GODFREY LIENHARDT (1921–1993)
SPECIAL ISSUE IN MEMORY OF GODFREY LIENHARDT
Edited by Ahmed Al-Shahi and Jeremy Coote

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Frontispiece: The photograph of Godfrey Lienhardt at the front of this issue is the official photograph taken when he took up the post of Vicegerent at Wolfson College, Oxford, a post he held from 1973 to 1975. Today it hangs outside the College's general office, alongside those of the College's other former Vicegerents. It is reproduced here by kind permission of Wolfson College.
PREFACE

The editors of JASO, on whose behalf as well as my own I now write, are pleased to publish this Special Issue of the Journal in memory of Godfrey Lienhardt. In doing so, we think back to Lienhardt’s retirement in 1988, which was marked by the publication of two volumes. A Special Issue of this Journal on ‘Names and their Uses’ (guest-edited by J. H. W. Penney) was published with contributions from a number of colleagues, friends, and students who had participated in a series of informal colloquia that Lienhardt had organized on the topic of Names (see JASO, Vol. XIX, no. 2 (1988)). Former students and others inspired by his work also contributed to the publication of a volume in JASO’s Occasional Paper series: Vernacular Christianity: Essays in the Social Anthropology of Religion Presented to Godfrey Lienhardt, a Festschrift volume edited by Wendy James and Douglas H. Johnson (JASO Occasional Papers No. 7; Oxford: JASO, 1988).

Taken together, the three volumes—the two earlier ones and this present one—emphasize Lienhardt’s close involvement and support for the Journal from its earliest days until his death in 1993. He chose it as the vehicle for the publication of a number of his essays, most notably for his Frazer Lecture for 1991, which appeared in these pages shortly before his death (Vol. XXIV, no. 1 (1992), pp. 1-12). More than this, however, he provided moral support through encouraging a diverse range of students and scholars to contribute to the Journal. Through this he helped to make JASO better known, not only within Oxford but also in wider anthropological circles in Britain and abroad, and thus contributed to the international reputation of the Journal. In 1981 or thereabouts Meyer Fortes remarked to me how disappointing it was that Lienhardt was publishing so little, and that what he was publishing was appearing in JASO, rather than in Africa or Man. Lienhardt, I think, saw publishing in JASO as achieving two aims. He was contributing to the discipline that was so important to him (and to which, pace Fortes, he continued to contribute up until the time of his death), and he was supporting
an important institution for anthropology at Oxford. Lienhardt had no ambition for himself, but he was ambitious for his students and saw the Journal as providing valuable experience for those who worked on it and as an excellent vehicle in which young anthropologists could publish for the first time.

This support for Oxford anthropology also applied to *JASO*’s ‘sister’ institution, the Oxford University Anthropological Society. Lienhardt joined the Society soon after his arrival in Oxford in 1948 and remained a member for the rest of his life. Typically, though he was technically already a Life Member and had no need to pay any subscription in later life, he insisted on paying an annual subscription, as well as supporting the activities of the Society in other ways. He also addressed the Society on at least three occasions. He spoke at the 472nd meeting (held on Wednesday 24 May 1950) on ‘Some Nilotic Religious Beliefs’. Serving as the Society’s President for the year 1956–57, he gave his presidential address at the 548th meeting (held on Wednesday 4 December 1957) on ‘The Beliefs and Customs Surrounding the Situation of Death among the Anuak’. Finally, he addressed the 557th meeting (held on 18th February 1959) with a ‘Comment on Anthropology and Literature’, presumably a revised version of the talk given at the Institute of Contemporary Arts in London in 1955 that was later published in *JASO* (Vol. IV, no. 2 (1973), pp. 59–67).

Lienhardt also served as President more recently, for the 1981–82 and 1982–83 academic years. With hindsight this period appears to have been one of the most successful in the Society’s history. Meetings were held regularly every other week during term and attracted substantial audiences from the Oxford anthropological community and from the multidisciplinary collegiate community of Wolfson, where the meetings were held. These meetings contributed to the prominence of anthropology at Wolfson, Oxford’s largest postgraduate college. Of course, Lienhardt’s presence—and that of other fellows and students attracted to the college—had already given anthropology a presence at Wolfson, but the activities of the Society confirmed the intellectual and social contribution that anthropologists could make to the life of the college. Anthropology’s presence at Wolfson—and Lienhardt’s contribution to it—is now marked by the establishment of the Godfrey Lienhardt Memorial Fund. This was set up with funds bequeathed by Lienhardt himself and contributions from his colleagues, friends, and students. The Fund exists ‘for the promotion of social and cultural anthropology in the continent of Africa south of the Sahara Desert, but excluding the Republic of South Africa’. The first awards have already been made and the Fund remains open for further contributions. An announcement about the fund appears below (page 137). The fund will continue to remind us of Lienhardt’s support for anthropology at Oxford.

This brief Preface has touched on a limited aspect of Lienhardt’s immense contribution to anthropology. Other aspects of his life and work—at Oxford, in the Sudan, and elsewhere—are dealt with in Ahmed Al-Shahi’s biographical notes and in the memoirs and appreciations, contributed by former colleagues, students, and friends, that appear below. We hope that this Special Issue, taken as a whole,
constitutes a fair reflection of a remarkable and much-loved personality, whose passing we continue to mourn.

In preparing this Special Issue for publication, Ahmed Al-Shahi and I have received assistance from a number of people. For general assistance we are grateful to Tania Kaiser. For helping to resolve particular queries, we are grateful to the following: Peter Allmond of the Bodleian Library, University of Oxford; Jonathon Benthall of the Royal Anthropological Institute; Mr John Davis of the BBC’s Written Archives Centre; Dennis Duerden; Professor John Haffenden; Dr M. A. Jamieson of the Department of Anthropology, London School of Economics; Miss B. J. Kirkpatrick of the Royal Anthropological Institute; Ms Therese Nolan of Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.; Professor W. S. F. Pickering; and Ms Jan Scriven of Wolfson College, Oxford. We are also grateful to Mike Morris of the Tylor Library at Oxford’s Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology and to the staff of the Bodleian Library for their expert, unfailing assistance.

Finally, the Editors of JASO are grateful to Wolfson College and to the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology for their generous support of this extended Special Issue.

JEREMY COOTE
INTRODUCTION

This Special Issue of JASO in memory of Godfrey Lienhardt contains seven previously unpublished talks by him; a bibliography of his work with biographical notes; fifteen appreciations and memoirs by some of his friends and former students; as well as two poems and three songs.

As Godfrey Lienhardt's literary executor, I have had the task of sorting his papers and deciding how best to make the material accessible to a wider readership. The first task was to compile a bibliography of his published work, which is, I hope, complete. Along with this, I have put together notes on his academic career. These do not amount to a biography as such, but will perhaps be helpful to students interested in his work.

The seven papers published here are by no means all those that were left unpublished at the time of his death. They are, rather, those that first came to light, and which required the least editorial work. They are published here in chronological order: the first having been written in 1957, the last in 1989. Though selected rather arbitrarily, they do represent Lienhardt's range of interests. The dominant themes are the Nilotes of the Southern Sudan and, in particular, the Dinka; comparative religion; and the history of anthropology, in particular the role of individuals in it.

As anyone familiar with his published work will have realised, Lienhardt never published anything until it met his own exacting standards. This often meant that a paper would go through a number of typescripts before he considered it ready. To give an example, among his papers there are two typescripts of the essay on Sir James Frazer and Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard published here, on each of which there are deletions and additions. None of the papers published here had been provided with footnotes and references. They were, of course, working papers and had Lienhardt prepared them for publication, he would no doubt have provided the necessary scholarly apparatus. Jeremy Coote and I have done our best to provide
this, though there remain a few gaps where Lienhardt left insufficient clues to enable a reference to be tracked down.

Three of the papers published here are transcripts of radio talks. Lienhardt gave seven talks on BBC radio in the 1950s and 1960s, of which three were published contemporaneously (see the biographical notes and bibliography below for details). Of those published here, the first, ‘Dinkas of the Sudan’, is particularly interesting as it takes the form of a dialogue, scripted by Lienhardt, between himself and a Dinka. The Dinka both reacts and responds to what the anthropologist has to say about his people and enriches and sharpens the anthropologist’s observations and perceptions. These three talks, like all the papers published here, should be understood as contributions to contemporary anthropological debates. The talks in particular are, in a sense, historical documents in their own right. Aimed at non-anthropological audiences, they deal accessibly with complex issues. ‘Dinkas of the Sudan’ was prepared for one of the BBC’s schools broadcasts and aims to provide an accessible word-picture of another way of life.

About half of the appreciations and memoirs published below are revised versions of addresses given at the gathering to remember him which was held at his Oxford college, Wolfson, on Saturday 7 May 1994. This was, in fact, a wonderful occasion—quite different in character, naturally, from the funeral six months before. As Lienhardt had requested that no memorial service should be held for him, this spring Saturday afternoon was to be a Celebration. In his address at Lienhardt’s Requiem Mass (see JASO, Vol. XXIV, no. 2 (1993), pp. 101–3), Peter Rivière had remarked how ‘Godfrey is no longer with us in person, but I know that whenever a company of his friends meet, his name will be on their lips’. Many of us have found that to be very true, and no more so than at this Celebration, when all the people one had met over the years at his regular table in the pub were gathered in one place. In all, some two hundred friends and colleagues gathered to celebrate Lienhardt’s life. After the addresses, a group of British-based Dinka danced and sang three songs—one traditional, two specially composed for the occasion by Nyuol M. Bol, Thiik A. Giir-Thiik, and Duang Ajing Arop. The performance provided a rousing end to the more formal part of the afternoon. In the evening a dinner was held, and Lienhardt’s friends stayed on to reminisce. Jeremy Coote and I are grateful to Stephen Madut Baak, Paul Baxter, Zachariah Bol Deng, Wendy James, Philip Lyon Roussel, and John Ryle for agreeing to the publication of their addresses here. We are also grateful to Nyuol M. Bol, Thiik A. Giir-Thiik, and Duang Ajing Arop for agreeing to the publication here of the specially composed songs, and to Bona Malwal for providing the English translations. My own address also appears here, in revised form.

While space in this publication is limited, it has been possible to include here a few other memoirs, as well as two poems dedicated to Lienhardt. The memoirs by Gerd Baumann, John W. Burton, Jeremy Coote, Francis M. Deng, Douglas H. Johnson, Bona Malwal, and F. C. T. Moore were written especially for publication here. We are also delighted to be able to include here the piece by Jack Goody, which was written two days after Lienhardt’s death but remained hidden among
his papers until three years later when he sent a copy to Peter Rivière. It is fitting
that Lienhardt’s great love of poetry is reflected in the publication here of two
poems. Ruth Padel’s ‘Cymbals for Strauss’ is dedicated to him and was first
published in 1975. Eva Gillies’ ‘Looking Back’ reflects on Lienhardt’s death and
is published here for the first time.

It has been possible to include material from only a few of the many people
among his wide circle of friends around the world who may have liked to contrib­
ute. We trust that Lienhardt’s other friends will understand our predicament and
not feel left out. We have no doubt they will find much to value in the affection­
ate appreciations published here. They may also like to know about the brief, but
excellent, pen portrait of Lienhardt by Keith Ovenden that appears in his biography
of Dan Davin (see pages 265–6 of A Fighting Withdrawal: The Life of Dan

The addresses, memoirs, and poems are published together below in alphabet­
ical order by author. It seemed fitting, however, to end this publication with the
Dinka songs, which drew to a close the formal part of the Celebration four years
ago. The final words of the third and final song are a prayer for peace in Sudan
so that a shrine can be erected to Thienydeng (Lienhardt’s Dinka name) among the
shrines of the Dinka ancestors.

Godfrey Lienhardt, and his brother Peter (who died in 1986), were central
personalities of an extraordinary era in the history of Oxford’s Institute of Social
Anthropology, in particular, and of the University of Oxford in general. The affec­
tion in which Godfrey’s memory is held is greater than any single volume could
adequately represent. This modest volume and the efforts that went into preparing
it are, however, offered in his memory. He is missed and will be remembered,
always.

AHMED AL-SHAHI
RONALD GODFREY LIENHARDT, 1921–1993: BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

AHMED AL-SHAHI

Introduction

Neither Godfrey Lienhardt nor his brother Peter kept systematic records of their publications or of their academic activities. While they did give copies of some of their publications to the Tylor Library at Oxford’s Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, where they both taught, they failed to provide other information for the records, so that until now the Institute has kept only very brief biographical notes. Moreover, although they kept copies of their books and offprints of some of their articles, it has required much detective work to track down the rest of their publications. For example, as executor of both their literary estates, since their deaths I have frequently found among their papers undated typescripts of papers and book reviews that give no clue as to where—or, indeed, whether—they were published.

Godfrey was modest in talking about his contributions to social anthropology in general and to the anthropology of the Southern Sudan (and especially the Dinka) in particular. The bibliography provided here, however, is testament to both the quality and quantity of his contribution to the subject, as represented in his published work. The 136 entries have been arranged in purely chronological order, rather than by category, as I think this shows more clearly Lienhardt’s developing intellectual and academic interests. Those who know and admire the style of his anthropological writings may be particularly interested to know of his early contributions to F. R. Leavis’s critical journal Scrutiny, which are listed here.
Lienhardt’s major contribution has been through his books and articles, which show his profound understanding of Dinka culture and of the discipline of anthropology. The many reviews he wrote, however, provide further insights into his wider intellectual interests and reveal the extent of his range of reference. Like all his writings, his reviews were meticulously drafted and redrafted until he found their form and content satisfactory. Given the intrinsic interest of these reviews, I have tried to track down all of them but recognize that there may be some I have missed. For example, it has not been possible to discover if Lienhardt reviewed for the *Times Literary Supplement* before the introduction of signed reviews in 1974. I quite expect, therefore, that additional material may come to light and will be pleased to receive (via the editors of *JASO*) corrections and additions to the information published here.1

Biographical Notes

Ronald Godfrey Lienhardt was born on 17 January 1921 in Bradford, Yorkshire, to a Swiss father and a British mother. He was educated at Eastborough Council School, Dewsbury (1926–31) and Batley Grammar School, Batley, West Yorkshire (1931–39), where he held an Akroyd Scholarship. In 1936 he gained his Matriculation Certificate from the Northern Universities Joint Matriculation Board. From 1936 to 1937 he was Secretary of the school’s literary society. He contributed to the school magazine and was its editor from 1938 to 1939. In 1938 he gained his Higher School Certificate from the Northern Universities Joint Matriculation Board in English, French, and History (with Distinction in English). In 1939 he participated in school plays (*The Purple Bedroom* and *Le Pharmacien*). He was also a member of the school athletics team.

1. My original intention was to publish these combined biographical notes and bibliography together with those I had prepared on Godfrey Lienhardt’s brother Peter. For editorial reasons, however, it was decided to publish them separately. The biographical notes and bibliography for Peter Lienhardt appeared in an earlier issue of *JASO* (Vol. XXVII, no. 2 (1996), pp. 107–112), where a version of this text also appeared. I should like to thank the following for their help in compiling the information presented here: Jeremy Coote, Mrs Isabella Birkin (Administrative Secretary, Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford), Mr Mike Morris (Tylor Librarian, Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford), Mr C. S. Parker (former headmaster, Batley Grammar School, Batley, West Yorkshire), Mr Leslie Spurr (former master at Batley Grammar School, Batley, West Yorkshire), Dr Philip Howell (former Archivist, Downing College, Cambridge), Anne Macdonald (College Secretary, Exeter College, Oxford), Dr Shirley Ardener (Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford), and Mrs Janet Walker (former College Secretary, Wolfson College, Oxford). I should also like to thank Margaret Tulip for her help in preparing the material for publication.
From 1939 to 1941 he was a State Scholar (Open Major Scholar) at Downing College, Cambridge, achieving First Class Honours in Part I of the English Tripos. In 1941 he joined the Royal Army Ordinance Corps (RAOC) as a private. In March 1943 he was commissioned as a Lieutenant in the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) and posted to East Africa. In 1945 he returned to Cambridge on ‘B’ release (i.e. 'at the request of the Ministry of Labour and National Service in order to perform work of national reconstruction'). He was awarded an MA under war regulations. In 1947 he took First Class Honours (with Distinction) in the Archaeological and Anthropological Tripos, Section A.

In 1947 the government of the Sudan awarded him a grant to study the Dinka; Downing College, Cambridge, also made a grant towards his initial expenses. This fieldwork was carried out between 1947 and 1951. In 1948 he became a postgraduate student at Exeter College, Oxford. In 1952 he was awarded his D.Phil. for his thesis 'The Dinka of the Southern Sudan: Religion and Social Structure'.

In 1949 he was appointed Research Lecturer (later Lecturer) in African Sociology at the University of Oxford. From 1950 to 1952 he held a Research Fellowship from the International African Institute to study the Anuak of Southern Sudan. Through the Institute of Social Anthropology, he also received a grant from All Souls College, Oxford to extend his researches in the Sudan. This fieldwork was carried out between 1952 and 1954.

From 1955 to 1956 he was given leave to start a department in Sociology and Social Anthropology at the College of Arts and Sciences in Baghdad, Iraq. During this time he held the post of Professor of Sociology and Social Anthropology. Also in 1955 he was appointed Senior Lecturer in African Sociology at the University of Oxford. From the late 1950s until the middle 1960s he was a Member of Common Room at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, where for much of the time he was also resident. In 1964 he was Visiting Professor at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ghana, Accra.

In 1967 he was appointed a Governing Body Fellow of Wolfson College, Oxford, later becoming a Professorial Fellow. In 1972 he was appointed to an ad hominem Readership in Social Anthropology. From 1973 to 1975 he was Vicegerent at Wolfson College. From 1975 to 1976 he was Acting Head of the Institute of Social Anthropology. In 1983 he received an honorary D.Litt. from Northwestern University, Illinois. In 1988 he retired, after some forty-one years’ service to the Institute of Social Anthropology and to the University of Oxford. He became Reader Emeritus in Social Anthropology and an Emeritus Fellow at Wolfson College, positions he held until his death in 1993.

Lienhardt was an active member of university and college committees throughout his career. At various times he served on, amongst others, the Board of the Faculty of Oriental Studies, the Board of the Faculty of Anthropology and Geography, the Committee for the Pitt Rivers Museum, the Inter-Faculty Liaison Committee for African Studies, and the Standing Committee on Matters Referred to the General Board. In addition, he served on the Advisory Board of the Oxford Review (University College, Oxford), as a Judge for the Amaury Talbot Prize, as
Faculty Board Liaison Officer with Oxford University Press, as an Elector for the Bagby Studentship, as a Member of Council of the Royal Anthropological Institute, as co-editor (and later General Editor) of the Oxford Library of African Literature, and (for a number of periods) as President of the Oxford University Anthropological Society.

He also frequently served as an examiner. He was Chief Examiner for Social Anthropology on the International Baccalaureate from 1968 to 1976 and on various occasions external examiner at the University of Ghana, at the University of Khartoum, at the University of Cambridge, at the University of London (London School of Economics and Political Science), and at the University of Newcastle upon Tyne.


Lienhardt also gave a number of talks on the radio. ‘The Birth of Civilization in the Near East’, a talk about Henri Frankfort’s book of the same name, was broadcast on the BBC Third Programme on Saturday 6 October 1951. ‘Modes of Thought’, in the series ‘The Values of Primitive Society’, was broadcast on the BBC Third Programme on Tuesday 7 April 1953 (and was later published twice; as 1953a and 1954a). The first of a number of talks about the Dinka, ‘Dinka: People of the Southern Sudan’, was broadcast under the heading ‘Geography: Life and Work in Africa’ on the BBC Home Service for Schools on Wednesday 13 May 1953. A second talk about the Dinka, ‘Dinkas of the Sudan’, was also broadcast on the BBC Home Service for Schools on Friday 1 March 1957 (and is published for the first time below; as 1997a). A third talk about the Dinka, ‘Sacrifice in Primitive Societies’, was broadcast in the series ‘The Sacrificial Society’ on the BBC Third Programme on Saturday 4 June 1960 (and published in revised form as 1960a). A fourth talk about the Dinka, under the title ‘Man in Society’, was broadcast in the series ‘Ancient Civilizations’ on BBC Network Three on Wednesday 3 April 1963 (and published in revised form as 1963b); Francis Deng contributed to this broadcast. Lienhardt also took part in ‘What is Civilization?’, a further programme in the series ‘Ancient Civilizations’, which was broadcast on BBC Network 3 on Easter Sunday, 14 April 1963. This was a discussion programme featuring, in addition to Lienhardt, Stuart Piggott, M. I. Finley, and Richard Hoggart. Two further talks by Lienhardt were broadcast in 1965: ‘Plato and the Vailala Madness’ was broadcast on the BBC Third Programme on
Tuesday 16 February 1965 (and is published for the first time below; as 1997b); ‘Simpler Societies in an Industrialized World’, a contribution to the series ‘Man and His Environment’, was broadcast on Monday 12 April 1965 on the BBC Third Network (and again is published for the first time below; as 1997d). A discussion with Dennis Duerden, John Nagenda, and Lewis Nkosi on ‘The Oral Tradition’, recorded in London in 1966 for broadcast by a number of African radio stations was also later broadcast by Deutsche Welle, Cologne (it was also published as 1966f). Finally, he was the principal speaker on ‘An Outline Map of the Social World: The Contribution of the Social Anthropologist’, a programme in the series ‘Understanding Other Societies’, broadcast on the BBC Third Network (Study Session) on Monday 15 May 1967.

Lienhardt died on 9 November 1993. His death was marked by this and other journals. An Obituary Notice appeared in these pages (Vol. XXIV, no. 2 (1993)) as did the text of the address delivered by Peter Rivière at the Requiem Mass (ibid., pp. 101–3). Obituaries appeared in the Independent (17 November 1993; by Douglas H. Johnson), the Guardian (19 November 1993; by André Singer), the Sudan Democratic Gazette (December 1993; by Bona Malwal), and Cambridge Anthropology (Vol. XVI, no. 3 (1992/1993; by Achol Deng)).

Lienhardt’s intellectual legacy has yet to be fully appreciated. His contribution to anthropology was, of course, discussed by the writers of his obituaries and is also discussed by many of the contributors to this Special Issue. The contributors to Vernacular Christianity: Essays in the Social Anthropology of Religion Presented to Godfrey Lienhardt (edited by Wendy James and Douglas H. Johnson; Oxford: JASO, 1988 (JASO Occasional Papers No. 7)) also discussed it; and a select bibliography of his publications dealing ‘most directly with the anthropological study of morality and religion’ appeared there (pp. 183–4). Dominique Casajus has also discussed Lienhardt’s contribution to anthropology in his entry on him in the Dictionnaire de l’ethnologie et de l’anthropologie (edited by Pierre Bonte, Michel Izard, and others; Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1991, p. 421). The publication here of a complete listing of his writings, plus the publication below of seven previously unpublished talks, will enable a fuller appreciation of his contribution to emerge in due course.

Bibliography


1966f (with Dennis Duerden, John Nagenda, and Lewis Nkosi). ‘The Oral Tradition’, *The New African* (July), pp. 124–5 (transcription of a discussion recorded at the Transcription Centre, London, for broadcast by a number of radio stations in Africa; it was later broadcast also by Deutsche Welle, Cologne).


24 Ahmed Al-Shahi


GODFREY LIENHARDT

SEVEN TALKS
[Music: Nuer music, hold as background for Lienhardt's opening remarks.]

LIENHARDT: If you were to travel up the River Nile, first through Egypt and the desert lands of the northern Sudan, you would reach at last the country of this people, who are very tall and very black. They call themselves Jyeng; but foreigners in their land, who find this name hard to pronounce, call them 'Dinka'. The Southern Sudan is divided by many rivers; and as you approach it, carried by a little steamer which paddles along by day and by night, you will pass all the creatures which love the river—ducks, black-and-white geese, pelicans, hippos, crocodiles. Further inland are all the wild big-game animals of Africa, including the lion and the leopard, hiding and resting by day, killing and feeding by night. This is the world of the Dinka; and some night, when your steamer stops for a few hours, you will perhaps hear in the distance drumming and singing. It is the beginning of a dance; perhaps you would like a Dinka to speak about it.

Editors' note: Text of a talk recorded for BBC Radio's Home Service for Schools on Tuesday 26 February 1957 and broadcast on Friday 1 March 1957. Lienhardt wrote the script and narrated it, the part of the Dinka being performed by Errol John. Only very minor changes have been made to the copy of the text surviving in the author's papers, including those on it in the author's own hand. Acknowledgement is due to the BBC (Rights Archive) for permission to publish this material here.
DINKA: Yes of course, it is a dance. But you are mistaken when you think it is a Dinka dance. That is not really the music of our people. It is the music of our neighbours, the Nuer tribe. Long ago we used to fight with them and seize their cattle.

L: Yes, and of course I really knew that this was Nuer music but I thought it didn’t matter very much. But you Dinka, you are very like the Nuer tribe, aren’t you? A visitor can’t always tell the difference between you and them.

D: And we cannot always tell the difference between you British and the French and the Germans and the rest. We call you all ‘red foreigners’, because we say that when God first made people he made you red and hairy. And he gave you rifles to hunt with and motor cars to love. But he made us, and the Nuer, smooth and shiny and black; and he gave us spears to hunt with and cows to love. So I suppose that you are all the same—you and the French and Germans and the rest—and we are all the same, we and the Nuer.

L: Yes, but you know it’s not quite so. Even a stranger can learn to tell a Nuer. He has six long scars right across his forehead, from one ear to the other. The Dinka have different marks on their foreheads—in fact I have seen them make them. When a Dinka boy is growing big, and his father thinks that it is time to let him do the things which only a man is allowed to do, he will say, ‘Now you are old enough to have the marks of a grown man. You may have the lines cut on your head.’ The youth calls together the other boys of the village whose fathers have agreed; and they shave off their hair, and pay a man to cut V-shaped lines deep into the flesh of their foreheads, from the top of the nose right over the scalp. When these cuts heal, they leave scars for life; and those are the marks of a fully grown Dinka man.

D: Yes, that is so; and in some places they cut the girls’ heads too—they say that their faces will then become long and beautiful, instead of fat and round. Now that many of our boys are going to school they don’t have these cuts made any more. Still, the other boys who do not go to school look forward to the time when their heads will be cut. They have to be very brave of course, for it is painful, and if you twist your head away from the knife you will have a bad wavy scar for the rest of your life. But until those marks on your head have been made, you are only a child, looking after goats, helping your mother, running errands for everyone, and cracking open roasted tortoises for your grandfather to eat. When you have your head-scars, you are a man; you help your father and your older brothers with the cattle, and that is what every Dinka boy wants to do. Even the school-boys want to own cows and bulls; when they first started schools for us, every boy
had to take a cow to school and look after it there. Cattle are the most important things in our life.

L: And there perhaps we might mention another custom. When a boy reaches manhood, his father will give him an ox as a present.

D: Yes, that's right.

L: This ox now becomes his close friend. He gives it a poetic name, picks insects and mud from its body, polishes its horns and ties tassels on them—tassels made from the hair of a lion if he can get it. Then sometimes he will wear his best beads (for in the villages young people don't need clothes) and take his ox for a walk. He will sing a song he's composed, and his music will be the sound of a bell on the ox's neck. The girls will look up from milking and admire him. And one of them will think, 'There is the man I want for my husband.'

D: But no girl will want him unless he owns cows. Who ever heard of a good marriage in my country without a present of cows? He will need thirty cows before he can marry the girl.

L: That is true—you cannot get married in Dinkaland without giving a present of cows to your bride's family. People there say that the girl's family has had all the trouble of bringing her up. She has been taught by them how to make pots and baskets, how to cook and make flour and beer. And so why should her husband take her away from her family without giving them something to make up for all their trouble? When there's a wedding, all a man's uncles and aunts and cousins will give him cows as wedding presents, and he will give them all to his wife's family. But in fact the bride and bridegroom scarcely appear at all at their own wedding! They stay in the background, and their relatives do all the talking and dancing and singing.

[Music: Fade in Nuer record on the words 'talking and dancing', hold for a few seconds. Fade under.]

L: Then after the wedding, the guests go home, some of them carrying large joints of meat tied to their spears—for the father of the bride will have killed a bull and made a big feast. And then, for a long time, the husband mustn't go near his wife's family, perhaps until he has children of his own.

D: And that is how it should be. We like some of your British customs; but you marry without cows, and that is bad; and you speak to your mother-in-law, and that, well, that is really shameful.
L: Yes, I know you all think so, but we have our customs and you have yours. Then comes the time when a baby is born. For that, a young wife goes home to her mother, who will teach her how to look after it. She will have to make a cradle (for you have to make most things yourself in Dinkaland); and when the baby is strong, she’ll set off back to her husband with the baby in the cradle on her head. She has to balance it very carefully; and perhaps she must walk for twenty miles.

D: She ought to know how to balance it, if she’s not a fool! She has had a lot of training. Haven’t you seen how our little girls always carry pots of water from the river on their heads? It makes their necks strong; and if they carry things like that in their hands, instead of on their heads, they cannot carry a stick. And then what will they do, when they meet a snake or a wild dog?

L: Yes, indeed. But talking of babies, I was surprised to find that a very small Dinka baby is quite pink, not black. But sometimes it’s not wise to look at a baby very closely, if you are a foreigner. Some mothers may think you are a witch and want to eat it.

D: Yes, many people say that there are witches in our country. I don’t know whether to believe it or not; but certainly there are all sorts of magicians. You see we have no real doctors; and so when a man has a pain, he will go to a magician—his cousin might be a magician—and he will perform magic to take the pain away. I have seen some magicians take bits of charcoal out of a man’s back, and say, ‘There, I have taken away your backache.’ But I think that is a trick. More important magic can bring the rain, though.

L: The rain—yes. Rain is very important for the Dinka; because for half the year there is no rain at all. Then the rivers begin to dry up, until the fish are so thick in them that they sometimes die and float to the top, like overcrowded goldfish in a bowl. And the grass dries up and withers away. There is nothing good for the cattle to eat. Then the Dinka have to leave their villages (carrying all their household things, remember) and make a long journey with the cattle to the swamps, which don’t dry up. They camp out by the swamps for months, until the rain comes again and the earth in the villages becomes wet, and soft enough for sowing corn. But if the rains are late, it is a hard time for the Dinka. The cattle stop giving milk, and the crops will be spoilt at the harvest. So the Dinka believe that some powerful magicians can persuade God to let the rains come. They pray about it; and sometimes, certainly, a cloud comes out of the clear sky, and rain falls.

[Rain and thunderstorm, as loud as possible.]
D: That sounds like a spring storm in my country. Sometimes people are struck by lightning, but we don't mind too much. We say that God has taken them away, and get on with our planting and gardening. This time after the spring rains is the only time when the weather is right for gardening.

L: And now, in late spring, the corn is sprouting. The older men are watching the cattle some way from the village—of course there are no fields for cows in Dinkaland, and they must be watched so that they do not stray. Also, there are lions in the woods which might attack the cattle, and then you need a strong spear. In the river, when the cattle go to drink, a crocodile may be waiting. It waits quietly until a calf has waded a little way into the stream, and then it seizes it, and lashes round with its heavy tail to sweep its meal right out in the water. So the cattle have to be watched all the time, until they are brought back at night to be tied up near the village, where the women are grinding corn.

D: And preparing porridge and sauce for the evening. We only eat one large meal a day. You English always seem to be picking at food, like birds. Little girls will be out gathering vegetables for their mothers to cook. Boys are looking after the goats, and playing at herding cattle. They collect large snail-shells, and pretend they are their cows, and play at looking after them. Then in playing they forget about the goats; and the goats go and eat the best corn growing in the neighbours' gardens. And then all the women shout and sometimes quarrel, and the little boys run away and leave them to it. But the girls shout to support their mothers; men say that it is a mistake to interfere when the women quarrel.

L: But they make it up of course sooner or later, and help each other with their gardens, which are now growing well; but the country round them is becoming flooded, for the rains are heavy. The cows are stamping about in mud, which is bad for their hooves. So this is the time for the young men to go camping again, this time in the forest where it's drier. The old people and the girls stay behind to chase off the birds, antelopes, and sometimes monkeys, which come to feed in the gardens.

D: And if the birds are very troublesome, it may be necessary to call in a magician who knows how to make the birds listen to him. He will come to your garden, and sprinkle milk and other things on your grain, and tell the birds to leave it alone. Sometimes they do, and then you pay him something. Sometimes they don't, and then you say that he is not truly a magician. Because some people pretend to be magicians, and some people are real magicians. You have to find out for yourself which are which. I don't think our boys are taught that in school.

L: And what a pity! But of course you can't leave everything to magicians. You have to be constantly watchful if you are a Dinka. The mother who is preparing food has to see out of the corner of her eye that the baby isn't crawling too near
the fire; the little girl who is weaving a mat must watch at the same time to see that a dog isn’t going to sneak up and run away with the family’s fish. The boys, as I have said, are playing games and watching to see that the goats don’t eat their neighbours’ gardens. The grown-up men are watching out for lions and crocodiles which might seize the cows; and the cows are searching for the best tufts of grass. As you see, it’s a very watchful kind of life; but it is a dangerous country, and you have to be careful.

D: Still, we like it. It’s a good land for cows. And in the evenings, there are dances. Even the little girls can go and dance a few steps. They make little bunches of bells and tie them round the waist so they hang down behind. And then they jig up and down to make the bells tinkle. And the young men wash off the ashes which they usually rub on their bodies to keep flies away. For the dance they rub oil on their bodies, and sometimes put markings on them with coloured powder, to make themselves look like their oxen. And so, dressed up in their beads and ivory bangles, they go to the dance. They begin it by beating the drums and singing alone, to let the girls know they want to dance. Like this:

[Music: Singing on Nuer or Dinka record.]

L: Sometimes they are disappointed. The girls think it is too cold, or too dark, for a dance. There are no lamps to light the way, and you can scarcely see your partner unless the moon is bright.

D: I don’t think that matters very much. You go to a dance to dance, not to see. But it is true that our girls do not always have time to dance. Cooking and grinding are hard work, and when you have to carry all your water from the river—and that may be a mile or two away—you may be tired. And Dinka dancing is not like your dancing, just walking about arm in arm. We have to stamp and jump and shout—we pretend that we are bulls, and we hold our arms like the horns of a bull. It is very beautiful—but it is very tiring too.

L: And then of course at night all the insects in Africa come to keep you awake—or so I thought, even in a mosquito net; and in the morning, there are again the cows to be milked, the goats to be let out, the fish to catch for supper, the corn to grind, the babies crying for attention, the goats spoiling the garden, and so on and so on. But in the evening, a large bowl of porridge, the cattle safely tied to their pegs near home and making the pleasantest music for Dinka ears.

[Cows making terrific bellows.]

L: And then, another dance.

[Dance music to end.]
PLATO AND THE VAILALA MADNESS

GODFREY LIENHARDT

The interpretation of moral and political change is a large topic for a short talk; but like Dr Jarvie in a recent book (Jarvie 1964), I consider it now for the most part in the context of some small communities in New Guinea. There in Papua, just after the First World War, the islanders tried to reform—to abolish even—their traditional way of life by acting in a way that seemed madness to Europeans.

My subject then is rapid social change, a kind of speeded-up history. Plato clearly belongs somewhere in any discussion of social stability and social revolution, hence the title of this talk. So do Professor Karl Popper’s severe criticisms of Plato’s influence on political thought when, in the first volume of his *The Open Society and its Enemies* (Popper 1945), he condemned many of his contemporaries’ Platonic leanings towards a tribalistic, conservative, and inward-looking political philosophy. With Dr Jarvie himself, who acknowledges a great debt to Popper, I hope to suggest how the so-called ‘Vailala madness’ of some people of Vailala in

*Editors’ note:* Text of a talk recorded for BBC Radio’s Third Programme on Tuesday 1 December 1964 and broadcast on Tuesday 16 February 1965. Only very minor changes have been made to the copy of the text surviving in the author’s papers, including those on it in the author’s own hand. The references have been supplied. Acknowledgement is due to the BBC (Rights Archive) for permission to publish this material here. The billing for the programme in that week’s *Radio Times* (Vol. CLXVI, no. 2153 (11 February 1965; for 13–19 February 1965), p. 34) was as follows: ‘What happens, and then what is the best policy, when a closed primitive society is wrenched open by encountering Western civilisation? In Papua, too, the question arises between Plato and Popper, the closed and the open society: a complicated question.’
the Gulf Division of Papua connects with the thought of Plato, of Popper, and other social theorists.

In 1919, Mr F. E. Williams was assistant government anthropologist in Papua. Colonial administrations have often given encouragement to anthropologists, partly from a disinterested curiosity about local antiquities and customs, partly because they have hoped for information and advice about the effects of their policies. Also in 1919, Mr J. H. P. (later Sir Herbert) Murray was Lieutenant-Governor of Papua. Sir Herbert was the brother of Professor Gilbert Murray the Greek scholar, whose anthropological interests owed much to that connection. He knew his Plato. His brother had to deal with 'the Vailala madness'. A further Murray, Mr G. H. Murray—Murray is a great name there—was Acting Resident Magistrate. It is from an official report by Mr G. H. Murray that I introduce that 'madness', 'the Vailala madness'. Murray writes:

10th September, 1919. Mr —— visited the Government Station on the evening of the 9th September to report extraordinary conduct on the part of the natives from Keuru to Vailala. According to him, the natives were saying that the spirits of their ancestors had appeared to several in the villages and told them that all flour, rice, tobacco and other trade belonged to the New Guinea people, and that the white man had no right whatever to these goods; in a short time all the white men were to be driven away, and then everything would be in the hands of the natives; a large ship was also shortly to appear bringing back the spirits of their departed relatives with quantities of cargo, and all the villages were to make ready to receive them. Platforms were being erected in the villages, and these were being loaded up with presents. Bosses, or big men, were appointed, presumably self-appointed, who seemed to be acting as masters of ceremony in these preparations, and making the other natives 'fall in' with a pretence of drilling them and making them salute. (G. H. Murray 1923: 65)

Mr Murray further reported that the natives were erecting flags, explaining that they were for 'making Christmas' (ibid.: 66), and that he became suspicious that 'after all, there might be some hidden motives behind their Madness' (ibid.). He was afraid of subversion. He therefore began to make very careful enquiries, starting with a native called Hareha. In Murray's words this man, 'came forward very frightened, and after assuring him there was nothing to be alarmed about, as the Government were the friends of the natives, he was prevailed upon to talk' (ibid.). (I should add here that since, according to his own report, Mr Murray had that day already arrested a number of suspects, it is not entirely surprising that this informant was frightened.) He told Murray that his 'head has gone round', making him fall to the ground, and that the sky had opened and Jesus Christ had 'gone through his head'.

Another case, apparently typical of many, has been described by the government anthropologist in the following terms:
A young man, Karoa (of fine physique and appearance), was displeased because several others and myself had entered the ahea uvi [cult house] without consulting him. He poured forth a volume of gibberish which contained a good many Pidgin-English phrases, but was intelligible to nobody. When his harangue was finished he stood aside, stuttering and mumbling in the familiar manner suggestive of teeth-chattering; he made a few symmetrical gestures with both hands, but for the most part motioned with his right hand before his solar plexus as if encouraging his stomach to rise. (Williams 1923: 6-7)

(Here I may mention that a common pidgin English name for this condition was 'belly don't know', inspiration being held to start in the belly.) To continue with Williams’s report: ‘Meanwhile he heaved long sighs, and looked genuinely distracted. Finally he moved across to the flag-pole, and stamped round and round it, shouting such phrases as “Hurry up!”, “What’s-a-matter?”, “Come on boy!”’ (ibid.: 7).

In these extracts from reports, the main features of what have since become known in New Guinea and more widely as ‘cargo cults’ are already delineated. Those who follow such cults hold that by following certain religious and practical prescriptions, often directly contrary to their own customs and destructive of their own possessions, but also involving acting out some of the habits of Europeans, they will gain real integrity; and also (in the New Guinea cults) they would obtain the cargoes of consumer goods that had hitherto come primarily for their European rulers. In fact, as it has turned out, the spectacular displays of social giddiness which attracted most attention in ‘the Vailala madness’ seem to be more incidental than they then appeared. They provided the appearances of inspired leadership and purpose; but the central aim of the cults was the attempt to possess fully the attributes of European power and wealth, often in association with a reunion of the ancestral dead with the living. All in the past, present, and future would then be reconciled.

The rather different attitudes adopted towards ‘the Vailala madness’ by the government anthropologist on the one side, and the Lieutenant-Governor of the territory on the other, suggest the relevance of this behaviour to political philosophy. The anthropologist was intensely, sentimentally even, sympathetic towards the culture of the Papuans. Government, plantations, and missions had certainly undermined their original forms of society, art, and pleasure, leaving them still impoverished, dissociated, and in a state of permanent inferiority. The frequency with which European insults and commands appear in the speech and song of those under the influence of inspiration show the violence of the impression some of those Europeans had made. The anthropologist, then, pleading for the retention of most of the traditional way of life, wrote that ‘Whoever, in the name of philanthropy or of Christianity, would discourage them [i.e. the traditional ceremonies] is depriving the native of his best, and giving him in return some unappreciated material reforms and a smattering of strange religion—an exchange which leaves him poor indeed’ (ibid.: 63).
The official anthropologist (but you must remember it was in 1919) was particularly anxious that the government should suppress the leaders of the new cults, 'Automaniacs' as he calls them. He wrote:

These Automaniacs, I believe, hold the others in check. Whether they are sincere, or whether they are schemers, their power is a malign influence upon the villages: and before the ceremonies can burst into life again, this evil restraint will have to be removed.... If the Government officers, and the white men in general, made it their business to ridicule and discredit these men...then the Gulf Division would yet struggle back to life and health. (ibid.)

For those who appreciate the variety and satisfaction of traditional ways of life, and know the many forms of distress caused by thoughtless European contempt for local virtues and arts in many parts of the Empire, the anthropologist's solicitude is clearly right-minded and well-intentioned. Yet, in Melanesian terms, he stands in practice for conservatism and segregation. He adopts what has been called a 'functionalist' theory of human society—a theory which holds that social institutions are functionally interdependent. According to this theory at its more extreme, one change implies total change and hence, logically, the ultimate destruction of the whole traditional form of social life, which the anthropologist himself valued perhaps more than the local people themselves. In social anthropology the name of Malinowski is particularly associated with functionalist theories; and the revolution in social anthropology of which Dr Jarvie writes is partly the revolution initiated by Malinowski when he promised a true science of society based upon this approach. Dr Jarvie feels that the revolution has failed to produce the promised results, partly because it will not allow for the dynamic elements in society represented by 'the Vailala madness', and with some justification, even if he might have said so somewhat more briefly and with more real grasp of social anthropology today.

To return to practical attitudes towards 'the Vailala madness'. The Lieutenant-Governor's views, expressed in a memorandum to the government anthropologist, are less basically conservative in Melanesian terms than the anthropologist's: 'I think that these old customs must probably all die out sooner or later,' he wrote, '...still I do not think that we can do much good by direct efforts to bolster them up' (J. H. P. Murray 1923). He proposed to advise government officers to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards traditional custom. But as far as the leaders of the cults, the 'Automaniacs' were concerned, he was content merely to ensure that none of them should become village constables. If they practised sorcery, police action might then be taken against them on those grounds; but no action was to be taken, he said, that might be construed as implying government opposition to any form of Christianity.

It is clear from later studies of cargo cults—K. O. L. Burridge's book *Mambu* is a good example (see Burridge 1960)—that a central feature there is an effort and intention more-or-less conscious to break, or grow, out of the traditional tribal society, and really to enter the larger world which the native peoples shared with
the European rulers—but on painfully unequal terms for them. Many of the leaders of these movements were in fact men who had more experience of the world outside the village community, who had ‘adapted’ themselves more vigorously than their more homebound friends. They had felt, more than others, a tension between the local European sets of values and the Melanesian at that time. Burridge (ibid.: 247–8) says that:

The most significant theme in the Cargo [movement among the Kanaka] seems to be moral regeneration: the creation of a new man, the creation of new unities, the creation of a new society.... And both new man and new society are to be a true amalgam or synthesis, not a mixture of European and Kanaka forms and ideals.

If this is so, then the government anthropologist—though he may have been right in his admiration for the ancient ways of the Papuans, was advising a policy which would in effect have prevented them from entering the modern world as full members of it. The Lieutenant-Governor, on the other hand, was permissive to such a development.

And here that official anthropologist stood with Plato in his social theory and ideals. Professor Popper’s criticism of Plato refers to Plato’s hatred of the individual in politics, and his conviction of the evil of most social and political change. In this, Plato belongs to and advocates what Popper calls ‘the closed society and with it its creed that the tribe is everything and the individual nothing’ (Popper 1945: 166). Popper in fact much overestimates the conservatism of the so-called ‘primitive societies’, but it is probably true that the teaching of tribal elders, elevated to the level of a political philosophy, would express a fear of change. They seem to have done so in the referendum recently organized by Mr Ian Smith in Rhodesia, where his tribal chiefs have been represented as wishing to perpetuate the closed society, which he also thinks better for them. Those who in New Guinea and elsewhere have shown a great apparent concern to preserve traditional modes of life also looked with disfavour on attempts by ‘natives’, as they called them, to break out from the restrictions of tribal reserves into a world of real influence and power—the world of their erstwhile rulers. So in many cases, to preserve ‘the closed society’ is also to preserve old inequalities; for the dependence of Europeans on non-European labour is such as to make it impossible for native peoples to enjoy the advantages of the old unrecoverable days of tribal integrity and autonomy.

On the other side, with Governor Murray to some extent, and with leaders of cargo movements themselves—with Professor Popper’s ‘open’ against Plato’s ‘closed’ society—are those who are prepared to let the past die away and new social syntheses arise. A dialogue between these two reactions to a rapidly changing world goes on, of course, in the minds of many outside Papua today. Many people, like those of Vailala if without their dramatic symptoms, feel in themselves a tension between older and newer values. They know or sense themselves growing into a form of society which presents radically different problems of adaptation from that into which they were born. And in some cases, this disturbance has
produced, especially among young people, outbreaks of apparently mad destructiveness, such as occupied so much space in the press not very long ago.

Now in the cargo cults and allied movements of social protest or social adaptation, such destructiveness has also been a common feature. A very early report of cargo activity, dating back to 1894, reads as follows:

One man named Tokerua...made a great stir among the natives. He gave out that he had seen a ‘spirit’ in a large tree that told him to tell all the villagers to kill their pigs, burn their houses, and take to the highest peaks in the ranges, as a large wave was coming and would swamp the place for two or three months, and after that they would come down from the hills and they would live in comfort. He (Tokerua) was to form a new government and have a steamer of his own after the style of the ‘Merrie England’ [the governor’s yacht], only larger. The people quite believed him, and built their houses in the bush and killed 300 or 400 of their pigs. (Kennedy 1894: 71)

Such behaviour and beliefs may be paralleled among many groups, all over the world, who have believed in an imminent millennium. But that the actual destruction represents not only an act of faith in a millenarian prophecy but also a doing away with the symbols of the then closing tribal past, is shown by an outstanding feature of ‘the Vailala madness’. Amulets and other ancient religious symbols which might now make their owners rich were burnt wholesale, and ceremonies considered essential to the old way of life were totally proscribed. ‘It is with the utmost disappointment that one finds in village after village the devastation which this movement has caused’, wrote the government anthropologist (Williams 1923: 37). He continues (ibid.): ‘It seems nothing less than preposterous that old men, who have been brought up among the ceremonies, and who have taught their sons that their prime moral duty is to carry on the ceremonies, should of their own accord come to despise and abandon them.’

It is clear that in Vailala and other parts of New Guinea affected by such cults, the whole native population, young and old, shared to some extent a common reaction to European paternalism. The protest was against paternalism. Can it be partly this which in our own society sometimes produces behaviour in the young which horrifies the old, or those of the old who respect, and often for good reason, the old ceremonies, but old ceremonies which the young perhaps sense no longer to correspond with their needs? (Do they feel themselves excluded from, or just bored by, an ‘adult world of privilege and power’?)

Our commissions and enquiries into social affairs represent, surely, a rational attempt to grapple with social problems of rapid change. There is no one, in truth—nor is there any body of people—who really know in full the circumstances in which we are even now living. For some of the people of Vailala in 1919, such problems, pressing upon people not educated, spiritually, to cope with them, produced that ‘madness’. Is it possible that something of the sort happens to some of us today, trying to keep up with ‘the times’, without knowing what ‘the times’ really represent?
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'HIGH GODS' AMONG SOME NILOTIC PEOPLES

GODFREY LIENHARDT

The objects of this paper are three: (i) to suggest that the problem of 'High Gods', among the Nilotes at least, is largely a pseudo-problem, arising from the context of European thought in theology and anthropology and not from the material itself; (ii) to give an account of some of the religious conceptions of several Nilotic people with a view to demonstrating this point; and (iii) to suggest tentatively some of the lines upon which sociological comparison between these peoples might be made with a view to attaining a better understanding of the factors affecting the differences between some of their religious conceptions.

As is well known, the anthropological interpretation of 'primitive' religion up to (and probably including) our times has been affected by a debate between two philosophies, the one grounded in rationalism and the other in kinds of Christian theology. The principal tenets of the latter may be represented by a passage from More's *Utopia*, which is an account, based to some extent on the reports of travellers, of a 'natural' society uninformed by the Christian revelations:

*Editors' note:* Text of a paper given at a conference on 'The High God in Africa' held at the Institute of African Studies, University of Ife, Ibadan, Nigeria, in December 1964. (For an account of the conference, including comments on Lienhardt's paper, see Robin Horton, 'Conference: "The High God in Africa"', in *Odu: University of Ife Journal of African Studies*, Vol. II, no. 2 (January 1966), pp. 87-95.) Only very minor changes have been made to the copy of the text surviving in the author's papers, including those on it in the author's own hand. The footnotes and the references have been supplied.
The most and the wisest part, rejecting all these, believe that there is a certain godly power unknown, everlasting, incomprehensible, inexplicable, far above the capacity and reach of man's wit, dispersed throughout all the world, not in bigness, but in virtue and power.... To him alone they attribute the beginnings, the increasings, the proceedings, the changes, and the ends of all things...every one of them, whatsoever that is which he taketh for the chief god, thinketh it to be the very same nature to whose only divine might and majesty the sum and sovereignty of all things by the consent of all people is attributed and given. (More 1951 [1516]: 117–18)

The former, rationalistic view, is expressed by David Hume, in a passage I quote at length since it compresses and clearly expresses an interpretation which many anthropologists later developed more diffusely:

It is remarkable, that the principles of religion have a kind of flux and reflux in the human mind, and that men have a natural tendency to rise from idolatry to theism, and to sink again from theism into idolatry. The vulgar, that is, indeed, all mankind, a few excepted, being ignorant and uninstructed, never elevate their contemplation to the heavens, or penetrate by their disquisitions into the secret structure of vegetable or animal bodies; so far as to discover a supreme mind or original providence, which bestowed order on every part of nature. They consider these admirable works in a more confined and selfish view; and finding their own happiness and misery to depend on the secret influence and unforeseen concurrence of external objects, they regard, with perpetual attention, the unknown causes, which govern all these natural events, and distribute pleasure and pain, good and ill, by their powerful, but silent, operation. The unknown causes are still appealed to on every emergence; and in this general appearance or confused image, are the perpetual objects of human hopes and fears, wishes and apprehensions. By degrees, the active imagination of men, uneasy in this abstract conception of objects, about which it is incessantly employed, begins to render them more particular, and to clothe them in shapes more suitable to its natural comprehension. It represents them to be sensible, intelligent beings, like mankind; actuated by love and hatred, and flexible by gifts and entreaties, by prayers and sacrifices. Hence the origin of religion: And hence the origin of idolatry or polytheism. (Hume 1956 [1757]: 46–7; original emphasis)

As you will see, these views, in that both take the superiority of theism for granted, are not entirely opposed; but under the influence of the evolutionary philosophy of the nineteenth century, the disagreement between those who, like St Thomas More and in his Christian tradition, sought to establish the historical and religious primacy of theistic and even monotheistic ideas, and those who, like David Hume, argued that 'the vulgar and uninstructed' would tend towards polytheistic conceptions, became more absolute. I need not go into details; but as you will know there were many influential anthropologists who like Darwin himself could not believe that very 'primitive' people could have the 'superior' religious conceptions of the theistic religions; and there were those like Andrew Lang and,
most thoroughgoing, Pater Schmidt (with his powerful influence over missionary sources of information) who laboured to establish the primacy of primitive monotheism, which would be consistent with the Christian revelation.

Now my point in this introduction is simply this: that this debate (which must still have its influence upon us since we are still here discussing 'High Gods') is so obviously a European philosophical and theological debate, and little more, that it is surprising that it should have continued in various ways to affect anthropology. And that it has done so is largely explained by the fact that only a small fraction of our basic information about the facts of African belief has been unaffected by it. Many of our best reports have been by missionaries or anti-missionaries whose standard of relevance in collecting and presenting their material has derived, not from problems intrinsic to that material, but from disputes within the field of European philosophy and theology. If this conference does something finally to show the irrelevance of many such philosophical ideas for the organizing or understanding of the facts before us in the study of religion, it will have achieved something.

For some indication of what has happened to indispensable source material in the Nilotic field, by trying to fit it into an inappropriate framework of ideas—and also to give some direct evidence for the inappropriateness of that framework—I will quote one or two examples. Since the word will appear again, I had better mention now that one widespread word among the Nilotes which has been translated as 'God' or 'Spirit' is jwok, also juok or some recognizable variant of that sound. The first example comes from Mr Heasty, a missionary writing about jwok in the religion of the Shilluk of the Upper Nile:

He appears to be one, and yet he seems to be a plurality as well, and the native himself is puzzled.... He will say there is but one juok, and then he will say of one who has been extremely fortunate that his juok is very good, while he speaks of another who is less fortunate as having a bad or angry juok. The foreigner is spoken of as juok because of the marvellous things he does. He flies through the air, or makes a machine that talks, so he is a juok. (quoted in Seligman and Seligman 1932: 76; original ellipsis)

(Here I would interject that a subtle but important shift of meaning in translation occurs, since the language has neither definite nor indefinite articles in our sense. One cannot, therefore, strictly speaking talk of a jwok, though the sense of some expressions such as jwok tim, literally 'jwok wood' and jwok nam, literally 'jwok river', may seem to demand it.) To conclude the quotation: 'A badly wounded animal that is lost in the grass is juok, because it walked off dead and could not be found... Juok is the creator of mankind, and the Universe...but anything that the Shilluk cannot understand is juok' (ibid.; original ellipses). It seems to me clear enough here, as from my experience in Nilotic societies, that it is not so much the Shilluk who is puzzled by his own religion, as that a puzzle arises when he tries to fit it into a framework of questions deriving from the theological and philosophical assumptions mentioned earlier. This puzzle
arises also for Europeans. It permeates Pater Schmidt’s monumental and carefully documented *Der Ursprung der Gottesidee* (Schmidt 1912–55) of course; but also missionaries with the practical experience of Nilotic peoples which Pater Schmidt did not have, recognized the possibilities of error. Father Crazzolara, one of the most outstanding missionary ethnologists, wrote of the Acholi of Uganda:

It was...taken for granted that the generic term *jok* could not mean something independent from the many particular *jogi* [plural of *jok*] with their peculiar names. Based on such supposition natives were urged by tiresome questions...as to which *jok* among the many had created them. Such enquiries implied suppositions and questions which most probably had never occurred to their simple minds: it puzzled them, as they are still puzzled at such questions. With hesitation they answered...that they did not know, which was more nearly approaching truth but less satisfactory. (Crazzolara 1940: 135)

Let us take another example, again in reference to the Acholi. The distinguished Italian scholar Professor Boccassino wrote an article, published in 1939, describing the Supreme Being of the Acholi in terms which made it very closely comparable with the Christian conception of God (Boccassino 1939). This view was challenged by another writer experienced in Acholi matters, Mr A. C. A. Wright, who includes in his article a long note from Crazzolara, who mentions having met Professor Boccassino in Acholi country: ‘R. B. came to the, in my opinion, erroneous result as a consequence of his peculiar method of enquiry. His chief assistants during his stay among the Acooli were Christians, and his Acooli texts were written down by them’ (Crazzolara 1940: 136). The word used for the Supreme Being by the Acholi, probably under Christian and certainly Bantu influence, is the non-Nilotic term *Rubanga*. Crazzolara quotes an old Acholi *Christian convert* as saying: ‘The Acholi did not know *Lubanga*, they know *jok*. *Lubanga* means death, he kills people’ (ibid.).

Finally, in his work on the Shilluk, by far the fullest we have, Father Hofmayr emphasizes (no doubt rightly within that framework of thought and vocabulary) the monotheistic strain in Shilluk religion rejecting ‘dualism’ and ‘polytheism’ (Hofmayr 1925); but his own evidence very fully bears out that if the Shilluk word *jwok* can be made, in missionary endeavour, to bear the meaning of the English word ‘God’, it is only by excluding very many of the associations of the Shilluk word. I do not deny, I may say, that when a people such as the Shilluk come to view their own religion in vaguely Christian theological categories, then that in itself is a religious phenomenon worthy of anthropological description and analysis. But I do think that the ends of social anthropology (and even ultimately

1. *Editors’ note:* In the original text Lienhardt mistakenly ascribes to Wright both Crazzolara’s meeting with Boccassino and his quotation from the Christian convert, missing the fact that these matters are dealt with in the long note from Crazzolara that Wright is quoting. These misascriptions have been corrected here.
perhaps of creative theology) are best served by seeing what sort of pattern the facts fit into, rather than by importing what anthropologists would call 'a model' from a different religion.

To turn now to some aspects of the religion of several Nilotic peoples. Let me say first that the Nilotes are ethnically, linguistically, and almost certainly historically a large group of peoples with more in common among themselves than with any other African peoples. Nobody who has studied any Nilotic people can fail to be struck by an underlying similarity between them and others, a similarity which must also strike students to whom they are known merely through the literature. The nature of this similarity is as yet not capable of clear definition, since it makes itself felt in such a multitude of details, but that it is there no competent student of Nilotic peoples will, I think, deny.

I must now give you some indication of the major similarities and differences between the Nilotic peoples, more particularly those I primarily consider in this paper—the Nuer, Dinka, Acholi, Anuak, and Shilluk. I shall consider these under the general headings of mode of livelihood and settlement pattern, political organization, and finally, religion.

The Nilotes all show marked traces of having originally been a predominantly pastoral people. All now are mixed farmers, but there is a distinct contrast between (to take only those I have mentioned) the cattle-rich, transhumant, Nuer and Dinka, and the rest, all of whom are primarily agriculturalists settled in permanent villages, in which the whole population remains, on the whole, for the complete year. Except for the Shilluk, who alone among these form a single nation, the effective political community traditionally was considerably larger among Dinka and Nuer than among the others.

All these Nilotes have patrilineal clans and lineages, though their importance politically varies much between one and another. In the case of the Dinka and Nuer, highly segmented lineage systems form the framework of tribal territorial organization. Among the Anuak, the really significant lineages are those which produce village chiefs and nobles, and form a nucleus for the politically distinct villages. Something similar is found among the Acholi, whilst the Shilluk have a royal clan distributed throughout the country, from which a nationally accepted 'divine king' is chosen. All the Nilotes, however, are essentially extremely democratic. Even the nation of the Shilluk is not a state with a highly developed administrative hierarchy like, say, those of the Interlacustrine Bantu. When Jwok (hereafter called Divinity) is spoken of as being 'high' therefore (as it is) that word does not have any of the connotations of height in a social hierarchy which it may have among other peoples, and indeed the word 'ahead', not 'high', would be normally used for social superiority.

Here—and it is a striking fact in itself—there are very marked differences as well as similarities which are germane to our theme. It is noteworthy, for example, that although what has been called 'ancestor worship' is a very minor aspect, if an aspect at all, of the religion of the pastoral Nilotes, it is present in the form of offerings to ancestors, especially in the noble families of the Anuak and Shilluk, and seems to be the dominant element in the religion of the Acholi—the
only group among these which has for long been in close contact with Bantu peoples. Totemic beliefs, present to a small extent among all, are centrally important only among the Dinka, where totemic cults form a major aspect of religious practice. All have a term which translated would literally be ‘Divinity High’ or ‘in the above’; but whereas with the pastoral Nilotes sacrifice and prayers are regularly and conspicuously offered to the ‘being’ with this name, among the others it looms far less large as an object of direct religious attention. Among the Shilluk, this ‘Divinity High’ is associated with and merged in the cult of the king’s ancestors, and of the spirit of the first king. Among the Anuak and, on convincing evidence, it would appear also among the Acholi, ‘Divinity High’ is less personified (if that be the right word) and is to a marked degree more otiose than among the others. I shall suggest later how this difference may be connected with some differences in the nature of the political community, mode of livelihood, and mythology of some of these peoples.

First though, how are we as anthropologists to view the ‘spirits’—I have myself preferred the word ‘divinities’ or ‘powers’—which for the Nilotes are active, ultra-human forces acting upon them? Both Professor Evans-Pritchard, in his book on Nuer Religion (Evans-Pritchard 1956), and I in mine on Dinka religion (Lienhardt 1961), saw that the facts could only be distorted, and analysis impeded, by regarding the Powers (as the Nilotes themselves perhaps do) as simply ‘spirits’ in the vague, older anthropological sense, peopling the Nilotic imagination. We saw also that while it would be possible to interpret many statements as indicating a basic tendency towards monotheism, in that the conception of ‘Divinity High’ in some cases seems in a general way to cover all manifestations of divinity (that is, it is the least specialized and specific of many related conceptions), monotheism, polytheism, and even henotheism were not terms we could very usefully or precisely use. We approached this problem, and came to similar conclusions, from different directions.

Professor Evans-Pritchard started with the least specialized concept kwoth—literally here ‘spirit’ but not strictly a spirit—and interpreted other more specialized and precise ‘spirits’ as refractions or manifestations of this concept in relation to particular distinct and different aspects of human experience. I started with the different forms of human experience—the experience of clanship, for example, or of diseases—and sought to show a correspondence between these and the Dinka Powers and divinities. I suggested then that what earlier anthropologists would have called ‘spirits’ might be better understood, from the point of view of those not believing in their objective existence, by regarding them as conceptions—‘images’. I called them—by which different complexes of human experience could be summed up in a single name, communicated about, and acted upon. I thought thus (and I think now) that from the anthropological point of view the ‘spirits’ of other peoples corresponded to the lived experience of those peoples in something of the same way as a concept corresponds to a range of direct perceptions. This is not to say, as some seem to have understood it to mean, that in the manner of Tylor I interpret the Nilotic spirits only, or even primarily, as explanatory con-
cepts, 'personified causes'. First, there is no way of proving that they do not objectively exist, and all of them, in just the way the Nilotes say. But they do not exist for the foreigner in that he is not affected by them as presences acting directly upon him. Hence the Nilotic account of them cannot be universalized, and is theological, not scientific. Secondly, by referring to 'images' of lived experience to try to analyse the meaning of these Nilotic religious concepts, I really mean that for one living fully as a Nilote, in his particular circumstances, the 'spirits' might well be mental images (in the ordinary sense of that word) formed from whole complexes of sensory and mental experience. And, although I shall not go further into this here, I think that this interpretation does not conflict with the Nilotes' own interpretation. It merely presents it on a different plane of intellectual and imaginative activity. And on this interpretation I suggested that 'Divinity High' was the least precise of many images of a similar kind.

With this in mind, we can now turn to some of the information about the image 'Divinity High' among these five peoples. I have said that among all it represents the most generalizing concept of its class. Even among the Nilotes for whom the high divinity is most otiose—the Anuak and the Acholi—and whose attention is primarily directed to divinity with other more specialized attributes, 'Divinity High' is not simply one among many equals of the same kind. But this, I suggest, is because the human experiences referred to it are themselves more universal and aspecific than those attributed to divinities with different qualifying objectives. These experiences tend to be those of creation and death in general, and those human conditions outside any technical control. It is true that among many, perhaps all, of these peoples, creation and birth, and certainly death, may also be attributed to other 'spiritual agencies'; but even so, in these cases the more specific agents are often closely connected with 'Divinity High'. Whatever other agents may be conceived of as the sources of special instances of creation or destruction, 'Divinity High' among the Nilotes is ultimately Creator and Destroyer, and (here it is more difficult for peoples with more developed dualistic theologies to grasp) this does not seem to involve, for the Nilotes, a conflict between two opposing principles. There is no evidence that thought is given to supposed relations of the separately named divinities among themselves, as in Christian teaching about God and the Devil, for example, and it is clear from much writing on the Nilotes that the missionaries found it particularly difficult to make such a distinction between 'good' and 'bad' divinities within the terms of the languages they were forced to use.

This, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Lienhardt 1961), is consistent with the fact that human experiences of such matters, for example, as birth and death, though different and in a sense opposed, are not in conflict. Even the major division of the world, between earth and sky, with which Nilotic attributions of sky or earth qualities to divinity and divinities are closely connected, is obviously not a conflict. What in some other religions, then, has been seen as a battle between forces of good and evil, life and death, light and darkness, and so forth, is not found among the Nilotes. And although there is much evidence among the Nuer
and Dinka particularly that there are occasions when Divinity with the attribute of height is represented as a father, a helper, a judge, the guardian of truth and the rest; these aspects are not as it were cut off from others to form together a single image of all forms of 'goodness', as they are in Christianity. The theological position of Nicolas of Cusa, 'God is the coincidence of opposites', for which he was charged with pantheism, is much nearer to the facts reported from Nilotic societies than any discussion of primitive monotheism and polytheism. It may be significant that his supporter was the scientist Bruno.2

But given among all these peoples the fact of such a conception of High Divinity, and given their comparability in many respects, the part played by that conception in their social lives varies from one to another in a very striking way. It is difficult to know what the significant variables in this respect are in a diffuse mass of information of very uneven quality, but some correlations may be suggested. Of the five peoples I have mentioned, only the Nuer and Dinka are transhumant pastoralists; only they have a large-scale political organization based upon a highly developed segmentary lineage system; and only they have nothing which could be called difference in rank. They also are the peoples who have the most highly developed religion of a High God, to whom sacrifice and prayers are regularly offered. It would appear, also, that though all Nilotes have some form of myth accounting for, or referring to, the division and distance between earth and sky, man and Divinity, a myth explaining this present division in terms of an original conjunction of earth and sky is of central significance and consistency only among Dinka and Nuer. This myth tells, to put it briefly, how sky and earth, Divinity and man, were once conjoined by a rope by means of which man had access to Divinity. There was no death, and a tiny portion of food sufficed the first man and woman for each day. Then the first woman (in the Dinka myth) pounded more grain than Divinity permitted, and he fled to his present distance from earth, and the rope connecting them was severed. The purpose of their prayer and sacrifice to Divinity is to restore that original closeness.

How different from this seems to be the far less developed cosmogonic myths of the other Nilotes here considered. The Anuak, who actually border the Nuer, provide the best example. Among the Anuak, the first man and woman were 'born' of Divinity, but he did not like them and gave them to Dog to throw away. Dog, however, gave them to Crow to suckle, and thus despite Divinity's wish, they grew up, with Dog as their friend. Further, in the Anuak story, Divinity really favoured the wild animals, and man received such strength as he has only by the trickery of Dog. The Anuak divinities one hears most of are associated with natural features. This story is not reported from the Acholi, but neither is any account of an original conjunction of man and Divinity. The point may also be worth making, for those influenced by Max Muller's idea that the notion of God

2. Editors' note: Nicholas of Cusa (1401–64) was a cardinal, theologian and influential philosopher. Giordano Bruno (c. 1548–1600) was a philosopher, astronomer and mathematician who became a Dominican at Naples.
comes from contemplating the sky, that the Anuak, with little emphasis on the sky divinity, have a much more developed interest in the stars and sky-phenomena than the Dinka, whose ‘Divinity High’ is literally ‘in the sky’ or ‘in the above’. The Shilluk present a rather different problem since their religion, unlike that of the others, is entirely, or almost entirely, centred around the cult of their kings, who are intermediaries between their people and divinity. Shilluk mythology thus seems to tell us little about divinity as such in relation to man; it is centred on the kings, and especially the first, who has become fused in thought with Jwok. He is spoken of as Jwok on earth.

And here, as far as the Nilotes I have been discussing are concerned, is a point which may be of some importance. The Anuak also have noble rulers but many, who are all theoretically equal, ruling over small villages, and who are themselves thought of as ‘spirit’ (jok) since their ancestor was himself a spirit. Among them, of the Nilotes of whom I have some experience, the notion of ‘Divinity High’ seems mostly to be one of an otiose being. The Acholi also live in relatively small political communities, with chiefs. I never saw a sacrifice of any kind in over a year among the Anuak. Although the literature is contradictory on this point, some of it at least suggests that the ‘Divinity High’ concept plays a relatively small part in Acholi religious thought and practice. The same seems to be true of the little segmentary states of the Alur of Uganda and the Congo (see Southall 1956).

The purpose of this paper has only been to find out whether conclusions which the Nilotic material would support have any bearing on those which might be reached from the study of other peoples in Africa. Divinity is most diversified in societies where either there is most diversification of rank, occupation etc., or where the effective moral and political community to which a person feels himself to belong is smallest. And the converse, whereas with Dinka, Nuer, and to some extent Shilluk, the first two acephalous and the last a ‘divine kingship’, people are conscious of belonging to a relatively large moral community (all Dinka, all Nuer, all Shilluk are morally unified in this way, but by different political arrangements), there ‘Divinity High’ plays a larger part in relation to other agencies of the same class. I suggest in fact that the relation of the size of the moral and political community to the extent of diversification of rank and role seems, among the Nilotes, to have a significant connection with the balance between unification and diversification of the divine. No rulers, or a single ruler, within a homogeneous population, seems to be consistent with emphasis upon height and unity in Divinity; the existence of many small and equal rulers among a whole people seems consistent with a more atomized set of conceptions of divinity.
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SIMPLER SOCIETIES IN AN INDUSTRIALIZED WORLD

GODFREY LIENHARDT

It would be easy to stress an obvious contrast between modern technological civilization with its great measure of control over environment, and those traditional societies whose simpler tools and techniques leave them more subject to natural forces. But from the beginning, I should like to try to avoid making this contrast too sharply. It would be misleading to think of all traditional societies as comprised in a single type—call it pre-industrial, primitive, or what you will—as against modern industrial society. For in the first place, there are great differences among traditional societies themselves with regard to their indigenous technological development—between the Eskimo, with their rich and varied assortment of tools and weapons, for example, and the Bushman of the Kalahari desert, whose material culture really is meagre in quantity and simple in design. Even here then, two technologically simpler peoples are equipped on very different scales to grapple with very harsh environments. And secondly, though our more-or-less uniform type of modern technology has spread almost throughout the world, it has

Editors' note: Text of a talk recorded for BBC Radio’s Third Network on Tuesday 6 April 1965 and broadcast on Monday 12 April 1965. Only very minor changes have been made to the copy of the text surviving in the author’s papers, including those on it in the author’s own hand. The note and references have been supplied. Acknowledgement is due to the BBC (Rights Archive) for permission to publish this material here. The talk was the second in the final group of thirteen talks in a series ‘concerned with social man in a changing environment’ and entitled ‘Man and his Environment’. The previous talk, given by Professor C. H. Waddington on Monday 5 April 1965, to which Lienhardt makes passing reference, was entitled ‘Man and his Future Environment’.
not spread evenly throughout any particular society. Hand cultivation, let us say, is still the means of subsistence for the parents and brothers of many who may be driving tractors or operating lathes. Hence arise many interesting problems in a society's relations to its environment, problems which can be properly understood only by studying them in all their differences of local detail.

In the first talk of this section of the series, Professor Waddington placed human societies in the context of other organized groupings of animals, all seeking survival in the habitat and with the resources at their disposal. But human societies differ in structure more than societies of other single animal species. Here we are no longer dealing with Man simply as a social animal, a creature belonging—in Professor Waddington's words—to 'any population in which the members are in some sort of organized relation with one another'. Now, we are considering socially differentiated communities, each conscious and proud of its own specifically human cultural inheritance, each not merely reacting to environmental circumstance, but making its own evaluation of it. For members of a human community do set a positive store by their own environment and their special modes of adaptation to it. After all, what seem necessary comforts to one type of community may be matters of indifference to another. So many traditional pleasures and accepted virtues—so much of the artistic and religious heritage of a society, for example—are bound up with its own particular culture and form of social organization, which turn partly on its response to its own environment.

It has often been thought that the hard life of many societies of nomadic herdsmen—the Bedouin Arabs, the Somali, the pastoral Nilotes of the Southern Sudan—might be alleviated by schemes designed to permit a more sedentary existence. This certainly is a prerequisite of a modern form of government, and hence probably of more effective participation in modern world affairs. But while many members of these societies may see the advantages of such a change—money, for example, is now necessary for them—they remain unhappy about its implications. They are morally committed to an uncentralized form of political organization, impatient of government. And this perpetuates and is nourished by a pastoral mode of life with its own particular choice of environmental possibilities, its own emphasis on cattle or camels. They enjoy their own way of life, as may be instanced from a short modern Somali poem. It is called 'The Best Dance' (see Andrzejewski and Lewis 1964: 144):

The best dance is the dance of the Eastern clans,
The best people are ourselves,
Of this I have always been sure.
The best wealth is camels,
The *duur* grass is the best fresh grazing,
The *dareemo* grass is the best hay,
Of this I have always been sure.

It is one of the problems presented by modern technological power that the way of life it makes possible, and to some degree inevitable, is more uniform than
the communities into which it is introduced as yet are, or wish themselves wholly to be. So though it is true that the extent to which any social group exploits its environmental possibilities depends in general upon its technological inventiveness, purely social values come to play a great part in determining the particular choice and use of natural resources. In the early days when the Plains Indians of America, whose lives had come to revolve round the hunting of buffalo, were urged to turn to an agricultural way of life, they had profound social objections to the irreligious act of tearing open the surface of the earth, regarded by them as a mother. And the Indians of British Columbia, well-known for their elaborate political and ceremonial organization, built a culture of considerable material wealth and comfort on fishing and collecting wild harvests, to the virtual exclusion of other potentialities of their country.

Physical environment, where little can be done to alter it, does of course have a great influence on the movements and groupings of populations. Where, as in the Southern Sudan during the dry season, only a few rivers continue to supply water and pastures, large populations are forced to converge on their banks. These large populations must accept some common values, if this concentration is not to result in total anarchy. On the other hand, in the wet season in the same part of the world, only a few ridges are left above the floods. The peoples are then forced to disperse into the isolation of small communities, each cut off from the rest by the floods and conducting its own affairs separately for many months. This seasonal rhythm of aggregation and dispersal, directly related to the environment, is consistent with the political organization and values of these societies. They are able on occasions, as in war, to build up into large united tribes; but these tribes have no permanent leadership, and are divided and subdivided into autonomous sections whose own local loyalties often bring them into mutual opposition.

Here environmental circumstances impose a certain pattern of distribution on the population, and naturally this is reflected in the political organization. But the connection is of a very general nature. The particular structure of any one of the tribes of this area could not be explained without considering other factors—historical and social factors—besides the environmental ones. And still less will habitat and economy together explain other social institutions—marriage rules, for example—for there is great variation in these, among peoples whose physical circumstances and mode of life are basically similar.

However straitly tied to the natural conditions of its habitat a society may be, then, its own social tradition emphasizes values and choices, a selective use of resources in relation to socially defined needs and ambitions grounded in sentiment and custom. The Lele of Kasai, in the Congo, fairly recently described in a book of that title by Dr Mary Douglas (1963), practise hand cultivation in a forest park environment. They live in village communities with a form of social organization depending in many ways on privileges accorded to those who are senior in age. As Dr Douglas shows, this involves a certain lack of co-operation, and even hostility, between different generations in the same village, while villages themselves were often in conflict. A state of insecurity prevailed, also reducing
agricultural productivity. The older men in these villages, despite all the prestige and deference accorded them, had little real authority; and the Lele were in fact more interested in the prestige of age than in economic prosperity. They were content therefore with a much poorer material way of life than other neighbouring societies living in comparable physical circumstances. Dr Douglas shows how many interrelated social institutions and values influenced the Lele’s refusal to use their environmental possibilities in what would seem to us a more rational way.

But also something more complex than social inertia, or even attachment to a customary way of life, is involved when we consider the uses of environment developed by any human society. The system of descent and inheritance among the Akan of Ghana, whereby property is inherited through the mother from her brother, results in many families having rights in scattered plots of land. At first sight, this would seem to be a source of inconvenience for the farmer, whereas the consolidation of single estates—which inheritance through the father would make possible—appears a more rational system. But apart from the traditional Akan regard for inheritance through the mother—bound up with many spiritual beliefs and values—the effect of this dispersal of properties was to widen every individual’s range of social contacts, and hence to connect Akan societies with one another. Purely ‘rational’ use of the environment may prevent the achievement of such social ends.

So much for the value set by traditional societies on the customs and beliefs intimately bound up with their own use of their own country. With modern technology, as I have said, a much more uniform and universal man-made environment becomes possible; and conflicts arise, between habits and values that societies are partly reluctant to relinquish and their material ambitions, which greater technological power might fulfil. Dr David Pocock, among others, has observed this in India, which has been rapidly industrializing since 1947.\footnote{Editors’ note: It is not known if Lienhardt had in mind here a particular book or article. Even with Professor Pocock’s assistance, however, it has not proved possible to supply one.} The traditional Indian rural family is agriculturally based, sharing its land and meeting expenses out of a common purse—the joint family, as it is called. When the pressure on land becomes too heavy, members are encouraged to seek employment in some industrial centre, and for a time they still contribute to and are helped from the family resources. But within a generation, with the difference in the cost of living between the town and the country, the townsman must have his own budget; it becomes apparent too that the industrial worker who lives apart from his family enjoys a higher standard of living than those who commute to and from the industrial centre and whose wages are immediately absorbed into the resources of the family on the land.

Choices then have to be made. In India, as in many other parts of the developing world, education is seen as a major avenue to self-betterment. Expenditure on education in the budget of a townsman can only be at the cost of the traditional, family-oriented expenditure. Further, a man who has raised his children in
an industrial town has still finally to face the expense of various traditional ceremonies. In the village he would be obliged to invite many people and spend, proportionately, much of his wealth. In the town he has not the facilities for this, nor have his relatives the time and money to travel. In this situation, some still perform the ceremonies in their own villages in the old way; others, taking advantage of practical difficulties, tend to opt out of the traditional system, and increasingly circumstances favour this latter choice. Those whose lives are governed by the factory siren and the shift system do not have the slack periods of minimum activity which the agricultural calendar provides, and in which ceremonies are performed. Here, then, the use of environment which industrialization has made possible radically affects, and must affect more and more, the form and values of the older social and family organization. And even where cleavages between urban and rural life are not so marked—where several small-scale industries employ workers nearer to the villages, in which they continue to live—the factory's time schedule begins to affect the farmer also, for he is often obliged to curtail ceremonies or hold them at untraditional times to suit the convenience of the industrial workers in his family.

And here perhaps we are able to learn from the simpler societies something about any society's relation to its environment—something which we might not so readily observe without having them for comparison. That is, that men's understanding of the passage and use of time is closely linked to their relation to their environment. Where a people are dependent for their livelihood upon the rhythm of the seasons, time is reckoned by what occupation is currently undertaken—spring is when we sow, autumn when we harvest, summer when we collect wild fruits, winter when we fish, and so on. Days, still less hours and minutes, are not significant units for work. And in such circumstances, there are naturally periods of greater and lesser activity, periods of plenty and periods of scarcity. Among several peoples of East Africa, for example, there is so little occupational variation between the two months at the height of the dry season that they are often not distinguished from one another by name. When the season demands it, people work hard and live frugally. But when food becomes plentiful and there is less necessary work to do, they give themselves to feasting and to ceremonial. The rhythm of the machine in our industrial civilization will not permit this, and those members of the simpler societies who become part of that world must also, and often with difficulty, become accustomed to the abstract system of time reckoning which it demands.

This different approach to the value of time does perhaps generally distinguish the simpler societies from our own. For both ways of life, the rhythm of work and play is decided by the way in which the environment is exploited; but for members of the simpler societies, that rhythm is more varied and its pace less uniform. And the price they have to pay for entering into the kinds of relations with the world which modern technology demands, and attaining the kind of advantages it seems to offer, is increasing conformity, conformity now no longer to the local, social demands of a small society in its specific habitat, but to a world society. We all
find it difficult to grasp the full implications of this change; but the more we try to work them out, the more consciously they are faced, the more intelligently we can try to adapt ourselves to them. It would be sad if simpler societies were merely in their turn to exchange their adaptation to a natural environment they could but feebly control, for adaptation to a machine-made environment which they can control still less.

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C. G. SELIGMAN AND ETHNOLOGY IN THE SUDAN

GODFREY LIENHARDT

Professor Fortes has asked me to speak about C. G. (and necessarily also B. Z.) Seligman and ethnology in the Sudan. My eligibility for this invitation is that as a pupil and friend of Professor Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, I first visited the Dinka of the Southern Sudan in 1947, when I had the opportunity of relating the Seligmans' reports to the realities observable some three decades or more after their pioneering journeys. Some aspects of that comparison I shall later very briefly mention. But also, although I never met Professor Seligman, I have other reasons for feeling that I have been at fairly close quarters with him.

For many years Miss Phyllis Puckle, who I am delighted to say has accompanied me here today, was secretary of the Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford; and for a happy number of those years I lived in a flat in her house. Miss Puckle, as many people here well know, was secretary and friend to the Seligmans for a longish time. Living at close quarters with her, I could not feel myself at any great distance from the Seligmans, more particularly because Brenda Seligman paid us very occasional visits. Miss Puckle will not, I hope, mind if I mention one of

Editors' note: Text of a talk given at the Seligman Centenary Symposium organized by the Royal Anthropological Institute and held at the London School of Economics and Political Science on 28 June 1973. (Among the other speakers were Paul Howell—to whom Lienhardt refers in passing below—and Raymond Firth, whose talk on 'Seligman's Contribution to Oceanic Anthropology' was published in Oceania (Vol. XLV, no. 4 (1975), pp. 272–82).) Only very minor changes have been made to the copy of the text surviving in the author's papers, including those on it in the author's own hand. The footnotes and the references have been supplied.
my memories of those visitations. It was Miss Puckle's habit, when a visit had been announced, to hide away gifts of, for example, Chinese celadon—gifts from the Seligmans. For Brenda might well, on seeing again, and in another setting, some choice piece, conclude that it had not really been a gift but a long-term loan, and ask for it back. (How fortunate, for the Royal Anthropological Institute, that she did not do so with the Benin ivory.) So although I did not meet C. G. Seligman, I had—and still have—a strong sense of Brenda's presence; and I must say that her immense interest in information from the Southern Sudan in the 1950s testified to a real feeling for it, for the most part represented perhaps in the Seligmans' writings, and also an abiding interest, more than merely scientific, in the ethnological knowledge of which the Sudan has since yielded so much.

At a meeting of the Association of Social Anthropologists in Oxford some considerable time ago, Brenda Seligman and I stayed up until nearly midnight in Halifax House—then a residential refuge for quiet lecturers—discussing the ethnology of the Southern Sudan. She was alive with observations and anecdotes: how, for example, when talking to the then king of the Shilluk she was treated with a regal, civil coldness until a praying mantis settled on her camera. This, she felt (how rightly I do not know), immediately broke through the royal reserve, since the praying mantis is an avatar of Nyikango, the first Shilluk king. In any case, her conversations that evening, carried on with me, a much younger person, with uncontrived intellectual equality, represented a combination of enthusiasm and scientific excitement—an intellectual raciness, one might almost call it—which I have always found exhilarating in the anthropological profession, and which my own teacher Evans-Pritchard had in such great measure.

At the end of the evening we went through the quiet house and I watched her arthritically climb the stairs to her room. At the top of the stairs she said good-night; and then, in a piercing voice which must have disturbed the sleep of many a more humdrum inhabitant, declared like an anthropological Juliet from a balcony: 'I have always been convinced that Nadel utterly failed to grasp the significance of the tessellated pavements of the Southern Nuba.' Could dramatic commitment—and of a kind not so obvious in the Seligmans' writings—go further?

I started to consider for this talk the number of papers which the Seligmans contributed to the study of Sudan ethnology, but decided that to try to deal with them all would be pointless. Those interested may consult the bibliography in the substantial Festschrift presented to C. G. Seligman in 1934 (see Anonymous 1934).

Editors' note: Lienhardt is referring here to the famous 'Seligman Ivory Mask from Benin' (see Fagg 1957). The mask was sold for $20,000 in September 1957 (or January 1958, accounts differ) to Nelson A. Rockefeller's Museum of Primitive Art in New York. It may now be seen in that city's Metropolitan Museum of Art. The $20,000 'was applied by Mrs B. Z. Seligman to an endowment fund at the Royal Anthropological Institute...in memory of her late husband' (Lienhardt 1958: 174; see also the inside front cover of Man, Vol. LXI (January 1961)). We understand from Jonathan Benthall, Director of the Royal Anthropological Institute, that this was the Institute's first major financial benefaction. The Seligman Fund is now part of the Institute's unrestricted capital endowment.
More interesting on this occasion are some of the contents of that volume, and the names of the editors who brought it together: E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Raymond Firth, Bronislaw Malinowski, and Isaac Schapera. In their preface, the editors wrote (and I apologize if, as is likely, other contributors to this symposium have referred or will refer to it):

No administrator or theoretical worker on the cultures of Africa could do without the *Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan*. Nor will anyone easily forget that [the book was] written in collaboration with his constant companion, Mrs Brenda Z. Seligman. The three volumes [they refer specifically to *The Melanesians of British New Guinea* and *The Veddas*] are the charter of Seligman's claim to be *primus inter pares* among the best field-workers of our times. As his pupils, the editors wish to express their profound indebtedness to Professor Seligman for the intellectual stimulus and personal kindness which he gives to all those who work with him. (Evans-Pritchard and others 1934b; see C. G. Seligman 1910; C. G. Seligman and B. Z. Seligman 1911, 1932)

Now, of course, contributors to presentation volumes are under no oath to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. I doubt (though two of them are here to remove that doubt if they so wish) if those four editors really thought of Seligman as a very great fieldworker. If they saw him as *primus inter pares*, they certainly had no intention that he should remain so for long. That charter, they must have felt, was mythical. And it would be wrong for me to omit here—as it would be wrong for me to dwell on it too—the fact that Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard has since that time drawn attention to many defects, by his own remarkable standards and those of most anthropologists today, in the Seligmans' fieldwork in the Sudan (see, for example, Evans-Pritchard 1971: 130, 150–74). Still, that very Festschrift does contain an article on Zande therapeutics, by Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard (1934), which foreshadows one of his most famous contributions, not only to the social anthropology of the Sudan, but to the social anthropology of all times, *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande* (Evans-Pritchard 1937). And that widely influential work, read with interest not only by anthropologists but by scholars as different as say, R. G. Collingwood and Michael Polanyi (see, for example, Collingwood 1938: 8 and Polanyi 1958: 287 ff.)—as, indeed, *Pagan Tribes*, was read by Arnold Toynbee (see, for example, Toynbee 1930: 313)—carries with it everywhere the name of C. G. Seligman, who wrote the Foreword—that Foreword with its opening sentence well-known at least to my anthropological contemporaries: ‘Dr Evans-Pritchard has given us good measure, pressed down and running over’ (Seligman 1937). And in his own Preface to that book, Evans-Pritchard wrote:

2. *Editors' note:* Lienhardt is referring to Raymond Firth and Isaac Schapera (Malinowski was dead and—according to Wendy James and others who were there—Evans-Pritchard was not present).
I studied anthropology under Professor C. G. Seligman, and it was at his suggestion that I continued the ethnological investigations made in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan by Mrs Seligman and himself. I owe much to both of them. They initiated me into my Sudan research, raised funds for my expeditions, and gave me constant assistance, advice, and friendship throughout my labours. I am further indebted to Professor Seligman for his kindness in writing a foreword to this book. (Evans-Pritchard 1937: vii)

Of those social anthropologists who have worked in the Sudan, the late Professor Nadel was encouraged primarily by the then Civil Secretary, Sir Douglas Newbold, as Dr Howell has mentioned. But there are many, many of us who have followed in Sir Edward’s footsteps (and therefore in those of the Seligmans) who must truthfully say that he, Evans-Pritchard, ‘initiated us into our Sudan research, raised funds for our expeditions, and gave us constant assistance, advice and encouragement throughout our labours’. (Perhaps, on reflection, not too much advice.) And here, ‘following in the footsteps’ is not a mere metaphor. In the Sudan, and especially in the Southern Sudan, you had to walk. And walking, I am convinced, brought one into more comradely contact with the peoples one was supposed to be studying (but actually trying to please, part of the time anyway) than would otherwise have been possible.

Most social anthropologists will accept that by now the Sudan is one of the best anthropologically documented of countries, not only in quantity but in quality. The knowledge which the Seligmans started, piecemeal, to acquire and present with some of the limitations of an intellectual climate now very different from our own, has been added to by many more anthropologists, administrators, and Sudanese nationals, and continues to be so. It is true that the inspiration for this has come very largely from Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, as indeed has the inspiration for much first-class work in other parts of the world. But C. G. Seligman in encouraging such a successor clearly saw what was needed there. The result has been not only a whole library of standard works on various peoples of the Sudan, which make them known (and, I find, make them liked and admired) far outside Africa, but a flourishing and scholarly Department of Social Anthropology in the University of Khartoum, for long built up by my friend and fellow-student of Evans-Pritchard’s, Professor Ian Cunnison. *Sudan Notes and Records* is, of course, acknowledged as having been for long one of the very finest journals of its kind in the world.

I should like to return for a moment to the contributions to Sudan ethnology made by Sudanese nationals. It would be absurd, of course, to suggest that the Seligmans had any direct influence on this, but at least they, and their successors did not turn those who have the greatest stake in the country against the subject. In the period of decolonization, it has been common and understandable, in parts of Africa, for African intellectuals themselves to resent anthropology as a servant of colonialism, or as a study rooted in deeply patronizing attitudes towards its victims. I can speak perhaps best from my own experience. In the several years I spent in the Sudan, I was never once asked for any collaboration by the govern-
ment. Indeed, I think some of my friends in the Sudan Political Service would have despised any attempt on my part to assimilate to their role. They wanted me to be out in the villages, not hanging around their bungalows drinking their small stocks of cold beer while they were at the office or on trek. Indeed, they themselves, or some of them, would often have preferred, I thought, an anthropologist’s existence to their own.

The result of this rapport between the people interested in Sudan society—colonialists, objectively speaking, though some of us in a sense certainly weren’t—has been, I think, a more sympathetic attitude among Sudanese themselves to social anthropology than is found in some other parts of Africa. A generation hence, there will be a quite considerable number of Sudanese anthropologists. Sudanese retain a great interest in the systematic presentation of their own cultures to the rest of the world. It gives me personally the greatest pleasure, for example, that in my own particular field within the Sudan my friend Dr Francis Deng Majok has published two excellent works on the Dinka (Deng 1971, 1972), with a third (on Dinka poetry) soon to follow (Deng 1973). And even now my friend and student Mr Natale Olwak Akolawin is engaged in research among his own people, the Shilluk, whom (it cannot be denied) the Seligmans did so much to make famous.3 (Famous not only amongst anthropologists either. Louis MacNeice came to cover the occasion of an election to the Professorship of Poetry in Oxford some years ago for the New Statesman and Nation. It was with some pleasure that I, as a Niloticist, read his article, since it began with a reference to the Shilluk (MacNeice 1961). To have got the Shilluk embroiled in such an election seemed to me to have put together two parts of our Oxford world, the one at home there, the other at home in the Sudan.)

So, just as there was no rivalry—indeed on the surface at least a kind of continuity between the Seligmans and Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, and between Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard and those of us who have followed him to the Sudan—so there seems to be no rivalry between Sudanese scholars and ourselves. It has always indeed been one of Sir Edward’s principles that the people who really know about themselves are the peoples themselves, and that theoretical constructs about them which are repudiated by those of them qualified to judge are useless. I think I can truly say of those of us who have worked in the Sudan that there has been a familial give-and-take so to speak, between ourselves and our Sudanese friends. For Seligman, in the manner of his time and upbringing, there certainly was of course a certain distance in this respect; but I think that he (like Miss Puckle, who has considerable experience of our African friends) would have welcomed the opportunity to talk in England, and with Sudanese people themselves, about customs and beliefs.

I have, it is true, once heard Sir Edward criticized by a Nuer. When I first arrived in Malakal I went to a small bookshop run, I think, by one of the

A Dinka assistant there asked me what I was doing, and I told him (since Evans-Pritchard's *The Nuer* was on the shelf) that I hoped to write such a book about the Dinka. He said, to my surprise and alarm, 'But that is a very bad book.' I said it was considered to be one of the very best studies of a Sudanese people, and asked him why he disagreed. 'Because,' he replied, 'he says our country is monotonous.'

And now finally to the Seligmans' *Pagan Tribes*. The copy I am referring to is inscribed as follows to Miss Puckle: 'In friendship & with all thanks, Sligs, Brenda'; and has, further, in Sir Edward's handwriting, 'Presented by Miss P. H. Puckle.'

1. *Editors' note*: Malakal is a town on the Nile in Southern Sudan.

5. *Editors' note*: This copy is still in the Tylor Library at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, University of Oxford (shelfmark G10.23b).

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TWO GREAT BRITISH SOCIAL ANTHROPOLOGISTS:
SIR JAMES FRAZER AND SIR EDWARD EVANS-Pritchard

GODFREY LIENHARDT

Social anthropology, in the course of this century, has behaved like some shops—Boots the Chemists, W. H. Smith & Son the newsagent and booksellers, for example. It has expanded, diversified, and shifted its alliances and boundaries, so that what it was first known for no longer indicates the range of commodities it stocks. But for what I have to say here it is enough to know that for both Sir James Frazer and Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, social anthropology was the study of peoples whose ideas, ways of life, and forms of society were more or less remote from those in which they themselves had been brought up. Frazer tried to understand such peoples by applying his imagination to written accounts by others; Evans-Pritchard did so, in the manner of modern anthropology, by going and living among them.

Editors' note: This text has been compiled from two typescript versions, on each of which there are deletions and additions in the author's hand. One version, entitled 'Sir James Frazer and Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard in British Social Anthropology', was prepared for a lecture in 1979 at the University of Frankfurt. That version begins: 'When Professor Kronenberg kindly asked me to speak here, I wanted to say something about Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard (E-P, as he was usually called), because Professor Kronenberg and I shared his friendship and his interests, particularly in the Sudan and in Nilotic Studies. But Evans-Pritchard, the most British of British social anthropologists, must be understood in a certain kind of British context; and I therefore chose my broad title, knowing very well that it represents themes far too complex to treat adequately in a mere hour or so.' The footnote and the references have been supplied.
Sir James Frazer was born in 1854 and died in 1941. He was thus already twenty-eight years old when Charles Darwin died, and twenty-nine when Karl Marx died. Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard, who was born in 1902 and died in 1973, was thirty-seven when Sigmund Freud died, and forty-nine when Ludwig Wittgenstein died. These are only a few intellectual markers to the period. The literary and artistic figures whose names are now common knowledge and who were for a time their contemporaries are almost innumerable.

Frazer and Evans-Pritchard, then, are important not only because between them they span the formative period of modern social anthropology: they spanned the period which shaped our intellectual interests today and they had their own parts in shaping them. And this was recognized in their lifetimes. They were loaded with academic honours. They were given knighthoods, two of the first three to be conferred on social anthropologists. (The first had been given to Sir Edward Tylor, known as the father of anthropology in Britain, who had a great influence on both of them.) Such recognition indicates not only respect for academic achievements; it is a mark of approval, in the eyes of a wider world than that of the universities, for contributions to Britain’s academic reputation. In its own way, it promotes the interests of the subject. And for Frazer and Evans-Pritchard, to promote the interests of social anthropology was also to promote the interests of distant peoples then often misunderstood, or worse, by powerful foreign governments. Their ways of doing so were indirect and literary, rather than political, but they may have been the more generally persuasive for that.

Some thirty years ago (in 1946), social anthropologists in Britain began to form an association, as a forum for discussion of their subject and as a guardian of its practical and theoretical integrity. At the time, its terms of admission were deliberately exclusive. It was called ‘The Association of Social Anthropologists of Great Britain and the Commonwealth’ and required that its members (with some few exceptions as foreign corresponding members) should have received most of their training in the British tradition of social anthropology. Frazer was dead by that time, and in any case in his later years he had little interest in younger followers. Evans-Pritchard was a founder member, as was his predecessor as Professor in Oxford, Radcliffe-Brown, who was its first President.

There are very many differences in character, background, and interests between Frazer and Evans-Pritchard; but they also had something in common in special ways which many prominent earlier members of the Association of Social Anthropologists of Great Britain and the Commonwealth did not share. Frazer and Evans-Pritchard were not only British; both also were members by birth and upbringing (whatever their more remote ancestry) of the comparatively comfortably off, privately educated, and socially influential British middle classes, from which, along with some of the aristocracy, came what others called ‘The Establishment’. From this class came members of the government, of the professions, the home and foreign service, the established church, and much of the then smaller, but socially more important, fellowship of the older universities. Evans-Pritchard writes of ‘The Establishment’ mockingly: ‘The “Establishment”, as we have now
learnt to call them, the few cultured, well-connected, influential and rich who really understand affairs and can control them with urbanity from behind the scenes. (I am not sure who they are now, though it appears that the Warden of my college is an ex-officio member) (Evans-Pritchard 1960a: 113). Mocking he may be, but the passage does not suggest that this was a circle from which he himself was quite excluded. Frazer, who was brought up in the less clearly stratified, more egalitarian society of Scotland, was in a rather different position from Evans-Pritchard (educated entirely at Winchester and Oxford) in relation to the British middle classes; nevertheless, they were both fully accepted as belonging by birth and upbringing to those classes, as many of their contemporaries in British social anthropology were not.

It has often been suggested that among the reasons for choosing anthropology as a career has been the social anthropologist’s sense of alienation from his own society, of dissatisfaction with its dominant assumptions and values, of not entirely ‘belonging’. In this regard, let us briefly consider the differences between Frazer and Evans-Pritchard on the one hand, and their two outstanding contemporaries, Tylor and Malinowski, on the other. Frazer and Evans-Pritchard proceeded from what were called ‘good schools’ to Cambridge and Oxford respectively, where they both became Fellows of two of the richest and most powerful colleges: Frazer at Trinity College, Cambridge, Evans-Pritchard at All Souls, Oxford. Tylor, brought up a Quaker, could not attend a school where attendance at chapel was compulsory (as it was at ‘good schools’), and he was debarred by university regulations from ever being a student at Oxford. Though not poor, he had for a time worked as a clerk in the family’s brass foundry, and when he eventually taught social anthropology in Oxford well-entrenched academic interests put many difficulties in his way. Malinowski was Polish, and though his social standing in his own country may have been high, he made his reputation in the then politically radical atmosphere of the London School of Economics and Political Science. Some of those he had influenced in London proceeded to posts in Oxford and Cambridge, but he himself had little contact with the older universities. In their world (perhaps in Oxford more particularly) he was accepted with strong if polite reservations, as a clever, exhibitionistic, controversial, iconoclastic, and by their standards somehow ungentlemanly, foreigner.

If then (as I think is partly true) social anthropology attracted people with some sense of not fully belonging to the dominant order of the society in which they lived, for Tylor and Malinowski—and many others—that partial alienation had an objective and even legal basis. They actually were not quite as equal as other higher British academics of comparable distinction. As a Quaker too, Tylor was in principle a pacifist, and as an alien Malinowski was allowed to go and study the Trobriand Islanders as an alternative to internment during the 1914-18 war. Personal reaction to such a situation is of course a matter of character and temperament; but I am inclined to think that in some social anthropologists it produced a certain social radicalism, different in kind from the social criticism of Frazer and Evans-Pritchard. Certainly Quakers played a part in the earlier days of
the subject out of all proportion to their numbers, as later did Jews and persons not wholly of British extraction; and some of its most determined and hostile opponents (as well as a few supporters) were the spokesmen of the Presbyterian Church of Scotland and the strongly established Church of England. The elders of the Church of Scotland drove the brilliant Semitic scholar, William Robertson Smith (to whom Frazer dedicated *The Golden Bough*), from his professorship in Aberdeen for heresy; and the Anglican theologians in Oxford more particularly put obstructions in Tylor's way. Frazer and Evans-Pritchard when young were members of these established Churches, and though they both changed their positions *vis-à-vis* them as they grew up, they still partly in a way belonged to them.

Evans-Pritchard, brought up in the Church of England, always retained a sympathetic feeling towards some features of it. He knew many of its hymns by heart (and later in life would sometimes sing snatches of them rather embarrassingly in random social contexts) and he was well-instructed in the Authorized Version of the Bible. Frazer was brought up in a devout Presbyterian household, and remembered the pious atmosphere of his childhood with affection and respect, even when later (and it would seem with some regret) he lost his faith. His prose is filled with echoes of the Authorized Version (which also influenced Evans-Pritchard's literary style), and he edited an anthology of passages from it (Frazer 1895). While not concealing his ultimate agnosticism, Frazer continued to attend church services all his life, and (like Evans-Pritchard) showed respect for religious ceremonial. (Lady Frazer once refused to relinquish their place in the Chapel of the Inner Temple to King George V and his courtiers.) This religious conformism of Frazer's seems to have been curiously underestimated or misunderstood by Evans-Pritchard himself, who tended to represent Frazer as a confirmed atheist, deliberately attempting to undermine revealed religion by showing that Christian practices and beliefs were paralleled in many totally non-Christian cultures. In fact, Frazer's writings never impeded his career, and they made a strong appeal to the more liberal and adventurous of the clergy. Evans-Pritchard, though to some extent temperamentally an anarchist, even a nihilist, and in youth holding views radical for his time, became a Catholic; and though this had in my opinion much less effect on his social anthropological work than some have thought, it certainly distinguished him (he represented himself in later life as a traditionalist) from almost all his contemporaries, for some of whom social anthropology itself was a faith and a way of life.

Religiously and socially, then, both Frazer and Evans-Pritchard belonged to the influential established order of the British society of their time, and this inevitably had some effect upon their anthropological outlook and interests. They were certainly critical of aspects of the social world in which they lived, but their criticisms, often oblique, came from a secure position within that world, and were based on standards and values which its other members could accept. Hence they moved with ease and were treated with respect in social circles when social anthropology itself might not have been much esteemed. (Among the many great names subscribing to a bibliography of Frazer's work were the Prime Ministers of
Frazer and Evans-Pritchard also had another British quality which was not so marked in some other prominent social anthropologists of their time: they set a high value on being 'gentlemen'. This is a very difficult term to explain (it is probably now outmoded), but for them it went with a kind of reticence, combined with intellectual and social self-assurance, which made the appearance of any competition seem vulgar. Frazer and Evans-Pritchard, both wishing to be known as basically modest geniuses, preferred not to be personally involved in the acrimonious quarrels which disfigure (or enliven) anthropological journals. They set great store by courtesy, even chivalry. 'Gentlemen' in this sense might be 'scholars'; but gentlemen were not 'intellectuals', and Frazer and Evans-Pritchard belonged to their class and kind in being somewhat suspicious of 'intellectuals'. Indeed, in their social world, 'intellectuals' tended to be regarded as foreign or full of foreign ideas, just as 'gentlemen', on the whole, only included foreigners in special individual circumstances. To say in English 'a foreign gentleman' almost always involves some ironical devaluation of the person. They might have partly subscribed to this view, expressed by an Etonian:

Now I am afraid that compared to foreign boys the average Eton boy, of my time at any rate, could only be described as ignorant. What is it then that sets the ignorant above the learned and gives them a repose and a dignity, which all the knowledge contained in the Encyclopaedia Britannica fails to do?...respect for its womankind. (Drage 1890: 17)

Or again:

It is of the utmost importance that those, who bring up the younger generation of the lower orders, should be before all things gentlemen, and I use the term in the highest sense. What is wanted there, as elsewhere for the young, is not a cram knowledge of all the 'osophies', the 'ologies', and the 'onomies', but a certain right as Aristotle calls it, a tone and a code of honour such as is obtained here [at Eton]. (ibid.: 25)

A very well-known English scholar once told me that Radcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard’s predecessor as Professor of Social Anthropology in Oxford, though not a scholar, was a gentleman (by some standards this might have to be qualified), and Evans-Pritchard was both, whereas Malinowski, though intellectually brilliant, was a cad. Evans-Pritchard tells how, early in his career, he asked several prominent anthropologists, who had themselves carried out fieldwork research, for advice on how to proceed. Professor Haddon of Cambridge (whom he admired) told him that one should always behave as a gentleman. Seligman, Evans-Pritchard maintained, told him to remember to take his quinine and keep off ‘local women’; Malinowski, perhaps typically, told him not to be a bloody fool (Evans-Pritchard
1973a: 1). Again, in his reminiscences, Evans-Pritchard writes about his begin­nings in anthropology:

I began to vary the tedium of the History School [at Oxford] by taking an interest in books like Tylor's *Primitive Culture* and Frazer's *The Golden Bough*. But there was here a snag. I did not want to become, I was going to say, just an intellectual. I wanted a life of adventure too, and fieldwork seemed to be the solution to combine both. (Evans-Pritchard 1973b: 18)

Here, the words 'I was going to say, just an intellectual' mildly disparage 'intellectuals', while suggesting that they are not intended to do so. We do not have such direct information about Frazer's attitudes, but his literary hero was Addison, whose writing Frazer very closely imitated; and especially in the character of Sir Roger de Coverley, a bluff, sporting English country gentleman, very suspicious of foreign ideas and foreign music, suspicious indeed of 'ideas' in general. We do know that Sigmund Freud, who admired Frazer, but was certainly a foreigner, an intellectual, and a man of ideas, was dismissed by Frazer simply as 'that creature Freud' (see Downie 1970: 21); and he wrote rather dismissively also of Poincaré, Einstein, and others as 'several scientific gentlemen' (see ibid.: 15; quoting Frazer 1926: 12, n.).

I have dwelt a little on these characteristics of Frazer and Evans-Pritchard because they have something to do with what may be interpreted as the insularity of some British social anthropology, and because they partly explain why neither of these great men produced an intellectual movement or expressly approved any school of interpretation. Frazer prided himself on not having done so; and Evans-Pritchard ignored, even despised, the dogmas and debates between the various 'isms'—functionalism, structuralism, Marxism, and so forth—which excited his contemporaries and live on in modern controversies: 'The theoretical conclusions will...be found to be implicit in an exact and detailed description', he wrote (Evans-Pritchard 1973a: 3). He is not really at home in that series of small books, the Fontana Modern Masters (see Douglas 1980), published in England to introduce 'the men who have changed and are changing the life and thought of our age' (Kermode 1970): Camus, Fanon, Guevara, Marcuse, Chomsky, Freud, Lukacs, McLuhan, Wittgenstein—even Lévi-Strauss, for although he respected Lévi-Strauss personally he was no more impressed or influenced by French structuralist thought than by British functionalism.

I have dwelt on the Britishness of Frazer and Evans-Pritchard, but here another very British situation arises: British they were, but English they certainly were not. This distinction is still important to the British who are not English, as for example demands for political devolution in the British Isles demonstrate. Evans-Pritchard was very conscious (indeed sometimes proud) of not being English, of being a Celt. He was part Welsh and part Irish, and would blame 'the English' for those features of British life he disliked. Frazer was a self-conscious and sentimental Scot. They had both accommodated themselves to the English middle class, but with deep reservations. ‘Some of my best friends are...’, they might have said.
At a gathering held in Frazer’s honour at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1927, his response to the speeches included the following:

The first time I ever invaded England was when I came from my native Glasgow to compete for a scholarship at Trinity. I had never crossed the border before, and I fear I was a very raw Scotchman indeed; I looked on every Englishman, I will not say as my natural enemy, but certainly as a foreigner and a stranger. (Frazer n.d. [1927]: 16).

But he adds in a British gentlemanly way:

Well, Bannockburn and Flodden are old stories now, but I sometimes think that one reason why Englishmen and Scotchmen are such good friends, is that they had such good fights before they shook hands and decided to fight side by side for the future, as no doubt they will do to the end of the story. (ibid.)

Very strictly speaking indeed, Frazer was not, by some English standards, a ‘gentleman’, since his father—a cultivated man—owned a retail chemist’s, and to ‘engage in trade’ was not by those standards gentlemanly. On the other hand, as Frazer’s biographer and long-suffering secretary R. A. Downie wrote, his mother ‘came of a family of well-to-do Glasgow merchants, several of whom owned estates near Glasgow. Among her ancestors were descendants both of the Stuarts and of Cromwell, and through her Sir James could claim remote kinship with the Earl of Crawford and Balcarres and with Sir Ian Hamilton’ (Downie 1940: 2). The Earl of Crawford in fact made a speech at the gathering in Frazer’s honour in 1927, in which he said, of Frazer’s having lived fifty years in England, that ‘on the whole he has become tolerably well acclimatised, but I suspect that he remains a Scotsman at heart’ (Crawford and Balcarres n.d. [1927]: 20).

A sense of belonging to peoples to some extent conquered and colonized by the English, sometimes jokingly patronized by them, informed Frazer’s and Evans-Pritchard’s attitudes towards the subject peoples of Empire. Indeed, in a lecture entitled ‘The Scope of Social Anthropology’, Frazer, intending to stir the consciences of his listeners on behalf of what he called ‘the lower races’, spoke as though the English, not the British, were the conquerors of Empire, regardless of the fact that so many colonial servants were Scottish:

We owe it to them, we owe it to ourselves, we owe it to posterity, who will require it at our hands, that we should describe them as they were before we found them, before they ever saw the English flag and heard, for good or evil, the English tongue. The voice of England speaks to her subject peoples in other accents than in the thunder of her guns. Peace has its triumphs as well as war: there are nobler trophies than captured flags and cannons. (Frazer 1908: 22; also 1913a: 176)
Here is the criticism of imperialism from within its own assumptions that I mentioned earlier. Similar attitudes are found in Evans-Pritchard. In his lecture ‘Religion and the Anthropologists’ he vigorously attacks rationalists, positivists, and other ideological enemies of religion as ‘crashing bores, smug and full of intellectual conceit’ (Evans-Pritchard 1960a: 114). (You will notice again the pejorative use of the word ‘intellectual’.) But then he changes his position and takes their side for a time against the representatives of the established order of the English middle classes, ‘the long-winded Gladstones’ (ibid.) as he calls them (his maternal grandfather was a great supporter of Gladstone):

I find the whole period [of Queen Victoria and King Edward VII]...exceedingly tedious; its interminable wars against the weak—Zulus, Ashanti, Benin, Afghans, Burmese, Egyptians, Sudanese and Boers—H. M. Stanley, Lord Randolph Churchill in South Africa, the Prince at Baden Baden...and for good measure, though of an earlier vintage, Dr Arnold at Rugby. (ibid.)

Not always just in his censure, he regarded Dr Arnold, the famous headmaster of Rugby School, a nursery of Empire, as representative of the sanctimonious side of British imperialism, which he particularly detested. At a conference on colonial administration in 1938, where the tone was rather high-minded and in places complacent and self-congratulatory, he spoke of the Southern Sudan as he might have spoken of Southern Ireland under the English:

To understand native feelings we have to bear in mind that the Southern Sudan was conquered by force and is ruled by force, the threat of force, and the memory of force. Natives do not pay taxes nor make roads from a sense of moral obligation, but because they are afraid of retaliation. The moral relations between natives and Government provide the most fundamental of administrative problems, for the natives have to integrate into their social system a political organization that has no moral value for them. (Evans-Pritchard 1938: 76)

In practice, Evans-Pritchard’s research was financed by the Sudan government at their invitation, and he was respected by administrators, and on good social terms with most of them, who came from similar backgrounds to his own. He could even be patronizing to some administrators—those whom Major Jarvis (1937: 117–21) humorously teased as ‘guaranteed cock angels’—feeling that there was something of the Boy Scout in their devotion to duty, exaggerating their belief in their simple, straightforward principles, their optimism and their muscular Christianity. But in relation to British officials, to missionaries, and certain other expatriate dwellers among the peoples studied by anthropologists, he told his students that if when abroad they could not get on with their own nationals they were unlikely to be able to get on with any others. He had little sympathy with colleagues who, because of political or social idealism, found themselves on bad terms with the government of the territories in which they worked (as Malinowski, Max Gluckman, and Reo Fortune most certainly had). Yet he was on the worst
possible terms with the governor of the province of the Sudan in which he worked, and outspoken when he felt criticism was inevitable. In relation to heavily colonized Kenya and its White settlers, for example, he wrote that 'it was hard to decide who were the more unpleasant, the officials or the settlers, both of whom were so loathed by the Africans that it was difficult for a white anthropologist to gain their confidence' (Evans-Pritchard 1973a: 11). Still again there is a certain ambivalence in his situation. Mr F. D. Corfield, once Governor of Upper Nile Province in the Sudan, who is mentioned in the acknowledgements to Evans-Pritchard’s book *The Nuer* as ‘*amico et condiscipulo meo* [my friend and fellow student]’ (Evans-Pritchard 1940: vii), was the author of the official government report on the Mau Mau rebellion in Kenya, a report which to some, even at that time, seemed to show considerable prejudice and misunderstanding.

I have said enough, I think, to show that since Frazer and Evans-Pritchard were British gentlemen and scholars, a certain intensity of commitment to purely intellectual questions, to a world of ideas and theories, was incompatible with their social upbringing. They distrusted new words and supposedly new concepts, the methodologies, the system-building of those of their colleagues who were most enthusiastic about ‘advancing the subject’. Partly, doubtless, this was a temperamental similarity, for though each had abundant self-confidence and self-assurance, as I have said, they both wished to appear as intellectually modest. In later life, when Evans-Pritchard had developed an exaggerated hostility to his predecessor Radcliffe-Brown (with whom he had seemed to be on friendly terms) he wrote of him: ‘Personally and in private urbane, he was inclined when talking to colleagues to combine arrogance with vanity. This can be done at Oxford, but only in the Oxford manner’ (Evans-Pritchard 1973b: 22–3). You will note here the sense of belonging to the established order to which I earlier referred; Radcliffe-Brown was a Cambridge man, and not a public schoolboy. Also Frazer’s and Evans-Pritchard’s education and upbringing inclined them to prefer a literary and historical approach to social anthropology, even sometimes a personal preference for imagination rather than for what they regarded as bloodless analysis. But at the same time, both were committed to ‘scientific’ procedures and ambitions, appearing to be so sometimes against their will, and taking no pleasure in the idea of reducing the living social world to patterns, laws, structures, statistics, and so on. They seem to have felt that the overriding importance of truth required that they should be ‘scientists’ in spite of themselves, but they had none of the evangelical optimism for a scientific future—for a time when we should be able to reduce the rich variety of social forms to a few classes of phenomena explicable by general laws and under sociological control—which inspired some of their colleagues. What J. B. Vickery observed about Frazer in his book, *The Literary Impact of the Golden Bough*, would be equally true of Evans-Pritchard, and I can think of no other British social anthropologist of their generations of whom it could so certainly be said:

the intellectual tradition that shaped Frazer encompassed two chief strains, one looking essentially to the future, the other to the past. The former was the source
of major advances in science, radical attitudes in politics, and positivistic philosophical principles. The latter, on the other hand, subsumed political conservatives, religious traditionalists, and historical antiquarians. Though diametrically opposed in beliefs and assumptions, the two nevertheless were not so violently hostile as they frequently were in Europe proper. This was largely because of a firmly ingrained moral attitude common to both, which cut across intellectual lines. (Vickery 1973: 6)

Both were, again, conservative in literary taste. Their sympathies and knowledge were confined on the whole to the established classics, and their taste in literature was basically that of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Britain. They had little understanding of, or liking for, modern literature or modern literary criticism. Vickery's book shows in astonishing detail how widely, on the other hand, modern authors and literary radicals made use of Frazer's writings. Evans-Pritchard does not attempt to deal with the vast themes of *The Golden Bough* which attracted poets and novelists to Frazer's writings; but by an irony that Evans-Pritchard himself enjoyed, his accounts of the thought of the Nuer and the Azande found their way into the discussions of modern philosophers for whose work he had little sympathy (see, for example, Polanyi 1958 and Winch 1964). Frazer wrote and published a small quantity of verse of his own, including a poem, 'June in Cambridge', expressing his feeling of being an exile from Scotland (see Frazer 1927: 439), of which these are the fourth and fifth stanzas:

I shall not feel the breezes,
I may not smell the sea
That breaks to-day in Scotland
On shores how dear to me!

I'm far away, dear Scotland,
A prisoner in the halls
Where sluggish Cam steals silent
By ancient English walls.

But with characteristic ambivalence, he also wrote about the supreme happiness of being at Trinity College, Cambridge (see, for example, his 'My Old Study'; ibid.: 441–2). There may well have been some difficulties there, though, since if Frazer was a gentleman his dramatic French wife was certainly not, in the English sense, a lady, and she made no secret of her hostility to the constriction, as she thought it, of Cambridge academic life.

Evans-Pritchard also wrote fragments of verse, and published some few translations (see, for example, Evans-Pritchard 1946, 1949). In later life he claimed that he would really have wished to be a poet or a novelist, and that a good novelist taught one more about human nature and society than any anthropologist. He took much more interest in developing the Oxford Library of African Literature, of
which he was an editor, than in the writings of any of his anthropological contemporaries.

Their literary and historical cast of mind, combined, it is not too fanciful to say, with the poetic temperament of the Celts and the Gaels, introduces a certain nostalgia, even pessimism, into their writings. In the first volume of his *The Belief in Immortality*, for example, Frazer appears to regret the replacing of the colourful errors of the past, with the cold scientific truths of the present:

> From one department of nature after another the gods are reluctantly or contemptuously dismissed and their provinces committed to the care of certain abstract ideas of others, atoms, molecules, and so forth, which, though just as imperceptible to human senses as their divine predecessors, are judged by prevailing opinion to discharge their duties with greater regularity and despatch, and are accordingly firmly installed on the vacant thrones amid the general applause of the more enlightened portion of mankind. Thus instead of being peopled with a noisy bustling crowd of full-blooded and picturesque deities, clothed in the graceful form and animated with the warm passions of humanity, the universe outside the narrow circle of our consciousness is now conceived as absolutely silent, colourless, and deserted. (Frazer 1913b: 20)

Evans-Pritchard, who earlier was for a time a leading exponent of the strictly scientific standing of social anthropology, and always insisted on the need for developing "theory", shows comparable sense of loss:

> It may be here that I should make a protest about anthropologists' books about peoples. A certain degree of abstraction is of course required, otherwise we could get nowhere, but is it really necessary to just make a book out of human beings? I find the usual account of field-research so boring as often to be unreadable—kinship systems, political systems, ritual systems, every sort of system, structure and function, but little flesh and blood. One seldom gets the impression that the anthropologist felt at one with the people about whom he writes. If this is romanticism and sentimentality I accept those terms. (Evans-Pritchard 1973a: 12)

The criticism is of course exaggerated; and Evans-Pritchard disliked the kind of anthropological writing which exploits the personality, exotic experience, feelings, and excogitations of the writer himself.

The often ambivalent attitude of Frazer and Evans-Pritchard to the attempt to introduce procedures of the natural sciences into the social sciences thus sets them apart from some of their best-known contemporaries. Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski in England, Durkheim and his followers in France, were tireless campaigners for the scientific status of the study of society—"a natural science of society" was what Radcliffe-Brown envisaged—and although enthusiasm for quite that approach has waned, some anthropologists in Britain today are still closer to forming a science of society than to the historical and humanistic approach which Frazer, and
Evans-Pritchard later on, desiderated. It is not surprising that Frazer probably still has more appeal for the general reader than any other anthropologist. Nevertheless, social anthropology in Britain has come somewhat nearer to history, literature, and philosophy than some of the founders of the Association of Social Anthropologists of the Commonwealth in 1946 would at that time have wished, and it is strange to remember now the shocked reactions of many of his contemporaries to Evans-Pritchard's public statements that social anthropology never could be a kind of natural science of society, but was a humanistic study, a kind of historiography (see, for example, Evans-Pritchard 1950, 1961).

I have said enough, I think, to suggest that Frazer and Evans-Pritchard, though typically British, were not in some ways typical of British social anthropologists as represented in their professional association. I have also suggested that though they had much in common they were also, intellectually, very different. I now turn, finally and briefly, to a great difference between them over a major interest they both shared—their interest in the problem (for it seemed a problem to educated Europeans of Frazer’s time) of ‘primitive mentality’. Evans-Pritchard’s reaction to Frazer’s interpretations, which had seemed convincing to many, is an important part of the history of British social anthropology. Today’s British social anthropologists do not find ‘primitive mentality’ a problem, or at least the same kind of problem; and when giving their exegeses of systems of thought they may now refer explicitly more to the French structuralists than to either Frazer or Evans-Pritchard. Nevertheless, the kind of debate which I now partly summarize lies in the background of much of their writing.

I have suggested that Frazer and Evans-Pritchard both wanted to live with the assumptions of their own class and kind, and yet to free themselves from them sufficiently for them to be able to understand the assumptions of others. What Frazer wrote in that part of *The Golden Bough* entitled ‘The Dying God’ might equally well have been written by Evans-Pritchard, except for the typically Frazerian prose:

> We should commit a grievous error were we to judge all men’s love of life by our own, and to assume that others cannot hold cheap what we count so dear. We shall never understand the long course of human history if we persist in measuring mankind in all ages and in all countries by the standard, perhaps excellent but certainly narrow, of the modern English middle class with their love of material comfort and ‘their passionate, absorbing, almost bloodthirsty clinging to life’. That class, of which I may say, in the words of Matthew Arnold, that I am myself a feeble unit, doubtless possesses many estimable qualities, but among them can hardly be reckoned the rare and delicate gift of historical imagination, the power of entering into the thoughts and feelings of men of other ages and countries, of conceiving that they may regulate their life by principles which do not square with ours, and may throw it away for objects which to us might seem ridiculously inadequate. (Frazer 1911a: 146)
It is this kind of criticism of, but accommodation to, the English middle class which, in part, made both Frazer and Evans-Pritchard into the kind of social anthropologists they were. For Frazer to speak of himself here as a member of the ‘English’ middle class is a matter, I think, of politeness: he clearly does not identify with it. Frazer aimed to do what all social anthropologists have wished to do since, that is, to enter into ways of thinking and living in some ways radically different from those which most people of his kind took for granted. But Frazer was not able to do so convincingly, partly because he neither knew the languages nor lived in the circumstances of those ‘savages’, as he called them, so he turned to introspection. It could only be done through fieldwork in the native language, a requisite which of course Malinowski probably first established in British social anthropology, which was proved invaluable by Evans-Pritchard and his contemporaries, and which made possible Evans-Pritchard’s critique of earlier attempts to interpret ‘primitive thought’.

Evans-Pritchard’s own writings on Frazer and Lévy-Bruhl are concerned, like those of Frazer himself, with what might be called ‘the problem of rationality’, of ‘our’ rationality and ‘theirs’. In view of some of what I have already said, it is notable that Evans-Pritchard calls his essay criticizing Frazer ‘The Intellectualist (English) Interpretation of Magic’ (Evans-Pritchard 1973c; first published as Evans-Pritchard 1933). His major objection to Frazer’s whole scheme of interpretation is that Frazer regards the magical thought and behaviour of his ‘primitive’ man as analogous to, and a very defective form of, the scientific thought and behaviour of educated Victorians like himself. By those standards, the savage is always trying to reason about cause and effect, but is too ignorant or infantile to reason correctly or to recognize false premises. Magic then, in Frazer’s own words, becomes ‘a spurious system of natural law as well as a fallacious guide of conduct; it is a false science as well as an abortive art’ (Frazer 1911b: 53). Evans-Pritchard on the other hand maintains that ‘the analogy which he [Frazer] draws between science and magic is unintelligible. He says that science and magic both visualize a uniform nature subject to invariable laws and that the scientist and the magician have a like psychological approach to nature’ (Evans-Pritchard 1973c: 136). On the contrary, says Evans-Pritchard, ‘it is clear from accounts of savages that they have no conception of nature as a system organized by laws and in any case the utilisation of magic to influence the course of nature is surely in direct opposition to the scientist’s conception of the universe’ (ibid.). (It is a point made by Durkheim when criticizing Tylor.) And he adds, with that sharp penetration

1. *Editors’ note*: It is unclear if Lienhardt had in mind here any particular passage from Durkheim’s writings. He elsewhere refers to Durkheim’s rejection of Tylor’s ‘individualistic and intellectualist interpretations of symbolic activity—his idea, for example, that primitive man arrived at religious belief by faulty reasoning from effect to cause’, but again without making specific references to Durkheim’s writings (see Lienhardt 1969: 89). Durkheim’s criticisms of Tylor are to be found in the pages of the *Elementary Forms* (see, for example, Durkheim 1976: 49ff., 55ff.).
to the root of the matter characteristic of his best writing, ‘You cannot both believe in natural law and that you can delay the sun by placing a stone in the fork of a tree. If there are any regularities and uniformities of thought they are in the workings of magic and not of nature’ (ibid.). What Frazer has entirely missed out, Evans-Pritchard observes, is the specific ritual context of magical thought and behaviour. Frazer explained magical thought and behaviour by mistaken associations of ideas, false ‘laws’, one of which he called ‘The Law of Contact or Contagion’, the other ‘The Law of Similarity’. From the first ‘the magician infers that he can produce any effect he desires merely by imitating it: from the second he infers that whatever he does to a material object will equally affect the person with whom the object was once in contact, whether it formed part of his body or not’ (Frazer 1911b: 52). But Evans-Pritchard (1973c: 140) rightly points out that ‘these associations are situational associations’ and ‘the association comes into being by the performance of a rite’ (ibid.). Thus, to take the common example of placing a stone in the fork of a tree with the intention of delaying the setting of the sun: Frazer’s ‘savages’, no more than Frazer himself, do not believe that all stones in themselves can influence the setting of the sun; that would be absurd, and Frazer’s way of representing their thoughts does, in the eyes of educated Europeans, make it seem absurd.

Evans-Pritchard on the other hand says ‘man endows a particular stone with a ritual quality by using it in a rite and for the duration of the rite’ (ibid.). Similarly, with another common practice, the throwing of water in the air with the intention of producing rain, no ‘savage’ supposes that whenever he throws water into the air it will produce rain. ‘He only thinks this’, Evans-Pritchard says,

when he throws water into the air during the performance of a rite to produce rain. Hence there is no mistaken association of ideas. The association between a certain quality in one thing and the same quality in another thing is a correct and universal association. It does not violate the laws of logic for it is a psychological process altogether outside their sphere. (ibid.: 140-41)

What he believes, then, is that rites can produce results (as have many educated Europeans), and the mimetic elements are simply ‘the manner in which the purpose of the rite is expressed’ (ibid.: 141). Somewhat paradoxically, Evans-Pritchard, by insisting that magical rites and beliefs are not intended to be ‘rational’, in the sense that empirical science is rational, asserts the rationality of the performers themselves. Frazer, by interpreting them as rational, but misguided, ignorant, and misinformed attempts at pseudo-scientific control of the world, makes the performers appear irrational, in that they consistently fail to realize that their procedures do not produce the results they intend. Says Frazer (1911a: 269), ‘after all, magical ceremonies are nothing but experiments which have failed, and which continue to be repeated merely because the operator is unaware of their failure’.

It is not of course only the conducting of original field-research which enabled Evans-Pritchard to question the Frazerian interpretations of primitive religion and magic which had satisfied most anthropologists in Britain until 1920 or so, and
which, I think, satisfy most of the general British public today. Evans-Pritchard also had a superior sensitivity and intelligence, a far stronger real sense of the ambiguities and ambivalences of human experience, and more personal knowledge of them. Frazer did indeed try to put himself in the position of his theoretical savage, and had no reason to doubt his ability to do so, for he received wide adulation for it. ‘More than once it has happened’, writes his biographer Downie, ‘when Sir James has been in conversation with Government Residents home from far-distant districts, or with missionaries from Central Africa, that these men, astonished by his insight, have exclaimed: “Why, you know my blacks better than I know them after twenty years’ residence among them!”’ (Downie 1940: 108).

This may well be true, but it demonstrates the limited understanding of those who said it, rather than the insight of Frazer. Evans-Pritchard’s writings place no such distance between the anthropological observer and the peoples he observes. Like Collingwood, the historian and philosopher who first saw the relevance of Evans-Pritchard’s studies to those of historians and others (see Collingwood 1938: 8), he saw his task as the recreation of the thought of others in the context of his own, very different, thought. What this involves is indeed a certain marginality, best expressed in Evans-Pritchard’s own words:

One enters into another culture and withdraws from it at the same time. One cannot really become a Zande or a Nuer or a Bedouin Arab, and the best compliment one can pay them is to remain apart from them in essentials. In any case one always remains oneself, inwardly a member of one’s own society and a sojourner in a strange land. Perhaps it would be better to say that one lives in two different worlds of thought at the same time, in categories and concepts and values which often cannot easily be reconciled. One becomes, at least temporarily, a sort of double marginal man, alienated from both worlds. (Evans-Pritchard 1973a: 3–4)

None of Frazer’s writing shows that he was capable of this kind of imaginative alienation, that he ever knew what it was like to act and think as though one believed something which one also knew one disbelieved. Evans-Pritchard was the kind of sceptical believer who became a great anthropologist by doing so. Frazer’s failing was that his way of reconciling his savages’ way of thinking with his own was all too easy, and it may be that this is why his interpretations have been so widely satisfying to general readers—they require from them the minimum of imaginative and intellectual effort.

The relationship between Frazer’s ideas and Evans-Pritchard’s on the subject of ‘primitive mentality’ has had a profound effect on the thought of British social anthropologists, and finally in discussing it I turn to the attitudes of both of them to the best-known writer on that subject of their time, the writer indeed who established the term ‘primitive mentality’, Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.

Frazer reviewed the translation of Lévy-Bruhl’s Primitive Mentality in 1923, before Evans-Pritchard had appeared on the anthropological scene but when he was beginning to read Tylor and Frazer. So when Evans-Pritchard was lecturing on Lévy-Bruhl in Cairo in the early 1930s, he may well have read that unsigned
review in the *Times Literary Supplement* published ten years earlier (Frazer 1923), though he may of course have come across it when it was published as part of a collection of Frazer’s occasional writings in 1931 (Frazer 1931). If so, he seems not to have taken account of it.

Evans-Pritchard’s work on Lévy-Bruhl is a long and rather tortuous essay. His interest was aroused because he was at that time working on his Azande material for the book *Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande*, and Lévy-Bruhl’s work had clearly suggested many ideas to him, some of them in plain contradiction of Lévy-Bruhl’s own thesis. Frazer’s writing on the subject, on the other hand, is a fairly brief review of one book and he had no research experience of his own against which to measure Lévy-Bruhl’s theories. Nevertheless, there is enough in the review to enable us to compare Frazer’s and Evans-Pritchard’s views.

Lévy-Bruhl maintained that primitive mentality was quite different from civilized mentality, in that it was what he called ‘prelogical’—that is, it did not, and did not attempt to, follow the logical procedures of civilized thought. It was mystically orientated, and conceived of the constant participation, at some mystical level, of phenomena in each other, phenomena which civilized thought kept distinct. So, for example, in primitive thought, a person has a mystical bond with his shadow, or with an animal which is his clan’s totem. Further, the thought of primitive peoples was circumscribed by what Lévy-Bruhl calls their ‘collective representations’—that is, those categories of thought and fundamental assumptions, found, we should now say, in all societies, which are so deeply ingrained in the mentality of the people that there would be, as it were, no intellectual position from which they could be questioned.

The idea of ‘collective representations’ has been one of the most illuminating contributions of Lévy-Bruhl’s in particular, and of the French school of the Année Sociologique in general. Evans-Pritchard singles this out and develops it; Frazer does not grasp its importance, thereby showing the lack of attention to the social conditioning of thought for which Evans-Pritchard criticized him. But Frazer is on the whole sympathetic towards Lévy-Bruhl, more so than many of the British social anthropologists of that time. (Malinowski, for example, gives a very crude summary of Lévy-Bruhl’s ideas in order to dismiss them; see Malinowski 1948 [1925]: 25 ff.) It is notable therefore that both Frazer and Evans-Pritchard were receptive to Lévy-Bruhl, and indeed to the thought of the French school in general, at times when such work had made little impression on British social anthropology. Evans-Pritchard, indeed, promoted a series of translations from the French, from which a great deal of subsequent British anthropological writing has been derivative (see, for example, Evans-Pritchard 1960b, 1964).

Frazer, of course, accepts up to a point the stereotypes about ‘savages’ of his time:

No doubt the savage in general is much less capable than the civilized man of reasoning on abstract questions; but the cause is not so much a defect in his logical apparatus as an incapacity of forming ideas that involve a high degree of abstraction. In that, as in many other respects, the savage adult is on an intellectual level
with the civilized child; the analogy between the two should never be forgotten. (Frazer 1923; also 1931: 417)

Evans-Pritchard would have regarded this as an indication that Frazer had misinterpreted the kind of problem which Lévy-Bruhl had set himself, and indeed it comes from the intellectual evolutionism which Evans-Pritchard himself did as much as anyone to discredit. In other ways, however, the criticisms of Lévy-Bruhl made by Frazer in 1923 and by Evans-Pritchard in 1933 have a basic similarity which, I would suggest, relates to some of the qualities they shared which I referred to earlier. Both of them saw clearly that Lévy-Bruhl’s writing raised what was to become one of the central implicit questions of later British anthropological writing—the question of who ‘we’ are, and who ‘they’ are, when contrasts between ‘our’ way of thinking and ‘their’ way of thinking are made. Frazer and Evans-Pritchard were both very well aware that the thought of educated middle-class England did not represent the thought of all English people, still less of the Scots and Welsh; and they both perceived that Lévy-Bruhl, who wrote as though he thought that only educated Europeans represented ‘civilization’, had appeared to blind himself to very obvious objections to his sharp dichotomy between ‘primitive’ and ‘civilized’ mentality. Here again the observations of Frazer are very similar to those of Evans-Pritchard: ‘Who are the “we” with whom anthropologists compare and contrast “savages”?’ they ask. For example, one of Lévy-Bruhl’s theses is that the logical laws of contradiction are ignored by savages; but so they are, say Frazer and Evans-Pritchard, amongst most of ‘us’. To quote Frazer:

And in regard to the law of contradiction, is it not directly violated by some of the highest doctrines of Christian, and especially Catholic, theology, which are yet accepted implicitly as true by millions of educated and intelligent men and women? Judged by this test, Pascal and Newton were ‘primitives’. Has not Pascal said that ‘Quand la parole de Dieu, qui est véritable, est fausse littéralement, elle est vraie spirituellement’? And is not this a perfect example of the method in which, according to Professor Lévy-Bruhl, the savage contrives to reconcile contradictory notions by virtue of what our author calls ‘the law of participation’? Hegel himself spent a world of energy in reconciling contradictions in ‘a higher unity’. Are we, therefore, to number Hegel also among the primitives? (Frazer 1923; also 1931: 416–17)

I could give more examples of similarities in the criticisms of Lévy-Bruhl made by Frazer and Evans-Pritchard, but they come basically from one similarity, a similarity in the kind of ‘Britishness’ that Frazer and Evans-Pritchard represent.
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ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE VIEW FROM AFAR

GODFREY LIENHARDT

When Peter Rivière asked me to fill in for him for this week, he suggested that I should discuss some modern trends in anthropology—particularly in America—represented by five books it has fallen to me to review for the *Times Literary Supplement* in the last few years (see Lienhardt 1985, 1988, 1989); perhaps because I had a grounding in literature and literary criticism, though that has only made me less sympathetic. First came two volumes of the ongoing 'History of Anthropology' series edited by George Stocking: *Observers Observed: Essays on Ethnographic Fieldwork* (Stocking (ed.) 1983) and *Functionalism Historicized: Essays on British Social Anthropology* (Stocking (ed.) 1984a); then came Clifford Geertz's *Works and Lives: The Anthropologist as Author* (Geertz 1988); and finally James Clifford's *The Predicament of Culture* (Clifford 1988).

Editors' note: Text of a talk given on 21 November 1989 in a course on 'Aspects of the Development of Anthropological Thought' organized by Peter Rivière for students at the Institute of Social Anthropology, University of Oxford. The title refers to that of a collection of essays by Lévi-Strauss published in 1985 (see References). In addition to referring to a number of well-known anthropologists, Lienhardt also makes reference to the writer, teacher, and literary critic William Empson (1906–1984) and to the literary and social critic F. R. Leavis (1895–1978). Lienhardt was a student of Leavis's at Cambridge and reviewed a number of books for Leavis's journal *Scrutiny*; hence Lienhardt's reference here to his 'grounding in literature and literary criticism'. Only very minor changes have been made to the copy of the text surviving in the author's papers, including those on it in the author's own hand. The footnote and the references have been supplied.
and Bernard McGrane's *Beyond Anthropology: Society and the Other* (McGrane 1989).

Of these authors, only Geertz, who is probably the most influential of American anthropologists, has any experience of actually doing anthropology. Stocking is a historian, and more or less admits that he and his students (of whom Clifford, also a historian by training, may well be one) turned their attention to the history of anthropology because they were getting short of more conventional historical fields to investigate for their D.Phils. He regards his research among social anthropologists in Britain as a kind of anthropological fieldwork, refers to them humorously in a tribal vocabulary and, rather against his principles as a historian when writing about his tribe, he can be somewhat coy about revealing his still living sources: 'Some professional gossip among critics of “structural functionalism” would have it that he [Radcliffe-Brown] did not really understand Durkheim; one disaffected disciple even remarked to me that Radcliffe-Brown, as a lower-middle-class Birmingham boy, could not really be expected to have read French' (Stocking 1984b: 106; original emphasis).

Like a fieldworker also, Stocking may bear scars from his anthropological travels. When he came to Oxford, he was so intent upon getting material from an informant, who happened to be Professor Evans-Pritchard, that as they were walking together down St Giles' he failed to notice a lamp-post, and we had to take him to a doctor to repair a gash in his head. Nevertheless, he persisted, and his own contributions to those volumes give one of the best, if disconnected, accounts of the development of British social anthropology, with a good grasp of the changes in theoretical orientations, and interesting details about the human and institutional relationships behind the scenes. He is interested in the distribution and source of academic power to hire and fire: Malinowski's determination to found a colony of functionalists in Oxford, for example, and appoint Raymond Firth as professorial viceroy. But nevertheless, this kind of history can produce a kind of paralysing self-consciousness, inhibiting perhaps the most reflective of younger anthropologists from writing lest they should appear to have ignored everything that has gone before. Hence endless 'footnotes' in the texts of American books written as D.Phils.—always looking over their shoulders and fearing to be caught out.

Nietzsche, to whose interest in the relationship between the individual and society, between individualism and socialism, these authors (along I may say with Radcliffe-Brown) make some reference, wrote an essay which they do not refer to, 'The Use and Abuse of History' (Nietzsche 1965 [1873]), in which he argued that an excess of history, then represented by David Strauss and German historicism, could corrupt lively intelligences. It could discourage some by leading them to think that everything they had to say had been said before in one way or another and that they themselves were mere epigone, the inferior successors of great men. It could flatter others to persuade themselves that they had better and juster ideas than those of their predecessors.
One of my own difficulties in welcoming any of these books with unqualified enthusiasm has been for somewhat similar reasons. Those anthropologists who have spent some time in the subject, and are in any case self-confident, can take in what suits them from very intelligent (with the possible exception of McGrane, whose Beyond Anthropology might perhaps better have been called ‘Just Beyond a Graduate Thesis’—though he may go further) and wide-ranging accounts they have given of their eclectic field, which lies somewhere between a cultural history of anthropology and anthropologists and a kind of anthropology of anthropologists, the ‘observers observed’ as Stocking has it. But on the other and obverse point made by Nietzsche, that too much knowledge of the history of anthropology can encourage every new generation to think itself intellectually and morally superior to any of its predecessors, Clifford (and McGrane) may have something to answer for. For them, no anthropologist can be trusted. Mao Zedong’s idea that the vitality of a really progressive society depends upon a condition of constant cultural revolution rather than evolution, a rejection of deadening ancestral traditions, has been put into practice, more or less politely, by anthropologists long before Mao was thought of. Audrey Richards, for example, experienced it, in her own way as she became an ancestor. When I wrote to her saying that her contribution (Richards 1969) on Malinowski to the ‘Founding Fathers’ series of essays was a useful and stimulating contribution to the teaching of the subject, she replied from Cambridge, where Leach was then a live wire: ‘How nice of you to admire my humble article. I am unused to praise, being generally regarded as a hum-drums old thing with a descriptive mind. Can I say worse?’ The critique of anthropology and anthropologists made by Clifford and his colleagues (which I must emphasize is in many ways thought-provoking and sensitive) is only the latest contribution to this endemic revolutionary ardour.

The received wisdom on earlier stages of our revolutionary crises is familiar to any students who have taken a course in the history of the subject. First came the unsystematic, often prejudiced and sometimes sensationalist accounts of ‘savages’ given by travellers, missionaries, and officials. Then came Tylor, that mole undermining the established order from within, and Frazer (I am referring particularly to Britain). Both, while influenced inevitably by Darwinian theories of evolution, argued for the psychic unity of mankind, which established that although some ‘races’ were lower and some higher in the evolutionary scale, their beliefs and customs could be paralleled among ourselves (especially among family gardeners, rustic villagers, and the remote people of Scotland); for indeed, as Darwin said on seeing the wild Tasmanians on the shore, ‘Such were our ancestors!’

Persuaded, particularly by Frazer, that it may be necessary for good and efficient government in the colonies that the governing powers should understand what their savage subjects were really like, colonial governments then came to fund the beginning of professional anthropological fieldwork. This on the whole showed that when one lived among them, savages properly understood were in many ways more like ourselves than had yet been thought, and that evolutionary theory applied to living societies was unscientific, a deplorable example of chauvinism
and ethnocentricity. Then came Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, both insisting that there was a specifically social and cultural anthropology, and that although social evolution might be a component of sociological theory about ‘primitive societies’ it must be kept distinct from biological evolution (‘up from the ape’ anthropology, as it might be called, after the title of a book by the eminent American physical anthropologist E. A. Hooton, a textbook in Cambridge when I was a student; see Hooton 1931). So came Malinowski’s general theory of social function, applicable to every society. Widely different social institutions were merely local formulations of answers to the need to socialize animal appetites, like eating or copulation. St Paul spoke of marriage in much the same way.

Rather different was Radcliffe-Brown’s belief in a ‘natural science of society’, of which he hoped to become the Newton. These two, first regarded as dangerous revolutionaries in their time, were deposed very soon after their deaths (Malinowski’s in 1942, Radcliffe-Brown’s in 1953). They had not found the kind of universal laws about human society which they had sought and promised. Much of what they wrote about ‘theory’ was dismissed as tautological commonplace, and pretentious at that. Evans-Pritchard successfully led a coup to establish social anthropology as a form of historiography, leaving Radcliffe-Brown’s followers (Adam Kuper, for example) to bandage their wounded as best as they could. Leach attacked on a different front, accusing Radcliffe-Brown (an admirer in fact of the anarchist Prince Kropotkin) and almost all of his own contemporaries of being conservative reactionaries, whose doctrines made no allowance for the obvious fact of social dynamics, the changing structure of societies from generation to generation. Evans-Pritchard, to his just and lasting annoyance, was represented as one such reactionary in The Political Systems of Highland Burma, where Leach suggested that the then remote and egalitarian Nuer pastoralists ought, if properly described, to have exhibited signs of the upward social mobility of some of the subjects of Burmese kingdoms, and that Evans-Pritchard should have sought the ‘maximization’ of their resources, political and economic, which Leach thought a central human characteristic (see Leach 1970).

Then, quietly at first, a foreign leader, Lévi-Strauss, built up a following among these warring British factions. Eventually reconciling Evans-Pritchard to having him share some of the battle-honours, he became for a time a widely acclaimed leader of the British avant-garde. On the principle of ‘if you can’t beat them, join them’—or perhaps rather, assimilate them—Lévi-Strauss was given an honorary D.Litt. at Oxford. Engineers, agriculturalists, and such other practical men, were asking (me, for example) what ‘structuralism’ was. They got some kind of answer in the Wolfson College Lectures on Structuralism, the first being given by Leach (on either the Virgin Birth or King Solomon, I can’t remember which; see Leach 1973).

There is, in fact, in relation to this succession of revolutionary crises, an interesting parallel between the view of British anthropology taken by Lévi-Strauss in a paper called ‘An Australian “Atom of Kinship”’—I guess it was written in the 1960s when Leach’s Rethinking Anthropology appeared (Leach 1961)—and a
passage in Geertz some 30 years later.1 The article appears in Lévi-Strauss’s collection of previously relatively inaccessible papers published in English under the title *The View from Afar* (Lévi-Strauss 1985: 63–72). It refers to one of Radcliffe-Brown’s ideas and his own that somewhere and sometime, given more and more rigorous scientific procedures, some anthropologist (himself perhaps) might split the social atom as physicists had done with the physical. Lévi-Strauss, viewing from not very far the British anthropological scene, wrote:

A new fashion has been spreading among our English-language colleagues as they repudiate all the achievements of our discipline, revile its founders and the scholars who succeeded them, and insist that it is necessary to ‘rethink’ anthropology from top to bottom, that nothing from its past remains valid. This rancour has been vented by turn on Frazer, Malinowski, Radcliffe-Brown, and several other anthropologists. (ibid.: 63)

He then goes on to defend Radcliffe-Brown’s contribution to the controversial study of Wikmunkan kinship; but ‘everybody must feel unwilling to enter the feverish atmosphere’ (as William Empson once wrote of F. R. Leavis in a letter responding to Leavis’s criticism; see Empson 1935: 65) of those Wikmunkan controversies, or indeed any such controversies about kinship.

At least the quotation brings me nearer to what I am supposed to be talking about. Clifford Geertz is (or was) the leading anthropologist to encourage the new movement, so to call it, of which James Clifford has now become the leader; among the tributes to Clifford’s enterprise on the dust-cover of *The Predicament of Culture* is this from Geertz: ‘Clifford is original and nearly unique. He is one of the few persons who connects history, literature and anthropology. He’s had an enormous impact because he provides a new perspective on the study of culture that would almost certainly not have been generated from within anthropology itself.’

I do not know when Geertz wrote this; but Geertz is not getting younger, and like Lévi-Strauss has also come to disapprove of some of the features of a younger generation of not so much anthropologists as *anthropologisants*—anthropological fellow-travellers up to a point, I suppose one might call them. In the last chapter of *Works and Lives* he surveys what he sees as the difficulties of doing anthropology in the modern world. (I may say without really digressing that he, like Clifford and his followers, thrive on representing the subject and all their readers as being in a state of acute crisis, anxiety and alienation. Clifford calls his predicament of culture ‘the predicament of ethnographic modernity’: ‘ethnographic because [we find ourselves] off centre among scattered traditions; modernity since

1. *Editors’ note:* From the acknowledgements in *The View from Afar* it seems that Lévi-Strauss’s paper ‘The Atom of Kinship’ was written in the mid-1970s, shortly before the death of T. G. H. Strehlow (in 1978), for whom it was written (Lévi-Strauss 1985: 299).
the condition of rootlessness and mobility [we confront] is an increasingly common fate' (Clifford 1988: 3).

Geertz writes as follows, having said that the certainties of the earlier period of Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, Lévi-Strauss, and Ruth Benedict 'now seem very far away':

What is at hand is a pervasive nervousness about the whole business of claiming to explain enigmatical others [that is, people from 'other cultures'] on the grounds that you have gone about with them in their native habitat or combed the writings of those who have. This nervousness brings on, in turn, various responses, variously excited: deconstructive attacks on canonical works, and on the very idea of canonicity as such. (Geertz 1988: 130–31)

(This is what Lévi-Strauss sharply rebuked.) And he continues: 'Ideologiekritik unmaskings of anthropological writings as the continuation of imperialism by other means; clarion calls to reflexivity, dialogue, heteroglossia, linguistic play, rhetorical self-consciousness, performative translation, verbatim recording, and first-person narrative as forms of cure' (ibid.: 131). To this he adds a footnote: 'For an interesting collection of the very good and the very bad, the knowledgeable and the pretentious, the truly original and the merely dazed, see now J. Clifford and G. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography' (ibid.: 131, n. 2; see Clifford and Marcus 1986).

But that dizzy-making prescription for curing a disease of anthropology, by allowing for every kind of self-consciousness, even the self-consciousness of very ignorant and silly selves, is what Clifford and Geertz themselves have presented us with, by assuming in the first place that we are all forever anxious, disorientated, and morbidly introspective. It may have something to do with taking their cultural bearings from intellectual life in New York. I have been to New York only once, when with Mary Douglas, Clifford Geertz, and other names known to the New York Review of Books I attended a lunch given to intellectuals by the Exxon Foundation, which showed some inclination to provide money to encourage the formation of an enlightened, well-informed, and politically sound way of forming public opinion. There was much talk of 'raising consciousness' and 'sharing insights'. It was a very nice lunch, with a little good wine; but I can imagine that if it had been followed by a long evening drinking in Greenwich Village with an intelligentsia, I should have been as fuddled by the morning with 'pervasive nervousness' as the anthropologists described in the passage from Geertz I have quoted above.

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IN MEMORY OF GODFREY LIENHARDT

APPRECIATIONS AND MEMOIRS

POEMS AND SONGS
A YEAR IN BAGHDAD


It was thirty-eight years ago that I met Godfrey as a teacher, and over the years he became a close friend. He went to Baghdad in 1955 to establish a department of anthropology and sociology at the College of Arts and Sciences, University of Baghdad. (Godfrey later told me that Evans-Pritchard was approached about going to Baghdad but recommended instead that Godfrey take up the appointment.) He was seconded from Oxford University to undertake this task with the help of the only Iraqi anthropologist at the time, Dr Shakir Mustafa Salim, who studied the Marsh Arabs and had been a student of Mary Douglas at University College London. At that time anthropology was a little-known subject and Godfrey was there to introduce and establish it as part of the curriculum.

The society in which Godfrey came to live was imbued with underlying political instability as a result of cultural, religious, and ethnic diversities, as well as from the pressure of Western countries to keep Iraq within their orbit and, in contrast, from nationalists who wanted the country to join other Arab countries in their fight against Western influence and colonialism. Godfrey became aware of these different currents and their repercussions on the state of the country. However, despite these problems there was order, a respect for the law, an air of prosperity, and an optimism about the future.

In the course of his stay in this complex society, Godfrey was able to meet a variety of people ranging from the king (through an introduction from Julian Pitt-Rivers), politicians, academics, and high-ranking civil servants, to ordinary people in the markets which he frequented. He wanted to understand the attitudes and values of the local people as well as to make friends.

I was among the first intake of nine students studying anthropology and sociology at the College of Arts. We were regarded as oddities. We were studying an unusual subject, taught by a strange Englishman at odd times of the day, and by an unusual method of instruction, the tutorial system. Moreover, we were constantly reminded as to our uncertain future career prospects; the common question was, 'What do we do with anthropology?' The nine students (including one woman) came from different backgrounds and regions of the country but we kept together because we were in a minority. Four of the students (including the female student) could not cope with the social and intellectual climate which prevailed during Godfrey's year, but the remaining five students enjoyed Godfrey's friendship and easy relationship with him. Normally a great distance was kept between staff and students, who were invited occasionally to very formal and boring tea-parties by some of their lecturers. But Godfrey used to invite us to drinks and introduce us to his circle of friends. He thought, rightly so, that the only way to get to know the students was to have drinks at home. He was always generous in his hospitality. However, it was reported to the Dean of the College
that Godfrey was corrupting the students by giving them alcoholic drinks at his home. Godfrey, as he informed me later, saw the Dean and explained to him that his parties were private, and soft drinks were available had the students wanted them; moreover, above all the students were old enough to make their own decisions. The authorities thought Godfrey was breaking the social code, but Godfrey saw these parties as a venue for sociability and making friends. No negative consequences followed, and we continued to see Godfrey at his home.

Godfrey used to teach us at an odd time, 4.00 p.m., when most people were having a rest. He chose this time in order that his lectures and seminars should not clash with those of other staff members who taught us other subjects. Moreover, his lectures and seminars often extended beyond the assigned time of one hour. He found this important as he was teaching a new subject which required patience; both in explaining the content and in delivering it in a language, English, which was difficult for students to follow. In particular, the tutorials were interesting and instructive, and less formal than lectures. The system instituted by Godfrey was contrary to the established method of instruction: learning by heart and no discussion with the lecturers. When Godfrey left, after a year in the College, the tutorials were, sadly, abolished. He always turned up to lectures and seminars well-dressed in a suit.

Unless there were justifiable reasons, nobody missed Godfrey’s classes. If a student interrupted Godfrey unnecessarily or disrupted the continuity of the teaching, then Godfrey reacted in a manner which made the student regret what he had done. The usual treatment would be an assignment to be discussed in class. No student wanted this and thus his lectures and seminars were, on the whole, trouble free. He taught about the Nilotic peoples of the Southern Sudan and particularly about the Nuer, their ecology and political system. The lectures and tutorials were interesting but daunting because we knew so little about other peoples and societies. He made comparisons between the Nilotes and the Marsh Arabs—their little inhabited islands, their interest in fishing, keeping cattle/buffaloes, blood feud, and the segmentary nature of their kinship and political systems. In the method and content of his course, which was radically different from other courses in anthropology and sociology taught at the College, Godfrey was a pioneer, and he was much respected for his contributions.

Godfrey lived first in a hotel and then with a British friend. But soon he moved to live in a small extension to a large house, with two rooms and a rooftop. This small extension was located in one of the exclusive areas of Baghdad which was inhabited by, on the whole, well-to-do people and well served with transport, shops etc. He was very pleased with the new accommodation and it became the centre of his social life; it was within a few minutes’ walk of the College of Sciences where he held his lectures and seminars. The extension was furnished by him, reflecting the style to which he was accustomed—simply but tastefully with local carpets and objects, and pictures. Fayyad, his manservant, was a Marsh Arab. He looked after Godfrey very well and he was protective of him. He even moved within Godfrey’s social circles—he became an indispensable member of the
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household. He was respected and trusted. Fayyad had a cousin who ran a taxi which Godfrey used whenever he needed to travel.

Godfrey used to frequent the Brazilian coffee-house and the Swiss café, located on Al-Rashid Street, which is the main street in Baghdad. The Brazilian coffee-house was a fashionable place to frequent and attracted artists, academics, writers, poets, journalists, expatriates etc. It served excellent coffee, ice-cream, cakes and other forms of patisserie, which were brought from the Swiss café located next door. Godfrey, like those who went there regularly, liked the Brazilian coffee-house because it was tastefully decorated, peaceful, with no radio or television, and it had foreign newspapers and magazines as well as local ones. It became a meeting-place for friends and colleagues. One used to see Godfrey there, and if there was nobody with him, then those students who knew him and happened to be there used to join him. The purpose was social and he and his expatriate friends did not mind the broken English of the students. As always, Godfrey was very sociable and showed interest in following events in the country, in the background of the students, their interests, and their reaction to learning anthropology. He always showed patience, kindness, and consideration to his students and was generous with both his time and his hospitality.

Another place Godfrey used to frequent was the Zia Hotel and Restaurant, a popular place located on the right bank of the River Tigris and frequented by the expatriate community as well as by well-to-do local people. He invariably remarked to me how much he enjoyed the views from the terrace of the hotel, the food, and having drinks with friends.

Soon Godfrey found an additional social circle which gave him an entry into the social circles of artists, writers, politicians, high-ranking civil servants, and expatriates. He used to join them at their regular meetings to discuss literary works, arts in general, cultural issues etc. Participation in these meeting was by invitation, and he informed me that he enjoyed these meetings and that they were instructive in that they were a good venue for understanding the thinking and attitudes of the educated class in Iraq as well as for dialogue between Iraqis and Europeans.

Godfrey was always an independent person and he had a sense of adventure: he took pleasure in a car journey (preferably off any motorway or major road) and there was a constant sense of exploration. Once he visited the Marsh Arabs in southern Iraq, travelling there in Fayyad’s cousin’s taxi. There were no hotels or restaurants in the Marshes and Godfrey had to take things as they came. By chance he met the resident doctor for the eastern Marshes and he stayed with him for a few days. He rented a small canoe and explored some parts of the Marshes and was entertained by the local tribal chiefs. He enjoyed his time there and often spoke with affection to me about some of the people whom he met. He also visited some archaeological sites and in particular Babylon; contrary to the romantic image of this civilization portrayed in books, he found it rather disappointing—a heap of rubble with a few high walls, as he described it.
He enjoyed visiting the local markets in Baghdad. In particular, on Sundays he used to take Fayyad to explore the delights of the biggest market in the country. It consisted of guilds (cloth, silversmiths and goldsmiths, grain, copper, carpets, fruit and vegetables, books etc.), with each guild occupying an assigned part of the market. Occupations were, on the whole, inherited and families occupied a particular shop for generations. Furniture and objects which he acquired from these markets were to be seen in his small extension. Some of these objects he brought with him back to Oxford.

While Godfrey was in Baghdad and enjoying himself and contributing to the educational system there, his brother Peter was in Kuwait, doing research. Peter came to visit Godfrey in Baghdad and they organized trips to some parts of the country. Later Godfrey met some of Peter’s friends from the Trucial States and likewise Peter met some of Godfrey’s friends from Iraq. These friends spoke with affection and respect about Godfrey and Peter. This friendship was reciprocated.

Peter died before the Gulf War but Godfrey was saddened by the invasion of Kuwait and the destruction that it caused to Kuwait and its people. At the same time he foresaw the consequences for Iraq. He followed the news with concern and he hoped that a settlement would be reached. But this was not to be. When the Gulf War broke out, he rang me up at 1.30 a.m. to tell me that the bombing of Iraq had started. He predicted that the Allied Forces would inflict a great deal of damage on Iraq. He did not care for the political authorities in Iraq or Kuwait, nor for the political leaders of the Allied forces. His concern and sympathy was for the ordinary people of both countries who would suffer greatly from the hostilities—as proved to be the case.

Godfrey’s one year in Baghdad was to have a deep impression on him. He spoke of his time there with affection and nostalgia. From time to time we would reminisce, and I will miss these occasions. Most importantly, all who knew him in this country and abroad will miss him as a teacher, friend, advisor, and distinguished anthropologist.

AHMED AL-SHAHI

YENAKAN


I am very happy to be here for this Celebration of the Life and Work of Godfrey Lienhardt. When he went to Sudan to research his thesis on divinity and experience in the religion of the Dinka I was a toddler: he didn’t know me and I didn’t know him. So the first time I met him was when I came to Britain in 1977. I met
him in the house of a friend, John Ryle. He welcomed me and, I remember, he said he had nothing to give me. But he offered me a pen, a biro pen. It was worth only about twenty pence, but in our tradition that gift has a meaning. I still cherish that pen and I still have that pen in my box now. It is one of my antiques. So, indeed, Godfrey has been a friend to my people and to the Sudanese people as a whole.

The study on which Godfrey Lienhardt embarked among the Dinka in the Sudan is not complete. The history of the Dinka people continues (we call it in Dinka yenakan, which means 'inconclusive'). I would therefore ask the University of Oxford, and this college especially, to continue to extend the hand of friendship to the peoples of that part of the world and to continue to support research in the area. We need people to continue to come here to further the work of Dr Lienhardt in this field.

In the meantime, we are all delighted to be here today to share in this celebration. Thank you very much.

STEPHEN MADUT BAAK

PRESENCE PERFECTED: TALKING TO GODFREY LIENHARDT

Except for the last one, the exchanges that follow took place between 1981 and 1991, and I have reconstructed them as close to verbatim as I can. For those who did not know Godfrey in person, I should like to recall his way of speaking. His articulation was cultivated and deliberate; this counteracted his natural tendency, in later life, to speak with a slight slur and at a slower speed. His modal speech tempo was adagio, but often enlivened with a sudden rallentando or accelerando. This gave him an immediate presence, no matter what else was on his mind. The vocal unity of the man, whether he was being snappy or pensive, was encapsulated in a voice whose dark sonority had an odd shine about it: the deeply guttural consonants and the largely nasal vowels were combined with a high-pitched tinkle of upper harmonics. This vocal grace, well-suited to the expression of feelings through irony, was entirely unconscious to him. To his friends, on the other hand, it was unmistakable. I always had to laugh when, phoning me up with, 'Hello Gerhard!', he thought it necessary to explain, 'It's Godfrey here.'

First encounter
Q. What time do the pubs close here? Same as in Ireland?
A. You're the anthropologist: sit down and find out!

On people in their places
Q. You seemed completely unapproachable after that first seminar I gave here.
A. All I remember of that seminar is thinking, ‘Who is this Irish communist with a German name?’
Q. That’s because you’re afraid of the Irish. Mind you, I would be, too, if I read the Telegraph every day and...
A. I do not read the Daily Telegraph every day; and if I did, I should have no need of a German communist to censor my reading. There is no need to be overbearing with me.

On ethnographic plausibility
Q. So you see, the Miri are translating the old Miri idea of divinity into Arabic and call it Allah, and they translate the new Islamic idea of Allah back into the old Miri idea of Massala. You see?
A. Do you believe this?
Q. Well obviously, I don’t; but the Miri do.
A. No, they do not.
Q. How can you say this? You’ve never seen a Miri in your life!
A. No, I haven’t; and nor do I need to. No one will ever translate one idea into another symmetrically. The symmetry of that translation reflects your own tidy mind; no matter what your notebooks say, you are imposing a symmetry that is preposterous.

On identity
Q. Did that kind of thing ever happen to you?
A. I’m not sure if it did or did not [chuckling]. At school, I was called ‘Fritz’ at times, since my father was Swiss, as you know. Even Peter called me ‘Fritz’ sometimes, though he was no less Swiss than I was. But then, I am indeed a burgher of the Canton of Zurich. Have you seen that wonderful document they sent me? I’m entitled to reside in the Canton of Zurich whenever I retire! Perhaps Peter and I will both go!

On the despicable
Q. Why don’t you like him?
A. He is...dishonest in a self-serving way. He has always made whatever use suited him of his personal past. In the end, of course, he will have to believe all the lies he has ever strewn out about himself. And I’m sure he does.

On confidentiality
Q. Would you mind keeping that to yourself?
A. I am so discreet, Gerhard, I can never even remember what it is I am being discreet about.

On power (1)
Q. You were cruel. You just used your verbal skills to put her down every time she spoke. It was...very cruel.
A. But whatever she said, it was all 'distasteful', as Peter would say, and stupid, too. What do you want me to do: nod benignly just because I am sitting in the College bar and people think 'old Godfrey is drunk again'?

Q. No. But couldn’t you just remember that other people have feelings, too, and that it hurts when you sting them?

A. Well, she was wrong, in public at least. I had to say, ‘Down, Towser, down!’, as John Beattie used to say to his dog. But I suppose I’d better invite her for lunch in College. Will you come along?

On ethnography and identity

Q. Don’t you know that feeling? I’d quite happily have stayed there in Miri. It was better than Belfast, and certainly better than Germany.

A. So you would have ‘become a Miri’ for the rest of your life?

Q. Yes. I thought that being a Miri was a better life than I’d ever had ‘at home’, in Germany or Belfast or, well...even here, to be honest.

A. I cannot know what you are lacking here, and nor shall I ask. I can only tell you this. I think I know who I would be if I were a Dinka. And I might well be proud of being a Dinka. But...I could never wish to become one.

On love (1)

Q. Would you have married her? If she hadn’t died?

A. She was the finest woman I have known. To marry her would have been...

Q. I don’t mean to...

A. She was quite certainly the only person I should have considered. She had that...fineness we were talking about; and since we speak of marriage, she was from a good family too.

On class

Q. You have this infatuation with country gentry and what you call 'good families' and, forgive me, all these bastards who got rich on the slave trade. I don’t get this at all!

A. There is no need for provocative language if you wish to ‘get this at all’. If you wish to find out, you should meet — whom I have known for thirty years. In fact, I would like you to meet him: he might enjoy a little provocation.

On love (2)

Q. You don’t mind I brought my boyfriend along to the pub, last time?

A. No, of course not. He was quite delightful! A bit shy, I thought?

Q. Well, he would be shy with you. He’s not used to academic conversation. But what did you make of him?

A. What do you talk about?

On power (2)

Q. Why didn’t you take the professorship then?
A. Even E-P couldn’t bear that All Souls club; and he was a parson’s son, so he should have been able to. And when I imagined life at All Souls, having lunch with all those pompous people, I thought, ‘Why?’

Q. Didn’t the power ever tempt you?
A. Power...! When Maurice Freedman died, I felt I might have to...but gratefully, that feeling went away again.

On exams
‘Read ethnographies for information; read novels for insight.’ Discuss.

On a reference
Q. Would you write me a reference for that job?
A. Yes, I will gladly, and for all the reasons I can think of, except that of prudence. I think that you might do better with a younger voice.

On music
Q. It’s amazing, the amount of literature you can quote from memory. Only with music, you seem to have none of Peter’s gifts?
A. Ma-de-moi-selle in the Family Way, la-da-di daa, di-daa.
Q. What’s that?
A. It’s a favourite of my father’s. He loved ‘English Music Hall’, as he called it. And if you need to know, I still do.

On beauty
Q. Is it out yet, the new paperback edition?
A. Yes, and they’ve taken the cover I asked them to take. You know, the drawing of the face of that young Dinka man I’ve had on the wall?
Q. That transcendental face?
A. I wouldn’t call it transcendental so much as translucent.

On the unageingly funny
Q. Isn’t that the same girl as...?
A [laughing out loud and struggling to speak while giggling]. Yes, who took my hand and said, ‘Come, uncle Godfrey: take me to the cellar and frighten me!’

On dying
Q. I phoned you after lunching in College, but you were out.
A. Yes, I wasn’t feeling well.
Q. What happened?
A. You know that bench just beyond the President’s house, opposite the playing fields? I went home from College, and as I was reaching the bench, I got the doux néant; and I sat down on the bench and thought, ‘Now let me die.’
Q. God! Godfrey?
A. But later I began to feel the cold, and I had to go home.
Q. And? Why didn’t you phone me then?
A. I had an omelette with Gentleman’s Relish.

On memory
Q. Did you hear about that wonderful feast we had at Wolfson, a year after you died, to celebrate you?
A. There was talk of that, and as you know, I left some money in my will for the wine. Was it good?
Q. It was the most astonishing occasion. Everyone loved everyone, simply because each of us had been a friend of Godfrey’s. People trusted each other at first sight, simply because you…. You should have been there!
A. I was, if you noticed. But what was that you said about my voice? I do hope you’re not going to make me sound ancestral!

GERD BAUMANN

BABES, BRAS, AND BUDGIES


My name is Paul Baxter. This afternoon I have been asked to talk about Godfrey’s earlier days. I first met Godfrey during the academic year 1946–7 when we were both students in Downing College, Cambridge. Peter Lienhardt, also a Downing man, and I attended tutorials together and Peter introduced me to his elder brother. We were all Leavisites who had chosen to go to Downing in order to become students of F. R. Leavis. Nowadays to assert that one was a follower of Leavis is almost like saying that you had the plague or, at the least, had been tainted by membership of a ranting cult; but, at that time, although admittedly sectarian, we felt ahead of our time, avant-garde, particular, and we were rather conceited about ourselves. Godfrey had already moved out of English and on to Social Anthropology but had not moved out of the influence of Leavis. Indeed I think that in many ways Godfrey was permanently influenced by Leavis, at any rate in directions in which it suited his own temperament to go. For example, his own loose tutorial style showed signs of his period under Leavis, whose tutorials were always more seminar than supervision. More deep were the intense concerns that they both shared for the subtleties and nuances of language and the relationships between language, society, and morality. This last did not appear on the surface so much but was, I think, integral to Godfrey’s perception of the world around him and his almost immediate smelling out of charlatanry. Words could be played with but not used carelessly. Godfrey acknowledged his debt to Queenie
and F. R. Leavis in his little Home University Library book *Social Anthropology* which is dedicated to them.

Godfrey completed Prelim. and Part One in English, with starred Firsts, before he went into the services. On his return he switched to Social Anthropology and Archaeology, as it then was. Godfrey was still a student in 1946 but he already had a reputation, at least within the ranks of the Leavisites and in Downing. He also had an easy, jocular relationship with both the Leavises, of whom I and most undergraduates stood in some awe. He was also treated with respect by our two postgraduate assistant teachers, Ian Doyle and Wilfred Mellors. Somehow Godfrey always had a little aura of respect around him. He already had a hard, bright, intensely accurate way with language so that you watched what you said, because he would pick you up if you were sloppy, and sometimes it was not pleasant when he did that. He left me feeling that I was plodding, but I was still encouraged by his friendship and his concern.

Godfrey was extremely mercurial and, even then, a provoker of innocent devilment, especially as a raconteur. He was serious when he was joking and joking when he was serious, which if you were slower than he was could be a little bewildering. For example, and after I had only met him a couple of times or so, he insisted that my wife and I had sold a photograph of our son to Cow & Gate (the baby milk manufacturers) to use on advertisement placards along the escalators at London Underground stations. For an earnest Leavisite that was an accusation of collusion, for advertisers were (and are) one of the main corrupters of the language. He laughed off our denials. Then I learned that he was also asserting that the formidably respectable wife of another of our coevals was posing for advertisements for big-busted bras, which were also displayed alongside the escalators!

In 1946–7 nine-tenths of the students were ex-service people and mostly male. I have been told that the college authorities had anticipated an influx of drunken ex-servicemen who would play hell with the place; but, in the event, we really were a very dull, grey cohort who just wanted to get down to our work, do our exams, and get the hell out of it. Everybody had had enough of enforced communal jollity and just wanted a quiet life. It must have been a tutor’s dream time. These days, the fiftieth anniversary of D-Day and such like are generating a miasma of nostalgia, but in 1946 the only military stories which ex-service students told were of cock-ups and confusions. Everyone had had enough of service ‘bullshit’.

Godfrey had a fund of anecdotal stories, but I can only recall one he told about his army days. He claimed, of all unlikely things, to have been appointed as his unit’s Motor Transport Officer, though he did not drive and hardly knew the difference between a spare wheel and a carburettor. But, as he said, because he had got his very good MT sergeant on his side that did not really matter; all he had to do was sign papers which were brought to him and say, ‘Carry on, Sergeant.’ All seemed to him to be going on quite well. The only difficulties he experienced derived from the unit being billeted in an old chicken farm where they
all had to bunk down in the chicken coops. The advantage of being an officer was that you only had to share a coop with another subaltern, and not live eight to a coop as the men did, though you still spent your time bent double scratching flea bites.

Then Godfrey had an unexplained run in with his commanding officer and was posted briskly to another unit. He took his rail warrant and went off. When he arrived at the little station at his new place he was met by a smart corporal driver, who saluted smartly and took him off to a beautiful country house and showed him into the anteroom of the officer’s mess. When Godfrey queried, ‘Shouldn’t I report to the adjutant?’ The corporal replied, ‘Don’t worry, Sir, the adjutant will come and see you.’ Godfrey said that he thought, ‘Really, this is marvellous. A unit in which the adjutant comes to see you rather than you reporting to the adjutant.’ Left alone in the anteroom he strolled over to look at the notice board, where the first thing that he read was a large notice which stated that officers must not remove cutlery from the mess. Which was odd. Then he read a series of others stating that no officer should ever leave the confines of the camp without permission, and such like. The penny dropped. He had been sent to a place for mentally disturbed officers. Immediately he realised that the very worst thing to do would be to say, ‘But I am all right!’, and that the best course would be to go along with events. The story continued with a few housekeeping-style details and then just stopped with, ‘Well, it was all right when I got used to it.’ It ended, as do so many African stories, with no ending, leaving the listener with questions to which he wants answers. There was no climax: the story just stopped. ‘So, well then, what happened?’ ‘Oh,’ he said, ‘I got a posting the following week.’ And that was that.

It now occurs to me, though of course it could not have crossed my mind at the time, that one of the reasons that Godfrey must have got on so well with Dinka was that he told stories like Africans tell stories. As many questions are raised as answered, and the missing bits of the story are as important as the bits which are told. The impact of the story depends on the experiences that the teller and the listener share, so that the ending is left partly open rather than coming to a denouement. The tale is a creative exchange and not just a narrative.

Godfrey’s roots and family in Dewsbury were important to him and he cared for them, like all things he held dear, conscientiously but never over-piously. He had been home to see his mother and, it must have been in the pub, I asked if he had had a pleasant time. ‘All right,’ he said, ‘but it was marred by a tragic accident.’ Well you have to say, ‘What?’ Godfrey then took about three-quarters of an hour to tell his tragic story. I am not allowed that long and could never tell it like Godfrey anyhow.

His mother had a pet budgerigar which was the comfort of her widowed years. She was used to letting the budgie out for a flight and then calling, ‘Tweet, tweet, tweet’, so that it would come and perch on her finger. This afternoon she let the budgie out and then went to the kitchen to make some tea. When she returned she called the bird but it did not come to her finger: ‘Where’s Charlie? Where’s
Charlie? She called it again and again but there was no response. So she got up to look for it in the kitchen and there in the chair from which she got up was the squashed budgie. His mother had sat on it.

We have much else to celebrate in addition to Godfrey’s contributions of fun and droll humour to our lives. Of his other contributions the following in particular strike me. First, as has already been said, Divinity and Experience is really one of the great books in our subject. It is one of the few, like Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic, which one can honestly urge on friends who are not anthropologists. Secondly, Godfrey always sought to connect his work, as he felt social anthropology should do, to established intellectual traditions. In a Leavisian sense he felt intellectual productions should continue as part of a ‘line’. In his very short Preface (signed also by Wilf Whiteley and E-P, but clearly by Godfrey) to the first volume of the Oxford Library of African Literature, Godfrey quotes from T. S. Eliot: ‘We shall often find only the best, but the most individual parts of his work may be those in which dead poets, his ancestors, assert their immortality most vigorously.’ Like Eliot he looked for strength in past achievements. Eliot was clearly a major influence on Godfrey and I would hold, despite the current bayings of the Sunday supplements, that Eliot was a nourishing source.

Thirdly, though similar, was his implicit insistence that our concerns should be for the traditional concerns of humanity: social anthropology is not a science. Godfrey was a regular dipper into Coleridge from whom he quotes as the epigraph to the chapter ‘Belief and Knowledge’ in his Social Anthropology. In so far as a sentence can do so it indicates what the aims of our discipline should be: ‘We have imprisoned our own conceptions, by the lines which we have drawn in order to exclude the conceptions of others.’ In the West we have imprisoned ourselves by holding others out. Godfrey’s life was devoted to penetrating those ‘lines’, which are the very opposite of Leavisian ‘lines’, and to opening up intellectual boundaries. We are glad for that. Thank you.

PAUL BAXTER

AN ENCOUNTER WITH GODFREY LIENHARDT

It was September 1975, our first visit to England. I was a research student in social anthropology at Cambridge University, preparing for field research in the Southern Sudan among a Nilotic-speaking people mentioned in the literature with the constant caveat, ‘little is known of them’. Cambridge would be useful, but Oxford was clearly the target we (my wife L’Ana and I) hoped to reach. From Cambridge I could set a plan for archival research, but as we unpacked our bags and moved into a small set of rooms at Churchill College, getting to Oxford and Godfrey was the real goal.
There was soon a first trip to Oxford by coach, a chance meeting with Rodney Needham, but no chance to meet Godfrey. I let him know of our disappointment. He responded in early October by writing: ‘I am sorry to have missed you when you were last in Oxford. I shall be here for the most part after term begins on 13th October and if you let me know when you will be in Oxford—preferably a week or two after the beginning of the term, I should be pleased to arrange a meeting.’ Another short letter and then his response of 20th October: ‘I shall be pleased to see you at 11 o’clock on the morning of 22nd December at this address. I shall be in the Common Room in the basement having coffee.’

And so he was. We drove from Cambridge in a rented Mini that Godfrey would not believe I knew how to drive. To convince him otherwise I drove him to his College so that he could attend to some details, en route to a pub (the name eludes me now) where we could talk in detail about anthropological research in the Southern Sudan. And soon there were four: Peter Lienhardt, Godfrey, L’Ana, and myself. I wasn’t accustomed to beer at noon, but ordered the same as Peter and Godfrey. Cigarettes were lit and when the beer was delivered, the conversation was also ignited. Said Godfrey, ‘So what do you want to do in my part of Africa?’ My response was interrupted by Peter asking, ‘Do you speak Arabic?’ ‘No,’ I replied, ‘but I had hopes of working on this at Cambridge.’ ‘Well,’ Peter continued, ‘then I don’t suppose you know how to write Arabic.’ No, I didn’t know that either. ‘Well, well,’ he replied, as he took a small pencil and piece of paper out of his jacket pocket. He drew a small dot, put down his pencil and said, as he pointed, ‘That means nothing in Arabic.’ Godfrey and Peter broke into deep laughter. ‘Consider this your first lesson in Arabic,’ Peter added.

A second round of bitters arrived. Godfrey squinted over the top of his glasses to ask, ‘Have you read Sudan Notes and Records in detail? I mean, have you read all the important things?’ ‘Well,’ I said, ‘I have read the whole thing up to 1972 and I thought I had a good grip on it.’ ‘Well, we’ll see about that,’ was his response. Then followed a probing inquiry about why, as an American, I wanted to do research in an area of the world that had once been under British domination, and a series of pointed questions about my knowledge of the real reasons for research in Southern Sudan. Next followed a prolonged interrogation (or so it seemed at the time: in retrospect it was more of an oral exam and defence) about my knowledge of Nilotic ethnography. My most vivid memory of this first encounter with Godfrey was his admonition, ‘You don’t really believe that Nuer have lineages, do you?’ Shortly after I began my response, Peter and Godfrey went off to have a pee.

When they were gone, I turned to L’Ana and said, ‘Who needs this colonial bullshit? Who do they think they are? Let’s get out of here now. I don’t need his approval to do research in the Southern Sudan.’ L’Ana wisely said to let it pass and see what it would lead to.

But when they returned, there was a palpable change of mood at the table where we were seated. Some light-hearted jokes were exchanged—a number in particular about recent efforts at Freudian interpretations of Nuer custom—after
which Godfrey turned to me and said, ‘Well John, you’ve passed your initiation. Let us meet at the Gardener’s Arms tonight for drinks.’ ‘But I’m not sure where that is,’ I replied. As he headed out from the pub and down the sidewalk, Godfrey called over his shoulder, ‘If you want to find the Atuot of the Southern Sudan, you ought to be able to find the Gardener’s Arms in Oxford.’ That evening we talked in great detail about our plans for research, how these overlapped with an Oxford history of Nilotic studies, and how Godfrey might be able to help toward these ends.

This initial encounter resulted in a number of invaluable lessons. Don’t presuppose that anyone who has an expressed interest in a matter has any knowledge of it. A master of sanza himself, Godfrey had offered a tutorial on how Nilotic peoples might respond to us. What Godfrey had really seemed to be saying was to let yourself be defined by local peoples before you seek a sense of their own definition.

When I stopped back in Oxford before leaving for Sudan, Godfrey and I spoke through the night at his flat in Bardwell Court. We shared a bottle of wine, but otherwise drank little. Near two o’clock in the morning he retreated to his study and read to me from his fieldnotes written while living with the Anuak in the early 1950s. The prose was astounding. To this point I had thought of fieldnotes as random, ungrammatical efforts to capture the details of an observed or described event. Godfrey’s text sounded like measured poetry; indeed, it was as compelling as his published work. One phrase made him pause, to recall in detail a memory of floating up the Nile on a steamer with Radcliffe-Brown, when Godfrey was still a very junior associate of the Institute at Oxford. Just as quickly his attention turned back to his fieldnotes, now with dawn approaching the Oxford sky. He said I would have success in fieldwork because I was a good listener, but reminded me of the Anuak aphorism, ‘If you see an approaching python on the way, you had better get it, because if you don’t, it will get you on the way back.’

Following that fieldwork, Godfrey agreed to read a copy of my doctoral dissertation and provide a written assessment for my Ph.D. committee. I had also sent him a copy of my first substantive essay from that research entitled ‘Ghosts, Ancestors and Individuals among the Atuot’. Godfrey approved of the dissertation. Of the article he replied, ‘I liked it a great deal, and I’m glad to see you didn’t leave anybody out.’

The probing wit, as his friends knew, was a constant reminder that Godfrey loved mystery. He loved irony and metaphor. And he loved those human inventions that made it possible to deal with each: faith, reason, and imagination. He never had an institutional responsibility to take an interest in my work. He did so only, I believe, in consequence of his passion for the peoples of Nilotic Africa. But my debt to him remains a presence with me.

JOHN W. BURTON
I first met Godfrey Lienhardt when he discovered me rifling through the contents of his pigeon-hole at the Institute. At least that’s how later, to tease me, he told others the story of our first meeting. As with all Godfrey’s stories, I suspect, there were some kernels of truth bound up in it. First, we did first encounter each other by the pigeon-holes at the Institute. It was the first Wednesday morning (i.e. coffee-morning) of the first term of my Diploma year and I think I rather took Godfrey aback by being so forward as to introduce myself to him. Secondly, one of the few (banal) anecdotes I had at my disposal with which to attempt to enter the lists of the conversational tourneys at the Gardener’s Arms was a story about how I had been interrogated by my Jesuit headmaster about the ethics of reading other people’s correspondence—before he invited me to read a letter he had just written to a Jesuit friend of the family telling him I had passed my 11+ (this was a day or two before the results were to be announced). I said it was banal. For some reason, however, the story stuck and would be referred to from time to time. Thirdly, in later years I would, at his request, rifle through the contents of his pigeon-hole so as to sort out the things worth taking to him at the pub at lunch-time.

Godfrey was a hero of mine well before I met him for the first time, or ever thought I might. *Divinity and Experience* was a central text of my undergraduate course on the anthropology of religion. I must have read it three or four times during my first degree; the eponymous Chapter Four a dozen times perhaps. It struck me then, and still strikes me now, as the profoundest of ethnographies. What sort of man I thought, as I prepared to move to Oxford, could reach such depth of understanding—and then communicate it so accessibly, and stylishly? Though not perfectly, it has to be said. This is perhaps not the place to criticize, but I do feel obliged to point out that the book’s scholarship is, or at least was, seriously flawed, and that it is due to me that the extraneous footnote 1 on page 65 that repeats footnote 1 on page 64 was removed for the paperback edition—a claim to fame of which I am absurdly proud. Godfrey claimed never to have noted the repeated footnote. He was well aware, however, of the infelicity on page 1 where he claims that ‘this study is orientated to the Western Dinka’. He rather liked that. The slip, of course, merely points up the precision of the rest of the text, indeed of all his prose.

As an undergraduate, I never dreamed I would even meet Godfrey, let alone that I would become his student; let alone become his friend; let alone visit Dinkaland; let alone write about him as I am doing now; let alone spend an uproariously funny Sunday afternoon full of roast lamb, beer, and red wine discussing with him and his brother which characters from life at the Institute most closely matched those in the Muppet show (it isn’t difficult to guess who we decided were Statler and Waldorf, the two old men in the theatre box wickedly criticizing everything that happened on stage, but I had better leave the job of making other matches to the reader); let alone that he would teach me (to my
wife's continuing embarrassment) how to stand up urgently and importantly whenever there is a public announcement for 'Mr Smith to go to Information immediately', or how to wave at nobody in particular in the crowd waiting for friends and relations to emerge from airport customs; let alone that he would tell me the most amazing stories about E-P and everyone else, or that I would be too drunk at the time to remember them the next morning; let alone that on a trip on a crowded train to London he would launch into a pretence, which he kept up for the full hour (and which I had to go along with) that I was a senior Oxford don on my way to advise the Foreign and Commonwealth Office on some important matter of the day—and that he was my minder!

This memoir is as much, if not more, about me than it is about Godfrey. I make no apology for that. The person I am today owes more than I can say to Godfrey. He has influenced my life more than anyone, other than my family—and as I write this I am less conscious of their influence. For a year or so after his death I would find myself heading to the pub (in body occasionally, in mind frequently) to tell him of some piece of news, some interesting happening, coincidence, or whatever. Still today a whole category of my thought processes might be labelled 'must tell Godfrey that'. It is as if he is present in my consciousness picking up on the bits and pieces that interest him.

A week before Godfrey gave his talk on BBC Radio on 'The Sacrificial Society', P. F. Strawson spoke (28 May 1960) on ‘The Meaning of “I”’. According to that week’s Radio Times, Strawson’s talk was to cover: ‘How do we distinguish and identify people? What do I mean when I refer to myself? Is it much easier than you might suppose to start a long line of illusion by misconceiving the uses of the personal pronouns and the illusions can be quite disastrous; Descartes, for example.’ When I discovered that Strawson had spoken on the radio on this subject a week before Godfrey gave his talk, I had one of those 'must tell Godfrey that' moments. As you will see, it amounts to little, but if I had been able to tell him about it it might have set off a chain of conversational thoughts and connections of some sort. That has always seemed to me to be the point of ‘only connect’, not that the connection itself is necessarily significant, but that it stimulates.

Anyway, the point of “The Meaning of “I”” is that some twenty-five years later Godfrey contributed to a series of lectures on ‘The Category of the Person’, held at Wolfson College. As I remember it, Godfrey spoke fairly late in the series after a number of philosophers and Indologists had had their say (for the point of the story, this has to have been so). Each week the regular attendees had been bombarded with Sanskrit, Hindu, Buddhist, and Chinese terms, many of which had been inscribed upon the whiteboard to help the non-specialists in the audience keep their bearings. As usual when speaking in public, Godfrey was surprisingly nervous to begin with, though this didn’t last long. ‘Before I begin,’ he said, ‘I had better write up on the board a word I am going to be using a lot this evening.’ He then drew a single straight line down the board. With one stroke of his marker pen, he gently poked fun at the previous speakers, broke the ice, relaxed his audience, and got straight to the heart of the matter. This was something he
always seemed to be able to do. Even after seemingly sleeping through a Friday afternoon departmental seminar (as many of us should have liked to have done), he would ask the most penetrating—frequently down-to-earth—question.

The inscription of that 'I' on that whiteboard that evening somehow epitomizes Godfrey for me: witty, wicked even, to the point, down-to-earth, entertaining. It may also be used here for Godfrey's own extraordinary self-awareness. He was never selfish, egoistical, or egotistical, never self-obsessed. Quite the opposite. He was, however, remarkably self-conscious in both senses (or the two of them that come to mind). He had a surprising shyness, especially when speaking in public, but he was also full of self-knowledge. I think it was the obvious fact that he knew himself so well that made one think he could penetrate others so well too. That look he had that seemed to see through any pretence. You knew it was there, so that even when it wasn't switched on, as it were, you knew it might be and never attempted to dissimulate. It was part of his 'teaching method'; one of the many things he taught me that I will try not to forget.

JEREMY COOTE

DEBT TO GODFREY LIENHARDT

Lienhardt did his fieldwork among the Rek Dinka in Bahr-el-Ghazal, quite distant from our area of the Ngok Dinka. I had therefore not met him or heard of him until 1962 when I was a graduate student in London. As I got to know him, Godfrey became not only a dear friend, but a principal source of deepening understanding of my people—the Dinka—more than my mere membership of the group could have cultivated. But Godfrey was more than an interpreter of the Dinka. While he never pretended to have lost his Englishness, his intimate association with our people must have resulted in a significant amount of shared values and behaviour patterns that endeared him to the flood of Dinka visitors whom he frequently invited to Oxford and generously entertained.

My first encounter with Godfrey was quite unexpected, and had I reacted to him according to my normal disposition I suspect that the door to our prospective friendship would have been prematurely shut. I was standing with a group of students in the senior sitting-room of the School of Oriental and African Studies one afternoon. Suddenly, I felt a hand on my shoulder. I turned to see a rather small figure with conspicuous spectacles. Without preliminaries, he asked, 'Are you a Dinka?' I said I was. 'From which Dinka?', he probed further. Strangely enough, although I thought his manner was rather rude and, ordinarily, would have discouraged the conversation, I answered him warmly, more out of curiosity: 'From the Ngok Dinka,' I said. 'Oh! I have a rather nice photograph of your chief,' he replied. 'Who is that?', I seized the turn in questioning. 'Deng Majok,'
he answered. ‘He is my father,’ I said. At that moment, completely oblivious to the possibility that he might have crossed any boundary of propriety, he literally ordered me, ‘Put that down and let’s go to a pub for a drink.’ By ‘that’ he was referring to a soft drink I was holding. It was my own response more than his behaviour that surprised me even then. I obeyed him almost automatically, still driven by curiosity about the behaviour of this peculiar, but intriguing personality. We went to a pub nearby and initiated a friendship in which pubs provided a lubricating environment.

I received frequent invitations from Godfrey to visit him in Oxford and often stayed overnight, sharing with him his large room at Queen Elizabeth House. As he and I sat around the fireplace with his brother, Peter, and other friends from the Oxford circle of anthropologists, I often thought of Godfrey’s room as having much in common with a Dinka luak or cattle-byre, which men use for large gatherings, and which also provides an open sleeping-place for residents and visitors. Even sharing the room, with Godfrey generously offering me his bed, while he himself slept on the sofa, seemed more Dinka than European. My image of Godfrey’s room as a Dinka luak was shared by the other Dinka who visited Godfrey. Even when Godfrey later moved into an apartment, our symbolic view of his home as a Dinka luak persisted. And indeed, it was not so much the physical environment of his residence, but rather the qualities Godfrey himself reflected, the warmth with which he received people, and the overall social climate he created, that made us feel that this was by no means a typical English environment. There was almost something Dinka about it, but its charm and attraction lay in its ambiguity; it could not be labelled in exclusive terms.

My evolving friendship with Godfrey and frequent visits to Oxford played a very important cathartic role in my life at a time when I was confronted with the serious crisis of an eye disease that threatened me with what I feared was imminent blindness. I was suffering from a case of glaucoma that went back to my time in senior secondary school, but was not detected until my last year in Khartoum University. I had my first operation on both eyes in Berlin, shortly after graduating. Except for the sight I had already lost, I was told that I had escaped blindness. In England, I was informed that the operation in Berlin had not, after all, succeeded; the pressure was back and I would have to undergo another operation. By then, I had become aware of the danger of blindness associated with glaucoma. After agonizing over the prospects, I approached my ophthalmologist for a frank prognosis. His response was that I would probably be able to see for three years, possibly five, but beyond that, he could not predict. I interpreted his remarks to mean that I would probably be blind in three years. The shock was indescribable. While the Sudanese community in London took my profile as being one of flamboyant self-enjoyment, my inner world was profoundly shattered.

Seeing little, if any, future before me and fearing that I might be blind before I could see my people again, I needed and wanted some source of spiritual return home. What deepened my friendship with Godfrey was that he provided me with the incentive and the tools to rediscover the deeper meaning of what it meant to
be Dinka. Again, this was a profound experience which cannot be fully explained without oversimplification. It began with Godfrey asking me to participate with him on a radio programme for a BBC series entitled ‘Man in Society’, in which we were to talk about Nilotic societies. My role was to talk about the Dinka.

That event gave me the opportunity to use excerpts from Dinka songs which I had tape-recorded before leaving home for England. The occasion of my last visit home was a sad one, associated with the death of my young uncle, Bona Bulabek Kwol, a victim of a car accident in Czechoslovakia, while in his final year of medicine at Padua University in Italy. I asked my father whether it would be appropriate for me to record Dinka songs to keep me in touch with my people and to provide me with materials for promoting Dinka culture abroad. My father not only agreed to have me record, but actually attended the recording session. An Italian missionary lent me his tape-recorder which, because of lack of batteries, we operated with the battery of the radio transmitter at the police station. My father’s attendance attracted large crowds to the recording. Father had even sent for famous singers in the tribe to come to Abyei to be recorded. And so I had a large collection of individual ox songs, women’s songs, initiation songs, and war songs. That was probably the first time these Dinka had seen a tape-recorder at work. As we walked back home, followed by a crowd of people who had attended the recording, I heard a voice say: ‘What a clever machine. It listens to a song only once and repeats it exactly as it was sung, and in the very voice of the singer.’ Godfrey and I agreed that I use extracts from the tapes, first to have the song presented in the voice of the singer, with me subsequently presenting the translation in English. The publication of a version of the broadcast in The Listener was the first time I saw myself in print, which was intellectually empowering.

Although I had become quite aware of the deep respect and admiration which Godfrey had for the Dinka and their culture, that occasion gave me an added insight. One of the passages from our BBC broadcast which I would quote frequently later concerned Dinka mannerism in the settlement of disputes. Godfrey wrote:

I suppose everyone would agree that one of the most decisive marks of a society we should call in a spiritual sense ‘civilized’ is a highly developed sense and practice of justice, and here the Nilotes, with their intense respect for the personal independence and dignity of themselves and of others, may be superior to societies more civilized in the material sense.... The Dinka and Nuer are a warlike people, and have never been slow to assert their rights, as they see them, by physical force. Yet if one sees Dinka trying to resolve a dispute, according to their own customary law, there is often a reasonableness and gentleness in their demeanour, a courtesy and quietness in the speech of those elder men superior in status and wisdom, an attempt to get at the whole truth of the situation before them.

Of course, Godfrey was not saying anything that was new to me. I had grown up sitting in my father’s court and observing the process Godfrey was describing. But the fact that he said it to the global audience of the BBC, placing the Dinka in
such a favourable comparative light, put those values in focus, and gave them a significance I had not before been conscious of in precisely the same way.

Godfrey did not only want to represent the Dinka to the world; he wanted them to be understood and accepted by universal standards. He did not want to provide chauvinistic audiences with grounds for justifying their prejudices against the Dinka. In this, he was clearly better equipped than I was to promote the Dinka with appropriate sensitivity to British values and sensibilities. In preparing for our BBC broadcast, I addressed the importance of leadership among the Dinka and alluded to the Dinka belief that traditionally their chiefs, who are also spiritual leaders, were not allowed to die a natural death. When a chief was very ill and at the brink of death or too old and senile to lead, he was persuaded to say his last will and, amidst ritual dancing and the singing of ancient hymns, was placed in a specially prepared grave and buried alive. I dramatized the point by telling how my great-grandfather, the last of the chiefs to be buried alive, was reported to have remarked, ‘Mind my eyes from the dirt.’ Godfrey tried to persuade me to remove that from my text because it would strike the English as savagery, which he thought would give a distorted image of the Dinka.

As I became familiar with Godfrey’s works on the Dinka, in particular his book *Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka*, I felt increasingly educated about my people. What I knew about the Dinka was brought to a new level of consciousness; much that I did not know was added to my knowledge; and all of that was placed in an intellectual framework that was revealing, exciting, and challenging. For me, Dinka culture and worldview were no longer facts of life to be taken for granted, but a coherent complex of values, institutions, and behaviour patterns that were both contextually specific and cross-culturally sound.

What I learned about Dinka religion from Godfrey revived in me the beliefs and ritual practices which conversion to Christianity had almost obliterated, but which had been too engrained to be erased and had survived at a deeper level of consciousness. Even more significantly, the process of reawakening was not a return to a Dinka past, but a reinterpretation of the Dinka belief system in a manner that was capable of application to all levels of sophistication and universalism. Indeed, I developed a universalist religious outlook of which I had been only vaguely or partially aware and whose roots probably went back to my Dinka origins. The world to come, in terms of the Christian and Muslim hell and heaven, became less significant to me, as I appreciated the significance of experience in religion; the range of questions connected with where we come from, what life in this world signifies, and where we go to from here became more focused on this worldly life and the memory of the dead by the living. Ultimately, it is well-being in this world and the projection of life as we know it into the unknown world of the dead, whose identity and influence remain among us, that give practical meaning to immortality.

This may seem too much of a worldly view and too simple, if not simplistic, to those who believe literally in the Christian and Islamic concepts of hell and heaven. But here is where I would say, at the risk of revealing some Dinka
chauvinism without apology, that at least in this respect, Dinka religion may be some steps ahead of these two so-called universal religions. Ironically, if taken literally, the Christian and Islamic belief in the world to come, with its hell and heaven, strikes the Dinka as utterly superstitious—a remarkable turning of the tables.

This is perhaps illustrated by an exchange my brothers and I had with our father when we converted and were about to be baptized as Catholics. As the permission of the guardian was required by law, we approached our father for his consent. Father wondered why we wanted to be baptized. We gave him the line we had been taught by the Christian missionaries, that unless one was born again by being baptized, one would not join the kingdom of heaven, but would instead burn in the fire of hell. Father, and the elders in his company, looked at us with an amused sense of curiosity. It was as though we sounded so ridiculous that they did not know whether to argue with us or to dismiss the whole affair as a joke. Father chose something in between, posing the question, ‘Assuming that the Christians are right, that those whose heads are blessed with the water of God will go to heaven, and those who are not will burn in hell, are you boys going to be happy in heaven while the rest of the family burns in hell?’ In our naïveté, we gave the response that the missionaries had taught us: we would be judged as individuals and not as members of the family. It took me personally considerable educational and intellectual growth to see the wisdom of my father’s question and the degree to which our response had been a flawed negation of that wisdom.

Reading Divinity and Experience I was struck and indeed amazed at the ability of an outsider to come into a society and, within only two years, acquire so penetrating an understanding of the people and their culture as to write a book of such breadth and depth as Godfrey did. With its few negligible errors, the book was almost a miracle to me. And although Godfrey might not be flattered by the association, to me it was a Dinka Bible. What was even more striking was that I do not remember coming across anything in the book that offended me as a Dinka.

In this respect, I believe Godfrey stood out in sharp contrast to some of his contemporaries, who seemed oblivious to the fact that their works would one day become available to the people about whom they were writing. A positive interpretation of this is that the world has become unified at a much faster rate than was predicted by those authors. At the same time, these writings reveal the gulfs that we are called upon to bridge in order to foster a more positive interaction and cross-fertilization among peoples of varied cultural backgrounds.

In this respect, I found a contrasting example in the comments of E. E. Evans-Pritchard on the Dinka from a Nuer perspective. Although Godfrey’s works projected a positive image of the Dinka, Evans-Pritchard’s classic works on the Nuer and his unfavourable comparative references to the Dinka left indelible impressions on anthropologists throughout the world. Evans-Pritchard, whose only perspective on the Dinka was through the Nuer, wrote that the Nuer consider the Dinka ‘and rightly so—as thieves, and even the Dinka seem to admit the
reproach’. The words ‘and rightly so’ completely destroyed Evans-Pritchard’s objectivity and credibility as far as I was concerned. Of course, Evans-Pritchard’s observations focused only on sections of the Nuer and their view of their Dinka neighbours. They did not represent the views of all Nuer about all Dinka. And certainly, he did not know what the Dinka thought of the Nuer. Most readers of his works, however, took them at face value, believing them to represent the Nuer and the Dinka as a whole.

Understandably, Godfrey chose to describe the Dinka and let the facts speak for themselves rather than try to refute explicitly Evans-Pritchard’s Nuer-flavoured allegations about the Dinka. After all, Evans-Pritchard was Godfrey’s senior colleague and supervisor of his doctoral dissertation. Courtesy dictated the discreet manner in which he corrected the distortions of Evans-Pritchard’s perspective on the Dinka. I also realize that this was not an easy feat.

In a way, I confronted a similar dilemma from a very different perspective. I was, needless to say, enraged by Evans-Pritchard’s comments on the Dinka, which were not only subjective but sharply in contrast with what I knew about the Dinka and their comparative view of the Nuer. On the other hand, I had a political and national responsibility to transcend tribal differences in the interest of our national unity. Unlike Evans-Pritchard, who felt free to write down what he thought and felt about the Dinka, I was not at liberty to share my knowledge, thoughts, and prejudices about the Dinka and the Nuer.

Beyond cultivating a deeper understanding of my people through Godfrey’s scholarship, the social climate of Oxford continued to be intimate and very enjoyable. Godfrey found the meaning of his life in the circle of close friends, the essential meetings at the pubs, and a perpetual search for the eclectic union between the mind, the soul, and the human person. In many ways, the pubs became the defining framework. I must confess that there were times when I felt ambivalent about Godfrey’s association with the pub culture. I thought to myself that the amount of time he spent in pubs drinking beer was a waste of his talents. But, increasingly, I accepted that it was not possible to dichotomize between the brilliance I recognized in him, and in his writings, and the personality that was driven to the pub culture. And despite episodes associated with that pub culture, I did not see his intellectual and personal integrity significantly compromised.

So much did I come to expect and accept Godfrey’s attachment to the pub that I once called and reached him from the United States at a pub. Since I knew only the name of the pub, but not the number, I called telephone enquiries, identified myself as calling from the United States, and asked for the number of a given name, adding that it was a pub. The telephone operator on the other end responded, ‘A pub?’, and then proceeded to get the number. I knew the time when I expected that Godfrey would be at the pub and I was right.

Although Godfrey’s field experience predisposed him to close ties with the Dinka and the Southern Sudanese in general, it would be wrong and limiting to project him as a friend of the Southern Sudan only. He was genuinely a friend of the Sudan as a whole. Many of the people who visited him in Oxford were
Northern Sudanese. And his students were varied in their interests between the North and the South. There was indeed a time when he and Evans-Pritchard were so intent on avoiding politics and being impartial and even-handed between the North and the South that they ran the risk of being misunderstood by Southerners as pro-North. But although they sometimes appeared to be genuinely torn, they soon became unequivocal in their support for the Southern cause, as the Sudan government and the North in general appeared almost totally oblivious to the human tragedy that afflicted the South.

I witnessed something of Godfrey’s tension in this regard when I was confronted with a political crisis. I was suddenly recalled to the Sudan for reasons which I learned from my own sources in Khartoum were political. The government suspected me of masterminding the activities of the Southern Sudan Liberation Movement in Europe. My travels around Europe were misconstrued as part of the campaign for the movement. Even my frequent visits to Oxford were given a political interpretation. Of course, going to the Sudan would have meant persecution. I chose delaying tactics by writing letters asking for clarification. As a result, the government terminated my fellowship and, by implication, my position on the Faculty of Law. Meanwhile, I made contacts in England to ensure that I would receive political asylum, if it became necessary. Chief Enharo of Nigeria had just been extradited, a precedent which created a climate of uncertainty for African asylum-seekers.

Godfrey was spending a term teaching in Ghana at the time. His brother, Peter Lienhardt, also an Oxford don and anthropologist, gave me a great deal of support, both morally and politically. He made contacts in the Foreign Office and accompanied me in meetings with potential supporters. One of those was the Foreign Students’ Advisor in London University, whom I knew was well-disposed towards me and who was most sympathetic and helpful. As Peter and I explained the situation to her, she said that the Home Secretary was a dear friend of hers, and reaching for the phone said, ‘Let me talk to him.’ She got him, explained the situation, and after hanging up, announced, ‘He has assured me that you will not be forced back to the Sudan.’ She was also able to secure financial support for me.

I wrote Godfrey a letter explaining my predicament. In his response, he said he had learned from senior university officials that there was an acute shortage of lecturers and that it was possible I was needed back for that purpose. By implication, he was reconciling himself to my going to the Sudan. His brother, Peter, on the other hand, was from the start unequivocally against my going back. I understood Godfrey to be torn on the issue. I have no doubt that he would not have wanted me to expose myself to possible persecution. But he did not also want to come to the conclusion that the situation had deteriorated that much. At that time, both he and Evans-Pritchard were somewhat ambiguous on the North–South politics. Their scholarship bound them deeply to the South and they were unquestionably concerned about the welfare of the Southern people. At the same time, they also had very close ties to the North, and most Northerners shared a common
view of the Southern problem. The cleavage between Northerners and Southerners seemed so unbridgeable that to sympathize with the South by definition meant alienating the North, a choice which many scholars of the Sudan tried to avoid. It would be, however, only a matter of time before the escalation of the conflict and the gross insensitivities of the Abboud regime, and of the Northern Sudanese in general, made this ambiguous position untenable and both Godfrey and Evans-Pritchard found themselves becoming increasingly, and eventually unequivocally, pro-South.

My political crisis was compounded by the eye problem to which I have already alluded. When the crisis with the government was added and I refused to return, the pain was exacerbated by the thought that by the time I would be able to return to the Sudan, I would almost certainly have lost my sight and would not be able to see my relatives. Fortunately, I was able to undertake a study tour to Scandinavia which helped divert attention from my worries. During the summer vacation, I accepted an invitation from a Swedish writer, Percy Bucklund, who wanted an African perspective for a book he was writing on Scandinavia. An intensive four-month tour of all the Scandinavian countries was a significant distraction from my agonizing introspection. On my return, I wrote several essays about cross-cultural perspectives on the themes I had developed during my Scandinavian tour.

Godfrey introduced me to an advertisement for an essay competition on the subject of race relations in Britain. He thought that the essay in my notes on cross-cultural perspectives, which I wrote on my Scandinavian tour, could be rewritten to meet that purpose. I wrote the essay and gave it to him to edit. There was a prize for the top essay and the ten top essays were to be published in a book, with an honorarium for the authors. Over ninety students competed. I received a letter informing me that my essay had been a front-runner for the first position, but I was pleased that it was among the top ten selected for publication.

Godfrey also suggested that he and I cooperate on producing a volume of Dinka songs for the Oxford Library of African Literature which he, Evans-Pritchard, and W. H. Whiteley co-edited. He had his own collection of songs and our BBC programme made me aware of the literary potential of my own tapes of Dinka songs. I immediately embarked on transcribing and translating the songs. Wendy James, Godfrey’s postgraduate student, assisted me with the translation of the songs, thereby giving me a sense of how to combine scholarly authenticity with literary merit. Listening to the Dinka songs, and striving to convey the meaning vividly and authentically, generated in me a mixture of emotions: an elating spiritual journey back home, the satisfaction of communicating my indigenous culture to English readers, and the frustration of realizing the limitations of translation. I wanted to be as literary as possible, while Godfrey and Wendy were more concerned with making the translation intelligible to English readers. An example of our different approaches was the translation of the Dinka morning greeting *Ci yi bak*, which literally means, ‘Are you dawned?’—in other words, ‘Has dawn found you well?’ I wanted to use the literal translation and put ‘Good morning’
in a footnote, for I felt that the Dinka way of putting it said more about the context, the fears of the night, and the happiness of waking up in the morning, in good health, or at least alive. Godfrey preferred using ‘Good morning’ in the text with the literal translation in the footnote, because he thought it would be more cross-culturally understandable that way.

Godfrey made yet another suggestion for co-operation on a book project. He had been asked by the Spindlers, the editors of the Stanford series in social and cultural anthropology, to write a book on the Dinka. He suggested to the editors that I be a co-author with him, an idea they warmly welcomed.

Beyond these specific projects, I visited Oxford frequently and found in the circles of my friends there a source of spiritual rejuvenation. Indeed, since my tour of Scandinavia, I had reasonably transcended the frustrations of the worry over the eye problem, had reconciled myself to whatever would be, and had resolved to make the most of the time I had with my sight. Working with Dinka materials gave me a creative means of bridging the gap between home and the scholarly world in which I now lived and in which Oxford, even more than London where I was officially enrolled, played a crucial and informal part.

During a state visit by President Ibrahim Abboud, and as a result of interventions by a number of people, including a message to the president from my father, I was asked to see the president, as a result of which the government dropped its demand for my return and reinstated my fellowship. Meanwhile, however, I had made arrangements to study for a doctorate in law at Yale Law School. My former British lecturer in Khartoum, William Twining, had already introduced me to two professors from Yale Law School in the United States, Quinton Johnstone and Robert Stevans, who were visiting professors at the London School of Economics, through whom I received a fellowship from Yale University.

Before leaving Britain for the United States, Evans-Pritchard and Godfrey arranged for me to be invited to a conference being organized at the University of Ife in Nigeria, then located in Ibadan, on the theme of the High God in Africa. The conference was eventually held in December 1964, a few months after my joining Yale. It was my first trip to Nigeria, and although I was the only one who was not an anthropologist or a theologian, I enjoyed the experience. The reunion there with Godfrey was particularly gratifying.

Godfrey visited me in New Haven while I was significantly advanced in my doctoral work. We seized the opportunity to discuss our joint projects. His generosity of spirit continued to manifest itself. He suggested that since I had enough material to produce a book of Dinka songs by myself, it would be advantageous for me to be the sole editor instead of having his name on the cover with mine. Likewise, he welcomed the suggestion made by Professor John Middleton to the Spindlers that I be asked to write alone the book which Godfrey and I were originally supposed to co-author.

Godfrey’s contribution to my intellectual and professional progress went beyond the works he inspired. Through a fortuitous chain of events, my joining the United Nations Secretariat in New York was also connected with him. While
he was visiting me in New Haven, he suggested that we visit an old Oxford friend, then a senior official in the Secretariat. We spent a delightful evening with the family. This contact led eventually to my appointment to a position in the UN Division of Human Rights. And so, in many ways, Godfrey did not only set me on the path of writing about my people, the Dinka, inspiring me with his own works and providing me with guidance and the tools for getting the work done, but he also facilitated the connection that led to my career in the field of international affairs. Without my UN experience, it is almost certain that I would not have joined Sudan’s foreign service as Ambassador and Minister of State for Foreign Affairs. Nor would I have moved into the think-tank world of the United States, which I joined after leaving government service, and in which I find a great deal of fulfillment.

One of the passages I often quote from Godfrey’s work relates to the Dinka concept of immortality. He wrote, 'Dinka greatly fear to die without issue, in whom the survival of their names—the only kind of immortality they know—will be assured.' I often wondered how he personally felt about that Dinka notion of immortality, having been single all of his life. But then, I often recall what my brother, Dr Zachariah Bol Deng, said in congratulating me on my first book, *Tradition and Modernization*: ‘That is the only immortality in which I believe,’ he wrote. On the other hand, Bol fell back on Dinka values when he wrote later to congratulate me on the birth of the first of my four sons: ‘Now you can die in peace.’ For a Dinka, having a son ensures the continuity of the agnatic line, the Dinka source of immortality.

Needless to say, I still share the Dinka belief that immortality lies in the memory of the dead by the living. This memory is not passive, but is an active means of ensuring a form of continued existence, participation, and influence beyond death. While the Dinka tend to stress the biological aspect, the circle of continuity is wide and extensive. When Godfrey qualified the Dinka need for children as ‘the only kind of immortality they know’, he might have thought of the Christian and Muslim concepts of heaven and hell as other forms of immortality, but he could also have contemplated continuity through scholarly and literary contributions, as well as through friends and all those whom one touches in one’s lifetime in a profound and lasting way. As a Dinka, I could not help being saddened by the fact that Godfrey left no children, but I also have no doubt in my mind that he touched so many of us, so deeply, and in so many ways, that he continues to live through us and with us, wherever else he might be in accordance with other forms of immortality. This volume is a testimony to that concept of permanent identity and influence.

FRANCIS M. DENG
THIENYDENG


Having come from the Sudd region of the Sudan where people grow tall in order to avoid drowning, I think I need to raise this microphone.

My name is Bol Deng. I am honoured to be able to talk on this occasion, dear sisters and brothers. We have gathered here today in order to celebrate and not to mourn the departure of our dear friend Godfrey Lienhardt—or, as I should prefer to call him, Thiénydeng. For those of you who might not have not heard this name before, I should explain that Thiénydeng means a stick of lightning, or lightning as such, in Dinka. It also refers to a black bull with a white stripe on its side. Godfrey was a senior person among the Dinka, so that is why he was given this senior colour.

The idea of celebrating rather than mourning actually is not strange to many of us. In fact, when a Dinka chief dies there is always a huge celebration. The great man is not considered lost. He is expected to continue to watch over his people in a more detached but not necessarily less effective way. According to the Dinka, Thiénydeng has not really left us. He is with us in the form of a shadow with supernatural powers. We need him as a shadow and to use his super powers in order to guide us through the maze of troubles we are still in today.

I first met Godfrey in the early 1960s when I was working as a junior doctor in south London. But I really became close to him in 1970 when a personal tragedy happened to me. Like a good doctor, I closed myself in my room and cried my head out for two days. Then I remembered Thiénydeng and came to him here. His answer to my ordeals was to throw me a pen and introduce me to a journalist. I took the message and, as a result, an article came out in The Times which shook the Sudanese government of the day. By doing this, Godfrey taught me a different way of mourning. Thiénydeng is still teaching us, even in his absence, another way of mourning him.

Thiénydeng was a simple man who took great care of detail. He was humble, a humble man, and yet full of dignity and pride, which he used to the advantage of those around him. He was always there to give a helping hand to those who needed him. I will illustrate this with a simple example. Once, when my brother Francis was living in Connecticut in the United States he needed a question to be answered. So at 10.00 p.m. he rang the Victoria Arms and found Godfrey there.

Godfrey was always there to give a helping hand to those who needed it. Godfrey, Thiénydeng, will always be remembered as a man of the people. Thank you very much.

ZACHARIAH BOL DENG
LOOKING BACK

We tried to cut your death—
That massive lump of granite, your bequest—
To manageable pieces.

Tears we chipped off.
Splinters of verse. Fragments of conversation.
Searching recall of where and when and how.
Memorial fund for helping others journey
As you had done. Postcards. A book or two.
The echo of your laughter.

Something to carry home, a token.
No one could carry much. The heavy core
We had to leave behind.

But when we came to look
Back at the rock that had defeated us
We found we'd freed your image from the stone,
To follow us with that far-seeing smile
Archaic statues have.

Now,
We can begin to mourn.

EVA GILLIES

GODFREY

Memoir written on 11 November 1993, two days after Godfrey's death, while Professor Goody was teaching in Atlanta, Georgia, USA.

Godfrey is dead. The yellow leaves of the ginko trees lie scattered on the sidewalks. It is dark and the campus is black despite the myriad lights. What comes back? Driving an ancient Ford from Oxford to Cambridge and eating cherries out of a bag. It was that astringent flavour one lacks in the tropics and he had just come back from the Dinka. Or somewhere.... Stopping for a pint at a pub on the way—it was always pints, never wine, never whisky. And it was a Saturday morning, for we had stayed for the Friday seminar and then went to have more pints with E-P and his coterie in the Lamb & Flag.
That too brings back other pints, with Emrys in the Bun Shop, with Crick and Watson huddled in another corner, in the pub off Benet Street, the ceiling of which was covered with the signatures of American servicemen, the Baron of Beef in Bridge Street, and all those innumerable pubs in Oxford. We had been students together, Emrys Peters, Godfrey Lienhardt, and myself, reading anthropology. Like me, Godfrey had read English, where he had got a starred first. He was to do the same in anthropology, quite the most brilliant student of the subject.

As an undergraduate at Downing, he had been close to Leavis and had reviewed for Scrutiny, the avant-garde critical journal of its day. Indeed a review of the collected works of Auden was reprinted in a later anthology of ‘the best of Scrutiny’. But he got worried by the nature and source of Leavis’s moral and aesthetic judgements and shifted to read a Part II in anthropology, which at the time included archaeology and physical anthropology. The only intellectual stimulus he found was in the lectures by Evans-Pritchard, who came over each week from Oxford, allegedly writing his lectures on the train (but they were basically on the Nuer anyway). Godfrey was supervised by Glyn Daniel, a bright and sociable archaeologist, but he soon attracted the attention of Evans-Pritchard who planned to offer him a lecturership in Oxford before he had finished his Ph.D. Godfrey and he had other matters in common as both had become interested in Catholicism as a source of faith, but that I think had little to do with his election. He was the brightest, most intelligent, and in many ways the most sensitive student around; sensitive to the people he worked with, to their cognitive and social concerns, as well as to the intellectual currents around him.

Godfrey’s visits to Cambridge, which he enjoyed, became less frequent, as did mine to Oxford. Even when I went I was loath to get caught up in a lunchtime drinking session, and even the evening pints seem to have had more of a formality. So I saw less and less of him. But we occasionally wrote, he in reply to me rather than the other way round. And not long ago we exchanged books on flowers. His flowers would have been the cherry, astringent but sweet, not the actual flower (which it would have been sinful to pluck) but the fruit, out of a paper bag.

JACK GOODY

A GLASS OF MADEIRA


I am Wendy James, and together with a number of others in this room I belong to the Diploma class of ’63. That was a vintage year. I had already met Godfrey in the bar billiards room of the Colonial Services Club, later the Commonwealth
Services Club, in South Parks Road. And I remember over that game of bar billiards learning a number of other things besides the rules of that game. He asked, ‘And what are you reading?’ I admitted, ‘Geography.’ He sniffed: ‘Ah well. Suppose you start by getting yourself a first-class degree in Geography, and then you can come to the Institute and do Social Anthropology.’

It was a buoyant time, those years in the early ’60s. One African country after another was getting its independence and there were parties. There were parties in the colleges here, parties in the departments. There were parties in London, and mini-buses and coaches were hired to take people to them. This is how Godfrey and I both met Francis Deng, for example, for the first time, at such a party. I forget which country had its independence that particular week, but the excitement seemed endless. And it was that buoyant social atmosphere in which one learned one’s anthropology. The memory of Godfrey in those years is completely inseparable from the memory of Peter, the two of them gave each other such support, and their circle of friends was as large and as flexible and as lively a group as it was because the two of them were at the centre of it.

I remember hearing the reputation of the Institute: they were all Roman Catholics, always in the pub, and all of them brilliant. I wasn’t used to drinking beer at that time and I sort of prepared myself mentally for it, though I didn’t see myself going over to Rome. My first tutorial in anthropology was in Godfrey’s room in Queen Elizabeth House. It started with Godfrey saying, ‘My dear, would you like a glass of madeira?’ That set the tone, and we never looked back.

Godfrey has impinged on my life in ever so many ways. Five minutes is not enough to give a hint. But let me just tell you how I met my husband in June Anderson’s library at the Institute as a result of Godfrey having had too much of American students for the time being. Here was yet another American student coming through Oxford, and Godfrey said, ‘Oh Wendy, look, I’m busy, can you deal with this one?’ So I said, ‘All right’; and again I never looked back.

It was when Godfrey came to Khartoum as an external examiner to the University of Khartoum in the late ’60s that I saw another side of him. This was when the civil war in the Sudan was escalating and Godfrey hadn’t been back in the country since the early ’50s. He had long conversations with old friends, mostly along the lines of, ‘Where’s so-and-so, what about so-and-so?’ The answers came back more and more quietly. There was a large community of Southern Sudanese in Khartoum at that time (including some among our friends here today) and Godfrey would insist on visiting them or having them round to my flat, asking again, ‘What happened to old so-and-so?’ And the answer was again and again, ‘He’s died. They’ve died. That village no longer exists.’ I saw a different side of Godfrey, sad and tragically distracted from his normal lively self. And that’s a side of Godfrey that we saw again more recently in the later years, partly because of the renewed civil war in the Southern Sudan and partly because of the loss of Peter.

However, turning to brighter memories too, in this very room, in this very hospitable college, we had a wonderful retirement party in 1988 and many of you
were here then too. And I’d just like to finish by saying let’s remember that time, with the champagne and the wonderful Zairean band, when Godfrey took to the dance floor with something of the old gusto.

WENDY JAMES

GODFREY AND THE REDISCOVERY OF SECOND-HAND KNOWLEDGE

I was one of a large number of people taught by Godfrey who were, in fact, never formally his students. When I was finishing my thesis on African prophets Godfrey suggested (I believe at coffee one Wednesday, or at the pub over lunch shortly after, or in his flat for a post-pub drink) that I ought to have a look at Nora Chadwick’s book *Poetry and Prophecy*. He clearly had recommended this short book to a number of students, because it was permanently out of the library, and after a few attempts to find it I gave up looking for it. Years later, when I was trying to make a book on the same subject, Godfrey again casually mentioned that I ought to read Chadwick. This time it was available and I did read it. Now, there are a good many problems with the book: it has a grand diffusionist hypothesis about shamanism, and its African data is no more detailed and up-to-date than can be found in the published writings of David Livingstone. Yet it had one redeeming quality, and that was its discussion of prophecy as a type of mantic activity. This idea enabled me to escape from the functionalism of the jargon of ‘ritual experts’, still popular in African studies, as well as to avoid the formal typologies of Weber’s model of charisma, to develop a historical analysis of prophecy set within the context of other forms of spiritual knowledge and religious activity.

Godfrey’s role in this was characteristic of his style of teaching. In fact, Godfrey the teacher was very much like Godfrey the friend and colleague: his advice was often oblique, and he left it to others to discover for themselves the significance of his hints and asides. Basil Davidson told me that he had exactly the same experience when he first met Godfrey in Ghana. Godfrey never told him bluntly, ‘You ought to read…’, but by various turns of conversation Basil found himself delving into works of Africanist anthropology which his political journalism and his historical reading had bypassed. But more than that, Godfrey did not accept that an intelligent idea or (more importantly) an intelligent piece of writing was no longer valid, relevant, or interesting merely because it was old and superseded by new theory or fashion. In contrast with much of today’s anthropology, where so many seek professional recognition by lusting after the conference topic next but one at the expense of developing any coherent or consistent set of ideas
of their own, Godfrey constantly recycled old knowledge, refashioned in new and refreshing ways.

His research methods were similarly unorthodox: he never had a Bodleian Library card, but he seemed to do most of his reading from books combed from second-hand bookstores—frequently the same stores where he found his endless supply of appropriate postcards for all occasions (‘White’s the Son’ on Walton Street was one of his favourite sources). Many benefited from his finds. I first discovered Collingwood’s Autobiography when I found an old Pelican edition (printed on wartime rationed recycled paper, and kept together with a bulldog clip) in his office. He made a present of that copy (along with its bulldog clip) when I later started my own research on Collingwood, father and son.

Other discoveries he allowed us to make were not always literary and were perhaps ultimately more important. He was surprised when I told him that Divinity and Experience had been more useful than Nuer Religion in helping me make sense of much I was told in the field about Nuer divinities and their prophets, but he received that assertion without much comment. One point in particular was the spiritual importance of ring among the Nuer, which E-P had virtually ignored, but which is prominent in Godfrey’s discussion of the Dinka spearmasters. Over the years I wrote about this in some detail, but it was only when my writing was completed (and my manuscript in the hands of the publishers) that he remarked, somewhat casually, ‘Of course, E-P used to say that he hadn’t realised the importance of ring among the Nuer until he had read my book.’ ‘Did he?’, I exclaimed, surprised. ‘Oh, yes,’ Godfrey replied, eyes innocently wide. ‘Didn’t I tell you?’

DOUGLAS H. JOHNSON

IN MEMORY OF A TRIBAL FRIEND

I cannot believe that it is already nearly five three years since Godfrey Lienhardt, the Oxford don who is universally known to my people, the Dinka of Sudan, as Thienydeng, ‘The Rod of the Spirit’ or ‘The Stake of Rain’, died in Oxford in November 1993. So vivid are one’s memories of Godfrey’s personality, that it seems like yesterday that I was talking with him at his memorable flat at 14 Bardwell Court in Oxford. His ever-keen presence of mind and memory of things past, his intelligence, wit, extreme humility, and kindness live on in myself and in the members of my family who came to know and to love Godfrey over the years. These qualities continue to be a talking-point as we commemorate, remember, and honour this man who did so much, and in such a very special way, to put the Dinka of Sudan on the map of academia and scholarship. His book, Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka, is now a classic textbook around the world about the Dinka ways of life, beliefs, and ethical values. The bulk of the material
for this book, which so endeared Godfrey to the Dinka, was researched and
gathered in my native Dinka district of Gogrial in Bahr-el-Ghazal, Southern Sudan,
where he carried out his fieldwork.

It was in 1947, when I was in the fourth grade of my primary education, that
I first saw Godfrey at Mayen Abun in the Twic Dinka country of northern Gogrial.
I cannot now recall how I first met him personally. After all, the man was a
European, and English at that. This was during the colonial period and the British
were the colonial masters of Sudan. It did not seem possible for there to be any
social contact between a 'native' African school pupil and a British scholar. All
non-missionary Europeans seemed to us to be colonial officials, who, out of pru­
dence, had to be avoided. The only contact people of my age and level had with
Europeans was with the Christian missionaries who were our teachers and
preachers. Godfrey was visiting the Comboni Catholic fathers who were running
my primary school at Mayen Abun.

It transpired later that Godfrey had been mainly visiting the legendary Rever­
end Father Arthur Nebel, the Catholic priest who designed and perfected the Dinka
alphabet system and wrote all the Western Dinka textbooks for the Dinka ver­
nacular schools. We did not know until much later that Godfrey was studying the
ways of the Dinka and was therefore interested to learn from Father Nebel and us
schoolchildren how both to speak and write the Dinka language.

At Mayen Abun, Godfrey was noted for being interested in getting away from
the European community of the Comboni Fathers and coming to mingle with us
schoolchildren for much of the day. The only time he was not around with us was
at meal times, no doubt because he needed to go back to the fathers’ compound
to have his meals with the European priests. It was just as well, for the type of
food fed to us as schoolchildren by the missionaries, come to think of it now, was
not really fit for human consumption. It is still a mystery that so many of us
survived it.

Godfrey frequented our company because he wanted to learn the Dinka lan­
guage from us. As I was in the most senior class of my school, the fourth year,
I spoke some English. English had been introduced to us as a foreign language
at grade three. At class four we all spoke reasonably comprehensible English.
This seemed to suit Godfrey fine, for he only needed to ask someone who spoke
some English what a particular Dinka word meant. He did not want to ask Father
Nebel or any of the other Italian priests what these words meant as they were not
mother-tongue speakers. None of them would have had enough time for him
anyway, so he preferred to come to us. So that is how for the first time I came
to know Godfrey personally. I saw him on and off in Gogrial over the next three
years, including sometimes at the Dinka cattle-camps, where he was a familiar but
strange face among the camp-goers. It soon became clear that he had no colonial
administrative functions in the Dinka country. Colonial officers kept their distance
from the 'natives' to preserve the aura of authority. Godfrey did not, and the
'natives' noticed that he behaved as if he was their friend and guest, not a member
of the ruling authority, and treated him as a friend with special deference.
The Dinka do not believe that any non-Dinka can master and endure their ways. They regard their life as very specially superior to any there is anywhere in the world. To endure one rainy season in a cattle-camp or a summer of many sacrifices in the dry Dinka country is a special qualification. Godfrey met both of these qualifications with distinction, over and over again for several years, so that the Dinka came to accept him as one who had learned and accepted their ways. What especially endeared Godfrey to the Dinka was not just that he was learning the Dinka language and was indeed speaking it, but as a European he did not carry with him his European food or bring native cooks and servants to serve him while visiting the Dinka country, as the colonial administrators used to do; he accepted and ate what he found with his Dinka hosts. The Dinka do not much appreciate those who seem to be looking down on their ways of life and food. Godfrey had proved that he wanted to be treated like a Dinka man, even though the colour of his skin was different from theirs.

Godfrey and I were of different generations. He was many years older than myself, but the fact that I had helped him learn some Dinka during the few weeks he was visiting my school at Mayen Abun and later at Kuajok, also in Gogrial, and at my junior secondary school at Bussere outside Wau, made us almost contemporaries. Years later, when we were both older, we met frequently in Sudan and at Oxford, and we became lifelong friends.

Godfrey was an individual of deep humility and compassion. He was generous of heart and of spirit and extremely sensitive not to do anything that would offend. It was always easy for him to read in one’s actions what his role in helping out a friend might be. I recall a very personal encounter with Godfrey when I had completed the draft of my first book on Sudan in the late 1970s, *People and Power in Sudan*. I was a Senior Associate Member of St Antony’s College at the time of writing that manuscript. Both being at Oxford, Godfrey and I saw each other several times a week. He knew I was working on a book and I kept him informed of the various stages in the development of my writing. But Godfrey was Reader in Social Anthropology at the Institute of Social Anthropology and I was writing a book on the contemporary politics of Sudan. I did not think I should bother him or involve him in a field where he might not want to venture an opinion. Godfrey had many Sudanese friends from both the North and the South. While I knew he was deeply committed to fairness and justice and felt that Southern Sudan had a very raw deal in the Sudanese state, he did not necessarily feel that having a strong political opinion on the matter would help the cause of Southern Sudan. He would always seek a consensus view in discussions of the Sudanese political situation. I did not think that I should put such a close friend on the spot by giving him my manuscript to read, when he might be forced to take a view contrary to mine. Besides, I had many other colleagues at St Antony’s College who kindly volunteered to read the manuscript once it was done. Godfrey knew what I had decided, but did not ask about my manuscript until he knew that it had gone to the publishers.
One day, putting it very delicately and to my great embarrassment and shame, he said to me, ‘Bona, do you think that I would ever let you down or fail to support the just cause of the Dinka people?’ My book was not at all about the Dinka, but that was Godfrey’s tender and intimate way of putting things. I asked him why he felt that way. He asked me how I could complete the manuscript and not show it to him. I pretended that the manuscript was not totally done and that he would have the final look at it. A few weeks later, I handed him a photocopy of a 400-page manuscript. Although Godfrey knew that the book had gone to the publishers, and was indeed on its way to being printed, he sat down with this long manuscript, read through it thoroughly as if his comments were still needed, and made elaborate annotations and suggestions on it. But he did not return the manuscript to me and said nothing further. Eventually, the book was published and he received his personally autographed copy from me. He certainly knew and noted that his ideas and suggestions, which he had not passed on to me, were not incorporated. He later made a suggestion to me that perhaps I should write another book on Sudan which he advised should be titled ‘The History of the Great Rebellion’.

What I did not know was that Godfrey had kept his copy of that original manuscript, with his elaborate editing and comments, in his archives until his death. Somewhere in the manuscript he left a note to the executor of his literary estate, Dr Ahmed Al-Shahi, that the manuscript should be returned to me. Dr Al-Shahi dutifully gave me Godfrey’s copy of my old manuscript only several months ago, having just then reached that section of Godfrey’s archives in which it was stored. Being reminded of a personal shame of more than twenty years before, I received the manuscript, read through it and found good reason to regret that I had not asked for it from Godfrey at the time. There is much in his comments that would have greatly enriched the completed book.

People and Power in Sudan is currently out of print. As a commemoration to Godfrey Lienhardt, I have decided that I shall soon revise the old text of that book and incorporate his extremely valuable suggestions before reprinting the book again. I was a personal friend to Godfrey, but so was every Dinka who ever met him. The Dinka nation will ever be grateful to a man and a scholar who has put them with pride and dignity into the annals of academia.

BONA MALWAL

HOW ANTHROPOLOGISTS THINK

The last chapter of Godfrey Lienhardt’s Social Anthropology was entitled ‘How Anthropologists Think’. As someone who knew him rather well as a friend over more than thirty years, and who suffered from his acerbic wit as well as profiting
from his thoughts and companionship, I am not sure I know how anthropologists think.

Dan Sperber, who as a postgraduate student was also acquainted with Godfrey, tells the striking story of how, as a little boy, he went into a room in which his father was sitting still by a window with his chin in his hand and asked him what he was doing. His father replied, ‘Working’. This story can provoke many responses. In Dan’s case, one of (I think) fruitful work. But Godfrey, as a pupil of F. R. Leavis, always suspected the impulse to theorization. What form, for him, ought the thought of anthropologists to take, granted that he thought it ought to go beyond ethnographic description? Godfrey cited Marcel Proust:

One can place indefinitely in succession, in a description, the objects which figured in the place described: truth will not begin [to appear] until the moment when the writer will take two different objects, will place them in a relationship, analogue in the world of art to the unique relationship of the causal law in the world of science. (*Social Anthropology*, p. 153)

I recall that he once felt that he should, reluctantly, come to terms in print with ‘structuralism’. Though his book about the Dinka gave ample scope for structuralist approaches to the experiences he reported of their culture, he was clearly uneasy. How could he reconcile his old experience of Dinka life, and his continuing friendships, with these abstractions? Versed as he was in the then technicalities of his discipline, he wrote: ‘we have to start with observations of cultural phenomena, and of how people behave and what they say about themselves, for social structure is not, of course, there to be seen’ (ibid., p. 156; original emphasis).

Godfrey had a kind of human but pungent empiricism from which many who knew him profited. I think of the fine lines of Dr Johnson about Charles of Sweden, that hero of the enlightenment:

His fate was destined to be a barren strand
A dubious fortress and a dubious hand;
He left a name at which the world grew pale
To point a moral or adorn a tale.

I do not recall putting these verses to Godfrey, admirer of the Enlightenment as I remain, but I think that he might have dismissed and disliked them as falsifying the intimate structures of social life. I may be wrong. With Godfrey, one might always be wrong, and might always have to think twice: he was not a person at whose name the world grew pale, though he did sometimes challenge the assumptions of young students; and if his name points a moral, the moral is to pay attention to others in a humane and disinterested way, and to be willing to realize and act in light of their problematic affinity with ourselves.

F. C. T. MOORE
CYMBALS FOR STRAUSS

TO GODFREY LIENHARDT

Gaps between cymbals
idiotically resound
with theories of forms
as wave—shaped as

Chaos
between sky and the archaic mound,
the punconscious confusion of image and clay,
which feeds the bubbling cauldron, that dark sea
of blind and gaseous desires, and activates
the worlds
of Erebus
the pit
the
id

where Eurydice and her serpent hid.
Symbols clashing like Wandering Rocks
splinter brave Argonautic thoughts
in quest of the golden pleas
for commonsense. But though Charybdis
gulps thought down, a hundred limbs
still beating wildly the salt, astonished air,
a few shards get through. The others—
well, who knows? Perhaps down there
under the weeds and turmoil dark with teeth
of monsters new and ancient rocks
some Rhadamanthus still unlocks
opposing doors to glittering lands.
Perhaps there are silver, singing sands
under the contradictory dark,
from which images, new fabricated,
rise like eggs on one shore or another,

Editors' note: Reprinted, with the kind permission of the Editor, from the *Times Literary Supplement*, no. 3824 (20 June 1975), p. 696. Ruth Padel has provided the following gloss on the poem and the time of its composition: 'I wrote this poem as a joke when structuralism reigned, and when I, a Junior Fellow in Classics luckily landed in Wolfson College, Oxford, was getting to know Godfrey. Anthropology was suddenly everywhere (e.g. the TLS), was the key to everything; Lévi-Strauss held new keys to it, but Godfrey saw furthest and deepest. I was reading anthropology most of the time, but I learned to stand back from it from Godfrey. If the poem has a point, it is the seriousness of play—which Godfrey embodied.'
to poet and anthropologist, to a lover,
to some hopeful argument of the dedicated.
Asphodel and Syphilis no doubt resemble each other
on some structural, deep, phonetic level,
but somewhere beyond or underneath the drivel
Elysium still corners the market, inflating
her goods and gods, creating a rise,
source of expensive images and jade-bright Ayes.

RUTH PADEL

MASTER OF THE FISHING SPEAR?


Mr Vicegerent, fellow friends of Godfrey. I can not tell you what an honour it is to be asked to say a few words today, because I am one of Godfrey’s oldest friends. In fact, it is one of the delights and honours of my life to have been counted among his friends, as I am sure many of you here who have been his friends would agree. To be given five minutes to speak now gives me, according to my calculations, one minute for every eight years I knew Godfrey; and I can hear him saying over my shoulder, ‘Well you’d better get on with it then!’; which I will try to do.

I first met Godfrey in the Upper Nile where he did so much creative work (and what a pleasure it is to see so many people with us today from those days and those places where I first knew him). There have been many fine obituaries written about Godfrey, one of which I was surprised to see was entitled ‘Master of the Fishing Spear’. When I first met him he was walking along the road with his finger in the air and blood trickling down his arm from a very severe gash from his amateur efforts at fishing in the Nile. He had to be rushed off to a mission hospital for treatment.

Later, as our friendship developed, he was my best man at our wedding; which was 35 years ago now. We needed him as best man because I had five parents at the time and many concomitant relations. He said, ‘If you hadn’t had an anthropologist as best man, we’d never have got through.’ (I may say that only two of those parents were biological.) Well, our union was blessed and Godfrey became godfather to our son Edward who is here today. And a very successful godfather-ship it was. Edward’s room is festooned with fishing spears (that he doesn’t use), clubs, walking-sticks, and all sorts of et ceteras, and one or two unusual books, all of which he prizes very highly.
Although Godfrey was not married he was very much a family man. He adored children, and vice versa. Many of us will remember how he used to keep in touch with such a wide variety of friends, particularly his younger ones, with his endless postcards, all of which were exactly apropos of where you were or who you were, or what your interests were. He had this astonishing capacity for friendship—hoops of steel.

He also extended this family in a much wider sense, in an international sense. He was a one-man United Nations. He brought people together much more successfully than some of the highly paid agencies which are trying to do it today. In fact it was said that there was talk of widening North Parade because there was there such a congestion of Rolls Royces belonging to his former students, all of whom at one time seemed to become ambassadors and ministers, and they were all, of course, trying to get to the Gardener's Arms at the same time.

Although Godfrey died prematurely and too young, it was wonderful that he lived long enough to deliver the Frazer Lecture in Cambridge in 1992. I think we would agree that he bridged the two cultures—that is to say, the cultures, of course, of Oxford and Cambridge—and this lecture was the quintessence of Godfreyism, the quintessence of intellectual wit. It was as though his two mentors F. R. Leavis and E. E. Evans-Pritchard had conspired in heaven (assuming that's where they are) to combine their efforts to put at Godfrey's disposal their wit and intellect for that occasion.

I mustn't go beyond my five minutes. So let me end by saying what a tribute this is to our dear friend and let us all remember him today.

PHILIP LYON ROUSSEL

A SOCIABLE ANTHROPOLOGIST


I belonged to one of the later generations of Godfrey's students. We benefited from the visits of our predecessors, who returned to the shrine bearing news of the world beyond. The shrine, in those days, was one of a succession of north Oxford public houses—the Horse & Jockey, the Victoria Arms, the Gardener's Arms in Plantation Road, the Gardener's Arms in North Parade—watering-places that were linked in an ancient transhumant cycle.

Drinking and thinking went together for Godfrey; it was here, in the company of publicans and students, that the oblique process of his teaching became apparent. Oblique in the sense that you might take your leave at closing time certain that you had learned something, but not entirely sure what it was. Godfrey's
conversation was full of jokes and anecdotes and fragments of wisdom, but important aspects of what he had to teach could only be arrived at indirectly: by absorption and by example, rather than by precept or study. Perhaps the most important lesson was to show how social anthropology can and should be truly social, a discipline involving mutuality, one that begins in field research, but ends by keeping company with its subject on a global journey.

I recollect an occasion when I had been studying the Nilotic expansion in Southern Sudan, producing an essay that included a map shaded to represent the territories of the peoples of the South. When I arrived to discuss it I found Godfrey ensconced with three visiting Southerners, former students or friends from the field, now diplomats or professors. One of them pointed at my map and said, ‘I think you have given my village to our Arab brothers.’ It was Francis Mading Deng, author of a book on the Ngok Dinka of Southern Kordofan, at that time ambassador of Sudan to the Scandinavian countries. The second visitor, a colleague of Francis’s, added to this reproach. ‘You’ll find there’s a dispute over grazing grounds along that river,’ he said. ‘Might it not have been better left unshaded?’ The third visitor, a provincial commissioner, joined the discussion at this point. ‘I wonder,’ he said with a rueful air, ‘why you have put my village in Ethiopia?’

Godfrey said nothing, but he was clearly the instigator of this cunning piece of pedagogy. And it was not only for my benefit. To Godfrey the dialogue between neighbouring peoples was a constituent part of what anthropology was. His principal research had been, of course, among the Dinka, and he had a deep and abiding love for them and their ways. But he did not suffer from that affliction of anthropologists, deuteroethnocentricity, the unquestioning identification with a single host culture. One of his most elegant contributions to Nilotic studies is a comparative account of the myth of the bead and the spear, a story widespread among the peoples of the region. This study is an examination of the meaning of the gift, of borrowing and exchange—of what it implies in Nilotic societies to be lent something and lose it—but it also demonstrates how a story itself can be a shared resource, how culture can be transferred between one people and another.

Once we were discussing Father Santandrea’s article on the ethnography of Western Bahr-el-Ghazal province, ‘The Tribal Confusion Around Wau’, which documents the complex pattern of ethnic identity in the hinterland of the provincial capital. There were two young Southerners studying in Oxford at the time, one a Nuer, another a Dinka, each very certain of their ancestry and the centrality of their culture. Another Southerner, recently arrived, listened silently to the discussion. One of us asked him where he came from. ‘Oh,’ he replied, ‘I’m from the Confusion.’ ‘As we all are,’ said Godfrey.

This was how Godfrey prepared his students for fieldwork: by launching us into the great archipelago of his acquaintance. In north Oxford pubs, unbeknown to us, we began to learn the anthropologist’s art, the art of participant observation. And when we finally left for the field there was liable to be someone Godfrey knew in the place we were headed for. We would take gifts from him—books or articles of clothing, socks or cardigans from Marks & Spencer—for Godfrey
(though he himself took pride in dressing from thrift shops) knew that the gift was the thing, the social institution that spans tribes and nations, that opens the door of culture.

The gift that Godfrey leaves to the world is his writing—luminous, rigorous, free of obscurity, attuned to the genius of language and the hard task of translation. It is a gift that he has bequeathed both to the world of learning and to the world currently emerging from the tribal cultures of the Upper Nile. But Godfrey’s greatest gift to his friends and pupils—he made no distinction between them—was to introduce them to each other. Godfrey fostered friendship and took pleasure in its continuation in his absence, as many of us here have reason to know. And this, I sense, is how we will remember him, not simply as a great social anthropologist but as an anthropologist who was also eminently sociable, who conspired for our collective and individual good, who was generous, a giver of people to each other.

JOHN RYLE

TENE THIENYDENG: IN MEMORY OF GODFREY LIENHARDT

*Introduction*

The first song is a traditional Dinka song, sung at great memorial occasions such as that held for Godfrey Lienhardt. The second and third songs were composed especially for the occasion. The ‘big grey thing with horns curved towards the earth’ is an image of death. Abuk is the first woman, Garang the first man. Thiénydeng is Godfrey Lienhardt’s Dinka ox-name; the expression means ‘stick of the rain’, i.e. lightning, a metaphor for the black-and-white pattern of the ox Majok. Tim Atiep is the ox-name of Ranald Boyle, the last colonial district commissioner of Gogrial, where Godfrey Lienhardt conducted field research among the Rek Dinka in the late 1940s; the expression means a shady tree, a metaphor for the colour of a black ox, Macar. The songs were performed by the composers with Kon Deng Thiepf, Wol Mayer Ariec, and others.

I

*Kedit maluil ci tung gaal be pek piny;
caa yin be waac weng ee;
Kedit maluil ci tung gaal be pek piny;*
Big grey thing with horns curved towards the earth;
I shall appease you with a cow;
Big grey thing with horns curved towards the earth;

*Deng Abuk lang wei ee;*
*Deng Garang lang wei ee;*
*Lang wei ee lang wei weng ku raan;*
*Yen lam Mabior be Nhialic thiok*
*be Wa ok yek wei ee.*

Spirit Deng of Abuk, pray for the soul;
Spirit Deng of Garang, pray for the soul;
Pray for the soul of cow and for the soul of mankind;
We offer Mabior in prayer to bring Divinity
and our spirits closer to our own souls.

*Yen lam Mabior be Nhialic thiok*
*be Wa ok yek wei ee;*
*Deng Abuk lang wei ee;*
*Deng Garang lang wei ee;*
*Lang wei ee lang wei weng ku raan;*
*Yen lam Mabior be Nhialic thiok*
*be Wa ok yek wei ee.*

We offer Mabior in prayer to bring Divinity
and our spirits closer to our own souls;
Spirit Deng of Abuk, pray for the soul;
Spirit Deng of Garang, pray for the soul;
Pray for the soul of cow and for the soul of mankind;
We offer Mabior in prayer to bring Divinity
and our spirits closer to our own souls.

II

*Muonyjangda,*
*Ku Thienydeng aci ok luel;*
*Muonyjangda,*
*Ku Thienydeng aci ok luel;*

Our Dinka Nation,
Thienydeng has presented us so well to the world;
Our Dinka Nation,
Thienydeng has presented us so well to the world;
Ci ok luel be ok ping wuoot;  
k ku Thiénydeng aci ok luel;  
Muonyjangda,  
k ku Thiénydeng aci ok luel;  

That the nations of the world now know of us;  
Thiénydeng has presented us so well;  
Our Dinka Nation,  
Thiénydeng has presented us so well to the world;  

Ciengda ku piirda;  
k ku Thiénydeng aci ok luel;  
Muonyjangda,  
k ku Thiénydeng aci ok luel;  

Our ways of life and our culture;  
Thiénydeng has presented us so well;  
Our Dinka Nation,  
Thiénydeng has presented us very well;  

Ke yeko theek,  
k ku Thiénydeng aci ok luel;  
Muonyjangda,  
k ku Thiénydeng aci ok luel.  

/  
Our beliefs and all that we worship as a people,  
Thiénydeng has presented us so well;  
Our Dinka Nation,  
Thiénydeng has presented us very well.  

Beny Tim Atiep,  
k ku Thiénydeng aci ok luel;  
Muonyjangda,  
k ku Thiénydeng aci ok luel.  

Chief Tim Atiep,  
Thiénydeng has presented us so well to the world;  
Our Dinka Nation,  
Thiénydeng has presented us very well.  

Yin Wendy James, Bany Bona Malwal,  
Bany Gordon Muortat, Bany Bol Deng,  
Bany John Ryle, Bany Douglas Johnson,  
Cak ping week wuoot
ku Thienydeng aci ok luel;
Muonyjangda,
ku Thienydeng aci ok luel.

You, Wendy James, Chief Bona Malwal,
Chief Gordon Muortat, Chief Bol Deng,
Chief John Ryle, Chief Douglas Johnson,
We sing songs of thanks and universal praise
Because Thienydeng has presented us so well;
Our Dinka Nation,
Thienydeng has presented us very well.

III

Piny Abuk,
Yin abuk aa long akolkol;

World of Abuk,
We shall always pray to you:

Piny Garang,
Yin abuk aa long akolkol;

World of Garang,
We shall always pray to you;

Aye ku wic ku be pinyda lac door,
ku buk Thienydeng la lui dhor.

We pray that peace returns to our country soon,
So that we may erect a shrine for Thienydeng
amongst the shrines of our ancestors.
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CARIB SOUL MATTERS—SINCE FOCK

PETER RIVIÈRE

Niels Fock's *Waiwai: Religion and Society of an Amazonian Tribe* (1963), together with Jens Yde's *Material culture of the Waiwai* (1965), form a veritable mine of ethnographic riches on these Carib-speaking people living in the Upper Essequibo region of Guyana in the 1950s. Both traditional ethnographies in the very best sense of the word, when they appeared they did so in what was an ethnographic desert. One only has to look at the bibliographies in these two volumes to appreciate just how little of a genuinely anthropological nature had been written on Guiana at that time.1 Furthermore, much of the information in these volumes has been confirmed and extended by later writers. This paper concentrates on one such topic, well described by Fock, viz. the human soul. The aim is to review what Fock has to say about the Waiwai soul and then consider how it fits with what has been reported from other Carib-speaking peoples of the region.

First, however, some precautionary words are in order. The word 'soul' is being used here as shorthand for a complex concept which defies definition even

This article was first published in Danish as 'Caribiske Sjæleanliggender—efter Fock' in a special issue of the journal *Tidsskrifet Antropologi* (35-36 (1997): 183-91) published as a Festschrift in honour of the Danish anthropologist, Niels Fock.

1. By Guiana I am referring to the geographical area that includes parts of Brazil, Venezuela, Guyana, Surinam, and French Guiana. A similar situation may be noted among the Tukanoan-speakers of the north-west Amazon, where Goldman's *The Cubeo* (also published in 1963) marked the dawn of that area’s involvement in modern anthropological literature.
within the English-speaking world. Other possible terms that could have been used include ‘life’, ‘life-force’, ‘essence’, ‘spirit’ and so on. None of them is any better or worse than any other: they all misrepresent the vernacular concepts in some way. The second point is that I am restricting consideration to the human soul, whereas the same soul is often seen as being common to all animate beings, and even the definition of what constitutes an animate being needs to be examined in each case. In other words, this article deals with only a small aspect of what is a very large subject and in so doing is inevitably distorting.

The Waiwai word for soul is *ekati*, which also means ‘shadow’, ‘picture’, ‘vital force’. The chief locus of the soul is in the heart, but it is disseminated throughout the body and is also divisible and spreads, fluid-like, on to things with which it comes into contact. Fock also reports that the degree of fixity of the soul in an individual varies, and using this criterion, he recognizes three types of person: shamans, babies and ordinary people. In life, except in dreams, the ordinary person’s soul is fixed to the individual, and its loss means sickness or death. The shaman, on the other hand, is in control of his soul and is able voluntarily to despatch it to visit other cosmic regions. In contrast with both of these, the soul of a young child is not fixed but detaches itself involuntarily and wanders freely. It is during this period of the child’s life that the parents submit to couvade restrictions, which, in part, are concerned with the construction of the person by securing the soul to the body (see Rivière 1974). It might also be noted that until initiation at around the age of thirteen, a boy or girl is addressed as *okopuchi*, literally ‘little corpse’, a usage that also suggests the rather tentative relationship between the individual and his soul (Fock 1963: 14–16, 151–2).

The Waiwai also recognize the existence of an eye-soul, but information on it is vague and Fock does not say whether there is a distinct term for it. It is described as being ‘the small person one always sees in the others’ eye’. Curiously, and unlike the *ekati*, the eye-soul ‘is not regarded as an absolute necessity for the individual’ even though its departure appears to be a sign of death (ibid.: 19–20).

Fock was unable to obtain definite information about where the soul of the newborn child comes from, although it is there at birth and there is some evidence that it comes into being at conception. Fock’s main informant claimed that a boy’s soul came from his father and a girl’s from her mother (ibid.: 17).

The name, for which no native term is provided, is given to an infant soon after birth and is usually that of a deceased grandparent or great-grandparent. As well as this family name, the infant also receives a spirit name which is obtained by a shaman from the sky-spirit, Moon. Fock does not examine the relationship of the name to the individual or the degree to which it forms an integral part of the person, though he states that names have a ‘psychic’ quality (ibid.: 16–17, 140–1).

At death the *ekati* leaves the body and becomes the *ekatinhoh*, literally ‘former soul’. The full term is *ekatinhoh-kworokjam* or soul-spirit. There are two kinds of *kworokjam*, but it is only this form that is of interest for present purposes. It
resides as an invisible spirit near the grave of the deceased, although it can manifest itself in animal form. On the other hand, at death the eye-soul goes to the sky, where, after being made subject to torments, it has an eternal happy life (ibid.: 18–20).

Although Fock does not draw attention to it, there is an interesting if rough correlation between the modes of disposing of a corpse and the types of people distinguished by the degree of fixity of the soul. A shaman, with a voluntarily unfixed soul, is buried, perhaps with a soul ladder ascending from the grave; an ordinary person, with a fixed soul, is cremated; a child, with an involuntarily unfixed soul, is cremated, but the bones are gathered under an inverted pot. These three different practices also appear to be linked to ideas about the fate of the soul. The ekatinho, the former soul of an ordinary person, resides permanently at the place of cremation, although it is free to wander either as an invisible spirit or in the form of an animal. It is feared as being malicious and vengeful towards people. On the other hand, the soul of a dead shaman proceeds together with his familiars to the sky, ‘where all are thought to be happy and friendly’. What is unclear is why the unburnt bones of a child are given a secondary burial, nor are we told what happens to a child’s soul on death. Even so, the differences in mortuary rites seem to reflect Waiwai notions about the varying relationship between body and soul according to different sorts of person (ibid.: 161–7).

From this summary account of Fock’s detailed description of Waiwai ideas and practices, the intention is now to look at other ethnographies from the region, all post-Fock, and see how far the Waiwai material coincides with them. A start will be made with the Waiwai’s eastern neighbours, the Trio.

Among the Trio the person is composed of body (pun), soul (amore) and name (eka). As with the Waiwai, the Trio use the same word for soul and shadow. The Trio soul can best be described as a morally neutral concept, something akin to our notion of consciousness in its sense of the totality of thoughts and feelings which constitute a person’s conscious being. It is more than this in so far as there are degrees of consciousness that are associated with status, prowess, and knowledge.

The soul is thought to permeate the body with special concentrations at the heart and pulses as well as at the joints, particularly the knees and ankles. Attempts to discover whether these are different aspects of a single soul or multiple souls produced a very variable response. However—and although the same word is used for it—there is the clear recognition of a distinct eye-soul that is an essential ingredient of life and is extinguished on death. This contrasts with

2. The material has to be forced slightly to obtain the correlation, and the situation is obscured by variation and external influences. Even so there is something here, and as will be seen below, a similar example occurs elsewhere in the region.

3. It is interesting to note that when Farabee visited the Waiwai in 1913, the unburnt remains of ordinary Waiwai were being gathered together and placed in a pot (Farabee 1924: 171–2).

4. The Trio material was collected by the present author.
Fock’s claim that among the Waiwai it is not an ‘absolute necessity for the individual’ in life, but it fits with some other cases that I will turn to shortly, in which the eye-soul is explicitly equated with what may be translated as ‘life’. On the question of when the soul enters an infant, there was further disagreement. Some said that babies receive their soul through the fontanelle at birth, whereas others claimed that they were born with their eye-soul but had no other soul until four or five years old. There is some idea that, as with the Waiwai, the source of the soul is sex-linked, a boy deriving it from his father, a girl from her mother. The soul of the newborn child is small and not secured to the body and there is a great danger that, unless the correct ritual procedures, that is the couvade, are observed by the parents, the soul will stray away from the infant. Part of the explanation for this is the consubstantiality that is thought to exist between the parents and the child, so that the activities of the former affect the latter’s well-being. But the idea is more general; for consubstantiality is also thought to exist between husband and wife and in varying degrees among other kin. What is shared is soul or essence, so that those with whom you are consubstantial are affected by your actions and you by theirs. In other words, a person’s soul is not entirely discrete.

As the Trio child grows up the soul becomes increasingly fixed to the body, but even in adulthood it is never totally fixed. The soul leaves the body during dreams and this is understood as normal. In fact the vernacular term for dreaming literally means ‘to provide oneself with a soul’. What is not normal is when the soul is absent from the body under other conditions, above all during sickness. I do not have space to consider Trio aetiology in depth, but, as with most other people in the region, causes lie in the invisible world and it is there that one has to look to understand events in the visible world. They are the result of human activation of spirits or direct spirit intervention or a combination of both. One diagnosis of sickness is soul-loss, and here the dividing line between sickness and death becomes blurred—the state of someone dead or unconscious in a coma is described by the same word, wakenai. This term literally translates as ‘not being’, and the answer to the question ‘what is not being?’ is the soul. This reflects the perceived association between the states of sickness and death, as they are both conditions under which the soul and the body are in a tenuous relationship. Good health, on the other hand, is manifest in a secure, firm relationship between body and soul—the hardness of the person (see Rivière 1969: 262–3).

Death provides a privileged moment in which to understand the soul as it is when the person is, so to speak, unassembled. I will deal with the Trio’s eschatological beliefs quite briefly. At death the mortal body is disposed of, traditionally buried in the floor of the house, which is abandoned. What is not so certain is what happens to the soul or souls (now become amorempé or ‘former soul’). From the contradictory statements I obtained, it would appear that part of the soul hangs

5. For a more complex and decidedly patrilineal theory of conception provided by one Trio shaman, see Rivière 1969: 62–3.
around the survivors for a time and tries to lure them away, whereas the eye-soul departs on a hazardous journey through the sky to the *amore entuhtao* on the eastern horizon, where sky and water meet. The term *entu* means ‘owner’, ‘source’, ‘root’ or ‘origin’, and *-htao* is a postposition meaning ‘in’. The descriptions I obtained of this place are less than clear, but it appears to be like a lake of soul matter, a soul reservoir. At death the soul merges back into the lake and becomes indistinguishable as an entity. It seems to be like pouring a cup of water into a bucket of water. At birth a cup of water is scooped out, so that whereas any newborn may have a few particles of someone else’s former soul, the odds against receiving all the same particles of that person are very remote. In other words, although soul matter is recycled so that any particular soul is constituted of particles from a number of former souls, in itself it will almost certainly be unique. Thus in terms of soul it is difficult to talk about reincarnation: what is reincarnated is that aspect of the individual that is signified by a name.

The name is the link between the body and the soul, or better perhaps the signifier of the joint presence of body and soul as a person in the visible world. Names are transmitted through alternate generations, a person receiving the name of a recently deceased member of the grandparental generation. The name goes into abeyance on the death of its bearer, but it is under these circumstances that the significance of the name in the relationship between body and soul becomes fully apparent. In Trio, to ask the name of a dead person makes no sense—in other words, a question such as ‘what is the name of your deceased father?’ is not understood. The properly formulated question is ‘what is the deceased name of your father?’ The Trio point out quite reasonably that just because your father is dead, this does not mean that he has ceased to be your father. In other words, it is not the relationship that has ceased to exist but the name which signifies and binds together body and soul as a living, visible, social being.

As a further example I will take the Maroni River Caribs of Surinam as described by Kloos (1971), with additional information from Magaña (1988). Although heavily influenced by Christianity, similar features to those I have noted among the Trio and Waiwai are discernible. The Maroni River Caribs have the words *a:ka*, *aka:límbo*, and *ekato:nímbô* which Kloos translates respectively as ‘soul’, ‘former soul’, and ‘ghost’.\(^6\) There are several souls, located in different parts of the body, but Kloos considers them to be different manifestations of a single entity. At death, the former soul makes a hazardous journey to heaven unless the person has met a bad death, in which case it remains on earth to haunt people. The ghost, *ekato:nímbô*, comes into existence at the moment of death,

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6. Kloos (1971: 151) notes that in 1907, Penard and Penard had recorded the word *kasoele* as ‘soul of a human being’ and states that it is unknown in that sense today, when it means ‘bead’. This is interesting, as the Piaroa of Venezuela use the concept of ‘beads’ to convey ideas about awareness and knowledge (see Overing 1988).
some people claiming that it is the shadow that acquires an independent existence, and that bothers the living, causing sickness and death (1971: 151-2). However, Kloos also suggests (ibid.: 216) that it is only the ghosts of people who have met bad deaths who are troublesome in this way. According to Magaña (1988: 162), who mainly relies on earlier sources, the Kalifia conceive of various souls, which are located in different parts of the body and have different destinations on death, some going to the sky and others remaining on earth converted into animals and spirits. In fact these two positions, except for the question of whether there is one or more souls, are not that different and bear strong resemblances to Trio and Waiwai ideas on the matter.

A further striking similarity to the Waiwai is the fact that Maroni River Carib funerary practices differ according to whether the deceased is an infant, an ordinary person, or a shaman (Kloos 1971: 146-7). Here it is not the method of disposing of the corpse that varies but the degree of elaboration of the funeral. Everyone is now buried in a graveyard, although formerly burial occurred in or near the house, an old canoe being used as a coffin. A wake is held for both ordinary people and shamans, although in the case of the latter different types of song (spirit-songs) are sung by an assembly of shamans. For an infant no nocturnal feast is held and the burial takes place with little ceremony or public attention. Although it is not explicitly stated, it would seem safe to assume that also in the case of infants also, neither of the two further feasts celebrated for older people is held. Whether or not either of these feasts traditionally involved secondary burial, neither does so today, and Kloos interprets them as partly commemorative of the dead and as partly marking the gradual phasing out of mourning (ibid.: 147-51).

A baby goes without a name (e:ti) for some time, although Kloos does not specify how long. The name is given to it by a maternal grandmother, who is said to dream it. These names are also said to be old (ibid.: 104). There is nothing here that contradicts the two earlier cases, but one may speculate on whether the unceremonious treatment of dead infants is limited to the period before they receive names, or in Christian terms before they are baptized.

We continue to find ourselves in familiar territory when we turn to the Kapon and Pemon of Guyana, Brazil and Venezuela. Among these people there is pon, the substance or flesh of a body, which is distinguished from esak, which refers to the body as a whole. The term esak also has the sense of ownership of or control over something and thus appears to have a semantic overlap with the Trio term entu. However, entu does not mean 'body', nor does it have 'the notion of incorporating something', as esak does. The spirit or soul (akwaru among the

7. It is not clear what ekato means, since the word for ghost, ekato:nimbo, is clearly derived from ekato and nimbo and presumably means a 'former ekato'. However, I have failed to find a translation of ekato; Kloos does not elucidate the term, nor is it mentioned in either Ahlbrinck (1931) or Hoff (1968).

8. The Pemon are composed of the Macusi, Taurepan, Arekuna and Karamakoto, the Kapon of the Akawaio and Patamona.
Kapon, ekaton among the Pemon) acts as a life force and is understood to be a portion of the radiant light (akwa) that emanates from the sun. However, this is not a merely mechanical concept but has qualitative and moral associations as well as quantitative variation. Thus someone with more soul or spirit is more intelligent, knowledgeable, wiser and happier. The Akawaio also refer to an eye-soul (ewang enu) but, like the Waiwai, do not credit it with much importance. Finally it might be noted that the Trio word for soul, amore, occurs among the Akawaio with the same meaning, not in everyday speech but only in shamanic songs (Butt Colson 1989: 53–61; Butt Colson and De Armellada 1990: 13–34; Butt Colson, personal communication, 1997).

In an earlier article, Butt (1954) also refers to the concept of akwarupo, ghost, literally ‘deprived of a soul’, which suggests that it only comes into existence on the death of a person. She makes the point that at death the akwaru goes to the sky, whereas the akwarupo remains to haunt the earth. She also notes that they are seen as being respectively good and bad (ibid.: 52–6). Once again, we have in basic outline a very similar set of ideas to those we have already examined.

The Yekuana of southern Venezuela, another Carib-speaking group of tropical forest cultivators, recognize the existence of six souls, although all of them involve verbal elaborations of a single basic term, akato, which literally means ‘double’ and is derived from aka, ‘two’. Two of them, the eye-soul (ayenudu akano akato) and the heart-soul (ayewana akano akato), are contained within the body, represent immortal life, travel during dreams, and return to heaven on death. These souls are irreversibly good and contrast with the other four, which are external to the body and are redemptive in the sense that they absorb the sins of the individual. The ‘soul in the Moon’ (nuna awono akato) absorbs most of the wickedness of a person and burns for eternity, whereas the ‘soul in the Sun’ (shi awono akato) has some goodness about it and returns to its home in the sun at death. The ‘soul in the water’ (tuna awono akato) is the reflection of the individual in the water whither it returns on death, and is considered as nearly as evil as the soul of the Moon. The final soul is that of the Earth, akatomba, which reveals itself as the shadow and after death wanders the earth in the form of a small dwarf making bleating sounds (Guss 1989: 50–1). Although Guss does not say so, one

9. While the Pemon word ekaton would mean ‘names’ in Trio, Butt Colson makes no mention of names being part of the person. Williams (1932: 182) gives the Macusi word for one’s soul as i-té-katón and one’s former soul as i-ka-ton-be. The Akawaio word for name is esik (Audrey Colson, personal communication, 1997).

10. In 1954, Butt used ‘l’ rather than ‘r’ in both akwaru and akwarupo. The flap ‘l’ in Carib languages often sounds like an ‘r’ and may be regarded as orthographically equivalent to it.

11. The Yekuana conceive of every object, animate or inanimate, as having an invisible double or akato. Accordingly this is a very important concept in the ordering of their universe. Guss (1989: 31–61) deals with it at length in a section entitled ‘The Dual Nature of Reality’.


might guess that *akatomba* means 'former *akato*' and is thus the equivalent of the ghost or *ekatînho* of the Waiwai, the *ekato:nîmbo* of the Maroni River Caribs, and the *akwarupo* of the Pemon.

In choosing four examples with which to compare the Waiwai one is obviously being selective, but to some degree the selection has been driven by the nature of the material available. There are many Carib-speaking peoples for whom we have little or no information on this topic. It cannot, therefore, be purely a result of selection that a high degree of convergence of ideas has emerged. Indeed, given the different backgrounds, theoretical standpoints and aims of the ethnographers concerned, the coincidence is remarkable. A distinct and basic pattern is present which consists of a soul dispersed through the body, which is an essential component of the individual's living existence. There may be more than one part or aspect of the soul. At death a part of the soul goes to the sky and part stays on the earth as a ghost, although the latter may only come into existence at death. There is some correlation between the soul which goes to heaven and goodness and the ghost that remains on earth and wickedness. Beyond this there is a degree of variation which may result from either genuine local elaborations or differences in ethnographic presentation.

One such variation concerns names. We saw that in the Trio material the name is an essential ingredient of the living person, while Fock states that the Waiwai name has a psychic component. In the other cases the name does not appear to have this characteristic, although it may be noted that the syllables forming the Trio word for name (*eka*) recur in the Waiwai word for soul, *ekati*, in the Maroni River Caribs word for 'ghost', *ekato:nîmbo*, in the Pemon word for 'soul', *ekaton*, and possibly in the Yecuana word for 'double', *akato*. This may be an insignificant coincidence but it is suggestive, especially when it is placed alongside another feature of names throughout the region, namely the secrecy within which they are veiled, which in turn arises from the intimate association between individuals and their names. What it suggests is that names are as much an essential of individual personhood as other components such as body and soul.\[12\]

If we look outside the sphere of Carib-speakers, we find among many peoples of Lowland South America that the name is not simply an aspect of the person or a psychic component but a component of the psyche. Examples are very numerous and I will only adduce two. The first are the Tukanoan Barasana of the north-west Amazon among whom the name is soul in its purest, immaterial form, in contrast to the souls associated with the soft organs and bones of the body (Hugh-Jones 1979: 133-4). The second are the Arakmbut of the Madre de Dios region of Peru. Their ideas are strikingly similar to those of the Trio; for them the person is

12. Audrey Colson, in providing some very helpful comments on this paper, felt there is probably more to names among the Akawaio than it had been possible to find out because of their high degree of secretiveness about them.
composed of body, soul and name, and the last ‘constitutes the essence of a person, binding the body and soul together into one whole’ (Gray 1996: 80, 81).\footnote{13}

It would seem that ideas concerning the soul among some of the Carib-speakers of Guiana fit well with notions found within the wider tropical forest area. It was Niels Fock, at the dawn of modern Amazonian ethnography, who first sketched these ideas so accurately.

\footnote{13. For Gray’s full discussion of this matter, see his Chapter 6, aptly entitled ‘Keeping Body and Soul Together’.}

REFERENCES


CONFLICTS AND CONTRASTS OF IDENTITY IN A CHANGING CORNISH VILLAGE

MILS HILLS

Introduction

In this paper I seek to illustrate and exemplify the multiple changes which have been wrought by the flow of residents born elsewhere in the United Kingdom into a small rural Cornish village. With the decline of the agricultural economy, increased mechanization and the seemingly concomitant rise in the desirability of the countryside as a place of residence for those born outside it, the composition and character of such villages have greatly changed recently.

The ethnographic material for this article was collected while I was working as a veterinary assistant in a rural Cornish veterinary practice. Being explicitly part of the local daily life of the village, I was able to get to grips with the distinctions between local and non-local without the problem of attempting to highlight my 'Cornishness'. In spite of my predominantly non-Cornish accent, I was able to avoid having to define my Cornishness because I was in the company of a professional person (the veterinary surgeon). We were evaluated not in purely local terms, but rather in terms of a complicated matrix made up of valuations of professional ability, courtesy, showing appropriate respect to the farmer and the outcome of farm visits in terms of both the health of the animal(s) concerned and the monthly invoice.

1. Cornwall is the most south-western county of the United Kingdom, sometimes known as the 'toe of Britain'.
In this paper, I do not deal with qualitative niceties such as the non-existence of the ‘rural’ as a result of the predominance of telecommunications, private cars, urban migration and so on (cf. Strathern 1982). Rather, I take the existence of the rural as read because of its role in action. In other words, if my informants say that Penberthy is rural, it is ethically dubious to insist otherwise. Through the discourse of one local informant in particular, I attempt to apply Rapport’s notion of ‘loops’ of discourse (1993) in order to draw out the contrasts and conflicts between local and incomer identities.

Penberthy is a small Cornish village near Truro on the Roseland Peninsula, several miles from the main trunk-road which carries most road traffic into and out of the Duchy of Cornwall. The main street of the village is on one side of a leafy valley. Some one hundred and fifty people live in the village, most of whom are not locally recognized as ‘belonging’ to Penberthy. Locals and incomers can meet in the post office-cum-village shop, in either of two pubs, at church or at the cricket club.

Having secured work for myself as a veterinary assistant in Penberthy, I decided not to live in the village itself because this would have irrevocably placed me within the ‘camp’ of the non-locals. I therefore confined my interactions with locals to a more professional level. I worked with and for the veterinary surgeon and was thus in an instantly recognizable and classifiable situation. Some villagers whom I grew to know better than others learnt from me that I was a student taking time out to pay my way through university. This was locally modelled as a ‘good thing’, an appropriate kind of action, avoiding ‘sponging off of the state’ or depending on parental contributions. The villagers and I were both victims of the economic situation of the country: they, as farmers, were over-taxed and at the mercy of bureaucrats, while I was short of money and a deserving case, in contrast to the undeserving, those who actively shirked work and were getting, I was told, vast amounts of money from the state. My position as a stranger to the area, being neither non-local or local, meant that I could manipulate this situation to my insightful advantage. As Rapport writes (1993: 123):

> only the stranger, socially dislocated and placing habit in question (and, more precisely, annotating conversations and then juxtaposing these records in alien ways), would possibly have to deal with what Schutz has described as the incoherence, partiality and contradictoriness inherent in the assumptions of people’s everyday commonsensical knowledge.

From my vantage-point as a veterinary assistant, visiting farms and carrying instruments and medicines for a local veterinary surgeon, I was able to meet farmers and other rural folk in what I label ‘situations of similarity’, in that all were united in sharing concern about, for example, a cow’s distress. The circle of mutual interest centred around the task in hand, from which I was able to manipu-

2. The names of both village and villagers have been altered.
late my questioning and, more particularly, my listening in order to ascertain both farmers' identities and their means of expressing and making them explicit. These identities were always expressed in contrast to those of the incomers, the folk from 'up-country'. This is how the locals gloss those who have 'left the rat race', as the incomers themselves portray their entry into their rural idyll. Of course, this 'rural idyll' is the farmer’s factory, as well as a landscape that is creatively deployed to define those who belong and those who do not.

In this paper, I would like present a selection of the individuals concerned and the situations in which their identities are made both explicit and, most importantly, contrasting. Present-day anthropology is largely concerned with the confused, often contradictory multiplicity of statuses, opinions, beliefs and stances which are contained within each individual human being as an actor. It may even be that such a jumble characterizes, even defines, what it is to be human. As Walt Whitman observed: 'Do I contradict myself? Very well then...I contradict myself. I am large...I contain multitudes' (cited in Wolf 1993: 119). Dissecting out these multiple identities has been pioneered by Rapport, in *Diverse World-Views* (1993), where he proposes the term 'loop' to describe the cyclical discourses which each sub-persona uses to 'speak through' the individual in question: 'each loop seemed to represent a whole world, a world replete with relevant people and events, manners and mores, institutions and relations, evaluations and expectations' (1993: 122). As a veterinary assistant helping out on a farm, gossiping in the pub at lunchtime or chatting in the post office queue, I came to hear some of these loops.

The loops of thought presented in farmers' discourse show that they value an entirely different set of priorities and icons than do those who have recently moved into the area. Farmers, it is true to say, do not find much of the heralded 'peace and tranquillity' in the countryside—indeed, it is more like a factory that they are unable to leave, condemned as they are to work long, lonely hours and negotiate ever more complex bodies of law relating to the correct employment of chemicals, and so on. Consequently, farmers suffer one of the highest suicide and alcoholism rates of all occupational groups. In this paper, I focus on the discourse of one informant in particular.

*Local Identity*

'The English village,' writes Thomas Sharp, 'is, I believe, among the pleasantest and most warmly human places that men have ever built to live in' (cited in Sprott 1964: 89).

The picture-postcard view of the rural Cornish village is of a clump of thatched cottages grouped around a small square, with a church and a couple of public houses, not so very different, in fact, to the classic English village scene. However, due to the massive increase in both tourism and people relocating to retire
because of the ‘slower pace of life’, the ‘peace and quiet of the countryside’, the village is not what it once was. In fact, it is no longer what the locals want. In the space of a lifetime the village has changed from being the centre of locals’ activities—with bring-and-buy sales, Methodist Chapel ‘tea-treats’ (where all the children have a day-trip and traditionally were given a saffron cake, tea and some pocket money), and so on—to being on the periphery of locals’ priorities. Today, all the cottages in this village—and most villages nearby are also like this—are either inhabited by those moving into the area or left empty for most of the year, only being used as holiday homes in the high season. There is thus some tension between locals and tourists, as it is often local women who are employed to ‘skivvy round’, as they sometimes put it, cleaning the houses ready for the tourists’ arrival.

While actual physical violence between locals and incomers does exist, mainly in the pubs and clubs of holiday resorts such as Newquay (where, for example, local youths take exception to holiday-makers going out with local girls), there is certainly symbolic violence in rural villages. The popular, pervasive and persuasive urban myth of the harmonious village community is much misplaced. There are bitter feuds in many villages, even where the demographic balance between local and non-local has not altered significantly. The symbolic violence is usually made manifest in terms of ostracism and the imposition of social distance. This is underlined and emphasized by the fact that, unsurprisingly, non-locals never attend, show interest in or have the knowledge to be able to participate in any of the recognized groups which confer and confirm local identity, such as the Young Farmers’ Club or local meetings of the National Farmers Union. Similarly, the farmers and other locals have no time for meetings of the (urban) Round Table or of conservation groups such as the Council for the Protection of Rural England.3 Often, it seemed to me, the only thing which united these disparate groups of people was the actual countryside itself as an object. The only contact between the two sides was a cursory wave from car to tractor as one passed the other on the lane between the village and the nearby headland which leads to the local spur road that eventually joins up with the Falmouth–Truro road. At the same moment that the countryside united everyone, at least spatially, it simultaneously threw them apart because of the polar opposition between landscape as workplace (for farmers and farm workers) and landscape as an unchanged and unchangeable source of tranquillity and country walks (for the incomers).

3. Not least because many Cornish people feel themselves as distinct from England and from English ethnicity.
Ross Tremayne

Ross Tremayne, a farmer in his early fifties, is a very thoughtful and phlegmatic man. One of his favourite farm occupations is ploughing, because it allows him both time and space to ‘think long an’ hard about things, and fit them in perspective, like’. He has been very active in village affairs, having served on the Parish Council for many years, and is also a stalwart of the local Conservative Party Association. His ponderings while ploughing have led him to conclude that the future of the village is very bleak. He is frustrated almost daily by the incomers, who either leave gates open and allow stock to get mixed up in the fields, which he has to sort out, or else allow their or their friends’ cars to block farm gates and entrances. At other times ‘they’re on the blower, telling my wife to get me to shut up the cocks from crowin’, or the cows from lowin’ or summat stupid. I says to them, if you don’t like it, get out! Me and my family’ve been here for years, and they got no right interferin’ with things now.’ Indeed, Ross’s brother once traced the family tree back over five hundred years before calling it a day.

Ross misses the old times in the village, when everyone knew everyone else, and where everyone knew their place in the scheme of things. It wasn’t that work in those days was any easier. In fact it was much harder, but everyone was honest and everyone knew about farming and those necessary but now highly unpopular events which defined the rural cultural calendar, like cubbing, fox-hunting and the annual pigeon shoot. Almost everyone got involved in some activity or other. Time for the whole village was organized around this rural timetable, which has now mainly disappeared, save for the Harvest Supper and annual inter-village ploughing match. At that time, Ross agreed, the entire organization and activity of the village centred around the rural calendar. Everyone agreed on the necessity to exploit the land and its resources (both wild and domesticated), and there was no polarized dichotomy between (incomer) environmentalists and (local) farmers. Now, events like the ploughing match and especially the Royal Cornwall Show are, Ross feels, really important occasions when busy farmers from all over Cornwall and further afield can come together and compare equipment, catch up on gossip, and exchange complaints. They reassure themselves that they are all doing things ‘right’. Says Ross, ‘it keeps us sane’.

Simon Schama has recently written (1995: 61):

Landscapes are culture before they are nature, constructs of the imagination projected on to wood and water and rock. [...] But it should also be acknowledged that once a certain idea of landscape, a myth, a vision, establishes itself in an actual place, it has a peculiar way of muddling categories, of making metaphors more real than their referents, of becoming, in fact, part of the scenery.

4. A pseudonym.
Attitudes to the landscape (the ‘countryside’) and the people and animals that inhabit it are a crucial and highly visible means by which identities are made and kept distinct: the metaphors and myths of Penberthy abut uncomfortably on to the expectations of incomers. Farmers such as Ross Tremayne saw both land and animals as commoditized. Ross owned the five-hundred-acre dairy and arable farm which he and his ancestors had built up over generations through sheer hard work and graft. As the landowner, he felt more or less able to do what he wanted, even—and especially—when this involved practices of dubious legality, such as the burying of agrochemicals which had been banned and which would have been expensive to dispose of according to the letter of the law. The same went for the destruction of the ancient dry-stone hedges that are so characteristic of conventional Cornish farm practice. The gateways were so narrow that much of his modern plant was unable to fit through the gaps, and anyway, he said, some of the enclosed fields were so small that they were hardly worth using. He solved both problems by simply grubbing up the hedges. Needless to say, this had caused a great deal of alarm to those who had moved into the area in search of a rural Arcadia. Although campaigns and petitions had been organized, signed solely by those recognized, by both groups, as non-locals, the farmer stuck to his guns and continued with the process of making his fields easier for him to get into to plough and harvest. As Ross put it: ‘These upcountry types forget that this isn’t the garden of Eden; and even if ‘twas, a garden requires a gardener; and it’s me that puts the food on their tables’. However, given the propensity of environmentally concerned incomers to buy organic produce in the nearby supermarkets of Truro, that might not actually be as true as Ross thought.

Ross, as my main informant (being a major client of the veterinary practice), seemed to be precisely the sort of person to whose discourse one could apply Rapport’s notion of loops of discourse. For Rapport loops of discourse are idiosyncratic, cyclical sets of associated phrases, regularly repeated in daily utterances. ‘Each loop seemed to represent a whole world, a world replete with relevant people and events, manners and mores, institutions and relations, evaluations and expectations’ (Rapport 1993: 122). Rapport, from his key informants, isolated several personae and world-views, i.e. complexes of loops. This is what I propose to apply to the discourses of Ross Tremayne.

One of Ross’s most frequent discoursal loops was that of him as villager. Whether concerned about the raft of planning applications by incomers to have satellite dishes fitted, or about the increase in bed-and-breakfast accommodation run by the incomers, which undermined the ‘traditional’ sources of income to the locals, he frequently invoked his genetic claim to legitimately be in the village and to be a ‘proper villager’. Although there was no ‘core’ of real villagers who were related by birth (as Strathern, for example, found in Elmdon [1982]) and who were recognized, by various audiences and thus by varying memberships, to be genuine locals. ‘proper’ villagers were, Ross said, those who had always lived in the village or nearby (i.e. in a neighbouring village) and whose parents had also resided locally. Church attendance, although not obligatory in defining proper ‘villager-
ness', was often a corollary, and presence at village social events such as the annual Young Farmers' Hog Roast and village-hall coffee mornings was more obligatory.

The term 'proper' in the local dialectal meaning is imbied with a moral judgement that the individual concerned fulfils through residence, dress, occupation (or, if retired, past occupation), and daily behaviour. Those who change within one of these categories of local recognition are liable to be viewed, at least temporarily, with some suspicion, their actions being carefully scrutinized in case the individual is 'picking up emmet ways'. Ross's use of 'proper' expanded out from his recognition of locals and non-locals, and also, interestingly, was applied to tasks and chores that were in his eyes efficiently and effectively carried out: 'proper job', he would observe, as the vet appropriately assessed, diagnosed and treated an ailing animal. When he spoke of outsiders and their activities, they were identified as 'that bloke in advertising', identity here being contingent on occupational specialization alone. The fact that, for example, the advertising copywriter had lived in the village for ten years did not make him any more of a villager, because the grounds for membership of the category 'villager' were not ones that either he or anyone else could fulfil. That does not, though, stop people who have lived in the village for a fairly long time thinking that they are 'almost locals', an identity they base solely on the length of time they have been resident in the village and on knowing most people in the village by name. This kind of statement is greeted with more than derision by Tremayne: 'Ah, them's not proper locals, however long they're here, them's always new, they don't understand our ways'.

The agricultural round of activities governs many of a farmer's activities. The hours of daylight still tend to dictate how long they work. Tremayne valued his early starts in the morning, which in some ways defined his identity and his localness. He liked to wake up to the early news briefing on the radio, grab a bite of breakfast and a mug of tea as he decided what to do that day, and then head out to the fields and barns to collect his herd for milking or to deliver bales of silage for animals in outlying fields. He derived some pleasure from chugging through the village on his tractor, hard at work, while the incomers were mostly asleep. This, though, he also found frustrating, that he should be out getting dirty, working in all weathers, while those with 'cushy jobs' could take their time in getting up, head out to their cars and drive to a nice warm office somewhere. Simultaneously, he disapproved of their behaviour, which affirmed the value of his. This was reinforced by the fact that as he drove along the main street of the village, he could see lights in the houses of those he recognized as locals—even the elderly tended to get up as early, as they had when they had had to rise early to work on the farms.

5. 'Emmet' is explained below.
The Veterinary Surgeon

The veterinary surgeon I accompanied most frequently on farm visits was Martin. Having been born and educated in the Bristol area, from primary through to veterinary school, he was recognized as being from the West Country and so was not that much of an ‘up-country emmet’: he was not exactly ‘one of us’, but neither was he seen as an interloper. The pejorative term ‘emmet’ is used by supposedly native Cornish people to describe those who have not been born and bred in Cornwall and is recognized as a valid category vividly conveying one’s right to be living in the Duchy. Gilligan writes that ‘the derogatory term ‘emmet’ [...] can encompass both tourists and [now resident] outsiders in a deliberately blanketing and hostile manner, but is generally only used to refer to abstract categories of persons rather than to actual individuals’ (Gilligan 1987: 78). Until and unless a veterinary surgeon makes a mistake or is perceived to have made a mistake, he or she is usually insulated from being labelled as an ‘emmet’ because of the clearly useful services being provided. This is in rather sharp contrast to those graphic designers, architects, etc., who, having moved into the heart of the village or into a ‘done-up’ (converted and renovated) barn, do not produce anything useful, though none the less they openly flaunt their wealth in the form of large cars, ‘poncy’ mobile telephones, useless dogs, and so on.

Of Cars and Commuters

There is thus a cultural difference in the prestige invested in those things which legitimately show wealth according to local cultural norms—such as new(er) tractor and equipment, computer-controlled cattle-feeding equipment—and those forms of ostentation which are locally modelled as non-legitimate. A surprising area of contrast was provided by the Land Rover. This distinctive cultural icon is used by both sides to define themselves, but in different ways. Of late, the four-wheel-drive Land Rover has become a popular vehicle with incomers, and they are a familiar sight both in the village and commuting to offices in the city of Truro and even as far afield as Plymouth. However, without exception, the model of Land Rover that incomers purchase is the Discovery, the model which is explicitly marketed as a leisure vehicle. The farming fraternity, meanwhile, loyally continue to purchase (or mend!) the Defender, the original Land Rover model, which usually lacks the refinements that make the Discovery such a popular buy, such as metallic paint, carpeting and air-conditioning. The Defender is available in the five-seater configuration, but this is almost always rejected in favour of a model

6. For a number of years it has been possible to purchase a car sticker declaring that the driver of the car is not an emmet. The matching term employed in Devon is apparently ‘grockle’.
with a canvas hood over a rear pickup section. Thus the Defender is a culturally appropriate vehicle for the locals, while the Discovery, usually pristinely clean and undented, is deemed singularly inappropriate. The locals seem to find something immoral in the sight of a Land Rover which is not a ‘working’ vehicle, an impression highlighted by their cleanliness.

The metaphor of dirt is a powerful means of elucidating the difference between people (cf. Okely [1983] on Gypsy notions of internal versus external purity). Similarly in many ways dirt is employed to distinguish between true and new locals in and around Penberthy. Farmers and others who have not moved into the area recently tend to prize the dung-bespattered condition of their vehicles and, often, much-mended clothes as markers of their ability and respect for the ethic of hard work. Cliches often heard are that there is ‘no shame in hard work’ and that ‘where there’s muck, there’s money’. If something breaks down or falls apart, great efforts are made to repair it before its perhaps inevitable replacement. Non-locals, however, would tend to skip the repair-attempt stage, an action which again was endowed with a negative moral value by the locals. Taken through to its logical conclusion, this is best exemplified by the recognized fact that those local farmers with the most wealth do not, in fact, look as if they have very much. While incomers, like as Roger Dunn, originally from the Milton Keynes area, mouth such epithets as ‘You never see a dead donkey and a happy farmer on the same day’, the farmers and their associated service-industry workers (such as a local tyre-service contractor who mends punctures on large farm plant) admire a dispassionate, dour attitude to life and its endless disappointments—as they model their own existence. The very rich farmer dresses like his fellow farmers, i.e. dresses less well than his poorer friends and colleagues; this is admired, not so much in terms of what people say about him but, rather like the dog that did not bark, in terms of what isn’t said about him. Approval, it is important to note, can be gained and marked by lack of display, and also by the absence of disapproval. This is reflected and emphasized in the ‘proper’ kinds of dress appropriate for going to market or church, where the ‘special’ suit will be worn.

The Knacker’s Yard: Identities in Conflict

The specific case of the knacker’s yard crystallizes all the tensions that exist between what we might call the ‘traditional locals’ and those arrivistes in search of a sometimes elusive sense of rural peace and tranquillity. It is a recognized fact, at least among farmers, veterinarians and so on, first that there is a certain mortality rate among livestock, and secondly, that economic criteria cannot be excluded from the rearing of farm stock. The first is common sense; the second relates to the decision of a farmer or herdsman to ‘send an animal away’ if, for example, it consistently fails to thrive as well as its fellow stock or, in the case of
breeding females, if it repeatedly miscarries or gives birth to below-average young. The time comes when the animal is sent either to a market cull-sale (which means that they progress straight from the market to the slaughterhouse and are not fattened up), or the knacker man is called in. As well as dealing with animals which have died and those which are no longer economic to keep, he also humanely destroys casualties (those with broken legs, etc.). The sites where knacker men operate from are where they bring back carcasses, butcher them and treat the meat so that it is safe for the pet-food trade as well as grinding bones for bonemeal, etc. Of course, these operations create a fair amount of smell, an issue which absolutely galvanized the villagers of Penberthy. Many of those who had moved into the village and bought expensive new bungalows on a ridge opposite the yard, with a commanding view of the village, had been unaware of the smell that would waft up to them when the wind changed direction and when the seasons grew warmer. Singularly unimpressed with this very necessary aspect of the farming industry, they attempted to have the yard closed, or at least moved. Unfortunately for the protesters, knacker's yards are highly regulated by the Health and Safety Executive and the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food; moreover the knackers were adhering closely to the law.

What, I suggest, the incomers found distasteful and revolting was the fact that while they had been convinced by a multitude of literary and televisual sources that the countryside was an open, honest and welcoming place, a place of tranquility where farmers were decent, if earthy, folk, and where both people and animals lived out happy and healthy lives wafted by Cornish sea-breezes, there were plenty of lacunae in the existential validity of this world-view. What they were highly disturbed to find was that up discreet slopes, tucked away in picturesque villages on the main south-coast road, the countryside and its economy possessed hidden parts which allowed the non-hidden parts (i.e. animals in fields, picturesque farms and colourful farmers) to exist. These consisted of hidden parts of the rural organism, such things as abattoirs, knacker's yards, horse-slaughterers, intensive pig and chicken units and so on. This the incomers somehow saw as 'dishonest'. They remarked that they did not know that such places existed, as though the countryside and the village should reveal all of its faces so that non-rural innocents would not be offended by unpleasant sights or smells.

The reality, of course, is that there is a miscomprehension, a méconnaissance, of what the shared image of the countryside is. Everyone sees (topographically) hills, valleys, trees and hedges: the difference between the farmer and the architect is in terms of what one could label 'cultural modelling'. While the cultural modelling of the farmer is non-Arcadian, the incomer is unable to grasp the complexities of agro-economics or the problems caused by leaving gates open and having unruly dogs around sheep. Several incomers indicated that they had

7. Perhaps symbolic of the incomers' aloofness and presumed superiority, Ross and other locals modelled the residential location of the incomers by labelling them the 'high and mighties'.
expected the countryside to be much more similar to the books and films they had read and seen when they were growing up than the more profit-oriented, industrial reality which characterizes modern farming.

There was a connection between this complex of beliefs about what the countryside and its population(s) ought to be and the loops of discourse that were employed. Incomers' speech tended to be peppered with references to peace, quiet, restfulness, the 'slow pace of life', the escape from the daily grind of the 'rat race' of London/Bristol/Milton Keynes, and so on. These were in extreme contrast to, say, the farmers, who could never comprehend there being a 'slow pace of life' when their harvesting equipment or tractor spare-part deliveries were being held up behind tourist caravans in the narrow lanes leading up to Penberthy. In fact, they said, farmers had never been busier, with more paperwork, fewer employees, and more expensive contractors than in the past. They resented the visible leisure time the incomers ostentatiously flaunted (they 'rub our faces in it') with their long walks, hours of gardening, and so on.

**Conclusion**

In conclusion, I would like to draw a historical contrast with the example of a working definition of a village published in 1964:

> with the changing years has come leisure and new interests. It is in the development of sectional organizations, each catering for special interests of all the inhabitants, irrespective of status, that we may see, not the disintegration of social life, but its enhancement. There are local football and cricket leagues in which village plays village, there are village dramatic societies which compete with one another at drama festivals; groups of villagers can hire a bus for an expedition, and above all there are the Women's Institutes to which all classes belong and at which the most retiring can be 'brought out' by competitions, little exhibitions, and simple games. These are but a handful of village activities. Where they flourish we can say that the village is alive. (Sprott 1964: 88)

Although this sounds quite dramatic, we must conclude that if the village of Penberthy is defined as above—and similarly seen through the discourses of the locals—as such it is dead. There is a radical rupture between the village as it was and is remembered by those locals who had been part of a community—which they say was similar to that in the above quotation—and the village as lived in by incomers. The latter find a certain village ethos largely because the village is now mainly comprised of people who also expect the village to take a certain form and provide certain things which, in the form of a self-fulfilling prophecy, they then ensure that it does. Control of the metaphor of the village has been wrested from
the hands of those local to the area, something which is made manifest in all areas of behaviour, from the composition of the cricket team to pew seating arrangements right through to membership of the Women’s Institute. The whole basis of identity and the means by which it is engendered, maintained and reproduced has altered. Even though those who are originally from the area attempt to maintain the relevance of their criteria through use, it seems that this arena of discursive distinctiveness has a limited future. The time-scales of the village, its joint activities and the very landscape itself have been contested by incomers and have thus changed. I contend that through a close analysis of loops of discourse, one can isolate the threads of everyday speech in which these contradictions and conflicts can be viewed. I am reluctant to make any suggestions as to how the present situation could be alleviated: I feel that the solution really lies in the hands of the incomers, to make their approach to Penberthy more sensitive and to hope that this effort will be reciprocated by the locals.

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RITUAL AND CIVIL SOCIETY: THE CASE OF BRITISH ÉLITES

J. SHAWN LANDRES

I

Each spring in Oxford two intriguing phenomena may be observed. First, student finalists dressed in subfusc (a strictly regulated uniform that consists of a dark suit, dark socks, a white shirt, a white tie for men or a black ribbon for women, and an academic gown) gather at the Examination Schools and in their colleges to take the examinations that will determine whether and how well they qualify for a degree from the University. Oxford is the last remaining university in Britain to require that students dress up for exams in this manner.

Explanations offered for the persistence of this practice vary. The most common reason is "that’s how we’ve done it for eight hundred years"—this is tradition as explanation. Another reason, perhaps, is that students have been shown to perform better in examinations when they are dressed well, though such a sociological explanation seems rather modern for a practice dating back eight hundred years. A third reason, which is perhaps the most explicitly anthropological of the three given here, is that the weeks during Trinity Term when final examinations take place are the single period when Oxford students come into their fullest identity as university students (paradoxically, it is the period during which

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their aim is to advance from their student status); thus the examination uniform is a material signifier of one's identity as a student in the University of Oxford.¹

The second phenomenon that may be seen occurs in tandem with the first, although it does not take place among all finalists. The casual observer will note that some finalists wear a white carnation in their lapel, others a pink carnation, and still others a red carnation. The careful observer, perhaps watching a specific group of students over time, will find that each individual student will wear first a white carnation, then a pink one, and then a red one. Inquiries will reveal that the white carnation is worn by a finalist sitting his or her first exam, the pink one is worn for subsequent exams up to and including the penultimate one, and the red carnation is worn only by a finalist sitting his or her last exam.² Further inquiries will uncover the fact that these carnations are purchased neither by the finalist nor by his or her college; rather, a friend or group of friends will meet the finalist prior to the exam and pin it on. The same group of friends will also tend to greet the finalist at the conclusion of his or her last exam and shower the finalist with anything from champagne, flowers and glitter to eggs, flour, and the occasional dead fish.

What is the significance of these practices? First, wearing a carnation is a subtle subversion of the University’s strict rules about subfusc that adds a personal element to an otherwise uniform dress code. Secondly, and conversely, the set colour scheme suggests that even this anti-establishment subversion is regulated by its own codes. Thirdly, the paradox between institutional conformity and personal innovation is paralleled in the custom that the carnations are not distributed impersonally by the college administration but rather are purchased and put in place by the finalist’s closest friends; moreover the practice is repeated for each examination. The tradition of throwing eggs and flour after the finalist’s last exam, which thoroughly destroys the finalist’s subfusc clothing, provides a ceremonial conclusion to the examination period and serves to reintegrate the finalist into the general community of students. The destruction of the subfusc symbolizes the completion of the finalist’s status as a student and anticipates his or her graduation into ‘the real world’, where such a uniform is not required.

Taken together, subfusc and carnations have a significance that transcends their materiality: they are manifestations of the ritual apotheosis of the Oxford student. Through the ritual of donning subfusc and being fitted with a carnation, the individual acquires institutional and interpersonal status as a student and as one of

¹. Subfusc, but more commonly simply the academic gown, is generally associated with the aspects of life in Oxford that are unique to the University: subfusc is worn by first-years sitting their Honours Moderations examinations, and gowns are worn to college collections (exams), to the inaugural lectures of professors newly appointed to University chairs, and in the presence of the University’s two highest-ranking officials, the Chancellor and the Vice-Chancellor.

². An alternative to this scheme is to wear the white carnation for all but the last two exams and then to don a pink carnation for one’s penultimate exam. The red carnation always signifies the last exam.
a group of friends. Through that status he or she is affirmed as a full (though junior) member of the University. These rituals locate the student in time and place within the public institutional and private interpersonal structures of the University and colleges of Oxford. I suggest, therefore, that this set of rituals is one among many that constitute civil society in Oxford.

II

Twice a year, an equally intriguing phenomenon takes place all over the United Kingdom and in some parts of the Commonwealth. On New Year’s Day and on the Queen’s Birthday a list is published in major newspapers, such as The Times, of the names of people who are to be singled out for one of a variety of honours, from elevation to the peerage to investiture as a knight bachelor to induction into one of a number of ‘orders’ of honour. In June 1997 these ‘honours lists’, as they are called, contained the names of some 980 people selected to be honoured for various civil, military, and voluntary ‘services’ to the nation. Half of the honours were for voluntary service, up from one-quarter in 1986 (Hibbs 1997; Walker 1987: 22). The pattern repeated itself in 1998, when ‘the City [was] ignored’, 175 of the 976 awards recognized health-sector employees and 40 rewarded educators (Dunne 1998, Shrimley 1998, Webster 1998). This reflects the contemporary trend that ‘in the vast majority of cases honours are awarded for public work beyond that which the recipients are paid to perform’ (Sherman and Bale 1997).

I suggest that the biannual honours list (excluding life peerages for simplicity’s sake) involves a set of rituals that constitutes civil society in Britain. The ritual by which honours are bestowed serves to initiate certain individuals into a particular status that calls attention to their service—even to the extent of re-naming the person by changing his or her form of address and adding initials to the end of his or her name—such that ‘the uniqueness of the person, his [or her] personal identity, subserves his position on the hierarchy’ (Hanks 1962: 1252). Thus the ritual may be said to reconstitute their personhood in a way that suppresses their individual autonomy in favour of an institutional—in this case civic—social identity, much as, in its way, the subfusc suppresses personal identity in favour of an institutional one, or the succession of white, pink and red carnations continually reconstitutes the identity and personhood of the finalist from student to presumptive graduate. Furthermore, the honours system, like the carnation ritual, is a mixture of the personal and the institutional; just as the finalist depends on his or her group of friends to purchase and pin on the carnations, so does the potential honours recipient depend on recommendations to the prime minister from sympathetic colleagues and friends (see Hankinson 1963: 118). Moreover, just as participation in the finalists’ ritual is not limited to the finalist and his or her friends but rather incorporates an active audience who authenticate the ritual by witnessing it,
so too the honours list involves the implicit participation of those who pick up *The Times* or *Guardian* to read the list of names (for a discussion of how ‘ritual blurs the distinction between performer and observer’, see Turner 1992: 293; also Lewis 1980). As Gupta (1995: 385) has argued, daily newspapers are critical to the discursive construction of the reality of the state and are an important mediator and translator between government and the individual. Thus in a sense the civic reality of the honours list is established rather more through its publication to the nation than through the subsequent private investiture ceremonies that formally bestow the honour on its recipient.

III

This essay is about civil society and social anthropology. Specifically, I argue that social anthropology’s contribution to the study of civil society has been and should continue to consist in an attempt to understand the relationship between ritual and the social order. Moreover, I suggest that such an anthropological approach to the study of civil society will reveal that, far from the idealistic assumptions (often made by well-meaning sociologists) that civil society has something to do with individualism and equality, the ritual practices that create and structure civil society do so by establishing specific kinds of personhood and the social bonds that link persons. The two vignettes above—and I shall return to the example of the honours list later in this essay—have been presented in order to make three main points. First, civil society is made visible to anthropologists through rituals that simultaneously constitute civil society and create and re-create social persons. Secondly, because ritual and personhood occur in a variety of contexts, the idea of civil society ought not to be restricted to the broadest sphere between the individual and the nation-state; rather, they may be observed mediating between the personal and the institutional in many different settings. Thirdly, through ritual practices and the actions of creating and re-creating social persons, civil society is inextricably involved with power relations and negotiations over status.

The sceptical reader may question the relevance of Oxford traditions and the honours list to the idea of a national non-state sphere of action that is often predicated on notions of equality, and such a reader may well imagine this argument as an attempt to mask what is, in the end, simply snobbery. A cynical reader might point out the historical links between the honours system and corrupt practices popularly called ‘sleaze’ that date back at least to David Lloyd-George and Maundy Gregory (see McMillan 1969, Walker 1987, De-La-Noy 1992). A more forgiving reader will acknowledge that while ‘the term civil society has a specific currency in the history of Western ideas’ (Hann 1996: 17), one that does indeed invoke the ideals of nationhood and egalitarianism, none the less there is no universal single currency through which to express the concepts to which the
term 'civil society' refers: the rituals described here assign different moral values to different phenomena, depending on social context. Thus notions of social inequality and corruption may well bear on certain understandings of the meaning of 'civil society' (see Yang 1994, on China; Gupta 1995, on India). A forgiving reader may also consider the extent to which rituals may effect the creation and re-creation, if not cloning, of civil societies over time (Durkheim 1995: 382, 390).

'Civil society' as a field of anthropological inquiry is heir to a tradition of political anthropology that dates back at least to the 1940 publication of *African Political Systems*. In that volume, as Jonathan Spencer (1997) observes, Fortes and Evans-Pritchard emphasized 'the absolute separation between the political and the cultural' and 'observation rather than interpretation'. However, this functionalist separation soon succumbed to attacks that 'exposed the incoherence of the putative separation of political facts from political values, of political behaviour from its interpretation' (Spencer ibid.: 4–5). Responding to the collapse of political anthropology since the 1970s, Spencer calls for 'an anthropology of actually existing politics that would endeavour to gaze wide-eyed at whatever happened to be designated political in our own and other people's lives' (ibid.: 15).

With respect to 'civil society', then, the task of social anthropologists is not only to investigate 'actually existing' political situations, but to determine what, in any particular instance, is 'designated' 'civil society'. This double task is no mean feat: one could devote an entire essay to the wars waged over its definition. To be sure, social anthropology has some catching up to do, as the *Encyclopedia of Social and Cultural Anthropology* glosses 'civil society' in the following way:

Term widely employed in eighteenth-century political philosophy to describe the state, or political society in its broadest sense. The term lapsed into disuse until the early twentieth century. In Gramsci's usage, civil society became that area of society (churches, schools, etc.) within which the powers-that-be create and maintain consent. In Eastern Europe under Communist rule, the term came to refer to a broad sphere of potential opposition to the totalizing claims of the state. (Barnard and Spencer 1996: 597)

The first part of the glossary entry, 'the state...in its broadest sense', is so vague as to be virtually useless as a definition; it would be better simply to use the terms 'the state' or 'political society'. The second part of the entry, the notion that civil society is an arena for the legitimation (or at least acquiescence) of rule by the state, comes closer to a formal definition, but it seems directly to contradict the third part, which explains civil society as a sphere of opposition and resistance to the state. Thus it is worthwhile considering, if only briefly, some alternative connotations of 'civil society'.

The liberal political theorist Will Kymlicka locates 'civil society' outside 'the apparatus of the state' and suggests that it contains 'forums...for non-politicized debate' (1990: 218, 223). Similarly, Ronald Beiner describes 'an autonomous civil society composed of a multitude of voluntary associations separate from (or opposed to) the sphere of the state'. However, he emphasizes that citizenship
within civil society is conceived as a mode of opposition to the 'anonymity, bureaucratic remoteness [and] imperviousness to democratic agency' of the modern state; thus 'citizenship...must be localized' (1995: 4). Michael Walzer writes that 'the words “civil society” name the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks—formed for the sake of family, faith, interest, and ideology—that fill this space' (1995: 153). Standing in something of a contrast to these definitions is Adam Seligman’s, which focuses not on 'civil society' itself but rather on the idea of civil society:

what makes the idea of civil society so attractive to so many social thinkers is its assumed synthesis of private and public ‘good’ and of individual and social desiderata. The idea of civil society thus embodies for many an ethical ideal of the social order, one that, if not overcomes, at least harmonizes, the conflicting demands of individual interest and social good. (1992: x)

The advantage of Seligman’s definition is that it separates the ideal of civil society from any particular reality—it retains the fact–value distinction upon which Fortes and Evans-Pritchard insisted. But it also opens up a space for ethnographic investigation—namely how different groups create and re-create their ‘idea of civil society’—as well as the arena in which the relationship between the ideal and the real is continuously negotiated.

At this point it may be helpful to turn to a specific instance of anthropological theorizing about civil society. In his introduction to Civil Society: Challenging Western Models (1996), Chris Hann discusses the potential contributions social anthropologists have to make to the study of civil society within a more general context of the problem of defining ‘civil society’. Hann proposes that

perhaps the most obvious agenda for anthropological contributions to the civil society debates would be precisely to particularize and to make concrete: to show how an idea with its origins in European intellectual discourse has very different referents, varying significantly even within European societies. This agenda would also be concerned with analogues to the discourse of civil society in non-European cultural traditions, and with the interaction of these specific cultural ideas with the putative universalism of civil society as this idea is exported across the globe. Ethnographic research would focus on how these ideas are manifested in practice, in everyday social behaviour. (1996: 2)

Hann’s proposed agenda is anthropologically useful in at least three ways. First, it calls attention to the need to examine ‘civil society’ in its local contexts and with respect to specific cultural milieux. Secondly, the agenda not only differentiates between civil society in and beyond Europe, it also points to the possibility of internal variation within the notion of ‘Western civil society’ that is so often treated as a coherent whole. Thirdly, the proposal attends to the relationship
between ideas and practice as ethnographically observable through the medium of ‘everyday social behaviour’.

Each aspect of these proposals, however, reveals limitations to Hann’s conception of ‘civil society’ that would unnecessarily bind social anthropology to an intellectualist approach and ultimately lead the discipline to the same impasse at which sociology has found itself. First, while Hann is careful to present ‘civil society’ as a concept that can vary according to cultural context, he does not attend in particular to the possibility of the historicity of civil society, either as an idea or as a more or less coherent set of practices (I will return to this problem below). Secondly, Hann’s understanding of ‘civil society’ remains essentially European: while he is willing to consider non-European instances of civil society, he treats them as artificial European impositions that are then locally resisted or adapted. Indeed the theories advanced in Civil Society: Challenging Western Models seem not to allow for the possibility that ‘civil society’ might manifest itself in a wide variety of indigenous forms that may or may not resemble European practices. My proposal that the study of ritual be used as a pathway to the understanding of civil society is in part intended to provide a set of theoretical and methodological tools not restricted to Western intellectual idealism. Finally, while Hann’s attention to ‘everyday social behaviour’ is certainly legitimate and indeed important, it perhaps moves too far away from the behaviour of élites and socially important ceremonies. Neither final examinations nor the honours system can fairly be called ‘everyday behaviour’, but it seems apparent none the less that both sets of rituals—perhaps because of their special status and rarity—contribute to understandings of civil society in Oxford and Britain respectively.

Hann goes on to make a number of useful points regarding how social anthropologists ought to use the idea of civil society. First, he distinguishes between civil society as an ideal value, invoked by politicians and by some sociologists as a Good Thing, as against the facts of civil society, ‘with concrete referents that can be investigated through empirical research’ (1996: 2). Such ‘referents’ may be viewed ‘concretely’ via the honours system. As of 1969 those most likely to receive honours were Tory members of parliament, upper-echelon holders of public office and professors at Oxford and Cambridge; those least likely to receive honours were accountants, clergymen, and solicitors (McMillan 1969: 208). More recently, according to the Daily Telegraph, ‘between June 1984 and June 1993 there were 952 awards for political [party] service’ (Jones 1997). In 1993, the then Prime Minister John Major overhauled the honours system in the name of establishing a ‘classless society’: he abolished automatic honours for civil servants, opened the nominations process to the public and placed a new emphasis on awards for community service—‘hardworking lollipop ladies, deserving postmen and volunteer carers’. However, The Times reported that the Prime Minister’s reforms did not significantly change the fact that most honours go to high-ranking civil servants, soldiers and political party supporters, even though the Queen’s Birthday Honours of June 1996 did include ‘one lollipop lady, ...[a ninety-year-old woman] who still cares for elderly patients; ...and a postman well-known for his
charitable feats', and 'most of the 100 extra MBEs (Member of the Order of the British Empire, the lowest grade of the Order) ‘...go to people working in the voluntary sector’ (Thomson and Pierce 1996). More recently, the current Prime Minister, Tony Blair, has ended (once again) the practice of giving honours for party political service and has ordered a review of the entire system (Elliott 1997). Results have been seen already, in so far as political honours were not awarded in the 1997 and 1998 Queen's Birthday Honours, and more attention was paid to dedicated service in general. To take the example of personal secretaries, the unsung heroes of many offices whose years of devoted service often go unrecognized, whereas in June 1996 approximately eight personal secretaries were awarded MBEs, in June 1997 approximately eighteen secretaries were so honoured. Prime Minister Blair has used the honours list to boost his efforts to give the profession of education a higher public profile and increased prestige. In the June 1998 Queen’s Birthday Honours, which were ‘unusually free of favouritism or sleaze’ (Jenkins 1998), honours were given to forty teachers, heads and school governors; these included two knighthoods, two DBEs and six CBEs (Lightfoot 1998). It remains to be seen whether the reality will approach the ideal with any greater success under Blair than under Major, but none the less the difference is acknowledged.

Hann also draws attention to at least two different underlying assumptions about the person in civil society, the one as socially constituted (see Ferguson 1966), the other as an inviolable individual (see Seligman 1992). Hann's distinction between these two assumptions, alongside his assertion of the specifically Western origins of civil society, calls to mind the history of personhood elaborated by Marcel Mauss, who argued that the Western conception of the individual person as a self-contained, autonomous moral agent possessed of inalienable substance is a highly culturally specific notion, the contingent product of millennia of philosophy dating back to early Christianity and beyond that to the ancient Greeks (Mauss 1985). Since then anthropologists have generally acknowledged two notions of the individual, the one the typically Western idea of a self-contained autonomous moral agent possessed of inalienable substance, the other an idea of the person having no autonomous self-contained substance, but rather being socially constituted only through kinship relations, class or caste status, and social networks. These are the same notions of the person that Hann finds in discussions of civil society. However, in so far as civil society can involve 'space for manoeuvre between the personal and the public' (Goody, quoted in Hann 1996: 20), then the difference between the inviolable individual and the socially constituted individual is one more of degree than of kind. To take one example among many, Dumont’s distinction between homo aequalis and homo hierarchicus is, I think, a useful but limited heuristic device that papers over the extent to which both homines exist in Western and non-Western society (see Dumont 1972; Kolenda 1991: 110).
As I stated earlier, Chris Hann does not emphasize the historicity of civil society—a historicity that may be observed through ritual. He interprets Vaclav Havel's observation that 'communism brought history, and with it all natural development, to a halt' (Havel 1993) to mean that 'East European societies were placed in some kind of deep freeze for forty years' (Hann 1996: 7). Hann's reading is correct but perhaps incomplete. As I understand it, Havel's aim is also to emphasize the difference between ideologies of history (as advanced by communist ideologies) and the experience of history (as lived by citizens of East European societies). Havel's understanding of history here is derived from that of his mentor, the philosopher Jan Patocka, whose notions of the importance of civil society rest not only on interdependence in social space but also on interdependence in historical time. The 'solidarity of the shaken', as he puts it, is 'the solidarity of those who are capable of understanding...that history is the conflict of mere life, barren and chained by fear, with life at the peak, life that does not plan for the ordinary days of a future but sees clearly that the everyday, its life and its "peace," have an end' (Patocká 1996: 134–5). The totalitarian ideology of Czechoslovakia's rulers between 1948 and 1989 claimed—in a manner eerily similar to that of Francis Fukuyama (1992) about liberal democracy—that the conflicts driving history had been permanently resolved and that history was therefore not simply finished, but obsolete.

The importance of this reinterpretation for the social-anthropological understanding of civil society is the following: the rituals that constitute civil society in their various social contexts, even if they are couched in a rhetoric of timelessness, are themselves historically contingent. Thus civil society is not only the intellectual product of a particular genealogy of Western political philosophy, it is itself also historically contingent. It is helpful to turn at this point to the volumes edited by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (1992) and by David Cannadine and Simon Price (1987), which, though nominally works of history, explicitly deploy anthropological methods to uncover the historicity of ritual. Hobsbawm defines 'invented tradition' as 'a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values and norms of behaviour by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past' (1992: 1). This definition, applied to rituals of civil society, highlights not only the importance of ritual for the establishment of an ideal civic order but also the historical contingency of such an effort. Cannadine emphasizes the extent to which these relationships 'between the earthly order, the heavenly order, and splendour and spectacle' exist in a historical 'dynamic...of growth and development, change and decay, evolution and revolution' (1987: 4, 6). Thus, 'pomp and pageantry, spectacle and splendour, are treated as an integral part of the political process and the structure of power' (ibid.: 12). Cannadine suggests that the difference between anthropologists and historians here is as follows:
The historians are interested in the working of ceremonial in society, whereas the anthropologists are more concerned with the working of society through ceremonial. The historians ask about structures of power, whereas the anthropologists ask about structures of meaning. The historians want to know how the ceremonial image and the stability of the state relate to each other, whereas the anthropologists want to know how a society constructs a transcendent symbolic idiom, and how human beings are transformed into divine kings. (ibid.: 14)

The historical approach to the study of ritual advanced here offers social anthropologists the opportunity to explore the ways civil society, in both its ideal senses and its real forms, has changed over time. This may be demonstrated through an analysis of the honours system. Although a handful of orders of chivalry—the Order of the Garter (1348), the Order of the Thistle (1687), the Order of the Bath (1725), the now obsolete Order of St Patrick (1783), and the Order of St Michael and St George (1818)—have long histories, the great majority of orders and medals, including those whose current membership is the largest, were created between 1850 and 1917 (McMillan 1969). As David Cannadine (1992) has found, this is the same period during which the rituals of the modern monarchy were created, often out of whole cloth. The specific historical context of these orders ought not to be understated: it is probably no coincidence that the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire (1917), which for the first time opened the orders of chivalry to commoners and women (Vickers 1994: 131), was created at the same time that the First World War (for which most conscripts were commoners) and the universal suffrage movement were bringing unprecedented pressure on the British establishment. If, as Silverman has suggested, 'it might be useful...to think of prestige...as processes whereby the determinants of socioeconomic and power differences are partially obscured', and if 'rituals...might then be seen as acting to solidify and isolate the prestige categories, which have reordered the facts of class and power' (1981: 174–5), then it is worthwhile to consider the extension the OBE to commoners and women as a 're-ordering' of civil society. Although this gesture was clearly not sufficient to relieve social pressures on its own, and indeed may have been intended as a coping mechanism rather than as a concession (see Turner 1992: 297), certainly it was a critical first step in authorizing the entry of commoners and women into a British civil society that was in theory, if not in reality, open to all who deserved to participate.

Cannadine argues that for social anthropologists, 'the rituals of rulers, the "symbolics of power", are not mere incidental ephemera, but are central to the structure and working of any society' (1987: 3). Indeed, the starting-point for establishing the link between ritual and civil society is the work of Durkheim, who describes the rituals of 'positive cults' as

a whole collection of ceremonies whose sole purpose is to arouse certain ideas and feelings, to join the present to the past and the individual to the collectivity. (1995: 382)
The rites are means by which the social group reaffirms itself periodically.... Men who feel united—in part by ties of blood but even more by common interests and traditions—assemble and become conscious of their moral unity. (ibid.: 390–1)

Malinowski applied this logic to British coronation ceremonies: observing that the 'monarch stands for the nation', he describes the coronation of King George VI in 1937 as a 'large-scale ceremonial display of the greatness, power and wealth of Britain. [...] The unity of Empire, the strength of its bonds, was publicly enacted. [...] The coronation generated an increased feeling of security, of stability, and [of] the permanence of the British Empire' (1938: 112–15).  

V

However applicable this theory of ritual and society may be in the British case, my argument that anthropologists can and should report on the myriad indigenous forms of civil society, rather than merely on local examples and adaptations of a European model, depends on ethnographic examples from a variety of settings. At the risk of being accused of taking a 'world tour' of the social-anthropological study of ritual and civil society, I want to turn to one important study—that of ceremonial chiefship in West Africa—which explicitly links ritual with civil society.

In his introduction to The Politics of Cultural Performance (1996) David Parkin asks 'what is special about power emanating from cultural events, ceremonials and customary practices'. He calls attention to 'the idea of power and symbolism as distinct variables in dialectical relationship with each other' (Parkin 1996: xv). Parkin cites Sandra Barnes's description of post-colonial ceremonial chiefship in West Africa as an instance of such a relationship:

It is a form of chiefship that is neither co-terminous with government nor subservient to it, nor even simplistically to be regarded as exclusively a local-level political institution. ...These new forms of ceremonially titled chieftancy constitute the civic society that many African states seek. ...It is not the result of organised central government policy, nor presented by people as filling a gap in the hierarchy of a modern political machine. It arises from people's confidence in the efficacy of local-level rituals and personalised leadership. (Parkin 1996: xxiii–xxiv)

3. Space does not permit an extended account of the importance of investiture ceremonies in the creation and reproduction of the civic order, but see Fortes (1967) for a helpful introductory discussion.
Barnes makes explicit her point that 'civic rituals...[provide] a context in which local people make connections to the wider world' (1996: 20). Moreover, 'the chiefdom sphere makes use of civic ritual as a neutral arena for the expression and consolidation of society's values' (ibid.: 22). The strength of the ceremonial chiefdom lies not only in its ability to draw on pre-colonial historical precedents but also on its formal independence from the post-colonial state; as in Britain, greater honour attaches to appointed chiefs than to hereditary ones (ibid.: 36). The chiefs' civic rituals—especially the installation of new chiefs and the conferment of titles—'constitute a public dramatization of reciprocal relationships and networks. The rituals communicate the fact that high value is placed not simply on this institution but...on the attainments of the actors involved and what they represent' (ibid.: 31-32).

Barnes's ethnography of the rituals of West African chiefship thus provides a direct link between notions of 'civil' or 'civic' society and the ritual practices that constitute such society. Following the example set out in the later work of Meyer Fortes (1962, 1967), the ethnography demonstrates how 'ritual...achieves and ensures the unity of a given political community by stressing the common interests of the people and by harmonizing them with their private interests, with which they are dialectically linked' (Schneipel 1990: 23).

What Barnes's ethnography does not extensively address is the extent to which involvement with rituals of chiefship is both producer and product of power relations among and between individuals and groups. This is also perhaps the most crucial area missing from Hann's assessment of anthropology and civil society, and it is with the discussion of power relations that I wish to conclude this essay.

Civil society, like all aspects of society, is intimately involved in the distribution and redistribution of power. Moreover, the ritual foundations of civil society are bound up with ideas about and expressions of power, not simply the power of society as a whole to which Durkheim refers, but also the unequal distribution of power among and between individuals and groups. On the one hand, these power relations can take place among the persons who participate in civil society. Barnes notes that the West African chiefship rituals

provide a special meeting ground for individuals whose loyalties and activities often place them at the disempowered, grassroots end of political and economic privilege. Chiefly activities and practices offer...a sphere where individuals of either end of the political continuum gain access to one another. (Barnes 1996: 38)
In Oxford, the practices surrounding the wearing of subfusc and carnations constitute a space within which the finalist and the institution negotiate constantly over the power to enforce conformity and order and the capacity to resist that power and assert individuality. Within the honours system, entry into the orders of chivalry is contingent upon submission to the monarch, and each honours recipient is assigned a grade—nominally proportional to the level of his or her service—within the order in which he or she is inducted. On the other hand, power relations can manifest themselves between those who are ‘inside’ civil society and those who are ‘outside’ it. Clear power differentials are visible between finalists and other students, and between recipients of honours and non-recipients, in so far as both in the rituals and as a result of them, finalists and recipients of honours are given social and institutional precedence. As the anthropologist of religion Catherine Bell has commented, ‘effective political ritual evokes a complex cluster of traditional symbols and postures of appropriate moral leadership [and] actually constructs an argument, a set of tensions. Ritual...is politics; it acts and it actuates’ (Bell 1992: 195).

In this way the final examinations and honours systems are not only examples of moral leadership and its rewards, they also communicate to their audiences the values to which the audience itself ought to aspire (ibid.). Returning to the themes outlined at the beginning of this essay, which interpret civil society as a mediating element between the institution and the individual—in Goody’s words ‘opening a space for manoeuvre between the personal and the public’—it is thus possible to conceive of civil society as the outcome of a set of ritual practices, which are themselves

the very production and negotiation of power relations.... Ritualization as a strategic mode of practice produces nuanced relationships of power, relationships characterized by acceptance and resistance, negotiated appropriation, and redemptive reinterpretation of the hegemonic order. (Bell 1992: 196)

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Like an unfinished symphony, culture is a work of art never meant to be completed. Its expressiveness demands that it be endlessly recreated and that its appreciation derive from this process of creation. (Guss 1989: 67)

Introduction

Despite the growing number of anthropologists who recognize the usefulness of aesthetics in cultural analysis (see, for example, Forrest 1988, Guss 1989, Morphy 1991, Morphy 1992, Coote 1992, Shelton 1992), aesthetics—especially as it pertains to everyday existence—seldom appears in social analysis. Its common association with subjective, qualitative sense-activity removed from collective, observable cognitive processes has unnecessarily excluded it from social scientific inquiry. Such a position ignores the phenomenological aspect of aesthetic experience in favour of a rigid, Kantian view of aesthetics as disinterested appreciation. In this article I offer a critique of the Kantian foundations of contemporary Western aesthetics and seek to establish an anthropological model for aesthetic systems that reorients Western readers to a more generalizable connotation of aesthetics. To that end, the theoretical foundations of this paper are twofold: (1) aesthetic

1. The theoretical premises outlined in this article have been developed in preparation for field research into everyday aesthetics in Puerto Limón, Costa Rica.
perception is the attachment of values to experience; and (2) aesthetic expression is the re-creation of experience through which those values are reconstituted and/or transformed.

The concept of aesthetic perception presented here incorporates a cognitive process into what has largely been written of as the qualitative/emotional response to experience. It also offers a critique of the universal application of the Western, more specifically leisure-class concept of aesthetics as an attitude of disinterested appreciation, placing such a concept in its proper context as one of a number of different aesthetic systems that have been constructed around the world throughout history.

The concept of aesthetic expression incorporates the active, processual aspects of creative expression into an analytical framework that has until now focused predominantly on isolated expressive products, or 'art objects'. It also positions the theorization of aesthetic systems as a potential answer to the structure/practice dilemma, that is, how to incorporate creative practice into structural models.

Redefining Aesthetic Perception

Aesthetic perception is the attachment of value to the sensory experience of objects or events. This notion of aesthetic perception is derived from Baumgarten's (1954 [1735]) formulation of the Greek concept and Kant's first critique (1934 [1787]), both of which refer to the cognitive process of qualitative sensory perception. The concept here refers to a cross-cultural system of value attachment that involves both form and function.

Alexander Baumgarten's original use of the term *aestheticae* in the 1750s referred to 'the science of perception'—that is, 'a science which might direct the lower cognitive faculty in knowing things sensately' (Baumgarten 1954: 78). Baumgarten formulated aesthetics as a complement to philosophy, which was concerned with things known intellectually and therefore removed from the senses. The importance of the 'lower cognitive faculty' of the senses and their effects led Baumgarten to stress the importance of aesthetics in any philosophical pursuit of truth.

Baumgarten's use of aesthetics drew on the Ancient Greek concept, which referred to the apprehension of the material world as distinct from things immaterial or which could only be thought. This does not mean that sensory perception is excluded from the cognitive faculties; it in fact depends upon them for sense to be made of apprehensions. Kant, somewhat circuitously, draws this conclusion at the outset of *Critique of Pure Reason*. Kant defines 'intuition', or sensibility, as the way in which knowledge relates to objects in their immediacy. Concepts arise from thought, and all thought is in some way related to intuition (Kant 1934: 41). In this way, cognition is intimately related to the experience of intuition.
Mills neatly illustrates the relationship between qualitative sensory perception and cognition: ‘experience is like a river, one bank of which is cognitive, the other qualitative. It is as incorrect to speak of a cognitive experience or a qualitative experience as it is to speak of a river with one bank’ (Mills 1971 [1957]: 85–6). There can be no qualitative sensory perception if the cognitive faculties of the mind do not attach some value to the experience.

Aesthetic perception in this cognitive/qualitative sense is universal, though qualitative responses to objects and events are necessarily coloured by the given social environment. Depending on the context, an aesthetic response may be elicited by ‘the perfect functional utility of a chair, the simplicity of an idea, or the elegance of a solution to a problem’ (Morphy 1992: 181), not to mention the efficacy of a prayer blanket or the particular use of colour in a Matisse painting. This universal, yet culturally variable quality makes the concept of an aesthetic system particularly useful in the development of anthropological models of social formation.

In his third critique, Critique of Judgment (1952 [1790]), Kant constructs one of the earliest and most insightful characterizations of a culturally specific aesthetic system. Kant claims that for an object to be considered beautiful, viewers must completely detach themselves from any practical consideration of the object. This view of aesthetics may be seen to be that of Western elite society; and, so far as it goes, Kant’s discussion provides a helpful analysis of one culture’s view of aesthetics. Unfortunately, the philosophical power of Kant’s presentation of this culturally specific conception of aesthetic perception has led others to argue for the inapplicability of ‘aesthetics’ in any context outside of the West (see, for example, Overing 1994, Gell 1995). Such an argument, however, hinges on two misconceptions (partly derived from Kant’s third critique) concerning aesthetics: namely, that the critical use of judgement is uniquely Western, and that the valuation of function over form is uniquely non-Western.

The notion that judgement is a uniquely Western qualifier of artistic achievement excludes the possibility of a comparable use of aesthetic judgement in a non-Western context. The obvious argument against such a notion is the strikingly similar concept of aesthetic judgement found in the large-scale, socially stratified societies of Asia. For the moment, however, my intention is to illustrate the use of judgement in various non-Western contexts, where ‘non-Western’ refers to small-scale, non-state societies.

The typical argument against aesthetics as a cross-cultural category is based on the notion that non-Western expressive forms are intimately bound up with everyday cultural activity, where every member of the society is an ‘artist’ and no cultural products are judged in their own right as ‘beautiful’ or ‘ugly’ (Overing 1994). A well-documented example of the use of aesthetic judgement in a non-Western setting is provided by Harry R. Silver for the Asante (Ashanti) of Ghana and their carvings. Silver (1979) describes the then growing Asante carving-market as being largely a product of a thriving tourist industry. The Asante carve for a Western market and, maintaining a hierarchy of craftsmanship, make aesthetic
decisions based on that market that are comparable to those made using a Western concept of aesthetic judgement. Beyond that, the carvers themselves do not view every object produced as beautiful. The Asante have certain criteria by which they 'judge' aesthetic expressions. Styles that have been borrowed from other cultural traditions to meet the demand of tourists are judged to be 'conceptually incomprehensible, unspeakably ugly, and occasionally downright frightening' (ibid.: 200). Carvings that reflect the 'real Asante aesthetic' are 'judged' to be better than just any artistic creation. The Asante distaste for styles appreciated by Western consumers demonstrates the existence of an indigenous aesthetic that is different from that of the West, but comparable in its use of judgement as a qualification of beauty.

Another example of aesthetic judgement in a non-Western setting may be found among the Yolngu bark-painters of north-east Arnhem Land, Australia, as documented by Howard Morphy (1991). Though the aesthetic aspects of what is produced by the Yolngu serve an important function (and in some cases the objects themselves are not even meant to be displayed), the success of an 'artist' depends upon the aesthetic judgement of those around him or her. Howard Morphy describes one instance where a bark-painting was rejected by some men of the Djinaŋ moiety who were watching the progress of its production. According to Morphy, 'the reason for this rejection was explicit: the figure looked too much like a crocodile, a Yirritja moiety species' (ibid.: 158). The technical mastery of the painter was not sufficient to portray accurately the correct Djinaŋ moiety species of lizard, and so the painting was rejected.

These examples illustrate non-Western uses of aesthetic judgement in the attachment of value to objects. But are not these examples all focused on the evaluation of beauty in terms of its social or spiritual utility, and not on beauty as such? Does this not prove that valuing function over form is characteristic of non-Western traditions alone? Are there no examples of non-Western groups attaching value to an object or event for its own sake? The answers to these questions are debatable, but so are the underlying assumptions that prompt their asking. As the above ethnographic examples imply, within non-Western contexts concepts of beauty rarely have to do with the disinterestedness of Kantian appreciation, but relate directly to social or ritual practices. The success of an artist in a non-Western context often depends less on the creative use of a particular medium than on his or her ability to effectively manifest the cultural world-view. Thus, for most non-Western peoples, the concept of beauty is inextricably associated with social or spiritual utility. However, beauty 'as such' is rarely detached from function even in a Western context. Not only is the non-Western appreciation of beauty in utility valid as an aesthetic response, it is in many ways similar to Western aesthetic appreciation, which is not so much disinterested in functional aspects of an art object as it is interested in how its evaluation will be received in society. This analysis must now turn to examining the proposition that the value of function over form is limited to non-Western societies.
Pierre Bourdieu undermines the universal applicability of Kant's view of aesthetics in *Distinction* (1984), his often-referred-to work concerning taste and class distinction in French society. Bourdieu demonstrates that disinterested appreciation is neither universal nor even wholly Western, but the product of the existence of an élite class accustomed to the luxury of having disposable time and resources. For Bourdieu, the working classes of Western, or any stratified, state society regard each thing in terms of its function, and yet are still able to discern beauty. Bourdieu writes: 'detachment, disinterestedness, indifference—aesthetic theory has so often presented these as the only way to recognize the work of art for what it is...that one ends up forgetting that they really mean disinvestment, detachment, indifference, in other words, the refusal to invest oneself and take things seriously' (ibid.: 34). For those unaccustomed to having disposable time and resources, survival is not taken for granted, and every word, thought, or deed requires an investment of oneself. This investment or attachment does not make impossible aesthetic perception, indeed it points to the existence of an alternate aesthetic system constructed by the working class that attaches value to objects and events in a fundamentally different way from the way in which they are constructed by the élite class. In modern French society there are at least two aesthetic systems operating side by side, mutually exclusive in the ways in which they attach value, but both valid as ways of knowing the surrounding world.

The Kantian concept of disinterested appreciation, where utilitarian contemplation spoils the aesthetic experience, is not found in small-scale non-state societies outside the West; nor, according to Bourdieu, is it found among certain classes in the West. The Kantian aesthetic therefore seems to be limited to élite classes within large-scale state societies, a fact that explains its appearance in the great societies of the Orient. Kant's critique of judgement, and the aesthetic experience that prompts it, is a product of his own experience within an intellectual élite, and designed to apply to it; and, like much else in European philosophy, has been accorded a universal currency. However, even if it should be accepted that Kant's conception has limited applicability, this does not negate the argument that the term 'aesthetic' refers only to Kant's conception of disinterestedness and therefore cannot apply cross-culturally or, apparently, across classes. But this argument may have merit only in so far as Kant's concept of disinterested appreciation applies within any class or culture at all.

There are, however, non-Western cases in which 'Western' dispositions may be seen to exist. The cattle-keeping Nilotes of the Southern Sudan offer a helpful illustration. In reference to the Dinka, Jeremy Coote describes a common dilemma for the owner of cattle: whether to keep a well-marked calf for stud purposes or to castrate it for display (Coote 1992: 252). This exemplifies a critical conflict between form and function in a non-Western context. The Dinka here are operating an aesthetic distinction, comparable to that found in the West, between that which is beautiful and that which is functional. This is not to say that a calf left to stud is not considered beautiful, but that that which is set apart purely for visual
appreciation is a category familiar both to Dinka cattle-keepers and to Western art collectors.

In his critique of Coote's essay, Alfred Gell convincingly argues that Dinka youth are more concerned with the social distinction accorded them through owning well-marked cattle than they are with any intrinsic beauty associated with certain configurations of black-and-white markings (Gell 1995: 23–4). In this sense, what appears to be the disinterested appreciation of a well-marked calf, which prompts its display, is in reality another example of a non-Western inability to separate form from function. No doubt Gell's argument is grounded in a reading of Bourdieu's discussion in Distinction, not to mention everyday observations of the role of art as social marker within élite Western society.

A thorough examination of this élite Western use of taste in society is found in Thorstein Veblen's Theory of the Leisure Class (1994 [1899]). If Kant's aesthetic exists in any context, it surely exists here. Veblen describes all the activity of the élite in industrial society as being centred around pecuniary emulation—that is, the continual increase of wealth relative to others within the élite class. Honour is accorded when accumulated wealth renders labour and efficient consumption unnecessary, thus leisure and wastefulness become the marks of élite social status. In this context there is a socially constructed notion of the beautiful as that which marks wealth and leisure. In other words, beautiful objects 'are wasteful and ill adapted to their ostensible use' (ibid.: 78). As in Kant's formulation, members of the leisure class perceive beauty in objects removed from the context of their practical use.

Veblen uses as an example (ibid.) the contemplation of two spoons, one hand-wrought from silver, the other machine-made from aluminium, to illustrate the leisure-class aesthetic. The hand-wrought spoon would provide more aesthetic gratification than the common, machine-made spoon because the former is much more expensive and involves a far more complex production process without any appreciable increase in serviceability. However, if a close inspection should show that the supposed hand-wrought spoon were in reality only a very clever imitation of hand-wrought goods, but an imitation so cleverly wrought as to give the same impression of line and surface, the gratification which the user derives from its contemplation as an object of beauty would immediately decline.

The imitation spoon, being more cheaply made and easier to acquire, loses value as a beautiful object because it is more practical than a truly hand-wrought spoon. In as much as it is more practical it is less wasteful, and therefore less valued as beautiful by a member of the leisure class. The qualitative evaluation of the spoon as beautiful depends upon its appreciation apart from practical use, not because of some notion of 'purity' in aesthetic judgement but because the maintenance of class status depends upon conspicuous waste and abstention from labour, which are the conventional marks of social standing within the leisure class. Veblen explains: 'the requirement of conspicuous wastefulness is...a constraining norm selectively shaping and sustaining our sense of what is beautiful, and guiding our discrimination with respect to what may legitimately be approved
as beautiful and what may not’ (ibid.: 79). The disinterested appreciation of objects is at the foundation of the leisure-class aesthetic system, but only in so far as ‘disinterested’ refers to the serviceability of objects and not to the attitude of the observer. The leisure class is supremely ‘interested’ in the social utility of aesthetic experience.

Kant’s aesthetic model in *Critique of Judgement* initiated much worthwhile exploration of aesthetic contemplation, but it remains largely impracticable as a testable theory in ethnographic research. The utilitarian aspect of aesthetic perception that appears across cultures and classes is as necessary an ingredient of an aesthetic system as the faculties with which to qualitatively judge an experience as aesthetic ‘in its own right’. The social utility of Dinka display-cattle does not detract from the aesthetic attachment of value to the experience of the cattle; in fact, it is a necessary aspect of the Dinka aesthetic system. Among the Dinka, the French working class, or the industrial leisure class, there is ‘an ineffable reciprocity of feeling’ (Eagleton 1990: 75) that arises from the attachment of value to experience, whether that experience be a well-marked calf, a glass of cheap beer, or a hand-wrought spoon.

A discussion of aesthetic perception ends where Kant began in his first critique: it is the attachment of value to the experience of objects or events. It is a cognitive process of qualitative evaluation, and as much as cognition is socialized, aesthetic perception is socially constructed and therefore viable as a locus of anthropological inquiry. Aesthetic systems ‘materialize a way of experiencing’ (Geertz 1983: 99), bridging the chasm between the rational, empirical world of material objects and the non-rational, subjective world of experience in its intuitive immediacy. For the Huichol of north-west Mexico, beauty is synonymous with clarity, which ‘does not refer solely to their perception of the objective environment, but also to their recognition and understanding of the essences underlying perceptual phenomena’ (Shelton 1992: 237). If social science hopes to grasp the processes of social formation in their complex variety, it must learn from the Huichol how to grasp the powerful influence of both the objective material world and the collectively subjective experience of that world embodied in aesthetic perception.

**Redefining Aesthetic Expression**

Aesthetic expression is the human re-creation of experience through which the values attached by means of aesthetic perception are reconstituted and/or transformed. Aesthetic expression encompasses the whole of the creative process, including not only the art object or event as a creative product, but the cultural context and production process as well. Creative works are produced out of expressive forms and are used constantly to reorganize cultural forms in both the
institutionalized arenas of artistic expression as well as in the mundane realms of everyday activity. In this way, aesthetic expression embodies the bricolage of cultural production that bridges the theoretical chasm between static social structures and dynamic human practice.

The Western and, by association, anthropological preoccupation with the art object has proven to be a great distraction from a more useful focus on aesthetic expression. There has been a conceptual fusion of aesthetics with ‘art’ that has resulted not only in the conceptual limitation of aesthetics as critiqued above, but also in the inverted conception of aesthetics as subordinate to the Western, culturally static category of ‘fine art’.

Within the Western aesthetic there is a category of ‘art’ that is concerned with the attachment of value to certain formal qualities of objects or events, which retain that value regardless of context. To the Western eye, a Trobriand canoe prow board can be considered an ‘art’ object whether it is viewed cutting through the surf on its way to a Kula exchange or suspended from a museum ceiling. Its aesthetic appreciation is not dependent upon its cultural context. The problem with ‘art’ as a cross-cultural category is its particularly Western connotation as an end in itself. The Western art object, whether it be an Italian fresco or Duchamp’s urinal, is viewed and critiqued in isolation. Objects extracted from non-Western cultures are subjected to the same contextually isolated evaluation, and therefore become incorporated into a Western aesthetic.

The preoccupation with art in isolation has narrowed the Western concept of universal aesthetic forms to those that are principally visual. This is largely due to the practical need for non-Western aesthetic forms to be portable in order to reach Western audiences, resulting in an emphasis on such art objects as sculpture and painting. Coote aptly points out that such an emphasis undervalues the poetic, choreological, and other arts (Coote 1992: 246), but it also excludes the importance of context in the aesthetic experience of any creative product. Rarely is any one creative product meant to be experienced in isolation from a particular environment. As Anthony Seeger (1994) argues, if music is studied in isolation the student misses the visual, sensual, and olfactory components of the aesthetic experience. In a sense, the music is taken out of context, physically and culturally. An aesthetic expression incorporates every aspect of the creative process, placing objects and events in the specific aesthetic setting crucial to its meaningful experience.

Art is a qualitative category of objects and events. Aesthetics is an evaluative process that subsumes such culturally specific categories as ‘art’ in its incorporation of all value attachment systems. Art is an important, but largely unique, aspect of a Western aesthetic. The fact that many languages seemingly lack a word translatable as ‘art’ illustrates this largely unique character. Jacques Maquet (1986: 10) suggests that any general study of aesthetics must start in a society that has a word for ‘art’ in its vocabulary, but this is to limit ethnocentrically what is understood by aesthetic expression.
The aesthetic systems of other cultures have no place for a term ‘art’ as the West knows it, because their expressive forms differ; but this does not indicate the lack of an aesthetic. A Kunama friend from Eritrea living in England recently commented to me upon the meticulously crafted ornaments found in so many shops around Christmas. The idea of putting so much effort into a decorative object was foreign to her since years of war have left the Kunama with few attachments to material culture. As a result, the Kunama aesthetic centres around performance; and she described with enthusiasm the dances performed at the funerals of the elderly who have lived complete lives and the rhythmic sound of the men with long-soled shoes who pound the earth as they dance for days on end. A simple cup of coffee becomes an aesthetic expression involving three hours of selecting, roasting, and brewing beans with the proper materials, and is no less meticulous a process than the fashioning of a Christmas ornament.

The conceptual fusion of aesthetics and art not only limits aesthetics as a Western category, it also obscures the potential of aesthetics for the examination of expressive processes. For example, the Eskimo emphasize process in expressive forms, especially sculpture, and often care little for the objects themselves (Carpenter 1961). To focus, as many writers have done, on the tiny sculptures, which the Eskimo themselves often discard, amounts to an idolatry of objects isolated from the meanings imbued through the productive process. The anthropology of aesthetics gives primacy to the expressive process, where product matters less than production. A work of art is just that—a work, or an act of expression. The anthropology of aesthetics is concerned with the work of art as well as other productive processes of expression that appeal to the senses in a culturally specific way. As such, aesthetics ‘offers us a cross-culturally valid field of inquiry which partially subsumes “art” without detracting from the latter’s historical and cultural specificity’ (Coote 1989: 232).

As the embodiment of a productive process, aesthetic expression is a dynamic part of cultural transformation. The constant flux of cultural forms and the meanings attached to those forms has successfully eluded sophisticated social theory, which seeks concrete patterns in human interaction. Such scholars as Clifford Geertz (e.g. 1973, 1983), Michael Sahlins (e.g. 1987), Marilyn Strathern (e.g. 1991), and Pierre Bourdieu (e.g. 1977, 1990) have taken up the challenge of integrating practice into social theory. Geertz’s ‘thick description’ seeks to avoid the entanglement of explanatory models by drawing out the complexity of cultural ‘webs of meaning’ through detailed ethnographic description. Sahlins’s historical perspective informs his description of processual social structures that reproduce meaning over time in a dynamic way. Strathern writes of ‘partial connections’, where human interaction is contingent and constantly reproduced, rendering social structures flexible and, at times, fragile. Bourdieu refers to social strategies, where cultural members have any number of options from which to choose a course of action. In this way action may be anticipated rather than predicted. There is still considerable room for manipulation and interpretation.
Analyses of aesthetic expression must build upon the work of these and other writers concerned with integrating creative practice and social theory. Aesthetic expression is a phenomenological process of cultural production where a conceptual bricolage is made manifest within a material reality to produce meaning in a structured and dynamic way. Lévi-Strauss (1966) uses the concept of bricolage as a metaphor for his view of cultural production. The bricoleur, the jack of all trades cum handyman, represents the native or local, the producer of social meaning. As the producer seeks to express meaning, there is a limited set of tools and materials from which to choose, and therefore a limited amount of manoeuvrable space in which to produce meaning. The elements are ‘pre-constrained’ in that each signifies an aspect of experience over time. As a producer of culture, the bricoleur has a limited number of objects and events, meaningful to all members of the group, with which to signify.

While Lévi-Strauss’s concept of bricolage is abstract, aesthetic expressions materialize experience in a way people can interact with and manipulate (Geertz 1983: 99). Further, the configurations of meaning in expressive form not only refer to socially meaningful experiences, they are themselves meaningful experiences to which values may be attached. This dual role of aesthetic expression as both signifier and signified expands the set of referents at the bricoleur’s disposal, which increases the possible configurations of meaning. Alan P. Merriam succinctly summarizes this process when he describes the ‘four-fold organizational pattern involved in the arts: concept, leading to behavior, resulting in product, which in turn feeds back upon the concept’ (Merriam 1971: 98). In this way, ‘the artistic system...can both generate new meanings or ways of expressing meanings appropriate to context and hide old meanings or associations’ (Morphy 1991: 141). People produce culture, not in a static system of law and predictable action, but in a dynamic process where the possible configurations of meaning in aesthetic expression increases continually.

Adding actual practice in a material context to Lévi-Strauss’s concept of bricolage allows one to retain its elegance while tempering its troubling emphasis on an underlying social structure that pre-constrains action. Though the limited set of images and signs at the bricoleur’s disposal limits the possible coherent configurations of meaning, it does not constrain production to one particular option. The creative production involved in aesthetic expression implies what Mills calls ‘style’, the ‘selection of elements from human experience and their reordering in new structures’ (Mills 1971: 72). In this theorization of cultural production, ‘the material-social world is changed by the artist (that is, everyone) and the artist is changed by it’ (Flores Fratto 1978: 136). The speaker of a language is limited by the possible arrangements of words to express a thought that will be understandable to the listener, but this does not mean that the same thought will be expressed in the same way every time. A cultural theory that focuses upon aesthetic expression provides room for a human agency missing in much of the literature concerning social structure, and accounts for the identifiable patterns of structure giving form to the creative choices made by human agents.
David Guss’s (1989) study of the Yekuana of Venezuela offers one particularly insightful example of cultural aesthetic expression as the re-creation of experience where values are either reconstituted or transformed. Even among the Yekuana, who pride themselves on the continuity and longevity of their cultural practices, the transformation of meaning takes place through aesthetic expression, which reconstitutes meaningful attachments to the past as it transforms the present set of collective referents in a creative and dynamic way.

Much of Yekuana daily activity centres around a connection to the mythical past and the adventures of ancestors. Storytelling among the Yekuana is not as institutionalized a verbal activity as it is in many cultures; rather, all activity is laden with aspects of the ancestor myths. As Guss describes it, ‘to tell a story...was to weave a basket, just as it was to make a canoe, to prepare barbasco, to build a house, to clear a garden, to give birth, to die’ (Guss 1989: 4). Creativity in recounting the myths is associated with mastery of technique, whether it be of weaving, carving, or decorating, rather than innovation or change, since reconstituting the values attached to ancestral experiences is of utmost importance.

As the world crowds in on the Yekuana, new experiences and contacts must be dealt with in a creative way in order to reconstitute the primacy of the ancestors’ experience. One way this is accomplished is through the narrative incorporation of the surrounding landscape into the mythical flight of Wanadi, the Yekuana culture hero, from the centre of the universe. As Yekuana experience of the outside world increases, so too do the geographical features and cultural groups encountered by Wanadi in the myths increase. As a result, ‘the historical events surrounding the arrival of the Spanish, along with the new technology they introduced, are reinterpreted into the meaningful language of Yekuana symbols’ (ibid.: 60). In this way, the primacy of ancestor experience is reconstituted while the symbols associated with that experience change over time. Guss explains that the ‘ability to endlessly manipulate these [symbols] insures that the culture continues as a dynamic mode of thought capable of processing new information and ideas’ (ibid.: 61). The expressive forms drawn on in myth-telling invoke the meanings associated with certain experiences and incorporate them in a dynamic way that reconstitutes Yekuana values.

Another way the Yekuana use aesthetic expression to transform meaning while reconstituting certain values, is in the socialization of people and things through decoration or spatial arrangement. Objects, people, and even history (as described above) must receive the cultural stamp to be recognized as distinctly Yekuana. Within a Yekuana house, women are symbolically and physically located beneath men, that is, further from the centre. This arrangement is completely transformed outside the house in the garden (ibid.: 33). In a ritual concerning the creation of new gardens, the Yekuana express the inversion of power between men and women in order to ‘civilize’ nature and ensure a productive garden. During three days of singing, dancing, and drinking, women take the men’s place at the centre of the house before moving out into the garden. This empowers women to successfully ‘tame’ the land and cultivate the freshly cleared earth. Music, dance,
food, and architecture are all drawn on as expressive forms in the transformation of the land into a meaningful part of Yekuana life.

This view of the re-creation of experience in aesthetic expression, which reconstitutes and/or transforms meaning through the manipulation of values attached to collective experience, fits well with Sahlin's ideas about processual social structures that are constructed or recreated through history. Sahlin claims (1987: 138) that 'the transformation of a culture is a mode of its reproduction'. And he goes on: 'every reproduction of culture is an alteration, insofar as in action, the categories by which a present world is orchestrated pick up some novel empirical content' (ibid.: 144). The Yekuana's increasing contact with the outside world has forced what Sahlin calls a 'functional revaluation of signs' (ibid.: 149) to incorporate new experiences in the long-established set of concepts that inform the content of aesthetic expression.

Like bricoleurs, people in general construct meaningful attachments to the social and material world through a set of familiar concepts. In his analysis of Yekuana aesthetics, Guss concentrates on a few specific aesthetic concepts that unify the expressive forms. Concepts like 'centrality' and 'wild/tame' permeate the Yekuana aesthetic system and as a result inform their way of interacting with one another and the world. The manifestation of specific aesthetic concepts within an aesthetic system appears in other contexts as well. Coote (1992) illustrates how qualities found pleasing by Dinka in cattle, like contrasting colours and curving horns, are repeated in expressive forms such as jewellery, pottery, tree-branch shrines, and even dance. Morphy (1992) explains how the Yolngu aesthetic is based on the concept of ancestral power, which is linked to visual brilliance. This concept is manifest in painting through cross-hatching, intended to provide a shimmering effect, and in certain foods high in shiny, visible fat. The shimmering brilliance of cross-hatching and the shiny, fatty foods are in turn evoked in compositions of Yolngu song and poetry. For contemporary Trinidad, Daniel Miller (1994) identifies 'covering', 'elaboration', and 'enclosure' as specific aesthetic concepts that are expressed in a number of forms such as the organization and use of the living-room as well as in cake decoration. In each of these examples specific aesthetic concepts may be seen to unify all expressions of the cultural aesthetic. Through the bricolage of cultural production manifest in an aesthetic system, these concepts are taken apart and reconnected to produce a new understanding of a new and constantly changing world.

In the bricolage of cultural production, meaning is constructed from the materials at hand in a constant reproduction of experience through aesthetic expression. The structures that constrain the possible configurations of meaning are themselves constantly reproduced and therefore susceptible to transformation with each new experience. What Sean O'Faolain wrote of Ireland some sixty years ago could be applied to any cultural context: 'This Ireland is young and earnest. She knows that somewhere among the briars and the brambles, there stands the reality which the generations have tried to reach—not, you notice, the Ideal.... We are living experimentally' (quoted in Sheehy 1968: 58). In this way,
all cultural participants are living experimentally, maintaining a connection to the past as they wade through the present world of ideas to come out with some semblance of meaning.

Conclusion

The purpose of this article has been to outline a more fruitful theorization of aesthetics than that which currently dominates social science and popular philosophy. The concept of aesthetics, as outlined above, is both cross-cultural and culturally relative and, when treated as an integrated whole, offers insights into socio-cultural processes that might otherwise remain invisible to the social scientist. The process of socialization, the production of moral values, and the construction of identity all draw heavily on aspects of a cultural aesthetic.

Terry Eagleton describes the ultimate binding forces of social order as 'habits, pieties, sentiments and affections', attributing the formation of these forces to aesthetic experience (Eagleton 1990: 20). Aesthetic experience within the context of a particular culture is necessarily filtered through the process of socialization. An initiate is not only introduced to ways of interacting, but also to ways of perceiving the sensory world. In this way, there is an aesthetic disposition common to a particular group, establishing a social bond at the level of the subconscious. The connection can be inarticulate, but each understands the value of, and can share in, certain experiences. Cultural members are therefore inclined to maintain that bond on the conscious level through political and economic means.

Coote observes that 'what is morally good is expected to display valued aesthetic qualities, and what displays valued aesthetic qualities is expected to be morally good' (Coote 1992: 266). Though expectations are not always satisfied, there is a conceptual connection between aesthetics and morality. Distinctions between good and bad, or right and wrong, spring from the same process of value-attachment that perpetuates the aesthetic system. Beauty is attributed to those experiences that appeal to the socialized senses, sparking a myriad of different associations embedded deep in a cultural way of knowing the world, and as such, those experiences are felt to be right and good. The association between beauty and morality is based on an important ideological aspect of aesthetic systems. Aesthetics, like ideology, provides a culturally specific way of knowing the world, and as such 'offers to the participants in a society a model upon which they may (and by implication should) base their beliefs, their behavior, and their characters' (Flores Fratto 1986: 250). A culturally specific aesthetic system stands as an absolute upon which a group as a whole, like Eagleton's 'new subject', can establish 'a law at one with its immediate experience' (Eagleton 1990: 20). The 'comprehensive factual "is"' from which grows 'the powerfully coercive "ought"' (Geertz 1973: 126) owes its existence to the aesthetic experience. Unlike ideology,
an aesthetic system is constantly reconstituted or transformed by everyday activity within a group, rendering its claims malleable by the people and therefore less susceptible to manipulation by a ruling élite.

The construction of identity also hinges upon a collective acknowledgment of a cultural aesthetic, or a particular way of knowing the world. That collective acknowledgment is based on a shared history of experience to which all members have attached value. As noted above, Eagleton claims that ‘the ultimate binding force of...social order, in contrast to the coercive apparatus of absolutism, will be habits, pieties, sentiments and affections’ (Eagleton 1990: 20). Those ‘habits, pieties, sentiments and affections’ can themselves be the product of some coercive apparatus like slavery, which colours the sensory perception of the world of a group of people who as a result recognize and express beauty in a similar way. Among the Yolngu, aesthetic expressions communicate group affiliations and interclan relations (Morphy 1991). As such, these expressions can incorporate or exclude, thus establishing the boundaries of group identity.

Roger Abrahams claims there is a one-to-one relationship between social and aesthetic patterns. Rather than view expressive events as epiphenomenal, ‘we can now listen to our informants, who have long been telling us that it is in such events that a people depict themselves most fully and regard themselves most seriously (even when the event is carried out in fun)’ (Abrahams 1983: xxiv). Coote, and a growing number of others, support this view, maintaining that ‘all other things being equal, people act in the world to maximize their aesthetic satisfaction’ (Coote 1992: 269). If this is so, then the processes of socialization, morality, and identity outlined above form only part of what is surely a host of social phenomena that may be better understood through an analysis of aesthetic systems. This article seeks to contribute to increasing the current level of awareness in social science concerning the usefulness of aesthetic analysis, and urges its implementation in social research.

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CAUGHT BETWEEN TWO WORLDS:
THE BIRHOR OF HAZARIBAGH AND
TRIBAL DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

KUNTALA LAHIRI-DUTT

Introduction

In recent years, ethnic plurality has attracted more and more notice as a characteristic of the Indian population. Over the years, however, the issues this recognition has given rise to have become more intricate and complex. Development among so-called tribals or adivasis¹ is one part of the current debate. In this commentary, I try to analyse problems of development in this context in general, and with reference to the Birhor of Hazaribagh, Bihar, India as a specific example.

The Context

In their accounts, chroniclers of ancient India tend to present rulers as humane and committed to the social and economic equality of their subjects. Little mention is made of the brutality inflicted upon the lower classes and castes, who mostly lacked any organized forms of resistance. The rise of Buddhism and subcultures within the broader scope of Hinduism, and the ruthlessness with which they were

1. Literally ‘original inhabitant’ and usually glossed in English as ‘aboriginal, aborigine’.
dealt with, bear witness to this sort of oppression. Buddhism offered at least a notional social equality. Of much greater appeal, however, was Islam, the religion of the ruling classes from the twelfth century. Later, Christianity introduced the values of a still higher level of social and economic equality. Hinduism reacted to these challenges by tightening the traditional social and economic restrictions of the varna system. As a result, all through the centuries, yet more groups of people have been peeling themselves away from the fold of Hinduism.

However, the case of the indigenous ethnic communities the British first called 'aborigines', 'animists', and finally 'tribals' is somewhat different. These communities had been left relatively untouched up to the end of the Muslim period, compared to the lower castes embedded in the fold of Hinduism. The large forest tracts of India, into which the indigenous populations were finally pushed, are geographically so widely distributed and so peripheral to mainstream life that they served as effective buffer zones limiting intergroup conflict. At least up until the nineteenth century, this marginal location may have saved them to some extent from the kind of annihilation that was perpetrated in Tasmania and the Americas by immigrant Europeans.

The Question of Definition

According to the spirit of the Indian constitution, a 'tribe' is identified in terms of ethnic background or origin. At the same time, communities inhabiting a territory declared a 'scheduled area' are also treated as scheduled tribes (i.e. as tribes listed in a schedule to the constitution, who are thereby entitled to reserved quotas in respect of parliamentary seats, university places, and government jobs). 'Tribe' as a concept, however, has undergone a major transformation over time. The meanings of 'tribe' and 'tribal culture' originating in Vedic literature were lost through exposure to European concepts. A new notion of tribe has been transplanted instead through the British system of education in India, giving rise to the question whether any scientific concept can be society- or culture-specific.

Under the patronage of the British colonial rulers, anthropological analysis in India tended to reflect the historical experiences and social realities of Europe. In fact, the distinction between adivasis and non-adivasis in India was never as sharp as that made between Europeans and Africans in the colonial period. British definitions of 'tribe' therefore reflect a sort of prejudice, as if the members of a tribe were queer and exotic, living an isolated life without any contact or communication beyond their territory. The implication that the tribals represent a primordial state of life way behind in the scale of evolution was strengthened and perpetuated through such definitions. This European point of view is entirely unrealistic and lacking in objectivity. For an Indian, a tribal is very much part of his or her larger social and cultural whole, someone with whom a degree of
identity is shared. A multiplicity of identities is a common experience for the peoples of India. To Indians, therefore, *adivasis* do not represent 'other cultures' as much as Africans or American Indians do to Euro-Americans. Since British rule, however, India's characteristic approach to the understanding of indigenous peoples disappeared in favour of accepting the Anglo-Saxon attitude. The British policy of segregation created a wide gap between the tribals and the rest of the Indian people. Tribal communities remained on the lowest rung of the socio-economic ladder.

*The Question of Integration*

The result was an ambiguity regarding tribal development in India. The majority of Indian scholars do not consciously maintain any distinction between the two. From an operational point of view, tribal development can be conceived as a continuous process involving both spontaneous and induced changes—in other words, both endogenous and exogenous changes—resulting in a steady process of differentiation. The emphasis here is on the ongoing nature of the process and the mechanism of differentiation, which, when put together, make the course of evolution seem uninterrupted. Tribal development, on the other hand, places all the emphasis on programmes of induced change for the fulfilment of definite objectives. Here the emphasis is on the process of adoption that is created by the new situation of induced innovation as well as on adaptation to concomitant and resultant changes.

Tribal transformation and tribal development can both be comprehended in terms of social, cultural, political, and economic attributes. In India, the creation of linguistic states, disregarding the ethnic identity of the indigenous peoples, resulted in each state trying to impose its language and culture, directly or indirectly, on these peoples. The project of national integration essentially attempted to assimilate the *adivasis*. There was a widespread neo-colonialist understanding that tribals would develop alongside the majority linguistic populations in each state, with the assistance of the latter.

Economy, as the expression of techno-cultural efficiency in the exploration of and adaptability to a given ecological setting at a particular point of time, is one of the key factors regulating the 'lifestyle' of a people. With the passage of time, changes in the ecological setting of techno-cultural activity are to be expected. Any transformation in the economy is therefore subject to either ecological disturbance or an alteration in techno-cultural efficiency or a combination of both. We shall see later how this has especially affected the Birhor.

Since independence, the problem of tribal development has received considerable attention, and various programmes have been launched by the government through Five-Year Plans. The gap in development between different communities
found recognition in the constitution of India, where Article 46 reads: ‘The state shall promote with special care the educational and economic interests of the weaker sections of the people, and in particular of the scheduled castes and scheduled tribes, and shall protect them from social injustice and all forms of exploitation.’ This statement was followed by serious debate regarding the approach to be taken towards tribal development. One group of administrators was in favour of the British policy of segregation. This ‘National Park’ theory stemmed from imperialist attitudes towards the people of colonized countries and advocated keeping tribals marginalized from the mainstream developmental process in the name of preserving their tradition and culture undisturbed. Another group advocated the complete assimilation of tribals to the rest of the society. The inherent risk in this approach is that at any point of development, the socio-cultural practices of others may be imposed on tribal communities and result in a loss of tribal identity.

Eventually, the state settled for a policy of integration in terms of five principles, known as the tribal **panchsheel**. These are:

1. That tribals should develop along their own lines and that outsiders should avoid imposing anything on them. Their own traditional arts and cultures should be encouraged in every way.
2. Tribal rights over land and forests should be respected.
3. The government should try to train and build teams formed from tribal people to carry out administrative and developmental tasks. Some outside technical personnel will no doubt be needed, especially at the beginning, but introducing too many outsiders into tribal territory should be avoided.
4. These areas should not be over-administered or overwhelmed with a multiplicity of schemes. Government should rather work through and not in rivalry with tribal social and cultural institutions.
5. Results should be judged not by statistics or the amount of money spent, but by the quality of human life that is created.

**Plans and Projects for Tribal Development**

In spite of progressive increases in plan outlays over the years, tribal development has clearly not been sufficient. The real achievements so far have been very discouraging; at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan in 1960, the Dhebar Commission reported indebtedness, land alienation, bonded labour and the activities of money-lenders, traders and contractors, who were still playing dominant roles in tribal economies and societies. The Seventh Plan itself recognized that not all scheduled tribal families who had been assisted by the government had crossed the poverty line.
A multitude of organizations for tribal development, such as the Tribal Sub-Plan, Multipurpose Tribal Blocks, Multipurpose Tribal Development Projects, Tribal Development Agencies, the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Corporation, and Large Agricultural Multipurpose Societies (LAMPS) have been set up in tribal areas over the years, all quite against the spirit of *panchsheel*. Special institutions have also been created for investment and nationalized banks entrusted with special responsibility to look after the financial needs of the tribal regions. It has been estimated that not more than twenty per cent of total expenditure on tribal development through such organizations actually trickles down to the people for whom it is meant. This is mainly because of a lack of coordination between, for example, the state-level Tribal Development Corporation and the national-level Tribal Marketing Organization.

The entire thrust of present development planning in tribal regions is welfare-oriented and philanthropic. The plans were formulated by outsiders and the problems viewed from their perspective. All this reflects a persisting colonial attitude in the form of greater emphasis being given to family-oriented development than to infrastructural development. As development proceeds, the tribals tend to become assimilated into the mainstream. However, because of geographical, ethnic, and other barriers, this fusion process is often slow and full of contradictory twists and turns. The tightrope balance with which officialdom tries to steer a path between the assimilation of indigenous people and the maintenance of their cultural distinctiveness leads either to the deliberate encouragement of ‘backward’ features in their economy and culture or to letting them stagnate indefinitely while ‘progress’ is foisted on them by outside forces. At the same time, planners and administrators arrogate to themselves the right to impose their will and understanding on the indigenous communities in a paternalistic fashion in the name of tribal development. As a result, tribals have been pushed further into poverty, with the status of agrarian dependants.

To illustrate this failure, we may examine the estimates of the 32nd (1977-78, revised) and 38th Rounds (1983) of the National Sample Survey. These reveal that the number of people below the poverty line has declined by about 12.5 per cent in rural areas. However, distinguishing within the rural population, the relevant figures are about 7.6 per cent in the case of scheduled castes, 7.1 per cent in the case of scheduled tribes, and 15.1 per cent for the ‘other castes’. Thus the rate of decline is more than double among the latter than among the scheduled tribe population. Moreover, the process of land alienation, which began during British rule, still continues today, despite the fact that several laws have recently been enacted to prevent such transfers of land from tribals to non-tribals. The process of land dispossession has been accelerated by the establishment of industrial units, dams, and the extraction of minerals in tribal areas. Generally, dispossessed tribals have either turned into day-labourers locally or joined metropolitan labour markets as unskilled construction workers. In the 1961 census, 49 per cent of tribal workers were cultivators with their own land and 29 per cent were agricultural
labourers; in 1971 the corresponding figures were 28 per cent and 49 per cent. This trend is discernible in all tribal regions.

A Case-study: The Birhor

The Birhor are a wandering people engaged in hunting and gathering. They are found in their greatest concentration in Hazaribagh and Palamau districts, southern Bihar. Their entire sustenance comes by hunting and trapping wild game with nets and snares in the fast dwindling forests. Birhor women make ropes and nets from the fibres of a special creeper called chop, as well as gathering roots and herbs from the jungle. Many of these products have medicinal properties. Much effort is expended merely on survival. For hundreds of years, close interaction with nature had determined the Birhor life pattern in terms of the nature and quantity of food, the size of a food-gathering and -consuming group, the material of dwelling units (called kumbas), occupation, and even social organization.

A Birhor's attitude to nature and life is best exemplified by his kumba, a dome-shaped hut made of sal leaves about six feet high with a single opening about two feet high. The kumba remains well insulated during the often severe summers and winters of Hazaribagh and is wind- and waterproof. Most of all, it is a test of a Birhor's manhood to be able to make his own kumba before he is allowed to marry.

From the very beginning of development, the Birhor have opted out of the modern economic system and retreated deeper and deeper into the forests. However, as we have seen, the forests, which were the very basis of their survival, have been gradually and systematically depleted over the years. This process too began in the British period, when contractors were allowed to exploit forest resources through land leases granted by the administration. Even then, till about 1905, when the Land Survey was made, most forest areas were under tribal occupation. Later, when the Indian Forest Act was passed, most forest areas were taken over by the Forest Department. Today, as more areas are auctioned off to forest contractors, and with the loss or restriction of traditional rights to use the forest for firewood, hunting, and gathering, the Birhor have become poorer and have sunk deeper into debt. Landless, and denied their traditional rights to the forest, they have been forced to erode the basis of their common property resources.

In recent years, the Birhor have faced severe problems of adaptation environmentally as well as socio-economically. Faced with the stark reality of rapidly degrading forests, selected Birhor tandas (settlements) were adopted by the government as the focuses of community aid. An Action Project was organized in 1975. Later, in 1980, in a bid to settle them in a specific area, the Birhor were given land, and brick and mortar houses with asbestos or tin roofs were provided for each family unit. However, this 'resettlement' not only went against Birhor
cultural values and broke up traditional social support systems, it also failed to yield any permanent results. Sickness levels rose, domestic violence increased, and several older couples left the colonies in favour of their former nomadic lifestyles. The lack of sensitivity to Birhor culture on the part of administrators has caused the failure of many such projects. A group of people who have traditionally been master-hunters with a keen sense of scent and hearing and an intimate knowledge of forest flora and fauna have thus been turned into ‘victims of development’. In some cases, rising expectations have changed perceptions of life, and young males have migrated, alone or with their families, to nearby urban centres. There was no official examination of the root of the problem, which could only be prevented by protecting the ecosystem to sustain the Birhor’s livelihood and at the same time making available to them the benefits of development, such as better nutrition, health care and education.

**Conclusion**

Since the nineteenth century, the natural wealth of southern Bihar has been exploited in many ways. Since the British began administering the area, history has also been marked by tribal resistance and rebellion. Several agrarian revolts during 1831–2, the Kol rebellion of the 1830s, and the Santal uprising of 1857 are notable among them. These movements were basically directed against the dikus (outsiders, especially high-caste Hindus), who had penetrated the area as money-lenders, businessmen and officials. The British began with the exploitation of forest wealth and went on to open up coal mines, which in turn gave rise to heavy and light industries. The first workers in these mines and factories were tribals and semi-tribals who took up mainstream occupations along with their families. When facilities increased, safety measures were developed, pay scales improved, and mechanization initiated; but adivasi labour was pushed out of the modern sector. Even today, not a single executive position in any industry or mining enterprise is held by a tribal, let alone the ownership of such enterprises.

The indigenous communities of southern Bihar are today caught between two worlds: fifty years of independence have given them little power or choice in determining their own lives. So far, modern development has pushed them further to the margins of mainstream life. Each new ‘development’ project—large dams, industrial complexes, urban schemes, mining sites—has caused large-scale displacement of adivasis, who have borne the brunt of environmental degradation.

In the case of more isolated communities like the Birhor, greater interaction with the mainstream world has only turned them from self-sustaining communities into groups of scavengers. The initiatives taken so far by the government have robbed them of their traditional cultural skills and materials without helping them learn new skills or improve on the old ones. Rising aspirations produced by
greater contact have simply been channelled towards consumer items, mostly
things having little or no impact on either their standards of living or the quality
of their lives more generally.
Private and public sector industrial 'development' has led to the wholesale
expropriation of tribal land without any thought being given to the rehabilitation
of those who have been displaced. With the alienation of tribal land, the erosion
of indigenous cultures has accelerated. Tribals have mostly been bypassed by
modern society, and even where they are a part of it, they have achieved a position
only on the very lowest stratum.
KAORU FUKUDA, The Place of Animals in British Moral Discourse: A Field Study from the Scottish Borders. D.Phil. (BLLD 46–9556)

This thesis intends to provide a new analytical perspective for the study of human–animal relationships. Anthropological studies of human perceptions of animals have been dominated by defining symbolic meanings of animals in human thought. Moral values and taboos have been treated by most anthropologists as socially shared ideas which are somehow imposed on individuals. By providing an ethnography of a community in the Scottish Borders, I aim to demonstrate people’s practical views of animals and the heterogeneity of moral opinions.

The ethnography is based mainly on interviews with, and observations of, people who deal with animals for various occupational and recreational purposes. The first chapter indicates the significance of animals in British moral discourses and discusses how a study of these discourses could contribute to the study of moral values. The second chapter gives a general introduction to the Scottish Borders and demonstrates the variety of human–animal relationships in the region. The third chapter discusses changes in local life which took place in this century.
and resulted in changes in people's perceptions of animals. The fourth chapter focuses on people's perceptions of animals which have been developed through their first-hand experiences. The fifth chapter deals with moral discussions on how humans should treat animals.

The ethnography shows that most people appreciate animals' existence through their experiences. Anthropology, however, with some exceptions, has paid little attention to the empirical way of perceiving things, and has tended to reduce people's empirical knowledge to conceptualized thoughts. This thesis suggests that trends in anthropology, as well as in philosophical moral discourses, reflect anthropologists' and philosophers' conventional attitudes, which themselves are produced socially and culturally.

Lisa Radhika Kaul, Reclaiming the Nation through Land: Jewish Religious Nationalism in Israel. D.Phil. (BLLD 46-748)

This thesis seeks to provide a counter-example to the claim that nationalisms, by definition, have to be secular. It focuses on one example of a religious nationalist movement as embodied in the Jewish settler movement in Israel, the Gush Emunim. From the broad perspective of a social movement it narrows its focus to a case-study of religious nationalists in one settlement, 'Tekoa'. Tekoa is affiliated to the Gush Emunim and is one of the 'facts on the ground' of the religious nationalist movement.

Possible reasons for the rise of religious nationalism are explored in this thesis. One avenue explored is that the dominant nationalist ideology of the state may itself be shot through with inconsistencies, which allows for the rise of alternative nationalist ideologies. Religious nationalism is one of the alternative ideologies which highlight the religious basis of the prevalent secular nationalist ideology.

Religious nationalism is thus constructed against what has been called the 'enemy within' and the 'enemy without' in this work. The enemy within, in this case, are the secular nationalists in Israel who are seen as degenerate and lacking in idealism and true vision. They are castigated for failing to represent, authentically, the imagined community of the co-religionists. In their bid to present the 'authentic' nationalist ideology, these religious nationalists appropriate the term used to describe the secular nationalists in Israel (Zionists) and reformulate the meaning and the content of the term. They attempt to make their religious identity coterminous with the national identity, which they perceive to be secular. This equation is reflected on to the state, which is expected to be a Jewish state rather than a state for Jews. And by extension, the nationalist ideology is seen as religious rather than secular.
D. R. Moore, Concepts of Disease and their Relationship to Health-seeking Behaviour in Chuquisaca Department, South Bolivia. D.Phil. (BLLD 46–3523)

The thesis is a medical ethnography of Quechua- and Spanish-speaking peasants and share-croppers in Belisario Boeto Province, Chuquisaca Department, Bolivia. Some major anthropological categories (magic, ritual, symbol) are reanalysed in order to stress their relevance to the construction of ethnography. A fundamental aim of the thesis is to write an ethnography which reproduces the actors’ categories and is unfettered by jargon.

Chapter 1 presents the fieldwork location, and discusses political and socio-economic aspects, class relations and ethnic identity, showing that the society is undergoing constant change. Chapter 2 discusses the basic religious premises upon which health and illness concepts are based and demonstrates how Protestant sects are spreading in the area. Chapter 3 presents and discusses the popular illness classifications and conceptions in the fieldwork area. It questions diffusionist theories concerning the alleged exclusive Hispanic origins of the hot-cold dichotomy in South America, provides data on the concepts of the person, health, illness, the interpretation of affliction, symptomatologies, and emotional conditions.

Chapter 4 discusses the symbolism and practice of divination.

Chapter 5 discusses the structure of medical knowledge in the health-care systems of the area, focusing on the practices of curanderos (healers). Chapter 6 reanalyses the anthropological models of symbol and rite and describes the major therapeutic rituals (llamadalwayyana and santiguada). Chapter 7 analyses the therapeutic rituals and theories of sacrifice. Chapter 8 discusses magic and witchcraft sociologically and ethnographically. Chapter 9 analyses susto, the fright-illness taxeme, and the culture-bound syndrome debate. Health-seeking behaviour and the performance of the popular therapeutic rituals serve important emotional and religious functions. The thesis provides a comprehensive picture of the meaning of health and illness in an Andean society.

Richard McGill Murphy, Space, Class and Rhetoric in Lahore.

The following is a study of class relationships and nationalism in contemporary Lahore, based on fieldwork conducted in the city between 1992 and 1994. The fieldwork method adopted was participant observation, supplemented by close readings of texts drawn from Urdu and Persian literature, from school textbooks, from the Pakistani media (principally the Urdu and English press, along with two Urdu television dramas), and from the sermons of Sunni and Shi’a Muslim preachers which I recorded at mosques and prayer gatherings around the Old City.

Lahore may be described as a complex of village-like communities, defined both spatially and by an overlapping series of criteria such as clans, kinship,
gender, and occupation. My fieldwork strategy was to live in as many of these 'villages' as possible. I cultivated Lahori informants of various backgrounds: among others, landowning politicians ('feudals', in Pakistani English), middle- and working-class political workers, journalists, bourgeois socialites, theatre and television personalities, working women, low-caste musicians, real-estate developers, and bureaucrats. In the tradition of participant observation, I got to know most of these informants by taking part in their everyday activities. My entrée into the journalistic community was by writing feature articles for a local English-language newspaper. I learned about the television world by playing the role of an intrepid, Urdu-speaking foreign correspondent in a Pakistan Television docu-drama about Kashmir. I met low-caste musicians and Kanjar dancing-girls by studying the tabla and by living near Hira Mandi, Lahore’s traditional vice district. I cultivated most of my political connections by accompanying them on canvassing tours, attending political rallies, and sitting endlessly in political salons.

Perspectival multiplicity, uncertainty, and moral ambiguity are fundamental to the rhetorical strategies through which Lahoris construct and act upon the world. It is argued that what I call a crisis of social representation in urban Pakistan is best analysed as a debate whose rhetorical positions undercut the naturalistic representation of truth by a constant questioning of the moral authority conveyed by any particular perspective on the social world. My analysis distinguishes three broad, often clashing moral perspectives within urban Pakistani society today: nationalism, modernism, and Islam; and I coin the term 'cubistic' to describe this complex debate, borrowing from the theory of multiple perspective deployed in Cubist painting.

Some frames of explanation, such as formal Islam, encompass a broader world than Pakistan, yet are deployed in very local ways. Others, such as nationalism, are less easy to deploy in the Lahori setting but set moral limits to the development of local ‘meta-narratives’. Indeed, certain obvious possibilities for totalizing explanation (not least 'caste') are ruled out by a need for contrast with neighbouring India. My argument engages with a world dominated by rhetorical contestation. Hence, I proceed from the premise that the social facts with which we have to deal are not real objects, but rather arguments about reality. Lahore, in this view, is not a set of objective social facts connected according to some more or less transparent logic, but a set of debates about social, political and historical registers of truth.

This proposition is tested in a variety of ethnographic case-studies. Chapter 1 provides the historical background to contemporary Pakistani nationalist debate while situating the present study in relation to the broader discourses of social anthropology and South Asian studies. Chapter 2 explores thematic and structural connections between Pakistani nationalism and the rhetoric of class distinction in Lahore. Chapter 3 expands the discussion of hierarchy by relating it to nostalgia, which in urban Pakistan takes the form of pervasive claims that society no longer makes sense. In this analysis, Lahori representations of rationality thus provide the bridge between contemporary social relations and the social construction of history.
In chapter 4, I test these arguments in a series of ethnographic descriptions of debates over the quality and control of urban space. Finally, chapter 5 explores urban Pakistani political discourse through discussions of conspiracy theories, Shi'a Muslim mourning rituals, and politically angled state television dramas.

PATRICIA SLOANE, Good Works and Networks: Islam, Modernity, and Entrepreneurship among the Malays. D.Phil.

This analysis shows how a group of Malay entrepreneurs in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, demonstrated a culturally based understanding of the individual's and the communal group's role and responsibility in economic development. The process by which obligations to others, hard work, and faith have become symbolized and synthesized in entrepreneurial economic activities which are at once 'modern', 'Muslim', and 'Malay' is the subject of Part One, presented under the rubric of 'Good Works'. Exploring the themes of obligation and responsibility in Malay life, I show how entrepreneurship has become the main vector of ethnic, religious, and moral worth and the test of meritocracy and modernity among the primary beneficiaries of Malay affirmative-action policy (NEP) in an ethnically polarized state.

In chapter 2, I explore the complex theme of obligation which enframes Malay life, winding through relationships with parents, spouses, cohorts, and communal group. I relate this theme to the sense of ethnic duty which Malay entrepreneurship entails. I examine the way in which Islamic theories of material obligation and social roles have affected the lives of modern Malay men and women, giving meaning to their identities, but also creating conflicts and paradoxes in domestic and economic life.

In chapter 3, I explore the 'modern' redefinitions of Islamic economic beliefs and meanings which have shaped Malay entrepreneurship. I examine the ways in which a Muslim world-view established definitions of self-interest and group interest. Defining their culture of Islamic economic modernity, my informants distinguished themselves from kampung or village Malays, from royal-born and aristocratic Malays, and, perhaps most importantly, from the anti-modern tendencies of dakwah or fundamentalist Malay Muslims.

The nuances of identity and hegemony constructed from these ideas become crucial to my informants' understanding of the distinctiveness of Malay culture, the subject of chapter 4. I explore 'Malayness' through descriptions of traditional difference that my informants—and their government—were elaborating for and preserving in modern Malay and Malaysian culture. I focus on the roles of Malay 'hospitality', 'openness', and 'egalitarianism'—the cornerstones of 'Malayness'—in establishing ritual harmony, but which confirm social hierarchy and roles of power. I examine my informants' belief that they were reviving and preserving—often
through entrepreneurship—values from the Malay past, guided by a government-supported program for creating a multiethnic and harmonious civil society in capitalist modernity ("Vision 2020").

Part Two, presented under the rubric of 'Networks', elucidates how my informants enact their understanding of Malay economic modernity and entrepreneurship, that is, how they infuse their altruistic image of 'good works' into economic and social action through networks. In chapter 5, I describe the way in which networks form in Kuala Lumpur society, how information and resources flow through social networks, and the emergence of business alliances. I explore the ways in which these social arrangements give eidetic form to the theory of conjoined economic development ('good works') which my informants were elaborating.

The next three chapters are case-studies of entrepreneurial networking. Chapter 6 describes the way in which alliances form among Malay entrepreneurs, often as a consequence of the way in which the government represents modern economic opportunity and enterprise to Malays. Chapter 7 continues the discussion of the role of networking in social and economic life, examining the negative consequences of a high profile for one female entrepreneur in Kuala Lumpur. I suggest that these consequences are often experienced by overly autonomous women in Malay entrepreneurial society. In chapter 8, I examine an entrepreneurial venture which harnessed its very existence to the role of Malay networks, to the point at which 'networking' became the 'product' of the enterprise itself. I draw parallels between this business and other forms of Malay action which explicitly use social relations for economic ends.

In the Conclusion, I discuss the crucial role of entrepreneurship in establishing and legitimizing Malay ethnic identity and representing Malay ideals of morality and tradition in the contexts of rapid social and economic change. I elucidate a general theory of Malay entrepreneurship, describing the way in which it tends to confirm, establish the gender of, and politicize Malay éliteness at the same time as it elides the role of the state in creating and supporting entrepreneurs.

HEUNG WAH WONG. An Anthropological Study of a Supermarket in Hong Kong. D.Phil. (BLLD 46–9561)

This thesis is an anthropological study of a Japanese supermarket in Hong Kong. It contributes to the ethnography of Japanese overseas companies in particular and of the limited-stock company in general, for these subjects have received little attention from anthropologists. It is neither a general anthropology nor a management study of Japanese overseas companies. The thesis is both more specific and more ambitious. Narrowly conceived, this study is an anthropology of the supermarket’s venture into Hong Kong. I understand this venture as the product of a dialectic in a double sense: (1) the structural interplay of socio-cultural order and
human practices and (2) the historical articulation of Japanese and Hong Kong Chinese systems. This study is ambitious because it aims more broadly at two aspects. First, although it focuses on one Japanese company, this study has a substantial discussion of the concept of Japanese *kaisha* (corporations) of which the supermarket is a unique actualization. Secondly, it speaks to a series of theoretical issues that continue to vex many social scientists. The thesis focuses on the interconnection of the determining force of socio-cultural orders and the creative action of the human subject, through an investigation of the historical process in which the supermarket ventured into Hong Kong and the institutional culture of the company.

I suggest that the supermarket’s Hong Kong venture has to be considered as a two-sided historical process: as a dialectic that takes into account the socio-cultural endowments of, but also the consequences for, both Hong Kong Chinese and Japanese employees. Therefore, I start with an investigation of the ethnographic peculiarities of the supermarket: Fumei as a regional supermarket, as a family company, and a religious group, and move on to discuss the notion of Japanese *kaisha* (corporations). I then examine how these ethnographic peculiarities and the general notion of *kaisha* interplay with the socio-political context of Hong Kong and the local categorization of supermarkets and department stores to produce a particular historical process of the venture. The interplay itself is a conjuncture of reciprocal determination. For on the one hand, the larger socio-cultural orders reproduce themselves in action, while on the other they are changed by the transformative action of human subjects. The company reproduces itself as a regional supermarket in Hong Kong, making itself different from other Japanese department stores in such aspects as locational strategy, merchandising policy, clientele, customer services and so on, while the company chairman transforms the company from a regional supermarket through an international retailer and conglomerate to a company with Chinese fever. More interestingly, the interplay itself is also marked by structural discontinuities. Although the company’s fate is to a great extent subject to the dispositions of the company chairman, the chairman’s insistence on keeping the company’s independence in the early 1970s, when the company was facing a crisis, still cannot explain why the company went overseas in 1971 and why it started with Brazil. Therefore, the supermarket’s venture into Hong Kong is the result of dialectic interaction between phenomena at different levels.

The same goes for the internal dynamics of the company in Hong Kong. The company’s ways of organizing work and its ranking, compensation, and promotion systems foster the organized dependence of both Japanese and local staff on the company: economic and social dependence on the company and personal dependence on the superiors, although they affect the former more than the latter. This organized dependence can be attributed to the notion of *kaisha*, and seen as one of the major characteristics of Japanese companies. I then move on to investigate how the configuration of organized dependence and the differentiated organized
dependence of Japanese and local staff shaped the institutional culture of the supermarket.

Five features of the company's institutional culture are identified. They are (1) the division of the workforce along lines of ethnicity; (2) relationships with Japanese expatriates as the focus of competition among local employees; (3) development of a consciousness and calculative 'presentation of self' among local employees; (4) distinctions between ambitious and adaptive local staff; and (5) a different set of social relationships among Japanese expatriates.

My discussion of the company's institutional culture shows, on the one hand, that Japanese employees are not culturally programmed but coerced to be obedient to the company authority because they are dependent on their company, but on the other that they can transform the relationship between kaisha and employees prescribed in the notion of kaisha. For instance, a Japanese female employee successfully moved out of her company flat. I argue that such a move transformed the meaning of company housing from being a means of company control to being a place for employees to live.

The same happens in the relationships between Japanese expatriates and local staff. While the strategies local staff adopt in advancing their own interests are very much determined by the power structure of the company in which Japanese expatriates dominae and local staff are dominated, the former learn from the latter that they can have their own business while working for the company.

The major problem for this study is thus the specific configuration of the interplay between structure and agency; and the interplay itself, as shown in the supermarket's Hong Kong venture, is a conjuncture of mutual determination in which the structure cannot be reduced to the individual action and vice versa, and yet each is determining the other.

This Bison Books edition of Alice Fletcher's presentation and analysis of the Pawnee Hako ceremony is an excellent example of the kind of salvage anthropology advocated by Boas, not only because it preserves a detailed account of a now extinct ceremony, but also because it rescues this valuable document from the relative obscurity of the musty annals of the Smithsonian Bureau of American Ethnology. There is a wealth of information contained in those rare copies of the annual reports to the Secretary of the Smithsonian that beg reprinting in monograph form, not the least of which are lengthy reports by Ruth Bunzel, Ruth Benedict, and Frank Hamilton Cushing. Fletcher's contribution to the long-running series rightfully deserves this accessible reprint, which will be an excellent resource for students of native North America as well as those interested in the politics of presentation brimming beneath the surface of its authorship.

Helen Myers provides a helpful introduction to the book which places the research in its historical context and fills in some biographical data on Fletcher. We learn in Myers' introduction of Fletcher's consistent championing of the North American Indian, as well as her efforts to thwart the scientific classification of native North Americans on the lower end of the social evolutionary scale. Myers also introduces us to Fletcher's key informant, Tahirussawichi, a Pawnee who had participated in the Hako Ceremony.

What is perhaps most intriguing about Fletcher's work on the Hako ceremony is her relative silence throughout the book. After a few pages of introduction, Fletcher allows Tahirussawichi to describe the ceremony in detail through the use of a graphophone, deeming it 'best not to change his method or introduce elements' (p. 25). Tahirussawichi proceeds to fill the next 252 pages of text with his description of the Hako ceremony. The fact that his name does not appear on the cover is a curious oversight, given that no less than four names are printed prominently below the title, including that of Edwin S. Tracy, who transcribed the ceremonial music. It would be an object-lesson in the problems of agency and ethnographic voice in turn-of-the-century anthropology if this were not so modern an edition that it could easily have corrected the misplaced authorship. An ironic epitaph is offered by Tahirussawichi himself in the last line of his lengthy description: 'It must be that I have been preserved for this purpose, otherwise I should be lying back there among the dead' (p. 278). One wonders if the issues of authorship which confront the reader have not unwittingly left Tahirussawichi back among the dead after all.
Tahirussawichi’s description of the Hako ceremony is interrupted only by transcriptions of the ceremonial music. The emphasis on the music of the ceremony is no doubt due to Fletcher’s own interest in music and is a refreshingly early recognition of the importance of such expressive forms in cultural practices. Along with the music are detailed descriptions of the ceremonial objects and the various myths which play a part in the ceremony. The result is an inspired balance between the straightforward verbal reconstruction of the Pawnee ceremony and the sensory experience of sights and sounds integral to the performance of the Hako.

The last hundred pages of the book are devoted to Fletcher’s recapitulation and analysis of the ceremony as described by Tahirussawichi. She offers some insightful elaborations on symbolism, along with some conjecture on the origins and dissemination of the ceremony, but her objective is less to offer analysis than to preserve the ceremony. Fletcher certainly meets her objective, and in fact offers two texts side by side, that of Tahirussawichi and her own summary.

Fletcher’s reluctance to obscure Tahirussawichi’s text with her own in-depth analysis is to her credit, and as a result the rich detail of Tahirussawichi’s description and Fletcher’s broad summary provide an excellent resource from which to draw data for contemporary analysis. A careful read of the ceremony reveals its efficiency in establishing inter-tribal affinal kinship networks through ritual exchange. It also serves as a blueprint for Pawnee semiotics and their particular use of material culture. As a whole, this modern edition is an admirable attempt to make accessible the research of anthropologists which would otherwise, in the words of Tahirussawichi, be lying back among the dead.

RUSSELL SHARMAN


Luke Taylor joins a growing list of scholars interested in the social implications of art with the publication of his Seeing the Inside: Bark Painting in Western Arnhem Land. Like Nancy Munn and Howard Morphy before him, Taylor’s interest in Australian Aboriginal art serves as a raison d’être of the current cross-disciplinary enthusiasm for art and, more generally, aesthetics as a catalyst for social cohesion and the semiotic development of expressive cultural forms in the face of modernity. In his own words, Taylor is ‘concerned to reveal how the activity of artists in producing works for the market can also be seen to maintain a number of key religious principles within the context of the changing conditions of Kunwinjku social life’ (p. 6).

The Kunwinjku, the predominant language-group of Australia’s Western Arnhem Land aborigines, form the basis of Taylor’s study. After a lengthy introduction to his specific intentions, Taylor reconstructs the historical development of the art market in Western Arnhem Land. Focusing on the contributions of anthropologists and missionaries, Taylor describes how the Kunwinjku have adapted to the market for their paint-
ings and how it may have influenced the particular style and subject-matter of Kunwinjku artists. Taylor argues that as the market for bark paintings expanded, subject-matter became more representational than geometric. He also claims that many anthropologists stressed distinctions between Eastern and Western Arnhem Land art which may not have been altogether accurate, but inspired further division.

Chapters three, four, and five develop Taylor's argument for the integration of social analysis and the analysis of art. Beginning with Kunwinjku social organization, Taylor describes how individuals are integrated into the social system and how that integration affects artistic production. Based on kinship and clan affiliation, the Kunwinjku maintain a distinction between 'ownership' and 'management' of sacred places, objects, and deities. The managers, or djangkay, are responsible for all that is sacred to the members of their mother's brother's clan, which includes ritual painting. Among artists, Taylor distinguishes three levels of social identity which incorporate the overall, notably figurative style of Western Arnhem Land art, the individual style and technique of artists, and the general style and technique of various Kunwinjku art 'schools' based on apprenticeship networks. Though stylistic identity varies among artists, the subject-matter of Kunwinjku painting invariably falls within one or more of four figurative categories: (1) major regional ceremonial figures; (2) minor regional spirits; (3) food animals; and (4) sacred ancestral deities, or djang figures. Taylor places these subject categories in ceremonial context to demonstrate the development of Kunwinjku art within the sacred ritual cycle.

Moving from the general to the specific, chapters six to nine offer detailed analysis of Kunwinjku bark painting, beginning with the formal components of production and leading up to the complex levels of meaning inherent in Kunwinjku figurative style. Taylor takes us through the gathering of materials and the initial stages of a painting's composition. Then the analysis turns to the various figurative styles available to Kunwinjku artists, which Taylor lists as fish, birds, crocodiles, macropods (kangaroo and wallaby), and various human forms. Taylor indicates his list is by no means exhaustive since the iconic system of representation used by the Kunwinjku is constantly expanding. This aspect of iconic representational systems leads into Taylor's analysis of what he calls transforming figures, which consist of two or more figures combined in a way to demonstrate the intermingling of the landscape, humans, animals, and deities in Kunwinjku cosmology. Accompanied by first-hand accounts of Kunwinjku myth, the examination of transforming figures demonstrates Taylor's affinity to Lévi-Strauss's views on both the flexibility and permanence of meaning. Like the bricoleur in Lévi-Strauss's The Savage Mind, the Kunwinjku break up and modify the representational schema through the historical process of new and influential experience, and then draw from its constituent parts to recombine meaningful aspects of style and subject-matter to produce new and creative forms. Taylor breaks with Lévi-Strauss, however, where he seeks out how abstract schema are put into action and words in a social context. Where Lévi-Strauss lacked a contextual example of bricolage, Taylor seeks to implement the concept through the material reality of Kunwinjku art and its place in the nexus of human interaction.

One of the most interesting sections of Taylor's book is his analysis of Kunwinjku X-ray painting. It is here that we begin to see clearly the inspiration for the book's title as Kunwinjku construct an 'obvious' or 'outside' meaning of a composition as
well as a deeper, ‘inside’ meaning that requires knowledge passed through initiation. This is most evident in X-ray art which details the internal organs of various figures (notably not human figures) in stylized representational conventions. The outside meaning refers to the basic subdivisions of certain food animals, but the inside meaning refers to the creation myths of ancestral deities, with certain aspects of internal division corresponding to the sacred landscape. The X-ray figures become maps to the initiated, documenting the adventures of ancestors across the clan land.

Taylor's detailed account of Western Arnhem Land art adds significantly to the work begun by Morphy and Munn concerning one of the most important art-producing regions of the world. His book not only documents the artistry of the Kunwinjku, but also seeks to integrate the artistic process into an analysis of social change and semiotic transformation, allowing for innovation within the confines of a rigorously traditional cultural institution. These facts will perhaps balance what at times can be mildly tedious technical descriptions, and the curious scarcity of women among the Kunwinjku, which, in all fairness to Taylor, is due mostly to their exclusion as Kunwinjku painters. An interesting follow-up to Taylor's detailed and well-written study of Western Arnhem Land bark painting might be a broader analysis of artistry in the region which would incorporate women and their expressive forms (of which examples undoubtedly exist), as well a further elaboration on Taylor's interesting analysis of how art is tied to the social fabric of Kunwinjku life.

RUSSELL SHARMAN


Based on a workshop on European Reactions to the Tourist Gaze held at the EASA conference in Prague in 1992, this collection of eight papers by mostly young scholars at the beginning of their careers includes an introduction and ‘postlude’ by two heavyweights in the anthropology of tourism, Jeremy Boissevain and Tom Selwyn. Geographically, the chapters examine respectively Andalusia, Sardinia, Malta, Skyros (Greece), Cantal (France), the Lofoten Islands (Norway), and Amsterdam, which although limited offer insights into events which may be applicable world-wide.

Apart from certain theoretical weaknesses and subject limitations, described below, the collection offers excellent ethnographic data to support the arguments put forward, as well as attesting to the value of anthropological research and analysis in understanding tourism and the rewards of the study of tourism for anthropology. The volume is grounded within the notion of the ‘host community’, i.e. the indigenous population’s reaction to tourism, and many papers record with sensitivity the multiplicity and complexity of local opinions and reactions concerning tourism. Examples include Cornelia Zarkia’s paper describing the different social classes on a Greek island and their varying relationships with property, where, although the poor had become
marginalized, they became the possessors of a valuable resource and entrepreneurs in
the tourist sector through their fortuitous ownership of sub-standard agricultural land
on the coast. Another popular theme is that of reflexivity among the host population,
including the development and establishment of celebratory events and representational
showcases. This is dealt with by Antonio Pedregal, who examines different festivals
in Andalusia, contrasting organizations and intentions. Peter Odermatt writes about
the use and symbolism of ancient remains on Sardinia and draws attention to the politics
of (re)presentation, while Annabel Black notes the recovery of pride in local culture
by Maltese villagers. Simone Abram analyses and deconstructs the traditional qualities
of life in a Cantal village, drawing attention to the varied consequences of the com­
mmoditization of culture, the confrontation of cultural values, and the construction of
history.

A reorganization of representation generates inevitable conflicts within communi-
ties themselves, as well as between locals and tourists. Mary Crain draws attention
to the multivoval aspects of Spain's new appeal for visitors, drawing on a variety of
qualities besides the stalwarts of sea and sunshine. Three items—a national park, a
religious shrine, and a beach—provide the key magnets, which are examined by explor­
ing the conflicting interests, including most notably ecological deterioration, which
result from such development. The local people's relationship with the park, which is
seen as a hunting-ground, is contrasted with the desires of conservationists to preserve
and protect it against such encroachment. We learn how local people have overcome
the constant pressure of tourism and have created ways of avoiding tourists in order
to maintain their privacy and enjoyment of social rituals such as night-time religious
processions. Nature is also a main attraction for visitors to the Lofoten Islands. Roel
Pujik describes the increased development of tourism in one traditional fishing-village,
emphasising tourism's dependence on fishing as an attraction and addressing the
seasonal variation in types of tourists (summer versus winter) and types of visitors
(tourists versus non-resident fishermen). Pujik is interested in the similarity between
local people and visitors in terms of modernity, and he examines the occasionally
dubious attractions of the rorbu or fisherman's lodge, used as tourist accommodation.

Each paper gives a rich evocation of the field site gained through long-term
residence and research, and the variety of reactions and relationships with tourists is
made very clear: each paper touches on subjects which deserve further expansion.
Eight such themes which appear throughout the book are pinpointed by Selwyn in his
postlude, including the motivations and backgrounds of the tourists, the commoditiza-
tion of culture, politics, and tourism, the complexity of change, and the political and
economic forces shaping the tourist industry. This section offers the reader an expert’s
insight into the subject and helps draw together the chapters, offering a neat conclusion.

There are, however, certain restrictions in the locational sense, in that only Heidi
Dahles' chapter on Amsterdam offers a study of urban tourism in contrast to the rural
and marginal focus of the other studies. Here lies a further weakness, in that the type
of tourism experienced by these sites is not primarily 'mass tourism', a problematic
term generally understood as involving charter flights, multinational hotels and tourist
hordes. These points should be tackled directly. Boissevain’s introduction does not
clarify them, though it is very useful for its broad account of theoretical preoccupations
in the anthropology of tourism, and it points out the irony involved in the cultural
tourist's potentially destructive quest. Nevertheless, it fails to address the issues of post-modernism and globalization, current concerns which the anthropology of tourism is in an excellent position to illuminate. A number of papers could well have benefited from these perspectives, instead of relying on MacCanell's 'authenticity' argument, which he himself has revised using post-modernist ideas.

There is also a problem with the book's focus on the question of 'coping' with tourists. The very concept of 'coping' is taken up uncritically, though it deserves deconstruction as being too evocative of a delineated subject (a person or a community) wrestling with illness or catastrophe. The contributors point out time and again that the communities they have studied are not homogeneous but consist of various classes of people with different ideas and values. In this sense, however 'coping' is to be defined, some people will cope and others will not. Selwyn's postlude concludes that anthropologists can help assess the conditions for coping or otherwise. While consultative roles are to be welcomed, this is an implicitly judgemental view, overtly positivistic. It leads me to suggest that the topic requires further hard analytical input in order to match the high-quality ethnography displayed in this volume.

DON MACLEOD


For readers still unfamiliar with this well-known book, it is an account of British social anthropology's main trends and achievements from the 1920s to the present day, traced through the work and influence of the discipline's most influential individuals. In this third edition, the last two chapters of the second edition of 1985 are replaced by a new chapter, summarized in the last two paragraphs of this review.

Kuper begins with Malinowski and Radcliffe-Brown, who both published their major monographs in 1922. He gives a lucid, accessible account, sometimes funny, sometimes anecdotal, of their fieldwork methods and published work. The rest of the book is mainly concerned with the legacies of these two 'founders' of British social anthropology. Radcliffe-Brown's interests in social structure and comparative analysis dominated the monographs of the inter-war period, most notably in Evans-Pritchard's The Nuer (1940), which shows how social order is achieved and maintained in the absence of centralized government. Malinowski's legacy lay in the emphasis on fieldwork and in questions of 'rationality', most famously illustrated by Evans-Pritchard's Witchcraft, Oracles and Magic among the Azande (1937). Typically, ethnographies of this period were based on research carried out in colonial Africa. Kuper's chapter on colonialism provides a useful starting-point for anyone interested in how, until the loss of empire in the 1950s, the colonial environment affected the practical and theoretical development of social anthropology and in the (little) impact anthropologists had on colonial governments.
After the mid-1950s, with its broader changes in the political environment, British social anthropology expanded massively, offering new recruits the prospect of a professional career. Kuper’s task of drawing out the main intellectual trends becomes correspondingly more difficult. He argues that ‘the theoretical map of British anthropology between about 1950 and 1970 was largely, though never entirely, the same as the map of the major departments’, and he follows this with a useful sketch of the characteristics of the London, Oxford, Cambridge, and Manchester schools. But despite their differences, says Kuper, the monographs were characterized by Malinowskian methods and Radcliffe-Brownian structural analysis, being focused on politics and on magico-religious systems (including witchcraft and ritual) and tending to be limited to Africa, in contrast, for instance, to the American interests in ‘culture and personality’. In this way, Kuper concludes, the Radcliffe-Brownian and Malinowskian legacy dominated until the 1960s.

Kuper discusses in some detail the work—influential from the mid-1950s—of ‘two key mavericks’, Edmund Leach and Max Gluckman. Leach was influenced most by Malinowski, Gluckman by Radcliffe-Brown and later Evans-Pritchard, but both believed that competing individual political interests provided the ‘central dynamic of social systems’. Gluckman’s early work on Zulu society followed The Nuer model but gave new emphasis to the instability of the colonial situation. Later, he analysed tribal systems within the framework of a colonial regime, showing how equilibrium is achieved through the ritual expression of social conflicts. His analysis was of the ‘total’ system of interactions within and between Whites, Africans and Indians in rural and urban situations. Gluckman and his students developed the use of extended case-studies, statistics, and historical data—hallmarks of the ‘Manchester school’, of which Victor Turner’s work on the Ndembu in Schism and Continuity in an African Society (1957) is exemplary. Likewise, Leach was interested in developing methods to analyse how personal interests eventually change a system, and he too emphasized how interacting communities must be seen as part of a single social system. Both were concerned with how systems persist, despite their internal contradictions, and with the power of individual self-interest. ‘Perhaps’, Kuper concludes, ‘it was simply that this area of tension between man’s interests and the values propagated by the “society” was obviously the area to investigate after the massive, dichotomous statements of Radcliffe-Brown and Malinowski had been assimilated.’ This ‘new synthesis’ persisted until the disruption caused by Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism, influential in Britain from the 1960s.

The disruption was a major one, for Lévi-Strauss was interested in ‘how people think’, with cultural categories and images, rather than with what people actually do. The anthropologist’s task was to reveal underlying mental processes, of which the anthropologist’s actions or a ‘native’ people’s myths are equally manifestations. Lévi-Strauss’s structuralism ‘came to have something of the momentum of a millennial movement’. Kuper gives an excellent summary of those features of Lévi-Strauss’s work which were influential in Britain—his writings on the structures of kinship, for instance—and of the complex debates that ensued on what Lévi-Strauss ‘really meant’. He shows how the posing of the questions reflected ‘traditional’ empirical concerns and how Lévi-Strauss’s view of culture as a symbolic system was ‘reined in’ to show how ‘cultural categories sustain a given social structure’.
We have, then, a coherent picture of the intellectual progress of a scientific academic discipline in which elements of earlier theory inspired and were transformed in subsequent models. Kuper’s book provides a useful vantage-point from which to consider recent accounts of the history of the discipline, such as Jack Goody’s *The Expansive Moment: Anthropology in Britain and Africa 1918–1970* (1995), which emphasizes not so much the ‘internal’ intellectual tradition as the discipline’s responses to the issues of the time, and the historian George Stocking’s *After Tylor: British Social Anthropology 1888–1951* (1995), the culmination of twenty-five years of archival research.

By the early 1970s, however, this intellectual coherence had been lost. The collapse of empire and the corresponding loss of the ‘laboratory’ raised many questions about the future of the discipline, and there was no consensus as to the answers. The first edition of Kuper’s book, published in 1973, was ‘in the nature of an obituary notice’ and induced vehement responses from many. Peter Rivière, at Oxford, considered Kuper’s portrayal of Evans-Pritchard too ‘Radcliffe-Brownian’ (*Nature*, Vol. CCXLV (1973), p. 395). In Oxford, at least, where, under Evans-Pritchard and into the early 1970s, there was no undergraduate teaching of social anthropology, it was as if Kuper had broken a taboo by writing accessibly and directly and divulging the ‘secrets’ of the profession in doing so.

The second edition of Kuper’s book, published in 1983, reviewed achievements since 1972: little in the way of theory, but high-quality ethnographic explorations of issues of ethnicity, Third-World development, and applied anthropology. The second edition also has a valuable and, given the prevailing intellectual climate, courageous final chapter devoted to the ‘internal intellectual problems’ of the discipline: is social anthropology a descriptive and interpretative discipline or, echoing Radcliffe-Brown, a scientific enterprise, one that tells us something about the ‘real’ world, about the nature of human actions? Kuper’s answer is that it is not a science in the sense of ‘grand theory’, but that it does offer a set of methods and techniques from which a practitioner can select those which have the greatest explanatory value in any given social situation. Social anthropology may never come as close to the ‘truth’ as the natural science; but ethnographic descriptions, testable against other accounts and against the standards of the discipline, will continue to add to a body of theoretical concepts and empirical knowledge about the human social world.

In this third edition, Kuper outlines the fresh attacks on the subject’s legitimacy deriving from feminism, orientalism, Marxist critiques, and dependency theorists, and he places current post-modern concerns in context. Hermeneutic anthropology and the concomitant rejection of objective ‘scientific’ projects have their origins in Evans-Pritchard’s rejection of Radcliffe-Brown’s positivism in the 1950s and in earlier American trends. American ‘cultural’ anthropology, interested in such topics as the cultural patterning of personality, diverged under Franz Boas from the British ‘sociological’ tradition in the 1920s, gaining theoretical legitimacy in the 1950s through Talcott Parsons’ work and later that of Clifford Geertz, the most influential living anthropologist, with his method of ‘thick description’ and his view of culture as a meaningful symbolic system. The ‘Boasian tradition’, Kuper writes, ‘was always relativist, insistent that conceptual systems should not be reduced to some supposedly more fundamental reality, such as social structure. And the goal was...understanding,
rather than the positivist ambition of scientific explanation. Anthropology should not
pretend to be a comparative sociology.' American post-modernism, 'a radical develop­
ment of the Boasian programme', had its effects in Europe, particularly through James
Clifford's and George A. Marcus's *Writing Culture*, published in 1986. The act of
writing about culture is itself full of cultural meanings, and there is 'no single, true,
objective account of a cultural event or a social programme'. The 'spotlight' was on
the 'disconcerted ethnographers' themselves.

Nevertheless, other anthropological traditions have survived. The often uneasy
relationship between social or cultural and biological approaches (which Kuper explores
in his open-minded, well-written book, *The Chosen Primate*, 1994) may yet bear fruit:
the relatively new British undergraduate courses which teach both biological and
sociological sciences may generate interdisciplinary research. There are also the
younger European centres of social anthropology and, since 1989, the European
Association of Social Anthropologists, fertile territories for high-quality ethnographic
research on such topics as minority communities and the relationship between Euro­
pean, national, and local interests. For a student of social anthropology today, ventur­
ing into the confusing territory of contemporary theory, this book continues to provide
an invaluable introduction, with its direct, lucid style and clear landmarks.

ALISON SHAW

RAY ABRAHAMS (ed.), *After Socialism: Land Reform and Social Change in Eastern
Europe* (New Directions in Anthropology, Vol. 6), Providence and Oxford: Berghahn
1996. ix, 221 pp., Figures, Tables, Index. £35.00.

This volume brings together a number of very solid essays arising out of a symposium
on the Privatization of Agriculture in Eastern Europe, convened in Cambridge in 1994
by the editor. The countries covered are Hungary, Poland, Estonia (each with more
than one paper), Albania and Bulgaria (one paper each), but not East Germany, Ro­
mania, the former Yugoslavia or any part of the rest of the CIS. The former
Czechoslovakia is covered in one section of one paper only. This spread is still
sufficient to show that the experience of these countries with privatization has not been
uniform. Thus Hungary has chosen a voucher system instead of the policy of direct
restitution adopted by many other countries; there has been much popular resistance to
the break-up of cooperatives in Bulgaria, where they predate the communist takeover;
and in Poland, the fact that collectivization was abandoned before it got very far means
that there is less land to privatize, with the consequence that privatization has less
political urgency than elsewhere. It is also evident that there are many areas of
continuity from both the communist and pre-communist pasts, although at the same
time the fact that peasant farmers scarcely used to producing above subsistence levels
are now being asked to enter a world market dominated by capitalist agribusinesses
clearly represents a radical shift for many.
From the point of view of an emerging anthropology of eastern Europe, two general points of derogation might be made about this book, impressive and valuable though it is in its own right. First, there will surely come a time when the present heavy concentration—amounting almost to an obsession—on ‘the transition’ in this region will have to give way to a broader spectrum of topics, which are in some danger of being neglected just at a time when restrictions on research in most of these countries have been lifted. Secondly, although placed in a series entitled ‘New Directions in Anthropology’, there is not actually very much that is distinctively anthropological about this volume, in the sense that much of it could have been written equally well by lawyers, economists, rural geographers, or even agronomists or political scientists (as the case may be). This is not entirely a result of the multi-disciplinary nature of the project but represents a continuing hazard in the anthropology of Europe, especially when one falls to discussing the political, legal, and economic aspects of social transformations. It was something of a relief, in fact, to turn to Frances Pine’s discussion of work and gender in Poland as the chapter which goes furthest in treating matters in an anthropological manner.

As a book in its own right, it is fine. For these two reasons, however, it is hardly to be recommended as a ‘New Direction in Anthropology’ that others should be following.

ROBERT PARKIN


The discovery of the continuing, although masked presence of head-hunting rituals in the Sulawesi highlands in Indonesia has led Kenneth M. George to a study of ritual violence. By examining the Pangngae ritual of the Ada’ Mapurondo communities, George is able to approach politics on many levels, such as local mediations of the politics of the nation-state, constructions of local identity through cultural reconstruction, and displays of gender and other significant differences. Showing Signs of Violence is also a contribution to studies of the construction and significance of violence and terror. Finally, it offers a new approach to the classic problem of head-hunting.

For the Mapurondo communities Pangngae is a harvest ritual aimed at improving prosperity and ending public mourning. George adds layers to local interpretations by asserting that Pangngae is also a claim of dominance over downstream neighbours as well as a commemoration of the past and a claim to continuity with the present. As the title indicates, at present Pangngae rituals only simulate the violence of the past. The trophy head traditionally taken from downstream communities has been replaced by a coconut bought in the local town market.
By building on Renato Rosaldo's work on head-hunting among the Ilongot, George shows how the case of the missing head becomes a puzzle. According to Renato Rosaldo's touching essay 'Grief and a Head-hunter's Rage' (1984), the personal catharsis that occurs at the moment of the dismembering of the enemy head is the significant motivation for head-hunting practices among the Ilongot. George argues convincingly that in the case of the Mapurondo communities, the head-hunters' motivation is communal more than individual. Both the presence of Pangngae as a necessary communal transition and the use of surrogate heads points in the direction of an explanation emphasizing communal motivations. If the hunter relied on the taking of a head to exorcise his own rage and anguish, buying a coconut would hardly have the same effect.

George's criticism of Rosaldo does not, however, question whether head-hunting can be approached as a category of phenomenon, or indeed whether Rosaldo intended such generalizations. If Rosaldo's analysis was mainly directed at understanding the motivations of the Ilongot, George's points merely expose a difference.

As is indicated in the title, the question of how the coconut can effectively replace the grotesque head underlies most of the chapters of the book and becomes a vital clue to the unravelling of the significance of Pangngae for the Mapurondo communities. George disputes traditional explanations of the coconut as a replacement invented with the advent of colonialism. His hypothesis is based on the idea that the actual head might not be so important. Many head-hunting practices, among them those of the Ilongot, do not include bringing the head home. To George there is 'nothing in a trophy skull that promotes well-being'. Instead, it is the 'doing something to a head that helps prosperity' (p. 66). The head is a reciprocating sign, an object of exchange between different human worlds and between human and spirit worlds. The importance of exchange as a theme is also strengthened by the use of the term 'going to the sea' as a euphemism both for taking a head and for trading. Trade relations between people upstream and downstream engendered conflict due to the dominance of the latter. This superiority was balanced by the yearly taking of the head. The purpose in taking a head was to dehumanize the enemy. According to George, the dismembering involved in the head-hunters' actions not only objectifies the other but produces a 'demonized and degraded other' (p. 92). The grotesque mixes terror and laughter and becomes a symbol not only of the degradation of another human being but of the disintegration of an oppositional community. George found that the practice of using surrogate heads went back to before colonization. As the taking of a real head from dominant trading partners could have caused violent revenge expeditions, the taking of a surrogate head could be described as a 'ritualized art of resistance' (p. 89). According to George, as the coconut is a prestige food associated with the coast, the association between downstream people and the coconut is confirmed.

The illusion of the coconut being an enemy head is made possible because the head is covered when presented to the villagers and is never exposed for them to view. Consequently, neither the head-hunters' violence nor the humiliation caused by the fact that no head has actually been stolen, are made visible. Showing violence, according to George, becomes a form of symbolic resistance towards a recognizably more powerful trading partner.
George does not deny that there also are personal motivations for head-hunting. In an egalitarian society Pangngae is one of very few paths towards the attainment of personal prestige. The ritual provides a measure and an ideal for local social hierarchies related to both gender and prestige. Courage and violence are not the only valued traits in the discourse of manhood. Authority and clever rhetoric demonstrated in the song cycles that follow the victorious return to the village with the enemy head is also highly significant. If a label was to be provided, Pangngae is thus for George not a rite of initiation but of consecration which institutes both gender differences and differences between junior and senior men. Through their adornments, head-hunters’ are made different from other men in Mapurondo villages. Images of manhood inform the ideals of both head-hunter and rhetorician: after a while, speech displaces violence. However, Pangngae also includes women as political actors. Although women are excluded from the head-hunting ritual and only participate as passive recipients, their presence at the latter is nevertheless all-important. The end of Pangngae is followed by a women’s ritual aimed at increasing the prosperity of the households.

By emphasizing the political aspects of head-hunting in relation to the communities’ relationship with outside forces, George criticizes earlier approaches that selectively focused on the logic and meaning of the severed head. He stresses strongly that we must not forget the political discourse surrounding the ritual. Pangngae also entails a claim to superiority and power that refuses to acknowledge the interdependencies of the Mapurondo communities with the Dutch, Indonesians, Muslims, Christians, or the people downstream. Presently Mapurondo communities are facing outside pressure from several sources, Muslim and Christian as well as the Indonesian state. The latter includes everyone as citizens, simultaneously excluding images of local enemies. These pressures towards sameness are contradicted by pressures from the Christian churches, while the Muslims regard Mapurondo communities as marginal and pagan. Through Pangngae both dependence on and independence of the outside world are articulated. The ritual represents Mapurondo communities as an ideological enclave, at the same time that the absence of anything but signs of violence act as a reminder of their vulnerability to state control. Pangngae is an attempt to retain political autonomy in an era of subordination.

The flexibility of ritual and the commemoration of the past is valued in George’s explanations. In his view, different versions of the head-hunt can be brought out from a communal repertoire in order to respond to the conditions of the present. With this broader focus, questions arise of authenticity and of the recreation of the past by a marginalized ethnic group. As George argues: ‘commemoration was a political end in its own right’ (p. 187). Ritual tradition is what distinguishes Mapurondo communities, and it therefore becomes the only way of reproducing the community. By using a historical approach involving the Mapurondo community in a greater Indonesian context, George reminds us that the use and execution of ritual at some level have a purpose within the given context. The flexibility of the Pangngae through time as well as its persistence is what gives the community the illusion of continuity with the past in an ever-changing environment.

In light of the many levels of politics that, according to George, are manifested in Pangngae, his underlying idea of resistance through the representation of identity and difference deserves greater clarification. The topic of resistance has been debated for
more than a decade. The term itself is recognized to be problematic and has been associated with romanticized, simplified attempts to empower marginalized groups. The same problem occurs with George’s use of terms introduced by Turner and Taussig, such as ‘theatre of violence’ and ‘mimesis’, terms embedded within clear anthropological traditions which should not be used uncritically.

_Showing Signs of Violence_ none the less represents a major effort to deflate the attribution of otherness implied in images of head-hunting, which, next to cannibalism, has been used to represent the peak of savagery. The book is a valuable contribution to anthropological questions of violence and terror. Finally, it re-introduces indigenous politics by placing ritual in the context of the nation-state, thus firmly putting questions of authenticity and the reconstruction of tradition back on the agenda.

**GRO WEEN**


This is a revised version of a 1993 Oxford doctorate by a Fellow of Merton College. Following on an immense amount of scholarship, including two French monographs by D. Aubriot-Sevin (Prêtre et Conceptions religieuses en Grèce ancienne, Lyons 1992) and A. Corlu (Recherches sur les mots relatifs à l'idée de la prière, d'Homère aux tragiques, Paris 1966), with whom the author pursues a critical dialogue, Pulley not only situates the recent unresolved debates about the meaning of prayer in classical Greece, he does so in a way that is accessible for those anthropologists who are interested in prayer but for whom the Greek language is largely a forgotten grammarschool experience.

Chapter 2, on ‘Reciprocity and Remembrance’, contains useful comparisons with the Old Testament (much of which is younger than Homer) and with Hittite, Talmudic, and Indo-Iranian evidence. Chapters 3 (‘Thanks and Praise’), 4 (‘Prayer and Supplication’), 5 (‘Curses and Justice’), and 6 (‘Magic and Names’) all proceed from Pulley’s initial conception of what Greek prayer is constituted by, namely requests for reciprocity or favour. Only with chapters 7 (‘Prayers to the Dead’) and 9 (‘Sitz im Leben’) does one begin to obtain an impression of the morphology of the society. This is despite the fact that the author is at pains to situate his literary witnesses in their setting. The uninitiated reader would have benefited from an introductory chapter on Greek cosmology so as to have an overview of the spiritual geography of the orants. As it stands, one sometimes has the feeling that prayers have become an essentially literary phenomenon (p. 215). Although Pulley mentions sociolinguistics only once (p. 152), he is aware that there exists an overlap between prayer and other social exchange such as hospitality (called ‘guest friendship’) and supplication, and that these involve gesture. Although note 74 (p. 189) refers to the Roman bronze copy of a earlier Greek statue of a ‘boy in prayer’ and notes 73–7 refer to ancient representations
of gestures of prayer, no explanation is provided of the cover photograph, which would certainly have been relevant.

Pulleyn also discusses (pp. 178–84) the question of the gender of the orant, for the Greeks had certain exclamations in prayer that were gender-specific. However, he does not acknowledge any continuum between daily speech such as greetings (p. 162) and requests of the gods, which for him constitute real prayer. Nor does he allow himself to become pinned down to any theoretical relationship between sacrifice and prayer, which both ‘re-establish and confirm the existence of links of reciprocity’ (p. 160). Because the only prayers in Greek antiquity to which we have access are written, Pulleyn’s typology is finally based on Latin syntactic models of reciprocity (cf. p. xv): ‘give because I give/give because you gave/give because (s)he gave/give so that I will give/give so that I will be able to give/I give that you might give’.

Using a basically synchronic rather than diachronic approach spanning some four centuries from Homer to the fourth century BC, Pulleyn shows how little prayer changed in this period, even though the Greek language evolved considerably. In his Prolegomena, he admits that the stylistics of Greek literature risks compromising the validity of the Sitz im Leben of the examples he describes in chapter 9. For this reason he uses epigraphic examples of prayer whenever these are available, although they are also subject to artistic embellishment. Finally, in order to be able to conduct his investigation, the author had to abandon any attempt to separate art from life. For an anthropologist, it seems unlikely that a society could imagine pragmatic acts it had never performed.

Once he has observed that prayer does not always require sacrifice, Pulleyn separates sacrifice into a category distinct from prayer, and he also invests it with a definition based on reciprocal favour (xapix). The whole idea of storing up favour and thus gratitude on the part of a given god could well have led the author to discuss Michel de Certeau’s notion of faire croire, which is based on Benveniste’s analysis of the Indo-European notion of credit that structures the different etymologies of the verb ‘believe’ (*kred). Instead, apparently influenced by notion of rhetorical analysis (cf. chapter 8), Pulleyn initially limits Aubriot’s broad definition of prayer as including non-verbal acts to a simple conception of invocation and request (pp. 7, 162). By chapter 9 (Sitz im Leben), however, he has begun to broaden his definition to prayer in the heart or soul. Ritual silence (p. 184), for instance, turns out to mean abstention from ill-omened speech. From an anthropological point of view, this has the disadvantage of focusing on the person praying and not on society, which has set the conditions for prayer in a Maussian perspective. Why does a society constantly try to please the gods? Why do the gods crave honour? It is not enough to say that since the gods were not always considered omniscient, they needed to be told what the worshipper wanted (p. 14). Many assumptions, for instance the relationship between prayer and surrender (p. 195), although recognized as unprovable, are not quite swept aside. These queries apart, for an anthropologist interested in the immense knowledge that is available on the world of ancient Greece and its oral rites, Pulleyn’s book offers a handsome synthesis.

STEPHEN C. HEADLEY

Ellen and Fukui’s book is ambitious in its scope, attempting to bring together several major themes in environmental anthropology. It considers cultural concepts of nature, the implications of these concepts in relationships between domesticated species and human populations, and the theoretical issues concerned with cultural adaptation to the environment.

The volume can be located within the growing body of literature in the social sciences that rejects the overly simplistic ‘nature–culture’ dichotomy which still appears to dominate the physical sciences and popular models of the environment. Though it accepts that there may be a representational need for this kind of symbolic bifurcation, Redefining Nature critiques the Cartesian model in which nature and culture are ‘reified as scientific concepts’ and human beings seen as interacting with a separate material world. Building on earlier explorations of this issue by such writers as Mary Douglas, Pierre Bourdieu, Tim Ingold, Marilyn Strathern, Carole McCormack, and Geoffrey Harrison, Ellen and Fukui suggest that there is a need for a much more complex model in which human relationships with the environment are considered as interactive and dynamic adaptations.

In his introduction Ellen outlines some of the changes in theoretical approaches to the environment within the discipline of anthropology, and he cites Strathern to highlight an increasing appreciation of relativity and fluidity in different cultural concepts of nature: ‘...there is no such thing as culture or nature. Each is a highly relativized concept whose ultimate signification must be derived from its place within a specific metaphysics.... There is not a consistent dichotomy, only a matrix of contrasts’ (in M. Strathern and C. McCormack (eds.), Nature, Culture and Gender, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1980).

Thus the first section of the book presents visions of nature from different cultural perspectives. For example, Akimichi’s chapter explores Satawalese marine-oriented concepts of wilderness; Feld’s chapter on the Kaluli in Papua New Guinea focuses on an ‘ecology of sound’ and on song maps; and Frake’s chapter on the Norfolk countryside considers how discourse about the landscape draws upon reinterpretations of the past to engage with current political and economic issues. Some of the chapters deal directly with the problem of popular notions of nature and culture: Ingold, for instance, argues that such a division is wholly inadequate in describing hunter-gatherer schemata, which frequently conflate human and non-human agencies or entities and see no separation between the social and natural worlds. Ingold’s chapter also deals with a theme which is developed throughout the book, namely that concepts of nature are not passive but depend upon cognitive and sensory ‘engagement’ with the physical world.

This ‘engagement’ is usefully examined in a variety of ways. At the outset, Ellen proposes that we should ‘...examine the evidence for any underlying cognitive propensities which might generate the variety of images we intuitively interpret as conceptions of nature, even though these may vary between places and times in their degree of prominence and combinatorial properties’ (p. 4).
Cognitive issues are examined further in Boster’s chapter, in which, through an analysis of different cultural recognitions of bird species and processes of classification, he argues that universal cognitive processes provide a measure of commonality in all classificatory systems. In considering human cognition as both ‘product and agent’ of evolution, this chapter also centres on the second major theme of the book, which is the recursive interaction between human constructions of nature and the physical world. As Ellen points out: ‘The inadequacy of the distinction between what we conventionally call nature and culture is no better exemplified than through the examination of particular domesticates, species which owe their current genetic composition to close encounters with human populations which harvest them for food and other products’ (p. 20).

This section of the book provides some excellent case-studies in which species domestication and concomitant environmental changes are related to particular cultural values and classificatory systems. Sigaut considers how activities such as commercial fishing or farming engender particular concepts and practices in relation to the environment, while Fukui’s chapter on the Bodi of Ethiopia considers the role of folk classifications in the co-evolution of human and other species. Sakamoto and Shigeta explore the links between cognitive selection, ritual practices, cultural identity, and the proliferation of certain food sources and land uses. Attention is also given to the ways in which values and language affect processes of domestication: thus Richards considers how aesthetic and moral factors influence the selection of rice types in West Africa, while Tani examines how animal social relations are perceived and utilized in the domestication of animals in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. These issues are then brought together by Harris, who provides an overview of the issues of domestication and subsistence.

In the third section of the book, the co-evolution of human populations and their physical environments are placed within a model of cultural adaptation which acknowledges the ‘interpenetration’ of the material and conceptual worlds. Ichikawa posits that Mbuti use of the Ituri forest provides a model of sustainable use of this kind of ecosystem. Ohtsuka considers changes in adaptive strategies among the Gidra of Papua New Guinea, and Moran explores similar issues in the Amazon Basin. The final chapters highlight the analytical importance of integrating social and cultural forms in considering adaptive strategies for resource management. Dove examines the use of augury as a metaphorical tool in decision-making about the use of resources in Borneo, and Ellen considers how individual strategizing and social relationships articulate with hunting efficiency and resource management on the Indonesian island of Seram.

Redefining Nature therefore provides a thorough examination of issues that are central to environmental anthropology and makes a substantial contribution to the debates on them. There are a couple of aspects to the book which some readers may find troublesome. Stylistically it is a little choppy in places, and some of the chapters might have been written more accessibly, but in most instances the content makes them worth the effort. Given the lead provided on ‘nature–culture’ issues by such writers as Douglas, McCormack, Strathern, Munn, and Bender, it is also slightly surprising to find that, in a book of over twenty chapters, there are no female authors at all. This lack is further underlined by the use of rather out-moded terminology, for example ‘man and nature’. Despite these, some might say minor, cavils, however, Redefining
Nature is a thoughtful, in-depth attempt to reconcile cultural and cognitive issues and their agency in the co-evolution of humans and other species. Its detailed and wide-ranging case-studies underscore the complexities of this interaction and provide the reader with some genuine insights into the dynamics of the relationship between humans and the environment.

VERONICA STRANG


After a protracted childhood and painful adolescence, the anthropology of Britain has come of age. Indeed, its maturity has outpaced that of the attitudes to it still taken by so many of our colleagues in and related to the discipline, who continue to believe that anthropology depends for its authenticity on being applied elsewhere, to other cultures. The banality of this fallacy does not lie so much in its enchantment with the exotic or the distant as in its failure to acknowledge that all cultures are ‘other’ and that it is the nature of anthropological inquiry which ‘others’ them and those who bear them. The anthropology of Britain is perfectly capable of doing what all good anthropology must do: offer a sensible account and interpretation of a specific society and its culture, in so doing providing a means of sensitizing and refining our understanding of other societies and cultures. It is not only academics who have resisted this view—though resist it they have—but also publishers. It remains easier to publish a monograph on New Guinea than on Newcastle, unless the study in question is vogue-ish: bodies, gender, sexuality, reproduction, post-colonial/industrial/modern slants on any of the foregoing, preferably written in the deeply impressive but impenetrable prose of anthropology’s—and cultural studies’—beautiful people.

Thank heavens, then, for Sharon Macdonald and Berg, who can claim credit for this excellent book. The locality is Skye; the field is Gaelic culture; the topic is Culture itself. Macdonald shows how this minority language, deprived of political and ethnic value within Scotland as a whole, and demeaned over many generations by relentless anglicization and association with impoverishment, depopulation, and sectarianism, nevertheless continues to evoke and symbolize the rich and distinctive cultural traditions of tenacious communities. I believe Macdonald’s late mentor, Edwin Ardener, would have been deeply and rightfully proud of this book. It is built on a profound knowledge of and ethnographic familiarity with Hebridean cultures, to which he aspired; but it also rises above the parochial to comment meaningfully on contemporary currents in Scottish nationalism and politics and, yet more generally, on the complex interrelationships of language and culture.

Macdonald is steeped in her field. She writes with authority of crofting strategy, literature, Presbyterianism, and domestic relationships. She moves easily from discussion of the politics of the local co-operative enterprise to the politics of language and linguistic revival. Her account is all the more telling for its modesty and self-
deprecating allusions, for the lucidity of its style, and for the obvious affection and respect in which she holds the people about whom she writes. She does not make great, new theoretical claims; she does not construct opponents with whom to joust. Rather, she accomplishes that great and elusive feat of fine writing: she makes a very complex story seem simple; she appears to tell it as she sees it. The argument could well pass unremarked, not because it is unimportant, but because it is, and is correctly presented as being, straightforward. Culture and cultural identity do not lie in iconic markers of difference. They are grounded in and experienced through the everyday conditions of life. These may for some purposes and in some circumstances be elevated to iconic status; but should they become so elevated, they risk losing their potency, not least because this would be to impose a fictitious orthodoxy, a uniformity on their meanings, which are the subject of contestation in social interaction within their communities. Not surprisingly, a similar story has been told elsewhere in the anthropology of Britain and of Europe—but that is to say that the story has grasped one of the features of this cultural region, and its salience helps explain why the concern with personal and cultural identities has been so prominent in the anthropology of the region over the last two decades.

The depth of scholarship which lies beneath Macdonald’s version of this narrative, and the craft with which it is told, are unmistakable. This is a very mature piece of anthropology indeed.

ANTHONY P. COHEN


Cultural Producers in Perilous States is the fourth collection of interviews and conversations that George Marcus has edited for the Late Editions series. This volume looks at journalists, film-makers, artists and intellectuals working in conditions that are in some way unstable. The Late Editions series is slated to run until the year 2000 (as is indicated in the series subtitle, ‘Cultural Studies for the End of the Century’) and this self-consciously fin-de-siècle orientation manifests itself in an emphasis on change and crisis. As Marcus explains in his introduction, the series ‘is as much interested in the widespread self-awareness of massive changes in society and culture globally...as it is in the facts and lived experiences of these changes themselves’ (p. i). Cultural producers, those who ‘engage in intellectual work in various genres and who are difficult to pin down by any single speciality’ (p. 8), are natural subjects for a series whose focus is on commentary and self-consciousness.

Marcus’ determination to treat events and their representations equally reflects his background as an original proponent of ‘postmodern anthropology’. He has been one of anthropology’s most prolific critics in the United States. In turn, he has received
no small amount of criticism himself, and this series has been no exception. In his introduction, Marcus recounts the most common criticism, namely that the chapters lack adequate historical, political, and sociological frames. In response to these complaints, he solicited framing commentaries from the contributors to this collection. This was a wise move, for without such contextual information it would be very difficult to make sense of the book’s mixture of facts, personal reflections, and conversational theorizing. The chapters are dense and reflexive, providing not only the authors’ views of their subjects, but also the authors’ views of themselves, the subjects’ views of themselves and of the authors, and the subjects’ views of the worlds in which they live.

The cultural producers considered in this volume work in various states of peril. The South African journalist Khaba Mkhize is at one extreme. Leslie Fordred interviews Mkhize as he travels to investigate a massacre in a KwaZulu-Natal village. He explains that for South African journalists, journalist imperatives of objectivity and balance are intensified by the fact that stories perceived as partisan are likely to provoke violent reprisals. Since balanced reporting is not always accurate or fair, Mkhize argues, reporters occupy very delicate political and ethical positions. In an equally perilous position is the Colombian lawyer and scholar Hernando Valencia-Villa, interviewed by Santiago Villaveces-Izquierdo. At the time of the interview, Valencia-Villa was deputy attorney-general for human rights in Colombia. He had just begun issuing human rights reports and accusations, and feared for his safety. Less than a year after the interview Valencia-Villa sought political asylum in Spain. Both of these interviews provide personal accounts of the challenges and dangers of professional truth-telling in violent political situations and offer insight into the motivations and rationalizations of people who risk their lives to report on human rights.

The other extreme is represented by successful film-makers and novelists who are imperilled by their own identities. The Armenian-Canadian film-maker Atom Egoyan explores his personal struggles with belonging and self-expression in a ‘therapeutic’ interview with Hamid Naficy. Naficy provokes Egoyan to find in his films a psychic peril born of frustrated nostalgia and cultural alienation, and Egoyan’s success in both experimental and mainstream film production suggests that this particular kind of peril can be quite productive. Raphael Confiant, a prolific novelist from Martinique interviewed by Lucien Taylor, occupies a similar state of psychological peril. Confiant is more overtly political than Egoyan, and far less confessional, steering the interview away from personal revelations and towards questions of language and identity, diglossia, and post-colonial politics. The ambiguous national identity he experiences unites him with an intellectual community that provides rich ground for cultural production, another positive aspect of this type of peril.

The diversity of subjects interviewed in Cultural Producers in Perilous States is balanced by a unity of theoretical purpose which gives the volume coherence. The authors are all concerned with the effects of transnational processes on local politics, representations, and identity formations, and the cultural producers themselves frequently produce similar theoretical formulations to explain their work. Yet the rare instances when producers resist the theories posed by authors and provoke familiar academic formulations with their own immediate and practical concerns are some of the most instructive in the volume.
The dynamics of interviewing which many chapters reveal illustrate the ethnographic process. From the resistance Tom Wolf encounters interviewing Russian journalists to the mutual identification pervading the conversation between Egoyan and Naficy, the perils and rewards of ethnographic interviews are put on display. Even the two chapters not in interview form—Michael Fischer’s discussion of the Polish filmmaker Maria Zmarz-Koczanowicz and Gudrun Klein’s ‘letter’ about East German film and drama—are self-reflexive and meditative, representing the spirit of the volume as a whole. Cultural Producers in Perilous States is about the different ways in which conflict and change can be represented and theorized. The frustrations that accompany this book arise from an inevitable lack of contextual knowledge, for no reader is likely to be familiar with all the films, plays, novels, and political histories it discusses. If the theoretical framework at times obscures the descriptions of these works or situations to a frustrating extent, the degree to which author and producer alike share these frameworks tells us as much about transnational processes as any of the analyses presented in this book. By describing many varieties of conflict which make the world of the 1990s perilous, this collection offers an implicit explanation for the extraordinary range and depth of cultural production that has characterized the end of this century.

ELIZABETH MERMIN


Washabaugh aims to distil musical creations into verbal form in order to spotlight how politics is embodied in performance. ‘Everything’, he writes, ‘is present at any performance’ (p. 26). His book is not an ethnographic account of flamenco, but rather a historical and contemporary analysis of the political processes permeating this musical genre, resonating in the vibrations of guitar-strings, vocal chords or the multiple layers of dancers’ dresses.

Flamenco music is depicted as a field of political activity and social creativity. Although the ephemeral, invisible, and transcendent nature of music fosters assumptions about its neutrality and ability to unify, its powers, like any others, are Janus-faced. Inherent in music’s capacity to transcend lies its powers to divide. It is this covert side of flamenco that Washabaugh focuses on. Countering an emphasis, predominant among flamencologists, on the apolitical and conservative nature of flamenco performances, he attempts to unmask the ubiquity of underlying political interests, revealing how flamenco can be a crucial tool for the negotiation of politically charged categories such as gender, tradition, authenticity, ethnicity or identity.

The anti-essentialising stance adopted by the author influences the highly contentious notion of politics applied. According to Washabaugh, isolating political agendas in the art of flamenco implies uncovering the paradoxes, dialectics, and ironies inherent in this phenomenon. ‘The term political refers to sub-politics...[a] contradictory,
multiple engagement which mixes and combines the classical poles of politics so that, if we think things through to their logical conclusions, everyone thinks and acts as a right-winger and left-winger, radically and conservatively, democratically and undemocratically, ecologically and unecologically, politically and unpolitically, all at the same time' (ibid.).

Consequently, the ironies of politics are revealed, not by considering overt political ideologies which are predominantly conscious and conceptual, but rather by focusing on bodily practices, on embodied, musical metonyms acting largely in an inadvertent and unintentional manner, showing ‘how muscles, not minds, accomplish politics in flamenco performance’ (p. 4). This focus on the physiological level of power games constitutes the most interesting and innovative aspect of this book. However, the analysis leaves the reader with a blurred picture of flamenco music and performances. A preliminary knowledge of flamenco is assumed, while the documentary television series, Rito y Geografía del Cante, consisting of a hundred half-hour programmes aired on Spanish national television between 1971 and 1973, provides the main source of analytical and illustrative material. As a result, the reader is only occasionally taken beyond the virtuality of the TV screen.

The Rito series is critically assessed in light of the issues addressed in each section and discussed in detail in the final chapter. The methods of cinematographic realism, claiming to project authentic images, are presented as a perfect tool for both revealing and concealing the multi-dimensionality of flamenco politics. Flamenco is depicted as both contributing to and resisting ‘Franco’s essentialist conception of Spanish culture’ (p. 164), which dominated the political context at the time of production. Franquista policies deregionalized flamenco, cultivating it as a component of Spanish national identity. The Rito documentary, however, as Washabaugh attempts to show, opposed this centralizing force while shrewdly working according to its demands.

Each chapter of this publication addresses different political issues. The first, entitled ‘The Politics of Passion’, considers the historical and contemporary importance of several temporally and spatially overlapping political agendas: nacionalismo, románticismo, fatalismo, modernismo, franquismo, andalucismo and gitanismo. These political currents are both served and opposed by different metonymic—that is, embodied—processes, such as orientalization, synchronization, dys-appearance or recording, which are engaged in during flamenco performances.

First, orientalization refers to the assimilation of Arab musical elements into flamenco spectacles. Although accepted by proponents of franquismo because of its power to attract foreign tourists, this tendency simultaneously fuelled the interests of andalucismo, which was opposed by Franco because of its focus on regional specificities. Secondly, synchronization is defined as the co-ordination between instrumental, vocal and choreographic artists. This skill heightens the interactional sensitivity of performers and their abilities to co-operate not only in a musical setting but also in social and communal situations. In consequence, this metonymic process became a tool for such oppositional currents as nacionalismo or gitanismo. Thirdly, dys-appearance implies the inward reflexivity of performers absorbed in their spectacle. It is interpreted, on the one hand, as a way of accessing a sense of ‘flow’ or ‘communitas’, thus serving the identity-forming agendas of andalucismo or nacionalismo. On the other hand, it is seen as a means of resisting oppressive social constraints and may therefore
act in opposition to these same agendas. Finally, the multiple implementations of recording, the re-scripting and dispersal of music by means of technology, are exemplified with reference to the Rito series. The interests of both romanticismo and franquismo are administered to, as flamenco artists are celebrated as national heroes. At the same time, these political ideologies are contradicted through the portrayal of flamenco's regional diversities.

A further chapter on the histories of flamenco invalidates the argument presented by four traditional histories of flamenco that Washabaugh has selected—the Andalusian, Gitan, populist and sociological—which insist that commercialization depletes flamenco of its aesthetic and political meanings. By considering the ironies revealed in the musical metonyms of several public flamenco events such as the ópera flamenca or the Concurso del cante jondo, the author aims to expose the omnipresence of political agendas.

Another section focuses on the pleasures of music as experienced by participants and spectators of flamenco. In contrast to unilinear accounts identifying musical responses as consequences of specific social or individual demands, Washabaugh reveals the multiplicity and complexity of musical reactions. Particular reference is made to the impacts of the recording industry, as both responding to and recreating socio-cultural and political contexts.

A chapter referring to Gypsies questions whether the Gitan style of flamenco music constitutes the heart of this musical genre. This inquiry touches on the issue of whether Gypsy identity is inherited or invented and underlines the constitutive role of music in articulating ethnic boundaries.

A focus on the body counters ideas prominent in Western song traditions in general and in flamencological writings in particular, which emphasise the conceptual relationship between humans and music. The importance of the physical dimension is recognized by examining how bodily habits such as rhythmic competence involve muscular memories or how musical engagement may imply an absence of conceptual and communicative intentions as a result of dys-appearance, 'the communicative dead-end...of introspective body-talk' (p. 97).

A consideration of images of women challenges traditional views of female musical practice which present simplistic contrasts—for example, between the motherly, private figure of the madonna, linked only to domestic music, and the public woman or whore, associated with flamenco bars and street music. Washabaugh highlights the shifting nature of gender roles in flamenco performances. Female participation in the feria or carnivalesque fair, for instance, although public, is not usually seen as unvirtuous.

Finally, in a discussion of music, resistance, and popular culture, Washabaugh explicates the dangers of 'single-minded, rhetorically coherent, internally consistent monologues' (p. 135), as these inevitably 'flirt with oppression' (p. 136). He argues that any depictions of resistance or power as unqualified and uncompromised blind out the ironies of politics.

This warning epitomizes Washabaugh's approach in his work, capturing both the most significant contribution and criticism of this book. On the one hand, the reader is exposed to an in-depth analysis of the politics of flamenco past and present, acknowledging the contradictions of diverse perspectives, and refreshing in its proximity to the
paradoxical, processual and multi-faceted experience of everyday reality. On the other hand, we are left with hands itching to seize a descriptive rather than interpretative piece of evidence. A more detailed account of musical and choreographic elements, bodily gestures and temporal-spatial arrangements of flamenco performances would have added substance to the argument presented, particularly in recognition of its focus on the embodiment of politics, without setting off Washabaugh's anti-monologist alarm system. In consequence, as the author promises, this book leaves the reader with a sense of socio-musical chaos and the question: 'What is flamenco?'

KAREN LÜDTKE


Meanings are created and manifested in many different ways. In Western societies, one of the more important ways is through the objects created by manufacturing firms and the ways those objects are presented to the public. The creation and, especially, the marketing of objects is the subject of Lien's Marketing and Modernity, a study of the marketing department of Viking Foods, a pseudonymous Norwegian manufacturer of prepared foods.

Lien describes a number of the marketing department's activities, such as establishing a new line of prepared meals and refining the image of their range of frozen pizzas. She is concerned with the ways that people in the department think about, reach, and justify their decisions, and in particular how they deal with the uncertainties they confront. Because of this focus, the actual industrial design and production of manufactured foods and the activities of advertising agencies receive only scant attention.

The book can be read in several different ways. Perhaps most basic is a description of food-marketing. Lien has done her fieldwork well, and she relates the activities of Viking Foods' marketing department in an interesting way. We get a clearer sense of the ways in which people in marketing go about their work, from their practical comparisons of the industrial-food potential of chicken and turkey to their search for a brand name and label for a line of foods. As Lien describes it, marketing staff are involved in the design of food and they work to master the relative advantages and disadvantages of different types of raw materials and recipes. However, there is a gap between the foodstuffs they envisage and even produce in small batches, and what can be produced commercially: recalcitrant potatoes and watery pasta dishes can frustrate their plans. In this regard, there are points in the book where it would have been helpful to know more about how food is manufactured.

A second way the book can be read is signalled in its title, as a consideration of modernity. Heeding Daniel Miller's plea for field research, Lien wants to treat modernity not conceptually, as a tale we tell ourselves about ourselves, but ethnographically, through a consideration of modern lives and institutions. To this end, she is
concerned particularly with the ways in which marketers reflect self-consciously upon their actions and their situations, and the ways in which their knowledge and perspective transcends their immediate time and place. Usefully, she situates the modernity of the marketers she describes in their larger time and place, the time of the growing importance of international trade in manufactured food, and the place of a Common Market increasingly prone to encourage international trade (albeit within its own borders). ‘Globalization’ takes an immediate and concrete form in the Norwegian manufactured food business.

Lien makes a sustained and largely persuasive effort to treat the idea of modernity as an analytical tool in an ethnographic context, to see what it looks like on the ground. However, that effort raises questions, not so much about Lien’s project in this book as about her culturally oriented method, found in much contemporary anthropology. Because she resolutely tries to see things from the native’s perspective, she does not take the opportunity to approach the natives critically and locate them socially. For instance, the uncertainties and contradictions of people in the marketing department are treated as part of their cultural milieu, which is reasonable. However, they are not treated as one consequence of the quasi-professional aspirations of marketers, of their attempts to assert specialist knowledge and skills, an assertion that would justify their claims to secure and respected status, to prestige and pay. A more critical and social perspective might have allowed Lien to see the cultural world of those marketers as a manifestation not only of modernity, but also of their occupational and social strategies.

Put most simply, while Lien sees talk of knowledge and skill, of market segments and consumer research, as part of the cultural world of marketers, it is also possible to regard it as a tenuous claim to legitimacy, a claim that is, moreover, directed outward to the world in general, or at least those parts of the world that marketers think need persuading. Seeing that talk in this way would help make sense of things that Lien finds noteworthy, particularly the ambiguous place of factual information about consumers in the thought and talk of Viking Foods’ marketers. Although they commission consumer research by outside organizations, they seem generally ignorant of how it is carried out and how legitimate it is. Although they are supposed to be concerned with the mass of Norwegian consumers, commonly they base their marketing decisions on the tastes of their colleagues and friends. Their claims to legitimacy require marketers to base their decisions on empirical information about the mass of Norwegian consumers; their actual practices are, to their occasional embarrassment, much more subjective.

The point I have made can be read as a criticism of the approach used in this book. However, it should also be read as recognition that Lien’s descriptions are not just intriguing, they are also thorough and provocative, so much so that they have led me into the reviewer’s vice of asking the author to write the book the reviewer wants rather than the book the author intends. More fundamentally, perhaps, the topic of the marketing of factory-made food is a point of entry into an array of cultural issues that are important in the West, from those of purity (and of danger) to those of how we represent ourselves and the others against whom that representation is cast. We are indebted to Lien for investigating this topic in such an accessible and provocative way.

JAMES G. CARRIER

Over the last few years public debate in Australia has, as it has at various other historical moments, become intensely engaged with issues of national identity, multiculturalism, contemporary and past indigenous and settler relations, and reform of a constitution still closely linked to the United Kingdom—in short, questions of what it means to be Australian. One positive engagement with this debate has been the recent publication of a number of monographs examining identity formation in Australia and attending particularly to questions about the nature, form, and origin of Australian national culture and identity. One of these monographs, Kapferer’s Being All Equal, constitutes a readable, engaging and insightful, if theoretically somewhat limited discussion of contemporary projects of nation-building in Australia and how they might relate to the contemporary Australian state and people.

Kapferer begins by arguing that Australian understandings of difference and identity are, and have been for two centuries, fundamentally structured by ‘ideologies of egalitarian individualism’ (p. 3). She maintains that Australian social relations are organized around both a valuation of the equality of individuals and groups that expresses itself in notions of mateship, justice and a ‘fair go’, and an emphasis on individualistic traits such as self-reliance, physical prowess, and rights to private property. Kapferer demonstrates the pervasiveness of ‘egalitarian individualism’ in Australian social relations through the analysis of an astonishingly wide array of people, places, and activities and events. The book ranges over popular historiography, reconstructed ‘pioneer villages’ and other museums, the signification of space and particularly suburbia, the role of technical and intellectual work in official discourses on health and tertiary education, the problems of accommodating multiculturalism within public festivals, the design competition for Parliament House, and the construction of consumption and community at annual agricultural shows.

Kapferer’s approach in each of these domains is to combine descriptive case-studies with an explicitly post-structuralist analysis of the way in which each domain encodes particular social relations and cultural meanings (p. 283). One of the most successful of Kapferer’s analyses is her exploration of the Royal Adelaide Show. She presents a detailed description of its content and spatial organization, its displays of farm animals and produce, the skills and technology of police and fire-fighting forces, woodchopping competitions, schoolchildren’s arts and crafts, and the rides and side-shows which create a holiday atmosphere. She then argues that such elements present certain ‘focal meanings of contemporary Australian society’ (p. 184). For example, through bringing urban Australians into intimate contact with agricultural activities and produce, the Show recreates a sense of an Australian ethos centred around rural activity, rural self-sufficiency and independence, the ‘conservative “traditional values” of a rural past’ (p. 195), and of the quintessential Australian as the ‘rural battler’ (p. 187). The Show’s spatial organization generates an experience of equality and commonality, as people from different classes and backgrounds mingle in a common milieu, and organizations such as the police celebrate themselves as ‘pillars of a warm-hearted community’ (p. 199).
A significant strength of Kapferer's monograph is her attention to aspects of everyday leisure and work, such as the Show, as the grounds and material for identity formation. As such, she moves considerably beyond a predominant body of literature that investigates Australian national culture and identity solely through published media such as literature and film. Kapferer consequently produces a wealth of ethnographic detail that will be particularly interesting to readers unfamiliar with Australian cultural practice but concerned with the characteristics of activities such as public festivals. Her analytical approach to this material, however, renders the monograph subject to some significant criticism. In keeping with her post-structuralist perspective, Kapferer tends to treat each domain or event as a 'text' from which can be read evidence of cultural frames and social relations. Kapferer's concern to demonstrate the pervasiveness of 'egalitarian individualism' in Australian cultural practice frequently means that each 'reading' merely repeats the identification of this cultural trope rather than embedding each domain in a developing argument that explores the process, rather than just the characteristic frames, of nation-building in contemporary Australia. This lack of a developing argument is particularly apparent when she indicates the existence of cultural practices which might complicate rather than support dominant constructions of national identity, but fails to pursue such aspects of everyday life and public discourse in any depth. In discussing the Show, for example, she notes but disappointingly does not fully explore the paradox that the Show both presents discourses of national identity based around ideals of community and self-sufficiency, and valorizes a consumer capitalism that distances rural (or foreign) producer from consumer in a way that directly conflicts with such nationalist ideologies.

This apparent theoretical thinness may result from the ambitious nature of the monograph, which seeks to cover a very wide array of public discourse and consequently fails to examine any one of the domains in depth. This is perhaps a general problem with studying phenomena as diffuse as national identities, but I would argue that it is exacerbated by two further characteristics of Kapferer's analytical approach. The first of these is a common critique of post-structuralist analyses and relates to the way they rely too heavily on the analyst's ability to discern cultural tropes in discursive constructions. Kapferer neglects important questions about if, how, and why consumers of such discourses actually interpret and internalize them. Thus, while we may admire her virtuosity in deciphering events such as the Show, the history of building the Stockman's Hall of Fame, and Commonwealth tertiary education policy, this fails to tell us anything about whether such analysis accords with how specific audiences employ such discursive frames in producing their understanding of who they are and might be. Kapferer's approach means she can describe national cultural tropes but cannot really investigate how such tropes translate into national identity.

The second weakness of Kapferer's analytical approach is her reliance on a classical Althusserian understanding of the public domains she explores as 'ideological state apparatuses'. She conceptualizes these public domains as arenas in which the state promotes hegemonic discourses designed to subsume division and conflict engendered by social differences of, for example, class, status, wealth, ethnicity, and gender into a totalizing narrative of the nation as a coherent community. This approach depends heavily on a view of the state as a monolithic and coherent entity fundamentally separated from its subjects. Kapferer employs this understanding to develop a
conceptual opposition between the ‘Australian people’, whose discursive practices supposedly constitute ‘culture’ and are integral to an organic search for community, and the ‘Australian state’, whose discursive practices constitute ‘ideology’ and represent a spurious attempt at national integration. This Althusserian approach leaves little room for investigating how the differentiated complex of institutions—troubled by internal divisions and contradictions, and itself composed of individuals and groups variably positioned in relation to ideological formations—which constitutes the ‘state’ is engaged by different groups of people in the course of negotiating public discourse and national identity. That is to say, it is rather too easy to revert, as Kapferer often does, to the ‘state’ as an answer to the problem of how national identity and community is formed, rather than investigating how different aspects of the state are engaged in a complex way (sometimes in opposition, sometimes in alliance) with other groups in negotiating discursive formations.

In Being All Equal, Kapferer sets out to ‘illuminate or rejig perspectives on aspects of everyday life which form an unquestioned cultural stock’ (p. 5) of contemporary Australia. This she does admirably by exploring how different domains of social activity encode particular cultural frames summarized as ‘egalitarian individualism’. Important are her indications of some of the problems which arise when these entrenched frames attempt to accommodate concepts such as indigenous sovereignty or multiculturalism, and she further points to some of the broader issues, such as processes of commodification, economic globalization, and cultural tourism, which both drive and complicate any contemporary process of nation-building. As such, she both provides a resource for Australians grappling with their own cultural milieu, and suggests a number of directions in which the theorizing of the nation-state within contemporary public cultural studies might develop.

Kapferer concludes her monograph with the hope that it will facilitate the Australian people’s search for the ‘dream of human community’ (p. 282) by bringing into focus the ways in which Australians’ identities are constrained and shaped by contemporary cultural forms and social relations, particularly the action of the nation-state. Yet I would argue that the monograph cannot fulfil such a laudable goal precisely because of the theoretical limitations of Kapferer’s approach. In order to be able to intervene in the shaping of discursive formations, and consequently identity, it is necessary not merely to notice their particular characteristics and attribute them to unidentified entities such as the ‘Australian state’ or the ‘Australian people’—but also, and rather, to understand the material practices through which specific social groups, including aspects of the state, negotiate the production and use of such formations.


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SPECIAL ISSUE ON KINSHIP AND IDENTITY

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KINSHIP AND IDENTITY: INTRODUCTION

ROBERT PARKIN

The present collection of papers derives from a seminar series that I convened in collaboration with Shirley Ardener, Tamara Dragadze, and Jonathan Webber at the Institute of Social and Cultural Anthropology, Oxford, in Michaelmas Term 1996, on the theme of 'Kinship and Identity'. This was part of a continuing initiative organized by my three colleagues for a number of years past, the original idea being to build further on the foundations of the late Edwin Ardener's work on questions of ethnicity and identity, following his untimely death in 1987. These events have been immensely productive in terms of work delivered, discussed, published and read, and it is an honour for me to be associated with one of them. The original series on 'Kinship and Identity' consisted of the usual eight papers, of which five appear here (the other contributors had already committed their papers elsewhere and were therefore not able to take part in this publication). I would like to thank all the contributors warmly for their willingness to take part, as well as my co-convenors for their unfailing support for the series.

Although questions of ethnicity and identity now have arespectably long history in anthropology—including a recognition of the importance of notions of common descent when listing what might be significant in general terms—there is still not a great deal of work locating kinship centrally in identity construction. One often has to tease the connections that are obviously present out of the material through liberal amounts of lateral thinking and reading between the lines. One obvious candidate in this respect is David Schneider's pioneering work American Kinship (1968), which, banal though it may be inclined to the average Euroamerican reader, still successfully insisted—with its stress on the symbolic
meanings of a form of kinship that was very familiar personally to probably a majority of his potential readers—that those meanings were culturally specific and could be expected to change when shifting to other societies in other parts of the world. The influence of the work of this one-time maverick has grown steadily, and it has clearly had an impact on such authorities as Marilyn Strathern, who has sought to show that much professional anthropological discourse about kinship is rooted in similarly culturally grounded and bounded notions (1992). But there have been more explicit approaches recently incorporating the theoretical theme of identity with ethnographically derived notions of kinship. One might mention here Joan Bestard-Camps on Catalonia (1991), Jeremy MacClancy on Basques (1993), and John Bornemann on kinship and identity in the two parts of formerly divided Berlin, where he shows how official policy regarding the family underpinned both themes in both areas (1992). More recently still, David Sutton has reminded us of the connections between kinship and nationalism in terms of metaphors of belonging, and he has attempted to develop this insight using a ‘bottom-up’ approach in relation to a Greek island (1997).

Qualitatively pertinent though these texts might be, they are none the less quantitatively rather modest. One of the factors delaying a more vigorous use of kinship in debates on identity has probably been the predominance of formal analyses in the tradition of Morgan and Lévi-Strauss, out of fashion though these may seem to be at the present time (but cf. countervailing comments in Parkin 1997). However, it seems to me that these two approaches are far from being unbridgeable. Since I myself have contributed, if very modestly, to the more formal side of kinship studies before, quite a bit later, beginning to pay attention to issues of identity and ethnicity, it might be useful if I introduce some personal history at this point.

My first two research interests in anthropology were kinship and South Asia, and they remain important to me, often in association with one another. However, my work in this respect has really been in the mainstream tradition of analysing kinship systems as if they were discrete, the properties, even mainspring, of certain bounded social systems we used to call tribal. My interest in questions of ethnicity and identity came later and arose out of the realization that the sharp distinctions that Poles and Germans make from one another, and the quite negative stereotypes of difference they hold, has to be balanced by a history of populations mixing and an active tendency by some individuals to shift between these identities, especially in the context of the migration of Polish citizens to Germany on the basis of some demonstrable German descent.

I have, of course, always been aware of arguments from ethnicity and identity in anthropology, if rather vaguely at times. One situation I found myself in as a student in late 1970s—already a post-structuralist period for some, as expressed not least in the pages of earlier issues of the present journal, though no more than late-structuralist for others—was that many of my fellow students were frankly sceptical of these approaches. Many were inclined to argue that they added nothing, really, to what had gone before: what was different over the hallowed method of
identifying a particular ethnic group in terms of customary attributes such as
descent and marriage systems, rituals, beliefs etc.? Well, what this once vigorous
but now rather old-fashioned approach assumed was tribal boundedness and
discreteness, as well as a certain essentialism, and a marked reluctance, whether
the analyst was basically a functionalist or a structuralist, to account for either
process as a dynamic aspect of how social systems were actually constituted, or
history in the chronological or at least narrative sense. Supplying the first of these
wants shows that social systems are not intrinsically bounded and that in many
cases people move between them according to context, whether permanently or
temporarily, this being an almost normative aspect of many social systems.
Focusing on history allows us to identify not only social change but also processes
of ethnogenesis, as boundaries expand and contract, are created and disappear
altogether.

In the wider sense, however, history presents us with certain problems even in
the context of identity. First, are, for example, ethnic identities as a type the
product of modern circumstances, such as reactions to the colonial experience or
conflicts over increasingly scarce resources, or are they older, much older, as old
as human history, even? Clearly, the differentiation of human populations has
always led to a difference in identity of some sort, but there are many other bases
for identity—class, clan, locality, politics, religion, occupation, life-style, aesthetic
taste, sexual orientation, and much more, often in combination—many of which
seem clearly more relevant for earlier periods. Another question relates to the
bases of ethnogenesis itself, which is sometimes presented almost as arising out of
nothing, as sheer creativity is given priority over the bases that must underlie it.
In reality, this is unlikely to be the case, and here I appreciate most the position
of those like John Peel (on ethnicity; 1989), Anthony Smith (on nationalism; 1986)
and latterly Anton Blok (on history; 1992). at least to the extent that they argue
for a degree of continuity with the past in respect of such changes. Finally,
although identities in general tend to show themselves to the analyst as fluid,
unbounded, and historically contingent, ethnic identities in particular are often
presented by their spokespersons as essentialist, bounded, and as old as the hills
(Parkin: in preparation). This is the familiar difference between the outside
observer's perspective and the indigenous one. In seeing social systems as
bounded and unchanging, it could be argued that pre-Barthian anthropology was
allowing itself to be seduced by the folk models of the people it was studying.

I do not want to present my intellectual development as leading to some sort
of spiritual crisis or process of conversion from the illicit delights of formal
analysis to a belated recognition of some hard truths about identity, not least
because I do not intend to abandon the former for ever (and this position has
nothing to do with their possibly being illicit!). Over the years, however, I have
come to recognize two things in this context. One is that India, with its hierarchi­
cal and at the same time micro-differentiated social structure, is an excellent
laboratory for the identity and increasingly also ethnicity theses. Indeed, it may
even reinforce these theses, as India exemplifies repeatedly the truth that the
identity one claims for oneself is not always that attributed to one by others. The other consideration is that ethnic groups may portray themselves as different from their neighbours partly with reference to kinship. This can be seen under (at least) two fundamental aspects. One relates to structural features and the realm of practice: we are distinct because of the sort of kinship system we have. This is exemplified in this collection by Llobera’s account of the Catalan patriarch or stem family and primogeniture as peculiar to the Catalans within this region, and it is also a consideration in India in respect of how one marries, as I attempt to show in my own paper. The other aspect relates to actual networks of relationships on the ground: we are distinct because we are all of one stock. Here one most obviously thinks, perhaps, of descent, and this is highlighted by Clammer in particular on Chinese and other groups in Singapore, and is also touched on by Llobera as regards Catalans. Of course, this may be true no matter what the mode of descent itself is. What is also interesting in Clammer’s case is how this has been officially maintained and even created by the Chinese-dominated Singapore government using a combination of neo-Confucianism and modern sociobiology which to a large extent flies in the face of contradictory historical circumstances.

However, marriage may also be implicated in the delineation of supposedly separate ‘stocks’. If there is a stress on common substance, there may well be a concomitant tendency to restrict marriage to the group in the interests of preserving that substance from outside contamination: as I also try to show in my paper, this is certainly the case in India, in respect of the endogamy of caste. This is obviously impossible where intermarriage is at all frequent, although both in- and out-marriage may pose a problem in terms of a perceived loss of cultural substance and/or vigour, as the paper by Romain on mixed-faith marriages in Britain shows. However, the nature of the marriage system itself may be less at issue in this particular context: north and south India share the value of endogamy, even though the north characteristically abhors cross-cousin marriage, while for the south it is normative.

Lest the contrast still be obscure, let us reflect on Leach’s data on the Kachin of Upper Burma (1954), which was pioneering in this regard as in many others. Essentially, the Kachin were constituted by a number of more or less antagonistic upland populations who were ethnically and politically distinct in the Barthian sense but who shared much in respect of system and practice. Their distinctiveness could be seen in terms of the claimed common descent of each group, that is, as a set of relationships which each group had for itself and which was not shared with other groups, however similarly constituted. On the other dimension, however, they all had the same sort of descent system, which basically consisted of patrilineal, segmented lineage systems, frequently with ultimogeniture in respect of succession and inheritance, the chronologically junior line having status priority in most respects. In addition there were MBD marriage, nat worship, chiefly rule, subsistence cultivation etc. As well as tending to unite these politically disparate groups culturally, such features also distinguished these upland populations from the lowland Shan, with their shallow descent, non-prescriptive marriage systems,
princely rule, primogeniture and ancestor worship. Fundamental in Leach's account was the contrast between marriage systems. For Kachin, wife-takers are inferior in status and often political clients. For Shan, the reverse is the case: giving a wife itself indicates political clientship. Therefore, if an ambitious Kachin chief gives a wife to a Shan princely house in an attempt to increase rank, he simply becomes a client in their eyes. Leach's *gumsa/gumlao* model can be seen in part as a simple culture clash. However, it is also true that one set of cultural expectations, the Kachin one, is broadly shared by a number of different groups who see themselves as distinct in terms of shared descent, despite the fact that they trace descent in basically the same ways.

I am therefore not arguing that these two dimensions, that of system and practice and that of actual networks of relationship, are mutually exclusive: the Indian material too shows how they may converge. But there are differences in the ways in which they are put to use. It seems to me that networks of relationship are particularly suitable for marking off one's own group as exclusive and particular. While one may marry out—though with more or less deleterious consequences, perhaps at the cost of no longer counting as a member of the group even in terms of ethnicity (see again Romain's paper, below)—one's birth is less negotiable. There are many groups for whom birth is an essential requirement for full membership: in Europe Germans certainly, and very largely also Jews, even though religious conversion is recognized in principle by the latter. This may seem to apply to some groups but not to others: it may be tempting to cite as an example here the well-known fact that many Nuer are of Dinka origin (Evans-Pritchard 1940). The fact that this is remembered, conversely, suggests that there is still a distinction in terms of Nuerness: outside origins are frequently remembered for generations, even where there is superficial unity, a fact that anthropologists may only become aware of after a considerable time in the field.

The nature of systems and practices, conversely, is such that they can be adopted by anyone, as is shown repeatedly by Indian low-caste status-climbers. As regards this dimension, there is the consideration that whatever the use made of systems and practices in terms of creating an identity, there are some limitations on the variations that one expects to encounter: above a certain level of detail, there are only so many possible ways of actually tracing descent, for example, or of forming an affinal alliance system. Thus, with reference to Llobera's paper (below), the use of Catalan primogeniture as a marker of Catalan identity is potent in the regional context, where the Castilians (for many Catalans simply 'the Spanish') and at least certain Portuguese do not have it, the former being the people from whom Catalans are generally most anxious to distance themselves. However, they are far from being the only group even in Europe to have primogeniture, let alone the rest of the world. Thus, while this may mark Catalaness for Catalans, it does not define Catalaness sociologically across the planet.

Ifeka and Flower's paper in this collection, finally, on the Boki of Nigeria, is on the face of it a little different from the others in that it demonstrates the importance of patrilineal kinsmen in the context of witchcraft accusations which centre
on the accused's consumption of close relatives, especially sons, by spiritual means. Here too, however, there is a dimension of contrast which can be viewed in terms of more all-embracing forms of identity, namely between traditional, collective forms of property rights, and modern, Western-derived ideas that stress individual rights and advantageous empowerment through them. Ardener showed among the Bakweri (1970) how witchcraft, prosperity, spiritual aggression, and destroying one's own may be intimately bound up together in a single nexus, but permanently so—that is, regardless of changing and superficially far-reaching outside influences, which are relentlessly accommodated to it. In the case of the Boki, the particularity and self-centredness of prosperity drawn from supposedly Western-derived attitudes to property is converted through witchcraft accusations into an attack on anti-social behaviour in quasi-traditional fashion. A conflict of identities, in other words, is tackled with reference to a system of retribution which focuses on relations between kin and their apparent denial through witchcraft attacks upon them.

In my belief these papers all exemplify what might be done in the realm of the still comparatively fresh topic of identity by bringing in a further domain, that of kinship, which has always been at the heart of anthropology in some form, and which chronologically was in at the start of what we can still recognize as the modern subject or at least proto-subject, in the work of Morgan, McLennan, Maine, Tylor, Bachofen, and others. It seems to me that there is no reason why these two strands should continue to remain apart and that they are actually capable of enriching one another in all sorts of ways. It is hoped that the papers in this collection may provide a degree of inspiration leading others too towards that goal.

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REINSORBING PATRIARCHY:
THE SEXUAL POLITICS OF NEO-CONFUCIANISM
IN CONTEMPORARY SINGAPORE

JOHN CLAMMER

Introduction

All Chinese societies, whether on the mainland of Asia, in Taiwan, Hong Kong or elsewhere in world-wide diaspora, have had to struggle with their past, to recall it, to edit it, and, where necessary, to invent it. The intensity of this historical remembering, in contrast to the societal amnesia of much of the West and of contemporary Japan, comes from three sources: the need to remember because individual and cultural identity lies primarily in continuity (best expressed anthropologically in the concern with descent and the role of ancestors); because present political legitimacy derives from the patterns and fractures of the past; and because of the constant pressure to assimilate, express, and reinterpret the fuzzy body of practices, sentiments, and ideologies known collectively as ‘Confucianism’. Much of the history of the Chinese-speaking world in the last half-century can be seen in these terms: in the struggle against, and subsequent reincorporation, even redeification, of Confucius in the People’s Republic; in the struggles for legitimacy, autonomy, and democracy in Taiwan; and in the identity politics of Southeast Asian Chinese, most of them ethnic and linguistic minorities in societies still their own, but in which to varying degrees they are still considered outsiders.

The society in Asia which is in many ways the clearest exemplar of these preoccupations is Singapore—the one state in Southeast Asia with a substantial Chinese majority, the one in which identity-anxiety seems to be most keenly felt,
but also the one that committed itself at its origin as an independent state in 1965 to a model of perpetual multiracialism, a model from which it is now in some significant ways retreating. Chinese dominance in this society of many ethnicities has begun to reassert itself in some obvious and many subtle ways. The Singapore situation also condenses or focuses social processes going on in Chinese communities elsewhere in Southeast Asia and especially in neighbouring Malaysia, significantly the country with the second biggest Chinese population in the region, but also to some degree throughout the Asian diaspora. It is also of great interest because it represents an attempt to achieve the 'resinification' of a population already ethnically Chinese sociologically as well as culturally. To attempt resinification culturally is one process—to reintroduce language, art, architecture, literature, music, and even philosophy—and is one which has to some extent occurred spontaneously, individually, or through the efforts of community associations and religious and educational bodies in many Southeast Asian Chinese societies over a considerable period of time (Clammer 1975). But for the state to attempt a deliberate policy of sociological resinification requiring the creation or adaptation of social forms—family organization, descent systems, community organizations, the management of the microeconomics of everyday life, religious practices, and patterns of reproduction and socialization—which had previously not existed or had fallen into disuse is a rare and interesting phenomenon.

And indeed, this has happened and is continuing to happen in contemporary Singapore and can be analyzed from a number of points of view—in terms of ethnic relations for example, or through the study of the political sociology of the society. While these and a number of other dimensions are involved and will be discussed here, I will also argue here that the phenomenon of resinification is best approached through the exploration of a group of social policies involving population, education, the creation of ideology and the refurbishment of Confucianism, which collectively but hiddenly focus on the re-establishment of patriarchy. In a world in which patriarchy is under fairly general attack, the attempt to reassert patriarchal practices and values is a somewhat audacious move and one worthy of deeper comment. In order to do this, some context needs to be established which makes sense of the framework in which these policies have arisen.

The Context of Policy

The movement towards the establishment or invention of patriarchy reflects the end-point of four characteristics of social change in Singapore over the last decade. The first of these is the slow shift from genuine pluralism or multiracialism—the original 'founding charter' of post-colonial Singapore society (Benjamin 1976)—towards a distinctive Sinocentrism in language policy, political culture, the promotion of high culture, and the siting of Singapore within the geopolitics of the wider
region. The second is the increasingly politically driven nature of change. As far back as the 1970s some commentators (e.g. Chan 1975) were arguing that Singapore was an ‘administrative state’, one in which bureaucratic management had replaced genuine politics. What this argument overlooked was that plenty of politics in fact existed, but were elite politics committed to a form of ‘guided democracy’ which involved the suppression of political alternatives other than those sanctioned by the government together with the intense politicization of virtually every level of Singapore life—housing, education, culture, language, reproduction and family life, religion, car ownership, the keeping of pets, and the chewing of gum. Social change has, as a consequence, arisen almost entirely not from spontaneous sources, but from political intervention designed to create, direct or prevent the evolution of social practices and values.

The third characteristic is the progressive racialization of identity. At its inception independent Singapore opted for a primary ordering of the social structure in terms of race. Every permanent member of the population is required to ‘have’ a ‘race’, the title of which is inscribed on his or her identity card and which determines many aspects of social life—languages of education, possible religious identities, and position in relation to privileges, quotas, and access to cultural resources (from issues as significant as entitlement to scholarships or entry to the civil service or indeed to political life to those as minor as the amount of television or radio airtime available in one’s native language and reflecting one’s cultural interests or the public holidays and religious festivals that symbolically mark, or do not mark, the political visibility of one’s ethnic group). The rhetoric of meritocracy in Singapore in fact masks unequal ethnic distribution of national resources. The result has been the enshrining of a classificatory system which allocates every individual to a racial category (Chinese, Malay, Indian, or ‘Other’) which is regarded as permanent, essentialist, and non-negotiable. This system has been both reinforced in its fundamental characteristics—immutability, creation of a social organization based on vertical loyalties rather than horizontal class lines, conflation of race, ethnicity, and culture—and slowly distorted in a pro-Chinese direction by other social policies. These refer to education, the establishment of quotas for ethnic minorities (i.e. non-Chinese) in public housing estates, and very much in the area of language with the active and very public promotion (with taxpayers’ money) of Mandarin, not only as a way of unifying the ‘dialect’ (i.e. South Chinese regional languages) speakers who form the majority of Chinese Singaporeans, but also to assert Singapore’s primarily Chinese identity and to establish closer cultural and business links with the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Shifts in regional geopolitics have made this ‘Chinese’ identification possible. Almost surrounded by Malaysia to the north and Indonesia to the west and south, stressing a Chinese identity was not such a healthy idea until the establishment of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) created a relatively stable regional grouping including Singapore, and until diplomatic relations had been established between the individual nation-states comprising ASEAN and the PRC.
While sensitivities to China’s long-term political and economic objectives in Southeast Asia still remain, these are to some extent deflected by even greater fears of Japan’s large and ever-increasing presence in the region (Ben-Ari and Clammer 1997); by the increasing significance of Overseas Chinese investment in China and of the links that these are creating and of the interest that this is generating regionally and internationally (e.g. Seagrave 1996); and by the sheer business opportunities that the Chinese market or use of cheap Chinese labour offers to entrepreneurs familiar with the language and culture of that most populous of countries.

Public policy and geopolitics have both found an ally in the spread, especially in Singapore and Malaysia, of ideas derived from sociobiology which seem to suggest to their supporters not only the basically racial nature of identity (i.e. discrete groups, each with distinct physical characteristics, culture, intelligence, and even entrepreneurial skills) derivable from this primary identity, but also, of course, the irreducibly biological character of these elements (Chee and Chan 1984). The appeal to sociobiology, which I will shortly return to in respect of its direct connection with patriarchy (for a broader discussion, see Clammer 1996) relates closely to the fourth aspect of social change—the attempt to legislate values. This is interesting for several reasons—the attempt itself in a world in which the effectiveness of such propagandist methods has been called severely into question; the attempt to create a ‘national ideology’ in a society of disparate ethnicities and cultures; and the attempt to base this ideology on a but faintly veiled version of Confucianism (Clammer 1993a). Where an essentialist view of identity exists, the easiest way to derive values is not from open debate about what kind of world people want and how their religious and cultural histories might contribute to this, but from a view of racially defined ‘givens’ of an ultimately genetic nature. Taken together, these four aspects of social change in Singapore have great significance for the organization of the family and the situation of women, a theme which takes us to the next level of analysis.

Women, Biology, and Race

The most conspicuous and best-known example of these elements coming together and being expressed in policy is undoubtedly to be found in the ‘graduate wives’ controversy that broke out in 1983 when the then Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew announced figures that showed that women who were university graduates were not marrying to anything like the same extent as non-graduate women and that those who did were having fewer children. These bald statistics however were placed in an interpretative framework deriving from some of the most dubious examples of writing in sociobiology, an interpretation which led Lee to the conclusion that intelligence is eighty per cent genetic and only twenty per cent en-
vironmental in origin, that intelligence is genetically transmitted, and that consequently declining fertility rates amongst the well-educated would lead to a progressive diminution of the intelligence of the nation as a whole (Lee 1983). Policies were instituted, including substantial tax advantages for graduates with children, the setting up of an agency called the ‘Social Development Unit’ to encourage marriage between graduates, and cash grants for less educated couples who agreed to voluntary sterilization. The whole issue is significant not only for grounding social policy on the flimsiest of scientific bases but equally for its racist overtones. Most graduates being Chinese and most Malays (the second largest ethnic category) both being non-graduates and having much bigger families, it is apparent at once that the real issue was the declining percentage of Chinese in the total population and the potential loss of Chinese educational supremacy, as the ‘intelligence’ of Chinese children declined as predicted by Lee’s fantastic model.

The blame for this sorry state of affairs was significantly laid at the feet of Singaporean Chinese women, especially the well-educated ones: they were selfish and career-oriented, were refusing to get married and were failing in their duty to expand the number of intelligent consumers in Singapore. The social inadequacies of Singapore Chinese men (a constant source of local humour and satire), their careerism, materialism, and self-centred attitudes were not discussed or considered publicly to be part of the ‘problem’. The difficultly facing the government in 1983–4 was how to address the issues raised by Lee in order quietly to offset the ethnic erosion that he was clearly referring to while not making it too obvious that the policies being introduced were actually racial ones, an important difficulty, given that the ideology of multiracialism cannot be publicly questioned, even if it is being undermined in practice. Two possibilities emerged: the financial and social incentives mentioned above, and a broader set of policies intended to create a world-view, a sense of reality, in which certain behaviours would be seen as naturally acceptable, so that people, in particular Chinese women, would adjust their attitudes and practices accordingly. Normalization, the creation of an acceptance of ‘reality’ where there is actually only ideology, is standard Singapore political practice. In this case, however, the adjustment of population coincided with what in the mid 1980s was beginning to emerge as the major underlying domestic political agenda: the enhancement of Chinese superiority not only in educational, occupational, and material terms (goals already achieved), but also in cultural and symbolic terms—as creators and arbitrators of values—something which had as yet been imperfectly achieved and which was by its very nature a contested realm.

To create this shift was not entirely easy, even in controlled Singapore, for two major reasons. The first of these, of course, was the status of multiculturalism as the formal foundation of the society and the fact that, in light of this, the ethnic minorities would oppose any signs of the erosion of their position or opportunities. The second was that the new population policy of encouraging larger families for the educated was a complete reversal of the preceding policy, with its slogans (posted on bus shelters throughout the island and even projected at night on to the
end walls of public housing blocks) of ‘Boy or girl—two is enough’ and its dire warnings of overcrowding, pressure on social facilities and resources, and the economic non-sustainability of a large population in a small country. At that time a different set of incentives and disincentives had been offered (including tax measures, access to preferred schools, and access to public housing) to promote limitation of family size, and many Chinese women had undergone sterilization to gain these benefits. These same women (many of them no longer able to have children) suddenly found themselves castigated for bringing about a long-term population decline, in terms of both numbers and intelligence. Now suddenly the emphasis was on providing more people to swell the ranks of consumers (to stimulate the domestic economy) and to maintain Singapore’s economic competitiveness internationally. But how were these new ideas to be made to take root and achieve their desired effect, especially on a population that is well educated and which is increasingly sceptical of ever-changing campaigns of exhortation and bullying? Clearly the best plan was to make the shift seem ‘natural’, to place it in a framework where policy seemed part of a social cosmology. And the place to begin, given that the ‘problem’ was seen as arising from the behaviour and attitudes of Chinese women, was quite logically the family.

Since independence the Singapore government has had a strong but fluctuating interest in the family (Salaff 1988). Initially, concern with the family focused on, in a sense, creating families in an immigrant society with a large percentage of single-person households. Many of the numerous social problems of colonial and postcolonial Singapore, especially as they affected the Chinese population, hinged on crime, drugs, unemployment, and secret-society involvement by single men, and on prostitution, servitude, and ageing among single immigrant women (for case-studies, see Koh 1994 and Chiang 1994). The early policy of developing extensive public housing projects had three objectives: to generate employment and economic activity; to root people in Singapore and generate political loyalty by giving them a stake in the country through home ownership; and to create more stable family units by providing the physical infrastructure for the emergence of more ‘normal’ patterns of marriage and care of the aged. The Women’s Charter of 1961 was designed both to protect women and girls from economic abuse and to encourage the regularization of marriage, through, for example, the banning of further polygamous marriages except among Muslims. With the growth of the economy, the widespread provision of education, and the stabilization of marriage, the family had not been of primary political concern between the late 1960s and the late 1980s. Suddenly, however, with the revised population policy, it moved back to centre-stage, but in an interestingly different way which has not so far received any detailed analysis.

In Chinese society it is not an exaggeration to say that the family has always been the central sociological feature: at least in its ideal-typical form, it organizes descent and is the focus of socialization, the locus of religious activities, and the agency for structuring memory and identity. It is also, as a host of commentators have pointed out, a highly gendered organization, strongly patriarchal in nature, in
which marriage was historically not a free union of equals, but a relation of subservience for a wife to her husband, eventually to her sons and certainly to her in-laws (Watson and Ebrey 1991). Yet in practice many Chinese Singaporeans came from backgrounds in China in which their families did not possess lineages, in which many ‘irregular’ patterns of marriage and residence were common (Jashok and Miers 1994) and in which poverty was a normal experience. Nevertheless, the family as an ideal remains at the very centre of Chinese self-images worldwide; it is the fundamental element in what Barbara Ward, in discussing the ethnography of a very ‘deviant’ group—the Tanka boat people of Hong Kong’s harbours and inlets—has called the ‘conscious model’ of Chinese social organization (Ward 1965). Basic to this model, in other words, is not only an image of culture (language, food, and everyday practices for instance), but also one of race (understood as lineal descent from ancestors of common stock and the phenotypical representation of that ancestry) and one of social structure. To be Chinese is to be a member not only of a ‘race’ but also of a distinctive form of social organization. To rescribe Chinese Singaporeans thus necessarily requires not only the re-creation of culture, but also the re-creation of that distinctive social organization.

The need for such fundamental social intervention indicates that the limits of conventional social policies are bringing about structural change. And there is no shortage of such policies, which have been applied at three levels. The first of these is most easily recognizable as a zone of ‘normal’ policy intervention, which has encompassed a range of strategies including the aggressive promotion of Mandarin, the encouraging of an interest in Chinese art (not only through private or semi-private agencies such as the Chinese Chamber of Commerce, but also through the creation of an officially sponsored gallery of Chinese art in the old Immigration Department building at Empress Place in the heart of the colonial district, a few minutes’ walk from Parliament House and the Supreme Court), and a range of social plans. The latter include the encouragement of in-migration from ‘traditional’ source areas, which turns out in practice to mean the Chinese-speaking world, including members of North American Chinese communities, but significantly not India; the restriction of non-Chinese minorities settling in large numbers in individual public housing estates (offically to prevent ‘ghettoization’, but in practice because minorities tend to vote against the government); and the population policy noted above.

The second level has been the promotion, since 1983, of sociobiological theories of genetic determinism. This essentially takes the form of the identification of race with biology (i.e. genetically determined hereditary characteristics), the equation of intelligence with such inherited characteristics, and the assumption that certain races have a specific distribution of such qualities. In reality this is an argument for Chinese superiority, as it is the Chinese who are assumed to have (inherited) qualities of entrepreneurship, intelligence, and cultural development and to be unusually (by the standards of other local ethnic groups) hard-working. It is also an argument against ethnic intermarriage (except presumably among the
non-dominant races) and against any 'melting pot' model of ethnic integration. In fact, it strongly supports in fact the official four-race classificatory model of permanent racial difference. The allegedly 'scientific' nature of this theory makes it difficult for the average layperson in Singapore to argue against it, particularly as it accords so well with widely held local folk models of racial stereotypes.

The third level has been the attempt to out-Weber himself, by assuming and building into policy the belief that values determine practice, and not the other way around. This is seen most clearly in two policies, one that ran throughout the 1980s and was then quietly abandoned, the other which began in 1988-9 and is officially still in place. The former was the attempt to introduce the teaching of values into Singapore schools via the introduction of religious education. This was a considerable innovation given the secular nature of the state in Singapore; it makes sense, however, when seen as an attempt to offset the situation that the government's own social and economic policies had brought about—a highly materialistic, individualistic society in which public levels of participation in voluntary and political affairs were declining—and as an outcome of the assumption that religion is potentially dangerous (its prophetic dimension could lead and has indeed led it into opposition to government policies), and it is best handled by teaching sanitized and approved versions which stress socially 'positive' moral values such as thrift, honesty, and hard work. In other words, the policy designed to compensate for the government's own destruction of the tender shoots of civil society in Singapore took the form of compulsory religious education, pupils being taught, however, their own religion (or in practice that of their parents). Muslim children were thus to be taught Islam, Protestant or Catholic ones Christianity, Hindu ones Hinduism, and only those who could not claim any religious affiliation were taught comparative religion. However, Chinese students, who form the bulk of the school population, were taught not Buddhism, the religion to which they or their parents adhere (mostly in its Mahayana form and substantially mixed with elements of Chinese 'folk' religion, mainly Taoism and spirit-mediumship), but rather Confucianism. Confucianism as a religion has almost no followers in Singapore (there was at the time only one small Confucian temple), although Confucius appears as a deity (usually of education) on the altars of many syncretic Mahayanist temples. There thus occurred in Singapore late in the twentieth century a process parallel to that which had taken place in Japan almost a century earlier, when the modernizing government of the Meiji Restoration set about the systematic suppression of both Buddhism and folk Shinto in an attempt to replace them both with state Shinto, a bureaucratized, non-critical religion closely watched and controlled from the centre.

Significantly, however, this policy was quietly abandoned after a decade (and great public expense in the training of teachers, preparation of teaching materials, and so on) because it had not delivered the political goods and because religion itself was becoming more visible, with the revival of traditional forms of religiosity, the substantial expansion of Christianity, the spread of fundamentalism in just about all religious communities, the rapid spread of the Japanese 'New Religion'
Soka Gakkai, the appearance of numerous sects (for example, that of Sai Baba among Hindus), and the migration of large numbers of both Indians and educated Chinese to Theravada Buddhism (Clammer 1991). Many of these forms of religious expression were beyond government control or understanding and as such were very anxiety-provoking in a government that values control above all else. The consequence was the abandonment of religious education in schools, the passage of an Act of Parliament (the quaintly named ‘Maintenance of Religious Harmony’ Act), designed to restrict the expression and practice of religion to approved forms and to ban absolutely any political expression of religion, and the decision to formulate and promulgate a ‘National Ideology’. This latter policy, which I have analyzed in detail elsewhere (Clammer 1993a), has many elements and strategies within it. Among key elements relevant to the present discussion are two: the decision to define the family officially as the basic unit of society; and the decision to replace the vaguely Marxist-sounding notion of ideology with one of ‘shared values’—based, however, not on any empirical attempt actually to discover whether such values exist in Singapore, and if so, what they are, but rather on the a priori decision to base these values on, or derive them from, Confucianism.

This idea in itself conceals two others. First, the idea that Confucianism is based on something called ‘consensus’ (i.e. not on debate), is the fundamental expression of something called ‘Asian values’, which are mainly defined by what they are not—i.e. Westernized, which in the words of Lee Kuan Yew are ‘individualistic and self-centred’. Quite apart from the extreme unlikeliness of there being any genuine pan-Asian values, Lee seems to have overlooked the fact that the National Ideology was introduced not to prevent the emergence of such ‘Westernized’ values in Singapore, but precisely because they are already rampant in what must be the most Westernized society anywhere in Asia and one which derives its distinctive culture from exactly that fact. Secondly, there is the idea that essential to Confucianism is not only a set of fairly vague ‘values’, but also its sociological expression: Confucianism means a particular ideology of the family and a particular practice which embodies that ideology.

The Problem and Practice of Confucianism

The difficulty with introducing Confucianism in an approved and bureaucratized way into Singapore, whether as something taught in the schools or as the basis of the ‘Shared Values’ or National Ideology, was that nobody in Singapore appeared to have a clear idea of what it was. Paradoxically, and without the least sense of irony (for this was, after all, supposed to be a national ideology), ‘experts’ on Confucianism were flown in from the United States and elsewhere to advise the government on exactly what it was that they were supposed to be talking about.
The local intellectual and academic community leapt as usual on to the bandwagon and began to produce instant books on the subject (e.g. Lu 1983, Lim 1992). And parallel to all this mental activity was a quasi-sociological one, which must be understood against the background of a very specific form of local cultural politics.

David Brown has argued (Brown 1993) that the status of ethnicity has evolved since independence from the original multiracialism, seen as a delicate structure requiring a strong state to keep it all together, through a series of intermediate transformations, each one of which has redefined the relationship between race, politics, and culture, to the current model, one that he dubs ‘corporatist’. Here, as in all the earlier models, the primacy of the state is not questioned, but two innovations have occurred: the definition of a national community based on allegedly shared values, and the reconceptualization of ethnic groups as interest associations. This last idea means that, without diminishing the priority of the state, responsibility for the welfare of individual ethnic communities is transferred from the state apparatus to those individual communities themselves. Such a move has occurred within the context of large-scale ‘privatization’ in Singapore (meaning that the state keeps ultimate control while increasingly transferring responsibility, problems, and costs to the public)—in housing, medicine, education, and other key areas. In a sense ‘corporatism’ means the ‘privatization’ of ethnicity, the transfer of responsibility for management and the provision of social services from the state to those communities themselves. But to do this requires the creation of institutions and structures to make the delivery of any such services effective.

The problem has been, however, that the modern history of Singapore has been one of the suppression of pre-existing social networks and social movements and their replacement by a government-created set of local as well as national institutions, such as community centres and residents’ associations. Community associations, one of which is found in every constituency, provide recreational and cultural facilities, often including Mandarin lessons, and are often part of the same complex housing government-run kindergartens and the local Area Office which has among its many functions the registration and monitoring of all the inhabitants of its district. Political, educational, and cultural functions are thus often run together and become effectively indistinguishable, as the few constituencies that have gone over to the opposition have found to their cost, it being very easy for the government to step up monitoring activities while simultaneously reducing social and cultural resources in such places. The destruction of civil society, however, has not been complete, and each community retains at least residual institutions reflecting its culture of origin and very frequently its religious practices. In the case of the Chinese community, these have been the remains of the once dense network of clan, dialect, and other associations which formerly animated the immigrant Chinese community from its earliest days (Hsieh 1978, Mak 1992).

At its inception, Singapore Chinese society was made up of a disparate mass of migrants—mostly male but with a slowly increasing number of women—from a number of areas in China, mostly along the southern seacoasts. Each of these
areas spoke different languages—Cantonese, Hokkien, Teochew, Hakka, Hainan­ese, and in a few cases more easterly languages such as the Shanghai dialect. Very rarely were northern dialects such as Mandarin spoken at all among migrants to Singapore. Very little sense of ethnic or class identity united the first generation of migrants, and reports from as late as the 1960s still speak of rivalry between language communities, clashes between secret societies, and the need for social workers on the island to speak several of the many dialects, since there was no lingua franca among the Chinese community, except possibly varieties of Bazaar Malay. Even after independence this situation continued to prevail for years until military service for men, imposition of common political institutions, the spread of Mandarin through the school system, and participation in the common economy and public housing schemes began to forge an increasing sense of unity, or at least of being Singaporean, among the local Chinese population. At least until independence, the numerous associations of the Chinese community, some based on dialect, some on place of origin in China, others on occupations or trades and yet others on religion, made up the basic social structure of that community and provided many of what welfare facilities then existed—hospitals and hospices, schools, and homes for the elderly.

Very importantly they also provided what might be termed quasi-kinship functions. Many Chinese migrants to Singapore were single or, if married, had left their spouses in China. And although most did originally intend to return to China, many never did, which meant of course that they grew old and died far from their native villages. Essential to Chinese familialism is what is often called ancestralism or sometimes, and inaccurately, 'ancestor worship'. What this term actually refers to is the centrality of patrilineal descent and the necessity for the dead, especially the recent dead, to be memorialized (for elaborations of this, see Hsu 1975, Baker 1979). Failure to do this meant a kind of cosmic loneliness for the dead—not being remembered, and no offerings being made to them—or at worst (for both the living and the dead) becoming a wandering ghost. Normally the functions of memorialization—the enshrining of the soul-tablet of the deceased, the cleaning and maintenance of graves and the making of offerings to the spirits of the ancestors—would be performed in the clan temple in China. For those dying alone in Southeast Asia, without kin and far from their native soil, the prospect of death was even more of an existential crisis than it was anyway. Community associations overseas took on these functions and often provided a variety of services under the same roof, oddly disparate to members of many other cultures, but very acceptably combinable to the overseas Chinese. Thus an association, formally based on dialect and/or district or even village of origin, would provide a shrine for the display and memorialization of the soul-tablets of its members (who would pay a subscription to the association while they were alive and economically active), a recreation area and space for elderly members to relax, drink tea, and read newspapers, sometimes a free or very cheap clinic on certain days or evenings of the week, and very possibly space for a wayang of Chinese opera performance for the dead (and the living) during the Hungry Ghosts month.
Some would provide retirement places for elderly individuals such as single women and might provide loans or welfare payments from the capital accumulated from members’ subscriptions. Religious, social, and recreational functions would thus often be combined in the same association.

Two issues stand out here: the production, among such associations, of quasi-kinship relations between people not genetically or agnatically related; and the fact that, in order to reproduce a system of Chinese kinship, a form of patrilineal descent had to be created. In practice some associations fudged this second requirement. In theory, the spiritual status (i.e. the disposition after death) of an unmarried Chinese female was extremely marginal and dangerous. Not incorporated into any husband’s lineage and without access to patrilineal status in her father’s lineage, the death of a female of marriageable age was an extremely anxiety-provoking event for all parties—for the woman herself and for living relatives and neighbours—since she too was liable to become a wandering ghost, resentful and revengeful in the way that such Chinese ghosts are often expected to be. The sociologically unincorporated individual is spiritually dangerous in Chinese religious culture. But there were always such women in Singapore—female labourers, domestic servants, prostitutes and others—often unaware of what legal protection was available to them and until 1961 with no clear code governing Chinese customary marriage (Chiang 1994). Some such women married and their names were inscribed on their husband’s soul-tablet; others took the option of never marrying (many indeed had fled from China precisely to avoid marriage (Topley 1975)) or became members of women’s vegetarian houses, to which they paid a subscription during their working lives and where they could spend their days off and could eventually retire, sometimes even going through a form of marriage with another woman and adopting a female child to care for them in their old age (Topley 1954). In such cases the house took care of their post-death status. For those who took neither of these options, associations would sometimes enshrine a soul-tablet on their behalf. But generally, in ideology and in practice, a patrilineal world-view prevailed.

Although they had retained some residual functions (mainly of a cultural and religious nature) this once extensive network of associations steadily lost ground as their position was eroded by the expansion of government activity, conversion of members to Christianity and other religions, and the many alternative attractions that an expanding consumer economy could offer young people. By the early 1990s many still existed (many others had entirely disappeared), but as shadows of their former wealth and influence, a far cry indeed from the days when they had essentially composed the social structure of the Singapore Chinese community. However, two things had now suddenly occurred which once again reversed previous government policy, which had been deliberately to diminish the strength of ‘natural’ organizations and to regulate and monitor them closely through an agency set up specifically for this purpose—the Registry of Societies. The first was that with the invention of the ‘corporatist’ conception of ethnicity, clan associations were suddenly needed again to carry out the new ‘privatized’ policy.
The second was that the parallel reinvention of Confucianism as the ideological basis of the social order required the sociological embodying of Confucian principles. The nuclear family in its modern form had hardly existed in China where smaller kinship units were always in principle incorporated into larger kin groups—lineages where these existed (and they were far from universal, even in south China from where most migrants came) and certainly surname or clan temples, which were necessary to memorialize the dead properly (Watson and Rauski 1988).

The reinvention of Confucianism thus meant not only the imposition of a set of 'values' but also the invention of a tradition to which many or most Singaporean Chinese did not belong, as well as the stimulation or fabrication of 'memories' of Chinese culture and of descent patterns where they did not in fact exist (Clammer 1993b)—a tradition which incorporated patriarchy as its fundamental principle. The problems this might create in a modern Singapore in which many women worked and in which very many (those recalcitrant graduate brides or non-brides) were highly educated did indeed occur to the engineers of these new policies; and the visiting experts were asked to address the problem of producing an acceptable version of Confucianism when the whole system was well known to be sexist, hierarchical, and not at all liberal in respect of social change or political development except in a very statist direction. How, then, was Confucianism to be made digestible to a modern, well-travelled, and materialistic contemporary Chinese population?

Several factors (apart from the government propaganda machine and the tame press) suggested that this could be done. The first was the emergence of China as a force to be reckoned with economically and politically in the region and, with its own rapid progress (or regression) towards capitalism, as a market and trading partner, no more the communist ogre. This major shift in regional geopolitics made a looking-towards-China policy possible and indeed culturally desirable. The second was the emergence of what might be termed Overseas Chinese triumphalism. Some time in the late 1980s many diaspora Chinese and many non-Chinese commentators on the Asia-Pacific region, as East Asia was now coming to be called, had begun to note the extensive economic and social networks of the overseas Chinese and their role in promoting investment, trade, and industrialization throughout the region. Many emerging multinational companies in Asia were overseas Chinese ones. From being a somewhat neglected minority, both envied and despised as entrepreneurial enclave-dwellers amidst much larger Muslim (in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Brunei), Theravada Buddhist (in Thailand, Cambodia, and Burma), Catholic (in the Philippines) or historically hostile (in Vietnam) host populations, the Chinese have suddenly become visible. With the rapid expansion of economies like that of Vietnam, in which both indigenous Chinese and overseas Chinese have played a major, if not the major, role, this marginal community has become a central one, a fact which has promoted an upsurge of pride and publications. And naturally the question has arisen as to what has made the economic resurgence of both China (at least of coastal south China) and the overseas Chinese
possible. Predictably the answer is Confucianism, although a Confucianism that
the sage himself would probably not recognize. This neo-Confucianism has two
main characteristics: it does for the Chinese what, according to Weber, the Protes-
tant ethic did for the British, namely allegedly provide the value system that makes
capitalism possible; and it constitutes a system which not only links Chinese to one
another through language and culture (making business relations easy) but which
is also based on the primacy of the family. At the root of Chinese economic
success in China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and throughout Southeast Asia is the
paternal family, descent system, and pattern of domestic relationships which, in
the last analysis, is what Confucianism represents. Patterns of saving, capital
accumulation, long working hours, socialization into an entrepreneurial life-
style—all, according to this theory, are ultimately related to Confucianism (the
literature on this question is now large and confused and extends even beyond the
Chinese to encompass the neo-Confucianism of Korea and Japan; for a good
sampler of this genre, by one of the experts much consulted by the Singapore
government, see Tu 1996).

Familialism (of the patriarchal variety), while being the fundamental plank in
this explanation of entrepreneurial success—especially as contrasted with the
Malay peoples of the region (the vast majority from southern Thailand through
Malaysia and Indonesia and on to the Philippines), with their bilateral kinship
patterns, matriarchal families, and even in some cases (the famous Minangkabau
people of Sumatra are a conspicuous case) matrilineal descent—is not the only
factor at play. For there is also an internal link between the promotion of
Confucianism on the one hand and the promotion of ideas derived from socio-
biology on the other. I have already suggested that ‘race’ in Singapore parlance
is understood or represented officially as a set of biological qualities transmitted
over time within a fairly discrete breeding population. Descent in this model has
two meanings: first a purely biological concept of genetic continuity, and secondly
a notion of sociological descent—a notion, that is, of lineal continuity ensured by
marriage and inheritance practices. Significantly it is only the Chinese who have
a patrilineal descent system of great depth reinforced by a patriarchal authority
system within the family (in theory—there are exceptions such as the *chin choe*
or in-marrying or adoptive son-in-law, or the *san po tsai* system of transferring
young girls from their natal households to those of their future husbands). As I
have said, Malays practise bilateral or matrilineal kinship; for Indians the primary
focus of kinship is caste rather than the descent group in the institutionalized
Chinese sense; and Eurasians tend to have simple nuclear families with shallow
notions of descent closer to those of the modern European or North American
family system. Furthermore, for Malays and Indians, ethnicity is not primarily a
matter of race but of culture, and it is possible for a person not born Malay to
become one through, for example, adoption (particularly of Chinese girls at one
time), marriage, or religious conversion.

For the Chinese, however, ethnicity is primarily racial, and so one can neither
become nor cease to be Chinese in the way that Malays or Eurasians potentially
can. One is Chinese by *descent*, understood in the twofold sense (biological/sociological) mentioned above. This helps to explain two things. One is why the Baba or Peranakan Chinese—arguably the most genuinely Singaporean culture in the country, with their unique combination of Chinese descent, Malay culture and language, and European political attitudes—never became a model for the society as a whole: they are too Malayanized, probably with intermarriage in the distant past, and they practice *chin choe* patterns of marriage too frequently. The other is why interethnic marriage among the Chinese is largely confined to marriage between Chinese women and men of other races (especially Europeans), not vice versa. Women marry out by definition in a patrilineal system and are lost to the patrilineage: sociologically they do not count, and the children of an ethnically outmarried woman will not be Chinese. Indeed, it is official policy in Singapore that children of mixed marriages follow the ‘race’ of the father and cannot either choose which race to identify with or choose an alternative identity. Subtly hidden in the Singaporean race and sociobiology models is the assumption that, while formally a child Naturally inherits genetic material from each parent equally, in reality it is the male genes that somehow predominate.

Perhaps not surprisingly, the resulting policies are rife with ambiguities. Women are encouraged to enter the workforce and to hire maids to look after their children while they are at work, but are then criticized for turning over the upbringing of their children to foreigners (most maids are Filipinos, sometimes Indonesians or from the PRC). The educated ones are criticized for not marrying and breeding enough (intelligence being, as we have seen, officially transmitted genetically), yet it is subtly insinuated that it is the male genes that are really important (in families with ‘too many’ female children, it is the husband who will be blamed in the local folk model for having ‘weak sperm’). Confucian ‘ethics’ has to promote seemingly universal values while actually arguing for the subordination of women and the primacy of ‘the family’—which has never actually been defined in Singapore public discourse, though it is, of course, both axiomatic and unspoken that it is the ‘Confucian’ one. What population policy, with its roots in sociobiology, actually says about women is hardly encouraging: they are for breeding intelligent consumers. Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew is on record as saying that he regrets the social policies that made education so widely available to women, a remarkable statement given that it is internationally thought that one of the most positive aspects of Singapore’s development policies has been to educate both genders equally (in many departments of the two universities, women indeed predominate: under government direction, the medical faculty at the National University established a quota system deliberately to keep down the number of female medical students, as they were becoming a majority; in most fields female students do better than males academically).

Singapore women, of course, are not unaware of what is going on, and even as their Chinese sisters in the past resisted patriarchy through a variety of strategies, so they do today—through not marrying at all, through education and independent careers, through ethnic out-marriage, and through consumption, migration,
and conversion to Christianity, with its egalitarian ethos. Significantly, there are far more Chinese Christian women than men in Singapore churches, and a high percentage of these women are well educated: it is not only graduate women who are not marrying, but graduate Christian women, a factor that may well have influenced the government's relative turning against Christianity—which it had previously looked upon benignly as promoting desirable family and moral values—and its quiet but visible encouragement of much more 'Asian' varieties of religion such as Soka Gakkai. Many women even choose their own personal names, usually ones of a European or European-derived nature, by which they are known among their friends, although they do not always inform their fathers of the de facto abandoning of their Chinese given names, especially if those names are derived from the hanyu pinyin syllabary now used in the PRC for romanizing the script rather than from the traditional dialect names. There has, in fact, been a quiet 'feminization' of culture in Singapore, as women have begun to dominate religion, such social movements as exist, teaching, wide areas of medicine, and some key areas of the bureaucracy.

One of the inadequacies of the Singapore government's own analysis of what it itself has created is its failure to understand the nature of capitalism. There is rather strong resistance to any such analysis, not only because it smacks of Marxism, but also because the government has committed itself to a form of state capitalism in which in theory the market governs (it does not, of course: the state does, except when the economy is doing badly, as it did during the recession of the mid-1980s, significantly the period from which many of these latter-day social policies also stem). In reality the social policies of the last two decades have caught women constantly on the wrong side not of trends of their own making, but of shifts in official policy. In the late 1970s and mid-1980s population was to be kept down and women were strongly encouraged not to have children. By the late 1980s this policy was reversed and (Chinese) women blamed for not having sufficient children. Women were encouraged to enter the work force in large numbers during the same period as the first phase of the population policy; then they were criticized for displacing domestic responsibilities on to maids, to neglecting their (Confucian) responsibilities to the aged, and, during the economic downturn, for taking jobs from men, who were the 'natural' breadwinners or, rather, fillers of rice-bowls. Encouraged to consume and thus to promote the expansion of the domestic economy, women were then accused, by the very architects of high growth, of materialism and of losing their 'Asian' values. While many of these fluctuations were simply the outcome of flip-flopping policies (known in Singapore polit-speech as 'pragmatism'), they were actually the result of modes of social relationship habitually unleashed by capitalism. The government, sensing that it could not have its cake and eat it and unable to think of a way forward that would not seriously compromise its own political vision and techniques, fell back on to the past, reinventing Confucianism with a dash of sociobiology for extra flavour.
Race, descent, and patriarchy are thus conflated, a distinctly gendered view of history is generated, and until very recently (e.g. Chiang 1994, Warren 1994) the experience and contribution of female migrants to Singapore was discounted. Within this male-biased world-view Chinese descent itself was seen as male-dominated and its paradigm—the patrilineage—seen as the essence of a Confucian social order, despite the absence of empirical lineages in the social backgrounds of many Singaporeans and the extensive evidence of variations in actual marriage practices throughout south China (Jaschok 1984, Watson 1991). As suggested elsewhere (Clammer 1996), the 'Confucian' model requires, and where it is successful it produces, docile bodies. Women in this view are essentially bodies, reproductive organisms whose emotions, if they are recognized at all, are entirely secondary. Women are to be presented and packaged according to patriarchal expectations of propriety, to be concealed or exposed according to whims not of their own making, and to be controlled through the establishment of norms, in some cases enforceable by law, about acceptable dress, gesture, habits, and public comportment. There is a whole sociology of the body waiting to be written from the perspective of the ideology and practice of Confucianism (for some hints about how this might proceed, see Zito and Barlow 1994). The memories, experiences and expectations of women—the possible roles, the preset limits of careers and responsibilities, position and duties within the family—are consequently set not by the expanding dynamics of a naturally evolving society, but by the constricting influence of a politically generated Confucianism, designed to limit the very gains that Singaporean Chinese women had made in the years since independence.

The earlier mention of Soka Gakkai, in origin a Buddhist-based Japanese 'New Religion' which grew very rapidly in Singapore in the late 1980s and 1990s, should alert us to the extent that Japan and Japanese Confucianism as well as the Chinese variety were used as models in Singapore. Japan was seen during the 1980s as a model not only of economic growth but also of social order—peaceful labour relations, politics dominated by a single party, and a hierarchical social structure (Stanley 1988). Here, however, a somewhat ahistorical and confused sociological approach prevailed, since the Confucian virtues that were extolled (obedience, service to the state, duties to parents) were rather more characteristic of pre-war Japan than of the contemporary situation, particularly since, if there is any one institution that is in a state of quiet crisis in Japan, it is the family. But then the emotions and quality of relationships within the family are not the primary concern of Singapore’s policy-makers: what they are concerned with is structural attributes. The modern Confucian family is understood as being led by a male, with responsibility for child socialization residing with the wife and with what is called in Singapore a ‘three-tiered family’ structure, in which parents, children, and grandparents comprise a single residential unit. New public housing units were built to accommodate this extended-family type, and priority in the allocation of public housing units was given to three-tier rather than nuclear families. Conversely, the ranking of single-person or single-parent households, especially those headed by a woman, was made so low as to make it extremely difficult for such
cases to gain access to public housing at all. So current legislation, while making
divorce possible and relatively simple, also makes it very difficult for women who
initiate divorce proceedings (as an increasing number do) subsequently to form a
viable economic or residential unit with their children or even with other women
in the same situation.
So today television advertisements promote the delights of having children,
pre-university students are taught the desirability of marriage, a Social Develop­
ment Unit has been set up to promote romantic meetings between unmarried
graduates, and very material incentives, particularly through the tax system (para­
doxically, given that real Confucianism teaches disdain for materialism), are given
to graduate couples who have more children. But then the whole policy is riddled
with ambiguities, and Confucianism in Singapore is fundamentally paradoxical in
its promotion of patriarchy and the hierarchical family on the one hand, while
leaving untouched the individualism and materialism that characterizes the actual
operation of the society. As Jenner has argued (1994), Confucius was in reality
someone who could not even accept the changes taking place in his own (some­
what precapitalist) times and who set his face towards the distant past as the model
for contemporary relationships. In fact the ‘plastic Confucianism’ (as Jenner aptly
calls the Singapore variety) invented by visiting experts is actually a highly selec­
tive culling of elements taken out of context and repackaged as an apparently
coherent set, while leaving the actual operation of capitalism (which the sage
would have abhorred) untouched. But then the family, not the economy, is the
target, and in theoretical terms correctly so, since there is no historical evidence
of any positive connection between Confucianism and rapid economic growth.

Patriarchy and the Narratives of Culture

Chinese society has long had profound difficulties with women and with women’s
sexuality. Women as wives and mothers is one thing, but powerful women, free
women, or women who begin to determine how reality is to be conceptualized is
another matter altogether. Despite legislative changes in marriage, divorce, and
custody laws throughout the Chinese-speaking world, practice has for the most part
been different from theory, especially in a cultural universe where the pull of the
past (often encapsulated in the idea of Confucianism) is so strong (Croll 1995).
The struggle, rather than the accommodation, between women and Confucianism
appears in many forms and is reflected perhaps most clearly in modern and con­
temporary Chinese fiction in which Hu Ying sees a narrative trajectory in the
following terms: ‘Metaphorically, then, the ability to sire sons is similar to the
ability to tell a story, the authority to narrate. Even more than the siring of sons,
the telling of stories confirms the patrilineage retrospectively...one might even say
that it is an act of paying homage to one’s forebears, an act of filial piety’ (Hu
What fiction (and film also) illustrates and should alert the anthropologist to is the construction of patriarchal narratives, stories which, through their emphases, selections, and suppressions, edit out the history of women. I have already suggested that the writing of Singapore history already does this and as such is not only ideological politically, but also in respect of gender (for example, see the recent history of Singapore edited by Chew and Lee 1991). Neo-Confucianism has the same effect: it imposes on reality a reading of history and of social causation which privileges patrilineality and places patriarchal narratives in the foreground.

Interestingly this observation needs to be placed in a rather special context: that of the virtual absence of either feminism or a movement for homosexual rights. There is a small women’s movement dominated by educated, upper-class women, which is not at all a voice for the average Singaporean female and which, despite its undoubted positive effect, has done nothing to challenge the political suppression of feminist discourse. One might suppose that patriarchy would be entirely compatible with male homosexuality, which would, after all, remove women from the arena entirely. But in Singapore this is not the case, and at the 1993 United Nations Human Rights conference in Vienna, Wong Kan Seng, the Singapore Foreign Minister publicly stated that ‘Homosexual rights are a Western issue and are not relevant to this conference’ (cited with commentary in Berry 1996: 159). The problem for Singaporeans is a complex one which appears to encompass the suppression of the concept of human rights, their replacement by ‘shared values’ (which emphatically do not include either women’s or homosexual rights) and a politics of regional difference—the West is Other/the East is Us—and the belief that this ‘East’ is unified by its adherence to ‘Asian’ values. The Foreign Minister’s statement is also interesting for its characteristic ignorance or suppression of alternative, non-statist histories, for there is ample evidence of extensive homosexuality in Chinese culture (Hinsch 1990). What it fundamentally seems to reflect, consistent with the ruling party’s deep puritanism, is a fear of sexuality, especially any ‘deviant’ form which challenges the order of the patriarchal family. Indeed, speaking of Singapore, two well-known local critics and writers argue that ‘women and all signs of the feminine, are by definition always and already antinational’ (Heng and Devan 1991: 356). State fatherhood and the empowerment of women are not compatible and, as in pre-war Japan, the Confucian family is the means to ensure the reproduction at the microlevel of the macro-level of the state itself. The discourse of Confucianism becomes the mechanism linking the political to the personal, but it also justifies a particular collectivist conception (or non-conception) of human rights (Berry 1996: 175).

All this points to levels of analysis not always attained in intellectual discourse within Singapore, with its positivist assumptions and modernist mentality, which has prevented, for example, debates about patriarchal familialism from occurring such as have occurred in Japan in the context of postmodernity or possibly even being conceivable (see, for example, Heine 1995), despite the fact that both are seen as being rooted in Confucianism. One of these levels involves the manage-
ment of the body and the constitution of the self. It was suggested above that Confucianism, at least in its Singapore version, promotes a particular view (or non-view) of the female body. Similarly it carries with it certain images of the self, not only those based on the achievement of righteousness and nobility, but of such virtues encapsulated entirely within a system of hierarchical relationships. They are not in fact abstract virtues at all but highly contextualized ones, set within the five fundamental relationships of ruler/subject, parent/child, older sibling/younger sibling, husband/wife and older friend/younger friend and traditionally underscored by the mourning grades and the extensive ramifications and extreme hierarchy of kin terms in classical Chinese. The ‘humanism’ of Confucianism is by no means universal but is set within a pattern of relationships in which male precedes female, older precedes younger, and ruler precedes subject. Significantly, Singapore’s policy-makers have never in any way drawn on the other major traditions of Chinese thought—Taoism for example, or the egalitarian philosophy of Mo Di, who lived only a century after Confucius.

What has emerged in modern Singapore, then, is a fascinating contemporary example of bio-politics in the setting of a rapidly developing Asian economy, one, moreover, which is attempting to practise and to keep alive ancient Chinese statecraft, historiography, and kinship at the end of the twentieth century. In this sense, despite its putative multiracialism, Singapore is a deeply Chinese polity, and many of the things that can be said about modernizing China—for example, the equation of race (zhongzhu) and culture (wenhua), the selective use of Western ideas of eugenics, the attempt to create authoritarian modernization or ‘capitalism with Chinese characteristics’, and the suppression of both democracy and feminism—can equally be said about Singapore, to the extent that it is no longer clear which state is borrowing ideas from which (Ong 1996).

If woman is the ‘primitive’—the bearer of both (non-political) wisdom and chaos—then her position is dangerous to the state, whether in China or in Singapore. As Rey Chow puts it:

If the conception of ‘woman’ was in the past mediated by women’s well-defined roles within the Chinese family, the modern promotion of the nation throws into instability all those traditional roles.

How are women’s sexuality, social function, economic function, contribution to cultural reproduction, and biological reproduction to be conceived of outside of the family and in terms of the nation? This is the historical juncture when, in what appeared to be a sudden ‘liberation’ of the traditional constraints on women’s identity, romantic love became a leading social issue.

For what is ‘romantic’ about romantic love is not sex, but the apparent freedom in which men and women could choose their sexual partners, in a way that differed from arranged marriage.

And since the traditional family system was paternalistic—that is, resting on the sexual stability, chastity, and fidelity of women while men were openly promiscuous or polygamous—the new freedom meant first and foremost the production of a new female sexuality. In other words, because the conception of the nation
sought to unify the culture regardless of sexual and class difference, it left open many questions as to how women's sexual identities, which were carefully differentiated and monitored within the kinship system, should be reformulated.

This is why, one could say, the Chinese woman suddenly became a newly discovered 'primitive'—a body adrift between the stagnant waters of the family, whose oppressiveness it seeks to escape, and the open sea of the nation, whose attention to 'woman' is only such that her sexual difference and history become primarily its support [i.e. become erased]. (Chow 1995: 67–8)

In Singapore we see an attempt to recover these traditional roles and to force even romantic love to submit to the requirements of the state in the interests of its own brand of control and its own version of Chinese capitalism. Indeed, Chow goes on to argue, in a passage that exactly fits Singapore if one substitutes the word ‘capitalism’ for ‘communism’ and the phrase ‘post-1983 developments’ for ‘cultural revolution’ (1993 being the year in which Lee announced his new eugenics policy in the light of falling graduate birth rates):

In the aftermath of the cultural revolution, the affirmation of traditional family values comes as an attempt to mask the lack created by the bankruptcy of communism and nationalism, even though nationalism may persist by reinscribing itself in traditional forms. The main point is that the central roles played by the family and village community are here signs of the dismantling of the modernist revolution from 'family' to 'nation'. 'Woman' is now caught between the bankruptcy of nationalism and communism, in which the sexes are 'equal' and women's problems do not exist, and the resurgence of older patriarchal forms of community, in which female sexuality is strictly managed for purposes of kinship reproduction. (Ibid.: 70, original emphasis)

This is not only true of Chinese societies (witness the pro-family and pro-capitalist rhetoric of the New Right in Europe and the Moral Majority in the United States), but it does indicate an important sociological and theoretical point: that modernity unleashes forces that it itself cannot fully comprehend, which, once they become visible, are managed by treating them as the Other within, as stigmatized and marginalized outsiders to the 'real' processes and purposes of the masculine state—women, ethnic and sexual minorities, artists, the handicapped, all who threaten order not through what they do but through what they are (see especially Bauman 1995: 143–8), who threaten degeneracy by their very being. They are, as it were, ontologically unsound unless co-opted and reincorporated into the patriarchal state. When Deng Xiaoping sends a delegation to Singapore (as he did in 1993) to study its state capitalism and state Confucianism, something interesting is clearly happening, especially when it is conceded that this new Confucianism, when actually explored historically, is, if not the product of the Jesuits in China, at least in part the brainchild of such Western scholars as Peter Berger and Herman Kahn (Dirlik 1996).
Singapore represents one of the many strategies of nationalism, and particularly of cultural nationalism, in the modern world, and is an interesting variation on the issues of public culture and state hegemony. But while Gellner, in his major work on nationalism (1983), argued that nation-building must be forward-looking in nature, Singapore demonstrates the co-existence of forward-lookingness in technology and economy and a decidedly backward-looking stance in many aspects of social policy. In trying to overcome ethnicity as primordial sentiments and to replace it with 'corporatism' and a notion of shared values, social policy has attempted to resurrect a patriarchal and largely mythical version of the Chinese past and to create an identity out of a reinvented Confucianism (Chun 1996) and a dash of sociobiology. What is particularly revealing about recent Singapore cultural discourse is that as element after element of policy was seen not to work (only 17.8% of students enrolled for Confucian ethics, less than the number enrolled for Bible Knowledge, during the decade of moral education in schools; there was fierce opposition from many quarters to the incentives for graduate women; the National Ideology concept was received with less than total enthusiasm) and as its electoral base was slowly but surely eroding, the strategies changed, but not the basic theme. Quietly the new Confucianism has been maintained; what is significant is the way in which it has been refocused from the realm of public values to private ones, from politics to patriarchy. But patriarchy proves to be politics by other means, the point at which the politics of gender, culture, history, and the state finally come together.

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I have long been interested in mixed-faith relationships but only became actively involved in 1987 after something that took me by surprise. I organized a series of discussion evenings for members of my congregation in Maidenhead who faced difficult personal issues: bereavement, divorce, the needs of elderly parents, problems with teenage children, and intermarriage. They each attracted a good number of participants—except the latter, which had an enormous attendance, far beyond my expectations and including people from far away who were not members but had heard of the event. It was clear that this was a topic that was not being tackled and was crying out for attention. Since then I have organized seminars throughout the country and met individually with several hundred couples.

One indication of the complexity of the issue is finding the best term to describe it. The expression 'mixed-faith marriages' is used in this paper as a convenient shorthand which will be intelligible to most people. However, it contains two flaws. It conceals the fact that a significant number of couples are not married but are living together, in a fully committed and fully consummated relationship, but not technically as man and wife. This is a phenomenon affecting society at large and includes many same-faith couples, but it often applies particularly to mixed-faith ones. Lack of parental approval and unresolved question marks in the couple’s own minds over the type of wedding mean that many mixed-faith couples prefer to sidestep these problems by avoiding an official marriage ceremony. As Jenny (a Catholic) put it, 'There's a sort of unwritten rule: so long
as my dad can tell the rest of the family I'm not married, he will put up with Malik and I sharing a flat. If he had to say I was married to a Muslim, then life would be impossible.' Some couples are happy to go along with this arrangement, although others are bothered by it. Gerald senses the dilemma acutely: 'Sometimes I feel as if I am living in sin, but for the time being I reckon it would be a greater sin to outrage the family by being the first member to get married in a registry office rather than a synagogue.'

The other disadvantage with the term 'mixed-faith marriages' is that not all of the unions are mixed-faith ones. Some of them are single-faith, in the sense that one partner has a faith and the other does not. In the case of the latter it may be that they were brought up in a religious tradition which they subsequently repudiated. Alternatively, they may never have received any religious orientation. The forms which hospital patients have to fill in on being admitted often ask their person's religion, but a high percentage leave it blank or simply put 'nothing'. They are not lapsed Anglican or former Jews or ex-Catholic, but simply nothing, never having been given a faith and never having taken one up of their own accord. There are those who find this hard to comprehend: 'But you must be something,' Jill, a regular church-goer, remembers telling Harry when they first met. He was not. In an age of secularism there are many who are second- or third-generation 'nothings'. This can sometimes be an advantage, leaving the religious partners free to practise their own faith and introduce it in the home. However, although they may not have the problem of religious competition, religious indifference or resentment can be equally divisive. The non-religious partners may consider domestic rituals and family gatherings at festivals to be an intrusion and may resist any attempts to introduce them or to 'indoctrinate' the children.

The difficulty is that most other terms are even more inappropriate. 'Mixed relationships' may avoid the theological and matrimonial problem but could be applied to other groupings, such as mixed-class or mixed-race. They too face many challenges, but as they can often involve people of the same faith, they must be considered a different category. The term also carries the connotation of mixed-up and confused, which would be unfair to a large percentage of couples. 'Marrying out' is also an inappropriate phrase because, as will be seen below, many individuals do not feel that they are jettisoning their own religious identity by marrying someone of a different faith. The religious authorities may view it that way, but their perspective does not always match the reality of what is happening in people's lives. 'I hate that term,' said Rachel; 'it is so negative. It implies that marrying out is giving up. Falling in love with Christopher meant I loved him, not that I suddenly hated my religion.' Moreover, in cases where one partner does not have a faith but feels happy to go along with the other person's beliefs and practices they vehemently object to the term, as does Helen: 'It's not a matter of Harvey marrying out, but of me marrying in!'

The expression 'intermarriage' has the advantage of being short and slipping easily off the tongue but is too imprecise. 'Exogamy' is more accurate but tends
to send people scuttling for a dictionary. ‘Cross-cultural marriage’ draws attention to the fact that it is often the cultural expression of beliefs rather than the beliefs themselves that may be problematic. Thus Trudy, a Methodist, values the command to honour one’s parents as much as her Jewish husband David. However, she finds it annoying that he feels obliged to ring his mother every day, whereas she speaks to her mother once a week. Still, ‘cross-cultural marriage’ can also refer to a Catholic Bolivian peasant married to a Catholic Austrian countess and does not necessarily involve religious differences. For the purposes of this paper, therefore, ‘mixed-faith marriages’ is the preferred, albeit imperfect, term of reference. Others will be used occasionally, purely for the sake of variation. The only situations specifically excluded are where one partner has converted to the faith of the other, in which case they are now in a same-faith marriage.

Of course, it could be argued that all marriages are mixed-faith ones. Even when people share the same religion, they may have different images of God, different ways of praying, different childhood experiences that influence the rest of their lives. The personality of a local priest during one’s teens—sensitive or repressive, stimulating or soporific—can radically affect one’s outlook and lead partners in later life to be amazed to hear each other’s understanding of the same faith. Even for those with an entirely similar religious background, marriage can present some formidable challenges. The current divorce rate in Britain—one in three of all marriages—includes a high percentage of same-faith marriages and shows how precarious marriage can be today. There is no suggestion that same-faith marriages are automatically successful and always full of bliss and harmony.

Why is it particularly an issue now? Mixed-faith marriages have always existed and can be found throughout the world, but in modern Britain they present a particularly striking, and as yet uncharted, phenomenon. Until 1945, London was the centre of a vast empire, at whose pinnacle was the head of the Church of England and whose subjects included nearly all the Hindus in the world, all the Sikhs, a large proportion of the Muslims, and enormous numbers of Buddhists. Since then the empire has disappeared, but its former citizens have mingled extensively, many of them migrating to England. This has had a dramatic effect on the religious landscape:

Within living memory every religion tended to be restricted to specific parts of the world. If one wished to see Buddhism at first hand it was necessary to travel to Ceylon or Japan. Now the Chiswick Vihara has some twenty thousand people on its mailing list, and saffron-robed monks walk the Sussex lanes or the streets of Wolverhampton. A Japanese peace pagoda rises on a lakeside in Milton Keynes and another is to tower above the suburbs of London. Muslims lived, then, in Arabia over-spilling into North Africa, and eastwards into Persia and India. Now among Nash’s terraces surrounding Regent’s Park the great dome of a splendid mosque symbolizes the presence of nearly a million Muslims in the United Kingdom. Hindus were properly the citizens of the Indian Empire. Now Leicester has the largest Hindu community, after Durban. Outside India; and Birmingham and Wolverhampton, Manchester and Leeds, Coventry and Bristol, as well as dozens
of much smaller towns, have flourishing temples.... Sikhs, too, have left their ancestral homes in north-west India.... Some two hundred thousand of these ‘disciples’ are now settled in Britain.... Nor should we forget the Chinese ‘diaspora’ scattered the length and breadth of these islands.... There are, too, small communities of Jains, of Zoroastrians, and of Bahais...[and in addition] there are 335,000 Jews living in the UK. (Anglican Consultative Council 1988: 4)

Not only is the UK a multi-faith society, but it has been one for over forty years. The children (and in many cases grandchildren) of those religious immigrants have been born in Britain and have grown up in the same roads, nurseries, schools, sports clubs, and jobs as other citizens. Certain voluntary ghettos may exist—Jewish areas, Hindu quarters, Muslim parts—but many have chosen to mix outside these domains or have been forced by economic circumstances to do so. They live and work alongside members of other faiths. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that physical proximity has led to social contact and has quickly developed into sexual attraction and emotional bonds. The sheer humanity of each other has broken through the religious barriers. Jack spoke for thousands of other couples when he said ‘When I met Varda for the first time, I didn’t think “Gosh, what a nice Hindu”; I thought, “Gosh, what a nice person she is.”’ What is surprising is that so many people—be it parents, priests, rabbis, or imams—have been caught off-guard by the explosion in such relationships. In a multi-religious country such as Britain today mixed-faith marriages are inevitable. They are the price of an open society in which pluralism and tolerance are regarded as virtues. Some will regard it as too high a price to pay and seek to retreat behind ghetto walls and isolate themselves. Many will attempt to find a middle path, participating in society at large, but maintaining distinctive family lifestyles, including marriage patterns. Their success rate, however, is subject to so many factors over which they have no control that it cannot be taken for granted. Others will be indifferent to the new trend and consider it the sign of a mature society that can accommodate diversity on both sides of the front doormat.

The exact number of mixed-faith marriages is impossible to quantify, as marriage licences do not specify the religion of the partners. One group that has begun to collate information is British Jewry, which reports a 44 per cent rate of outmarriage, while among American Jewry it stands at 52 per cent. The Catholic Church in Britain estimates that 65 per cent of weddings under their auspices involve a Catholic marrying a non-Catholic (Romain 1996). Why have mixed-faith marriages increased now and become such a pressing issue? The answer can be divided into four overall headings: changes within the wider society, developments within the religious communities themselves, dynamics within the family, and chance.

Changes within the wider society are certainly the most crucial reason for the growth in mixed-faith marriages, although they are still only part of the answer. Most important of all is the transformation of society from one that was strictly divided into groups and which judged people by the category to which they belonged to a society that valued the principles of egalitarianism and treated people
as individuals. ‘What do you do?’ has superseded ‘What do you believe?’ as the key question when meeting someone new, particularly of the opposite sex. As Rabbi Alexander Schindler put it pithily, ‘We live in an open society, and inter-marriage is the sting which comes to us in the honey of our freedom.’

The rise of tolerance led to a decline in the sense of public disgrace that had helped prevent many would-be mixed-faith marriages occurring. Hetty, now in her seventies, well remembers the non-Jewish boyfriend she loved and lost in her youth because both sets of parents refused to allow the match to proceed. ‘It simply wasn’t the done thing. It is hard to say who was more appalled—his father or my father—but they were both agreed that it had to stop.’ Her own experience did not stop her expressing concern when her grandson got his way and married out of the faith, although she admits that part of her felt very envious at the freedom he has that she did not. ‘Everything has changed now—and mixed marriages hardly seem to matter. It was so different in my day.’ Moreover, the religious pluralism that now exists in Britain, with many a church occupying the same road as a mosque or synagogue, has helped make faith appear to lack objective truth in the eyes of many and to be a subjective matter; in effect, religious viewpoints have lost much of their role as a criterion for public judgements. If an individual conforms to them or deviates from them—be it a Catholic who has an abortion or a Muslim who enjoys a pint of beer or a Sikh who intermarries—it is of no concern to society at large and does not affect that person’s standing in it.

At the same time, the concept of marriage has also undergone a radical change. For many, it is no longer a vehicle for transmitting family property rights, nor a means of perpetuating religious traditions. It is also no longer the union of two families, its arrangement not being the prerogative of family heads, with the actual bride and groom being incidental players. Instead it is a private matter for the couple concerned, with the family as bystanders. Compatibility is not only judged by the two partners, but is seen as being dependent on their feelings for each other. Love is the determining factor. When Rashid told his father, ‘I am in love with someone non-Muslim’, it was the first half of that sentence that was important to him, not the second half. When making a decision about their future together, his emotions took precedence over his background and convinced him that the marriage should go ahead. ‘It’s Pam that counts,’ he said, ‘not her religion.’

The social interchange between the faiths is not limited to children meeting in school but happens in a wide range of contexts: sports, political groups, cultural activities, social clubs, special interest societies. The result is that those who meet there find that what they have in common is often of much greater importance—at least at that stage in their lives—than what divides them. As Pete (lapsed Church of Scotland) said about his Jewish fiancée: ‘All I knew about Linda was that she was a brilliant chess-player. When we talked it was about chess or the people we knew. It never occurred to me to ask if she prayed and who to. It was months before I found out she was Jewish.’ The workplace is another major source of mating, and although members of different faiths have long co-existed side by side, changes in the social climate have meant that relationships have developed beyond
the merely collegial. The stereotype of the Jewish doctor who marries a Christian nurse represents not only the opportunities presented by the medical profession, but stands for men and women of all occupations who find that daily contact and common purpose create a bond that they wish to maintain for the rest of their lives.

In fact the points of contact very often go much deeper than hobbies but stem from the very similar upbringing individuals from different faiths can have. If their parents occupy the same socio-economic bracket and have similar standards of behaviour, their offspring can find that their journey through childhood and the teenage years has followed an almost identical path despite the religious differences. ‘Our homes were both loving, middle-class, relatively prosperous, with a lot of importance attached to the arts, but also a strong concern for social issues,’ said Clive, ‘and the fact that one of them was Christian and the other Hindu was almost an extra detail that got lost in the general mix.’ His wife nodded vehemently and added, ‘Yes, of course we were aware of that distinction—but it was the shared sense of values and goals that drew us together.’

The tolerant attitude society has evinced towards minority groups, including religious minorities, has led to members of those groups feeling more at ease in their relations with the majority culture and less inclined to live only in parts of the country in which they are surrounded by members of the same faith community. The result is that daily life becomes increasingly assimilated for them and their children. Several years later, when those parents are confronted by their offspring announcing their engagement to a partner of a different faith, they may feel a sense of regret but in the cold light of their own decisions they cannot be surprised.

Changes in society may be crucial, but equally important are developments within the religious communities themselves. Changes in society only become relevant when they are matched by a response from within the religious groups, and particularly when those groups lose the desire for cohesion or when their commitment to the future weakens.

The collapse in the religious identity of many households has been a key factor in this process. In many ways Jenny’s story is typical and speaks for a whole generation who feel that they have been religiously orphaned and given no clear sense of direction, or even roots to cling on to:

I know I am Church of England—because that’s what it says on my baptism certificate, which I got when I was a few weeks old. But as I was never taken to church or Sunday school after that, I feel it doesn’t really mean much. It’s like saying I am a Lancashire girl because I was born in Bolton—okay, it’s true, but so what? Anyway, I am not an atheist—because I do believe in a God—but I don’t really know in what way or how to express it in a religious sense. I suppose it means being moral—and that’s fine; but I don’t have any real understanding of rituals or festivals to give it a religious setting. And I suppose that would not have bothered me too much—a shame, but not a problem—unless there had been all that fuss over Len being Jewish and not wanting to get married in church. Sud-
denly my family was up in arms—I would be the first one not to have a church ceremony. I was stunned at first. Then I got furious. How dare they expect me to keep up a tradition they’d never bothered to pass on. If they had given me absolutely no reason for marrying in, why shouldn’t I marry out?

For his part, Len provided a mirror image, coming from a family that was more Jewish in name than in deed:

It was a fairly typical story. We observed the High Holy Days every year but did precious little in-between. I was Jewish once a year! True, my mother wouldn’t have pork in the house, but there was no objection to eating it in restaurants or at friends’ homes. That struck me as having double standards, but what was worse was the whole business of driving to synagogue when it is supposed to be forbidden [on festivals and sabbaths] and then parking round the corner and pretending we had walked there. I remember feeling that was awful—especially when the point of going to services was to pray to God and to be open and sincere, and I was determined that when I grew up I would either do it properly or not at all. With hindsight I guess it was inevitable that with that sort of background it was bound to be 'not at all'. Meeting Jenny didn’t really drag me away from my Judaism because it was never really there in the first place. And it wasn’t just my family. Most of my friends came from similar situations. What surprises me now is not that so many have married non-Jews like I have, but that some have still married Jews. It certainly wasn’t for religious reasons.

The change in family dynamics is another factor in the rise of mixed-faith marriages. This is particularly evident with regard to those who have been divorced and who are the most likely to marry out of the faith. In their case, there are even more reasons for doing so: first, the hostility against their former partner may be transferred to anything which symbolized them—be it their family, their friends, their favourite food (even though it could have been enjoyed by both of them), and their religion (even though they both shared the same faith). As Mike put it, ‘I know that I am as Jewish as Carol, my ex, is—so it wasn’t “her thing”—but somehow Jewish food and family and festivals is all tied up with her in my mind and I don’t want any of it any more.’ Secondly, the break in the marriage is often accompanied by a break with the mutual friends the couple once had. Both seek out new social circles, and the ones where they are less likely to meet each other or bump into old acquaintances will tend to be general leisure groups, evening classes, sports clubs, and singles groups in which there is no common religious denomination. Thirdly, the sale of the marital home and the search for cheaper property by one or both partners may lead either of them to move out of the area and to settle in a totally new environment where there may not be many members of their own faith community. Fourthly, it is much harder to establish a new social life once a person has left the age of youth clubs and college societies, and when most of one’s friends are single too and are a source of introduction to new faces. Having to look for a partner is difficult enough for
any divorcee, even if they are part of the religious and cultural majority. When they are part of a religious minority, the pool of eligible partners is considerably constricted. By deciding to enter a mixed-faith relationship, one is expanding one’s horizon enormously and increasing one’s prospects of success. As Ali said succinctly, ‘For every Muslim woman I might meet, there are thirty non-Muslims. It would be daft to limit my options so severely.’

A fifth reason is that many divorcees feel that they played by the rules the first time by marrying within the faith, but it did not work and so are free to change the rules next time round. Janice spoke for countless others of all faiths when she said: ‘I did everything by the book when I was married and it all ended in tears. Being both Jewish didn’t stop us tearing each other to bits. So maybe now I’ll have better luck with someone out of the faith—it certainly can’t be any worse.’ Henry, who met his wife in the church bell-ringing group, felt similarly: ‘Although I entered my first marriage willingly, I was conscious that it was what everyone else in the family wanted—right sort of girl and all that—and what I had been groomed for. Next time I marry, it’ll be purely up to me. It’s my turn now.’ A sixth cause is that divorcees have been living away from the parental home for several years and are used to running their own lives. They are therefore older and more independent than those marrying for the first time, who may still be living with their parents or be more subject to their influence. The family pressures to marry within the faith are considerably lessened, and even if they still do exist, divorcees feel more able to resist them. Mary relates how her parents put an end to a serious relationship with a non-Catholic before she married her Catholic ex-husband: ‘Now I don’t think they’d dare say anything, and even if they did they would get short shift from me.’ A seventh reason lies with the religious communities themselves, who sometimes fail to provide the support that is needed by divorcees and newly created single-parent families. ‘It was awful,’ said Susie, ‘one moment I was really involved in synagogue life, the next I was social outcast number one.’

There is also a fourth aspect to the rise in intermarriage that is not so easy to analyze but must be mentioned—chance. There are many individuals who did not enter a mixed-faith marriage for any of the numerous reasons listed above, but because ‘it just happened that way’. For many in this position, marrying out of the faith was not just unintentional, it also went against their own principles. ‘Whenever discussions came up about intermarriage, it was always me who said how wrong it was’, recalls Tracy. Her attitude was echoed by many others, including Rosalind, who said: ‘This may sound daft, but even though I am in a mixed-faith marriage, and a very happy one at that, I still feel it’s better not to have them. Okay, our marriage works marvellously, and I hope it will continue this way for the rest of my life, but I think the potential problems are enormous. So I would still counsel people against it in principle.’ This disapproval of the very course that they themselves had taken had ramifications for their hopes for their children. Stuart’s comments typified those of many: ‘I may have married out
of the faith, but however hypocritical this may seem, I still want my children to marry within the faith. I just think it’s better that way for all the usual reasons.’

What if the parents are hostile? Among the various strategies they adopt in trying to separate the newly engaged couples are:

1. preventing them meeting again, whether by forbidding them verbally or by sending them abroad (such as to visit relatives in India, or to work on a kibbutz in Israel);
2. creating obstacles (‘you can’t marry till you buy a house’, hoping that by the time they can afford one the relationship will have cooled; or ‘you must bring her to synagogue/the gurdwara’, hoping the experience will deter the other partner);
3. criticizing the other person’s suitability (which can range from ‘he’s not good enough for you’ to ‘he’s too good for you’);
4. instilling a sense of guilt (‘it will kill your grandfather if we tell him’; ‘all our sacrifices for you seem in vain’; ‘two thousand years of tradition will cease because of you’);
5. giving direct threats (‘she will never step inside this house’; ‘you’ll be cut out of the will’; ‘we won’t come to the wedding’);
6. predicting a terrible future (‘it can’t possibly work’; ‘he won’t treat you the way you expect’; ‘her family will take over and dominate your home’);
7. enlisting others to dissuade the person (usually relatives or the minister, although sometimes trying to get friends ‘to make him see sense’ and sometimes contacting the other parents to see if they are potential allies).

It is noticeable that these and many other strategies are employed as much by parents who have little religious involvement as by those who are staunchly traditional. Many of their objections are triggered by an emotional reaction rather than a concern for theology. One is a sense of rejection: that by marrying ‘somebody different from us’ their child is turning his or her back on them, which is perceived as a slap in the face. Another is the worry that the new partner will cause their son or daughter to become alienated from them. As Annie said, ‘I’m sure my daughter-in-law will drag my son away from us. I can feel it in my bones.’ There is also a sense of guilt at ‘where did we go wrong’ and a deep sense of failure that all the time and effort they put into their child’s upbringing has been wasted. For some parents there is anger that they are being shamed: ‘How can my son do this to me when he knows I’ll never be able to show my face in church again’, said one distraught mother. It begs the question of whether she really is responsible for her son’s choice of marriage partner and whether it is right that fellow congregants should spurn her rather than support her. Other parents are bothered more at the thought of having grandchildren of a different faith to them. This can either be because they fear a lack of relationship—‘they’ll think of us as strangers’—or because they feel that their family line will now come to an end and that they will lose their stake in the future.

Anguish and arguments may well precede many marriages, but ultimately an increasing number of today’s parents find not only that they have little control over their children’s paths, but also that they are not prepared to cut off all contact in
the name of tradition. This is true not only of religiously lapsed parents, but also of those who are still committed. It reflects two social factors. First, the tendency to have smaller families than in previous generations means that casting out a child is a much harder step; losing one child out of eight is sad, but losing one out of two is unbearable. Secondly, the fact that children marry at an older age and have often left home before marrying gives them an independence that lessens the impact of parental threats of dissociation. Love-struck seventeen-year-olds can have their pocket-money stopped and be sent to their room; a twenty-seven-year-old living in a semi twenty miles away, i.e., used to making decisions in every other aspect of life, will do so in the question of marriage too. Once all parental attempts to postpone the relationship have failed (or have not even been implemented for fear of being counter-productive), reluctant acceptance is the general reaction. In this respect, parents are the mirror image of their children, who in choosing their partner also put feelings before faith.

Parents are not the only source of contention. Grandparents often have stronger religious views than the parents of the couple—particularly among the minority faiths, as they are less assimilated in wider society. In certain families, it is their opinion that carries greater weight. In many instances they can take a divergent view from the parents, objecting when the latter are accepting, or vice versa. Jane’s parents did not mind too much when she married a non-Catholic, but her grandmother was desperately upset, refused to attend the wedding and has not yet seen her two-year-old grandson. Ross was very taken aback that his grandparents criticized him over his non-Jewish fiancée: ‘I was used to arguing with my parents—that was normal—but I was always very close to my granddad and ma. When they turned on me, that really hurt.’ At other times, it is the grandparents who can have a healing role, ‘knocking sense’ into parents and children and helping both sides to keep everything in perspective and not forget the bonds of affection that unite them. This is also true of siblings. Being of the same generation as the person marrying out of the faith, they are well aware of the social currents that have led to the relationship, yet also appreciate the upset that the parents feel. Often they occupy the role of mediators, urging each party to understand the position of the other and even acting as go-betweens, negotiating terms by which ‘mum and dad will invite Mike’s fiancée round and he will talk to her about having the wedding in a registry office rather than in church’. In other cases, though, brothers and sisters can be equally disapproving, whether it is because they object to mixed-faith marriages in principle or because they are aware of the distress caused to their parents by it. When Bakhshish broke off relations with his parents, he kept contact with his siblings. Abdul lost his whole family. His brother and sister were still living at home when he married a non-Muslim, whereupon his parents declared him persona non grata and forbade them to have any further contact with him.

As for day-to-day relations between the couple themselves, food is often bound up with religious traditions and can necessitate pre-planning of a sort not to be found in any cookbook. Ahmed does not insist that Jane buys halal meat, but he
has asked her not to cook pork for him, and so sometimes he has a cheese
omelette for breakfast while she enjoys bacon and eggs. Susan takes a different
view and in deference to her Jewish husband does not have pork in the house at
all, although she does relish having veal and ham pie when she is out with friends.
Frank’s wife goes even further and has made an effort to master the intricacies of
kosher food, such as not mixing meat and dairy products in the same meal: ‘Get­
ting used to making sure that, for instance, we had fruit salad after our Sunday
roast and not chocolate mousse was a bit of a headache at first, but it came with
time. I decided at the start of our marriage that if it means a lot to him, it should
do to me too.’

Her mother, by contrast, is less certain and is worried that she is not eating
properly because of the special regulations. She might be even more concerned
if she were Kate’s mother, as Kate’s Muslim husband Yaqub tries to observe the
laws of Ramadan. This entails fasting during the day and only eating food at night
throughout that month. Initially Kate objected on the grounds that he virtually
never went to the mosque so that it seemed ridiculous to ‘suddenly get religious
one month in the year, especially when it causes a lot of inconvenience for me’.
The result was lengthy discussions about why Ramadan was special for Yaqub and
why keeping it but ignoring other customs made sense to him, even if it did not
appear reasonable to her. The same could be said of many members of other
faiths, whose selection of what to observe and what not to observe may seem
arbitrary, even hypocritical, to their partners, but has an internal logic for them and
relates more to the customs of their home rather than the rules of their scriptures.
In the end, Kate came to understand Yaqub’s perspective and a compromise was
struck whereby he could eat when he liked during Ramadan, although he was
responsible for providing his own meals.

Even greater delicacy is required for religious occasions inside the home.
Even the most religiously lapsed person is caught up in some of the major ‘family
festivals’ such as Christmas or Passover, either because of their own warm associ­
ations with the festivals or because family expectations demand that they be
involved. Such times can prove to be enjoyable experiences for the other partner,
a chance to share religious traditions and to meet the extended family. However,
they can also be the source of problems. When Donald brought home a small
Christmas tree in mid-December, he saw it as a pretty decoration for the front
living-room, whereas his Muslim wife saw it as a declaration of religious war.
Donald was stunned: ‘She knows I never go to church; I thought she realized that
for me Christmas isn’t about Jesus and worshipping the Saviour, it’s about family
and giving presents.’ After a two-hour heart-to-heart conversation his wife began
to understand and consented to keep the tree, but it was typical of the sorts of
assumption that mixed-faith couples cannot take for granted about each other.
Some Jewish partners can also feel very ambivalent about Christmas, celebration
of which may have been portrayed by their parents as ‘selling out’ to Christianity
when they were children. Having holly and Christmas decorations in the home can
seem unnatural or even an act of betrayal, however much it is interpreted by the
other partner as merely a season of goodwill without any theological overtones. ‘Every year when my husband gave me a Christmas present,’ said Susie, ‘part of me felt it was like a bribe, egging me on to convert to Christianity. Rationally, I know that’s nuts, but that’s how I felt and it spoilt things.’ Often the solution was a *quid pro quo* deal, with the house having both a Christmas tree and a *menorah* (a nine-branched candelabrum that is used to celebrate the festival of Hanukkah, which occurs around the same time). A Hindu-Christian couple struck a similar bargain: she could have her Diwali lamps if he could have his mistletoe.

Mixed-faith sex is often considered a source of attraction—the lure of the forbidden—rather than a reason for discontent, but it can also have problematic aspects if the partners have conflicting attitudes to what happens in bed because of their religious backgrounds. Camilla describes herself as a nominal Catholic but is still strongly influenced by her upbringing, particularly the church’s teachings against contraception, even though she does not necessarily endorse them. She and her Sikh husband want to have children, but not yet, and she has no objections to the idea of family planning. However, she still feels that she does not want to be the one taking the contraceptives and so will not go on the pill, preferring her husband to wear a protective—to which he objects because he says intercourse does not feel as good when he is wearing one. The matter has now been resolved, but at one point it led to a lot of tension, culminating in a furious row, with her husband declaring ‘I’m going to bed with you, not the Pope!’ Kate’s problem with Yaqub related to the festival of Ramadan again. For them sex had never been just for night-time and in bed but ‘whenever the mood took us—even in the middle of breakfast’. She received a shock, therefore, when he did not respond to her daytime advances and told her that not only was food forbidden in the day during Ramadan, but also sexual relations (although they are permitted at night). ‘I must admit I thought that was a bit nutty’, she complained, ‘but what upset me much more was that he didn’t tell me beforehand or even ask if I minded. Of course, I respect his religion, but when it affects me I think I should be consulted.’

In these and many other points of tension, there is often an overlap between religious teachings and cultural traditions. This is not surprising, particularly among minority faiths who have a strong ethnic element to family and communal life. For them, there is little distinction between specifically religious rituals and more general activities, such as eating habits, sexual mores, and family dynamics. They are all part of ‘the way we do things’. It is common, therefore, for even those do not consider themselves religious to still be strongly attached to the cultural aspects of their heritage. The problem occurs when the other partner fails to appreciate that being lapsed religiously does not necessarily mean being lapsed culturally. Jilly still finds it strange that her pork-loving Jewish husband still insists on taking friends out to a Jewish restaurant because he adores the food there. Vic knows his lapsed Catholic wife has a wonderful sense of humour but cannot understand her blind spot over jokes about the sex life of the Pope.

Family relationships are an important area for these cultural norms. Jilly sees her parents once a month and speaks to them two or three times on the phone in-
between. She regards this as normal and certainly sufficient to fulfill her Christian
duty to honor her parents. She finds it highly perplexing that her Jewish husband
pops into his parents almost every other day as well as insisting that they both go
there on Sunday afternoons. The fact that the phone never seems to stop going
with his brothers and sisters, aunts and uncles ringing up drives her to exasper­
ation: 'I have nothing against a single one of them—they're all lovely people—but
I find this closeness pretty suffocating.' In other instances, the problem lay with
the family's expectations of the husband-wife relationship. Nair tells how her
Church of England husband incurred her parents' displeasure because 'he would
automatically light my cigarette or open the car door for me—something that
Muslim men don't do and was really frowned upon'.

The decision-making process in mixed-faith households can vary enormously.
Some couples plan in advance for as many contingencies as possible; others only
discuss issues when they arise. The former tends to be a much more successful
method, examining topics calmly and without pressure, whereas the latter means
debating issues in the heat of a crisis and needing to make a quick decision.
Sometimes it is the wife who has the upper hand, simply because she is the one
who is largely responsible for cooking or domestic rituals or the nurture of young
children. As Nair said, 'I told my husband that as a Muslim I wouldn't touch pig
meat, so if he wanted pork chops he would have to cook them himself. The result
is he doesn't!' However, there are two more important factors. The first is that
much depends on who has the stronger personality. That person will often get
their way in religious matters, just as they do in other areas, such as choosing
where to go on holiday or which house to buy. The second is that often one
partner takes religious traditions more seriously than the other, and so decisions
tend to be left to them, in the same way that one partner is keener on gardening
or is better at doing the domestic accounts and so naturally takes charge of them.
The art of compromise is a valuable skill in most marriages, but especially in
mixed-faith ones. This can involve some painful choices, giving up certain habits
and letting go of some expectations in return for one's partner also relinquishing
some of their preconceptions. Yet it is not just a matter of the partners negating
their traditions, but also, and more positively, of both of them adding new dimen­
sions to their life and permitting each other to continue those aspects of their
heritage that each considers fundamental to their identity.

In this respect there can be a 'learning curve' that takes some time to master.
Indeed, many couples find that they experience several different stages: first there
is an initial honeymoon period, albeit punctuated by an occasional hiccup ('you
never told me that'). After the euphoria has lessened, this is followed by period
of some irritation and even hostility when differing attitudes and unfulfilled
expectations simmer over into rows. Providing these difficulties are tackled
sensitively, this leads to a time of readjustment and adaptation, with the couple
eventually becoming bi-cultural and agreeing what to celebrate together, what both
should ignore, and when to 'go off and do our own thing every now and then'.
Yet what might have been a good compromise, or even a bit of a fudge, for the couple themselves does not always suffice when it comes to making decisions for a third party. The issue is further complicated by the fact that many people who describe themselves as lapsed find that their religious traditions become more important to them when they have children. This is partly because they automatically turn to the church/mosque/synagogue for major life-cycle events such as baby blessings or initiation rites, and partly because they feel a deep-seated instinct to pass on to their child the traditions in which they themselves grew up, however vaguely, even though they veered away from them later. The couples that seem to manage the best are generally those who have talked over the issues before they were married and have planned ahead. In this way, they both know where the other stands, what they feel is important, where they are willing to compromise and how they can best avoid sudden crises or running sores. They are also better able to present a joint front to relatives who may seek to exert pressure to ensure that ‘the grandchildren are brought up our way and not the other way’.

As for the religious upbringing of children, two separate issues are involved, which are often confused but which couples find much more helpful if they keep separate. One is the religious identity of children. This is the way in which they perceive themselves, and also how others label them. It is the response given to questions they will meet in all stages of life, ranging from nursery-school friends (‘I’m Christian. What are you?’) to forms to be filled out if they enter hospital with the box that says ‘Religion of patient’. The second aspect is their religious education. This is the religious knowledge they acquire, whether picked up from parents and other relatives or taught at religion school. The distinction between the two is crucial, because religious identity is a matter of what children believe in, while religious education is what they know about. Moreover the two need not necessarily be the same, and children can be brought up identifying with one faith yet exposed to the traditions of others. This can be particularly important for mixed-faith families where flexibility and openness can be essential requirements for their religious policy vis-à-vis the children. As a result there are several different options that are available to parents, depending on what they feel is the best course of action. Each one has its own advantages and disadvantages:

1. *Children having a single religious identity, with religious education in that faith only.* This enables the children to know exactly where they stand and gives them a firm sense of direction. However, unless there is enormous sensitivity to the partner whose faith is not being followed, he or she may feel marginalized and cut off from the children, while that person’s family may also feel estranged.

2. *Children having a single religious identity, but with religious education in both faiths.* This allows the children to know who they are religiously, yet be heir to the traditions of both parents. A possible problem is that it can puzzle those children who are given one identity yet decide they prefer the other faith.
3. **Children having a dual religious identity, but with religious education in both faiths.** This results in the children sharing fully both traditions, but while some children accept a dual identity as natural, it can confuse those who want to know, 'but which one am I really?'

4. **Children having a joint religious identity, with religious education in the syncretized faith.** This treats the two faiths as one and mixes together the customs and values. This can lessen potential tensions, although it can blur important distinctions and degenerate into a few annual feasts without any coherent system of beliefs.

5. **Children having the religious identity of a third faith, which is different to that into which the parents were each born but which they have decided to adopt for the family as a whole as a neutral compromise.** This only applies when both partners feel the need for a spiritual life and are also prepared to leave their own faith. It generally involves change to one that has a common denominator, e.g. a Catholic and Baptist becoming Unitarian, or a Muslim and a Jew becoming Bahai. It may solve many problems, although it can leave both sets of grandparents confused.

6. **Children having no religious identity, but with religious education in both faiths.** This permits the children to make a choice for themselves when they reach an age of maturity. However, this can cause the problem of them feeling guilty that if they choose the faith of one parent they may seem to be rejecting the other parent, even if that is not the case at all. The 'rejected' parent may also feel hurt.

7. **Children having no religious identity and no religious education.** This is an alternative attempt at being neutral, with children making their own decisions in adulthood unencumbered by parental influences. However, one cannot choose from a vacuum and so the result tends to be no choice at all and an absence of religion in later life.

Ultimately there is no right or wrong approach but only whatever is appropriate for each particular couple. If there is one golden rule it is that they act in harmony. Children will often accept the way in which they are brought up, providing it is consistent and genuinely believed in by both parents. Ten-year-old William takes it as natural that he is a Buddhist Jew, because one parent is Buddhist and one Jewish and they treat both as the family faith. It was something of a shock to him when he first realized that not everyone else in the world was a Buddhist Jew and he considers friends with just one faith as 'a bit odd, really'.

A radically different course of action that is adopted by a limited number of parents highlights some interesting lessons. They have chosen to give different religious identities to different children. Kevin is Jewish and his wife Isabel is a Quaker. Their children were brought up in their own image, with Daniel being Jewish, going to synagogue with his father and attending synagogue religion school, while his sister Virginia is a Quaker and went with her mother to meetings of the Society of Friends. The arrangement would seem to be a recipe for relig-
ious schizophrenia, or at least a very divided household, but in fact it has worked well. The children, now in their twenties, have a well-balanced attitude to religion, report no memories of conflict in their childhood or any disquiet now, and have maintained the separate identities in which they were respectively brought up. No doubt a similar arrangement with a different set of parents might not have worked so well, but the case illustrates how what to the outside may appear highly peculiar can seem perfectly satisfactory to those in the situation. It also demonstrates how the key to success is not the policy itself but the effort and sensitivity that is put into it. The success or failure of parents’ efforts with their children is not always in their hands alone. The extended family can play a helpful role, sharing their religious traditions and insights; alternatively, they can create problems through a variety of means, such as excluding them or interfering with them or denigrating them in front of the children.

As yet there are no statistics on the relative success of the respective situations, although some work has been done in the United States. A survey of Christian–Jewish marriages traced the affiliation of both the parents and their children (Mayer 1983):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>PARENTS</th>
<th>CHILDREN</th>
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</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Church</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Synagogue</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Both</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>—</td>
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<tr>
<td>Neither</td>
<td>49%</td>
<td>76%</td>
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Among those parents who are members, there is a significant drop in the religious affiliation of their children, whether attached to church, synagogue, or both. It suggests that while some parents may be able to pass on a strong religious heritage—single or dual—to their children, a considerable percentage fail to do so. The study also examined the celebration of festivals. These figures provide two lessons: first, that minority faith customs are observed less than those of the majority culture, Christianity; and secondly, that those celebrations which take place largely in the home (Christmas and Passover) are kept more than those which are church- or synagogue-based (Easter and Yom Kippur).

‘Marriage is not a word, it’s a sentence’, declared Mae West. Whether one entirely agrees with her or not, it is certainly true that marriages can last a long time, and often covering a period during which one or both partners can change considerably in terms of their needs and interests. This applies to religious matters too and can mean that attitudes to religion at the time of the wedding can be very different fifteen years later. Holly found this out to her cost: ‘I thought I had married a lapsed Muslim who didn’t care two hoots about God, and he then suddenly gets religious and wants me to convert and come to the mosque with him.’

The question must be asked whether mixed-faith marriages are more likely to experience a divorce than same-faith marriages. Statistical evidence has provided mixed results. Several different research projects have been undertaken, although
largely limited to very particular locations. The conclusion of most is that mixed-faith couples have a marginally higher rate of divorce than same-faith couples, but the difference is so slight as to be inconclusive (Christensen 1968: 13). Some other studies aver that mixed-faith marriages are definitely more prone to instability, with the divorce rate being several times higher (Bahr 1981: 251). While social scientists are arguing the exact percentages, there are some clear reasons why the findings point to a more negative result. One is the pressure that a mixed-faith marriage can face because of the extra compromises and difficult decisions involved. This is magnified if the surrounding families add to the conflict and actively foster dissension between the couple. A second is that a person who is prepared to flout their parents’ wishes in the choice of marriage partner may also be more liable to resist the compromises necessary for a harmonious relationship. A third is that a basic human need is security, and if one’s marriage partner is often presenting challenges—be it in terms of emotional expectations, family roles, or ways of communicating—this can be unsettling and lead to a collapse of trust. A fourth possible reason applies to those who intermarry specifically as an act of rebellion against their family or community and whose relationship is based on feelings against others rather than for that partner, in which case it may well end in disarray. A fifth reason is that if a marriage has taken place in the face of parental opposition, then relatives are less likely to rally round in times of trouble and offer the support that is often crucial in sustaining otherwise reasonably successful marriages through a difficult period. A sixth is that, as a generalization, the more religiously observant a couple the less likely they are to divorce, because marriage is seen not only as a bond between two people, but as a sacrament or union made before God, with an aura of sanctity that encourages them to persevere through difficulties. As mixed-faith marriages often, though not always, involve people without such a perspective and the wedding is usually conducted without a religious ceremony, it is inevitable that resistance to divorce will be lower among their ranks.

Despite the six possible reasons for divorce specifically among mixed-faith partners, interviews with such couples often elicit the comment that it was not religious differences that caused the break-up but a range of other, unrelated aspects. These include incompatibility of lifestyles, growing apart emotionally, financial crises, and sexual problems. As Margaret Mead once put it: ‘If you are not going to marry the boy next door—and if you do, you may die of boredom—then you are going to have to work much harder.’

Those whose mixed-faith life together is not ended prematurely by divorce—still the majority of such couples—face added questions as they approach death. One is where the burial will take place—in the cemetery of his faith or her faith? Or will they be buried apart, which may be upsetting for either them or their children? It is perhaps because of these territorial complications that many mixed-faith couples prefer to be cremated instead, and their ashes are usually scattered under the same non-denominational rose-bush.
There still remains the issue of who should take the service. Is it better for the minister of the person who died to do so, who can then conduct the last rites appropriate to the deceased? Or is it better for the minister of the spouse who survived to officiate, who can give the greatest degree of comfort to the partner left behind?

Until now there have been four myths that were widely held about mixed-faith marriages. They have been common currency for decades, arising from false assumptions that were either made in ignorance or were based on true cases which were mistakenly judged as representative of all cases. It must also be said that these myths are often encouraged by ministers of all faiths as a way of reinforcing their dire warnings against the perils of intermarriage.

The first myth is that those who marry out of their faith are deliberately rejecting that faith. They are not. Many would have been more than happy to marry a co-religionist, but it just so happened that the person they met and with whom they fell in love was of a different religion. They still have a deep attachment to their faith, with strong emotional ties that will remain with them for the rest of their lives. For them, marrying out does not mean opting out. They still wish to observe their faith, be part of the religious community to which they belong and pass on that heritage to their children. The question mark is very often not with them but with the religious establishment and whether it will permit them to remain a member of it. As Noreen said, ‘Just because I have fallen in love with someone who is not a Muslim does not make me any less of a Muslim. I will always identify with Islam—now it’s up to Islam whether it wants to identify with me.’

The second myth is that only those who marry out of their faith have no formal religious instruction nor any guidance or experience of home celebrations from their parents; in other words, intermarriage only affects the nominal members and not the educated ones. It is certainly true that the less religious background a person has the less they consider it a criterion when selecting a partner. However, there are many who had both a firm and positive religious background yet who also find happiness with a partner from a different faith. They enjoyed, and are grateful for, a vibrant family religious life and they attended after-school classes or even a religious day-school. Moreover, most are not headstrong youngsters who rush into marriage blindly but are often mature and experienced adults who gave much thought to their situation before making a decision. Moreover, they had undoubtedly assumed they would marry within their faith until circumstances introduced them to the person with whom they wanted to spend the rest of their life. If they are judged by their religious knowledge and identity, then their upbringing was highly successful; if they are judged by their choice of marriage partner, then it was an abject failure. Much depends on the yardstick that is used.

The third myth is that mixed-faith marriages are doomed to fail. Some do end in tears and there is evidence that such couples have a somewhat higher rate of divorce than do same-faith couples. However, the latter also have a high divorce
rate, and the argument is not whether mixed-faith couples get divorced and same-faith couples do not; both do, and therefore the debate is over percentages. Family or clergy opposed to intermarriage who preach that divorce is likely and unhappiness guaranteed are both distorting the truth and undermining their own message; it is all too easy to point to mixed-faith couples who have shared a long and happy life together.

The fourth myth is that mixed-faith marriage is an issue restricted to certain religions or certain denominations within them. Statements often thrown around in conversation—such as 'Catholics always stick with their own' or 'Jews only mix among themselves'—are ridiculous when compared to the enormous outmarriage rate of the former and the rising one of the latter. Equally unsound is the supposition that members of recent immigrant faiths only marry among themselves, whereas Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs are changing their traditional marriage patterns rapidly. It is also assumed that the more liberal branches of the faiths are more prone to intermarriage. This is an allegation that is usually part of internal fights within those faiths, with more traditional groups throwing at the liberal ones what they consider to be the worst possible accusation, encouraging assimilation and allowing adherents to kill off their faith without noticing it. In fact, it is clear that mixed-faith marriages are prevalent among all sections of every faith. Within the best documented religion in terms of mixed-faith marriages, Judaism, it is apparent that the issue affects Orthodox communities as much as Reform ones, and seminars for Jews in mixed-faith marriages attract equal numbers from both camps (Romain 1989: 18; Schmool 1990).

It is clear from the above that those in mixed-faith marriages cannot be stereotyped. This also means that they cannot be conveniently categorised for dismissive remarks or quick-fit solutions. They vary enormously and those concerned with the issue—be it from a religious, counselling, or sociological point of view—must acknowledge the diversity of factors and results. At least ten different types of relationship can be analyzed, and no doubt other commentators will be able to suggest further ones:

1. Dual faith harmonious. Both partners have their own strong faith, respect each other’s religious needs and are mutually supportive.

2. Dual faith conflicting. Both partners have their own strong faith, but find it a source of tension and rivalry.

3. Single faith harmonious. One partner has a strong faith and the other does not, but is happy to be supportive.

4. Single faith conflicting. One partner has a strong faith and the other does not, and resents the intrusion of religion into the marriage.

5. Merged faith. Both partners decide to merge their two faiths into a set of beliefs and way of life that they can share.
6. **Alternative faith.** Both partners agree to adopt a third faith, to which they can both belong and feel at ease.

7. **Lapsed faith.** Neither partner values their religious traditions and they share a common ‘lapsedness’.

8. **Converted same-faith.** One partner has converted to the faith of the other, whether before or after marriage, but still carries vestiges of the former faith, including close relatives who are part of the other faith.

9. **Re-emerged mixed-faith.** One partner, usually previously lapsed, has felt a re-emergence of their religious roots and thereby changes the religious balance of the marriage.

10. **Confused faith.** Both partners have religious traditions of their own, but are not sure what they believe and go through periods of making a religious effort, jointly or separately, and then giving it up.

The combined effect of these different types of mixed-faith marriages is profound and is having an impact on a wide range of areas. Henceforth ministers of all faiths will have both to acknowledge the new religious landscape and formulate a response to it. In judging how to react, they will have to take into account the two key findings that have become apparent regarding mixed-faith marriages. Firstly, that it is a trend that is dependent on so many factors in society at large, that it is futile to think that a few more sermons can halt it. Continuing the condemnation is certainly an option, but one likely to yield little result. Ministers must come to terms with the lack of power that they exercise in this respect. There is every reason to assume that the trend will remain and grow, and unless ministers wish to get their feet wet they should avoid becoming ecclesiastical Canutes. The clear implication is that the only successful response will be one that is positive and that seeks to work with mixed-faith couples rather than against them.

This is reinforced by the second finding, that many within mixed-faith marriages still value their religious roots and wish to maintain contact with their faith community. Here is where the real power of the clergy lies. By being welcoming to both partners, they can play a major role in influencing whether that residual loyalty is developed or jettisoned. Some ministers may find it difficult to welcome those who, according to one interpretation, have ‘betrayed’ their religious past. They may find it even more distasteful to welcome the other-religion partner. Moreover, it may provoke a crisis of conscience to welcome their children in the knowledge that they are being brought up in both faiths, or even in the other one. However, unless such policy changes and leaps of religious imagination are made, ministers will find their flock dwindling and will see a growing number of former congregants occupying a religious no man’s land. The coming decades will offer
a unique opportunity to relate to the faith of the mixed-faith couples that can be either seized or squandered.

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ASPECTS OF CATALAN KINSHIP, IDENTITY, AND NATIONALISM

JOSEP R. LLOBERA

Generalities

What is the bond that unites all those who form a nation? The modern literature on nationalism refers to objective factors such as common language, common religion, common culture, common history, etc. There is, however, another factor which used to be part of the list, but which in recent times has tended to fade into the background: common descent. Or perhaps, to put it more explicitly, the idea that the nation is a kinship group writ large. Social scientists may prefer to ignore that, but nationalist leaders refer frequently to ideas of common descent, often expressed in terms of shared blood and the like.¹

Gellner admits to the existence of ‘dark instinctual drives in human beings, which makes them wish to be close to others of the same blood’ (1993: 410), but these sentiments, he adds, cannot account for modern nationalism. Even if one agrees with Gellner’s assertion, is it not the case that these sentiments may help us towards achieving a better understanding of national identity, and hence of nationalism?

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Another phenomenon that needs to be mentioned in this context is that of national language as a kinship language. Loewenberg has rightly said that ‘nationalism begins in the family and at home’ (Loewenberg 1992: 94). Modern theories of nationalism downplay this factor, and can say with Gellner that ‘nationalism does not have very deep roots in the human psyche’ (Gellner 1983: 34). Deutsch, in a book somewhat forgotten today, could say as early as 1953 that nationalism was based on a common social culture which stemmed from the family and the home; it was the actual feeling of familiarity, comfort, and safety that made nationalism possible.

The sentiments generated during an early age towards parents and siblings create what Morin has called a ‘psycho-affective component which can be labelled matri-patriotic’ (Morin 1994: 225); these are later extended to the nation. Latin languages play with the bisexuality of the nation. The nation is envisaged as a mother who is protective and loving and hence must be cherished, but also as a father who is virile and represents authority and must be obeyed to the final sacrifice. The French word patrie (a feminine name for a masculine concept) expresses this fusion of the maternal and the paternal. Morin insists that it is in the expression mère-patrie that a kind of sacramentalization of the nation occurs. The sentiments required are those of effusion (towards the mother) and of obedience (towards the father).

The expression 'blood and soil' (Blut und Boden) well exemplifies traditional types of national identity. As Morin puts it (ibid.):

The matri-patriotic component implies a fraternal/sororal component (that is, among the children of the same fatherland) and a very strong sentiment of the fatherland as homeland (Heimat), that is, the fatherland as a roof, as a house (peoples might be wanderers, but fatherlands are not). It is easy to understand that from this conception should emerge the idea of common blood, and that this affective or emotional metaphor, when taken literally, may become national racism.

Connor has provided a long list of ‘familial’ metaphors used in English to indicate this state of things. In addition to fatherland and motherland, we have ancestral land, land of our fathers, sacred soil, land where our fathers died, native land, cradle of the nation, homeland, etc. (1994: 205). These expressions, and other similar ones, occur in many other European languages that I know of, and certainly in those with Latin roots. Furthermore, in Italian and Portuguese the word matria signifies the land that feeds you and rears you—culture at the affective-emotive level.

A final point to close these rather general introductory remarks. In an article entitled ‘Kinship, nationality and religion’ (1977), Schneider said that in America—and it is probably safe to generalize this to most Western cultures—one becomes a national by birth or through a process of what is rightly called naturalization. And this, adds Schneider, is as in kinship: there are kin by birth and kin by law. In fact, kinship and nationality are structured in a similar if not identical way:
What is the role of a national or of a kin? To love his country, that is his father­
land/motherland. It is also to support and to be loyal to his nation and to all those
who belong to the big family that is the nation. Loyalty to one's country is the
most generalized expression of the diffuse, enduring solidarity that starts with the
family. (Ibid.: 68)

Schneider concludes by saying that kinship and nationality (and he adds religion
as well) are all the same thing, culturally speaking. A case in point is that of
Judaism, where family, nation, and religion form an inseparable totality.

A Catalan Case-study

Turning our eyes towards Catalonia, it is possible to say that the topic that I am
presently dealing with has elicited a rather limited attention in the specialized
literature. It is only in the past few years that anthropologists working in Catalonia
have paid some passing attention to the issues of kinship, identity, and nationality.
This has inevitably taken the form of 'rediscovering' the work of some late nine­
teenth- or early twentieth-century Catalan legal scholars, historians, or folklorists
who had highlighted the idiosyncrasies of Catalan vis-à-vis Castilian kinship.
However, as ethnic markers go, kinship and the family perhaps never figured
prominently in the definition of Catalan national identity. Prat de la Riba, who
published his seminal Catalan Nationality (1906) ninety years ago, did not refer
specifically to anything distinctively Catalan in this area, although he mentioned
a long list of particularizing Catalan features. It is true, however, that kinship and
the family could be, and traditionally were, subsumed under the label of 'law'.

Let me highlight the points I am trying to make in this context:

1. National identity is about difference. If we think of the world as divided into
nations, each nation combines in a peculiar way a number of ethnic features or
markers. It is often the case that in neighbouring, culturally similar nations, efforts
to mark fewer differences are always greater than elsewhere. This is very much
the case for Catalonia and Castile/Spain.

2. In the case of Catalonia, kinship is an ethnic marker with a limited though not
unimportant presence. Although much more emphasis is given to the existence of
a distinctive language, a specific history, etc., kinship, particularly at the turn of
the century, played a distinctive role in the generalized attempt to differentiate
things Catalan. Surprisingly enough, the Francoist period, as I have demonstrated
elsewhere (Llobera 1986), reinforced Catalan essentialism, and specifically a
certain petrified vision of the past (including family and kinship), at a time when
many of the institutions referred to had long disappeared under the impact of the
accelerated process of industrialization.
The representatives of the Counts and the local, small nobility, seized public property, usurped Church property and confiscated land under the control of the peasants and constituted themselves as hereditary lords. Peasants were left with the usufruct of the property, which was subjected to a series of limitations. In addition part of the peasants were prohibited to leaving the manor without paying a ransom or renança. Hence the expression pagesos de renança or 'ransom peasants'. (Balcells 1996: 3–4)

After the demographic devastation of the fourteenth century due to the plague or Black Death, the Catalan countryside was depopulated and many properties reverted to fallow. The existing feudalism started to tumble down under these conditions. There followed a protracted struggle between feudal lords and the feudalized peasants (the pagesos de renança). After a century of confrontation, in the late fifteenth century (1468) King Ferdinand decided to free the pagesos de renança from their most onerous servile duties and they were allowed to buy their freedom and given some rights to the lands they had cultivated as servile tenant farmers. This was the beginning of a solid class of free peasants, unheard of in other parts of the Iberian peninsula, which in the centuries to come would become proprietors of the lands they cultivated.

In conclusion to Terradas’s research on the origins of Catalan kinship, it should be said that he sees its meaning changing: it is not something perennial, but evolves with the general conditions of the country, and more specifically with the transition from feudalism to capitalism.

The Making of Pairalisme: Patriotism and Traditionalism

I have already said that the importance of the family as a defining feature of Catalan national identity was perceived and emphasized for the first time in the late nineteenth century. Originally it came from the more traditional, that is, a religious, conservative, and ruralist perspective, which was competing with a more progressive, democratic, popular, and urban viewpoint. The group defending the pairalist vision of Catalonia was centred in the northern town of Vic and published a magazine called the Voice of Montserrat (the Virgin of Montserrat being the female patron saint of Catalonia). Their leading figure was Torras i Bages. It needs to be said that the terminology used by Torras and his colleagues is not always clearly nationalist: they refer to Catalonia indifferently as a region, country, nationality, and fatherland (patria,) and to Spain as a state and nation—they called their doctrine regionalism, not nationalism.

Bishop Josep Torras i Bages, whose see was in Vic, was one of the most important public figures of his time in Catalonia. In his book The Catalan Tradition (1892) he clearly relates family and country; here is a representative quotation from it:
The family is the substance and basis of social organization. Social decadence supposes decay in the family. Social regeneration, social reconstruction, must begin with the reconstruction of the family. We turn our eyes to Spain, and we see that the spirit is strongest in those nationalities that have the strongest regional spirit. Love for the homestead, the desire to preserve the patrimony, the order of the family hierarchy...all is superior where regional life has been maintained, even in the decayed form, as opposed to those areas which are confused with the great mass, the nation. (1966: 67)

Generally speaking, his book presented a romantic, conservative, Catholic vision of Catalonia. His well-known statement, 'If Catalonia is to exist, it must be Christian', exemplifies well his state of mind. A famous source of his inspiration was Herder's doctrine of the Volksgeist. In this context Catalonia is envisaged as a God-created moral person, with a clear place in the history of Europe, a thriving medieval nation which went underground and has been reawakened by the Romantic movement.

Torras i Bages insisted that the foundation of Catalan regionalism can only be found in the Catalan tradition, and specifically in past thinkers who clearly show the existence of a Catalan national character.

As I have said above, his thought is not always clearly nationalist in the modern sense of the term. Catalonia is referred to as both a region and a nationality, and the movement he favours is called regionalism. The modern, centralizing, unitary state—Spain in this case—is envisaged as an artificial entity which cannot generate patriotic sentiments: only the region or nationality can do that. The unitary state (a term not used by Torras) does not bring human harmony, and its interventionism leads to the collapse of natural, social bonds. Only the small units (regions) generate sentiments which give strength to the social body:

Patriotic love develops only at the level of the small unit (region); the state can generate a similar, but never as powerful and beautiful sentiment. [Torras insists that patriotic sentiments resemble filial love.] Our country is like our mother; it is the cause of our being, and we are what we are, because she is what she is. The children of the country reflect the qualities of the mother. It is only at the level of the region that human beings can become truly patriotic. It is like an instinctive sentiment, but it is also a civilizing principle. It attaches a people to a territory, it encourages the flourishing of the spirit of the family and it creates a tradition which transmits ancient wisdom. (Ibid.: 63)

Love of country is like an instinct for preservation: solidarity and identification with the fatherland is so absolute that it is not surprising to see it expressed in the following Horatian line: Dulcem et decorum est pro patria mori ['it is sweet and becoming to die for one's own country']. To believe that human beings will be willing to sacrifice their lives for a distant and abstract unitary state would be to ignore human nature. (Ibid.: 64)
It is in this context that Torras brings in the imagery of the family again. The state is not a patria (fatherland) but a distant and unknown mother, and hence it can hardly elicit any sentiments of love—or, if it does so, they would be only superficial ones. Only the region is truly a mare patria (a fatherland as a mother). There are other sentiments (of humanity, of the state), but it is only the patriotic sentiment which is crucial, and also the most natural and lasting one.

It is then fair to conclude that there is a clear connection between family and country in the mind of Torras i Bages. The family is the foundation of social organization; social decadence implies the decline of the family. A morally vigorous and united family is a source of societal strength. There is a clear correlation between a thriving fatherland and the love of homestead and family. Regionalism favours the family spirit, while statism (centralism) endangers it by enhancing individualistic and egotistical values. In addition, regionalism is more natural since it follows the divine law. Torras closes his argument by saying that the homestead or ancestral home (casa pairal) is the pillar of Catalonia.

Kinship and National Identity in Catalan Poetry

During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries Catalan patriotic poetry has often used kinship and family imagery to convey the sentiments which are deemed appropriate to the fatherland.

In one of the most popular nineteenth-century poets, Pitarra, we find different registers of the word patria. One of his poems connects fatherland with the ordinary things of life: a hearth with a fire, wife and children, the home. In another poem, loyalty to the fatherland takes precedence over family duties.

A recurrent theme is that of one’s country as mother earth. For example, a poem entitled ‘The Day of the Clay Men’ brings together earth, mother, blood, and country. The country is envisaged as a mother who is defended against her enemies by her children to the point of offering their blood (Didac Ruiz), which fertilizes the earth (A. Guimerà). Sometimes Catalonia is compared both to an oak-tree and a mother.

As earth, the mother country appears also as a nourishing and generous mother, a sweet and quiet mother looking after her children (Lopez-Picó). The continuity of the fatherland is also emphasized; the children may die, but the mother country is eternal (Apelles Mestres).

Finally, when reference is made to Catalonia and Spain, the point is made that you cannot have two mothers; you are born only in one country, which is your true mother (F. Arnau).
Anthropologists and Historians Come to Terms with Pairalisme

In a recent article (1995) Bestard has perceptively summarized the contribution made by jurists to the issue of pairalisme. He says:

The Catalan legal scholars and folklorists of the turn of the century created a new image of the Catalan family as they imagined a new nation. They announced the modernity of the nation on the basis of tradition; family is the metaphor linking customary local practices with homogeneous law. The family has its law (Maspons i Anglesell **dixit**) and that law can be generalized to the nation. The idea of a homogeneous family type characteristic of Catalonia, with an old domestic organization which is central to the social reproduction of Catalonia as a nation, is due to these scholars. (Ibid.: 250-1)

According to Bestard, one of the most powerful symbols of Catalan kinship is the house (casa). ‘An individual receives his/her identity as a member of a house; from it depends his name and position in the community’ (ibid.: 257). With this term two different sorts of idea converge: ideas of kinship and ideas of territory. So, in the Catalan mind, the house becomes a symbol of the nation.

The centrality of the house for Catalonia was perceived by a number of turn-of-the-century Catalan legal scholars: Josep Duran i Bas, Josep Faus i Condomines, Victorino Santamaria i Tous, Francesc Maspons i Anglesell, and others. They related it, via Le Play, to the originality of the Catalan stem family. On the other hand, political ideologists and politicians used the institution of the house as an emblem of the Catalan nation in opposition to the centralized state.

I have already suggested that the stem family and the house were perceived as the foundation of a homogeneous social order that was related to national identity. However, this was happening at a time when the process of industrialization was taking place and the nation was changing along with it. The house was a symbolic reservoir which allowed one to see individuals rooted in the past as well as being active in the present (ibid.).

In imagining the community that was Catalonia, nothing was better than the ancestral home (casa pairal); the house was seen as the first circle of belonging upon which the nation was built; the house maintained language and culture, a particularly important thing in a country where the state was alien. That is why somebody like Josep Faus, in 1907, saw ‘the house as the refuge of national continuity’ (ibid.: 258).

Another early twentieth-century legal scholar, Victorino Santamarina, insisted that ‘the perpetuation of the family via the idea of house was the cornerstone of the Catalan family, in opposition to the Castilian one which had no continuity and was dissolved after one generation. How was this continuity affected in the case of the Catalan family? People live in the same house and have the same house name. This is the reason for pride and social prestige (ibid.).
As I said above, the Francoist period had the surprising effect of solidifying a kind of Catalan essentialism. *Pairalisme* was enthroned as a Catalan virtue at a time when the society had anyway changed beyond recognition to a modern industrial one. One of the leading historians of the period, Jaume Vicens-Vives, in a book published in 1954 entitled *Noticia de Catalunya* (A panorama of Catalonia), emphasized many of the specific characteristics of Catalan kinship, while rejecting *pairalist* ideology. *Noticia de Catalunya* was an extremely influential book, and it shaped residual and hidden Catalan nationalism in one of the darkest periods of the history of Catalonia.

It is interesting to note, as Bestard and others do, that in the industrial context of today *pairalisme* has not lost all its power. Urban people, namely people from Barcelona, often refer to their ancestral home, a rural house where their ancestors originated. More commonly, a second house in the countryside may become the *casa pairal*, with family name and Catalan flag included. *Pairalisme* has become a cultural ideal which forms part of the Catalan tradition, in which even immigrant families can participate.

**Becoming a National: The Issue of Immigration**

According to Comas (1993), belonging and non-belonging are essential categories of the life of individuals in modern nations and states. To be a national means to belong to the nation; to be an alien, a foreigner, denies this quality. The alien may live in our society but he or she does not belong to its core, to what we might designate as the 'community'. Different countries define this belonging to the community with different metaphors. The racial analogy was common in the past (*Reinrassiger Deutscher, italiano di razza*); in other cases blood was emphasized ('full-blooded Englishman'). The idea of deep roots appears also frequently. In Catalan the expression is to be *a Català de soca-rel*, 'a root-and-branch Catalan'. In Spanish the expression would be *Español de pura cepa*, 'Spaniard of pure stock'.

An extremely interesting issue in relation to Catalonia is how it has managed to maintain and preserve its sense of national identity in spite of two extremely powerful forces working against it:

1. In approximately a century the population of Catalonia has grown from two to six million inhabitants in spite of having the lowest birth-rate in the whole of Europe. Over the period under consideration Catalonia has absorbed over three million immigrants. In the 1920s and 1930s they came from neighbouring areas, in the 1950s and 1960s mainly from Andalusia and other parts of Spain, and at present they originate from North and West Africa.
2. For most of this period, particularly under Franco (1939-75), Catalonia was subjected to the most intense ‘denationalizing’ process ever known, with the clear and avowed aim of totally uprooting Catalan national identity.

The success story of Catalonia is that it has not only managed to preserve the identity of the original Catalans, but that it has largely managed to integrate the majority of immigrants into the Catalan imagined community. This has been largely done essentially through language and culture. This is a pattern, involving immigration, which had occurred in previous centuries.

From afar, Catalonia may appear to be a homogeneous country, but close-up the situation can be seen to contain important cleavages which have nevertheless generated little conflict. Who is a Catalan? For those Spanish citizens not born but living in Catalonia there are some legal requirements in terms of residence (ten years) to qualify as a Catalan.

It has been a policy of the overall majority of Catalan parties (even before Franco’s death) that Catalans are those who live and work in Catalonia and express the wish to be Catalans. Here we can observe, unlike in other definitions of nationhood, how no requirements in terms of blood or descent are needed. The requirements are at the level of residence and at the level of consciousness. Although some references may be found to a difference between new and old Catalans (Estivill and Giner 1985), these are rather superficial distinctions. Indeed, it would be very easy to distinguish between Catalans and non-Catalans at a non-cultural and non-linguistic level simply by reference to patronymics. It is true that today only a quarter of Catalans can boast four grandparents with Catalan surnames.

Renan insisted that the nation was a spiritual family. More recently, Schneider (in American Kinship, 1968) has claimed that a kin is somebody who occupies a genealogical position or somebody who behaves like a kin. Something similar happens at the level of the nation: a national is somebody who is born in a certain country or who behaves like the people of this country (i.e. who has adopted the culture of this country).

The nation is a metaphor of the family. Those born in the nation are like consanguineals, whereas those who are incorporated into the nation (i.e., naturalized) are like in-laws. It should be theoretically possible to represent the nation as a huge genealogy showing that there is a degree of kinship among all its members. These blood ties are what cements the nation as a homogeneous social reality. If we provisionally leave aside naturalization, we can see that the nation is a natural entity (ascripton by birth), unavoidable (there is no choice), and transhistorical (related to past ancestors and future descendants).

Recent Catalan ideologists have emphasized the process of inclusiveness, that is, the conscious policy of integrating immigrants into the Catalan national project; in this context, language, culture, and historical memory are things to be shared between old and new Catalans.
Catalan Kinship Today

As regards Catalan kinship and family, the first thing to emphasize is its distinctiveness; the Catalan system of inheritance has no parallel in the rest of Spain (Puig-Salellas 1988).

It is important to remember, though, that the *hereu* system was only operative in the rural areas of what is traditionally called Old Catalonia (that is, the northern half of Catalonia); the southern part of Catalonia (which corresponds to the province of Tarragona) and the urban, industrial areas did not know this system. It has been suggested that the fact that the *hereu* system was not introduced into the industrial world tends to create a situation of indecisiveness due to the presence, after two or three generations, of too many relatives (Puig-Salellas 1988: 15–20) at the managerial level.

In the Catalan traditional system, the heir inherits three-quarters of the capital. This is a system of unigeniture, usually male primogeniture, although if there are no male heirs a female (*pubilla*) heir is substituted. The rest of the siblings divide a quarter of the capital among themselves, the daughters in the form of a dowry, the sons in the form of a capital stake. The *pater familias* has freedom in the designation of the *hereu*, although male primogeniture is the rule. At some stage in his life, when his children are of age, the *pater familias* decides who the *hereu* will be and organizes the marriage contract.

The *familia pairal* is strong only in some rural areas, and these are becoming fewer and fewer. The couple, husband and wife, have become much more central than ever before. The idea of a familial patrimony is no longer relevant; children tend to marry and leave, and if they stay they are economically independent. The importance given to liquid assets places agricultural property in a rather secondary position. In any case, only six per cent of the population are employed in agriculture today, as against fifty per cent in 1900 and many more before that. Furthermore, Catalonia is a macrocephalic society, with seventy per cent of the population living around Barcelona (McDonough 1986).

Conclusion

Pairalisme as an ideology is not dead but is preserved in some form at the level of the Catalan national character. Recent ethnographic research by Andrés Barrera (1986, 1990) shows that the peasants of the north-eastern part of Catalonia still hold fast to the practices of the Catalan system of family and kinship and that they believe it to be something that differentiates them from other Spaniards. In other words, pairalisme is one of the stereotypes that are believed in at some level of the Catalan psyche by an important number of people. These values, along with many others—like the idea that the Catalans believe in compromise (*pactisme*), or that
they oscillate between conservative judiciousness (*seny*) and extremist rashness (*rauxa*)—are still bandied about in political language and everyday life. They have to be taken into account, because they shape, to a certain extent, people’s behaviour.

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CAPTURING THE GLOBAL: IDENTITIES, KINSHIP, AND WITCHCRAFT TRIALS IN BOKI SOCIETY, NIGERIA

CAROLINE IFEKA and EMILIE FLOWER

Introduction

'GLOBALIZATION' presumes the homogenization of industrial and pre-industrial societies by post-industrial life-styles, values, and commodities (Waters 1995; cf. Said 1978). Crumbling before consumerism's symbolic and material power, indigenous identities fade: in various locales in Africa and Asia 'custom man' gives way to 'development man', a proponent of Western life-styles, values, and commodities. Liberated from encompassing ascriptive kinship networks, and inserted with others as separate actors into forward-investment-driven global networks of production for profit, African people sell their labour, accumulate money, and consume products imbued with universal (Westernizing) meanings of self-gratification. Representations of the individual as consumer thus symbolically detach the person from the social relations of kinship (Simmel 1978).1

1. We would like to acknowledge the financial assistance of the Department of International Development (ESCOR), which funded the field research undertaken in Boki and other villages in northern Cross River State in 1994-7. The Department of International Development is in no way responsible for the views, facts, or arguments discussed here. We also wish to thank the Overseas Training Programme (UK), which sponsored Emilie Flower in Nigeria for ten months. We are both indebted to our hosts in Boki, our field assistants, and many others who generously gave us their time and took us into their confidence.
Some theorists envisage custom acceding to a globalizing culture of triumphalist individualism that evolved in Western society’s successive ages of mercantile, entrepreneurial, and industrial international capitalism (Robertson 1992). At the macro-level, individuals everywhere find reference-points in supranational networks through the consumption of goods produced across the globe (Friedman 1994). At the micro-level, in African locales, entrepreneurial capitalism connects local identities and kinship networks into regional and national markets, where ‘custom man’ sells farm and forest produce in exchange for manufactured goods produced by ‘development man’. At points, and in markets, where ‘custom man’ and ‘development man’ intersect, they may encounter the structuring power of post-industrial global networks of multinational corporations, financial institutions, and non-government organizations. A new global cultural economy seemingly encompasses the local (Apter 1987).

Cultural Diversity

Yet historical and ethnographic research in African settings demonstrates the diversity, long duration, and multi-directionality of ‘indigenous’ responses to Westernizing representations of the individual purveyed by mission Christianity, the nation-state, and commodity production (Vansina 1985, Peel 1983, Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). Interactions between expatriate trader and chief/big man/military ruler, supplying slaves, palm oil, and oil in exchange for manufactured goods, reproduced, and continue to reproduce, the local and national entrepreneurial economy in subordination to international networks of accumulation. In kin-based contexts persons are constructed, that is, others impose social identities—i.e. gender-specific moral values, jural norms, and action typifications—on individuals as objects (Fortes 1973). These define the individual’s social persona. The individual as an object of others’ definitions and scrutinizing gaze is the recipient of social identities. The individual as a bearer of social identities is also the ‘me’ of the ‘authorial’ sentient, experiencing self (Mauss 1970, Ifeka 1982, Cohen 1994).

Individuals are culturally constructed as persons and thus representations and practices differ between societies in time and space (see MacCormack and Strathern 1980, Strathern 1988, Carrithers et al. 1985, Comaroff and Comaroff 1993). Differences in social identities also reflect differences in the social structures in which they are embedded. ‘Development man’ (teacher, catechist, civil servant, conservation agency manager) is constituted by the achieved criteria of profit-driven society in the form of education level, cash income and consumption patterns. In comparison, ‘custom man’ (chief, elder, youth) is constituted by the ascribed criteria of kin-based society in the form of seniority of descent, birth order, age, and gender. These representations map the person on to the hierarchy of ancestral authority, so that he or she is constrained from exercising the personal authority of individuals in market-integrated systems and remains in general within
Consider how the hierarchy of ancestral authority, kinship relations, and common descent from a founding ancestor (the genealogical charter) frame the terrain of sociality and supply a cultural map on which individuals locate themselves as socially interdependent persons. Persons are differentiated within this terrain according to kin-based criteria. For example, social differentiation by age separates youth from elders in the hierarchy of ancestral authority; differentiation by gender separates men and women into kin-based roles of fathering and mothering; differentiation by descent and birth order separates patrikinsmen. These differentiations order individuals according to their social identities or respective positions relative to one another in the order of kinship.

Persons are differentiated rather differently at points where local kin-based relations intersect with global representations of value, for example, land. Possessors of private rights in (socially exclusive) land contest with, and are separated from, claimants to the same land by virtue of the genealogical charter of common descent and (socially inclusive) ancestral authority over all descendants' land for the common good. Through contested relations with land, 'custom man' stands in opposition to 'development man'. These differentiations contain the potential to terminate the kin-based social order by detaching individuals from the socially inclusive obligations of the moral economy of kinship. In so far as individuals define themselves as politically unequal in relation to ownership or non-ownership of land, they are defining customary and development identities in conflict. Private property relations reproduce 'development' identities in the local, but contrary to some globalization theorists do not necessarily encompass the local. Rather, through pathways described below, customary identities and the kin-based criteria they encode may 'capture' development identities (Gluckman 1958, Balandier 1955, Ifeka 1993, Kopytoff 1987).

### Structuring and Tactical Power

In the Boki villages where we worked, we observed how struggles for dominance in decision-making between bearers of customary and development identities are framed in terms of inequalities of social age between men (youth/elder) that genealogical charters authorize (Gluckman 1958, Bayart 1993, Ifeka 1993, Reno 1995). We address masculine identities because these were our principal source-material.

Social differentiation by age and kin status is reflected in everyday political relations. On the one hand, men addressed as chief, elder or 'family' priest still dominate polity decision-making, though they are periodically checkmated by 'activist' (rebellious) youth who claim traditional authority for their actions. On the other hand, men may achieve considerable informal influence because they make money in the commodity economy as traders, contractors, wage-earners, or salaried civil servants. These men then seek to acquire formal positions of authority so they can integrate themselves in village decision-making, negotiating for and
being rewarded with chiefship titles, pre-eminent identities in the kin-based social order. The politics of negotiating contested identities is thus pivotal to individuals' interactions with others in the moral economy of collective exchange and the intersecting commodity economy. A politically centred analysis is required that highlights the respective power of indigenous and Westernizing practices to shape the contemporary construction of persons.

Wolf and others highlight the need to centre analyses of conflict in relation to the power that controls the settings in which people interact with others, for example, the power of kinship norms to structure the political domain of power divisions in village society (Wolf 1990; see also Gluckman 1958; Arendt 1970; Weber 1978; Foucault 1977, 1984). He explains this kind of power as equivalent to the Marxian concept of the power of capital to harness and allocate labour power. This also informs Foucault's notion of power as the ability 'to structure the possible field of action of others' in various modalities, including the structuring of social identities carried by gendered individuals (Foucault 1984: 428). Wolf also calls attention to power as tactics, as organizational, for example, youth's capacity in village settings to interact with their status seniors, the elders, so as to uphold or change criteria of authority based on kinship (ascribed) compared to the market (achieved). Power is therefore integral to analyses of conflicts at points of intersection between local and global structures and identities.

Power, in the sense of the capacity to affect others in thought, word, and deed, has shaped continuities and changes in social identities at points where the local and global intersect. Power is therefore pivotal to understanding social identities as dynamic processes in interaction with pre-industrial social structures and post-industrial international profit networks.

We ground our analysis of the politics of contested identities in a witchcraft trial that one of us (Flower) observed in a Boki village where we were working in late 1996. Youth accused certain elders of 'killing', by witchcraft, a popular age-mate to whom they were closely related. We shall argue that the discourse of witchcraft structured the onset, development, and resolution of the conflict between youth and elders. At the same time, youth displayed their command of tactical power, as they played with the semantically powerful word 'witch', convincing the village that they spoke the 'truth' in accusing certain elders of 'killing' a youth who could bring more money. For youth and others, these elders were 'holding back' development. We conclude that conflict over the distribution of resources among older patrikimens, and between older and younger kin, simultaneously critiqued the elders' greater authority while also reaffirming their social significance. Equally ambiguously, youth deployed representations of 'selfish' customary man with which to open up a space so as to argue subsequently for the 'promotion' of a few older youths into the category of elder. We suggest that youth 'entrapped' identities of 'development' in those of 'custom' and so upheld the kin-based hierarchy for the time being.

Were youth, then, continuing a well-established tradition in the area whereby 'boys' rebellions' end up affirming, rather than destroying, the power of social
identities associated, on the one hand, with the moral economy of collective exchange, and on the other with the commodity economy of private gain, to structure the articulation of conflict (Rowlands and Warnier 1988)? But why has this ‘tradition’ continued or been ‘reinvented’ in association with persisting kin-based criteria of social differentiation (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983)? What factors might account for the continuing power of these kin-based social identities—chief, elder, and youth—to structure the positioning of individuals with regard to the distribution of economic and cultural resources within and between the local (pre-industrial) and globalizing post-industrial economies? Why do customary, kin-based identities not only persist but on occasion ‘capture’ and thus subordinate development identities?

‘Development’ and Witchcraft

The many meanings social scientists attribute to ‘development’ may be said to boil down to positive economic and social change, that is, progress towards the kinds of life-style and economy exemplified by Northern post-industrial market economies. However, post-modern theorists stress the relativity of ‘truth values’ and local inequalities of wealth, power, and cultural control. In their view—pace Foucault (1977)—‘development’ is a series of events, actions, and discourses structured through power relationships between local, national, and international élites and subaltern classes (Gardner and Lewis 1996). However, local people interpret ‘development’ somewhat differently.

‘Development’

In the Boki villages where we worked, men frequently use this English word in everyday speech. They do so because Boki have a keen sense of the need to ‘develop’ themselves and others around them. They attribute this to their earlier conversion to Christianity, so they are bound by God to set a perfect example for their less-advanced neighbours. However, they are also, of course, motivated by prospects for economic advancement within the mixed economy of entrepreneurial capitalism and agricultural production for subsistence and exchange.

Youth and elders interpret ‘development’ as it was practised in Europe in the post-Second-World-War era of economic reconstruction and legitimized in modernization theory (Rostow 1960). By ‘development’, they mean, most importantly, the construction of fine (two-storey and higher) concrete buildings, tarred roads, factories, schools, health centres, and the accoutrements of urban settlements. They mean connection to the national electric power company and piped, clean water for household use. Thus, most people interpret ‘development’ to be provision of physical infrastructure, widely perceived in contemporary rural Nigeria to
be lacking in the extreme, and to be the pathway out of poverty and into a world of plentiful goods (Francis 1996). Teachers, doctors, lawyers, businessmen, and civil servants employed by the state or engaged in the private sector represent ‘development’ identities and life-styles to educated Boki youth. Local emphasis upon ‘development’ as physical infrastructure reflects relative disadvantage, the identification of state-funded ‘top-down’ initiatives with ‘development’, and dependence on access to markets in which villagers sell their own produce and buy manufactured goods such as clothes, torch batteries, cigarettes, and shoes. Most youth, educated or uneducated in English, as well as elders, espouse modernization in the Euro-American sense of the 1960s.

Educated youth, however, discuss ‘development’ among themselves and with interested outsiders such as fieldworkers. They are searching for new meanings of ‘development’ that seemingly echo post-modern notions of an improved quality of life—for example, greater social equality between all categories, especially women and men, justice before the law, accountability, and transparency. In this emerging sense, some youth are identifying ‘development’ with the satisfaction of ‘social needs’.

Older-style (modernization), ‘development’ identities are represented in Boki-land by teachers, civil servants, police officers and state security agents, conservation and rural development agency managers, logging company operators, and contractors. All are associated with state-funded livelihoods, not with the agricultural economy of subsistence production and sale of limited surpluses, and are connected with the national/international economy of accumulation. These men and their associates intervene in the local economy on behalf of outside interests and exploit its natural resources for profit, principally hardwood trees for furniture, construction, and fencing. At the same time, the Cross River National Park conservation agency recently imposed village decision-making committees on the area which challenged the authority of the clan head to determine, with his chiefs and elders, representation on village committees which manage land disputes, marital conflicts, and community banking. Village decision-makers handled the intervention astutely. They retained control of their most important committees (land, works, community council, community bank), which generate money through contracts, ‘commissions’, and fees levied on petitioners. They ‘allowed’ the new committees to merge with less-important village health, education, and church committees. In this way influential elders protected their control over key decision-making committees, income-generation, and their economic dominance of youth and junior kinsmen.

Witchcraft

Witchcraft accusations in small-scale societies have been interpreted in terms of the individual’s need to explain misfortune (Evans-Pritchard 1937). In West-Central African coastal and forest zones, a leading concern is the seemingly
inexplicable nature of wealth, unexpected illness, and death (Ardener 1996, Poole 1994). Many people, including Christians, find that unexpected events are most satisfactorily explained in terms of traditional belief systems that invoke the witch as a causal agent in death or wealth. At the same time, most villagers work hard to explain the predominance of a few men over the rest. A 'big man' has more sway over others and must therefore possess the mystical powers with which to accumulate the means of trouncing his enemies. Villagers believe that an elder accused of trying to 'kill' his paternal half-brother is challenging him to share his property, including farm land: the witch challenges authorized power relations between kinsmen in the world of the spirits as well as in the everyday visible world (Jackson and Karp 1990, Kapferer n.d.).

African representations of the individual as a witch portray the latter as suffering from a surfeit of individualism and self-love, 'killing' kin, and 'destroying' the extended family from within rather than respecting social obligations to 'share' wealth and assist kinsmen. This identity is a mirror image of globalizing representations that value the individual as a consumer of commodities whose price (worth) reflects supply in relation to demand and whose availability enables individuals to define themselves as consumers in world market networks.

Concepts of the witch, the witch's 'world', the powers attributed to them, and the identities they support supply insight into popular notions of the person and

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1. There are several analytical traditions distinguishing the social anthropology of witchcraft. An older British paradigm 'explains' witchcraft in terms of the 'need' for societal release of 'structural tensions' between close patri- or matrakin (Marwick 1952). Others adopt a structuralist approach (Douglas 1970). These and other structural-functionalist analyses usually situate witchcraft accusations in a descent-group context or portray the state as a repressor of subjectivities (Fürst and Geschiere 1990, Middleton and Winter 1963). Contemporary ontological analyses in America and Europe reflect post-modern concerns with the subjectivity of 'realities' (Berger and Luckman 1966, Jackson and Karp 1990) and investigate witchcraft beliefs as texts to be decoded to reveal the self's experience of misfortune (Hutini and Roberts 1993, Poole 1994, Baek 1995, De Latour 1995, Kamo n.d.). In parts of Highland New Guinea and West Africa, local communities still map agnation and masculine social identity on to the male body through representations of blood shed in initiation, homicide, and inter-village 'warfare' (Ruel 1969, Meggitt 1977, Knaatt 1985, Harrison 1993). A man's personhood or social (public) identity is represented in terms of moral and jural rights (La Fontaine 1985: 124–6). For example, rituals of initiation mark the commencement of youth's transition into manhood through blood shed (scarification, circumcision) and the first acts which publicly honour the patrilineal (family) name as legitimate procreation—the power of the right hand to kill enemies and large animals, and the capacity to accumulate wealth in the form of prestige goods and cash. Blood inscribes a man's public identity or persona in terms of the desired capacity to influence, direct, and control the field of action of others in the residential or patrilineal extended family group (Lukes 1990, Wolf 1990). In these villages, blood lost and subsequently regained in rituals of regeneration is the substance of mature men's identities as procreators who are born into the same extended patrilineal family or descent group, who share the same public name, whose male children reproduce the memory and name of the ancestors, and whose killing (right) arm invokes the ancestral name as it takes the life of enemies in neighbouring villages (Ifeka 1993, Offions 1982).
social identities in village societies of the forest-edge, where genealogies of descent still constitute charters for authorizing social inequality based on differences of age, gender, and birth. The witchcraft trials and confessions one of us observed in late 1996–7 demonstrate youth’s tactical skill in securing support for their campaign against elders whom they accused of witchcraft. Youth mobilized representations of anti-kin (‘bad’) individualism that signify non-development in local discourse and enhance their reputation for being progressive, for espousing ‘good’ development within the context of the kin-based moral economy of collective exchange that the chiefs and elders seek to control.

Some globalization theorists contend that incorporation in international networks of accumulation is homogenizing local identities, as if people in peripheral societies are passive objects of capital’s encompassing movements and as if they have no history of resistance, negotiation, compromise, and dispute among and between themselves and agents of change such as missionaries, the state, and multinational companies (Friedman 1994). Individuals in interaction with the structures of kin-based society and the economy of accumulation identify with the elders and their ancestors (‘the past’), in doing so highlighting the opposed category youth (‘development’). Interactional processes ‘bring forward’ into the present identities associated with the past, which therefore continue to be reproduced. In the villages where we worked, interaction between the bearers of contested identities associated respectively with ‘custom’ and ‘development’—elders and youth—continue to structure power relations and shape the construction of the social person (MacGaffey 1970).

We know little about how this happens. Identity trajectories sketched by anthropologists with a broad brush need to be deconstructed, so we can begin to disentangle particular moments in the reproduction of identities and the social structures with which they are associated. We build our argument on a situational analysis of one such moment, a witchcraft trial. We tell the story of conflict between the bearers of a traditionally subordinate identity (youth) and a new identity (development), and traditionally dominant elders. The conflict contains a twist: ‘customary’ social identities of kin-based society ‘capture’ those of development and thus guarantee their historical continuity in the shorter term. In the longer term these identities may be distanced from the present and inserted into the ‘past’, where they represent village society’s remembered points of departure or beginnings.

Setting the Scene

Beri, the eastern Boki village in Cross River State where we carried out field enquiries, is situated on the edge of damp forest. Agriculture is the predominant means of livelihood. Smallholders, men and women, produce staple food crops
(cassava, cocoyams, rice, vegetables) and cash crops (cocoa, bananas). Surpluses are traded in local markets. Land is the pivotal productive resource, the principal source of subsistence goods and cash, and is in short supply on account of population growth on a finite land base and rising prices for cash and good crops.

Land is highly contested between elders and senior youth (Ifeaka 1997). It is less usual for a young man to quarrel about land or to challenge an older man because he would be left standing alone before the assembly of respected older men. (Young youth are aged 15–25, senior youth are 25–35 or 40 years, and elders are 35 years old and upwards.) Men are allocated to these social categories on the basis of physical age, reliable performance of duties on family and village committees, being married and having children, and a reputation for being a solid provider. Paternal half-brothers of the same age category (elder/senior youth), for example, will often clash over whether a disputed plot is ‘general’ or family land (si kiku bene) held under customary law, or whether it is ‘personal’ land (esi yi) inherited from a father or father’s brother and owned exclusively by the claimant as private property. Men struggling to snatch a plot from an incumbent farmer argue that the land in question is held under customary (socially inclusive) law and that all ‘brothers’ are entitled to its use for their families’ subsistence and benefit. On the other hand, men seeking to hold on to a plot argue that they own it under the Western (socially exclusive) law of private property; no other ‘brother’ is entitled to its use without their agreement. Whether they claim to be closely or distantly related, contestants frame conflict between customary inclusive and Western exclusive land rights through the social relations of patrilineal kinship and common descent from an eponymous founding ancestor. There are two reasons for this. First, most farmers are smallholders exploiting land located on village territory defined in Beri’s genealogical charter as owned by all male descendants of the common eponymous ancestor. Men rely on patrikin and age-mates for labour assistance (only the largest cocoa farmers can afford to hire wage labour). Men claim with pride that ‘Beri is one’, cultivating its own land on cleared land bounded on all sides by five neighbouring villages. Understandably, land disputes are articulated in terms of social relations between patrikinsmen. Secondly, smallholders rely on their own labour and that of their patrikinsmen and age-mates, dependence on the former being reflected in the reality that patrikin contest land. Though youth seldom publicly clash with an older kinsman over farm or bush land, this is because they know they would alienate elders who—in the longer run, when they are older and have to be accorded greater respect—could approve a claim against a relative.

Men contest land by invoking one tenure regime or the other. Some land disputes continue for two generations, but these days men and their households refrain from dividing into as many villages as there are extended families because ‘we share one blood’ and ‘are as one’. Public views thus situate intersecting tenure regimes and associated political economies and social identities (i.e. elder and young civil servant) in relation to the customary authority of Beri’s family elders and spiritual/clan head. Consequently, the scene is set for laying the blame
for continuing conflict over land and inexplicable deaths at the feet of family elders who reportedly misuse their mystical powers.

Beri’s genealogical charter presents the village as comprising the male descendants in the patriline of an eponymous ancestor five generations or more removed from the present generation of young youth. Beri men classify themselves into three patrilineally related groupings they call ‘families’ through patrilineal descent from an eponymous ancestor. These families are called Batia, Baka, and Bawe, each containing three or four patrilineal groups that our English-speaking informants called ‘sub-families’. Though male members by birth of a patrilineal grouping (‘of one blood’) no longer reside in the same ‘quarter’ or ‘ward’, they still cling to the genealogical notion that their village is a united group of kinsmen. Patrilineal values inform continuing social identities as family elder/father or youth/son.

The Batia extended family comprises three sub-families called Ebupe, Ebuba, and Ebuko. Members say ‘we are of one blood’ (bifobo beloh nanke): some told us, ‘we are of the same “inborn blood”’, others said that it was ‘the red blood inside you that makes you one with the father’ (rifeh nanke, close relations) and ‘brothers’ (ebuauni). Most sub-families in Beri village proscribe sub-family endogamy and prescribe sub-family exogamy within the village, or wife-taking from nearby villages with whom Beri traditionally encouraged alliances for defensive and commercial purposes. Batia means ‘owners of land’. Despite a reputation for suffering the most from family witches and for being the most litigious family in the village, they are fond of saying that they are the most united and progressive family, with the largest number of educated sons working ‘out’. This claim is supported by our socio-economic data, as is the popular view that Batia has the largest population, is the least well-endowed in land per head, and has more land cases in court. In the 1990s, informants told us that Batia men and women have been involved in more witchcraft accusations and trials than members of the other two extended families. Youth and elders attribute the contentious nature of

2. Bawe comprises three sub-families, namely Ebua, Ario, and Beguor. The latter are described in legends of origin as the first settlers in Bateriko. Baka comprises four sub-families, namely Kinie, Ono, Begi, Ebuatuo.

3. We were unable to obtain reliable data on what farm sizes had been thirty years ago, but all informants maintained that they have been increasing. Preliminary analysis of our Beri data suggests an average farm size per household (including women’s plots, but excluding bush fallows) of between 2 and 4 hectares. These compare with the following: 2.4 ha per household in Umuahia (Iboland, Nigeria) in 1977 (Lagemann 1977); 1.5 ha per farm (26% of all farms), accounting for nearly 60% of land cultivated in Nsaw, Northwest Province, Cameroon, in 1988 (Goheen 1988); 3.4 ha per household intensively cultivated (home-garden) land, Mbalmayo, Cameroon (Shepherd and Okafor 1992).

The 1978 Land Use Decree, by means of which the Federal Government of Nigeria arrogated all land to itself, and granting authority to the states’ military administrators as guardians for the Federal Government, play no part in these conflicts. Bateriko, like many other village societies, behaves as if the Decree were non-existent; see Francis 1984.
sociality in Batia to factors other than population pressure on a finite land base or increasing market demand for staple food and cash crops. They say that the Christian god penetrated Boki ancestral religion and weakened the power of the families’ gods to protect them from witchcraft. Since the Church wiped out ‘too much’ of traditional religion too quickly and introduced too many changes (‘development’) overnight, ‘traditional’ individualistic solutions (witchcraft) are gaining ground. Witchcraft keeps on growing as respect fades for traditional cults and the collective moral authority of the elders. However, elders also attribute this decline in their ‘traditional’ mystical and political powers to an increase in spiritual abominations, by which they mean that two brothers shed the same patrilineal blood by committing homicide or by ‘killing’ one’s son or sons. These spiritual crimes invite collective or familial retribution that many men nowadays publicly represent as coming from the Christian god, but which they privately believe comes from the ‘small gods’ of the ancestral hearth, family witches, and powerful ju-ju hired by youth to punish the perpetrators of such abominations.

Witch Event

In what follows, we analyze a witchcraft trial lasting fourteen days that one of us (Flower) witnessed. It is important to note that some youths’ and elders’ statements as to what was happening each day changed when we asked them, a few months later, to tell us what had taken place. When in doubt we spoke informally to others and compared these statements with Flower’s observations for internal consistency. ‘Truth’ is contested, especially when an ostensibly non-Christian ‘traditional’ vehicle of conflict resolution (witchcraft trials) becomes an open forum by which youth ‘rise up’ against their elders, appealing to ‘custom’ as their authority to attack elders whom they accuse of ‘killing’ progressive educated ‘sons’ so that the village is ‘held back’ from ‘development’.4

4. See Bohannon 1958, Ojua 1993. The Boki, like the Tiv to the north, were noted in scanty colonial reports for young men’s age-sets’ virulent attacks on and killings of elders accused of witchcraft (Bohannon ibid.); ‘boys’ rebellions’ were a feature of district officers’ reports on neighbouring peoples in Manyu Division, Cameroon (Rowlands and Wamier 1988). In some villages modern Boki youth, including married women (i.e. daughters and wives), continue to engage in periodic witchcraft trials in which they torture and at times kill, by inhumation and immolation, elders accused of sacrificing the lives of their senior or successful sons or, less often, nephews, because it is their turn to contribute a life to the family witch society. Elders contributing a son do so against their wishes as a father. Though they will feel more freedom in substituting a paternal nephew, popular culture (especially youth) believes witch societies prefer a son. Youth, male and female, assume that elders are often witches who engage in tactics intended to obstruct youth’s ‘development’.
Inexplicable Death

The first, and in village eyes most successful son of the clan head of Beri, In O, fell very ill in late November 1996. He had been progressing well in his job in the state security services in Calabar. However, he had been sick on and off for two years or so; moreover, his wife had given birth to a son who had died aged one year and to twins who had died at birth. His father, Chief O, was attending the coronation of four chiefs in a neighbouring village, but on receiving a letter from a family member, a woman, that In was ill, left the coronation early to return home to Beri. Subsequently it was thought that the woman’s letter was the mystical weapon employed by the family witch society to ‘kill’ the clan head’s son. In O died in Calabar on December 1st before he had reached thirty years of age. His body was kept in a mortuary until Sunday December 15th, when it was escorted home by an entourage of mourners from the state security services, Beri youth living in Calabar, and family members. His inexplicable death sparked a major crisis in the village in which certain youth hired ju-ju to flush out witches.

Creating ‘Signs’

Upon hearing the news in Beri of In O’s untimely demise on December 1st, his age-mates of both sexes began to cry and lament. The next day, young youth called a general meeting of village youth. Young men had strong support from young ‘active’ women, who teamed up with the boys right from the start in a determined effort to exterminate the witches. Youth were angry because they were losing ‘good’ talents in the family at the hands of witches, whom they believed to be elders or barren women. As one of us (Flower) wrote at the time: ‘The division between youth and elders, and men and women, is clear’, and is evident in all families. The day-long meeting found close agnates guilty of witchcraft and of offering the youth as their ‘contribution’ to the family witch society. They held vigil at the O family house that night. The ring-leaders of the attacks on these elders were a young woman from another Batia sub-family and a few male youth of the ‘middling’ O family (class 2); one youth was sufficiently prosperous or well connected to a generous patron to own a motorbike.

When the youth met, they thought back to signs that might have predicted In O’s death. They found harbingers in the words of Mary A, also of the Ebupe family and a paternal aunt of the dead youth.

5. Middleton and Winter (1963) pointed out long ago that the prevalence of witchcraft accusations may reflect profound concern with mortality and morbidity that local health centres cannot cure. Cross River State is currently experiencing an increase in the reported cases of youth dying from AIDS, some of the deceased youths being personally known to us. In O probably died of AIDS, and his deceased infants may have been HIV-positive. Youth are dying from AIDS in towns and villages across the country.
Mary A fell sick in June 1995 and went to seek spiritual healing from a village Pentecostal church called Mother Church, led by a woman prophet. The 'Blessed Mother', as she is called, is not approved of by most elders because she 'encourages' women's spiritual and moral independence from their husbands and fathers, and in possessed states women are said to 'abort' pregnancies.

Mary soon confessed her sins before Mother Church so as to obtain spiritual absolution and healing. She revealed that she and six others—all seven were from Batia's Ebupe sub-family—belonged to a family witch society or group that was 'killing' young youth whose education and professional 'development' made them precious and valuable to their family. Mary confessed that these witches were planning to kill another youth soon, but said that she had repented and left them. However, people did not believe Mary, so she gave them up to six months in which to see that her prediction would come true. She warned that her family's witch society had tied some youth in the bush to stick trees, and if the community did not take action to halt their plan a young man would die.

On being informed of Mary A's confession and warnings, Chief A, the Ebupe family head, called a general meeting of the community. The Town Crier summoned everyone in Beri to the 'playground', that is, the market square. Mary was told to sit in front on a long bench. She called out the names of the six other members of the witch society, who were summoned to sit on the bench. They denied that they were witches or members of the society. They were fined N1,000 each and one goat; some refused to pay. Mary said, 'They refuse to pay; another event will come to “call” the person.'

Then a year or so later, in 1996, some months before In's death, a spiritual woman, Elizabeth O—also of the Ebupe family, and active in the ministry of the Blessed Mother—prophesied that 'something dangerous was going to happen in the family'; 'they will bring a corpse from outside to their family'; 'a youth will die within the space of one month'. Then, two or three months later, In O died of 'stomach-ache', meningitis, and pneumonia.

Accusations in Private

The day-long meeting on December 2nd found the deceased youth's senior agnates guilty of witchcraft and of offering up his life as their 'contribution' to the Ebuake family's witch society. They 'held' Mary A and questioned her. In this, her second confession, she agreed that she had been a witch, but maintained that she had left the family witch society. She confirmed that the following people were responsible for In O's death: his paternal uncles Joseph O and Raphael O, his father Julius O, and his paternal aunt Anna A. (Other names, i.e. of his paternal uncle Pi and paternal aunts Alice U and Mama Akobo, were added subsequently by Anna in her confession, but in some versions the names were added to Mary's second confession.)
Young youth then decided to send a delegation of two young men and one woman to a village belonging to another ethnic group. The native priest told them that the late In had been killed by a witch society and that the members were from In’s own family of Ebupe. He advised them to call the principal accused, namely Anna A of the Ebupe family, to account. They summoned Beri youth living in Calabar, they and the dead youth’s state security service sympathizers playing a leading role in shifting accusations of Anna and her co-accused from words to physical violence and torture.

Accusations in Public

‘Active’ youth did not consult family elders before they acted. They called Anna A to answer what she knew about In’s death, and though Anna denied she knew anything, Ebupe youth summoned her and other accused to the ‘playground’. Somewhat disconcertingly, the accused, along with many others, just wandered down to the market square, where male youth tied their legs with ropes and sticks (braces). The accused sat on a long bench in front of the community council, senior chiefs and family elders, youth, and, at the back, women.

The youth did not begin with the witches but spent three hours settling old debts, arguing at length about the fines to be imposed on youth who had not paid fines imposed on them previously for various offences. People murmured that youth’s insistence on defaulters paying fines was due to the need to ‘settle’ the community and achieve a moral balance by restitution, but that ‘really’ the trial was an opportunity for youth to put money into their empty coffers. Youth repeatedly harangued community council elders for allowing In’s death to take place and for general inaction reflected in endemic land disputes and witchcraft accusations, especially in Batia.

Confessions in Public

Anna was the principal accused, partly because she had been found guilty in previous trials of being a witch. About forty years of age, she was a staunch follower of the Blessed Mother, childless in this world, and prone to frequent, late miscarriages—‘the lamb just disappears’. She was poor, marginal, and ranked low among the family’s female agnates.

Male youth tightened the braces so that Anna cried and yelled with pain. She accused six other people of being members of the witch society that had brought about In’s death. Of the seven (including herself), three were close relations (half-brothers) and four were distant family relations; together the seven represent all the nuclear families of the Ebupe sub-family and thus ‘united’ the sub-family in the spirit world. Those named included the clan head’s senior paternal half-brother Raphael. The six denied the accusation, but subsequently Raphael confirmed their
names and admitted that they had had their ‘family open meeting’ (the witch society) in the house of Chief Anthony A, thereby implicating him. Anna was tortured again, thrown on the ground still manacled with hard wooden braces tied very tight with rope around her ankles and wrists. Young women hurled verbal abuse at Anna and the accused: the boys tortured the accused, slapping them and tightening the leg braces until Anna cried with pain. Then she confessed that she and other members had killed In, and that she had been asked by her witch society to give her brother, Chief Anthony A, who was actually her paternal cousin, though he had been brought up by her father and therefore had become of Chief Anthony’s ‘blood’ and was her brother. But she had refused. Instead she would give out his wealth, as she had done four years earlier, according to her confession in that witchcraft trial. She confessed she had sworn not to have any children so she could continue to sacrifice youth, but claimed that she had saved her brother Sebastian from death. She had allegedly given her womb to the family witch society so that any children she conceived would be eaten in the society. This was her ‘contribution’. But she admitted that since she had been with the witch society, she had not given them a child or any youth, but instead had given her ‘worms’ to represent the children or people she should have given to their society.

In the night the witches were tied up in their houses. In’s brother took hold of a gun with which to kill Anna, but was restrained. The next morning, at six o’clock, people started moving towards the ‘playground’. The witches whose legs had been tied in wooden blocks were released and wandered towards the ‘playground’. People ignored them, without any show of anger. Benches were gathered slowly, tables were placed at one end, and the community council was seated. Raphael and another accused sat in the middle, looking blank. No one talked to them. The secretary read out the agenda after the chairman’s opening speech. Speeches were made, subject to crowd approvals, rumours, and disapprovals by young and senior youth, male and female, of Ebupe and the other two Batia sub-families. They were anxious to establish who was the leader and which youth would be sacrificed next. The community council secretary recorded the discussion and decisions taken in his minute-book.

Raphael O, the clan head’s senior half-brother, admitted that he was the ‘commander-in-chief’ of the society and confessed his part in his paternal nephew’s death. The clan head had kept on telling Raphael that In ‘is not around’. Raphael admitted that he had ‘stolen’ the clan head’s ‘heart’ (riteh, mind) to make him useless, so that he could not protect In any longer and would kill his own son under Raphael’s ‘remote control’. Raphael was then able to trace In to his house in Calabar and kill him there. Raphael also claimed that once he had the clan head’s heart in his possession, he was able to make him turn into a snake so that he killed his own son. Raphael said he had called the clan head to give up his son so they could kill someone very close to them for their sacrifice and that In O would be the clan head’s ‘contribution’; each would enjoy the part of the ‘meat’ given to him/her. Raphael also confessed that he was also a member of a society of witches who transform themselves into bats for ease of movement at night to
eat human flesh and remove people’s lives. He brought the knife the society used in butchering youth they had killed. After full confessions had been obtained from all the seven accused, they were untied.

Remaining in a group, youth then started to negotiate the fines of the accused. The chairman wanted to move on, but the youth insisted that the fines should be agreed (N1,000 each, and a goat) and paid immediately. Thwarted by the chairman and senior elders, active youth went to the community council chairman’s house and returned with a brass bed, which they placed in the middle of a shelter in the market square. Then the community council, acting as judges, named the accused, including the clan head: the fines levied on each were recorded by the council secretary. The clan head was told to enter and sit on the bed, from where he protested his innocence, though he admitted he was a member of the family witch society and said that when his turn came to ‘contribute’, he had refused to donate his son. But Raphael had stolen his heart and controlled his movements, giving the society permission to ‘chop’ the dead youth. Debate ensued as to how the clan head would receive back his stolen heart.

The move to restore the stolen heart began when Raphael and others confirmed that there were still other youth waiting for their deaths, ‘tied’ up in trees. The witches were therefore exposed to the sun, blindfolded, and taken to free the spirits which were tied in trees. Male youth felled the branches of trees where the spirits of victims were ‘tied’ to save their lives. The witches were ignored. Then Raphael went to a tree outside the clan head’s house where the witches meet in spirit. He cracked open an egg, thought to contain the clan head’s heart, and rubbed the contents over the clan head’s chest so as to return his heart to him. A second egg was cracked open beside the tree and thrown into the bush. While cracking open the eggs, Raphael, who is a poor man, expressed his feelings of being unfairly treated by a selfish brother (the clan head) who did not ‘share’ his wealth. Raphael vowed that he would not carry out witchcraft again if ‘my brother looks after me’ and ‘gives to me as a proper senior should’.

Resolution

Less than two weeks later, on December 15th, In O’s body was brought from Calabar escorted by a large entourage. Calabar youth born in Bateriko felt seriously endangered by In O’s death at the hands of family witches. They were strongly supported by state security service sympathizers.

The Calabar youth summoned the witches, who had to repeat their confessions in full (permission was not sought from the elders and chiefs, who were anyway known to be split and to be acting with ‘two faces’, ‘managing’ the trial and yet also soliciting youths’ deaths as witches). The Calabar youth asked the accused what part of the body they normally ate in their witch society. They said the person who brings the victim will eat the head; if the father is present he will eat the victim’s heart, while the others eat the remaining parts. The youth insisted that
the coffin was opened so that the corpse was fully visible. After doing this they
told Raphael to chop off the hand of the corpse and eat it raw, as they would in
the spirit world. Raphael took a kitchen knife, but other relatives objected.
Instead, the witches in turn kissed or licked the right thumb and the mouth or
tongue of the corpse. This was highly objectionable to the witches but was
believed by youth to act as a poison oracle, which would strike the guilty through
the corpse’s saliva, and it would also represent consuming substances in the spirit
world (none of the witches has died as yet).

While the coffin was still open, the spiritually senior of the village chiefs, the
‘traditional’ chief Emmanuel O., made a sacrifice on the dead youth’s body with
a dead, uncooked cock struck against the corpse’s body, as well as with cola nuts.
The Ebupe family were asked to eat and drink the water along with offering
prayers. They promised to leave the witch society, but shortly afterwards another
Ebupe elder was accused of witchcraft in ‘killing’ another Batia sub-family (Ebu­
ba) brother on his farm. The sacrifice loosened all the ropes that were tying the
remaining victims who were intended for sacrifice in trees.

The following day, Monday, December 16th, without seeking permission from
the elders or chiefs, ‘active youth’ burnt the traditional village ju-ju or sacred
objects (staff, gongs for contacting the ancestors) kept in the ‘power house’ of
Beri’s traditional chief, Emmanuel O. Youth searched for the bowl which con­
tained human blood from youth sacrificed by the family witch society. This may
or may not be a ‘real’ bowl. On the same day, other ‘active youth’ went back to
the village they had visited earlier to purchase a new ju-ju for protection against
renewed witchcraft in Beri for N1,000 (some said it cost N3,500). It was called
‘no name’ to protect its power so that no one from within the village could control
it. ‘No name’ was buried in three places: in the market square, on the road close
to the health centre and at the entrance to the clan head’s compound. Unlike
traditional ju-jus like Lakumbo or Efor, which have become ‘weak,’ a strong ju-ju
like this one works for twenty-four hours ‘without a break’ and is therefore uncon­
trollable by witches. Anna was made to bathe in the stream after the trial because
she had said she did not bathe in the river, making people assume that bathing in
the stream might kill someone like her, who was a witch. Water is the special
spiritual responsibility of women. As a woman who is childless and a witch Anna
was only half woman: she had rejected her womanly duty of giving birth, so water
too would reject and kill her. Bathing was Anna’s ‘poison’ ordeal: if she were not
a witch she would survive, which she did, though she was exiled subsequently
because the community council and youth had found she was a witch anyway.

‘Peace’

Three days after In O’s burial, the leading members of the Ebupe family swore a
family oath against further witchcraft in their ranks. Yet witchcraft occurred again
shortly afterwards in the case of homicide by one ‘brother’ of another (the elder
man was, or had the status of ‘grandfather’ to his ‘grandson’). The agnates were descendants of a common ancestor, patrakin and brothers, because they did things in common and shared extended family property (i.e. land, blocks of forest, raffia, and bamboo stands). They were ‘as one’, being by birth of ‘the same blood’, so their identity was represented as being essentially the same. When one agnate shared the other’s blood in a quarrel over ownership of a plot of land and a fruiting oil palm tree, he committed a spiritual abomination that people feared would bring death and spiritual retribution to both men and their families.\(^6\) After

6. This dispute first came to the attention of the village land committee in 1994. It had worked its way upwards from the family meeting to the community land committee to the community council. Witnesses at this time were older men who were familiar with the disputed land. From 1994 to 1996, several appeals were made by Mr Ar and his brothers in order to strengthen their claims to land which Mr An contended was his:

(a) The committee recommended that Ar and his brother should maintain the left side of the disputed plot and An and his brothers should keep working on the right side of the plot. This arrangement would assist both parties in keeping to the original boundary without encroaching on one another. (We note that though the various committees act out the part of impartial arbiters—checking boundary markers etc.—the verdict is really decided by bribes and trade-offs. The stress on markers suggests that the parties to the conflict as well as the arbitrators are aware that markers mean little—otherwise, why do they keep on returning to check them? Privatizing land has meant that individuals who are rich in cash income, animals, economic trees, and land get richer because they can afford to give larger bribes and win cases, thus ensuring that redistribution is made in their favour.)

(b) Ar’s brother appealed to the Beri Community Council. He said he was unhappy with the decision. The Council inspected the land and agreed with the land committee’s ruling. Both parties were fined in cash and instructed that the land was ‘bounded’ for one month, i.e. put out of bounds, and they were told to stop going there.

(c) Mr Ar then appealed to the customary court, paying a sum of N500 for a civil summons and notice served on Mr An, who paid the same sum. The customary court visited the land and agreed with previous advice that the land was common property of the Ebupe (An) family, but that a portion had been given to Ar; they confirmed earlier rulings on the boundary between Ar and An, and that they should farm the centre of the disputed land, while three persons farm at the top, above Ar and An, and two farm land below them. The customary court also ruled that the land was placed out of bounds and both parties were to desist from going there.

(d) Mr Ar and his brothers disagreed with the customary court order. Then everyone would soon see what they were going to do, they would never leave the land (was this a threat to use ju-ju to ‘hold’ their rival and make him die? There are many land conflicts between members of the Ebuba family, and between this family and others. Land disputes are a potent source of witchcraft accusations, as we recount below).

The peace group ruled as follows: (i) The Ebupe family (An’s) would find a girl from another family—the two families may not intermarry—to send in marriage to Ar’s family (Ebuba). They will pay the brideprice for such a girl or swap a marriageable girl with another family. (ii) Restitution should be organized by the third Batia family of Ebunko. (iii) An should leave the village for some time and be made to sacrifice a live black cow before he can re-enter. (iv) He should bring back cola nuts to share with the whole village, showing reconciliation through sharing, to ‘heal’ the violation of the taboo on one brother shedding another’s blood. He should hand over two gallons of palm wine, 27 bags of cola nuts, and a bottle of ‘hot’.
several abortive attempts a peace group led and witnessed by elders of Batia’s three sub-families persuaded both families to agree in writing that the disputed land and its economic trees should be partitioned. Not all the sons of the two men would be allowed to farm there. The agreement thus sought a compromise between the traditional principle of family property held inclusively, in common, among all shareholders, in favour of the modern principle of individual property owned or leased exclusively by individuals. Once signed, the clan head and priests, accompanied by village chiefs and family heads, carried out customary rituals of cleansing. A goat was dragged around the village and then thrown into the bush with the sins of all on its back. A powerful ju-ju was then placed at the four corners of the village to destroy any remaining witches.

Analyzing the Trial

At the outset, youth framed the accusation in terms of their customary ‘right’ to accuse their seniors of witchcraft and to mobilize anti-witchcraft ‘cleansing’ ju-ju. In adopting the cause-and-effect discourse of kin-based society, they invoked ascribed criteria of social differentiation and political inequality with which to structure the relationship between contestants and the mode of conflict resolution. Beliefs in ‘family witchcraft’ constructed the discourse of spoken and imagined explanations of the youth’s death—the reluctance of some elders to redistribute wealth fairly, perceived economic inequality, and their propensity to indulge collectively in acts of witchcraft against their own ‘flesh and blood’. Social differentiation by age and kinship thus supplied the identities with which custom ‘captured’ development.

Youth and elders describe witches as social beings whose jealousy of others encourages them to ‘sell’ a favoured son or nephew to others in their group. In this respect they are assumed to be overly greedy, ‘selfish’, and individualistic: that is, witches are accused of cutting down talented youth in their prime, of destroying
‘development’ and holding back everyone else while they aggrandize themselves. Their imagined behaviour violates the collective ethos and supportive reciprocal exchange expected of elders. However, they are still social beings, for they partake of illicit flesh as a family society in the spirit world and do not act singly or in a solitary way. In fact it is believed that human flesh is contributed and blood shed in order to produce closer sociality, a common belief among neighbouring peoples. From the majority’s viewpoint, witches wield a negative form of power. In forming a ‘family witch society’ they act socially, but in ‘sucking’ the blood of close (junior) agnates their sociality becomes perverted, because it destroys some young patrikinsmen for the benefit of a small group of older pat­rikin (Rosny 1981).

Witch Sociality

Witches’ confessions about what they do with blood reconstruct the patrilineal extended family in several images of gendered pseudo-wholeness. In one popular scenario, senior agnates socialize secretly with others and use witchcraft to ‘kill’ young nephews or sons, ‘chopping’ young succulent flesh. Youth and elders say members use long teeth to chew flesh (‘meat’) which more often than not is transformed into ‘Christmas goat’ (ebu akanishu), so that human flesh is ‘eaten’ indireclty, perhaps rendering ‘cannibalism’ more culturally acceptable to Westernizing Boki. Some family witch societies possess ‘pots’ (kati be ne etse, ntsebe be ne etse) which drink or ‘suck the blood’ of human victims for members’ protection and enhanced power at the expense of others. ‘Pot societies’ place agnates imaged as witches at a distance from drinking blood and so may render ‘blood sucking’ more culturally acceptable. In another popular representation of empowerment through illicit access to spiritual powers, those accused of witchcraft may confess to ‘killing’ socially excluded family members, that is, richer, more powerful agnate’s sons or paternal nephews, whom they subsequently ‘incorporate’ in the form of ‘blood’ that ‘pots’ drink. Wealthier agnates may be obscured from view but reappear as the ‘killers’ of junior agnates from more affluent lines (see Winter 1963, Geschiere 1982, Ardener 1996), so that the patrilineal family is socially reconstructed. Conflict within a generation of agnates and between generations is then ‘resolved’ by ritual reparations involving sacrificial goats and the shedding of animal blood in order to ‘cleanse’ the offending family of witches and of bloodshed and to replace division with unity—reminding us of Fortes’s ‘axiom of amity’ (Fortes 1969). The case of the murder of one ‘brother’ by another that took place after the witch trial evoked another image of patrilineal unity, this time one that was ruptured violently by the shedding of blood. One man (Mr An) and his victim (Mr Ar) hailed from the same family (Batia): the murderer was ‘moved’ by a

7. Similar beliefs and practices are also current among the Anyang and Sankwala peoples with whom we are working too.
family witch to kill his 'brother'. Both broke the ultimate taboo because brothers 'saw each other's blood' (*be ri beloh beirie*). Genealogies we collected show how the two men reckoned their patrilineal relationship through a common ancestor. According to informants the common ancestor was five generations removed from Mr Ar but only three generations removed from Mr An, making the latter Mr Ar's 'grandfather'. They were patrikinsmen who did things together as 'brothers' and shared extended family property (i.e. land, stands of forest, certain economic trees). They were as 'one', being by birth 'of the same blood', so that their identity as persons was essentially the same, because the same patrilineal substance (blood) flowed in their bodies. When one agnate shed the other's blood he severed the blood uniting them, committing a spiritual abomination that people feared would bring death and spiritual retribution to both men and their families. Having 'strong blood' (*beloh omoh kar-kar*) is a key attribute of men's social identity which highlights the equation of mature manhood with the holding of respected public positions as chief, family head, council chairman, or land committee chairman. Elders and chiefs eat flesh and blood in their witch societies and become 'strong, strong' (*omoh kar-kar*). Strong blood means that a man will acquire riches, not through the hard work acclaimed by development agencies but—as one of our young informants hinted to us discreetly—through 'the sense of management' of public resources in which elders and youth can "share". Family witches increase their power to control the fortunes and life chances of others, including talented progressive youth living out of the village.

Youth's Assessment

A major social contradiction between youth and elders is inscribed in the young Boki man's view that the elders are witches who 'kill' progressive youth so as to drink their 'blood' and gain the strength to turn into bush pigs, which invade farms, eat cassava, and grab the wealth of others. The witch person seeks wealth for him- or herself—some is shared with other members of the family witch society (the elders)—at the expense of the wider society, so that 'development' for all is obstructed.

Is the witch acquiring new meanings as a metaphor for the greedy accumulator, the capitalist who exploits labour for personal gain and accumulates the (tactical) power to control the settings in which others operate (see Ardener 1996)?

Destroying life for 'selfish' reasons is attributed to elders' 'bad heart' (*obeh riteh*), which seeks to deny youth their life and struggle to bring 'development' (a fine name, money, and employment to younger youth; see Oshita 1992). An older person increases his wealth at youth's expense, even at the cost of his 'heart', his life. Witchcraft, the capacity to destroy the living so that their blood can be ingested in the spirit world and give 'power' to the drinker, is thought to be purchased, notoriously by offering the life of a favourite child or young adult son to a family society. Witches live off their intimates-by-blood, that is, agnates of
the same sub-family or, less often, the same extended family. The family is depleted. Each member of a family witch society which is believed to eat ‘meat’ must contribute in turn the flesh of a senior or successful son or—less valued—a paternal nephew who is ‘progressing’ in the city, in the formal sector. As already mentioned, some family witch societies possess ‘pots’ with a narrow round opening through which it (the pot) kati be ne ets, ntsebe be ne etse, ‘sucks’ in the human victim’s blood (beluo). Perhaps the ‘pot’ ‘sucks’ in the precious fluid because human blood is too ‘strong’ for witches to drink directly.

Youth believe family witches decrease other relatives’ wealth (life) by ‘enjoying’ food in the spirit world, giving them the ability to transform themselves into animals (bush pigs) so that they can ‘chop’ on envied brothers’ and neighbours’ cassava and cocoyam farms at night. Their activities in the spirit world reduce opportunities and life chances for other family members, especially those of youth. Witch societies practise direct exchange, often referred to in the physical world as ‘giving and receiving’ (nki, embua enkwo). Every member of a family witch society must take turns to give the life of someone close to them. A close relationship means virtue, worth, value; once a sacrifice has been carried out, members take it in turns to share the flesh, dividing it into portions called ‘shares’. Politicians and big men in the material world of the village’s and nation-state’s redistributive economy do the same. Small men (clients) or followers make their oga (big man, patron) feel they may have to impugn his reputation for ‘unselfishness’ and loyalty to his following (network) unless he redistributes to them some of his illicitly obtained gains in the form of ‘shares’ (i.e., ten to sixty per cent of the takings, depending upon the client’s rank in the political network and his utility to the big man).

Young youth think older men’s witchcraft is achieved at the expense of social unity. Accordingly, young ‘active’ youth believe in the anti-witchcraft detection ju-ju they mobilize and that the trials they instigate, which are ‘managed’ by ‘proper’ elders, upholders of unity—though behind the scenes some of them are also conniving with senior and young youth—are necessary to ‘scatter’ family witch societies and restore social amity between poorer, lesser agnates quarrelling with wealthier agnates over the latter’s perceived maldistribution of resources. Youth and elders who are not accused of being witches seek to restore unity (nitsebe ni berie) between men of the same ‘blood’.

Often among the poorest or most marginal members of the village, elders and barren women accused of witchcraft may be ‘distant’ or ‘close’ family members. Boki witchcraft is a ‘domestic’ affair that expresses social tensions between, for example, common and private tenurial regimes, thus tentatively titling the social identity of fathers towards their moral and jural ‘rights’ in nuclear family contexts. Constructs of the family witch society re-construct the sub-family in a truncated and socially distorted form. Wealthy elders and influential senior/young youth are almost invariably accusers, so higher status and higher economic-class family members are omitted from the witch ‘family’; the latter comprises in the main poor men and marginal (barren) women. In the course of launching accusations of
witchcraft against certain elders, youth puncture the collective silence of authority figures and open up growing economic inequality and the perceived failure of the informal redistributive economy to public debate (pace Bohannon's 1958 analysis of similar 'extra-processual' activities in Tiv society).

Contesting Identities

Social identity is highly contested, within and between families, by different groups, notably the politically pivotal categories of youth and elders. Economic inequality is increasing: there is de facto privatization of family lands, the emergence of a landless underclass of households, and a class of senior youth who own marginally productive small plots of land. Older men with relatively plentiful land need more labour and so are most committed to the principle of de jure common property rights in land and sub-village governance through extended family heads. Married senior youth with non-existent or smaller plots tend to support private property rights and a greater 'share' in contracts, commissions, and the like. They are asserting their right to a greater voice in the 'management' of village affairs so that the community will be protected from witchcraft and obstructions to 'development'. A year later the village spoke of the witchcraft trial as 'the crisis', and to avoid further attacks the elders encouraged the election of several senior youth to positions on the community council and the land committee.

Conflict between Custom and Development

Popular Boki culture interprets the kin-based redistributive polity as dualistic through vivid images of a world divided into the spiritual and physical, but one in which the spiritual penetrates and shapes events in the physical. As we have seen, popular thought images power in a double modality. Power can be achieved licitly or illicitly by obtaining money and flesh or blood, often from closely related agnates in the patrifocal family. Witches—mostly older patrilineally related men, but also a few patrilineally related women—redistribute ('share') illicitly obtained (human) resources through their networks, exchanging family unity for human blood with which to enhance their power to increase their political position at others' expense. Witches use this blood and flesh to give themselves physical strength on the farm at the expense of others and to accumulate wealth by diminishing that of others, that is, by bringing about the deaths of successful youth, the remittance senders, and resource 'gatekeepers' who benefit the village. In this view, some men's and women's access to mystical resources and blood-sucking proclivities diminishes economic opportunities for others in the spiritual and physical worlds.
Globalization theorists contend that local identities and societies are being replaced or homogenized by Westernizing practices of ‘consumer man’. However, Robertson (1992) and Friedman (1994), both sensitive to the complexities of world history, deconstruct this broad trajectory. They identify two interpenetrating processes—the universalization of particularism, as in the emergence of the nation-state from ethnic sub-national polities, and the particularization of a universalizing religion, as in Japanese (nationalized) Buddhism (Robertson 1992).

Reflecting on our observations of a witchcraft trial, we argued for a variant of the particularization thesis. Our analysis investigated ways in which customary representations and practices, reproduced by kin-based society and a mixed economy of agricultural production and entrepreneurial capital, ‘capture’ development identities. We suggested that in the short term, ‘capturing’ processes sustain ‘custom man’ and the moral economy of kinship. We proposed a conceptual framework or set of logically related propositions to explain these processes: how may conflict over contested symbolic, political, and economic resources arrest the diffusion of ‘development man’ at the intersection of the local with the global? A political approach was necessary because struggles for power are integral to conflict between youth (self-proclaimed bearers of development) and elders (guardians of custom) for control over the distribution of resources. Power is pivotal to contesting identities in social contexts shaped by the intersection of pre-industrial social structures and post-industrial international profit networks. Our situational analysis of a witchcraft trial demonstrates the cultural power of kin-based beliefs and practices to structure the discourse of conflict in terms of the ‘unity’ of Beri men who ‘share one blood’ and whose elders consented to youth purchasing an anti-witchcraft ju-ju with which to torture the accused and cleanse the community of their spiritual pollution. Relations of patrikinship also sustain the discourse of witchcraft which orchestrated the setting so that youth were authorized to hire a powerful ju-ju with which to identify and try the accused. Kin-based society still structures men’s social identities.

In Beri village, and elsewhere in Bokiland where witchcraft trials erupt periodically at times, with more violence than we witnessed, ‘boys’ rebellions’ shake rather than invert or destroy elders’ privileges. Youth know that in the fullness of time they too will achieve a more complete public identity as elders, with the ‘right’ to command others that a patrilineally based social hierarchy evoking notions of ‘one blood’ sustains (Rowlands 1986). Covertly, then, even young youth support established hierarchies of social age and descent, upholding their anticipated ascendancy and thus the customary social identities of chief, youth, and priest. In the shorter if not longer term, as MacGaffey (1970) has argued, communities tend to redefine Westernizing (global) identities through local representations and thus enhance ‘indigenous’ concepts of male personhood as chief, elder, priest, and prophet.
We suggested other reasons why customary identities structure the discourse of conflict so that they 'capture' the values of 'development'. Most smallholders' dependence on Beri village land for farming means that they have to rely on patrikinship in making claims to land. This dependence may also help to account for the popular view that land is the common property of all Beri men but is also owned by individuals—that it is subject to claims under private tenure but is managed on behalf of the village under customary common tenure. Making claims to land through patri-relations may be a factor in sustaining the cultural power of the customary belief in certain men (and women) who live in both the spiritual and physical worlds, and who use these mystical powers to their advantage and to the disadvantage of the wider society. Witches play off one world against the other, engaging in displays of tactical (organizational) power. Youth deploy the discourse of witchcraft as a tactical means of attacking elders for obstructing economic development, and in seeking for themselves a greater 'share' in some elders' contracts, commissions, and business deals. These beliefs and practices, we contend, reproduce the power of kinship to structure conflicts between socially younger and older men in the discourse of witchcraft and illicitly garnered dominance.

The witchcraft trials and confessions one of us observed in late 1996-97 demonstrated youth's tactical skill in mobilizing representations of anti-kin-group ('bad') individualism, as well as their use of these signifiers in enhancing their association as progressive youth with 'good development' within the political framework of the moral economy of collective exchange and reciprocity between kinsmen. But what may kinship, identity, and development also mean? How may representations of 'custom man' and 'development man' achieve new meanings in new locales—ironically, perhaps through association with and subjugation to symbols of non-development, tradition, and the blood of sacrifice?

'We offered a ram for sacrifice yesterday', said one informant. 'What for?', asked one of us. 'For progress, of course. For a blessing of the land.'

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CASTE, KINSHIP, AND IDENTITY IN INDIA

ROBERT PARKIN

I

My intention in this paper is to initiate or at least develop further the application of the themes of identity and ethnicity to Indian material. Although some work in the 1970s addressed these issues (e.g. in David 1977), and there has been recent work on neighbouring Nepal (in Gellner et al. 1997), South Asia is not an area that one associates with these themes as much as some other parts of the world, especially, perhaps, Europe or Africa. None the less, as I hope to show, the region is certainly one whose cultural and social formations lend themselves to such treatment. I shall argue very generally, painting with a broad brush and seeking to present familiar material in a fresh light. References will therefore be kept to a minimum.

II

I will begin by giving a brief account of general features. As is well known, India is divided into status groups to which the term 'caste' is generally given. I am not going to discuss all the various problems surrounding the use of this term, restricting myself for present purposes to two aspects. One is that it is not an indigenous term in any Indian language but derives from Spanish/Portuguese casta, and
through it from Latin *castus*, literally ‘chaste’, but by extension referring to something not mixed, pure. By the fifteenth century it had come to be used in Spanish and Portuguese of ‘race, kind, breed’, a usage which parallels very closely the common indigenous Indian term (not in all languages) for what we call caste, namely *jati*. The other objection is that although Indian society is overwhelmingly constituted of castes, this does not exhaust the social groupings it recognizes. This is true on two levels. First, there are other social groups in the formal sense. There are tribes, who are notoriously difficult to distinguish from castes through formal features but who none the less have a legal status as such and often feel themselves to be tribes as distinct from castes (Parkin 1992: chapter 1). There are also religious sects, of renouncers or the devotees of a particular god, who again show convergences with caste but whose focus is essentially other-worldly and transcendental. Secondly, there are the four varnas (Brahman, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra), social categories rather than groups which represent traditional general societal functions (respectively religious authority, secular rule, wealth creation, and service) and who act to group castes to some extent (there are many Brahman castes, for instance, some of whom are virtually untouchable for others). However, there are two qualifications indicating that the varnas are not simply the caste system in simplified form. One is that they exclude the Untouchables. The other is that they are imperfectly represented across India: the south in particular has a wide gap between Brahmans and Shudras, the latter generally including kingly castes in this region. It is important to mention the varnas here because the imitative models used by lower castes are mostly seen in terms of varna, not caste: one aspires to Kshatriya status, for example, more than that of any particular Kshatriya caste locally (such as the Rajputs), who will tend to be protective of their status in any particular region (Brahmans and Vaishyas, by contrast, rarely seem to appear as imitative models, possibly because their vegetarianism and other practices are seen as rigorous, their overall positions in society as relatively lacking in power).

Castes themselves are often seen as occupational groups embedded in a system of division of labour. The nature of this system, in particular from the economic point of view, is still an unresolved controversy, but there is general recognition that it has fundamental ritual aspects, as Dumont’s theory makes plain (1980): in brief, the continuance of world and cosmos depends on the Brahman’s ritual actions, which he can perform only in a state of purity. It is the function of the other castes to support him in this. One thinks here immediately of the Untouchables, removers of purity-denying pollution for other castes, especially those castes which also have varna status. However, the king and other higher castes also have a role in providing for the Brahman, both in terms of material sustenance (including the means thereto, such as land, though not all Brahmans enjoy this) and in terms of physical protection in the king’s case. Economically, many individuals do live from their caste occupation, but there are also many who do not (Quigley 1993). This is not entirely a feature of the modern state and economy. Across the Ganges plain the most frequently encountered Untouchables are the Chamars,
literally and traditionally leather-workers. In practice, however, they have long provided the land-owning castes with their main pool of agricultural labour, to such an extent that this actually seems to have become the prevailing stereotype of them, at least in the literature.

The axis of purity and impurity which Dumont sees as the basis of the way castes are integrated also has a moral dimension. This acts at both individual and caste levels. A characteristic of kaliyuga, the debased age in which we live today, is continual rebirth, which involves pain in itself and can be avoided only through ascetic practices based on a commitment to turn one's back on the transient, material world. It is the goal of the ascetic, the renouncer, to achieve this moksha or liberation from the cycle of rebirths. But lesser mortals who cannot free themselves from this world are not only condemned to perpetual rebirth, their status at every rebirth depends on the worth of their previous lives. In this way, one can hope to improve one's status through good works and fulfilling one's earthly duties, including caste duties, conscientiously, or fear losing possibly even human status—one can come back as any living creature—through doing evil, even unknowingly. In general, this karma, very roughly 'fate', is not a matter for the caste but the individual (Fürer-Haimendorf 1967). But also, lower castes as a whole, especially Untouchables, are said by upper castes to owe their status to their polluting occupations and generally un-Sanskritic practices such as meat-eating and alcohol. This tends to rule out status increases through reform: a caste can give up meat-eating and alcohol fairly easily, and sometimes even its occupation, but convincing others that they have done so is often difficult; besides, one cannot set aside one's history so easily. In effect, the upper castes say, 'Once a Chamar always a Chamar'. Not surprisingly, the lower castes have their own account of the reasons for their condition. This is generally that one of their number in the distant past inadvertently committed a ritual fault, such as eating beef, perhaps having been tricked by an evil Brahman. A variant, found particularly among tribes, is that the Brahmans stole the sacred thread from them. This is tantamount to saying, 'We are not at fault for our status, which is due to knavery or an innocent mistake, both of which can be rectified through compensatory ritual action and/or the restitution of what properly belongs to us.'

III

Equally important as a marker of castes is their endogamy—indeed, this is more salient ultimately than occupation, since it is an area where precept and practice are more prone to converge. Even this needs qualifying, since in practice it is likely to be sub-castes, sub-sub-castes etc. that are the operative units in affinal exchanges. However, I leave this complication aside here. What I stress in the present context is the value placed on common substance. A first point is that
there may be a certain academic bias at work. In India, descent may actually be stressed just as much as the ban on marriages with outsiders, that the outside world is more familiar with: even academic discourse, while recognizing the former, tends to stress the latter as definitional of caste and its sub-groups. In other parts of the world, descent may be stressed more by the analyst than the devaluation of out-marriage. In effect, though, each reinforces the other: although even in India descent lines may be gender-specific in terms of continuity of line if rarely of recruitment of children to it, this is often bound up with considerations of legitimacy which depend in their turn on the children being the issue of a proper marriage. Substance too may be diluted and/or polluted by out-marriage. There is, incidentally, no conflict with the principle of exogamy here: Rajputs are one example of an Indian caste which is divided into exogamous clans but which still protects its substance by a rule of endogamy for itself as an entirety.

However, as Dumont showed long ago (ibid.), what applies to marriage does not necessarily apply to other forms of sexual union, nor is marriage always taken in the same way by different groups. Throughout Indian society, I would say, including among tribes, marriage is important for adult personhood, though in some cases bearing a legitimate heir may be yet more significant. For example, the Ho tribe, in Bihar, associate marriage with effectiveness, ritually 'marrying' not only people but fishing, farming, hunting, and other implements to ensure their effectiveness (Majumdar 1950). But secondary unions are an important feature in many groups. In caste society there are many gender contrasts here as well as caste ones. Men may take second spouses simultaneously, women, if at all, only consecutively. Male polygyny may be due to the barrenness of the first wife (for example, among tribals) as much as prestige (as in the case of Kshatriyas); a good Brahman, however, prefers to remain monogamous. Second wives are caste mates and may, perhaps particularly in lower status groups, be lineage sisters of the first: among tribes, paying a brideprice often implies a right to a replacement in the event of the death or barrenness of the first wife. At this level in the hierarchy women frequently have the right to divorce (or at least to be divorced) and to remarry as divorcees or widows, but higher castes are generally opposed to both practices: widows in particular are highly inauspicious (Gough 1956). All this applies to marriage and to the caste or jati, so that endogamy is maintained. However, men frequently pursue relationships with women from lower castes, which may be long-term and lead to issue and to settled, if meagre, provision for it. The difference is that these are not marriages, and although inheritance for the issue of such relationships is not out of the question, it is almost bound to be subsidiary to transmission within the caste-embedded family of marriage and legitimate procreation. Sometimes such liaisons are so common between particular castes that separate castes arise from them, at least if tradition is to be believed. This is also well known among tribes: for example, the Mahali of Bihar trace their origin to past Santal–Munda mixed marriages. The status of such accounts is often very uncertain, especially since castes are often represented even in some of the ethnographic literature as deriving wholesale from mixed-varna unions. But it is
as if a new form of substance may be created if enough people act in this way. Carried on, on a more occasional basis, such liaisons pose a problem in terms of the caste attribution of any children. This is normally solved by attributing them to the caste of the mother.

An interesting variant on the topic of mixed-caste unions is provided by the Nayar, who until recent changes this century lived in matrilineal joint families in south India and have long been regarded as the ultimate test of the notion of the universality of marriage by anthropologists: at least, it has been frequently been doubted if they really have any (see Fuller 1976). Classed as Shudras, they are low in status, yet their women normatively maintain unions with Nambudiri Brahman men, who are very high in status, as well as with Nayar men. There is a distinction, however: in principle, liaisons with Nambudiri eldest sons are purely ritual, not sexual, though from the Nayar point of view they count as marriages. Nayar children are born of liaisons between Nayar women and Nayar men or Nambudiri younger sons, which are marriages from no one’s point of view. The distinction between eldest sons and their younger brothers among the Nambudiri is based on the position of the former as privileged heir within the caste—ritually, spiritually and materially—to the man who is father to all the brothers, and on the association found generally in India, particularly in Brahman families, between eldest son and father—quite simply, the younger sons are less important in terms of their family’s or caste’s continuity or status and can indulge in these liaisons quite freely, especially as they do not entail marriage. From the Nayar point of view, these relationships are ones which actively produce Nayar children but which are with men of higher status than the Nayar men from whom Nayar children are also born.

But what is the importance of Nambudiri eldest sons to Nayar women? I have said that these liaisons constitute ritual marriage from the Nayar point of view, and proper mourning will be observed for these ritual husbands on their deaths, even though they disappear from the woman’s life immediately the rite is concluded. For the Nambudiri, however, they are simply a ritual service in return for gifts which the Nayar see as marriage gifts but the Nambudiri do not. The central part of the rite is the tying of a token, called a tali, around the neck of the Nayar ‘bride’ by a Nambudiri eldest son, something which occurs in marriages among all castes all over south India. This allows the Nayar woman to claim the married status she needs to go off and indulge in subsidiary, non-marital relations with other Nambudiri and Nayar men. Does it, however, make the Nambudiri officiant her husband? No, he would say, because the tali is never tied by the groom elsewhere in south India. This is only one example of what we might call marriage as liberating in the sub-continent. Marriage to a pole or stake is a frequent part of the usual Indian wedding, but women especially are sometimes married to an object (a sword, for example) or a person who immediately disappears from their lives, so that they have the status of married women but can take part in what would otherwise be much more polluting practices—acting as temple prostitutes, for example, or as Nayar reproducers or, among the Newar of Nepal, indulging in
relations with men of lower castes (Dumont ibid.; Parkin 1997). The point to be made here is that not only substance but also status depends on marriage, but in unpredictable ways: in particular, many Indians manage to evade or limit loss of status by indulging in sexual practices in arenas which are not defined as marriage.

But there are many other aspects that have to be discussed under the rubric of marriage itself. I shall return to the question of substance later, but first I must deal with the question of marriage as system and practice, this time within castes as well as being an aspect of inter-caste distinctions. As in other respects, there is a difference in practice between different status groups, though this is complicated by a south–north contrast which cross-cuts this difference. I start with the so-called kanya dan ideology, which is generally associated with north India and with high- and middle-status groups. In brief, this entails the gift of a woman, a virgin, preferably a child, to a family of higher status; giving gifts to superiors is always meritorious, counting as a good work useful in building credit for one’s eventual salvation, and this ‘gift of a virgin’ is the supreme gift of all. Accompanying the bride is normally also a dowry, which is financially crippling for many families but strategically important in making as good a match as possible in terms of status. Given caste or even sub-caste endogamy, the status difference obviously occurs within the caste or sub-caste as the case may be. The stress on castes as conveying unity of substance therefore does not prevent further differences arising within the caste itself, or even sub-units of it: indeed, the hierarchy typically pervades the caste itself in this respect and does not end at its boundaries.

As regards the way the marriage system works, there are two qualifications. First, marriages can and do take place between families who were of roughly equal status to begin with, the status difference arising, perhaps only temporarily, as a result of the marriage itself. This is often imitated among groups for whom equality is the norm: the Juang, another tribe of Orissa, mark the high-status difference between wife-takers and wife-givers in the wedding itself, even though these actual differences do not matter outside this context (McDougal 1964).

Secondly, the status difference also tends to be kept small because there is a sort of bargaining process: a particular family will strive to ally itself with another family of as high a status as possible, which, however, may well reject the approach for fear of losing status by allying with a family of significantly lower status than itself. None the less, notions of common substance and therefore identity encompass clear status differences within the affinal alliance unit.

Kanya dan ideology is, among other things, one of the unsolicited gift of a virgin to a family of higher status; the approach should come from the virgin bride-to-be’s own family, not that of the prospective groom. There is also an emphasis on the unidirectional transfer of both virgin and other gifts: nothing should be taken in return from one’s wife-taker, not even, it is often said, a glass of water. This means that women move up the hierarchy. What happens, however, if, as a man, one is at the bottom of any endogamous unit and has no one below oneself to take a wife from? Such unfortunates are often forced to breach caste rules. One strategy is to take a wife from outside and therefore below the
endogamous unit, though not necessarily the wider caste; this contributes to secession and caste-fragmentation, since those of higher status may refuse to associate with those below them henceforth as a result. A new caste identity may then be born. Another tactic is to remain within the endogamous unit but to begin exchanging women within it, in violation of the ban on reciprocity associated with the ideology of kanya dan; this may be accompanied by, or modified in the direction of, the offer of a brideprice in place of dowry. In other words, not only may the ban on direct exchange be abandoned, the ban on the groom soliciting for a bride may also be reversed. Again, families concerned for their own status will be faced with the choice of suffering loss of status themselves by too close an association or breaking with their fellows in order to preserve it; they will often choose the latter.

The accumulation of women at the top of any endogamous group also poses problems, especially if the group is concerned for its status. Unmarried mature women are especially a liability for upper castes, not only because of the preservation of the reputation for virginity, but also because her natal family is responsible for the monthly destruction of an ovum and therefore a life. The sooner a female child is given away to her affinal kin, who will then assume this responsibility, the better, hence child marriage. Indeed, girls are not only potentially inauspicious and a burden in terms of the dowry that must be found for them, they are often considered as not belonging to their natal families at all but to the families that will eventually take them in marriage. However, if one has an endogamous boundary above one's head, marrying them off poses extra problems, and indeed there is competition for what marriages are available, for unmarried females tend to accumulate at the top of each endogamous division: hence purdah or the neglect of female infants, extending in the past, especially in Raiput groups, to female infanticide. Here too, the notion of unitary substance is qualified, since a daughter's substance is basically not ours; and indeed, in south India a wife is often regarded as exchanging part of her substance for her husband's on marriage (the male but not female aspect of that substance: see Fruzzetti et al. 1992). A boy, on the other hand, represents an heir, and the eldest son will play a key role in one's funeral and in turning one into an ancestor. His substance stays within the group, though as a householder he needs a wife in order to be able to perform the necessary rituals (this is most obviously true of Brahmans).

As one goes down the hierarchy, one eventually encounters castes that have nothing to do with kanya dan but who uniformly exchange women, with or without brideprice. Such practices therefore come to be associated with lower status groups, even though actual weddings may be modelled on those of the higher castes. Attempts at reform are frequent, but probably limited in their effects (see Parry 1979). Although there is no exact correlation between wealth and status, it is certainly the case that lower-status groups tend to be perpetually dependent on a brideprice rather than becoming able to offer a dowry. More particularly, perhaps, attempts to reform status are often rejected by some within the group, leading to further fragmentation and more numerous endogamous boundaries, thus
multiplying the problems just mentioned. In truth, the situation is quite fluid, but every sub-group seeking to abandon low-status practices is effectively upsetting established affinal relationships with other groups, meeting resistance on these grounds from its fellows, as well as on grounds of status from groups above it with whom it may be trying to ally itself through marriage.

I hope it will be seen from this how the marriage system, in terms of both the way it works and the models it uses, contributes to the multiplication of and shifts in caste, sub-caste etc. identity, both modifying and supporting notions of common substance through descent. I also said that the south was different in certain important respects, the chief of which is cross-cousin marriage. This means that in structural terms, marriage is conceived as taking place between individuals who are already kin to one another and therefore share doubly in substance, so to speak, since there is also caste. There is also less unhappiness with the notion that wife-takers and wife-givers may be of the same status, and indeed the kinship terminology is structured so as not to make this particular distinction, since it unites the two categories (unlike the northern terminology). In practice there is often a preference for one cross cousin over the other, especially, perhaps, for FZD over MBD, though on the whole this neither reflects nor leads to permanent differences in status between groups. However, Brahmanical circles in south India may have nothing to do with cross-cousin marriage and carry on their affairs in a north Indian fashion (Gough 1956).

IV

Is there actually more than one model of kinship in India or several? To some extent the latter, especially given the north–south divide. However, within the typical north Indian community, it may be more plausible to talk about an accepted common ideology which low-status groups find it impossible to follow for the reasons already indicated. Certainly lower castes often seek to rise in status by abandoning demeaning practices and adopting those of the higher castes. I mentioned earlier the abandonment of alcohol, meat-eating and even occupation, to which one can also add public dancing. In the domain of kinship there may be an agreement to abandon brideprice in favour of dowry, to widen the structural distance at which marriage takes place (often involving the abandonment of cross-cousin marriage), and to cease exchanging women directly. Such decisions are often made in public forums such as caste assemblies and are regarded as binding on all members—otherwise, there is even less chance of the strategy working. Although they amount to changing kinship practice and therefore the structural aspects of kinship, the principle of kinship in terms of common substance through a combination of descent and endogamy remains. However, the actual boundaries may be drawn more tightly, not least because the sub-caste may split on the
issue—and even if it does not, higher sub-castes may well not accept the validity of the reforms or see in them a threat to their own status. What may then well happen is that higher sub-castes change their practices to maintain their distance, meaning that the sub-caste that initiated the changes may find itself chasing a moving target.

The picture changes somewhat when we shift our attention to the tribes. Although typically quite Hinduized in religion and ritual, and generally occupying a niche in local hierarchies which otherwise consist of different castes, many of them, like the Santal, see their identity in terms of tribe, not caste. The Santal, of Bihar and Orissa, are an interesting case in respect of theories of ethnicity (Parkin: in preparation). We have become used to the idea, since Leach and Barth at least, that ethnic and cultural boundaries are not homologous: very broadly, different self-ascribed ethnic groups share cultures, and the same ethnic group may be culturally differentiated internally. At certain periods in recent history, however, the Santal have adopted many upper-caste/Hindu traits and applied them to their own practice in such a way as to claim them as the basis of an anti-caste and anti-Hindu but adivasi identity. Thus, in the inter-war period they adopted the sacred thread, used low-caste ritual specialists such as priests and barbers, recognized at least ritually notions of purity and pollution, cremated not buried their dead on the banks of the river Damodar (which is assimilated to the sacred river Ganges), married with vermilion marks and other Hindu features, and avoided the prescriptive marriage systems that some other tribes in the area continue to indulge in. Like castes they still use commensality rules to mark a distance, but reversed the polarity; whereas normally any caste feels able to take even the most vulnerable cooked food from Brahmans, a Santal will refuse to accept anything from them, since they are the chief representatives of casteism and Hinduism. The Santal descent system consists of formally twelve but practically never more than eleven clans, which are not only totemic like those of other tribes but were formerly each also associated with a particular traditional occupation or function, in clear imitation of the caste system.

Although the situation has changed markedly since Indian independence in 1947, in the direction of developing a separate tribal identity based on supposedly ‘aboriginal’ customs and features, between the wars the Santal were rather imitating those who would unhesitatingly regard themselves as their betters, in the manner of many low castes and other tribes. However, they eventually realized that the normal route to a higher status would do them no good, as the most they could expect would be to be able to enter the caste system at a low position, where they would remain. Staying as tribals, they can claim an identity which is wholly separate from caste, while selectively using some of the practices of the caste system as well as ‘aboriginal’ markers to do so. In effect, they are saying, ‘Our practice is as good as that of any Brahman; we don’t need to be a part of the system to show this.’ Like a caste too, they postulate their unity in terms of common substance; divided at a lower level into separate but intermarrying clans.
and lineages, at the ultimate level all Santal are seen as being agnatically related through their common origins.

This not only recalls many individual castes and sub-castes, it also resembles the way many tribal ethnic groups see themselves in other parts of the world. What is lacking as regards the first comparison is any ritual mechanism integrating the Santal with other groups of like kind sociologically but of different substance and status ethnographically—in short, they do not see themselves as part of a caste system. What is lacking as regards the second comparison is the attribution of ritual status to them in terms specifically of pure and impure: tribal groups outside India may regard each other as less perfectly human than themselves, but integrated rank systems are rare. A high-caste Hindu will automatically give tribals a low status as meat-eating, alcohol-consuming, cousin-marrying hedonists, though since they mostly refrain from polluting occupations they are generally considered a cut above the Untouchables. This is not simply prejudice on the part of higher castes: despite their reformism, for example, the Santal have little in the way of kanya dan ideology, and brideprice is still much commoner than dowry. This may indicate that while certain practices are to be imitated, others are to be avoided as casteism. At all events, the upper-caste attitude exemplifies the principle that the status one claims for oneself is not necessarily that accepted by others. In India, disputes over ranking between castes of roughly equal status are legendary at all status levels, among Untouchables and Brahmans as well as among middle-ranking groups. Santal leaders, being astute enough to recognize this, have done what they can to opt out of the status system entirely, by a combination of declaring their separation in terms of descent and of substance generally, reforming customs along caste lines up to a point, and introducing new, ‘aboriginal’ ones in an attempt to go beyond that point in a separatist direction.

It is time to draw things to a conclusion. In this article I have tried to take known and unexceptional facts about Indian kinship and to see them from the angle of caste and tribal identities specifically. I have certainly painted with a broad brush and on a very broad canvas; practice and ideology in India are both more nuanced and complex than I have been able to show here. But in essence my thesis is as follows. Different status groups not only see themselves as different in terms of substance, through descent, they also use marriage practices as one of a number of means not simply of distinguishing groups, but of according them a rank: your practice is less pure than mine, therefore I will regard you as beneath me and not ally my family affinally with yours. In addition, this very denial of affinity reinforces the sense of separation through descent. Although individual castes, sub-castes, etc. may be integrated internally through either high-status kanya dan
or low-status marriage exchanges, as the case may be, one has to look elsewhere for what integrates the caste system as a whole. As in many other parts of the world, kinship acts to create and maintain many of the distinctions from which social groups derive their identity.

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BOOK REVIEWS


This collection of fifteen essays derives from a conference held at the University of Ottawa in 1991, investigating the proposition that 'Theory (with a capital T) has emerged as a privileged site of mediation between processes of market valorization and discourses of intellectual and political legitimation in the production and circulation of art' (p. 3). If much contemporary Western artistic production has become, post-pictures, a matter of finding visual metaphors for bookish high theory, the reverse may also be true: high theory has itself assumed an 'artistic' dimension through celebrity authors whose publications and intellectual personalities circulate widely outside academia. If there is a tendency to celebrate this state of affairs, it can be located in a certain residual modernist vanguardism, in which high-concept art points the way forward, reconciling an age-old split between theory and practice. As Straw suggests in his succinct opening essay, this state of affairs should perhaps be seen less as the reconciliation of a historical problem and more as 'the product of institutional and sociological alignments. 'What are needed', he continues, 'are analyses which specify the dispositional, institutional, and social economics within which theory has come to occupy new relationships to artistic practice' (p. 29).

The volume as a whole provides just this. Individual essays are variously interventionist (de Duve), reflexive (Berland), or coolly philosophical (Asselin) and cover a variety of topics, including prison literature (Harlow), virtual reality and cyberspace (Tomas, Dagenais, Marchessault), and photography (Seaton). A number of issues cluster around the main theme. All the essays are critical of Theory’s institutional circuitry. A number of authors present detailed discussions of events in which Theory has attained sudden, revealing prominence. Dowler discusses the debates over the Canadian National Gallery’s purchase of Newman’s Voice of Fire in 1990 and Stobak’s Vanitas (a meat sculpture) the following year. Tomas discusses a ‘virtual seminar on the bioapparatus’ in Banff in 1991, in which artists, writers, and computer specialists were brought together to discuss issues emerging from cyborg theory and feminist critiques of technology. Clark subjects the use of Foucault by Canadian artists to a thoroughly Foucauldian analysis.

Others trace Theory’s institutional pathologies in a more abstract vein. A persistent theme is the way in which Theory reproduces decidedly old-fangled modes of thought and institutional practice: the ‘death of the author’ has produced authors as never before; multiculturalism reproduces rather than erodes a highly Eurocentric notion of ‘culture’; virtual reality does much less than its proponents claim to erase the distinctions between mind-work and body-work; post-structuralism renders feminist
theory increasingly untenable; demotic art museum educational policies maintain, despite their self-conscious anti-elitism, a rift between those in the know and those not.

We cannot avoid theory, as Wolff points out in her vigorously argued chapter; since we cannot, she implies, let us just make sure we choose the right ones.

Anthropologists may find references to familiar signposts (Appadurai, Bourdieu, Clifford) thin on the ground, although they are by no means absent. On the whole the volume is located squarely within the cultural studies canon. This is, however, a book that will be read with great interest by anyone working on the key cultural institutions of Western modernity. Taken as a whole, it contributes a thought-provoking twist to a well-entrenched discussion (at least within anthropology and, latterly, art history and musicology) of the ways in which theory is invoked, manipulated, and policed in these over-familiar but critical institutions.

MARTIN STOKES


Despite the medical likelihood that pregnancy loss has been experienced in all societies down through the ages, it has received little anthropological attention, as Cecil notes in her introduction. Perhaps this is because a pregnancy that ultimately fails to produce a new member of society might at first appear to have no impact on the social structure. Nevertheless, this collection of ten articles convincingly demonstrates that the study of pregnancy loss helps illuminate fundamental cultural concepts essential to much anthropological analysis, such as life, death, the person and the body, as well as the world-view of a given culture.

The book is divided into two parts. The first comprises ethnographic studies of non-Western societies. While the ethnographic aspects investigated in each differ somewhat, they generally include how people of the target culture define pregnancy and miscarriage, the attitudes and ways in which they deal with pregnancy loss, measures for recovery, and the impact of the pregnancy loss on social structure.

Cecil characterizes the articles of the second part as going beyond the ‘mainstream’ of anthropological enquiry. Their approaches vary widely. For instance, the studies by Deluca and Leslie apply statistical biomedical analysis to ‘modern, Western populations’. Layne employs textual analysis in the manner of literary criticism to explore the ‘ironies of pregnancy’ she finds in the personal accounts contributed by middle-class white American women to a pregnancy-loss support-group newsletter between 1984 and 1991. Chalmers ‘explores the influence of cultural expectations on the management of miscarriage among four major cultural groups in South Africa’. Cecil interviews elderly women in Northern Ireland about their recollections of pregnancy loss, and Jackson seeks to glean cultural concepts from eighteenth-century court records in England in which women sought to defend themselves from accusations of having killed their new-born children.
The essays are all quite detailed. The five ethnographic studies and Chalmers' cross-cultural study clearly work to present the natives' point of view and attitudes, laudably minimizing the influence of any Western preconceptions about pregnancy loss. These successes lead one to wish that the authors had moved beyond the feminist tendency of the 1970s to approach pregnancy loss primarily from a female perspective. With one exception, pregnancy loss is described in terms of the feelings or thoughts of women or mothers, with only an occasional oblique reference to how the other partner in the pregnancy, the father, might have felt or thought.

A telling example is Cecil's own study of the recollections of older women in Northern Ireland of their pregnancy losses. Her informants told her that generally only the father and male relations attended the funeral of the stillborn child, while a wake served as the occasion for other women to comfort the bereaved mother. One is left wondering what memories the father might have had of burying his own offspring. Cecil advocates this woman-centred approach in her introduction, arguing that 'the actual experience of pregnancy, childbirth and pregnancy loss can only be known by women.' A defence of this stance might be that men generally refuse to discuss such feelings or experiences; yet Cecil notes that some of her female informants themselves deprecated the importance of their memories. It would seem, then, that the anthropological researcher must supply a professional evaluation of the importance that should be attached to a particular informant's experience if the study is to stand the test of time. Even if the male and female partners to a given pregnancy in a Catholic (and Protestant) society such as Northern Ireland appear to never to have articulated their feelings about the loss to each other, this does not necessarily mean that no communication on any level has taken place. In any case, the nature or apparent lack of such communication between partners in such a pregnancy is itself an important aspect of social structure for the researcher to explore and analyse if the potential of this analytical tool is to be fully utilized. One study in this book that does give at least a somewhat more balanced gender perspective is Layne's textual analysis, which quotes two would-be fathers and the joint description of one couple among an otherwise all-female sample.

Perhaps another approach that could be employed in the future would be to explore pregnancy loss from a ritual perspective. Several of the studies in this book mention rituals, but none conducts any analysis. Cecil's observations of men attending a stillborn child's funeral while women attend the wake does at least point in this direction.

The greatest triumph of this path-breaking work may well be that it leads the reader to wish for more than it provides. For example, a comparative literature survey might unearth more literary works on pregnancy loss than those cited in the Introduction. The seventeenth-century anonymous Chinese novel Jou P'u-t'uan comes to mind for its mention of the miscarriage experienced by the neglected wife of the novel's roving hero, as she flees discovery by her father that she has been impregnated by her husband's enemy. If Cecil's thought-provoking collection leads to further efforts on this topic to fill in such gaps, the field of anthropology will have been well served.

LING-LING WONG

*Hybrids of Modernity* is an ambitious attempt to bring together the major debates in contemporary cultural theory in a way that provokes new critical thinking about anthropology and its subjects. Harvey uses her fieldwork experience at the Universal Exhibition held in Spain in 1992 to draw similarities between anthropology, the nation-state, and the exhibition, arguing that they are all hybrids of modernity. As such, these institutions are highly aware of their modernist tendency to represent and 'produce' culture, while they simultaneously question this process through postmodern deconstruction. The problem for anthropology, then, is how to analyze such cultural forms which use the 'same conceptual tools' and therefore challenge the monopoly on cultural knowledge, interpretation, and representation (p. 24). The global, technological nature of these forms further complicates this anthropological endeavour, as the field has yet to generate a sustainable methodology for the study of transnationalism.

The book offers both theoretical and methodological interventions into this problem. In the first two chapters and the conclusion, Harvey makes a number of programmatic arguments. First, she contends that anthropology can no longer afford to ignore the insights of cultural-studies theorists, who have often worked more successfully with postmodern theory to understand the global, the technological, and consumption. Anthropological hesitancy with the constructivist approach that analyzes layers of semiotic representation stems from the concern that representational knowledge 'misrepresents how people live in the world' by falsely positing a reality on which meaning is laid (p. 171). Anthropologists, Harvey argues, prefer to see culture as emerging from practice—a valuable theory in its own right, but dangerously incapable of analyzing just those practices which self-consciously represent and construct. Harvey asserts that the traditional anthropology/cultural-studies dichotomies between the study of people and of texts, embodied practice and representation, the local and the global, and the other and the self, must be bridged if anthropologists are to study what have become fundamental features of contemporary life. Similarly, cultural studies should look to anthropology's 'sensitivity to the culturally specific' if it is to avoid gross generalization (p. 178).

Harvey's second argument is in favour of 'auto-anthropology', or anthropology at home, which affords a chance to question more deeply the bases and claims of the discipline. She suggests that auto-anthropology has proved difficult for the same reasons that anthropologists have looked at cultural studies with suspicion—we are uncomfortable with challenges to our interpretative knowledge, particularly those that call attention to our own (often unwitting) tendency to reify a distinction between reality and representation. It is through auto-anthropology, Harvey argues, that the discipline can overcome its 'problematic dichotomy' between representational and practice approaches, and gain the tools to understand the self-conscious production of culture in other realms (p. 19).

The Expo'92 case-study forms the basis for the middle chapters of the book. The chapter on the nation-state is particularly useful for its consideration of the hybrid nature of nationalism. For example, Harvey shows how the exhibits simultaneously
invoked tradition and innovation as core elements of national identity. She links this with the modern self-awareness on the part of the presenters that the reality of the nation-state is unpresentable in its totality; this awareness occurs simultaneously with the postmodern idea that the nation-state is unpresentable because, ultimately, it was never real and is only imagined.

Chapter 4 continues to explore this hybridity in the exhibition itself. Harvey explains that the exhibition embodies traces of its origins (as an event that highlights the technological progress and uniqueness of nations), while using technology to question, and even undermine, those origins and the integrity of the nation that they imply. The overarching interest of the chapter is to analyze these changing relationships between technology and culture, and to suggest how culture and nation have become commodified to the point that technology is not merely used to represent the world but to simulate the world as well.

Chapter 5 looks at the hybrid subject of the consumer. Visitors' enjoyment of the simulation speaks to the importance of paying attention to experiential knowledge and various interpretative possibilities. One of Harvey's interesting suggestions in this chapter is that knowledge, for the consumer, no longer depends on the realist aesthetic which requires observation of the original for 'true' understanding. Commodified experiences of simulacra can be more engaging than 'the real'. As Harvey suggests, 'this presents a problem for the way in which experience is integrated into our theories of knowledge'—theories which tend to distinguish between the active and passive, the embodied and the contemplative, the tactile and the visual' (p. 169).

Hybrids of Modernity draws heavily on the work of Baudrillard, de Certeau, Eco, Harvey, and Lyotard, as well as Timothy Mitchell and Marilyn Strathern. The theoretical power of the book indeed stems from Harvey's creative interweaving of various thinkers, but at times this leads to a lack of clarity and shifting definitions of key concepts. Also, the middle chapters appear to stand apart. More tacking back and forth between their main points and the general theoretical interests of the book would have been helpful. For example, the author could have elaborated on the specific ways in which anthropology is like the nation-state or the exhibition (i.e., how is anthropology affected by technology, and how might it, like the nation, project itself through tradition and innovation?). Finally, attention could be paid to major changes in cultural studies itself, from the earlier focus on social action to the increased interest in social texts.

None the less, Harvey provides insight into the struggle between cultural studies and anthropology. In the process, she highlights some of the strengths and weaknesses of anthropological theory and proposes future avenues for thinking about the contemporary world. Finally, the book suggests a methodology for dealing with the global in a local context, something that many anthropologists are still struggling to formulate.

JESSICA WINEGAR

When Edward Said wrote Orientalism (Routledge 1978) and based his case mainly on Islamic examples from the Middle East (an Orientalist geographical term he surprisingly did not object to), he opened up a hitherto unsuspected valley of fertile fields for other scholars to till. Ronald Inden took up the challenge with gusto for Hinduism and British India in Imagining India (Blackwell 1990), but as Lopez points out, it has taken somewhat longer for a similar reflexivity to be practised within Buddhist studies. Following his editor's introduction, Curators of the Buddha brings together six studies: Charles Hallisey on the early study of Theravada Buddhism; Stanley K. Abe on the Western reception of Gandhara Buddhist art; Robert H. Sharf on 'The Zen of Japanese Nationalism'; Gustavo Benevides on Giuseppe Tucci and the connection between his views on Buddhism and Asia and his fascism; Luis O. Gómez on Jung; and Donald S. Lopez himself on selected Western encounters (including his own) with Tibetan lamas. This interesting combination of topics should upset a few preconceptions about both Buddhism and the people who study it. I found it fascinating; believers may be infuriated. Either way, this is a book that all students of Buddhism should read, questioning, as it does, the conditions of their existence.

Surprisingly, the editor does not explicitly discuss the fact that a large number of Buddhist societies were never colonized (Japan, China, Korea, Tibet, Nepal, Thailand). Thus, what the book is really concerned with is not the study of Buddhism under colonialism, but the study of Buddhism in the colonial period. Any crude anti-Orientalist thesis to the effect that orientalist scholarship was carried on to advance the colonial project falls to too many counter-examples (when Tucci started to work on Tibet and India, Italy had no immediate strategic interests there).

Not all the contributors accept a Saidian framework to the same degree, and some do not mention him at all. However, all agree that the way in which Buddhism has been studied in the past has involved at least as much the prejudices of those who studied it as the discovery of a new religion or way of life. At the most extreme end of the spectrum is Abe's chapter about the art of Gandhara. He tells the story of its appeal to the British in India because of its Greek antecedents and includes an extended set piece on the confrontation of the lama and the museum curator in Kipling's Kim. The whole category of 'Greco-Buddhist art' is considered to be so subjective, simply a projection of the predilections of the British of the day, that the present scholarly consensus on Gandharan art is not even mentioned. In a similar way, Jung had so little real interaction with Hindu or Buddhist mysticism, other than reading the Tibetan Book of the Dead and the Meditation Sutra (on Amitayus), that Gómez can analyse his thought simply by looking at his writings and those of some of his followers.

Given the current popularity of Buddhism in Hollywood, it would probably come as no surprise there that one of the greatest scholars of Tibetan Buddhism, Giuseppe Tucci, was a strong supporter of fascism and used Buddhist arguments to support it. Tucci, in contrast to Jung, was a great scholar of Buddhism, with enormous textual and historical work to his credit. However, his generalizations about 'Oriental culture', Tibet, India, and the Japanese seem to have borne little relation to his detailed scholarly
work. Indeed, for me Benevides’s paper clarified something that had always puzzled me about Tucci’s *Theory and Practice of the Mandala*, which went through so many printings as a Rider paperback and must have sat on the shelf of so many spiritual seekers: it combines his rather mechanical generalizations about spirituality with highly detailed translations from original texts, with no real relationship between the two. For Tucci there is true spirituality, which is timeless and beyond words and explanation, and there is the meaningless materialism of Western civilization and its outposts in India. At the same time he despised the actual practice of Buddhism in Tibet and called the monasticism he saw there ‘a kind of elephantiasis of asceticism’ (p. 165). Benevides shows how Tucci’s views evolved, under the influence of Gentili, ‘the official philosopher of fascism’, so that he could interpret the Bodhisattva as someone who sacrifices and fights for others, a move he reversed after the war. Unfortunately Benevides gives few details about Tucci’s personal and professional history which might help put his Hegelo-Buddhism (my term) into context. He does demonstrate well, however, that ‘silent, incommunicable experiences could be used in the service of a state that could not otherwise provide a rationale to those who would be required to kill and be killed’ (p. 181).

A similar conclusion underlies Scharf’s account of the rise of modernist Zen (again, my term). This is the fascinating history of how D. T. Suzuki, Paul Carus (a German religious philosopher based in the USA), and, following them, two Japanese philosophers, Nishida Kitaro and Hisamatsu Shin’ichi, created the modern idea of Zen as a humanist, experience-based technique that lay behind the whole of Japanese civilization. Ironically, ‘the key Japanese terms for experience...were adopted [in the early Meiji period] to render Western terms for which there was no ready Japanese equivalent’ (pp. 124–5). So-called Zen gardens were first associated with Zen doctrine in an English-language guidebook of 1935. ‘Those aspects of Zen most attractive to the Occident...were derived in large part from Occidental sources. Like Narcissus, Western enthusiasts failed to recognize their own reflection in the mirror being held out to them’ (p. 140). Scharf’s narrative has great force, perhaps because, for once, interpretation is not something done to them by us, but something they are doing for themselves in response to us.

By contrast, Hallisey follows Said quite closely, except that he evidently has considerable sympathy for the early Pali scholars he describes. He shows how, as the Pali texts became better known, the more modern vernacular sources were gradually marginalized, until we have the situation today, when the latter are barely studied at all. This has led to an unbalanced view of the Theravada tradition, further exacerbated by the rationalist and anti-ritualist assumptions of influential early interpreters such as Rhys Davids. But unlike in Scharf’s account, Theravada Buddhists themselves seem to have played little role in determining how their texts were read. Perhaps it is true to say that, conceptually speaking, Dharmapala, unlike his Japanese counterparts, followed where the traditional Buddhist scholars led. Hallisey is at pains to point out that ‘we should avoid attributing too much force to the “West” (or Christianity, or Protestant assumptions, or Orientalism)’ (p. 48), since very similar changes happened in Thailand without colonialism or missionaries. But the fact remains that his story is about Westerners and how they interpreted Buddhism.
The same is true of Lopez’s chapter about Tibet. He looks briefly at the remarkable Jesuit Desideri, who lived in Lhasa for five years from 1716; the first Tibetologist, Csoma da Körös, a Hungarian nationalist looking for the origin of his people; and the arch-Orientalist L. Austine Waddell, who spent ten years in Sikkim and wrote the highly influential The Buddhism of Tibet, or Lamaism (1895). Waddell’s purple passages denouncing Lamaist ritualism, as well as his obsession with penetrating the interior, which he accomplished when he accompanied Younghusband’s expeditionary force to Lhasa in 1905, make him the perfect illustration of the Saidian thesis. Any of these three emblematic figures could have been treated in a separate chapter devoted to themselves (and perhaps they receive their just deserts in Lopez’s forthcoming Prisoners of Shangri-la). But Lopez concludes with an evocative account of his own personal search for Tibetan authenticity at the feet of a lama in a reconstituted Gelukpa monastery in south India. He ends by explaining how the ritual of leave-taking from a lama simulates an interrupted lesson, so that there is always the possibility of return and continuation. This is a rather more open-ended and morally neutral conclusion than he provides at the end of the introduction. There he denies that the aim is to assign blame or to suggest alternative ways of doing Buddhist studies: rather it is to historicize, to put forward genealogies, and, quoting Robert Young’s White Mythologies (Routledge 1990), to suggest that somehow theory and historical material can be presented so as to invert ‘dominant structures of knowledge and power’.

DAVID N. GELLNER


This volume, the first in a series on Cameroon Studies published by Berghahn Books, brings together a number of papers by the late Edwin Ardener. As the title, Kingdom on Mount Cameroon, suggests, the papers emanate from Ardener’s time among the Bakweri, who inhabit the slopes of this dormant volcano in south-west Cameroon. There are seven chapters, three of which have been published before and appear here in more or less identical form as the original. A fourth chapter has also been published previously but has a note written by Ardener subsequent to its original publication prefaced to it. The other items consist of a chapter extracted from an earlier book and two previously unpublished papers, one from a conference. There is also an introduction by Shirley Ardener.

The sub-title of the book, Studies in the History of the Cameroon Coast, 1500–1970, suggests a focus on historical work, something which in a narrow sense is only true of some of the papers. The opening chapter, ‘Documentary and Linguistic Evidence for the Rise of the Trading Polities between Rio del Rey and Cameroons 1500–1650’ (originally published in 1968), is an ultimately successful attempt to bring some order to the contradictions found in the early historical records of the coastal area west
of Mount Cameroon up to what is now the border with Nigeria. Part of the problem arises in the contradictory or confused use of toponyms and ethnonyms, and the inaccurate or vague mappings of the area found in the records of early European traders. These early sources, together with what appears to be the first recorded word-list of local languages, are carefully considered by Ardener in clearing the way for more detailed historical investigation of the area and issues examined here.

'Kingdom on Mount Cameroon: The Bakweri and the Europeans', written in 1969, continues the historical view. The longest single contribution to the volume, it examines the period from the mid- to late nineteenth century and is based partly on the writings of the missionary Merrick (including a long extract from the original), and partly on German records never published in English, as well as on Ardener's own original research among the Bakweri. One of its key aspects is the previously little-known story of how the Bakweri denied the Germans access to the mountain for over a decade.

The third chapter, 'The Plantations and the People of Victoria Division', was originally published in 1960 and has long been out of print. It deals mainly with the establishment of the plantations which continue to play a large role in the area, though less from historical than from the social, demographic, and economic perspectives, in particular the effects of immigration and movement on marriage and the growth of prostitution. The themes of marriage, divorce, and fertility are also investigated in some detail in the following chapter, 'Bakweri Fertility and Marriage', originally a 1958 conference paper. This work is based on a survey of a substantial sample of Bakweri women and provides statistical evidence for the instability of marriage and for the correlation between promiscuity and low fertility among the Bakweri.

The next two chapters, 'Witchcraft, Economics and the Continuity of Belief' (originally published in 1970) and 'The Bakweri Elephant Dance' (published in 1959), document different aspects of Bakweri culture and how these have been maintained or adapted in the face of changes in the surrounding world and—in the case of the former—used to understand these changes. The final chapter of the book, 'The Boundaries of Kamerun and Cameroon', is a composite piece. The main paper was published in 1967 under the title 'The Nature of the Reunification of Cameroon'. In its present form, a note originally given as seminar presentation in 1968 is included as a foundation for the main paper. Together the two constitute a short political and economic history of West Cameroon, the first section looking at the period from the mid-1800s to the end of the German period, the second looking at the immediate post-independence period.

The first of the four appendixes is a short piece jointly written by Edwin and Shirley Ardener on 'The Wovea Islanders of Ambas Bay', first published in 1958. At that time, the Wovea people numbered about 550; it is not known whether this number has increased or decreased in the interval, though Shirley Ardener reports in a postscript that they have now all moved to the mainland. The second appendix, compiled again by both Ardeners, is an annotated chronology of historical events on the Cameroon coast, covering the period 1474–1887. The third and fourth appendixes consist of the second and third collections of bibliographical material (the first being references to citations in the text), which list respectively Edwin Ardener's writings on
Africa and suggested further readings to cover the period since Ardener’s work (i.e. from 1970 to the present).

One can always find things to complain about, however minor, in reviewing any book. (I refrain here from critical comment on Ardener’s work, as much of this debate will already be familiar to JASO readers.) Here, for example, the ‘History’ of the subtitle accurately reflects the book’s contents only if one applies a very broad interpretation to that word—or if we construe the entire book as a historical document, for its gathering together of a set of Ardener’s writings. Nevertheless, Kingdom on Mount Cameroon is an interesting and highly readable collection of papers. It is of obvious interest to those who follow Ardener’s work in its presentation of previously unpublished work, as well as to those concerned with the coastal region of Cameroon. It should also attract those with a more general view of developments in Africa. Individual papers will, of course, have broader appeal, according to the interests of respective readers.

BRUCE CONNELL


African Crossroads: Intersections between History and Anthropology in Cameroon is the second volume published by Berghahn in their Cameroon Studies series. It is one of three collections of papers edited by Ian Fowler and David Zeitlyn commemorating the contribution E. M. Chilver has made to the study of Cameroon, the other two being special issues of Paideuma (Vol. XLI) and JASO (Vol. XXVI no. 1). Readers of JASO will therefore already be familiar with biographical and bibliographical aspects of Sally Chilver’s career as a Cameroonist, so we can pass here directly to the contributions others have made in her honour in this volume.

Apart from Shirley Ardener’s Foreword and the Preface and Introduction, both by Ian Fowler and David Zeitlyn, there are nine papers. These focus either on aspects of the political and cultural history and anthropology of the geographical region of Cameroon (i.e., the Grassfields, in western Cameroon) or on the historical era (the early twentieth-century German colonial period) to which Chilver devoted most of her attention. With respect to content, they can be loosely divided into three themes: German contact, ethnicity and identity, and religion.

The theme of ethnic identity and its development is taken up first by Fowler and Zeitlyn, in their introductory essay ‘The Grassfields and the Tikar’, which presents the ‘Tikar problem’ as an illustration of the complex issue of the emergence of ethnicity. The Tikar problem is identified here as the manner in which the Tikar connection with the Grassfields came about—i.e., the fact that several Grassfields groups claim a Tikar origin, despite their language and culture being only remotely related to those of the Tikar. But, as is clear from Zeitlyn’s contribution to the JASO collection (an epitome
of Mohammadou’s work on Tikar origins), the Tikar question goes well beyond the Grassfields claims. In fact, Tikar identity appears to be relatively recent, an amalgam of different groups originating in the region to the north and east of the Grassfields. The issue is complicated further by the fact that more recently a number Tikar sub-groups have merged with the Kwanja, as the latter moved into what was formerly Tikar territory and now see themselves to some extent as Kwanja. The ‘Tikar problem’, then, is indeed still a topic with many unresolved issues, one whose investigation will shed considerable light on questions of merging and emerging ethnicities, as well as answering questions of a historical nature. It illustrates well the fluid nature of ethnicity in this part of Africa, and the various discussions of the Tikar and their identity found in these tributes to Chilver serve as excellent case-studies of this more general question.

The question of ethnicity and identity is further explored in Richard Fardon’s contribution ‘The Person, Ethnicity and the Problem of Identity in West Africa’, a chapter which examines the Bali-Nyonga, who are geographically of the Grassfields but ethnically of Chamba origin, or at least from a more northern, Adamawa region. Part of Fardon’s purpose is to explore how and why they came to be identified as Chamba.

Four papers have a common theme in their treatment of the German colonial period: Ralph Austen’s ‘Mythic Transformation and Historical Continuity: The Duala of Cameroon and German Colonialism’ (Chapter 3); Robert O’Neil’s ‘Imperialisms at the Century’s End: Moghamo Relations with Bali-Nyonga and Germany’ (Chapter 4); Jean-Pierre Warnier’s ‘Rebellion, Defection and the Position of the Male Cadets’ (Chapter 6); and Christaud Geary’s contribution, ‘Political Dress: German-style Military Attire and Colonial Politics in Bamum’ (Chapter 9). These four ‘German’ chapters are, of course, not isolated thematically from the rest of the book. O’Neil’s contribution, for example, complements Fardon’s examination of the Bali-Nyonga, while Fardon himself makes reference to the position of the Bali-Nyonga as agents for German interests.

Verkijika Fanso and Bongfen Chem-Langhe’s chapter, ‘Nso’ Military Organization and Warfare in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries’, gives a good sense of the militaristic aspect of Grassfields history. This is a theme also treated by O’Neil, but he concentrates not so much on the German campaigns as the previous period, providing insight into how the military strength of the Nso’ evolved and operated.

As its title indicates, Philip Burnham’s contribution, ‘Political Relations on the Eastern Marches of Adamawa in the Late Nineteenth Century’, fits neither the temporal nor the spatial aspects mentioned above, but in a sense is all the more interesting for this, as it helps form a frame for the other papers.

Two other contributions, both dealing with religion, round out the collection. Like other contributions to the book, Joseph Bardzem on ‘Catholicism and Nso’ Traditional Beliefs’ and Claude Tardits’ ‘Pursue to Attain: A Royal Religion’, both rely on documentary evidence from the period. Both also concentrate on individuals and their experiences, though Tardits’ primary focus is on Njoya, the paramount ruler of the Bamoun, and his dominant influence in attempting to create a particularly Bamoun form of Islam. Put side by side the two papers make interesting comparative reading, for while the Nso’ leaned towards Christianity, the religion of the incoming colonizers,
Njoya favoured a form of Islam which, despite its ultimate foreignness and colonizing status, was seen as African.

In short, for those who are new or relatively new to Cameroon studies, this collection presents a gateway into an enticing world. For Cameroonists, the papers offered here will contribute to debate and discussion that is of no doubt already familiar, but not settled. Many of the contributions in the present collection are more theoretical in nature than those in the other two commemorative volumes, and as such this book may appeal more to the involved social anthropologist than to the 'academic tourist'. None the less, there is much here for those less theoretically inclined, and the volume should interest a wide range of readers.

BRUCE CONNELL


Infertility and Patriarchy is a companion volume to Inhorn’s Quest for Conception: Gender, Infertility, and Egyptian Medical Traditions (1994). Together these books explore the broad socio-political contours of reproduction and family life in Egypt. Readers learn how long-standing conditions like the ease with which Egyptian men may marry other women (either after divorce or via polygyny), as well as more recent phenomena, such as the large number of peasants migrating to the cities and the domestication of migrant women’s lives, work together to render the situation of infertile women particularly difficult. Inhorn describes the many psychosocial, social-structural, and political-economic factors which make children so much desired by Egyptian women and their families. As in Quest, she begins each chapter with an extended account of an individual woman’s experience of infertility, these vignettes portraying vividly the profound disappointment and often marked stigmatization of women who do not bear children.

While in Quest Inhorn focused on the ethnogynaecological and biogynaecological treatments these women seek, in this volume she provides a nuanced analysis of infertile women’s relationships with their husbands, extended families, and neighbours. The most interesting findings of her semi-structured interviews with eighty-nine infertile and ninety fertile women are found in her chapter on ‘Conjugal Connectivity’. Inhorn describes the ideal ‘arranged marriage’, and the expectations that ‘love marriages’ do not last and that all marriages require children ‘to tie’ husbands to their wives. She then describes ‘marital realities’ which challenge these assumptions. ‘Despite women’s conviction that children are the key ingredient in securing the future of a marriage’, Inhorn argues that ‘having children in many cases may be more problematic and stressful to the marital relationship than having none at all’ (p. 126). This is particularly true for the urban poor, who often lack adequate resources to support large families. Inhorn found that the infertile marriages in her sample were among the
most stable. ‘The emotional enmeshment of these men and women, the friendships that
they forge with one another, and their ability to withstand familial and other external
pressure all speak to the strength of their marital bonds’ (ibid.). Despite the fact that
‘infertile marriages are viewed by Egyptians as diverging so considerably from marital
ideals that they are assumed to be almost inherently unsuccessful’, 46 per cent of the
infertile women Inhorn surveyed had marriages with what she terms ‘minimum replace­
ment potential’ (p. 127). A number of factors that seem to increase the likelihood of
success include marriage to a cousin or a Coptic Christian (Copts do not allow divorce
or polygyny), or if the couple knew each other before the wedding and had married for
love. Success was also greater if the husband was particularly religious and therefore
more likely to view infertility as ‘from God’, or if, as in 40 per cent of her cases, the
man had been diagnosed with an infertility problem. In the latter cases, women often
protect their husbands by taking the blame. The book is illustrated with wonderful
photographs of the people Inhorn describes. Of particular note—given the rarity of
such images of Arabs—are the captivating portraits of loving, companionate marriages.

In a chapter on ‘Relatives’ Response’ Inhorn describes the diametrically opposed
positions of men’s and women’s families with regard to ‘stigma management’. Mem­
bers of the man’s family, particularly his mother and sisters, are likely actively to stig­
matize the infertile wife living in their midst and urge the husband to try a different
wife in order to contribute to the patrilineage. In contrast, the woman’s family is likely
to be supportive and to help her try to ‘manage’ the stigma through control of informa­
tion.

Inhorn also discusses alternatives to raising a child of one’s own. Adoption is
forbidden in Islam and culturally unacceptable. Instead, infertile women are often
offered a child of their fertile siblings to raise, or are presented with abandoned new­
borns to foster. Despite these apparent opportunities, Inhorn reports that long-term
fostering arrangements, although practised among the middle and upper classes, are rare
among the urban poor. In the cases of nieces and nephews, infertile couples know that
the parents will probably eventually renge, and that in the cases of abandoned babies,
it is assumed that such children were born illegitimately and are therefore tainted with
the bad blood of their immoral parents. As a result, poor infertile couples usually
decline such offers. Nevertheless, some infertile women enjoy close, nurturing rela­
tionships with their siblings’ children. This is sometimes true for neighbours’ children
too, despite the widespread fear that infertile women cannot help but covet the progeny
of others and therefore cast the evil eye upon them.

For the most part, Inhorn’s discussion of relationships among neighbours portrays
a situation of extreme alienation and isolation. As in the case of relationships with in­
laws, she focuses on how neighbourhood women ‘use their social networks in ways
that serve to oppress other women’ (p. 206). Infertile women are often subjected to
‘malicious comments, criticism, and “dirty looks”’ as well as ‘actual physical avoid­
ance’ (pp. 213–14). One positive effect of gossip is that most infertile women learn
of other women with the condition, which can help alleviate their sense of aloneness
and provide them with ‘therapeutic companions’ as they seek treatment for their
problem (p. 209).

Despite its ethnographic richness, Inhorn’s discussion of infertile women’s
responses to community ostracism is somewhat wide of the mark. In this section she
continues to apply Goffman's model of stigma, asserting that 'women may choose two contrasting stigma management styles'—'assimilation' (which she uses interchangeably with 'passing') or 'resistance' (p. 219). Although some infertile women may 'work diligently at gaining acceptance' by 'ingratiating themselves with their “normal” neighbours', this cannot be considered 'passing', since their childlessness cannot be hidden or disguised. Furthermore, it is difficult to see how the more common strategy of 'self-isolation from the community of “normal” women' constitutes 'resistance'. Inhorn reports that most infertile women 'tend to shy away from children as much as possible—and even avoid looking at children as they pass by' so as not to be blamed for any ill-fortune that may beset them. Such behaviour seems less a form of 'resistance' to the community's 'attempts to dehumanize them' (p. 221) than chilling evidence of the success of such attempts.

As in Inhorn's earlier work, the clear prose and well-defined organization of Infertility and Patriarchy makes this an ideal text for undergraduate teaching in anthropology, Middle Eastern studies, and women's studies. Although Inhorn does not make explicit comparisons with family life and the experience of infertility elsewhere, the material lends itself to such an exercise. One is bound to be enriched by this compelling account of women as they cope with the barrenness and poverty in their lives.

LINDA L. LAYNE


This collection of articles brings together an impressive array of north American cultural anthropologists, most of whom are already well known for substantial monographs related to rituals of healing. Some of the papers stick close to the ground and eschew global comparisons, but nearly all of them demonstrate a high level of linguistic and ethnographic competence in their detailed analyses of particular healing rites or performances.

Chapters 1 and 2, 'Initiating Performance: The Story of Chini, a Korean Shaman', by Laurel Kendall, and 'On Failure and Performance: Throwing the Medium out of the Seance', by Edward Schieffelin, give detailed accounts of an attempt to initiate a new shaman and of an agonistic mediumistic display respectively. Both show a very high level of ethnographic reporting (helped by the presence of a film crew in Kendall's case), and both, interestingly, concentrate on cases where the performance fails. Schieffelin draws more out of this, perhaps, since in the case of Kendall's shaman the possibility remains open that further initiatory sessions will succeed in transforming the candidate into a shaman. Schieffelin also draws out very sensitively the way in which, for the Kalula, what is essential is that the medium is not putting on a performance: if they judge that he is, rather than acting as an authentic medium for the spirits' voices, by that token he is not successful.
Thomas J. Csordas argues, as he has elsewhere, for embodiment as a paradigm for grasping the transformations that ritual performances bring about: 'the moods and motivations evoked [through embodiment] in ritual performances', he concludes with an echo of Geertz, 'are indeed uniquely realistic' (p. 108). His ethnographic material comes from American Charismatic Catholics, who, by the late 1960s, evidently began to feel that they too could have a transforming personal relationship with Jesus.

Paul Stoller gives a personal account of his own fieldwork odyssey and how it took him five trips and eight years to begin to concentrate on the sounds rather than sights of Songhay society. Of all the healing 'texts' described in the volume, Charles L. Briggs' analysis of a Warao (Venezuela) ritual mobilizes the most sophisticated battery of linguistic concepts to try and explain its effectiveness. Janet Hoskins' paper on the Kodi of eastern Indonesia is the only one (apart from the last chapter) to focus on the tensions between biomedical and 'folk' views of the same afflictions, with three contrasting case-studies to bring out how differently defined maladies receive different public or private treatment. The two editors, Laderman and Roseman, both write detailed ethnographic accounts of specific healing performances in Malaysia, each alike convincing in its accumulation of observation. There is also a piece by Robert Desjarlais on the shaman he worked with in Helambu, Nepal (see his Body and Emotion, University of Philadelphia Press 1992). Desjarlais describes the shaman's attempts to use ritual and performance to mobilize the senses of the patient and bring back his or her lost soul. He is the only contributing author who is content to record of his own performance as an anthropologist observing a healer: 'As Meme mumbles his chant...one catches snippets of meaning' (p. 158).

The final chapter is very different from those that precede it. 'Dying as a Medical Performance: The Oncologist as Charon', by Megan Biesele and Robbie Davis-Floyd, describes the last months of an American woman they call Margaret Bell, her feelings about cancer, death, and being a burden, as well as those of her doctor and family members. The key moment is when the oncologist decides that there is no more to be done and uses the full authority of biomedicine to bring home the message that now she should prepare for death. Since Biesele also works with the !Kung of the Kalahari, the article ends with a comparison of holistic Western attitudes and those of the !Kung healer: the latter, when told Margaret Bell's story, insists that he would have tried to cure her to the last and that he would have cured her, rather than telling her to prepare for the end.

Despite a common concern with performance and healing, these papers go off in surprisingly different directions. This is surely a tribute to the richness of the ethnography presented and the variety of questions that the contributors pose it. Briggs notes that anthropologists have tended to explain the effectiveness of healing rituals either in terms of the manner of their presentation or through the wider social and political context, and he proposes that the best kind of analysis would transcend this dichotomy (p. 225). It is no criticism of this interesting and thought-provoking volume that the papers here do not do this, and it surely would have been pointless for the editors to insist that the contributors try to do so.

DAVID N. GELLNER
JAMES FENTRESS and CHRIS WICKHAM, *Social Memory*, Oxford: Blackwell 1992. xii, 229 pp., Index. £35.00/£11.95.

This is an accessible and attractive introduction to the study of the social production of historical memories. It deserves a prominent place on all reading-lists on ‘anthropology and history’. The collaboration of a historian and an anthropologist, it usefully summarizes the main issues and main theorists, avoiding the idiosyncrasies of works such as Connerton’s *How Societies Remember* (CUP 1989). It uses a good number of ethnographic and historical examples to illustrate its theme that social memory is above all an activity which must be worked at hard, and the authors show that, equally often, societies put as much effort into forgetting the past. The examples, which run from ‘The Song of Roland’ to the Mafia, and Sicilian national identity to the working class in Turin, are presented in sufficient detail for the student to see and follow how collective memory should be understood in practical terms. The only drawback of the book is its very Christocentric and Eurocentric focus (betrayed by the authors’ reference to Judaism as a ‘special case’ in their guide to further reading). Nothing is said about historical memory in other literate traditions, and the few references to anthropological work on non-literate societies are fairly perfunctory, adding little to the general argument. Despite this over-restricted comparative range, the book manages successfully to straddle the divide between, on the one hand, providing an introduction to the subject for students, and on the other, giving a stimulus to anthropologists interested in the past—and who, these days, is not?

DAVID N. GELLNER


The Vagri are a low-status group of south and west India, found in an area stretching from Gujarat to Tamil Nadu. The present book is a very comprehensive and largely ethnographic account of the Tamil Nadu group, based on the author’s doctoral fieldwork. Following a mainly theoretical introduction, successive chapters deal with the Vagri’s status and relations with the outside world, their occupations and livelihoods, social organization from moieties, clans and lineages down to the family, birth, marriage and death ritual, and the sacrifices made to the gods and the myths associated with them.

One of the strengths of this book is the way in which the author consistently seeks to place the Vagri in the wider social context in Tamil Nadu, to which are added comparisons with Vagri in other parts of southern India, many of which the author has also visited. Thus although the Vagri are low in status like many other groups throughout India, unlike the Untouchables they are marginal to the caste system, in the sense that they have no occupation necessary to it. Rather, they live as hunters, beggars, and
scavengers, and by selling religious amulets and medicines. They do not perform any ritual services for other castes, nor will other castes ordinarily serve them. The roles of men and women are somewhat atypical for a caste, and widows are not at all inauspicious. None the less, their independence is not of such a quality that they are likely to be classed with the tribes, living as they do mostly on the fringes of caste settlements, and Werth points out that there is no evidence of any connections with the Gypsies, who in many ways have a similar life-style. Their position is perhaps best summed up by saying that 'we are concerned here...not with a fundamentally different ideology from that of the surrounding society but rather with a different emphasis, a stress on other aspects of the same preconceptions' (p. 300, my translation).

In general, however, it is true to say (p. 398) that kinship is more important than caste to the Vagri. The Vagri are unusual in south India in having, in Louis Dumont's terms, a global model of affinal exchange, with moieties associated with those who sacrifice buffaloes and goats respectively being the overarching units in affinal alliance. However, there are also clans and lineages, which locally may be more important, such that three clans may intermarry freely without regard to the moiety system. Marriage preferences envisage the direct exchange of cross cousins and also provide for elder sister's daughter's marriage, as in south India generally. The kinship terminology is conventionally south Indian (though, like the Vagri language, linguistically Indo-Aryan), and there are none of the alternating generation equations one finds with the tribes of central India.

Theoretically, the treatment is, in the broad sense, structuralist, and it makes absolutely no concessions to postmodernist developments—in that sense, it is refreshingly free from any sense of theoretical crisis. Werth supports Dumont against his critics, though he expresses some reservations regarding Michael Moffat, one of Dumont's supporters, who also worked among low-status groups in Tamil Nadu and purported to show that they shared the Brahmanical model of caste without being satisfied with their own place within it (An Untouchable Community in South India, Princeton University Press 1979). On kinship, Werth is also critical of Thomas Trautmann (Dravidian Kinship, Cambridge University Press 1980), though he makes extensive use of the writings of both Rodney Needham and Anthony Good (the latter applied Needham's key ideas to Tamil Nadu material—The Female Bridegroom, Clarendon Press 1991). Needham's ideas reappear at the end in the context of dual symbolic classification, although Werth also shows that the opposition between buffalo- and goat-sacrificers is a hierarchical one (in the manner of Dumont's ideas), since sacrificial occasions held by the former offer both animals, those of the latter only the one. There is also a distinction between the creator god Dadaji, who stands for unity, and the goddesses who are linked to the respective groups of the sacrificers, who stand for the latter's particularity.

All in all, this is a very full account of an interesting, because rather marginal, group, which repays repeated study for both its ethnographic details and theoretical implications.

ROBERT PARKIN

While the study of kinship persists in anthropology, perspectives change: currently, personhood, gender, and even identity are more important than formal analyses, and a Schneiderian emphasis on indigenous representations of relationships is very much to the fore. None the less, there is a case for giving students the basics at an early stage, if only so that they can learn to deconstruct them, where appropriate, later. Linda Stone’s book is clearly intended to fall into the category of an introductory book, though it does not really achieve what its title suggests—a thoroughgoing account of the significance of gender to kinship and vice versa. This is not to say it is in any way unworthy or unhelpful. There are goodish chapters on descent (successively patrilineal, matrilinal, and double plus cognatic) and marriage, and the chapters on non-human primate societies and the new reproductive technologies are particularly useful. The pattern in most chapters tends to be one of giving basic information on the anthropology of kinship followed by an attempt to show the importance of gender to it. Unfortunately, the two segments tend to lack either depth or breadth, and the accounts given are often rather perfunctory. More significantly, perhaps, no really convincing attempt is made to write about kinship from the perspective of gender studies in a unifying way. As a result, we end up too often with a halfway house that is not totally satisfying from either point of view. A lot of the book is also taken up with nine case-studies, which read well on the whole but are often drawn out far too much for what are clearly intended to be illustrative materials in an introductory book—is the twenty-page account of the Julio-Claudian emperors in ancient Rome really justified, especially given that their peccadilloes can hardly be said to typify Roman society generally?

Descent is seen mainly as a matter of groups, and although the notion of category is mentioned, it is not developed: this is one area where the reader must call on prior knowledge. One unusual feature is that the author distinguishes cognatic from bilateral descent with reference to the notion of groups, which are defined as being present in the former case but not the latter. Kinship terminology is expressly left aside. The weakest passage is probably that dealing with exogamy on pp. 51-2, where a hypothetical example involving exogamous affinal relations between the Serbs and Muslims of the former Yugoslavia is introduced as a way of resolving conflict between them. Not only is exogamy between (rather than within) ethnic groups unusual to the point of rarity, this approach also ignores the fact that affinal alliance through exogamy often goes along with hostility in other contexts (however, this point is made later, p. 210).

These imperfections aside, there is little here that would mislead the student, who would undoubtedly benefit from reading the book overall. It is just that it is in perpetual danger of falling between the stools of kinship and gender, dealing with neither totally adequately. One is left with the impression that the definitive book on the merging of these two areas of anthropology still has to be written.

ROBERT PARKIN
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MULVANEY, JOHN, HOWARD MORPHY, and ALISON PETCH, *My Dear Spencer: The Letters of F. J. Gil­


SILVER, SHIRLEY, and WICK R. MILLER, American Indian Languages: Cultural and Social Contexts, Tucson: University of Arizona Press 1997. xix, 433 pp., Bibliography, Index. $60.00.


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