THE FATE OF ANTHROPOSOCIOLOGY IN L'ANNEE SOCIOLOGIQUE

JOSEP R. LLOBERA

Introduction

Among the many sociological schools that flourished at the turn of the century, anthroposociology was one that briefly caught the attention of philosophical and social-scientific circles in France and other countries. For a short time, there was a kind of fascination with the bizarre and all-explaining doctrines of anthroposociology. Durkheim was not immune to such an appeal, and when, in 1897, he was planning the first issue of L'Annee Sociologique (hereafter AS), he asked Henri Muffang, a sympathizer of anthroposociology, to edit a sub-section on the school.

What was the rationale behind this decision? First and foremost, Durkheim thought that his journal should present a comprehensive picture of all the different sociological tendencies. Secondly, although any sociologist would regard with suspicion a discipline like racial anthropology—which to a great extent made sociology redundant in so far as it treated social facts as derivative—one should always keep in mind the fact that it is not always possible to foresee the results of a particular scientific trend.

Durkheim’s ‘honeymoon’ with anthroposociology lasted three years. During this period Muffang edited a subsection of AS entitled ‘Anthroposociologie’ in which he reviewed (or rather summarized) articles and books on the topic. It published an average of thirteen pages a year, which was quite substantial, all things considered. From Volume IV (1899–1900) Muffang’s contribution disappeared as did the sub-section on anthroposociology as such. Subsequently, two of
Durkheim's closest collaborators, Mauss and Hubert, reviewed writings related to race, national origins and prehistory under the label 'Anthropologie et Sociologie'. However, after 1901, references to anthroposociology and allied topics were few and far between. A page had been closed in the Durkheimian sociological enterprise, that which dealt with the pretensions of racial science.

The aim of this paper is threefold: first, to provide an accurate description of the position of anthroposociology; secondly, to consider in some detail its reception in AS; and, finally, to compare Durkheim's attitude towards anthroposociology with that of his contemporaries, as well as to look at the fate of anthroposociology in the histories of sociology.

The aim and scope of anthroposociology

Not only was the term 'anthroposociology' coined by Vacher de Lapouge, the very origins of the discipline can be traced back to lectures he delivered at the University of Montpellier from 1886 to 1892. In 1899 he could write:

Si les tentatives faites pour arrêter mes premiers débuts avaient réussi, et si je n'avais pas écrit une ligne, l'anthroposociologie aurait été fondée à Karlsruhe en 1890 par Ammon, au lieu de l'être en 1886 à Montpellier, mais cette science n'en serait pas moins exactement au moment où s'impriment ces lignes. (Vacher de Lapouge 1899: 449)

Lapouge recognized, however, that the true founder of the discipline was Gobineau, who was the first to have emphasized the importance of race in the evolution of peoples (ibid.: 545–6). Darwin's struggle for existence and Broca's craniology were also seen as important stepping-stones in the development of anthroposociology.

Anthroposociology was established around the following premises: that human races are differently endowed in terms of intelligence and character; that the cephalic index is the concept with which to determine the capacity of the brain; that human behaviour is the result of the interaction between race and the social milieu; and that, among human beings, social selections predominate over natural selections.

As a discipline, anthroposociology flourished in France (under Vacher de Lapouge) and Germany (under Ammon) at the turn of the century. There were also more or less faithful representatives in Italy (Livi), Spain (Oloriz), the United Kingdom (Beddoe) and the USA (Closson).

Georges Vacher de Lapouge (1854–1936) was undoubtedly the most conspicuous representative of anthroposociology. He originally studied medicine and jurisprudence before following a career as a librarian, first at the University of Montpellier and later in Rennes and Poitiers. Having come into contact with social
Darwinism and craniology, he became an enthusiastic propagandist of these doctrines. By the mid-1880s he saw his task as the ‘application of the conclusions of biology to the social sciences’ (1886: 519). His wish to accede to an official position as an anthropologist was frustrated, although he taught unofficially (‘courses libres’) for a number of years at the University of Montpellier. In addition to a good number of articles published in different professional journals, Lapouge published two major books based on his lectures, Les Sélections sociales (1896) and L’Aryen: son rôle social (1899), as well as a collection of articles under the title Race et milieu sociale (1909). Perhaps the best known and most influential of his articles was ‘Les Lois fondamentales de l’Anthroposociologie’ of 1897, which was also published in Italian and English the same year. As a measure of his impact, Lapouge stated that there existed more than 3000 references (mostly positive) to his work (1909: xix).

Otto Ammon’s impact was perhaps more restricted to the German-speaking world, though some of his writings were translated into French and Italian, and his work was also commented upon world-wide. The monograph that established his anthropometric credentials was Die natürliche Auslese beim Menschen: Auf Grund der anthropologische Untersuchen der Wehrpflichtigen in Baden (1893), but it was in his Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen (1895) (French translation 1900) that anthroposociology was presented as a new discipline. Internationally, the most cited of his writings was ‘Histoire d’une idée: L’anthroposociologie’ (1898). He also published Zur Anthropologie der Badener (1899).

As we shall see, there are some differences between Lapouge and Ammon; for one thing, Lapouge was much more radical and pessimistic. An important dimension that can only be mentioned in passing is that Lapouge was a socialist who was trying to create a synthesis between Marx and Darwin. A severe critic of liberal democracy, he would maintain that ‘Aux fictions de Justice, d’Egalité, de Fraternité, la politique scientifique préfère la réalité des Forces, des Lois, des Races, de l’Évolution’ (1896: 489).

In the context of this short aperçu on anthroposociology I shall refer only to two major thematic areas: social selections and the laws of anthroposociology.

As Béjin has remarked, Lapouge was obsessed with the idea that the natural order of society had been dramatically changed due to the influence of social selections. Among the selections which had dysgenic effects, he listed the following levels:

militaire: les guerres modernes éliminent surtout les meilleures, les dysgéniques échappant au service.

politique: c’est le règne des coteries et des partis politiques favorable aux médiores.

religieuse: le célibat sacerdotal a interdit à de très nombreux eugéniques de se reproduire; les persecutions religieuses ont entraîné la disparition de nombreux êtres d’élite.
morale: la charité profite aux dysgéniques.

légale: l’interdiction de la polygamie, par exemple, nuit aux eugéniques.

economique: la plutocratie favorise l’élimination de l’aristocratie intellectuelle, conduit à multiplier les mariages dictées par des raisons financières aux dépens des considérations d’eugénisme.

professionelle: les individus les plus qualifiés ont généralement une fécondité moindre.

urbaine: les villes drainent les eugéniques puis les stérilisent. (Béjin 1982: 529–30)

Before enunciating the fundamental laws of anthroposociology, it is important to introduce some basic concepts. Lapouge states that ‘on appelle indice céphalique le nombre obtenu en multipliant la largeur maxima du crâne par 100 et divisant par la longeur maxima’ (1897: 546). This allows for the distinction of two basic types: dolichocephalic or long-headed and brachycephalic or round-headed. On the basis of this it is possible to classify the European races into two major types: Homo Europeus and Homo Alpinus. ‘Le premier est la grande race aux cheveux blonds et aux yeux bleus, au crâne long (dolichocéphale) .... Le second est la race plus petite, brune, à crâne et à face arrondis (brachycéphale)’ (ibid.: 516–17). A third European race, typical of southern Spain and Italy, is Homo Mediterraneus, a mixed type. According to Lapouge: ‘H. Alpinus se hiérarchise au dessous de H. Europeus; les races méditerranéennes se placent au niveau à peu près de l’Alpinus’ (ibid.: 517).

The laws are as follows (ibid.: 547–51):

(1) Loi de répartition des richesses. Dans les pays à mélange Europaeus-Alpinus, la richesse croît en raison inverse de l’indice céphalique.

(2) Loi des altitudes. Dans les régions où existent H. Europeus et H. Alpinus, le premier se localise dans les plus basses altitudes.

(3) Loi de répartition des villes. Les villes importantes sont presque exclusivement localisées dans les régions dolichocéphales, et dans les parties les moins brachycéphales des régions brachycéphales.

(4) Lois des indices urbains. L’indice céphalique des populations urbaines est inférieure à celui des populations rurales qui les englobent immédiatement.

(5) Loi d’émigration. Dans une population en voie de dissociation par déplacement, c’est l’élément le moins brachycéphale qui émigre.
(6) *Loi des formariages.* L'indice céphalique des individus issues de parents de pays différents est inférieure à la moyenne des pays d'origine.

(7) *Loi de concentration des dolichoïdes.* Les éléments mobilisés par la dissociation se concentrent par attraction dans les centres dolichoïdes.

(8) *Loi d'élimination urbaine.* La vie urbaine opère une sélection qui détruit les éléments les plus brachycéphales.

(9) *Loi de stratification.* L'indice céphalique va en diminuant et la proportion des dolichocéphales en augmentant des classes inférieures aux classes supérieures dans chaque localité.

(10) *Loi des intellectuels.* Dans les catégories de travailleurs intellectuels, les dimensions absolues du crâne et particulièrement la largeur sont plus élevées.

(11) *Loi des époques.* Depuis les temps préhistoriques, indice céphalique tend à augmenter constamment et partout.

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*The reception of anthroposociology in l'Année Sociologique*

The least that one can say about the rubric ‘anthroposociology’ in AS is its miscellaneous, marginal, and unstable character. As I have hinted in the introduction, the journal’s honeymoon with anthroposociology was of short duration. It was only in the first three volumes that anthroposociology was accorded ample space and the sympathetic voice of Muffang. By Volumes IV and V, it was being subjected to a sustained frontal assault by Henry Hubert and Marcel Mauss, who, as is well known, were both faithful Durkheimians. After that, and if we except the odd short review or reference, a curtain of heavy silence fell over anthroposociology.

It is interesting to note that Durkheim felt it necessary to write an introductory note to the first rubric on anthroposociology. The full text reads as follows:

Il a pu sembler parfois que l'anthropologie tendait à rendre inutile la sociologie. En essayant d'expliquer les phénomènes historiques par la seul vertue des races, elle paraissait traiter les faits sociaux comme des épiphenômes sans vie propre et sans action spécifique. De telles tendances étaient bien faites pour éveiller la défiance des sociologues.

Mais l'Année sociologique a, avant tout, pour devoir de présenter à ses lecteurs un tableau complet de tous les courants qui se font jour dans les différents domaines de la sociologie. D'ailleurs on ne sait jamais par avance quels résultats peuvent se dégager d'un mouvement scientifique. Très souvent, alors qu'il manque ce qui était primitivement son but principal et sa raison d'être apparante, il produit sur des
points secondaires des conséquences importaines et qui durent. Pour tous ces raisons, nous devions faire une place aux recherches de l’anthroposociologie, et, pour que notre exposé fût aussi fidèle que possible, nous nous sommes adressés à un partisan de l’école qui a bien voulu nous accorder sa collaboration. (AS, 1896–7, I: 519)

The correspondence between Durkheim and Bouglé illuminates some aspects of the place of anthroposociology in AS. In a letter from Durkheim to Bouglé of 15 July 1897, the future editor of the rubric on anthroposociology is mentioned as ‘votre collègue Muffang’ (Durkheim 1975, Vol. 2: 403). Durkheim referred also, and in favourable way, to an article that Bouglé had published recently (most probably Bouglé 1897). This paper, a critical review of the works of the leading representatives of anthroposociology (Ammon, Lapouge, Closson, etc.), was read by Durkheim with ‘grand intérêt’ (ibid.), and he added that ‘je n’ai besoin de vous dire que toutes ces spéculations anthropologiques nous laissent plus que sceptique, tout comme vous’ (ibid.).

Although both Durkheim and Bouglé were critical of the pretensions and reductionism of anthroposociology, Durkheim, unlike Bouglé, was in favour of allowing Muffang to present the school in a descriptive way and in a favourable light. In another of his letters (dated 27 September 1897), Durkheim referred to Bouglé’s intention of prefacing the rubric on anthroposociology with rather critical remarks and suggested a different approach:

Le préambule que vous avez rédigé me paraît un peu trop combatif; il me semble inutile d’entrer dans la discussion des problèmes dogmatiques que soulève la méthode anthropologique. Nous avons qu’à indiquer que notre publication est un acte d’impartialité et à faire sous réserves. (1975, Vol. 2: 411)

In addition to this paragraph, Durkheim made some concrete suggestions for the improvement of Muffang’s paper with the view of making it less repetitive, concluding: ‘Je suis d’ailleurs très content de sa collaboration et son exposé est clair et intéressant’ (ibid.: 412).

By 1900, however, AS was being run by a rather homogeneous team, much more so than Durkheim could have imagined when he started the journal. This meant the end of the rubric on anthroposociology, with which Durkheim and his team had lost sympathy. The reasons are obvious: it was reductionist, materialist, speculative, and politically dangerous. The demise of anthroposociology came in a letter to Bouglé (13 June 1900):

Pour l’anthroposociologie, j’ai écrit à Muffang que je supprimais la rubrique. Je ne demanderai plus de livres sur la matière; mais il est venu quelques livres d’anthropologie que je ne peux refuser.
On fera à la fin une courte rubrique *Anthropologie* dont je partage les éléments. Le Lapouge est entre les mains de Hubert qui s’en est déjà occupé. (Durkheim 1976)

The first issue of *AS* introduced anthroposociology in some detail, covering fifteen pages. After Durkheim’s short cautionary note, reproduced above, there followed two substantial review articles dealing with the works of Lapouge and Ammon respectively. Lapouge’s * Sélections sociales* (1896) was his first monograph, the transcript of a course that he taught at the University of Montpellier in 1888–89. Muffang celebrated the emergence of a new science, although he acknowledged that ‘l’avenir seul dira quel parti l’humanité pourra tirer des lois acquises de l’anthroposociologie’ (*AS*, 1896–7, I: 525).

Before reviewing *Les Sélections sociales*, Muffang offered a brief *aperçu* of the development of the anthroposociological school, emphasizing Lapouge’s early ideas about the superiority of the blonde, dolichocephalic race, that is, *Homo Europæus*.

The main focus of the book under review is to show that human societies have instituted principles of social selection which go against the grain of natural selection. This issue had first been mentioned by Francis Galton, Darwin’s nephew. As Muffang put it, while ‘la sélection naturelle assure généralement le triomphe du plus fort et du mieux doué, la sélection sociale assure trop souvent le triomphe des médiocres et des faibles, et produit l’élimination des éléments supérieurs des eugéniques’ (ibid.: 522). Muffang seemed to take the statistics provided by Vacher de Lapouge at face value, suggesting that ‘les mensurations fournissent ici des données’ (ibid.). He also seemed to be concerned with how one could contribute to the maximum possible diffusion of anthroposociological discoveries. He said that ‘il faudrait familiariser les masses avec les idées et les phénomènes d’hérité, d’évolution et de sélection, et déterminer un mouvement d’opinion contraire au mariage des individus tarés et conforme aux véritables devoirs de chacun vers l’espèce (ibid.: 524–5).

The second major item that received Muffang’s attention was the work of Otto Ammon. Under review was an article, ‘Die Geschichte einer Idee’ (1896), and a book, *Die Gesellschaftsordnung und ihre natürlichen Grundlagen* (1895). As in Lapouge’s case, Muffang emphasized the importance of the anthropometric data that had been collected, which seemed to establish, without a shadow of a doubt, what is called Ammon’s Law: ‘la plus grande dolichocephalie des urbains’ (*AS*, 1896–7: 526). If this happened it was because ‘les dolichocephales seraient donc attirés vers les villes en vertu de leurs aptitudes et de leur tendances psychiques’ (ibid.).

Interestingly, Muffang indicated that very different political conclusions can follow from the anthropometric data referred to: while ‘pour M. de Lapouge les sélections sociales agissent à l’encontre de la sélection naturelle dans un sens péjoratif..., pour Ammon sélections sociales et sélections naturelles se confondent’ (ibid.: 527, original emphasis). Ammon insisted that a flexible class system was the best mechanism for ensuring a progressive selection and social order.
The reviews of Lapouge (five pages) and Ammon (four pages) constituted the main bulk of the section on ‘Anthroposociologie’. The rest was dedicated to much shorter reviews and references. Studies by Livi (on Italy), Oloriz (on Spain) and Beddoe (on the United Kingdom) gave Muffang an opportunity to defend anthroposociology against criticisms that they invalidated the theses defended by Lapouge and Ammon. The crucial point here is that the fundamental laws of anthroposociology are only applicable where *Homo Europeus* and *Homo Alpinus* live side by side (Germany, France, northern Italy). This is not the case in the United Kingdom, which is occupied only by *Homo Europeus*, or southern Italy and Spain, which are occupied by *Homo Mediterraneus*. The latter, insists Muffang, ‘est d’ailleurs, elle aussi, dolichocéphale, mais la dolichocéphalie à elle seule ne signifie pas nécessairement supériorité et certains races excessivement dolichocéphales, telles que les Nègres, ne semblent pas aptes à s’élever beaucoup au-dessus de la barbarie’ (ibid.: 529-30).

As to the other items cited, there was a short review of two of Collignon’s anthropometric studies of France, which seemed to confirm some of the theses of anthroposociology, namely the law of the urban concentration of the dolichoids. Articles by Closson (an American follower of Lapouge) were also favourably mentioned. On the other hand, Bouglé’s article ‘Anthropologie et démocratie’, which was very critical of anthroposociology, was simply referred to without comment.

The final item examined was J. Novicow’s *L’Avenir de la race blanche* (1897). Muffang defended anthroposociology against Novicow’s attacks, insisting that the book contained ‘plus d’affirmations pures et simples que de chiffres et de faits’ (ibid.: 532).

The space dedicated to anthroposociology was slightly less (twelve pages) in the second volume of *AS* (1897–8, II: 565–76). Lapouge’s ‘Les Lois fondamentales de l’Anthroposociologie’ (1897) occupied centre stage. After acknowledging the role played by Gobineau in the development of anthroposociology, the review reproduced the substance of the laws more or less verbatim. Muffang also referred to certain other studies which seemed to confirm Lapouge’s Laws. Of particular importance among these was a joint empirical study by Durand de Gros and Lapouge on the Aveyron area of France.

Livi’s ‘Saggio di geografia del militarismo in Italia’ (1897) seemed to confirm rather nicely the anthroposociological hypothesis that economic and military aptitude is higher in those areas where *Homo Europeus* predominates. Although not quite favourable to the anthroposociological standpoint, Sergi’s ‘I dati antropologici in sociologia’ (1898) received a lengthy discussion of nearly three pages. Sergi put forward a racial classification different from that of Lapouge, based not on the cephalic index but on the shape of the skull. In any case, what Muffang welcomed was Sergi’s conviction that what was required to make sense of the origins and stratification of the population was a joint anthropometric, archaeological and philological approach.
One issue which seemed to baffle many of the practitioners of anthroposociology was that the cephalic index proved insufficient in characterizing racial groupings. The fact that *Homo Mediterraneus* was dolichocephalic, but neither tall nor blonde was quite a puzzle. This issue, taken up by Sergi, was also mentioned in another item discussed by Muffang: Ripley’s ‘The Racial Geography of Europe’ (1897). The works of Fouillée and Winiarski, who were quite critical of Lapouge, were also mentioned, but not properly reviewed. On the other hand, Closson’s ‘The Hierarchy of European Races’ (1897) attempted to confirm statistically that *Homo Europeus* was more economically active than *Homo Alpinus*. Muffang also mentioned other studies which suggested that Aryans were less criminally inclined than the other two European races.

In Volume III, (1898–9, 583–95), thirteen pages were dedicated to ‘Anthroposociologie’. Muffang’s main emphasis (five pages) was on Ammon’s long study, *Zur Anthropologie der Badener*, 1899. This book had been in the making for more than ten years and was meant to be a powerful empirical demonstration of the major tenets of anthroposociology. Two major conclusions seemed to emerge from Ammon’s study: a worrying historical tendency towards an increase in the cephalic index (in other words, a progressive increase of brachycephalic populations), and a strong correlation between race and class (the predominance of the dolichocephalic element in the upper classes).

Pullè’s *Profilo antropologico dell'Italia* (1898), which purported to illustrate the hierarchy which existed between the different European races, received careful attention. Using material from Italy, the author designed a number of civilizational indices to establish the superiority of *Homo Europeus* over *Homo Alpinus* (northern Italy) and of *Homo Alpinus* over *Homo Mediterraneus* (southern Italy).

As for Livi’s ‘La distribuzione geografica dei caratteri antropologici in Italia’ (1898), an article that challenged certain anthroposociological hypotheses, Muffang insisted on Pullè’s point that dolichocephalia and brachycephalia were not in themselves sufficient to explain the social structure of modern European societies, for the simple reason that both *Homo Europeus* and *Homo Mediterraneus* were dolichocephalic. In addition to the cephalic index, there was also the issue of a European racial hierarchy. This point, Muffang reminded us, had been made by Closson in his various articles on popularisation.

When the rubric ‘Anthroposociologie’ and its editor Muffang disappeared from AS from Volume IV (1899–1900) onwards, with Hubert and Mauss taking over the section under a different label, the tone of the commentaries became very different. For example, while Muffang’s review of Vacher de Lapouge’s *Les Sélections sociales* (1896) was extremely favourable, if bland, Hubert’s review of Lapouge’s next book, *L’Aryen: son rôle social* (1899), was rather negative (AS, 1899–1900, IV: 145–6). Anthroposociology was depicted as false science, while Lapouge was presented as a rabid prophet of Aryanism. Most damaging was Hubert’s dismantling of Lapouge’s basic principles and his emphasis on the unreliability of his statistics. Finally, there was the political sub-text: for Hubert the whole anthropo-
sociological exercise had no other outcome than creating a dangerous Aryan mythology.

It is intriguing that the subsection ‘Anthroposociologie’ should have disappeared, to be substituted by a more neutral term—‘Anthropologie et Sociologie’—which in practice covered the same ground in a mere nine pages (ibid.: 139–47). In terms of space, J. Deniker’s Les Races et les peuples de la terre (1900) was the main item of interest (four pages). Marcel Mauss, who reviewed this longish book, considered it ‘un excellent manuel d’ethnographie et d’anthropologie’ (ibid.: 139). One thing was clear in Mauss’s mind: the difficulty of establishing clear racial categories. Deniker proposed a new concept, that of a people, which was defined by its ‘caractères ethniques’. Mauss, however, found this concept rather unsatisfactory because of its vagueness (it referred to physical, social and linguistic features alike). In the final resort, the only things that existed for Mauss were societies, that is, ‘groupes définis par leur répartition dans un habitat déterminé’ (ibid.: 141). None the less, Mauss recognized the usefulness of the data on races and peoples. Deniker’s book was, he concluded, a work that ‘constitue une très riche repertoire des faits’ (ibid.: 143).

I have already indicated that in his review of Lapouge’s L’Aryen: son rôle social (1899), Hubert was rather dismissive and caustic, embracing many of the criticisms that had been put forward by L. Manouvrier in his ‘L’indice céphalique et la pseudosociologie’ (1899). This two-part article was also reviewed by Hubert, who heralded it as a defence of ‘la sociologie contre les prétendus sociologues’ (ibid.: 143) as Lapouge. Manouvrier accused the anthroposociological school of being essentially pseudoscientific and of being fixated on a concept—that of the cephalic index—which explained nothing.

Hubert’s conclusion to his review emphasizes an essential Durkheimian standpoint: sociology does not depend on anthropology. As he put it:

M. de Lapouge supprime la sociologie en l’absorbant. Peut-être a-t-il raison. Que les races aient des aptitudes intellectuelles spéciales, et que ces aptitudes correspondent à certains de leurs caractères physiques, nous n’en savons rien; sinon que ces propositions devraient faire l’objet d’une étude infiniment minutieuse et compliquée. En tout cas ce n’est pas notre affaire. Nous continuerons à chercher les causes sociales des faits sociaux. Nous enregistrerons avec soin tout ce que l’on dira de leurs effets anthropologiques. Mais l’étude des facteurs anthropologiques de l’évolution des sociétés échappe complètement à notre critique. (ibid.: 146)

In this long quotation, it is worth noting that Hubert’s rejection of anthroposociology is essentially methodological. In other words, sociology must stand on its own. Another important point is that the possibility of racial explanations is not rejected: what is condemned is the superficiality and shoddiness of anthroposociology. In a nutshell, what Hubert is reasserting is a different conception of sociological practice. While Lapouge gives explanatory primacy to the biological concept of inheritance, the Durkheimian vision consists in assuming that social facts can be explained by reference to social causes. So-called ‘anthropological
factors’ fall outside the remit of sociology, even though they may be relevant in
the course of social evolution. This position is not without contradiction.
Although the autonomy of the social domain is one of the key defining features
of the Durkheimian endeavour, the possibility of anthroposociology is not alto­
gether denied. But is it not the case that if biological facts can account for social
ones, then sociology is to a great extent irrelevant? Part of the problem arises
from the concept of race used in the literature of the time. Race is both a biologi­
cal and a cultural concept, hence the confusion between race and peoples or
nations.
As I mentioned in the ‘Introduction’, Vol. IV decided the destiny of anthro­
posociology in AS for good. In Vol. V (1900-01: 185-8, the space dedicated to
anthroposociology is minimal: four pages. The reviews appear under a new sub­
heading, ‘Le Milieu social et la race’, and it was left to Hubert to edit them, as
well as being the sole reviewer. Only two books were considered: Ripley’s The
Races of Europe (1900) and Sergi’s The Mediterranean Race (1901). A couple
of articles were also briefly referred to: Bouglé’s ‘Castes et Race’ (1901) and
Roberty’s ‘Les Préjugés de la sociologie contemporaine’ (1900). These papers
challenged, in different ways, the explanatory primacy given by anthroposociology
to the concept of race.
Ripley’s book had already been referred to in Vol. IV as an ‘important ouv­
rage’ (AS, 1899–1900, IV: 147). For Hubert, the main lesson of the book is that
it is too simple to want to ‘expliquer les phénomènes sociaux par les aptitudes
natives des races’ (AS 1900–01, V: 185). Interestingly enough, Ripley was con­
cerned with the opposite: ‘constater la réaction des phénomènes sociaux sur les
caractères physiques’ (ibid.). In the final instance, a proper sociology must be well
aware that social phenomena, be it suicide, artistic success, marriage patterns or
religious solidarity, cannot be accounted for in terms of the number of dolicho­
cephalics or brachycephalics, but ‘dépendent de causes purement sociales’ (ibid.:
187). Sergi’s book was highlighted because it emphasized, with some exceptions,
the existence of a single European race and rejected the pretensions of craniometry.
After Volume V, anthroposociology all but disappeared from AS. There were
only to be three very brief references in 1904–5, 1905–6, and 1909–12, two-and-a­
half pages altogether.
In AS 1904–5: 167–8, under the sub-section ‘Races et sociétés’, Hubert
reviewed Colajanni’s Latins et Anglo-Saxons (1905) and Finot’s Le Préjugé des
races (1905) together. The first three lines of the review give a flavour of Hu­
bert’s judgement: ‘Ces deux livres traitent du même problème. Ce problème n’est
pas un problème scientifique. Les réponses diverses qui lui sont données ne le
sont pas davantage’ (ibid.: 168). Both books are critical of anthroposociology, and
insist on something which is clear to Hubert and to the Durkheimian school as a
whole, namely that social phenomena can be accounted for only in terms of other
social phenomena. As Hubert put it, ‘la sociologie ne peut étudier que des so­
ciétés, jamais des races’ (ibid.). Finot’s book, however, is found wanting because
the author ‘ne connaît pas l’art des citations exactes... [et] il est trop loin des études auxquelles il touche’ (ibid.).

By Volume X (1905–6: 202–3) Hubert was no longer in charge of the topic. Houzé’s L’Aryen et l’Anthroposociologie (1906) was referred to in a subsection entitled ‘La Question de la Race’, edited by M. Chaillié (who was also presumably the reviewer). Houzé’s book was a well-organized and devastating attack on anthroposociology. Divided into three parts (‘Language’, ‘Anthropology’ and ‘Anthroposociology’), the author showed that ‘l’anthroposociologie n’est qu’une pseudo-science, bâtie sur des erreurs fondamentales et des déductions puériles’ (ibid.: 203).

The last volume in the original series of AS (Volume XII, 1909–12), contained a short review of Lapouge’s Race et milieu social (1909) by Bouglé, only half a page long and purely descriptive. What we can learn from the review is that it was a collection of papers in which Lapouge tried to answer his critics and to restate anthroposociology as a discipline which dealt with ‘l’étude des réactions réciproques de la race et du milieu’ (ibid.: 20).

The fate of anthroposociology

It is not my intention to produce an exhaustive survey of all the reactions to anthroposociology. I have only chosen a few representative items. Generally speaking, the range of opinions oscillate from cautious reservation to all-out condemnation. If we except a few recognized followers like Muffang and Closson, most sociologists, anthropologists and social philosophers were weary of the craniological and racial determinism of the new school, though also baffled by the pretended scientificity of the mountain of statistics thrown at them. Until the contradictions arising from the data were uncovered, anthroposociology enjoyed a certain appeal.

One of the first long book reviews of Lapouge’s Les Sélections sociales was published in the prestigious Revue Scientifique. The author, the philosopher F. Paulhan, found the text ‘un livre intéressant et de réelle valeur. [...] Les théories de l’auteur sont hardies et fortement exposées, leur conséquences sont d’une grande portée et l’ouvrage, malgré les reserves et les restrictions qu’il appelle, s’impose à l’étude de quiconque s’intéresse à la sociologie scientifique’ (1896: 13).

After this introduction, Paulhan provides the reader with a long summary of Lapouge’s main ideas. Special emphasis is placed on the concept of social selection and its deleterious effects on modern European society. Paulhan was also interested in the applied side of Lapouge’s ideas, in particular their eugenic possibilities, which were rather limited. Undoubtedly a book of such a revolutionary scope was bound to elicit numerous objections, particularly among the sentimental bien-pensants. In any case, Lapouge’s theses were not proven, but rather speculat-
ive. None the less, we are in the presence of a precious book, 'fertile en idées hardies, en constatations, intéressants, en suggestions fécondes, en vues libres et de longue portée' (ibid.: 18).

Among Durkheim's best-known contemporaries, it was perhaps the philosopher and social scientist Alfred Fouillé who devoted the greatest attention to anthroposociology. The introduction to his *Psychologie du peuple français* (1898a) is largely a presentation and discussion of the anthroposociological theses. This led Otto Ammon to consider Fouillé 'parmi les partisans de la théorie anthroposociologique qui fait de la race le facteur dominant de l’histoire, attribue le grand rôle aux dolichodes et se lamente sur l’universelle montée des brachycéphales' (Ammon 1898: 168–9). This conclusion was rather far-fetched; what happened, insisted Fouillé, was that 'Ammon a pris pour des adhésions formelles plusieurs passages où j’expose simplement cette théorie' (1898b: 369).

Fouillé was, in fact, dubious about both the principles and the conclusions of anthroposociology, while admitting that the data were interesting, though inconclusive. Any attempt at creating a philosophy of history on the basis of the statistics collected by anthroposociology was bound to fail. In conclusion, Fouillé insisted that 'sans méconnaître de certaines caractères physiques du point de vue de l’anthropologie et de la distinction entre les variétés humaines, il est impossible de leur accorder l’importance psychique, morale, et sociale que leur attribuent les anthroposociologistes' (ibid.: 371).

The same *Revue International de Sociologie* which published Ammon and Fouillé had the previous year (1897) published a short review of Lapouge's *Les Sélections sociales*. The editor, Renée Worms, after a brief summary of the book asked himself: 'Que vaut cette théorie?' His answer was rather positive, while acknowledging that many specialists rejected its anthropological basis—in short, a book 'pleine d’intérêt. Les suggestions fécondes y abondent. Presque à chaque page, un fait curieux, une idée originale' (1897: 330).

A very different, much more politically inspired article was that by Bouglé (1897). Reviewing works by Ammon, Lapouge and Closson, the crucial question which Bouglé believed lay at the core of the anthroposociological quest was ‘l’idée de l’inégalité de la race humaine’ (ibid.: 448). This doctrine tried to provide an ‘explication biologique de l’expansion des idées égalitaires’ (ibid.), that is, of the triumph of democracy.

What was at stake for Bouglé was not so much the accuracy of the theories, which he nevertheless disputed, but rather ethical issues. Hence his conclusion:

>S’il est vrai que, en déclarant les hommes égaux, nous portons un jugement non sur la façon dont les a fait la nature, mais sur la façon dont la société doit les traiter, les craniométries les plus précises ne sauraient nous donner ni tort ni raison. En croyant qu’il appartient à des observations scientifiques de juger, en dernier recours, de la valeur de cette idée pratique, l’anthropologie oublie que les questions sociales ne sont pas seulement ‘questions de faits’ mais encore et surtout ‘questions de principes’. (ibid.: 461)
A more favourable, though not uncritical review article was Mazel’s (1899). Vacher de Lapouge was saluted as a ‘savant rigoureux... bardé de statistiques, de chiffres, d’indices céphaliques et de mesures anthropométriques’ (ibid.: 666). For Mazel, Lapouge’s description of the ways in which social selections operate in society to thwart natural selection were perfectly reasonable. The book should be compulsory reading for social scientists, ‘car d’une part ils feront leur profit d’une foule d’excellentes suggestions, et d’autre part, s’ils méritent les noms de sociologues, ils seront d’avance à l’abri de l’idée fixe d’anthroposociologie’ (ibid.: 672). In conclusion, anthroposociology cannot stand up to the sociological ideal. The existence of inequalities in society cannot be justified on biological grounds. None the less, Mazel believed that the ideas of Ammon and Lapouge were useful to ‘mettre en garde contre les exagérations non moins indéniables, de l’esprit égalitaire’ (ibid.: 675).

The extremely negative tone of Manouvrier’s long review of anthroposociology (1899) made quite an impact on the scientific opinion of the time. He insisted that Ammon’s and Lapouge’s obsession for the cephalic index was surprising in the extreme. By fetishizing it, they left unconsidered other, perhaps more relevant anthropological data. Had they taken them into account, they would not find themselves in the odd position of having to explain why the city attracted dark-eyed, dark-complexioned individuals and why they survived better than the blonds. In addition, the putative correlation between head form and psychological features was not demonstrated.

Except for his Race et milieu social (1909), which is a collection of his papers, Lapouge’s contributions to anthroposociology in the 1900s were published in German in the Politisch-anthropologisch Revue, edited by Ludwig Woltmann. The French journals, Lapouge often complained, had lost interest in the new discipline. Perhaps the final, most devastating review of anthroposociology came from Belgium (Houzé 1906). For this author, anthroposociology should be rejected because, as Manouvrier had noted, it is a pseudo-science which cannot account for the complex phenomena of society. The Aryan hypothesis, for example, fails to distinguish between linguistic and ethnic facts: there may be an Indo-European language, but there is no Indo-European ethnic group.

In his detailed study, Houzé showed that intelligence did not depend on the brain alone but also on other organs. Furthermore, at birth the brain was a virgin organ, which only developed with education. Only basic ‘aptitudes’ were transmitted. Houzé also rejected the idea of social selection defended by Lapouge (following Broca and Galton), that is, the conviction that natural selection ceased the moment the human brain developed.

Houzé was, on the whole, very critical of the scientific pretensions of anthroposociology, and he went to great lengths to dismantle its intellectual pretensions. He insisted on the spurious character of the distinction between dolichocephalics and brachycephalics; in fact, the population was so mixed that the classification made no sense at all, even without bringing Homo Mediterraneus to complicate things. As to Lapouge’s Laws, the least that could be said was that
they were contradicted by facts everywhere. Houze concluded that Lapouge suffered from delusions of grandeur when he asserted that his school was appreciated world-wide.

It would be wrong, however, to conclude that the social scientific establishment rejected anthroposociology tout court, or, to be more specific, that race had ceased to be an explanatory variable. If we take, for example, the attitude of the leading American anthropologist of the period, Franz Boas, it is clear that he was critical but circumspect concerning the explanatory power of race. The main point to be emphasized here is that his thought on racial matters evolved slowly over a long period of time from a position in the 1890s, in which he believed that mental differences between races were not negligible, to a total rejection of racial formalism in the 1930s. By 1911, when the first edition of The Mind of Primitive Man was published, Boas was still struggling to accommodate the role of the racial variable in the anthropological scheme of things (cf. Stocking 1968, 1974).

How does anthroposociology fare in the histories of sociology of the first quarter of the twentieth century? It is interesting that as late as 1915, in the context of writing a short but panoramic article on French sociology, Durkheim referred very briefly to anthroposociology, although this school did not have an influence déterminable (Durkheim 1975, Vol. 1: 116). Vacher de Lapouge’s theses are depicted as ‘très aventureuses’ and in need of being ‘plus solidement établies’. Of course, Durkheim did not fail to mention that anthroposociology had the pretension of ‘résorber la sociologie dans l’anthropologie’ (ibid.).

It is perhaps appropriate to conclude this brief survey of the impact of anthroposociology on the social sciences by considering Pitirim Sorokin’s Contemporary Sociological Theories, which was published in 1928. He certainly gave a prominent place to anthroposociology in his text. In a book of nearly 800 pages, he dedicated 100 pages to the different authors who fell under the label ‘Anthroporacial, Selectionist and Hereditarist School’. His general opinion of the school is that ‘it has been one of the most important and valuable schools in sociology, in spite of its one-sidedness, fallacies and exaggerations’ (1928: 308). As to the work of Lapouge, he believed it to be ‘stamped with originality, independence and erudition’ (ibid.: 234). After providing a detailed exposition of the work of Gobineau, Chamberlain, Lapouge, Ammon, Galton, Pearson and others, Sorokin proceeded to a careful but balanced criticism of the school. He rejected a number of hypotheses as not proven, such as the polygenic origins of mankind and the superiority of the Aryan race. Many of the so-called Lapouge-Ammon Laws also came under heavy criticism, mostly on the basis that the historical and anthropometric data were rather contradictory. Sorokin insisted, however, that the school had proved a number of principles, particularly the existence of ‘innate differences between races, social classes and individuals’ (ibid.: 279), the idea that the differences are due to environmental and hereditary factors, and the theory of social selection (in a modified form, with positive effects).

In 1948, when H. E. Barnes edited a 1000-page volume entitled An Introduction to the History of Sociology, there were four chapters devoted to French
sociology, focusing on Fouillée, Tarde, Le Bon and Durkheim. Neither anthropo­sociology nor Lapouge were mentioned. Ammon was briefly referred to as a Darwinist who ‘made an honest effort to work out a theory of social evolution in terms of the principles of heredity, selection, variation, the struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest’ (Barnes 1948: 211). More recent general histories have at best totally ignored anthroposociology or at worst produced one-liners which make Lapouge the object of an infantile but politically correct derision.

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