semantic properties of individual words. While it is part of the core of linguistics, semantics can also be seen as a concern of psychology—whence the sub-discipline of cognitive semantics, and of anthropology and its sub-discipline cognitive anthropology. With only a bit of imagination, a lexical database can be used for purposes other than those for which it may originally have been designed. Systematic examination—say, extracting all the nouns of a particular semantic field—can reveal which areas are highly differentiated, thereby giving insight not only into the semantic and conceptual organization of the language, but also the structure of the grammar of the language and the structure of the speakers' culture and social organization. I quote Ellen Contini-Morava from her work on Swahili (1994):

From a semantic point of view, the phenomenon of noun classification has been of interest to linguists and anthropologists because understanding the basis for grouping nouns together as members of a class hints at a system of cognitive or cultural classification underlying the system of linguistic classification. From a grammatical point of view, noun classes are interesting because they mediate between grammar and lexicon, and fall somewhere between inflection and derivation. Also, the analysis of grammatical agreement has played an important role in arguments for and against various models of syntactic theory.²

² Noun classification in Swahili and throughout the Bantu languages refers to the system of prefixes used to mark singular and plural forms of words. Concord prefixes, which may or may not be identical to that borne by the noun, are found on modifying elements. Nouns taking a given prefix are assigned to the same morphological class. Frequently, however, it is the concord prefix that is considered the decisive determinant of class membership, since (by this criterion) there may be overlap found in classes as established by noun prefixes alone. Nouns of a class are also all assumed to take the same plural prefix: singular/plural
I turn now to illustrate, with reference to two unwritten minority languages of Cameroon, the importance of lexicographic/lexicological study to linguistics and anthropology.

Mòkpè

Mòkpè (also known as Bakweri) is a Bantu language spoken in south-west Cameroon. With approximately 32,000 speakers, it is not yet a language on the edge of extinction. It is, however, a relatively small language—clearly a minority language in the Cameroon context—and it is on the cusp of substantial change, its speakers being exposed to two colonial languages (English and French) as well as two local vehicular languages, Duala and Pidgin, and other local languages. It is unlikely to be among the 3,000 languages optimistically expected to be around this time next century, and certainly will not be around if this figure is reduced to 300.

The Mòkpè dictionary project (Connell 1997) is an attempt to bring both the lexicographic tradition of dictionary-writing and the theoretical concerns of the linguist to bear on documenting this language. Although based on limited materials, the traditional bilingual book version of the dictionary is aimed at addressing the concerns of the Bakweri themselves, as well as being of some service to the research linguist. An electronic database/dictionary is also being compiled. The added capabilities that technology affords this database allow for a version of the dictionary that is flexible in bringing more, not only to the Bakweri speaker, but also to the linguist and anthropologist.

This version incorporates additional materials, including sound recordings of most items included in the dictionary. It is set up so that the different noun classes are flagged; independent marking of semantic fields is also incorporated. It can be searched equally well for phonological characteristics, e.g. distributions and combinations of vowels, consonants, and tones; other flags can be added to permit greater searching and cross-referencing capabilities. Mòkpè can be used here to illustrate briefly how such a dictionary can be used for research into the semantic structure of the lexicon.

Words from the 'human' class, that is, those that are tagged with the feature [+human] according to a componential analysis, were extracted from the dictionary, together with information as to their classification according to Mòkpè noun class criteria. These are shown in Table 1 above. As can be seen, all but one of those nouns considered by a standard componential analysis to be [+human] fail

pairings are referred to as a gender. Membership of a gender, i.e. the fact of sharing the same singular and plural prefixes, is a further criterion used for noun classification.

3 I record here a debt of gratitude to Shirley Ardener, who not only persuaded me to take on the Mòkpè project, but also managed to tape-record almost the entire dictionary during a 1997 field trip and kindly made the tapes available to me.
### Table 1: Selected Mòkpè terms for [+human] objects

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gloss</th>
<th>Mòkpè</th>
<th>Noun Class, Sg/Pl Prfx</th>
<th>Guthrie number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>corpse</td>
<td>mwimbà</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>deceiver</td>
<td>mòòjònèlí</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>digger</td>
<td>mwíma</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>diviner</td>
<td>mwàñqba a ìlàngà</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>doctor (trad.)</td>
<td>ìgàñgà</td>
<td>ì-/ì</td>
<td>9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drinker</td>
<td>mònyyèlí</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>drunkard</td>
<td>mòsòkèlí</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>elder</td>
<td>mòmbàkí</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>eldest child</td>
<td>múulu</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>european</td>
<td>mòkala</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fisherman</td>
<td>mòtò a mòsòmbó</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>grassfielders</td>
<td>mòjéli</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gossiper</td>
<td>mòsàmbèlí</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>guest</td>
<td>mwènì</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>harlot</td>
<td>molana àkpàlà</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>hunter</td>
<td>mòphaèlí</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>husband</td>
<td>munyanà</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>parent-in-law</td>
<td>mòkìa</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in-law</td>
<td>mònyà</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>interpreter</td>
<td>mòukìsèlí</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>judge</td>
<td>mòkaìsèlí</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>king</td>
<td>mòkàñèlí; kingè</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>madman</td>
<td>mwèényè</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>man</td>
<td>munyanà</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mankind</td>
<td>mòtò</td>
<td>mò-/wà</td>
<td>1/2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Low tones are marked ``, high tones are unmarked; the Guthrie numbers give the standard class assignments used among Bantuists.

This suggests there is a valid semantic basis to the human class in Mòkpè and that the class has a cognitive basis. The one exception, ‘traditional doctor’, may reflect the fact that, given their assumed extra powers, such people are, in the Mòkpè world-view, extra-human.

In contrast to this, a sample of nouns that can be tagged with the feature [+body] (for parts of the body) according to a componential analysis were also ex-
TABLE 2  Selected Mòkpè terms for [+body], parts of the body

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gloss</th>
<th>Mòkpè</th>
<th>Noun Class, Sg/Pl Prfx</th>
<th>Noun Class, Sg/Pl</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>back</td>
<td>mbusà</td>
<td>ŋ/-ŋ</td>
<td>9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>backbone</td>
<td>mbìgù</td>
<td>mo/-mè-</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beak</td>
<td>mwèsè</td>
<td>mo/-mè-</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>beard</td>
<td>ājelù</td>
<td>ŋ/-ŋ</td>
<td>9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>belly</td>
<td>lùnɡa, lùnɡa</td>
<td>ŋ/-mà</td>
<td>5/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blood</td>
<td>màjìa</td>
<td>mà</td>
<td>6a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>body</td>
<td>mwìtìa</td>
<td>mo/-mè-</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bone</td>
<td>èèse</td>
<td>e/-wè-</td>
<td>7/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>brains</td>
<td>wɔnɡo</td>
<td>wɔ-</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>branch</td>
<td>ëkòkò</td>
<td>è/-wè-</td>
<td>7/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breast</td>
<td>fìwè</td>
<td>ŋ/-mà</td>
<td>5/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>breath</td>
<td>múluìì</td>
<td>mo/-mè-</td>
<td>3/4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>buttocks</td>
<td>mbònìdo</td>
<td>ŋ/-ŋ</td>
<td>9/10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>calf</td>
<td>lùnɡa la mwènde</td>
<td>ŋ/-mà</td>
<td>5/6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>chest</td>
<td>ñgèniɡè</td>
<td>ŋ/-ŋ</td>
<td>9/19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>crop (of fowl)</td>
<td>ëwànda</td>
<td>e/-wè-</td>
<td>7/8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ear</td>
<td>ñtò</td>
<td>ŋ/-mà</td>
<td>5/6.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

tracted, without finding any close correlation with noun class (see Table 2). Rather, parts of the body fall into at least six different noun classes, each of which can also be shown to include a wide range of other nouns. Even if this list were to be cross-classified with [+human] by eliminating those nouns which do not conceivably pertain to humans (i.e. beak, branch, and crop), we are still left with six different noun classes represented. Clearly, then, there is no rigid semantic basis to these classes. It may also be concluded that the potential semantic class ‘body part’ does not exist in a structural sense in the Mòkpè mental lexicon, nor, on this evidence, does it have a cognitive basis.

The Effect of Language Decline/Death on the Lexicon

Language contraction clearly has effects on the structures of the language in question. Dressler (1988) identifies a number of phenomena which accompany language decline/death, some of which are manifested in the lexicon. The most obvious of these is the preponderance of borrowing: there may be extensive loans from a dominant language, but only sporadic loaning (at most) in the opposite direction. This phenomenon can be seen to reflect the social, economic, political, and psychological subordination of the contracting language/culture. Word-formation rules also cease to be productive, as a result of the language of technology, fash-
ion, or culture having switched to that of the dominant language. The cognitive function of language (at least for ‘semi-speakers’, to use Dorian’s 1973 phrase) follows that of the dominant language: for example, calques, or loan translations based on forms found in the dominant language, become more typical than neologisms, or the building of new words from resources inherent in the language. Dying languages also appear to be characterized by considerable variation, largely through the relaxation of sociolinguistic norms and less frequent use.

Cambap

Mòkpè provides one example of a minority language. Cambap barely achieves even that status. It is now spoken more or less on a daily basis by some 30–35 people, though it is no longer the primary language of its speakers, who are scattered across five different villages, nor is it being transmitted to the young any more (Connell 1998, 1999). Work to document this language, including the compilation of a dictionary, is in progress. While it is too soon to reach clear conclusions as to what extent Cambap demonstrates the processes outlined by Dressler (1988), there is considerable overlap between its lexicon and that of Kwanja, now the dominant language of Cambap speakers. Moreover, examples can be found of most, if not all of Dressler’s other processes.

Conclusion

In this article I have attempted to draw attention to the gap between linguistics and lexicography and, through illustration with minority and moribund languages, tried to suggest ways in which linguistics and allied disciplines such as anthropology can benefit from devoting greater attention to lexicography. This is not to suggest a one-way street: dictionaries as traditionally designed and written are far from perfect, far from being as informative and user-friendly as they might be. Pawley (1996) points out some typical faults, to which I here add a few.

There is, first, too much reliance on traditional alphabetic organization to the disregard of semantic or conceptual organization. Thanks to technological advances, good dictionaries can now readily incorporate cross-referencing, not only to reveal semantic categories, but also folk taxonomies, antonyms, synonyms, etc. Organization by grammatical category, as is sometimes done, is not necessarily helpful; for example, listing verbal nouns only under the verbal root as a headword leads to difficult searching. On the other hand, there is frequently too little grammatical information—the typical grammatical sketch found in the introduction or preface of a dictionary rarely contains syntactic information of the sort mentioned earlier (collocation restrictions, restrictions on complements and grammatical particles). It is even less usual to find this sort of information associated with individ-
ual entries. In the case of tone languages, tone-marking and information on tonal modification in grammatical contexts is commonly inadequate or totally absent. There is frequently inadequate indexing of entries in terms of discourse and social context, insufficient attention to relevant cultural knowledge, and incomplete description of cross-speaker variation with respect to both meaning and pronunciation. Illustrative sentences are also frequently not given, definitions are often no more than translation equivalents, and archaic words are frequently omitted for no good reason. In other words, the notion of comprehensiveness discussed earlier should take into account not only the number of entries in a dictionary, but the information associated with each entry. Among other criticisms, finally, is that definitions themselves are often inadequate, and pronunciation keys either deficient or absent.

Thus narrowing the gap between linguistics and lexicography appears to be a two-way street. To be rectified, many if not all the criticisms or faults outlined above require that the lexicographer has a proper training in linguistics. This, of course, means doing away with the gulf between the two disciplines, for example offering appropriate courses and programmes in linguistics departments. Needless to say, such a step could have far-reaching implications for linguistics as a discipline: for example, linguists placing more emphasis on the nature of the lexicon, meaning not only its mental organization, but also treating it as an important key to understanding the relation between language and culture.

Finally, if we accept that language is in some sense a repository or encoding of culture, then the death of a language can mean the loss of much of our potential for understanding that culture—even heavy lexical borrowing, in cases where the existence of a language itself is not threatened, reduces our potential for understanding the culture that produced that language. Not only is our potential for understanding culture diminished, but—more crucially for the mainstream linguist—our potential for understanding language is also diminished. For example, there has yet to be an adequate descriptive theory of the semantics even of English, despite the work that has been done, let alone a language such as Mökpè.

REFERENCES


The preoccupation of so many anthropologists and anthropological departments with securing funding raises many questions about the control of the direction in which anthropological research is going. One is forced to take note not only of the kind and quantity of factual knowledge produced (or ignored), but also the effect this must have on the development of thought in anthropology. There is, of course, an old refrain that research of all kinds must adapt to the needs of society—which leads to the obvious question: who decides what those needs are? The structures of sponsorship and funding for anthropology deserve more research attention than they sometimes receive in this busy world. Some attention was focused on these processes at the EASA Biennial Conference in Frankfurt in September 1998. We were accused of pusillanimity in the face of bureaucratic requirements. But how often are these challenged? We are normally delighted when a colleague is funded by the ESRC or ODA or an NGO like Oxfam, CAFOD, and so on, or by the British Council at the request of an overseas government or university. We are reassured by knowing that it is likely that the selection board will be composed of scholars, among whom we hope will be at least some experienced social anthropologists. Such representatives of the profession will, nevertheless, probably have to make their selections within the guidelines and known proclivities of those who sanction the expenditure. As John Davis has recently noted (1999: 7):
When—as a referee in a peer review—we write to commend a research proposal, we do so in terms that will satisfy the council: we say the project is related to themes announced by the council; that it will increase material wealth in Britain; that it will be ‘value for money’.

Assessors may well feel, given the expectations of politicians and the public they represent, that they cannot make a decision on how to allocate money until the would-be researchers provide detailed hypotheses (will a question not do?), requiring them to anticipate their findings before leaving for the field. So much for open-mindedness! All this we accept as the way of the world. We even acquiesce when faced with the requirement, which I think is locally imposed, that if an applicant is not already in a post, some person who is in one must sign the funding application, not merely as having approved it as a head of department might reasonably do, but as ‘principal investigator’. This can happen even when it is well known that the latter has neither the time nor the experience to do any of the research in question. This is neither honest nor equitable. It must be especially galling when the real investigator is already an experienced researcher with a good track record, possibly as good as, maybe even better than, the so-called ‘principal investigator’. The humiliation of searching for a principal investigator is sometimes only equalled by the reluctance of those approached to be put in this embarrassing position, which they may accept only in order to open a way for the researcher. What other fudges are there?

The academic climate and academic careers are changing. Davis (ibid.: 5–6) writes that

For about seven hundred years the specialists in explanation...have belonged to chartered corporations [collegial organizations] with an internal organization that has generally been non-bureaucratic, and in which tasks are allocated according to skill and aptitude rather than by formal position in a hierarchy of rule-governed roles.

This is a model he favours, but fears is passing. In protesting against ‘market rationality’, he makes a plea for collegiality (ibid.: 8):

...in our university lives [we should] do what we can to preserve collegiality in a hostile environment, even if we have to flavour our Dionysian organization with increasing amounts of Zeus. That is because a Dionysian organization department gives more opportunity to our younger colleagues to create and innovate under the shelter of a defending leader, and gives them a temporary exemption from the new regime of audit and control conformity.

The problem is that those who need ‘shelter’ are not always the inexperienced young students for whom the model was intended, and furthermore, many mature scholars, of either sex, are excluded from the collegiate life. Currently, and per-
haps for some time to come, many have to exist for years (forever?) on ‘soft money’, hovering at times like displaced persons, sans papiers, ‘not eligible to apply’, perhaps ‘over age’ at 31. Unfunded married women are likely to be told they shouldn’t worry about it—as if neither death nor desertion were possibilities, and that prestige and career opportunities (and all the access, expenses, and perks that these entail) are not for them. Members of this growing caste contrast with their fellow academics in post: for those that have, so often, more can they obtain. It is good that studies of bureaucracies of various kinds have been made in recent years and that the modern practice of auditing has received attention (for example, by Strathern 1997). But perhaps in the rush of life we still have blind spots and cannot see everything beyond ourselves, where we are going, and the effect of the institutions that aid or hinder this.

Perhaps a rethinking of the past in the light of our present condition might now be helpful. We need not go back 700 years—the middle third of the twentieth century can be revealing. It is not uncommon to hear disparaging remarks about the social anthropologists who, through no default of their own, did their fieldwork when political colonialism was widespread, as opposed to today, when dominion comes in the guise of development, humanitarian or other aid, or globalization. Despite the motes in our own eyes, we can take another look at the support structures of those days, reflect further on their implications, and see what we can learn from them.

It is in keeping with JASO’s occasional backward look through the archives of anthropology that the editors have decided to publish below a hitherto unpublished paper given in December 1955 by Mrs E. M. (Sally) Chilver to a postgraduate seminar at London University’s Institute of Commonwealth Studies on ‘British Tropical Dependencies during the Past Hundred Years’ (and asked me to write this preamble). Chilver entitled her talk ‘The Organization of Social and Economic Research in the British Colonial Territories’. It has existed only in mimeographed form till now. JASO readers will remember the biographical note by Chilver in the special 1995 edition of JASO (Vol. XXVI, no. 1: see Chilver 1995, Fowler and Zeitlyn 1995a), which included papers in her honour edited by Ian Fowler and David Zeitlyn. This was only one publication of a group of three dedicated to her at that time, the others being African Crossroads (Fowler and Zeitlyn 1996), and a special issue of Paideuma (Fowler and Zeitlyn 1995b). These three publications are testimonies to Chilver’s standing as an academic, especially in the field of Cameroon studies. Her role in the allocation and administering of research grants is less well known. She has, however, published two papers on the structures within which research was conducted in the immediate post-war situation. How was she in a position to know about these matters? After graduating from Somerville in 1935, she odd-jobbed for her journalist father in the Near East and Balkans, returned to London, and published a book (1939), as well as (under the name Sally Graves) reviews, poems, and other pieces for weeklies. When the war broke
out, like other graduates she was recruited into the civil service, in which, for a
time, she was involved in liaison work with the Free French forces. After a brief
return to journalism with the News Chronicle, she was lured back into the civil
service in the form of the Colonial Office. She writes:

At the time [1947] the higher home civil servants in the Colonial office were a
remarkable group. One was to become Director of LSE; another had compiled
the best Turkish lexicon of his day and was a leading Orientalist; most were
scholarly. (Chilver 1977: 103-4)

For some time Chilver worked in an economic division of the Colonial Office as,
among other things, assistant to Kenneth Robinson, a scholarly civil servant who
later became Director of the London University Institute of Commonwealth Stud­
ies and the Vice-Chancellor of Hong Kong University. In 1948 she took over as
Secretary of the Colonial Social Science Research Council, which had been estab­
lished in 1944, a post she held for ten years.

Before the war, interest in Africa had been exemplified by the establishment
of the International African Institute in 1926. In her text below, Chilver refers to a
paper by Malinowski in Africa. There are indeed three papers by him in early vol­
umes of the journal (1929, 1930, 1939) which make particularly interesting read­
ing. They concern his view of the proper role at that time for the long-established
International African Institute and give justification for the engagement of social
anthropologists in ‘practical anthropology’—his functionalist anthropology. To­
gether they demonstrate Malinowski’s case for anthropologists to give assistance
to men of affairs. His 1929 paper sets the scene: ‘...anthropology would obviously
be of the highest importance to the practical man in the colonies’ (1929: 36); ‘...the
Institute could be a general meeting-place or central exchange between the practi­
cal and theoretical interests in anthropology’ (ibid.: 38). Yet the Institute must be
apolitical: it should concentrate upon ‘the study of the facts and processes which
bear upon the practical problems and leave to statesmen (and journalists) the final
decision of how to apply the results’ (1929: 23; see also Richards 1944). There
was a critical response in Africa by a Tanganyika Provincial Commissioner (later
Governor of Kenya), P. E. Mitchell, who scathingly described Malinowski as

waking up to the splendid prospects of service to mankind which the science
to which he has devoted himself holds out, and [as] casting around for the
means of applying to practical things the knowledge which he possesses, or
feels confident that he can acquire; and he stands a little dismayed before a
world which hurries past him and seems to care little for the help which he
can give. (Mitchell 1930: 220)

Malinowski was not one to let this go by meekly. He summed up Mitchell’s posi­
tion regarding the IAI: ‘...practical men should, to the exclusion of the specialist
[anthropologist], be organized by [the] Institute in order to work out their own sal-
vation’ (1930: 408), then proceeding to shred Mitchell’s argument, before ending with an emollient ‘olive branch and a few conclusions’ (ibid.: 424). Another article by Malinowski (1939) includes a polemical review of Herskovits’s book Acculturati6n: The Study of Culture Contact (1938) and talks of the ‘new subject’ of culture change. These debates from the 1930s suggest that the professional anthropologists, especially those connected with the IAI, were rethinking their role—and no doubt the sponsorship of anthropological research too.

Changes in the colonies were anticipated in the pre-war survey by Lord Hailey (1938). The 1957 revised version of this influential volume was to be the subject of an anonymous review article by Chilver (1957). In 1938, the year Hailey first published his book, the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute was set up. War did not stop the momentum for change:

The statement of policy on Colonial Development and Welfare of February 1940 [was] made at the height of the Battle of Britain.... The funds reserved for central schemes for research, higher education and training included the provision for £5 million a year for research. (Chilver 1957: 120).

Interest in the colonies continued despite the war. For example,

In 1943 a West African Institute of Arts, Industries and Social Science had been established at Achimota, with the purpose of preventing the disintegration of those arts and crafts which appeared capable of survival and development by the study of their social implications and technology. (Chilver 1951: 183)

In her paper for the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, printed below, Chilver gives an overview of her work at the Colonial Social Science Research Council, a predecessor of the Social Science Research Council and its successor the ESRC. She wrote a retrospective article in Anthropological Forum (1977) on her time as secretary of the CSSRC. Audrey Richards’ paper in the same volume records the contribution made in the 1940s by Raymond Firth to the Colonial Research Council, and to the Colonial Social Science Research Council, of which he was the first Secretary. It should be remembered that Firth, like others of his generation and even younger, had been swept into the war effort, in his case into the Admiralty’s Naval Intelligence Division. Like Chilver, Audrey Richards became a temporary civil servant dealing with colonial matters. In common with other wartime institutions, the civil service really did represent the democratic civil society so much talked of today. Meanwhile Major Edmund Leach was in the army. Jack Goody and John Barnes, indeed most of the younger anthropologists, were drawn into national service, some even before they had engaged with anthropology. Many acquired overseas experience of unfamiliar cultures. With the professional
anthropologists involved in the war effort and those of graduate age called up, the teaching of social anthropology was reduced.

After the war, the country came under a Labour government, and a spirit of reconstruction was in the air. There was renewed interest in the colonies and their moves towards the independence that most of them achieved twenty years later.

At that time Labour Ministers were heavily influenced by the Fabian Colonial Bureau, especially in so far as African matters were concerned; these bulked large, and Ministers had abandoned any hope of indirect rule as a route to independence, except in a few areas, in which the past refused to lie down (Chilver 1977: 105).

Anthropology departments began to function more normally again. Edwin Ardener was the first, and in his year the only, student taking the BA in social anthropology at LSE; he had been too young for conscription. He was joined in his second year by Wilfred Whitely. There was an age and experience gap between them and those they mingled with, most of whom were graduates.

Chilver left the secretaryship of the CSSRC late in 1957. Among her comments in her retrospective evaluation of 1977, she notes that there were relatively few constraints upon the work of those who obtained grants (valued at a million pounds a year in her time). Of her colleagues in the civil service she noted: ‘It was a donnish group and it was as far from their minds as it was from those of their academic advisers to work out any particularly restrictive machinery’ (1977: 104). Moreover, ‘mere radical opinions did not interest anybody: there were quite a few in the Colonial Office who shared them.’ In theory, the government owned the copyright of reports by persons paid for and employed by it, and it published some. But no formal constraint was placed upon the publication of papers in learned journals, and when research workers made their own arrangements for publication a copyright dispensation was automatic. She records some of the complaints of researchers, and of district officers about research workers—for example, of the latter driving like demons to the danger of people and livestock—and behavioural restraints due to the sensibilities of local dignitaries.

But by and large some sartorial and general social eccentricity was expected of CSSRC workers and rather appreciated. Professor Goody arrived attired in second-hand football jerseys and, it is alleged, called on the District Officer in his areas in the colours of Manchester United (ibid.: 109–10): I am sure this is an exaggeration, though if so, a pity! Mrs Bohannan in the middle of Tivland (as the records of her remarkable pseudonymous novel agree) dressed for dinner and had candles on her camp table to keep up her morale. One young man came off the boat in a topee and white ducks and was mistaken for a deputy-governor.

Chilver lists some of the names of those whose books were published by HMSO under the auspices of the Colonial Office. They included Phyllis Kaberry, Edmund Leach, Philip Mayer, Lucy Mair, Stephen Morris, G. W. B. Huntingford, J. D. Freeman, Jack Goody, Maurice Freedman, C. K. Meek, F. K. Girling, A. L. Epstein, M. G. Smith, John Middleton and Burton Benedict. She highlights the
excellent Oxford B.Litt. thesis by Conrad Reining, an American, recruited by the Sudan Government, whose wife was a member of the East African Institute of Social Research; this was his 'Applied Anthropology in Theory and Practice' (1952).

More publications were issued from the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and the new overseas Research Institutes at Makerere University in Uganda and Ibadan University in Nigeria. It is interesting that two of the overseas institutes, the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute and the East African Institute of Social Research at one time came under the direction of United States citizens (Dr Elizabeth Colson and Lloyd Fallers). Changing African conditions had been anticipated, and epitomised by Richards, who became Director of the Institute at Makerere:

The need for fundamental research by independent fieldworkers cannot be over-emphasized, because anthropological science will perish without it. But it will have to be recognized that African Governments need investigations of a special type and publications suited to their particular needs, and that they will, presumably, have to provide for these as they do for the work of their chemists, botanists, and other scientists. The production of senior investigators, qualified to organize studies of the kind required, takes a considerable time, and if these are going to be needed, the training of a new generation of research workers will have to be planned in advance. The training of African investigators and the development of focal research centres would greatly contribute to the success of such schemes. The study of culture change has brought anthropologists into the field of modern administrative, social, and economic problems, and the best form of co-operation with specialists in these subjects, having regard to the particular difficulties of cross-cultural study, will need to be worked out in future programmes of research. (Richards 1944: 300)

Looking back, we can see that the Colonial Social Science Research Council and the overseas research institutes gave some newly graduated anthropologists, both expatriate to them and locally educated, opportunities for sustained fieldwork at a formative age not open to many young scholars today. In the light of the foregoing and of Chilver's paper here, we can also detect a familiar ring, as, even before the war, anthropologists searched for new relevance and new claims for sponsorship. It is such factors that give the text below its relevance for the history of the funding of field research in anthropology, a history which needs to be reappraised and rewritten in the light of current preoccupations, and vice versa. It may well be discovered that the anthropologists of the 1940s and 1950s had more academic freedom than those of today. Particularly valuable would be a new content analysis of the published works, according to period, and the theoretical contributions embodied in them. These could be matched against analyses, not only of the effects of sponsorship, but of the reception of these works by both 'the practical man' and the anthropological specialist. This field would make an excellent topic for a doctoral thesis, assuming one has not been recently undertaken on this
topic—the texts quoted here and the references therein would make a possible place to begin.

REFERENCES


FOWLER, IAN, and DAVID ZEITLYN (eds.) 1995a. ‘Studies in the Ethnography of Cameroon in Honour of Sally Chilver’, *JASO* [Special Issue], Vol. XXVI, no. 1.

... 1995b. ‘Perspectives on the State: From Political History to Ethnography in Cameroon’, *Paideuma* [Special Issue], Vol. XLI, no. 1.


Perhaps I should explain first of all to those of you I do not know, who I am and what I do. I am a member of the Colonial Office Research Department whose title belies its real functions. The Research Department of the Colonial Office does no research but provides the secretariat for a number of advisory scientific bodies and is the department in the Colonial Office responsible for the day to day administration of that bit of C.D. & W. funds earmarked for research under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. Most of its time, I should explain, is spent pouring a quart of research into the pint pot of Treasury regulations.

Scientists, assisted by civil servants, are and always have been, in charge of the day-to-day central administration of the funds devoted to medical and agricultural research. But characteristically enough, the Secretary of the Colonial Social Science Research Council and the Colonial Economic Research Committee is now neither a sociologist nor an economist. I say ‘characteristically enough’ because the situation reflects the virtual absence of government social research organizations in the field. There are colonial agricultural and medical services, but no sociological service. There is a colonial research service, but it does not include any social scientists. There are only a handful of government ethnologists and sociolo-
gists, all recruited on different terms, and working quite independently of one another.

It would be impossible to discuss the work of the two advisory committees of which I am secretary—the Colonial Social Science Research Council and the Colonial Economic Research Committee—without making some mention of attempts to organize social science research in the Colonies before they were set up. My treatment will be very cursory and leave out of account the remoter influences leading to the setting up of the Council: for example, the precedents established in Australia and its Dependencies and in British India, nor indeed the local and short-lived experiments in government-sponsored research in Nigeria and the Gold Coast.

I think I can do no better than start with the foundation of the International African Institute in 1926, which is traced by Professor Forde back to the work of the Advisory Committee on Native Education in Tropical Africa which was appointed by the Colonial Secretary in 1923. Major Hanns Vischer was secretary of the Committee, which came to realize that ‘an organization was needed to promote research and serve as a clearing house for information on the social institutions and languages of Africa’. [The project took final shape at the International Missionary Conference at which the leading proponents of the idea of an International Institute were Major Vischer, Dr J. H. Oldham, the Revd. Edwin P. Smith and Professor Westermann.] The Institute was inaugurated in June 1926, under Lord Lugard’s chairmanship.

From the very start the influence of the Department of Anthropology at the London School of Economics under Professor Malinowski was important. In an earlier issue of Africa Professor Malinowski set out his views on how scientific anthropology could serve the needs of administration. This article provoked a debate with Philip Mitchell, then a Provincial Commissioner in Tanganyika, which in some ways set the tone of the debate between academic anthropologists and practical administrators ever since. In 1930 the Institute started a programme of research: then, as now, its primary purpose was to act as a clearing-house for information and to provide scientific information which could be used for a number of different purposes. At this time the Institute debated whether to appoint specialists to carry out individual inquiries, the results of which would be published in a series of monographs or to seek the collaboration of administrators and others and (I quote) ‘bring its inquiries into living and fruitful relation with the problems with which they were concerned’.

Although the second choice was decided on, it proved in the event that the first was the one carried out. It was during this period, and largely with the help of the Rockefeller Foundation, that material was collected for its monographs, which are now required reading for Africanists. Perhaps it is not true to say that the second and ostensible purpose of the Institute’s research was entirely neglected. It happened from time to time that African governments would ask the Institute’s
Fellows to make special inquiries. The most comprehensive of these were those undertaken by Professor Schapera for the Bechuanaland Government. He was the most successful of the Institute Fellows in getting government assistance after the period of his Fellowship. A candid evaluation of the results of the Institute's Fellowship Programme was published by Dr Audrey Richards in 1944, who wrote, 'at the outbreak of the war only the Governments of Australia, the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the Gold Coast and the Union of South Africa were employing Government Anthropologists. There were none in the other territories, nor were any employed as advisers or appointed to the staff of centres of higher education. Once their research grants came to an end it was in fact impossible for any but a small number to make a living, and University Departments regularly discouraged students without private means from taking up the subject as a post-graduate course so that the number of trained investigators is now dangerously small.'

I should make mention, however, of an experiment in applied anthropology conducted with Sir Philipp Mitchell's support by the anthropologist, Dr Gordon Brown, and the administrator, Mr Bruce Hutt, because it is so frequently referred to as a model. The purpose of this experiment was, according to Sir Philip Mitchell's letter to his District Officer, to examine in relation to a particular tribe the implementation of the Tanganyikan Government's new policy of 'local government in terms of its acceptability and its fluidity for future development.' As Sir Philip Mitchell said: 'it would be for the administrator to ask questions and for the anthropologist to answer them'. In the course of the project it was found necessary to define the duties and functions of the administrator together with the knowledge he should possess to perform his duties efficiently. As it happened, the anthropologist tended to want the inclusion of more knowledge than the administrator thought necessary, but they worked together very well and produced a joint book.

A few years later, in 1947, the first of the colonial field stations was set up; this was the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, which was not a government department but an independent body governed by a board of trustees. Its officers were, as its first director, Mr Godfrey Wilson put it, 'in no way directly responsible to any government or for any government policy, and their intellectual freedom is thus safeguarded. On the other hand, the presence of public men on the board ensures that the officers will not waste their time splitting academic hairs but will tackle instead problems of public importance.' Wilson had pointed out that the social research worker should not attempt to answer questions such as, 'What ought we to do about beer drinking in town?', but he could properly answer questions in the form of, 'Why is it so difficult to enforce the prohibition of private beer brewing?' He stressed the need for what he calls 'bare information'.

The next important event which led to the establishment of the Colonial Social Science Research Council was Lord Hailey's *African Survey*, which focused the attention of public men on the absence of information on native affairs. Hailey
himself seems to have favoured research on the lines of the Gordon Brown-Hutt experiments and further suggested that different disciplines should combine to attack specially pressing problems such as malnutrition. In 1940 the financial part of Lord Hailey's recommendations in his *African Survey* were put into effect by the passing of the first Colonial Development and Welfare Act, and a Colonial Research Council was set up under his chairmanship to advise the Secretary of State on the expenditure of funds for research. Nothing more could be done during the war years except to survey the information needs which a flood of development schemes appeared to require.

In 1944 the Colonial Research Council recommended the formation of the Colonial Social Science Research Council. Its terms of reference were to advise the Secretary of State on social research, but its early reports make it clear that such research was to be related to the requirements of colonial governments for information both general and specific, necessary for planning development schemes. At that time the Council proposed to start its operations with individual workers and to develop a system of research institutes modelled on the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute. Finding—perhaps understandably, since there existed no mediating technical branch of the Colonial Service—that its objects were not fully appreciated by colonial governments, the Council decided to send a number of specialists overseas to generate a better appreciation of the value of social science research. To this end Professor Forde visited the Gambia and Professor Firth went to the West African colonies. In 1947 Professor Schapera surveyed the several research needs of Kenya, Professor Firth those of Malaya, and Dr Leach those of Sarawak. Dr Stanner made a survey of Uganda and Tanganyika during 1947 and 1948 to correspond with Professor Schapera's Kenya survey. These East African surveys were intended to provide the basis of a programme for a new institute to be set up in East Africa along the lines of the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

At this point I should refer to two parallel developments: the emergence of colonial university colleges in a special relationship to the University of London in British Africa and the West Indies, and to the findings of the Scarbrough Commission.

To take the latter first, it was set up in 1944 to examine the facilities offered by universities for the study of oriental, Slavonic, East European and African languages and culture and to make recommendations for their improvement. The Commission recommended that public funds should be spent on building up appropriate university departments, and on providing opportunities for study abroad. The financial provisions were recommended in terms of five and ten years after initiation on the grounds that the new studies would be self-perpetuating after that.

The various commissions which examined proposals for the setting up of university colleges in the colonies were not primarily concerned with research but both the West Indian and West African commissions drew attention to the value of associated institutes of social and economic research in the new colleges.
The effect of these two developments, the Scarbrough Recommendations and the establishment of colonial university colleges, was to alter the original policy of the Colonial Social Science Research Council. It now set itself three objectives: the provision of a body of scientific information of general use, the provision of basic data of more specific value to particular colonial governments, and the provision of teaching materials for use by the new colonial colleges. The first effect of its new concerns was to alter very substantially its attitude to the proposed East African Institute, which was now to be closely associated with the new college at Makerere in contrast to the autonomous Rhodes-Livingstone Institute.

I do not think that the seminar will want from me a blow-by-blow account of the Council’s work from 1945 onwards, but rather an attempt to describe how the Council set about carrying out its wide terms of reference which, as you will see, had moved considerably from the Colonial Research Council’s first emphasis on fact-finding investigations and applied studies. One of its first concerns was to follow up the suggestion made by Dr Richards in 1944 that a cadre of social scientists should be trained, and some twenty studentships, involving a period of study in the United Kingdom followed by fieldwork overseas, were instituted. This was a sort of baby brother to the Scarbrough studentship scheme. It proved difficult in practice to gear these studentships to known demands of colonial governments, and for the most part they were directed to studies which would remedy gaps in general information rather than supply specific data required for colonial development policies. However, some students, having established themselves in the good graces of colonial governments, found themselves called upon in informal fashion to do just this.

A special scheme had been instituted for work in Kenya as a result of Professor Schapera’s visit. The ostensible purpose of this was to provide the Kenya Government with basic information required for projected developments in native agriculture, and as an experiment in applied anthropology. The scheme must be accounted a failure. I am not quite clear whether it would be wise to make generalizations on the basis of such a limited scheme, since accidents, illness, and personal quarrels all played their part in its failure, but I will venture to say this: although its needs for social research were great, Kenya was an unfavourable terrain for the experiment: at the head of things was a governor with very decided views about how the research should be conducted and who wanted quick results. Below him were provincial commissioners and district staff, well below strength and too overworked to give the kind of support to the anthropologists given in Tanganyika in 1934 by Bruce Hutt. Three of the research workers appointed were not British and relatively unacquainted with the underlying assumptions of colonial administration. Finally, having no working model to go on—Professor Schapera’s advice not having trickled down to the operational level—the researchers were treated to start with as if they were members of the Colonial Service and subject to colonial regulations. As often happens in small communities, when silly
mistakes are made these are rectified in an over-dramatic way: the anthropologists, unwilling to play the role of advisers or intelligence officers, were temporarily relegated to that of visiting eggheads. One or two of them managed to retrieve the position in the long run, and one in particular, Philip Mayer, ended by establishing a useful relationship with the Nyanza Provincial Administration. From the point of view of the Colonial Office, however, some conclusions could be drawn from the official correspondence about the scheme. It seemed, for example, that the independence of the social research worker could best be preserved if his role as an academic anthropologist were stressed and if the end-product of his work were represented as a publication which would add to general scientific knowledge. The phrasing of his role in these terms would enable him to be accorded the usual courtesies as a respectably sponsored scientific visitor. After he had established himself as part of the landscape, he could if he wished, and if the circumstances were favourable, develop an informal advisory role or better still the role of go-between betwixt administration and native people. The Colonial Office did not seek to formalize its views by indoctrinating either research workers or colonial governments, but it was left with the strong impression that what Mr James Spillius has called an operational research role was only possible from the outset in particularly favourable situations—where, for example, the demand of governments for information was strong, but not too strong, where the general political situation was not too disturbed, and where some appreciation of the methods of scientific social investigation already existed.

Once the essentially academic character of the research worker had been established, the Colonial Office was able to arrive at an informal code about publications, though not without some ups and downs. In recent years the social scientist’s report on commissioned work has often taken two forms: a brief outline report of some forty-odd pages for the colonial government’s files followed by a scholarly monograph. This has the advantage of maintaining the interest of colonial governments without sacrifice of academic standards.

Before I finish with Kenya I will bring the story of social research there up to date. The last two social-science research workers posted there were comparatively young men, one of whom had had previous field experience in Tanyanyika where he had settled easily into the operational research role because of unusually favourable circumstances which included the presence of government sociologists who took a keen interest in his work. He worked in Nyanza Province where a favourable attitude towards social research had been generated by the work of Wagner and Mayer. The other was posted to the Northern Frontier Province and he had the good luck to have as his provincial commissioner a man who fully understood the modern social anthropological approach. The first man has now been appointed by the Kenya Government as provincial anthropologist, the first appointment of its kind in Kenya. In the case of the second, when the epitome of his D. Phil. thesis reached the provincial commissioner’s office it was digested at once
and the full original text was called for practically by return of post. Copies of the epitome were made compulsory reading for the district staff.

Before I resume the theme of the institutes, which I have already touched upon, I think you might find it helpful if I give you at this juncture a picture of how the Colonial Social Science Research Council and its parallel, the Colonial Economic Research Committee, work, in theory at least. The CERC was started up in 1947 when it became clear that the CSSRC could not hope to give to this field the amount of attention it deserved. Both are advisory bodies, the CSSRC almost entirely and the CERC entirely academic in composition. Projects requiring Colonial Development and Welfare support may be presented to them either by colonial governments, the Colonial Office, or individual scholars. These projects do not, of course, come out of the blue. Those suggested by government are the result of circular inquiries or departmental initiative, those from scholars often arise out of informal discussions with Council and Committee members or as a result of circulars sent to UK and Commonwealth universities. Projects reaching the Council and Committee are always of three kinds: supervised projects for field work by Ph.D. candidates, proposals by established scholars, and team or institutional projects. These are examined first by Standing Committees in the case of the CSSRC. If they are considered worthwhile, and stand up scientifically, they are further examined by the Council in relation to the disposition of its funds. The function of the Secretary, as a temporary member of the Colonial Office staff, is to report colonial needs to the two advisory bodies, enlist their suggestions for getting them met—they often have to be formulated into researchable proportions—play back suggestions for research to colonial governments and get their goodwill, and cope generally with the administrative business involved in setting up a research project, from getting Treasury sanction for expenditure to ordering air tickets. The Council may appoint supervisors for a particular project and its specialist members sit on boards selecting younger candidates for fieldwork grants. Since there is no scientific secretary to cope with minor technical matters, the Secretary often has to poster particular members for advice. All their work is unremunerated and can often be a very heavy load on very busy people. The Council is also concerned with financial recommendations affecting the Institutes, although these are autonomous in every other respect. Their directors are solely responsible for the work carried out, their staff is recruited by the parent college, with the help of the IUC, and they publish their results how and where they like.

At the present time there is a flourishing academic research institute at Makerere College, one which has now got into its stride in Jamaica, and one which has been less successful in Ibadan. The Colonial Economic Research Committee has agreed to support an academic research unit at the UCGC, its only independent venture so far into institutional research. A social research unit was set up at the University of Malaya, but it has not struck root. The Rhodes-Livingstone Institute, established without C.D. & W. support, is now receiving it.
In so far as these institutes are concerned, there has been a curious echo of the Kenya problems I discussed at some length earlier, but in their case the vested interests, as it were, were not the colonial administrations but the academic ones of the university colleges. It has proved quite unexpectedly difficult to combine the interests of teaching and research. University colleges seem to be just as regulation-minded as colonial administrations and as impatient with the slow process of social investigation. To pursue the parallel, where teaching departments of social studies or economics existed even in embryo, the comprehension of the requirements of research in terms of day-to-day administration, study leave, and generally flexible management has been all the clearer. At Ibadan the absence of such a department has led in the long run to the decision that the institute is not viable as a field institution. By 1956 or early 1957 it will have ceased to exist and will be replaced, I hope, by a teaching department which will be generously enough staffed to allow its members fairly frequent field research leave. In Malaya, a social research unit was established under a committee, but, as experience shows, everybody’s baby is nobody’s baby. The Institute established in the West Indies in 1948 now has an embryo department of economics alongside it, and there is good hope that by the time its grant ceases it will have put down roots. In East Africa the Makerere Institute, which came into effective operation when Dr Richards went there in 1950, is a recognized part of the College, which had established a teaching department of social studies at an early stage. This institute, and to some extent the West Indian one, are the only two to have carried out successfully the original aims of the CSSRC which, as you already know, were the supply of general scientific information, of basic data for colonial development needs and for teaching material. Both of them have established themselves as recognized agencies with which colonial governments have concluded research contracts. The East African Institute specializes in the sociological and the West Indian Institute in the economic field. In spite of the poverty of the West Indies, the danger facing the West Indian Institute is not the absence of support from West Indian governments but the difficulty it faces in integrating the variety of demands for economic and social research it gets into a coherent programme. Now, an agency business can only be carried on by a going concern, and so far no colonial governments have been able to face the proposition of allocating sufficient funds to the parent university colleges by addition to block grants to enable the institutes to have a secure income. Nevertheless, what I have called the agency business of the Institutes creates goodwill, which I hope will stand them in good stead after the 31st March 1960, when the present C.D. & W. Act comes to an end.

Before speculating about what may happen after 1960, I should mention some new directions recently taken by the CSSRC and the CERC. The new direction taken by the CSSRC is the promotion of historical research—rather neglected over the past ten years because of the original bias of the Council towards applied and contemporary studies. The absence of reliable historical teaching material in the
new university colleges has been remarked on, for example, by the African History Conference, which took place under the auspices of the School of Oriental and African Studies. While it has been rather difficult to persuade the Treasury that historical studies can be fitted into the rubrics of the C.D. & W. Acts, the Colonial Office itself needs no conversion. The appearance of historical mythology has given scientific history an administrative raison d'être. The CSSRC has recently been discussing two projects involving the co-operation of historians and social anthropologists: the first is a cultural history of Benin based at the University College at Ibadan, where Dr Dike is the Head of the History Department, and the second is a proposal for the compilation of comprehensive regional histories of East and Central Africa. The organizational problems involved in this type of project are, of course, fairly novel and, no doubt, there will be muddles and mistakes to learn from.

Before describing the new look in the CERC, I should perhaps describe the old look. This Committee took the view from the very start that its first task should be to interest established academic economists in colonial economic problems, in theoretical and methodological ones, that is, rather than practical ones, Consequently, it made it its business to do what it could to persuade well-known economists to embark on colonial projects. The results have been Peter Bauer's 'West African Trade', for example, Ida Greaves 'Colonial Monetary Conditions', and Prest's and Stewart's 'National Income of Nigeria'. The new look, like most new looks, has two aspects, as you might say, a new waist and skirt length.

Encouragement has been given to descriptive studies based on overseas colonial universities either by their own staff or in association with them: for example, the Makerere Institute is working on the labour problems of local manufacturers, the UCGC in the incomes of cocoa farmers, and the West Indian Institute in a field study of the economic behaviour of small farmers. At the University of Hong Kong a descriptive study of money and banking in Southeast Asia has been supported, and a Durham scholar attached to Fourah Bay College is writing a history of economic development in Sierra Leone. A start has also been made in what one might call applied studies, which owe a great deal to Professor Austin Robinson's ideas. The base for these studies is an Economic Department of Government, such as the Statistics Department. These CERC projects are designed to help these Departments by means of what Austin Robinson calls bench-mark exercises. Governments now require regular economic and statistical information to guide policy makings and the setting up of a flow of information on economic conditions. Its analysis needs the views of those economists in this country who have worked on similar types of projects. Sometimes these combined advisory and operational tasks have been performed in vacations: for example, Mr Moser of the LSE has recently returned from Jamaica, where he has been studying amongst the files of government departments what the most feasible indicators of levels of living are in the island. Two other economists, Alan Peacock of the LSE and Douglas Dosser of
Sheffield, are just about to start out for Tanganyika to set in motion a national income exercise which, apart from its intrinsic interest, will set up a regular flow of statistics and train the administrators involved.

After 1960, as I said before, the future is obscure. I would guess myself that there will be a little money from C.D. & W. sources for social and economic research but that it will be considerably less than the half million-odd allocated during the present quinquennium. Such as there is would, I think, be for the most part devoted to any ‘bedded-out’ institutional research which showed signs of being self-perpetuating. The Colonial Office is, of course, not officially cognizant of the fact that C.D. & W. funds expended on social research has contributed to a small expansion in university studies in the United Kingdom. It is not officially cognizant either of such problems as lack of academic careers in certain fields of Colonial Office interest. The standing paradox of studies promoted by the CO is that their continuation depends to a great extent on the policies of UK universities, which are outside its range of influence and which will remain so. Only the universities can make them respectable.

In the course of time, the Colonial Office function as a patron of social and economic research will have to be taken over by others—by those colonial governments who can afford it and those of the new self-governing nations, by foundations, and perhaps by business. The CSSRC and CERC might be regarded in some respects as government-organized lobbies. It is perhaps not too soon to think about organizing other lobbies against the time when no more issues from the C.D. & W. Fund will be made.

The following were the principal points made in discussion at this seminar:

1. The Central Organization

The general strategy of research was controlled by the Colonial Research Committee, composed of the Parliamentary Under-Secretary, representatives of DISR and the Royal Society and the chairmen of the several research committees. The Colonial Social Service Research Council, with its committees, and the Colonial Economic Research Committee were subordinate to the CRC.

2. The West African Institute

Its failure had been due to the absence of a director for a long period, the inability to find an economist for pure research, and the lack of a long-term programme. It was
now hoped that funds would be found for a teaching department which would also do research, as at Achimota.

3. Relations between the Institutes and Colleges

It was suggested that the existence of the institutes might have removed the stimulus to research by members of the teaching staffs. The policy was now to integrate the two more closely, by rotating the personnel or in other ways. This was in fact the only chance of continuing existence for the institutes after 1960.

4. Relations between Colonial Governments and Social Researchers

The official attitude had been so much more favourable in Tanganyika than in Kenya because in the former there had already been a government Sociology Department, which had been able to interpret the needs and objects of anthropologists to the administration.

The outlook in Kenya now appeared to be more encouraging than in the past.

5. Pressure Groups

Anthropology suffered from not having a pressure group like most other disciplines, since it fell between the stools of the Royal Society and the British Academy. When the Acts ran out it would be left without an official ‘lobby’. Anthropology was not ‘built in’ to the Colonial Office structure, as were for example agriculture and medicine. It might, however, be built in to the colonial governments: the Kenya Government was about to appoint its own sociologist.

6. The Prospects for Research

The institute plan, Mrs Chilver thought, had been the right one in spite of some mistakes. Experiments in applied research, in the narrow sense, had proved a failure. The future of the institutes was not in question, but the problem was how to secure continuity of the type of independent academic research work which they had fostered. Possible answers included:

(i) The development of local graduate schools. It was absurd that candidates for doctorates should have to come to the UK where the necessary material was often not to be found. The conferment of higher degrees by the colonial university colleges was an end in view, and they were already conferred in Malaya—though this had not prevented doctorates being sought at British universities.
(ii) Expansion of the relevant studies at UK universities. There was, however, a danger of a time lag, which might leave experienced research workers stranded, between the sudden reduction in C.D. & W. money after 1960 and the hoped-for university developments.

(iii) American support. There were established organizations for African studies at North-Western and Boston Universities, and there might soon be others. There was also the Ford Foundation’s programme of African graduate fellowships, and there had been some informal attachments to the research institutes. A conference organised at Princeton by the Carnegie Corporation had attempted to secure co-ordination of African studies, but no continuing organization had been set up. It did not seem that Ford, etc. would really take the place of C.D. & W.

(iv) Unesco already financed research, but only on a hand-to-mouth basis.

(v) Financial support from the local governments. Even the West Indies, which was a special case, could pay for more research than it was at present, though it could not support the institute on its existing scale.

It was pointed out that in economics at least the problem was the lack of men rather than the lack of money.

7. Retrenchment and the School of Oriental and African Studies

The expansion of the School had been based to a large extent upon the Scarbrough scholarships, and would be halted if they came to an end, since the field for the recruitment of staff would become much smaller.

8. Historical Research

(i) Organization. The CSSRC’s move towards the promotion of historical studies was quite separate from the creation of a new advisory committee on archives and archaeology, which was the product of a different lobby and had a different source of funds. The CSSRC’s scheme was still on paper; it would be canvassed in UK universities.

(ii) Access to material. The plan for regional histories would raise the question of access to material after 1902. The Colonial Office had to keep in step with other Departments in this matter. The Secretary of State had indeed the right to allow access at his discretion, but this entailed censorship, and recent cases suggested that it was preferable not to have access on those terms. (This had wrecked an earlier plan for standard political histories of the colonies.) The Grigg Committee, however, had recently recommended automatic opening after fifty years. Moreover, in practice it was usually possible to get access to colonial archives, at least to unclassified dispatches and to purely local material, provided that this was done quietly and that the general issue was not publicly raised.
RELIGION, CONSUMERISM, AND
THE MODERNITY OF THE NEW AGE

PETER PELS


In Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, Evans-Pritchard memorably described the way in which Azande scepticism and rationality helped to maintain their system of belief in witchcraft, all empirical contrariness notwithstanding. Many twentieth-century social scientists have been equally tenacious in shoring up their system of belief in the face of contrary evidence, especially when defending the supposed existence of socio-historical processes like 'rationalization', 'secularization', 'civilization', or 'modernization'. Such an attitude seems peculiarly world-renouncing today, at a time when a global broadcaster like CNN asks Uri Geller—the former psychic spoon-bender, later unmasked as a fraud—to give an expert commentary on the multiple suicide, in March 1997, of the members of the 'Heaven's Gate' cybersect, who wanted to reach the 'next level' by leaving their earthly 'vehicle' and returning to their extraterrestrial source, a UFO passing the earth in the slipstream of the Hale-Bopp comet. This CNN expert, despite his scepticism about the
visions of ‘Heaven’s Gate’, preface his comments by saying that ‘of course, UFOs exist’—showing that, like Azande, we use scepticism to make our beliefs more convincing. A book like Paul Heelas’s The New Age Movement, which studies an important breeding-ground of such modern magicalities, must therefore be warmly welcomed, not only because it may provoke critical reflections on the articles of faith of social-scientific ‘sceptics’ (such as rationalization and secularization), but also because it may give precedence to the study of the phenomena that their beliefs are trying to marginalize or define out of existence—especially since the author’s training (he took a doctorate in anthropology at Oxford) suggests that he will bring the accomplishments of anthropological theories of religion and magic to bear on the subject.

The New Age Movement is the first comprehensive and affordable book on New Age to appear (it has an equally comprehensive but more expensive competitor in Wouter Hanegraaff’s New Age Religion and Western Culture). Its great merit is the clear and unambiguous way in which it opens up the field by defining it in terms of what Heelas calls the lingua franca of self-spirituality: ‘The great refrain, running throughout the New Age, is that we malfunction because we have been indoctrinated—or, in the New Age sense of the term, been “brainwashed”—by mainstream society and culture.’ This indoctrination obscures and cripples the power of the ‘real’ Self: ‘To experience the “Self” itself is to experience “God”, the “Goddess”, the “Source”, “Christ Consciousness”, the “inner child”, the “way of the heart”, or, most simply and, I think, most frequently, “inner spirituality”’ (pp.18–19). The New Age emphasis on self-spirituality is rooted in late nineteenth- or early twentieth-century forms of modern occultism (such as spiritualism and its successor, the Theosophical Society). It is an optimistic, ‘detraditionalized’ faith that internalizes religiosity in such a way that persons seek to rely on an ‘inner voice’ and reject any outside authority or tradition, especially in the form of established religion. The latter, in presupposing a normatively defined public self, devalues the person and excludes non-believers from its faith and worship, while ‘the New Age shows what “religion” looks like when it is organized in terms of what is taken to be the authority of the Self’ (p. 221). Although it turns out to be difficult to draw ‘hard and fast boundaries’ around the object ‘New Age’ (p. 117) in terms of religion or spirituality, Heelas makes it clear that, in spiritualizing the secular and transforming older religions like Christianity and Buddhism in its image, New Age is the first candidate for the post of the religion of modernity.

Heelas is particularly good at pointing out the wide range of what can fall under ‘New Age’: from world-rejecting to world-affirming, from countercultural re-enchantment to the affirmation of mainstream business magic, from anti-modern to explicitly modernist, New Age finds its way to everyone—just as nineteenth-century occultism was both working-class and aristocratic, both progressive and conservative. His identification of New Age as ‘perennialist’, that is, as seeking a hidden and similar core of wisdom in all religions, rather than defining an exclu-
ivist faith, is worth much further investigation. Perhaps his most important contribution is the way in which, helped by his research on 'cults for capitalism', the New Age bank BCCI and the role of New Age in neoliberal 'enterprise culture', he does away with the idea that New Age is tied to the countercultural. At first sight, says Heelas, New Age implies a break with modernity (pp. 3, 153); but 'the most controversial point to be made in this volume' is that New Age in fact also exemplifies—even more, sacralizes—long-standing cultural trajectories of modernity (pp. 136, 154). This invitation to subject specific cultural aspects of modern society to analysis—that is, to anthropologize modernity—is in itself sufficient to justify paying serious attention to this book.

Yet, while the culture of modernity is its main subject—and the book certainly offers important insights into it—Heelas rarely makes use of the arsenal of anthropological analysis in formulating his views on New Age. Especially in the field of religion and magic—where anthropological theory has been a guide to other social sciences—this is a puzzling omission. He prefers the analytical insights available from sociology (a sociology that is predominantly Durkheimian, does little with Weberian insights, and leaves out Marx altogether), from religious studies, and from psychology—all disciplines that have provided core ideologies of modernity and that sometimes tend to stay too close to the modern 'native point of view'. Likewise, Heelas sometimes seems to reproduce modernist self-conceptions and the ways in which New Age thinking legitimizes itself. He regularly shies away from discussing theoretical insights that could be unpleasant to New Age thinking. He never mentions the frauds and charlatans of the New Age, which the emphasis on fraud and illusion characteristic of the anthropological theory of magic would have brought forward; his repetitive assurance that real New Age converts are not consumerist seems intended to keep at bay Marx's insight that commodity fetishism and consumerism constitute modernity's Alltagsreligion. Finally, he rarely seems to realize the extent to which the methodology and rhetoric he employs abolish the boundaries between his own analytical stance and the points of view of the people researched, making him take over the moral sentiments of New Age itself. In the remainder of this brief essay, I would like to discuss in more detail these three issues: the contributions that the anthropology of magic and religion may make to studying New Age; the extent to which New Age is modern because it is indissolubly linked to its 'spirit of consumerism'; and the extent to which the modernity of the New Age is based on a merger with academic methodology and rhetoric itself.

At the outset, however, it seems necessary to affirm that it is impossible to demarcate New Age. New Age is a discourse (or, as Heelas puts it, a 'lingua

1 Heelas's references to the anthropological theory of religion are restricted to Geertz's ubiquitous 'model of/for' definition of religion (pp. 169, 173-4; cf. Geertz 1966), a reference to Turner's 'communitas' that, I feel, rather draws it out of context (p. 158; cf. Turner 1974), and, of course, Durkheim's notions of religion and the sacralization of the self.
franca') developed in the nineteenth century that produces its own social practices as much as it penetrates into others. The New Age character of much present-day Christianity, and the fact that humanistic psychology has always had a considerable ‘New Age’ component, show that the discourse of self-spirituality has no respect for the institutional boundaries by which many social scientists identify their objects. This explains why Heelas’s attempts to draw boundaries around his object—despite the fact that he agrees that no ‘hard and fast boundaries’ exist—constantly fail to produce any clarity. New Age is, as the title of the book suggests, a ‘movement’, yet it is not a ‘new religious movement’ (p. 9) although participation in New Age can be measured by participation in new religious movements (p. 111). That one can draw boundaries around New Age is suggested by the statement that one ‘steps inside’ New Age by conversion (pp. 181ff.), but is contradicted by the statement that New Age requires no great ‘leap of faith’ and that, rather than conversion, it is effective practices that turn someone into a ‘New Ager’ (p. 173). New Age’s self-spirituality is said to be distinct from the strictly secular, yet there are also forms of magical efficacy that fall in between the spiritual and the secular (p. 168). These forms of magical efficacy are closer to the expressivism and therapeutic experiences of practical psychology, from which one can gradually shift into New Age without a moment of ‘conversion’ (p. 197)—just as there is no sharp break between Freudian psychoanalysis and New Age, although the former has nothing to do with self-spirituality (p. 116). It is also hard to say how many people are ‘in’ New Age because many New Agers despise the term, because New Age organizations themselves are often those who provide figures on numbers of participants, and because polls give figures for New Agers in the USA ranging from only 20,000 up to 60 million (p. 112). Commercial indicators of New Age membership (of the sales of books, magazines, crystals, tarot decks, etc.) are, according to Heelas, more reliable (p. 114), but this seems to contradict his assertion that a consumerist attitude towards New Age items excludes genuine conversion to it (p. 186 n. 3), for the commercial indicators do not exclude those who merely seek pleasure (p. 203) or are fascinated by the occult rather than New Age ‘per se’ (p. 166). In other words, it seems to be as difficult to demarcate New Age as it is to say who ‘belongs’ to ‘it’.

In a situation where the object researched has no clearly identifiable social boundaries (because it is a discourse that does not respect such boundaries), it is difficult to see the use of a concept like ‘conversion’ (on which Heelas bases his chapter about the effectiveness of New Age ‘self-understanding’; pp. 181–200). Recent anthropological theory shows that our present understanding of conversion is founded on a Protestant Christian heritage imparted to social-scientific theories.

Let alone that we can start asking whether Heelas’s use of ‘movement’ (much like that of other scholars of religious movements) does not reify as an object what should be studied as a process. See Fabian 1981.
of religion, theories that tend to reify (systems of) belief and abstract them from the social practices and power relations that give them meaning (cf. Asad 1993; Comaroff and Comaroff 1991). It is significant that Heelas’s ambivalences about whether or not to speak of ‘conversion’, which pervade his text, only disappear when he wants to show that New Age training does indeed make a difference to participants—after the fact (p. 181 ff.). Our understanding of conversion is, indeed, based on narrative self-descriptions of those who have already been converted, after the fact, and is, therefore, close to the ‘native point of view’ of the convert. I think a critique of ‘conversion’ would have made Heelas more sensitive to different and more flexible concepts of religious change—for instance, the physical transformation suggested by the notion of initiation, or the idea of Lebensführung, propounded in Weber’s ‘Protestant Ethic’—that would have been less indebted to the ‘native point of view’ of New Age practitioners. ‘Initiation’ in particular would also have brought him closer to the anthropology of magical transformation (in the case of initiation, of the body), which Heelas, surprisingly for an anthropologist, completely ignores.

In fact, theories of magic would seem to be more appropriate for the analysis of New Age than notions like ‘conversion’ and ‘religion’. After all, anthropologists from Frazer and Mauss onwards have argued that magic is, compared to the publicity of religion, a private and secret activity, and much more experimental, variable, and experiential than the public system of beliefs, dogma, and ritual suggested by the concept of ‘religion’. But although Heelas repeatedly affirms the magicalities of the New Age, he never brings such theory to bear on his subject—in fact, he rarely discusses the fact that New Age perennialism, which seeks a hidden core of wisdom in every religion, directly derives from the attitudes propagated by the ‘occultism’ of the Theosophical Society, which itself drew on the ‘theosophical enlightenment’ of a world heritage of magical and esoteric knowledge (cf. Godwin 1994). But if it seems that the anthropology of magic would have been useful to Heelas (as it was useful to Tanya Luhrmann in her study of a sub-section of the New Age, namely pagan magic), it would also have confronted him with the issue of deception and illusion, inherited by anthropological theorizing about the occult from the Protestant denunciation of ‘papish knavery’ or folk healing. Nowhere in the book does Heelas address this core feature of talk about New Age. The fact that there are few New Age practitioners who do not somehow have to deal intellectually and practically with an environment of sceptical disbelief and accusations of fraud and charlatanry, seems to have no place in Heelas’s conception of it.

Another point at which Heelas tends to side with New Age practitioners’ self-conceptions is in his heavy emphasis on the ‘detraditionalization’ by which they

---

3 Cf. Luhrmann 1994. Although Heelas refers to her work, he does not deal with its insights.
are characterized, an issue that is related to his equally ambiguous—and, I would add, impossible—attempts to distinguish true New Age from consumerism. Heelas commendably moves away from naive modernization theory's insistence on rationalization and secularization as features of modernity by arguing that modernity is corrosive and detraditionalizing, and that it therefore makes people 'conversion-prone' (p. 143). His statement that detraditionalization is a 'necessary condition' of the appeal of New Age is fully correct and a core feature of his definition of what New Age discourse at the empirical level is all about. But elsewhere, Heelas has argued that detraditionalization involves a shift of authority from 'without' to 'within' and has recorded his surprise that this view was not shared by other social scientists, betraying the fact that he in fact believed detraditionalization was not just a modernist ideology, but an accurate analysis of modernization processes as well. Although a paper by Nikolas Rose convincingly demolishing the detraditionalization thesis has appeared in a book co-edited by Heelas (cf. Rose 1996)—and although his book recognizes, somewhat belatedly, that the New Age corpus is itself a tradition (p. 207)—he tends to maintain the New Age 'native point of view' of a distinction between 'other-directed forms of life' (p. 157) and detraditionalized selves. This often leads to a confusion of the concepts of 'tradition', 'authority', and the 'past' at the analytical level (see especially pp. 214–15). The notion of 'tradition' that New Agers oppose reproduces some core features of modernist 'folk theory', particularly in the way in which it defines 'traditional' authority in terms of religion and magic. Max Weber did that as well, but at least he discussed different forms of authority (legal-rational and charismatic) standing next to the traditional. Edward Shils argued (1981: 21–3) that the conception of 'tradition' as being religiously and magically constituted was an ideology derived from the Enlightenment, and that for social analysis, one should recognize that reason, science, and bureaucracy are transmitted by tradition as well.

In his tendency to use 'detradditionalization' as social theory rather than as a modernist fantasy, Heelas suggests that the detraditionalized self of New Age is an empirical fact rather than a construction of New Age rhetoric—thus again reproducing that rhetoric itself. But as Rose argues (1996), the subject is constituted by an 'infolding' of external forms of authority. One of these external forms of authority is a discourse that tells persons to seek authority in themselves, but it usually stands opposed to other forms of authority—by no means all 'traditional'—

---

4 Heelas cites Paul Piccone and Anthony Giddens as fellow-believers in 'detradditionalization' (in Heelas et al. 1996: 2), but it would have been more appropriate to associate his ideas with Norbert Elias's ideology of 'civilization', based also on a presumed historical movement from Fremdzwang ('control by others') to Selbstzwang ('self-control') (1982: 313).

5 Heelas cites Shils extensively where the latter affirms how an ideology of the self counters 'tradition' (p. 160), but he does not acknowledge that Shils's analysis implies a complete devaluation of the detradditionalization thesis for sociological theory.
that suggest that the unified self is a desirable illusion rather than an empirical fact. Colin Campbell has argued that the middle-class personality, caught between its desires towards personal perfection and the attempt to satisfy those desires by consumption, is characteristically multiple. Like Heelas (pp. 42, 217), Campbell identifies the New Age rhetoric of self-spirituality as being rooted in the Romantic critique of the Enlightenment, but he goes much further by arguing that it is therefore intimately linked to, rather than opposed by, consumerism. In his brilliant revision of Weber's classic, Campbell suggests that the development of a 'romantic ethic' was responsible for the emergence of the spirit of consumerism, in which the day-dreams of the bourgeois personality, its feelings of incompleteness and personal lack of fulfillment, were satisfied time and time again by consumption. The relevance of Campbell's notion of the bourgeois double personality for New Age is perfectly captured by Kate, one of the main characters of Cyra McFadden's The Serial:

To think she herself had grown up **programmed** like that, just taking it for granted that 'success' meant a house in the suburbs, two cars and an FHA mortgage. True, she **had** a house in the suburbs, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera, but she would have been the first to insist that none of this stuff really **meant** anything. What did matter was being true to yourself, getting centered, and realizing, as another friend had so eloquently put it recently when she and Kate were rapping about self-realization, that 'life was part of existence'. (McFadden 1976: 107; cf. Campbell 1987)

Like Kate but unlike Campbell, Heelas does not seem to realize that New Age's desire for 'getting centered' in the self leads, in the vast majority of cases, to a radical splitting and decentering of the personality between the authorities-that-be (whether those of the labour market, shopping mall, or state bureaucracy) and the authority of the self that is desired. This splitting of the personality between daydream and despised reality is, according to Campbell, the essential ingredient of fashion, the spirit that keeps consumerism moving. Therefore, contrary to what Heelas and many other New Agers want to suggest, New Age does not stand opposed to consumerism; rather, it seems to lie at the very heart of the cultural complex that keeps consumerism moving.

To be sure, it is difficult to acquire a sufficiently distanced and critical view of modernity and its spiritualities when many of the analytical devices that one can use have long been part of the construction of spiritualities of modernity as well. Anthropology itself was complicit in this. The Theosophical Society would not have emerged without the theory of an Aryan race propounded by orientalists and ethnologists; Yeats and AE would not have joined the Order of the Golden Dawn, and Gerald Gardner would not have invented modern witchcraft, or wicca, without the inspiration of The Golden Bough; while Carlos Castaneda's fictional Don Juan would not have been as convincing had Castaneda not emulated the model of pro-
fessional ethnography and received a Ph.D in anthropology from UCLA. Psychology was even more involved in the history of New Age. Almost all founding fathers of psychology (Wundt, James, Freud, Janet, Charcot) were experimenting with the phenomena of mesmerism, extra-sensory perception, and telepathy before a more disenchanted behaviourism became the academic norm (cf. Hacking 1988, 1995). As Heelas himself notes, psychology and psychotherapy were crucial in the emergence of a New Age phenomenon like the Human Potential Movement. Modern magic in general has, from Blavastky and Crowley onwards, been thoroughly psychologized (cf. Hanegraaff 1996: 433).

Heelas recognizes that anthropology and psychology are involved in the construction of New Age and that, even if New Agers often see academic inquiry as harmful to experiential wisdom, they write in ways that are difficult to distinguish from the academic (p. 10). But he does not analyze these ways of writing themselves. Had he done so, he might have noted that these ways of writing include modifications of the genre of the confession (for Foucault, the foremost technology of the self of modern society), such as those used in the anthropological fieldwork report, the sessions of psychotherapy and the narratives of conversion charted by the polls and questionnaires that Heelas uses as sources of data. In trying to explain why New Age 'makes a difference' to people, he not only falls back on the questionable concept of conversion, accounts of which are elicited by questionnaires after the fact, but also provides explanations in terms of either what New Agers would say themselves ('Self-spirituality is true' [p. 187]; 'The East is right' and it works [p. 197]) or a psychological language ('harmful ego-games', 'role-playing routines', 'physiological arousal' through powerful experience; pp. 188, 191) that, I feel, does not break with the language of New Agers' own accounts—something an analysis of scientistic discourse and narrative conventions might have achieved. The only argument from psychology that would have been a critique of New Age practices—that New Age sometimes involves 'brainwashing'—is countered by the argument that, on the contrary, New Age training makes participants 'more rebellious or anti-authoritarian' (p. 196)—an argument that dismisses a central element of the discourse on New Age in the same way as the omission of the discussion about fraud and charlatanism. Most important, perhaps, for his attempt to outline how New Age relates to modernity is the fact that he never really discusses the tradition of scientism that is so characteristic of New Age discourse, and that is particularly prominent in the way in which notions of personal experiment and experience— inherited from a Baconian view of science

---

6. The correspondences between confession, conversion and ethnography are discussed in Stewart 1994.

7. Heelas's only sociological explanation of why New Age makes a difference is the role of 'socialization' (p. 192), but to this, rather underspecified explanation one may object that New Age tendencies towards sacralizing the individual will (in the wake of Aleister Crowley's reinvention of 'magick') amount, if anything, to a desocialization.
as domestic experiment that lost force in the course of the nineteenth century and
was displaced on to occult practices like Spiritualism and Theosophy (cf. Shapin
1988; Pels 1995)—pervade the ways in which New Agers construct the authority
of their opinions and selves.

In conclusion, one might note that Heelas’s book contrasts sharply with that of
the most widely read ethnography of New Age by an anthropologist, Tanya Luhr­
mann's *Persuasions of the Witch’s Craft* (1994). While Luhrmann clearly took her
cue from the modernist scepticism that also characterized Evans-Pritchard’s analy­
sis of Azande witchcraft, and thus epitomized the extremes of the anthropological
‘stranger’s perspective’ towards culture, Heelas’s book can almost count as an
‘auto-ethnography’ of New Age—be it a very good one. This suggests that another
swing of the pendulum is needed. Although our understanding of New Age can
certainly build on Luhrmann and Heelas, new insights must come from someone
who is both an unbeliever in New Age and an unbeliever in the standard legitima­
tions of modernity. The merit of Heelas’s book is that is shows that New Agers are
often believers in both.

REFERENCES

Press.

and London: Blackwell.

Chicago: Chicago University Press.


FABIAN, JOHANNES 1981. ‘Six Theses Regarding the Anthropology of African Reli­

GEERTZ, CLIFFORD 1966. ‘Religion as a Cultural System’, in Michael Banton (ed.),


... 1995. *Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory*,


Rivals’, in P. Heelas, S. Lash, and P. Morris (eds.), *Detraditionalization*, Oxford:
Blackwell.


To those contemporary scholars within the anthropology of art who perceive the entire tradition of philosophical aesthetics as irredeemably tainted by the intellectual traditions of Enlightenment rationalism, the title *'Beauty in Context'* is itself enough to constitute a multiple provocation. Deferring a consideration of any sociopolitical implications of art and its appreciation—his ‘contextualism’ is instead a synthesis of formalist and semanticist theories of aesthetic value—the author seeks to advance, through a theory of the perception of beauty, the elaboration of a coherent theoretical and epistemological framework within which a distinctively anthropological approach to aesthetics might be elaborated. More specifically, his search is for a cross-culturally valid cultural determinant of aesthetic preferences which accounts for observable diversity, a regularity responsible for aesthetic difference. An appropriate perspective will be ‘empirical’—that is, will privilege verbalized aesthetic judgement over decontextualized formal analysis—and at the same time remain consistent both with the insights of experimental psychological aesthetics and ‘prevalent characterizations’ of ‘aesthetic percipience’ offered by the Western philosophical tradition (p. 239), though without compromising a commitment to collective and consensual evaluation. The notion of aesthetic experience as ‘disinterested’, for example, is accommodated by characterizing the aesthetic response as having to do with ‘feelings of gratification...related to matters cultural rather than individual’ (pp. 17–18).

To further these objectives, van Damme presents an ontology of the aesthetic object and an ‘operational’ model of its perception and evaluation. Rejecting equally the notions that aesthetic value resides exclusively in either its formal qualities or its ‘content’, he takes the art object to be a formal–cognitive stimulus, an ‘affecting’ or ‘gratifying’ ‘visual metaphor of the prevalent sociocultural ideal’ (pp. 233, 212), such metaphoricality being no mere product of analytic discourse but experientially constitutive, and universal. In the experience of this congruence of the formal and semantic, the cognitive takes precedence in aesthetic experience: it ‘appraised referential meaning...[that] trigger[s] the interest of the perceiving mind’ (p. 229). Through the process of ‘predication’—the transfer of valuational attributes from referential meaning to form’ (p. 232)—is constituted the experience of ‘beauty’: ‘those forms or formal characteristics are experienced as aesthetically pleasing which...aptly signify [a given culture’s] sociocultural values and ideals’ (p. xiii). Moreover, as ‘liminal’—mediating between ‘the concrete level of society’ and ‘the ideational level of culture’—the art work permits the ‘symbolic accomplishment’ of what may be unattainable in reality, releasing the ‘semantic tension’ between fact and value, between ‘ought’ and ‘is’ (pp. 206–12).
The first seven chapters provide a thorough and valuable critical review of the literature and examine the scope for the deployment of Western philosophical notions and psychological and neurophysiological insights in non-Western contexts, while concurrently articulating and elaborating his central thesis; this is then subject to closer scrutiny through four case-studies in the final two chapters. In some of the ethnographies he examines, his perspective closely reflects that adopted by the original author; in other cases, he demonstrates how the material can be so reinterpreted. Although his critical overview exposes the inadequacy of investigations ‘restricted to one sensorial domain...focus[ing] on one type of response, and...confined to only a single class of objects’, he acknowledges that the present examination stands well behind the implied vanguard, considering only ‘visual perception of the beauty of a material object’ (p. 56). Bracketed for the time being are not only tragic, comic, rhetorical, satirical, or other genres and possibilities of the aesthetic, but also corporeal knowledge and the intentionality of human action. The dichotomy between the affective and cognitive in human perception is challenged, but other fundamental diremptions—the subjugation of the haptic to the visual, of practice to theory—endure.

But it is in the light of its specific objectives that the work must be read. Van Damme’s detailed case-studies focus upon African anthropomorphic sculpture considered as visual metaphor, towards which ‘the perceiving mind has to adopt a stance’, a receptivity to non-discursive ‘semantic succinctness and suggestiveness’ partially constitutive of the aesthetic attitude...necessary for the perception of art and beauty’ (p. 241).

The formal properties of these sculptures are taken to include iconic representation as well as the qualities usually understood as aesthetic under a formalist description, and while conceding that similar visual preferences in the human figure and anthropomorphic statuary can be ‘rather easily related to sociocultural values’, van Damme shows how a ‘similar relationship between form and value’ may pertain for more abstract evaluative criteria. For the Baule, moderation or the mean instantiated in visual form evokes ‘culturally significant and favourably assessed meaning’—moderation in behaviour, the valutational attributes of which are predicated upon the formal quality itself (p. 232). Art and value thus stand in a familiar relationship, that of the reduction of beauty to morality, but his empirically grounded project contributes usefully to an understanding of how aesthetic community actually derives from moral community.

Deferred until the closing pages of the work, however, is a consideration of the dialectics of this emergent relation, or of art as not merely expressive but also transformative of the sociocultural domain. Some readers will find the author’s theoretical meditations repetitive; perhaps the curtailment of certain sections would have permitted an adequation of his aesthetic hypotheses to more complex and dynamic understandings of sociocultural reality. (When he asks whether art ‘may...play a role in the process of adjusting and reformulating values and ideals’ (p. 303)—a notion that has informed aesthetics practices and ideologies from Plato to Situationism—I understand him to be asking whether his model can accommodate such a perspective.) Here his notions of the art work as symbolic accomplishment of the presently unrealizable, and of the cognitive as source of aesthetic gratification, would benefit from an engagement with theoretical positions such as Jaussian reception aesthetics, which privilege the
sensuous as the originory ground of aesthetic pleasure, and a reconsideration of the neurophysiological aspects of aesthetic experience.

The work provides a useful introduction to the field and presents provocative ideas which contribute to the ongoing re-examination of the place of aesthetics in anthropology. Van Damme challenges the traditional reluctance to confront the complexities arising from the interaction of aesthetics and anthropological perspectives—a reluctance concealed behind assumptions that we know what we’re talking about when we talk of aesthetics—or the idea that all such meditations are irredeemably ethnocentric, and fruitless.

ED CARTER

EKKEHART MALOTKI (ed.), The Bedbugs' Night Dance and Other Hopi Sexual Tales (Mumispí 'yyungqa Tuutuwutsí), Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press 1995. xxiv, 399 pp., Illustrations, Appendixes. £28.50.

Malotki’s intention with this collection is to present stories with explicit sexual and scatological reference, features which are still characteristic of Hopi culture despite years of attempted repression by missionaries, school superintendents, and government administrators. For this purpose, he set out twenty tales derived from six sources, only two of whom were still alive at the time of publication. The stories are published in both Hopi and English translation. They include such tales as ‘The Man-Crazed Woman’ and ‘The Long Kwasi [Penis] of Kookopolo’. Themes include sexual intercourse, sexual exposure (male and female), disembodied sex organs, defecation, urination, sexual jealousy, sexual maturity, sexual discovery, sexual frustration, sexual education, marriage counselling, marriage sociology, and hostility toward Navaho, among other matters.

The English translations read smoothly, and the stories are not exceptionally salacious when judged by the standards of modern popular literature or those of Rabelais. According to Malotki, when he began to work on Hopi oral literature there was an almost complete absence of erotic or scatological matter in the published corpus of Hopi folklore, the exceptions being found in the work of Alexander M. Stephen and Mischa Titiev. ‘Purged of any so-called objectionable references to sex and bodily functions, such expurgated folklore tends to present a rather one-sided and sometimes shallow picture of Hopi culture.’

Two appendixes include a glossary (actually an alphabetical list of ethnographic notes) and a description of the Hopi alphabet. Malotki has omitted to include a bibliography or index. E. N. Genovese has provided a comparative discussion of sexual narrative in his introduction. These stories may be read for entertainment, for their ethnographic content, and for comparative purposes. The book is therefore both enjoyable and of intellectual interest.

R. H. BARNES
The Comanche are one branch of peoples speaking the Shoshonean language. They were apparently first mentioned in 1706, but most references to them are to individual bands in local contact with Europeans rather than to a political entity as a whole. The Comanche have been regarded as an anomaly among Plains peoples because they failed to achieve tribal integration. They appear to have been organized into a variety of bands, moving even in historical periods over vast tracts of the southern Plains, and these bands seem to have continually shifted their composition, often changing their names, as they split up or amalgamated with other bands. They were a ‘rank society’ in that there were fewer leadership positions than there were individuals capable of filling them, and access to economic resources was controlled, so that some were wealthier than others. An important issue was possession or lack of possession of horses. Once horses became part of the environment, soldier societies in horse-rich bands restricted participation in the buffalo hunt to those with horses, making persons lacking horses poor and dependent on others. Horse-poor bands had to pursue different subsistence strategies than horse-rich ones. Also important was trade, both with other Indians and directly with Europeans. Throughout the period covered by this book, the Spanish and French, the Republic of Texas and the United States all attempted to control their relationships with the Comanche (and other Indians), including through trade in particular. Given their economic importance, horse-raiding was a constant feature of Plains political and military history. Such raiding occurred between Indian groups and in both directions across the European and Indian divide. Mutual scalp-taking and the capture and enslavement of people were also shared activities, though the mayhem was punctuated by periods of negotiated peace. Thus, much of the evidence comes from the diplomatic record, such as it is. In the end, unlike, for example, the rather similar Cheyenne, the Comanche never developed a sense of nationhood, at least not in the period under consideration.

The structure of this book is straightforwardly chronological. After an introduction and a chapter on ‘Comanche Political Culture’, the subsequent chapters are on first Euroamerican contacts (1706–86), Comanche-Euroamerican relations (1786–1820), changes in Comanchería (1820–46), Comanchería at mid-century (1846–60), Comanchería during and after the Civil War (1860–75), and a concluding chapter on political history. Certainly throughout the nineteenth century, each decade brought tremendous changes in the demographic, political, and economic environment. Conflicts between Americans in Texas and Mexico and later between Texas and the United States during the Civil War affected the Comanche as well. Finally, the demographic, economic, and military power of the United States overwhelmed the Comanche and other Plains Indians. Most Comanche bands were eventually settled on a reservation in the Indian Territories (Oklahoma) by 1875. An incident not mentioned by Kavanagh shows just how rapid that change became. On 16 May 1870, an eleven-year-old German-speaking boy named Hermann Lehmann was captured on his parents’ farm in Mason County, Texas, by Apaches. He then became an Apache, participating in their raids, before joining the Comanches. Finally, he and his group were persuaded by the famous Quanah Parker to
come into the reservation at Fort Sill, and by 12 May 1878 he had been restored to his family. He lived until 1932, having learned English and become familiar with radio, telephones, automobiles, and aeroplanes. His younger brother Willie, also briefly taken captive in the same incident, lived until 1951, into the nuclear age and that of television.

This book is a very thorough treatment of Comanche history and makes a considerable contribution to regional and colonial history. It reads well and is attractively and usefully illustrated.

R. H. BARNES


A promising career in anthropology lay in front of Robert Hertz when, at the age of 33, he was cut down at the head of his section at Marcheville on 13 April 1915 in what Marcel Mauss characterized as a 'useless and bloody attack'. His published work up to that point included several political tracts that he wrote as a committed socialist, numerous reviews of books in English, German, Dutch, and Italian (Hertz also knew Ancient Greek and Latin), and his now famous articles on the collective representation of death, the pre-eminence of the right hand, and the cult of St Besse. His essays on the myth of Athena and on legends and cults of rocks and springs were lost altogether, but a partial draft of his doctoral dissertation (supervised by Durkheim) on sin and expiation was preserved and published by Mauss in 1922.

Sin and Expiation in Primitive Societies contains the text of this uncompleted thesis in English translation accompanied by a helpful preface by W. S. F. Pickering and a comprehensive introduction by Robert Parkin. In this work, Hertz set out to ask whether sin could be identified as a cross-cultural phenomenon. Missionaries had been among the first to pose Hertz's question in their efforts to find comparable concepts in the societies where they were trying to win converts. Hertz sought to develop a viable heuristic definition of sin that could be interrogated in the widest possible range of societies. He settled on the following: 'Sin is a transgression of a moral code, which is considered to involve, by virtue of itself, disastrous consequences for its author, and which concerns the religious society exclusively' (p. 108). Shortly after this passage, the narrative of Hertz's text tapers off into notes: apparently the effort of arriving at a generalizable definition had been so exacting that the author took a break and then never managed to return to the manuscript.

Mauss's reconstruction of Hertz's notes allows us a glimpse of where Hertz was heading. He wanted to connect sin to expiation, thus rescuing it from the strictly extrinsic, objectivist definition above, and locating it instead in the perceptions of the
people involved. A sin offended against the highest religious order, and its con­sequences were grave unless the offence could be expiated. Sin demanded expiation—was defined by it—and this was Hertz’s embryonic structuralist realization. Sin could be isolated for analytical attention on the basis of people’s evident contrite feelings and ritual acts of compunction. In a passage that Mauss found scribbled on a slip of paper Hertz had written: ‘There is expiation when certain actions which are in general ritualistic, are able to re-establish the state of things anterior to the transgression by annul­ling it and by satisfying justice, without the transgressor and those near to him being crushed thereby’ (p. 113). In Mauss’s view this little passage was ‘worthy of becoming a classic’ (ibid.).

In order to anchor his cross-cultural study of sin, Hertz used Polynesian examples where tabu was transgressed. In his Introduction to Sin and Expiation, and again in his chapter on this work in his The Dark Side of Humanity, Robert Parkin points out that Hertz ultimately pushed the concept of sin too far. It could not usefully distinguish purely accidental transgressions from more intentional ones, and the current balance of opinion in British anthropology tends more to the verdict that sin is not a universal category. Hertz’s work on sin thus may not have been successful in attaining its global comparativist goals, but this by no means renders it a failure: contrasts and differences can be every bit as interesting as the uncovering of neat similarities in cultural prac­tices and personal sentiments. Certainly the topic of sin impelled Hertz to make val­uable contrasts between sin and crime, honour and sanctity, guilt and shame, that are still suggestive today. He also made the point that even where a word like ‘sin’ could not be found in a given society’s vocabulary, this did not mean that the concept could not exercise implicit force. Some sixty years later Dumont made the very same argu­ment about the absence of an Indian word for hierarchy, a concept he had identified as crucial for understanding the structure of Indian society (Homo Aequalis, Paris: Galli­mard 1977, p. 28).

Sin and Expiation is a difficult text in French, poetic in places, terse and difficult to follow in others. We owe a debt of gratitude to Robert Parkin for rendering it into coherent English. This essay deserves to come to the attention of a wide anthropologi­cal audience, and one wonders why a major press did not undertake to publish it for the British Centre for Durkheimian Studies. Perhaps the appearance of Parkin’s mono­graph assessing Hertz’s life, his intellectual work, and his legacy in anthropology will help to raise interest in a possible re-issue.

The Dark Side of Humanity relies on close readings of all of Hertz’s available writings and correspondence, including unpublished materials deposited at the Laboratoire d’Anthropologie Sociale in Paris, and conversations with Hertz’s son, Antoine. It is a scholarly and judicious work that locates Hertz’s work and personal development within Durkheim’s circle at the turn of the century and then proceeds to examine his political writing and his book reviews for the Année Sociologique before considering his major anthropological essays in successive chapters.

In the chapter on right and left, Parkin reconsiders Hertz’s seminal essay on the right hand. Although a bona fide Durkheimian social constructionist, Hertz none the less felt obliged to allow that a certain natural physical bias had been blown out of proportion by society: the pre-eminence of the right hand could not be attributed solely and exclusively to social predilection. Parkin tracks subsequent scholarly debates over
right and left, symbolic classification, hierarchical encompassment, and the conscious or unconscious nature of their existence as logical ordering devices in cultural symbolism. He explains clearly the sometimes complicated positions of authors such as Needham, Dumont, and Tcherkézoff.

In a chapter on death, Parkin reviews Hertz’s thesis that rituals of secondary burial reveal everything about a society’s conception of the soul and the way the soul should be treated in order to secure the safe continuation of social life. Here as elsewhere Hertz situated himself in opposition to the intellectualist school of Frazer and Tylor, for whom death rituals amounted to people’s confrontation with the horror of the corpse. Bloch and Parry have altered Hertz’s emphasis slightly by asserting that death rituals create rather than just affirm the social order. Parkin shows that numerous subsequent anthropological treatments of death have also drawn upon Hertz. The only trouble here is that Hertz’s approach was so foundational that any subsequent study that attends to the social dimension of mortuary practice, the treatment of the corpse, or the collective social nature of the event could be classed as Hertzian.

Hertz’s study of the Italian/French alpine cult of St Besse is perhaps slightly less well-known than the preceding two essays, but Parkin’s chapter here as well as recent articles by him and others indicate that this essay, first translated into English in 1983, has risen in public appraisal. St Besse was a Roman soldier and Christian martyr whose cult was focused on a rock high in the Italian Alps. Elements of the cult were apparently pre-Christian, and the juxtaposition of paganism and Christianity was but one of the tensions that Hertz identified in the worship of St Besse. There were also tensions between the mountain people and the people of the plains as to who really ‘owned’ the St Besse cult. Vastly differing legends of the saint’s life circulated in these various communities, making Hertz’s study a valuable early examination of the negotiability and the social-constructedness of history.

In entitling his study The Dark Side of Humanity, Parkin is borrowing a phrase from Mauss, who suggested that Hertz’s apparently disparate essays shared a common focus on the anti-social: sin, death, the left hand, conflict—a range of ideas opposite and yet complementary to the usual Durkheimian focus on social solidarity. It is precisely the insistence on social coherence that has rendered Durkheimian sociology somewhat hard to use in the current moment, which is characterized by multiculturalism and internal social conflicts over the meaning of symbols and rituals. Hertz’s focus on threats to solidarity connects more directly to the interests of contemporary sociology and anthropology, making these two volumes valuable and timely contributions.

CHARLES STEWART


In their introduction to this volume, the editors make the point that Iceland presents an image of a homogeneous island population, with a long, well-recorded history. This is
an image that the present essays challenge, emphasizing instead the flow of cultural constructs in a holistic, global world. This entity, an 'ideal subject for anthropologists looking for neat boundaries [and] self-contained cultures' (p. 1), is therefore an illusion: Iceland is no 'billiard ball'. Indeed, the concept of culture, and the 'conventional anthropological idea of cultural translation in the general mosaic of cultural islands,' is deemed to be 'no longer appropriate, if it ever was' (p. 6). The editors do not pull their punches and strongly criticize essentialist constructions, offering valuable alternatives, referring to Ingold, Hannerz, and Appadurai for guidance, and bringing in metaphors of seamless landscapes with individual perspectives determined by position. They call for attention to local detail and realist ethnography, of the sort that would depict Iceland as a vantage-point in 'ever-shifting streams of events and images' (p. 22). In this they are successful, although the reader may consider that they are fighting battles that have already been won by others, with less ammunition.

This book, based on an anthropological workshop held in 1993, follows on from an earlier project which resulted in The Anthropology of Iceland (1989), a collection with the same editors. The focus in this workshop was on 'Modern Iceland', and this collection reflects the interest in the 'contemporary'. Inevitably the description 'contemporary' invites scepticism—everything is contemporary when first perceived or produced, regardless of subject; furthermore, 'modern' is a problematic concept, and 'modern' ideas become untimely fashion victims. Despite these misgivings, the underlying motives of the collection are most welcome, and the contributors boldly confront the task of pushing the boundaries of anthropology in directions which confirm Europe as an innovative area of exploration.

The ten papers are divided into three sections: 'Contested Images of Nature', 'Nation and Gender', and 'Nature and Nation'. The concepts of nation, nature, gender, and identity are all deconstructed in making the effort to evaluate the thing that is Iceland. Politics, economics, and history are involved in this wide-ranging examination of a people and their experience. The papers will therefore be of especial value to students of Europe, globalization, fishing, and gender, to those interested in the invention of tradition and imagined communities, and to those seeking a strong argument against the essentializing of cultures.

More specifically, contributors in the first part deal with the production of the nation state and its use of natural images, as well as the embrace of its population against 'irrational', sentimental outsiders concerned about whaling (Brydon). This theme is continued by N. Einarrson, with a plea to consider the local (albeit ethnocentric) perception of nature—wherein whales are pests—for the sake of conservation and of co-operation. Global perspectives are impinging on local practices, and Pálsson and Helgason note the existence of such debates in Iceland over fishing management, where resource economics enjoys hegemony and quota systems reorganize rights of access, undermining the ideal egalitarian structure and producing 'quota-kings'. A plea for greater respect for the practical (local) knowledge of skippers is made, a conclusion which reverberates throughout anthropological texts concerned with development and the environment.

Issues of cultural construction and power continue to inform chapters dealing with nation and gender. Skaptadóttir sees the fisher's production as romanticized in opposition to women's invisibility. Men's jobs assume greater value, based on power differ-
ences, and this difference is one of many (gender, class, age, region) which usually go unacknowledged (muted) by idealist romanticization in official state discourse. In diametrical opposition to this, the ‘Mountain Woman’ is portrayed as strong and free, the keeper of Icelandic culture. This mythical counter-symbol to the Danish kings has been invoked by one female president to strengthen the ‘ideal of the mother’ (Bjornsdottir)—a political figurehead manipulating natural and human images to suit her goal of maintaining the ‘purity’ of the ‘nation, the country and the tongue’ (p. 29). The hypocrisy of national rhetoric and the reality of power is further exposed by Gurdin in a chapter on domestic violence, which challenges romantic imagery and notions of the classless, crime-free society. Women are subjugated and defined as deviant by the state, which refuses to deal with abusive husbands.

The final part is especially useful for those seeking answers to the riddles and contradictions of Iceland. Durrenberger’s analysis of the assumed egalitarianism and homogeneity of Iceland, with emphasis on the autonomous individual subordinating the social group, explains the excuse of personal as opposed to societal responsibility, although this is being challenged by globalization, leaving the ‘skipper effect’ to be sidelined by technological advances.

Political desires have promoted favoured constructions: farmers with purity, and even the story of Iceland’s struggle through harsh conditions and years of misery, is seen as part of a broader, European, romantic vision (Vasey). Global communications, foreign observers, and political manipulators have all influenced Iceland, and now even the famed literary tradition is threatened with usurpation by the mass media. It may have been a ‘conserving force for Icelandic culture and identity’ (Sizeman and Walker, p. 194), but it is today more of a consumer’s accessory, superseded by television, and prompting a redefinition of the term ‘literate’.

Finally, those literate ‘wandering semioticians’, the tourists, are helping Icelanders redefine themselves as they interact, negotiating meanings and identities. Indeed, M. Einarsson suggests that there is a continuum between the tourist and the anthropologist (a hackneyed notion), which prompts us to consider whether we will go full circle to become armchair anthropologists again, desk-bound Internet surfers. Judging from the editors’ well-supported argument and the contributors’ valuable field research, probably not.

DONALD MACLEOD


In the summer of 1963, armed with a Grundig tape recorder and set on a mission to record the grammar and vocabulary of Washington State’s Lushootseed language, a young graduate student named Thomas Hess knocked on the door of Martha Lamont. The results of his encounter with Lamont and a few of her friends led to Hess’s many works on this little-known Coast Salish language. Fortunately also for the revitaliza-
tion that is currently underway in Lushootseed communities, Hess began to appreciate the cultural context of the linguistic texts he was eliciting. Now, after a decade of interdisciplinary collaboration with colleagues attuned to those other aspects of the narratives, the stories of a few elderly story-tellers appear in the publication of *Lushootseed Texts*, edited by anthropologist Crisca Bierwert and appearing in the University of Nebraska Press’s series, *Studies in the Anthropology of North American Indians*.

The seven stories comprising the volume, told by Mrs Lamont and two other raconteurs in the Lushootseed language, provide a sampling of a much larger corpus of Lushootseed oral literature that was recorded in the past. What sets this collection apart, however, is the analysis and commentary of a team of collaborators intent upon going beyond interlinear grammatical word-for-word translation. Bierwert’s editorial introduction reveals the volume’s approach. First is the team’s desire to reach many audiences without sacrificing academic interest or the attributes of traditional stories that link them so closely with ‘the people’. Secondly, there is the resolution of the problem by changing their perspective: ‘We resolved the contradictions in the questions that beset us by seeing them as related, not conflicting, demands, demands to keep alive the qualities of traditional stories that are intended to connect with people, and to protect the interpretative richness of the stories by offering multiple perspectives on them’ (p. 1). *Lushootseed Texts* does just that. Vi Hilbert, a Native Lushootseed language and culture specialist whose work with Hess resulted in the translations, presents personal glimpses of the three story-tellers and of her own childhood on the Skagit River. Hilbert is well known on the Northwest Coast for being the motivating spirit behind Lushootseed research, and her heartfelt words of introduction convey the personal dedication she brings to this project. In a self-reflective essay on his early field recording sessions, Hess confesses that the texts at first interested him purely as linguistic examples of free-flowing Lushootseed, exempt from the distortions that result from speaking at dictation speed. Yet it is Hess’s attention to linguistic detail, providing the foundation of accuracy for this collection, that ensures its enduring value. Particularly welcome is his section on Lushootseed grammatical analysis, which sets out for the non-specialist reader models of Lushootseed syntax drawn from the first section of one of the stories. Following a few basic structures, he maps affixes, roots, and suffixes in concentric boxes to show the enfolding pattern of this highly polysynthetic language. This annotated text stands as a welcome replacement to the often incomprehensible grammatical description that frequently accompanies Amerindian textual analysis. A section on ‘The Documentation of Lushootseed Language and Literature’ guides us to those other works, should we wish to pursue the comparison further.

Bierwert was naturally impressed with the linguistic excellence that the Hess–Hilbert team produced in providing the morpheme-by-morpheme translation. The concern she herself expresses with the accuracy of the English translation, including its graphic presentation on the page, convinces us that she kept up her end of the partnership. Bierwert’s guide has been the position of Walter Benjamin (*Illuminations*, New York: Schocken Books 1968, p. 79) that a good translation ‘may be achieved above all by a literal rendering of the syntax which proves words rather than sentences to be the primary element of the translator. For if the sentence is the wall before the language of
the original, literalness is the arcade.’ Bierwert’s choice, distribution, and consistency of glosses, as well as her regard for performance and presentation, leave us feeling that these seven simple stories have passed through the hands of an artisan. Endnotes and introductions provided by literary critic Toby Langen complement the task, dispensing explanations of cultural content and contributing discussion of the ‘literary’ qualities of each story. Even musical transcriptions of four brief stanzas appearing in Martha Lamont’s tales have been included by musicologist Tara Browner.

With such academic competence as has been brought to bear by Bierwert and her colleagues on the analysis of this collection of seven stories, it is fortunate that the selected texts include particularly interesting examples of common narrative genres. In Lamont’s ‘Changer Story’, we sense the story-teller’s command of the tale, emphasizing Mink’s repetitive mischievousness with her well-chosen use of specific words, patterned turns of phrasing, and simple chants. Her technique transforms ‘The Seal Hunters’, a story common throughout the Northwest Coast, into an enchanted journey, wooing the reader along with the travels of a cedar seal.

For those wanting to embark on a personal discovery of Northwest Coast oral literature, *Lushootseed Tales* is a good place to launch one’s tour. But if you are not familiar with the lay of the land, bring your own map; the editor overlooked this one basic accessory.

DOROTHY KENNEDY


Development work in the dry rangelands has predictably been a complex and delicate matter, so much so that a number of prominent research institutions, including one from the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research, have dropped the matter from their books. Part of the reason for this is that the ‘extensive pastoral’ system has been commonly misunderstood by ‘field specialist’ and government personnel alike. At least as important in pastoral development, if not more critical, has been the role played by local politics, which has typically advocated settlement on the grounds of ‘nation-building’ for reasons of security or the provision of social services.

Dawn Chatty provides a lucid and studied account of the perilous journey of one such pastoral development project among the Harasis of southern Oman. Enriched by her anthropological eye, she follows the project and its impact from conception through implementation to conclusion and ‘aftermath’. The project was modest in size by most standards but was made even more so when an administrative error reduced it by a half to one year. What was achieved, however, was in marked contrast to other pastoral development projects. Although the year only allowed research on the needs of the Harasis population, rudimentary social services were delivered and all-important channels of communication established between the local people and the central government. In some respects this is not altogether surprising. The government,
for their part, was genuinely interested in clarifying the needs of the population, and both the government and Harasiis were fortunate in the individual charged with the work, namely Chatty herself. In another respect it is a surprise that anything was achieved at all, considering the personality conflicts between the professional personnel—an aspect of development that has until now received too little attention. Here Chatty leaves little to the imagination and drives home the potentially damaging, if not fatal consequences, of adverse relationships between field specialists, national bureaucrats, and international aid officers. Each of these parties, and the Harasiis themselves, has its own priorities and own vision of the future. Reconciling these differences is the job of all those involved, although this has regularly fallen foul of institutional inertia, personality, politics, or the dogmatic allegiance of aid officials to one or other development theory. Although the Harasiis project ultimately saw off these conflicts of interest, the same cannot be said for the now infamous decline of the ‘Hema’ cooperative rangeland project in Syria. One of the main reasons for this must be the unwavering commitment Chatty showed to her work both during the project and for a long time afterwards.

A couple of interesting results of the ethnographic research relate to my own interest in grazing management. The first was an identified shift in competition among the pastoral groups away from water and towards grazing, signalling an important move in local property-right institutions. The other was the tacit recognition of the ‘disposable population model’ for pastoral tribes put forth by J. C. Wilkinson (‘Traditional Concepts of Territory in South East Arabia’, Geographical Journal, Vol. CXLIX (1983), p. 364), whereby excess and peripheral pastoral populations shift out of crowded pastures to other areas or forms of employment. Perhaps the most important outcome of the project for the Harasiis, however, was the channels established between them and the government. In this case, success here was partly due to the timing of the project—as it seems the government had additional plans to integrate this region of Oman within central government institutions— but largely due to Chatty herself. The catalyst for this contact was provided by the project: how it developed and assimilated some of the needs of the Harasiis and of the state is detailed in the final chapters of the book. The insights Chatty provides will be critical to those in pastoral and regional development, and should be recommended reading. A book can never be said to be too late, but if this book and others like it had arrived much earlier, the cynicism particular to pastoral development projects might well have been curbed.

JONATHAN RAE


The separate sections of this book are united by shared themes and an overall concern for the relationship between practical piety, as observed in ritual, and real or declared Islamic origins and motivation. Abu-Zahra’s dual background of Islamic Cairo and Western anthropology allow her to examine both these aspects in detail and with inside
knowledge. In these studies, holy persons of the past and as yet innocent young people are used as intermediaries to obtain blessing and sustenance. Rites and rituals may vary—the studies here move from Tunisia to Cairo—but these are argued to be firmly based on Islamic belief.

The first section describes and interprets the rain rituals of a village in Tunisia. The Islamic prayers, with their Prophetic approval, are followed by a fertility rite practised by girls and women, where the figure of 'Mother Tambu' represents the thirsty earth. Despite this apparently non-Islamic element, the author considers the whole ritual to be a devout supplication to the One God for the rain which is His gift alone. This aspect is also shown by the names used for rain, which also signify mercy and assistance.

The 'Comparative Study', which, like the item described above, has been published previously, shows differences between rituals in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as the shared Islamic tradition underlying them. A knowledge of the texts is vital, says Abu-Zahra, for a true understanding of rain rituals. The core concept of rahma as divine mercy/rain 'explains the connection between the environment, the social order, and the spiritual order' (p. 33). For 'Islam is an integrated whole' (p. 39), and even the mortuary rituals, which are outside normal life experience, conform to the Islamic patterns of the society.

The main part of the book focuses on the shrine of Sayyida Zaynab, granddaughter of the Prophet, in Cairo, with descriptions of the rituals and celebrations there. The whole area is intensely and exclusively Muslim, with no Western elements, and thus provides 'the symbols of Cairo and Egypt set against the West and Western traditions', while al-Sayyida is 'the mother and symbol of Cairo and all Egypt' (p. 134).

The two settings, a Tunisian village and the city of Cairo, differ chiefly in the lack of permanence inherent in city life. People come and go as they please, clan and family affinities are meagre or absent, and the main link is the presence of Sayyid Zaynab and the influence exerted here on women's lives. The theory of the valid Islamic nature of this public devotion is a little undermined by the late Sheikh Shaltut's rejection of popular rituals connected with shrines (pp. 104-7). Even this rejection, however, makes concessions to people's real needs, as expressed in the traditions—which are tolerated, for they are 'integrated into the performance of Islamic rituals' at shrines (p. 107).

In her careful exploration of practices associated with the shrine, Abu-Zahra finds that, for the women themselves, an acceptable explanation can be found for anything which may appear non-Islamic. It is the author's contention that practice and theory are in harmony, that religion and everyday life are combined, that 'the performance of an Islamic ritual incorporates both Islamic and social dimensions in one whole' (p. 96), and that these must therefore be studied together. A large part of this section is given over to observations of the women who visit the shrine, the very practical nature of their piety and devotion (which often centres around the provision of food), and the problems they bring to the Sayyida and share with one another. The social contact and solidarity between these women, and their own sense of religious duty, are very strong. Also described are the festivities for the Mawlid, the main feast day, and the involvement of government authorities. Such celebrations are 'a dominant feature of indige-
nous Egyptian culture' (p. 205) and thus contain popular as well as religious elements—which indeed are seldom thought of separately in such a context.

Two short sections complete the book. 'Ramadan in Cairo' describes the month of fasting, its social implications, and modern changes. 'Spring Rites in Cairo' explains that Shamm al-Nasim, the only feast which is not Muslim nor even religious, has roots far back in history, being a welcome of spring for both Muslims and Christians.

Descriptions are detailed, the data and conclusions well presented, and Abu-Zahra makes her point about the integration of social and religious elements with some vigour and, at times, considerable emphasis. Though this reviewer has lived in Muslim societies, she is not an anthropologist. None the less, it would seem strange to her if the ‘totality’ of life had really been overlooked or discounted by former researchers as much as is implied here. There may be a modern tendency to sideline religious elements, but it is generally acknowledged that, in a much-used phrase, Islam is ‘a complete way of life’. This is certainly made clear throughout the book. Abu-Zahra’s own background and experience give her observations immediacy and colour. Through her contacts with officials and religious authorities, she demonstrates how the Ulama or scholars are not in fact separated from the common people, who do come to consult them and receive fatwās (‘fatwas’). She is clear about the need to investigate ‘people’s performance of Islamic action within the context of their social conditions’ (p. xii), the latter being easier to observe. She speaks of ‘shared Islamic tradition... and different social conditions’ (ibid.), and regrets the ‘dichotomies’ which are found in some writings. Abu-Zahra also explains her own personal involvement with Sayyida Zaynab and her original motivation for undertaking the study, which lay in personal loss and the traditional ways of expressing it.

The ‘pure and powerful’, the holy persons whose sacred space is visited for consolation, for help, for divine and human company, will surely continue to exert their influence as long as such needs exist. In Cairo, the pressures of modern life bear heavily upon traditional belief and devotion. The essential humanity and practical common sense of the Egyptians in Cairo and Tunisian villagers come through clearly in the case-studies presented here.

PENELOPE JOHNSTONE


In Der Schmugglerzug, Malgorzata Irek describes small-scale smuggling between Berlin and Warsaw during the late 1980s and early 1990s. In essence, Irek poses the following questions: how was the Polish economy able to make such a rapid and successful transition to ‘free-market’ capitalism? Where did the capital, both social and monetary, come from? Irek argues that the combination of three factors—a relatively large ‘private sector’, freedom of movement within the socialist bloc and the gradual opening of Western borders—nurtured a class of smuggler Urkapitalisten. These incipient entrepreneurs and managers honed their market skills by smuggling and trading...
goods—cigarettes, cameras, radios, sweets, etc.—and currency throughout eastern and central Europe. With the fall of socialism, the smugglers constituted a ‘group of people that had accumulated sufficient experience and capital to establish themselves as completely normal operators in cross-border trade. They met the new legal regulations, and shortly after the introduction of the market economy, import-export firms shot up like mushrooms’ (p. 12). Irek’s analysis sheds new light on the transition to a ‘post-socialist’ economy in Poland. In particular, it shows how individuals were able to transfer economic strategies from the socialist to the capitalist market economy.

Irek writes simply and with humour, and the book is a pleasure to read. Using composite characters and brief vignettes, she gives us a clear sense of how some Poles responded creatively to the restrictions of the Cold War and the rapid changes that followed its end. While the book’s simplicity is one of its main strengths, it is also a critical weakness: for all the stories of successful transitions from smuggling to capitalism, the author provides no indication of how we are to interpret her examples in a broader context. We never learn, for example, how many people actually smuggled, nor how many of them later went into legitimate businesses. What quantities of money were involved? How were smuggling and nascent capitalism related to post-Cold War nation-building? Irek makes no effort to link her research to any other scholarly work—there are no citations in the book, and no bibliography—and she seems unwilling to risk theoretical discussion. Thus the book is a catalogue of missed opportunities. How, wonders this reader, would she position her work in relation to existing scholarship on border studies (see, for example, Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan, Border Identities, Cambridge University Press 1998), criminality (Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish, New York: Vintage Books 1979), socialism and post-socialism (Chris Hahn, ‘After Communism’, Social Anthropology, Vol. II, no. 3 (1994), pp. 229–49; Katherine Verdery, What was Socialism, and What Comes Next?, Princeton University Press 1996), or agency and resistance (James Scott, Domination and the Arts of Resistance, Yale University Press 1990)? Similarly, the work raises questions of field research technique and ethics, only to drop them. Early in the book, Irek describes her attempts to gain access to smugglers by disguising herself as a cleaning woman. Is such a strategy ethical? Irek, I am sure, could make a persuasive argument in favour of her approach. Unfortunately for all of us, she has chosen not to.

Despite these reservations, the book tells a fascinating story, and the very absence of theoretical integration would make it an excellent springboard for classroom discussion. I look forward to its release in an English translation and will be happy to adopt it in my own teaching.

STEFAN SENDERS


Thailand suffers from a dual image, as the land of smiles and the land of problems. It is an exotic place, full of monks, temples, and tradition, and simultaneously a country
with some of the worst social problems in the world. Whether it is AIDS, child prostitution, uncontrolled and irresponsible tourism, pollution, drug-trafficking, or urbanization, Thailand serves as useful exemplar, even a warning, of the dangers inherent in modernization and capitalism.

Despite this enormous scope for research, Thailand has long been an unfashionable and under-researched country in anthropological terms, especially as far as British anthropologists are concerned. As Van Esterik asks, 'Why have so few works on Thailand been designated theoretical, and why has Thai ethnography not informed anthropological theory nor become part of the canon?' (p. 13). Part of the reason is that although there have been excellent books on Thai village life and the centrality of Buddhism to Thai society, Thailand is generally better known through campaigning groups who have emphasised the seedier aspects of Thailand but rarely attempted to understand its multi-faceted complexity. But although Thailand is a series of problems and a collection of issues which generate international concern, and much more rarely a site for anthropological research, the gap between these two positions could be usefully explored. Thailand is not alone in experiencing rapid modernization with its attendant industrialisation and change from a rural- to urban-based economy. So why has Thailand become symbolic of so much that is bad?

Penny Van Esterik's book attempts to answer some of these questions by focusing on the roles and representations of women in modern Thailand and on the construction of femininity. She examines how the beauty and sexuality of Thai women have always been closely tied to national pride and social cohesion, and how the importance of beauty, whether as a reflection of Buddhist merit or of appropriate Thai models of femininity, is central to understanding the contemporary concerns of Thai society. If issues such as AIDS and prostitution are to be understood from a Thai perspective, they need to be understood in the context of Buddhism and of the construction of gender in Thailand.

By stressing representations, Van Esterik cleverly avoids essentialism and simplification. She emphasizes the complexities of Buddhism and Buddhist teaching. Buddhism is not a monolithic entity, and the factions within Buddhism and its various interpretations are discussed at length. Thai Buddhism is not a scripture-based religion, and consequently there is an enormous variety of interpretation of Buddhist texts and teaching on gender. Relying solely on the monasteries as the face of authentic Thai Buddhism is clearly problematic. Yet Buddhism informs and explains women's roles in Thailand, and the complexity of the links between them are explored at length. Unlike other authors, who have either blamed Buddhism for prostitution in Thailand or denied any link at all, the author examines the interplay between Buddhism, the state, and the construction of gender, and she argues convincingly for the need to understand Buddhism in its many manifestations as an influence on how Thai women see themselves and how they are perceived by the state and society.

Van Esterik pays particular attention to surfaces and to the importance of what might be interpreted elsewhere as superficial aspects. The gap between the actual and the ideal may be great, but this book rightly makes no claim that one of these is any more authentic or real than the other. Indeed, this work is premised on the importance of appearances, of 'keeping face' and appropriateness. This is shown most clearly when looking at representations and constructions of gender, as it is Thai women who
bear the brunt of this social pressure. During the Second World War, therefore, when Thailand was trying to position itself as being closer to the West than to Japan, Thai women were ordered to wear hats and Western clothing and to kiss their husbands goodbye as they set off to work (‘Wear a hat for your country; hats will lead Thailand to greatness’, quoted p. 103). More recently, the emphasis has been on wearing ‘traditional’ Thai outfits, especially in tourist brochures promoting ‘exotic’, and to tourists presumably authentic, Thailand under the tourist authority’s new slogan of ‘Amazing Thailand’. Thai nationalism has become mapped on to women’s bodies and displayed through their dress and their behaviour. Given this, it is not surprising that the government has done little to end sex tourism, and has actually encouraged it for the tourist dollars it brings in and the revenue it earns the country. It is only when an international outcry was raised over child prostitution that the government made any attempt to end the use of women’s bodies to boost its GNP.

Prostitution is an important aspect of this book, but it is one of Van Esterik’s great strengths that she does not see prostitution as a straightforward reflection of the role of women in Thai society. As she points out, ‘an analysis of Thai prostitution has often substituted for analysis of gender relations in Thailand, as if explaining Thai prostitution were adequate for understanding the position and condition of Thai women. There is a great danger in using prostitution as a proxy measure of women’s status in Thailand. There is an even greater danger in separating out prostitution as a social problem or a health problem, and isolating it from other gender issues’ (p. 85). Prostitution may well be one of the most visible roles that Thai women play, especially in the international tourist market, but it cannot be seen independently from their roles as daughters, wives, mothers, citizens, and Buddhists. This book is an impressive examination of gender in contemporary Thailand which skilfully avoids either idealizing or pathologizing it.

HEATHER MONTGOMERY


The Pathan Unarmed is an important book for scholars of Pathan culture. It is not, by any means, a replacement for previous ethnographies, since Banerjee focuses on what is apparently a cultural anomaly. It is interesting precisely because it describes a situation in which a group of people seemingly violated their own cultural codes. For this reason, Banerjee’s work can only truly be appreciated within the context of earlier studies of Pathan culture. South Asian scholars whose research is focused elsewhere in the sub-continent would also be well advised to read this book. Much attention has been paid to the leaders of the nationalist movement, such as Gandhi, Nehru, or Jinnah, but Banerjee shows how one successful leader employed pre-existing popular values and concepts to serve new purposes. These new purposes, and the values which supported them, were not incompatible with wider nationalist movements in other parts of
India. This book will hopefully cause South Asianists to reconsider critically certain implied divisions between so-called tribal and peasant groups. The values held by culture groups must be treated with considerable care. Banerjee provides an elegant demonstration of how cultural values may be adapted to a wider variety of expression than social analysts might predict.

Banerjee addresses a particularly intriguing puzzle in South Asian history. How did a group of notoriously aggressive Pathans (or Pukhtuns) create and sustain a non-violent nationalist movement? Using a combination of oral histories and archival data, Banerjee has reconstructed a highly readable account of the leadership and following of the Khudai Khidmatgar (the ‘Servants of God’) movement, which lasted from 1930 to 1947. The KK, or Red Shirt movement as the British referred to it, has been discussed in some South Asian literature, though up to now the focus has always been on the founder and leader of the movement, Abdul Gaffar Khan, more popularly known as Badshah Khan. He has been called the Frontier Gandhi because of his close friendship with Gandhi and his non-violent nationalist beliefs. Treatment of the KK leader has invariably centred on his close relationship with Mahatma Gandhi and neglected his independent conversion to non-violence, which Banerjee tells us occurred well before he became aware of Gandhi’s movement. The Pathan Unarmed examines not only Badshah Khan’s role as a charismatic leader but also the reasons why Pathans were prepared to redefine longstanding traditional values. Banerjee shows how Badshah Khan was able to adapt pukhtunwali, the moral code of Pathan culture, to render non-violent protest an indigenously approved course of action.

The strength of Banerjee’s account is in her use of oral histories collected from former members of the KK movement. She cites seventy separate interviews with KK members ranging in age from seventy to 120–130. These oral accounts are treated critically and are supported for the most part by relevant archival information from colonial records. Through these stories, Banerjee builds a picture of Badshah Khan as a man as well as a leader of a nationalist political movement. Many KK members, for example, distinctly recall Badshah Khan’s speeches and their own feelings about them. They explain how Badshah Khan taught them that highly prized social institutions like the blood feud had to be abandoned. Their collective energies had to be redirected to a different kind of jihad, or holy war, which was to be fought on the more demanding spiritual level. It would, of course, have been wholly inadequate simply to reproduce Badshah Khan’s speeches or sections of his autobiography. It is the sense that his followers gave to these ideas that offers an understanding of the ways in which a people may be persuaded to alter radically how they express their own cultural values.

Banerjee builds on the ethnographies of Barth, Ahmed, and Lindholm to show how violence need not always be considered an integral aspect of pukhtunwali. Contemporary stereotypes of Pathans in Pakistan continue to reinforce the idea that Pathans are quick to resort to violence and bloodshed. Pathan masculinity is commonly thought to demand that a man be prepared to fight. Banerjee, following Lindholm, shows instead that the willingness to suffer extreme consequences was an indigenously approved expression of honour and masculinity. Going to jail became a sign of a brave and honourable person. KK members adopted the idea that one could express greater courage by facing one’s enemy unarmed because it increased the risk of personal injury to oneself. The KK movement managed to incorporate indigenous values and
show how non-violence was not only a more effective protest, but a more courageous and noble expression of these values. That the movement endured for seventeen years suggests that it had indeed tapped into a set of indigenously approved cultural norms.

The one disappointment was Banerjee's brief treatment of the expression of colonialism through homoerotic sexuality. Unfortunately, she relies on Nandy's critique of colonialism and expands on notions of the effeminisation of the 'native'. This seems to rely far too much on giving primacy to an interpreted set of meta-messages behind what people actually said and did. Even if Nandy and Banerjee are correct that British men secretly desired Indian men, then I still fail to see the utility of this line of analysis. No one has effectively demonstrated that homoerotic desire was a primary motivating factor for British behaviour in India, but perhaps I hold a minority view on this issue. Happily for me, Banerjee does not dwell on the sexuality of colonialism, and the rest of the book is an unproblematic pleasure to read.

Methodologically, Banerjee provides a valuable discussion of the ways anthropologists may effectively employ oral histories. Mainstream historians, she tells us, are sceptical of personal memories, as they are often highly contextualised in contemporary situations. Memories are not only about the past but may be reconstructed to suit the needs of the present. The passages in which she justifies her heavy reliance on informants' memories and her explanation of the ways she was able to cross-check her data provide a useful reference for anyone intent on investigating recent historical events. There are limitations to what may be done with material of this sort, though as Banerjee's book demonstrates, what one may do is sufficiently worthwhile to justify the effort.

STEVEN LYON
PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED


Anthropology & Medicine, vol. 6, no. 2 (August 1999).


Publications Received 293


KOZAK, DAVID L., and DAVID J. LOPEZ, Devil Sickness and Devil Songs: Tohono O’odham Poetics (Smithsonian Series in Ethnographic Inquiry). ix, 190 pp. References, Index. £27.95/$45.00.


INDEX TO VOLUME XXIX (1998)

ARTICLES

ARDENER, SHIRLEY
The Funding of Social Anthropological Research: A Preliminary Note to a Fragment of History Written by E. M. Chilver in 1955 243–250

CHILVER, E. M.
The Organization of Social and Economic Research in the British Colonial Territories [From the Archives] 251–262

CONNELL, BRUCE
Linguistics, and Minority Languages 231–242

HENLEY, PAUL
Homage to the Arakmbut [Review Article] 71–79

KHAN, DINA
Mixed Marriages in Islam: An Anthropological Perspective on Pakistan 5–28

LUSSIER, DOMINIQUE
Durkheim on Respect: Modern Echoes of a ‘Naive Introspective Guess’ 137–157

MACLEOD, DONALD
Office Politics: Power in the London Salesroom 213–229

MCGOVERN, MICHAEL
Durkheim and Heidegger: Two Social Ontologies and Some Implications 105–120

MYHRE, KNUD CHRISTIAN

PARKIN, ROBERT
‘From Science to Action’: Durkheimian Engagement with Activists in the Groupe d’Etudes Socialistes [From the Archives] 81–90

PARKIN, ROBERT
Introduction [to Special Issue Celebrating the Centenary of L’Année Sociologique] 103–104

PARKIN, ROBERT
The Legacy of the Année Sociologique as a Journal 159–164

PELS, PETER

PFAFF-CZARNECKA, JOANNA
Let Sleeping Dogs Lie! Non-Christian Religious Minorities in Switzerland Today 29–51
### BOOK REVIEWS

**Samall, Bonani**
Applique Craft in Orissa, India: Continuity, Change and Commercialization .......................................................... 53–70

**Tripathy, Mamata**
Folk Art at the Crossroads of Tradition and Modernity: A Study of *Patta* Painting in Orissa ........................................... 197–211

---

**Abu-Zahra, Nadia,** *The Pure and the Powerful: Studies in Contemporary Muslim Society*
Reviewed by P.C. Johnstone ................................................................. 284–286

**Babatunde, Emmanuel D.,** *A Critical Study of Bini and Yoruba Value Systems of Nigeria in Change: Culture, Religion, and the Self*
Reviewed by Stefano Boni ................................................................. 192–194

**Banerjee, Mukulika,** *The Pathan Unarmed: Opposition and Memory in the North-West Frontier*
Reviewed by Steven Lyon ................................................................. 289–291

**Bierwert, Crisca (ed.),** *Lushootseed Texts: An Introduction to Puget Sound Narrative Aesthetics*
Reviewed by Dorothy Kennedy .......................................................... 281–283

**Chatty, Dawn,** *Mobile Pastoralists: Development Planning and Social Change in Oman*
Reviewed by Jonathan Rae ............................................................... 283–284

**Erlmann, Veit,** *Nightsong: Performance, Power and Practice in South Africa*
Reviewed by Karen Lüdtke ............................................................... 178–180

**Ferrell, Jeff and Mark Hamm (eds.),** *Ethnography at the Edge: Crime, Deviance and Field Research*
Reviewed by Ian O'Donnell .............................................................. 187–188

**Harkin, Michael Eugene,** *The Heiltsuks: Dialogues of Culture and History on the Northwest Coast*
Reviewed by Aix Dark ........................................................................... 176–178

**Heintze, Beatrix,** *Ethnographische Aneignungen: deutsche Forschungsreisende in Angola*
Reviewed by Robert Parkin ............................................................... 95–96

**Hertz, Robert,** *Sin and Expiation in Primitive Societies*
Reviewed by Charles Stewart ............................................................ 277–279

**Hill, Polly,** *The Migrant Cocoa-Farmers of Southern Ghana: A Study In Rural Capitalism*
Reviewed by Stefano Boni ............................................................... 173–174

**Irek, Malgorzata,** *Der Schmugglerzug Warschau-Berlin-Warschau: Materialien einer Feldforschung*
Reviewed by Stefan Senders ............................................................. 286–287
Kavanagh, Thomas K., *Comanche Political History: An Ethnohistorical Perspective 1706–1875*  
Reviewed by R. H. Barnes ........................................... 276–277

Malotki, Ekkehart (ed.), *The Bedbug’s Night Dance and Other Hopi Sexual Tales*  
Reviewed by R. H. Barnes ........................................... 275

Mansilla, Lucio V., *A Visit to the Ranquel Indian*  
Reviewed by Peter Rivière ........................................... 98–100

Mundy, Martha, *Domestic Government: Kinship, Community and Polity in North Yemen*  
Reviewed by W. Flagg Miller ........................................... 182–185

Nordstrom, Carolyn, *A Different Kind of War Story*  
Reviewed by Joann McGregor ........................................... 185–186

Padel, Felix, *Sacrifice of Human Being: British Rule and the Konds of Orissa*  
Reviewed by Robert Parkin ........................................... 93–94

Pálsson, Gisli, and E. Paul Durrenberger (eds.), *Images of Contemporary Iceland: Everyday Lives and Global Contexts*  
Reviewed by Donald Macleod ........................................... 279–281

Parkin, Robert, *The Dark Side of Humanity: The Work of Robert Hertz and its Legacy*  
Reviewed by Charles Stewart ........................................... 277–279

Pickering, W. S. F., and W. Watts Miller (eds.), *On Durkheim’s Elementary Forms of Religious Life*  
Reviewed by Phillip A. Mellor ........................................... 181–182

Rapport, Nigel, and Andrew Dawson (eds.), *Migrants of Identity: Perceptions of Home in a World of Movement*  
Reviewed by Janette Davies ........................................... 96–98

Sinclair, Simon, *Making Doctors: An Institutional Apprenticeship*  
Reviewed by Helen Sweet ........................................... 190–192

Trautmann, Thomas R., *Aryans and British India*  
Reviewed by David Gellner ........................................... 91–93

Usher, Ann Danaiya (ed.), *Dams as Aid: A Political Anatomy of Nordic Development Thinking*  
Reviewed by Barrie Sharpe ........................................... 188–190

Van Damme, Wilfried, *Beauty in Context: Towards an Anthropological Approach to Aesthetics*  
Reviewed by Ed Carter ........................................... 273–275

Van Esterik, Penny, *Materializing Thailand*  
Reviewed by Heather Montgomery ........................................... 287–289

Weissner, Polly, and Wulf Schiefenhövel, *Food and the Status Quest: An Interdisciplinary Perspective*  
Reviewed by Stefano Boni ........................................... 174–176
OTHER NOTES AND NOTICES

Obituary: Louis Dumont (1911–1998)
by N. J. Allen ............................................. 1–4

Oxford Research in Social and Cultural Anthropology
Abstracts of Theses in Social and Cultural Anthropology for which
Higher Degrees were Awarded by the University of Oxford in 1997 ... 165–172