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LAST year saw the seventieth anniversary of the inauguration of these Frazer Lectures when Frazer was presented with a laudatory address drawn up by A. E. Housman on behalf of a large number of his friends and admirers. Frazer, who was then 67 years old, a Fellow of the Royal Society and soon to receive the Order of Merit, replied with the rather grand modesty that was one of his conspicuous characteristics:

I can only hope that, if posterity should concern itself with my writings, it will not reverse the verdict which you have passed upon them.... It is my earnest wish that the lectureship should be used solely for the disinterested pursuit of truth, and not for the dissemination and propagation of any theories or opinions of mine. (See Frazer 1927a: 365; Dawson 1932: xii)

The truth is that his lasting influence has been in the literary rather than the academic world, while social anthropologists had for the most part distanced

Revised text of the Frazer Lecture in Social Anthropology for 1991, given at the University of Cambridge on Thursday, 5 March 1992, and prepared to mark the centenary of the publication in 1890 of the first edition of The Golden Bough. I am grateful to the Master and Fellows of Trinity College, Cambridge, for permission to quote from a few of the letters to Frazer held in the College's Wren Library, in particular those from Sir Arthur Keith, William Steed, the Revd Montague Pollock, R. R. Marett, Sir Francis Galton and Mr J. Parrott. I am also grateful to Steven Seidenberg and Jeremy Coote for their help in preparing the text of the lecture for publication.
themselves from his theories and opinions during his own long lifetime. Some thirty years after Frazer died at the age of 87, his one-time secretary, R. A. Downie, was provoked to defend him against presumptuous younger critics, among whom he singled out the Professor of Social Anthropology at Oxford, E. E. Evans-Pritchard. 'But anthropologists are a queer tribe,' Downie wrote, 'and since 1948, when Evans-Pritchard gave his lecture on *The Divine Kingship of the Shilluk*, it has become almost traditional in Frazer Lectures to take some idea of Frazer's and pull it to pieces' (Downie 1970: 29). Downie exaggerates, though it is true that some later lecturers have followed a brief conventional acknowledgement of Frazer's undoubted eminence with papers that implicitly raise doubts about why or even whether he deserved it.

But even now, a century after *The Golden Bough* was first published, and half a century after Frazer's death, 'Frazer of *The Golden Bough*’ still remains, if only by name, by far the most widely known of all British social anthropologists. Whether they like it or not, Frazer's popular reputation remains part of their own, and since he raised the question of posterity, it seems appropriate to take the occasion of these anniversaries to look back on some of the verdicts that have been passed on his work.

There was no full-scale biography of Frazer until 1987. Robert Ackerman's *J. G. Frazer: His Life and Work* draws upon most of the published and many of the hitherto unpublished sources to bring to life Frazer's character and intellectual interests (he had few, if any, which were not), in relation both to his own times and to ours. If I add here little more than a few asides from my own anthropological viewpoint, I have two excuses. The first is that my D.Phil. thesis was examined and approved by the Revd E. O. James (1888–1972), who is described by Ackerman (1987: 124) as probably 'the last of the true-believing Frazerians’ and who was kind enough to suppose that at heart I shared his faith. The second is that before Ackerman thought of writing his book, I had taken an interest in some unpublished letters to Frazer, when they first began to arrive in Trinity College, Cambridge, jumbled together in a few old cardboard boxes, including a few to which Ackerman does not refer. Handling those personal letters gave an intimate impression of the fascination Frazer's work had exercised over correspondents of all kinds from all over the world; and the respect and deference, even veneration, accorded this shy, reclusive, and personally far from charismatic scholar seemed to call for some explanation. Even as first-year students of anthropology in the mid-1940s we were allowed to assume that Frazer, to put it bluntly, was a bore, if on a grand scale; and he certainly wrote at inordinate length, as you may judge from one or two passages I am bound to quote.

Frazer could scarcely have hoped for a more sympathetic biographer than Ackerman, but even he introduces his subject with the intentionally challenging statement, ‘Frazer is an embarrassment’ (ibid.: 1); and Ackerman knows that this has been particularly true for British social anthropologists, who have to agree that Frazer was and remains the most famous of them all, while also dissociating themselves from much that he wrote. He embarrasses us now partly for the very
reason that gave him his wider popular appeal—his apparent sympathy with the assumptions and values of his own times and social class. Though he often appears to accept those values while at the same time obliquely suggesting their limitations, he never (unlike Matthew Arnold, whom he in some ways resembles) directly confronts them. It is not necessary, therefore, to read very far in his work to find examples of the imperialism, paternalism, ‘colonial mentality’ and now, certainly, ‘elitism’ that some critics of British social anthropology still detect in his successors, like the sins of their colonialist fathers inexorably visited upon their children, innocent though they may claim to be. And, of course, those peoples whose grandparents Frazer constantly refers to as ‘savages’—‘your dear savages’, as one of his clerical admirers called them—do not like it the better for knowing that Frazer included not only his own remote ancestors in that category, but also most of his living fellow countrymen. The masses everywhere, he wrote, constitute ‘a solid layer of savagery beneath the surface of society’ (cf. e.g. 1931: 129, 141). When Frazer died in 1941, Professor Fleure’s obituary for the Royal Society tried to allow for some of Frazer’s comments on the common people, which might be misunderstood in the more democratic atmosphere of the nation at war. As an example he quoted a Frazerian passage that ends with a reference to ‘empty husks of popular superstition on which the swine of modern society are still content to feed’. We are not quite reassured, I think, when Fleure then adds, ‘needless to say, “swine” is used here without any touch of unkindness’ (Fleure 1941: 902). Frazer was in principle sympathetic towards the underprivileged, but he could never resist a turn of phrase or a biblical allusion.

These are questions of a change in general social sensitivities between Frazer’s time and ours; but among the literary and academic public, who take Frazer’s social attitudes for granted as part of a history of ideas familiar through their own parents or grandparents, the part assigned to Frazer in the history of twentieth-century ideas and sentiments—in the history of modern ‘Western’ sensibility, to use the word in my title—is disproportionate to the much smaller part he soon came to play in the history of social anthropology. And as his influence on so many of this century’s creative writers shows, he provided general readers with more food for the imagination, and more colourful and stylized prose, than his successors usually had to offer.

Some thirty years ago, when I lectured on Frazer at the Jung Institute in Zurich, I criticizing Frazer’s interpretations of primitive religion more dismissively than I would now, suggesting that his ideas of primitive psychology were little more than plausible constructs of his own Victorian rationalism. The lecture was not at all well received by the students and members of the Institute, who preferred to admire him as a guide to the understanding of the human psyche, an imaginative pioneer in the exploration of Jungian archetypes. T. S. Eliot similarly found The Golden Bough psychologically complementary to the work of Freud, ‘throwing its light on the obscurities of the soul from a different angle’ (quoted in Vickery 1973: 235). I should have been better advised in Zurich to remember the line of Yeats, whose interests in Frazer were similar to those of the psychoanalysts: ‘Tread
softly, for you tread on my dreams’. For Frazer in several passages sees himself as Prospero, appealing to his readers’ sense of the illusions, transience and mystery of dreams. Compare, for example, the famous opening of the abridged version of *The Golden Bough* with that of Radcliffe-Brown’s *The Andaman Islanders*, published in the same year. Frazer begins by promising his readers ‘a voyage of discovery’, from ‘Turner’s dream-like vision of the little woodland lake of Nemi—“Diana’s Mirror”, as it was called by the ancients’ and so on to the secret of the King of the Sacred Wood. Radcliffe-Brown begins with a short geography lesson: ‘The Andaman Islands are part of a chain of islands stretching from Cape Negrais in Burma to Achin Head in Sumatra.’ Having myself started a book in the approved Oxford style of Radcliffe-Brown, I now think there may be some happy medium between the sensibility of the one and the science of the other.

Among later well-known social anthropologists, perhaps only Lévi-Strauss in *Tristes Tropiques* (itself a romantic, indeed deliberately poetic title) and Margaret Mead, in their very different ways, have invited their readers to share their personal anthropological experience, in a voyage of self-discovery. Both, like Frazer, are very self-conscious writers, and write with an eye to the reader’s own self-consciousness. It is clear that Frazer’s wider public often read him less for anthropological knowledge of very foreign peoples than because he encouraged them to think about themselves, and to discover themselves more interesting and exciting than they had supposed themselves to be. When he received an honorary degree at Manchester University he told the Mancunians that in their city ‘the pulse of life, the pulse of Empire beats more strongly than in the peaceful, the cloistered seclusion of our ancient Universities.... Manchester ranks with Athens and Alexandria in antiquity, and with Florence in the Middle Ages’ (see Frazer 1927a: 357). When Rudyard Kipling invited Frazer to accept yet another of his honorary degrees, from the University of St Andrews in 1923, he addressed him as ‘one to whom our civilization owes so much of its knowledge of itself’; and in marking the recent centenary of *The Golden Bough*, some well-known modern writers and critics have on the whole confirmed Kipling’s judgement, with reference to Frazer’s influence on ‘thinkers’ and creative writers during this century, some of it of a kind he would probably have preferred not to acknowledge (see e.g. Fraser (ed.) 1990). D. H. Lawrence and James Joyce, had he taken any interest in them, would have shocked or baffled him, and he soon found Eliot’s *The Waste Land* incomprehensible (see Downie 1970: 21, 60). With his fear of working-class ‘Bolshevism’ and his primness about sex, he would have been dismayed to find himself remembered in the company of Marx and Freud as ‘one of the makers of our modern consciousness’. But there are many other representatives of our modern consciousness (Mrs Whitehouse, for example) with whom he would have felt quite at home. He denounced ‘an age like ours’ (this was in 1920) when marriage and family ties counted for nothing, sexual communism was commonly taken for granted, and the very distinction between the sexes was being obliterated. At such a time, he suggested, we should do well to contemplate the domestic virtues of the poet William Cowper, in order to ‘repel and refute those
shallow sophisms which, addressed to the basest of human passions, would subvert the fabric of civilization and plunge us back into that savagery from which it has cost mankind so many generations of patient effort to emerge (see Frazer 1927a: 364). Downie, by contrast, mentions that a passage in Frazer suggesting that science itself might be superseded by some quite different approach to intellectual and moral enlightenment had been quoted by ‘the drug culture’ of the 1960s as ‘a prophecy of psychedelic insight’ (Downie 1970: 47). It is ironic that Frazer, a model of middle-class morality and social conformity, should have become accepted as a herald of later intellectual and emotional emancipation.

For social anthropologists Frazer began to belong to the past at almost the same moment as these Frazer lectures were established. In 1922, simultaneously with the publication of the first abridged edition of The Golden Bough, came Malinowski’s Argonauts of the Western Pacific and Radcliffe-Brown’s The Andaman Islanders, the first outstanding products of the British field research tradition that Frazer had very actively encouraged. As every first-year student knows, these monographs began to point students towards empirical studies of Frazer’s ‘savages’, who, when spoken to in their own homes and languages, were found to have much more of interest to say for themselves than Frazer had to say about them. The central theme (or, as he thought, theory) of The Golden Bough—that all mankind had evolved intellectually and psychologically from a superstitious belief in magicians, through a superstitious belief in priests and gods, to enlightened belief in scientists—had little or no relevance to the conduct of life in an Andamanese camp or a Melanesian village, and the whole, supposedly scientific, basis of Frazer’s anthropology was seen as a misapplication of Darwin’s theory of biological evolution to human history and psychology. This is, of course, an absurdly simplified account of what happened with the change from library research to field research, but it is enough to suggest why, among social anthropologists, Frazer’s reputation declined so rapidly after he had first achieved it. For a younger generation there were, of course, other more personal reasons. As Evans-Pritchard explained:

I began to vary the tedium of the History School [at Oxford]...by taking an interest in books like Tylor’s Primitive Culture and Frazer’s Golden Bough.... But there was here a snag. I did not want to become, I was going to say, just an intellectual. I wanted a life of adventure too, and fieldwork seemed to be the solution to combine both. (Evans-Pritchard 1973: 18)

Frazer’s immediate successors were still as committed as Frazer himself was to establishing the scientific credentials of their subject, but though their science was to be a social science (for Malinowski a ‘science of culture’, for Radcliffe-Brown a ‘natural science of society’) their model for this science, like Frazer’s, was taken from the natural sciences. ‘The great thinkers, the Newtons and Darwins of anthropology, will come after us,’ Frazer had written. They are still awaited, though Radcliffe-Brown sometimes seemed to hope that he might be one of them. It must be remembered, of course, that funding for research was
more readily forthcoming in the name of the sciences than in the name of the arts, and a scientific knowledge of social processes seemed to promise the power to control them.

In answer to doubts raised about the empirical foundations of his 'structuralism' Lévi-Strauss has said recently that 'the great speculative structures are made to be broken' (see Smyth 1991), but I cannot think that he now regards all structuralist interpretations to be entirely misconceived. In a paradoxical way, for an influential anthropologist to make such a statement disarms particular criticisms of his work, and Frazer was, if unconsciously, a master of such tactics. He often reminds his readers that all theories, magical, religious, or scientific, were in the last analysis only 'theories of thought', as though it mattered little whether they were mistaken or not. I doubt if Frazer meant to erect his 'speculative structure' of the whole evolution of the human intellect, from savagery to civilization, for the scientific satisfaction of seeing his successors demolish it, but by insisting that all theories of the nature of the world and the universe are merely of notional significance, that only facts really count, he appeals to his readers' inclination to accept at their face value the choice and arrangement of the facts by which he supports the theories.

And he does so with overtones particularly calculated to appeal to his contemporaries, brought up on sermons, the Bible, and a biblical view of human ignorance in relation to divine omniscience. All our human theories were after all, he wrote, 'merely hypotheses devised to explain that ever-shifting phantasmagoria of thought which we dignify with the high-sounding names of the world and the universe' (Frazer 1900, iii: 460), all 'fated to be washed away like children's castles in the sand by the rising tide of knowledge' (see Frazer 1927b: 280). It would seem impertinent to ask him what the low-sounding names of the world and the universe might be, or whether 'scientific', economic or political theories, applied as they have been with disastrous consequences, were really no more important than sand-castles. These are typically Frazerian images, and typically he uses them not because they are good to think with, but because they were good for his readers to feel with. The anatomist and physical anthropologist Sir Arthur Keith wrote to Frazer, after he had heard Frazer's Huxley Lecture, that in him 'without doubt the “kirk” had lost a tip-top preacher as well as a scholar'. Frazer was brought up in a tradition that took sermons seriously, and John Dwyer's recent book, Virtuous Discourse: Sensibility and Community in Late Eighteenth-Century Scotland (1987), often reminds one of this and other characteristics of his—the cultivation of a spirit of melancholy and of rational fellow-feeling, along with admiration for Addison, Hume, Adam Smith and Malthus. He certainly derived some satisfaction from his sad reflections on the human condition, spending so much time on that 'melancholy record of human error and folly', as he called The Golden Bough (Frazer 1900, iii: 458).

For many modern readers, the voice of the preacher, often echoed in Frazer's writings, must sometimes seem incongruous with the voice of the scientist. In what he called 'the scientific spirit', he wrote: 'we must endeavour to investigate
the beliefs and customs of mankind with the same rigorous impartiality with which, for example, the zoologist investigates the habits of bees and ants' (see Frazer 1927b: 27). But when he develops his well-known analogy between the magician and the scientist, both attempting to control nature by the application of immutable laws, the voice of the preacher carries him away. Take, for example, the following passage where, however, a consciousness of human weakness is complemented, as often in sermons, by a message of hope:

Both of them [the scientist and the magician] open up a seemingly boundless vista of possibilities to him who knows the causes of things and can touch the secret strings that set in motion the vast and intricate mechanism of the world... They lure the weary inquirer, the footsore seeker, on through the wilderness of disappointment in the present by their endless promises of the future; they take him to the top of an exceeding high mountain and show him, beyond the dark clouds and rolling mists at his feet, a vision of the celestial city, far off, it may be, but radiant with unearthly splendour, bathed in the light of dreams. (Frazer 1900, i: 62-3)

One can almost hear the announcement of the hymn that will follow; but for readers accustomed to the language and sentiments of the scriptures, and trying to reconcile them with the scientific authority of Darwin and Herbert Spencer, this amalgamation of the scientific quest and The Pilgrim's Progress offered a comforting literary resolution. Frazer was awarded a Civil List pension in 1905 'in recognition of his literary merits and of his anthropological studies' in that order, and his literary and biographical essays (on Condorcet, for example, and Renan; see Frazer 1927a, 1931) are admirable for their style and content, but it was the more homiletic and prophetic style of The Golden Bough, in which he presented his wide range of learning, that gave him his credence among the general public and brought him a repletion of high academic and official honours.

Frazer addresses his readers directly, in a tone of gentle but entirely assured authority, as though no reasonable person could possibly disagree with him, and even those social anthropologists who had been among the first to criticize his ideas had to come to terms with an uneasy sense of his superiority. With reference to the Frazer lectures Max Gluckman, for example, said that though we no longer found his basic ideas useful, that we read him, if at all, for antiquarian interest, and often found him dull, we were still 'perched upon his shoulders, dwarfs on a giant' (Gluckman 1962: 16). Though it must seem unlikely to those who remember Gluckman that he could ever regard himself as a dwarf, either physically or mentally, it is more than conventional praise. Again, Evans-Pritchard, in spite of his criticisms of Frazer's imaginative construct of 'divine kingship' (Evans-Pritchard 1948), later paid him much the same sort of tribute as Frazer's own contemporaries, describing The Golden Bough as 'among the great achievements of English literature and scholarship' (Evans-Pritchard 1986: 132). As late as 1965, Edmund Leach, one of the most impatient critics of Frazer's overblown prose and literary embellishment of his sources for dramatic effect, concluded an almost entirely hostile account of Frazer's (and Malinowski's) anthropology with
the highest praise: ‘It is because each of us can recognize in their pages the savage within us that we feel the excitement of insight, the unverifiable validity of a statement of genius’ (Leach 1965: 36). Again, the primary interest of ‘the savage’ would seem to be to heighten our own self-consciousness. Leach, however, had a sharp, advocate’s mind, and might equally well have argued for the prosecution, along with Wittgenstein, that ‘Frazer is much more savage than most of his savages’ since ‘his explanations of [their] observances are much cruder than the sense of the observances themselves’ (Wittgenstein 1979: 8e).

Frazer, like Wittgenstein, was a Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and therefore perhaps should have known better, but Frazer received his honorary DCL from Oxford in the company of Cecil Rhodes and Lord Kitchener, and was writing for a general public that, like them, had very much cruder notions of ‘savages’ than those which, largely as a result of his own work, began to be entertained after the Great War. (Though to be fair, and as Brian Street has shown (1975), Frazer earlier played a part in introducing a somewhat more enlightened view of ‘savages’ into the works of such popular writers as Rider Haggard.)

There are now very few social anthropologists who remember from their own direct experience how and why Frazer came for a time to be so highly regarded that any criticism of his work seemed a bold act of impiety (only Andrew Lang among his contemporaries openly made fun of him). Whatever others may have thought of his ideas or personality, for them he was still an authority to be reckoned with, and an original source of their own anthropological interests and knowledge. By now he seems a remote, ancestral figure, and The Golden Bough has become little more than an intellectual ancient monument—‘one of the most beautiful ruins in the history of thought’ Lord Annan called it even some thirty years ago (Annan 1959: 11); and if we are to understand how Frazer, whose work scarcely any student of social anthropology in the last fifty years has actually read, came to be so eminent, we can do so only by excavating that ruin, in a version, perhaps, of what Michel Foucault has termed an ‘archaeology of knowledge’. What fragments of ‘discourse’, one may ask, does one discover at the foundations of Frazer’s great reputation for authority among scholars and men of letters, poets and novelists, statesmen and politicians, liberal churchmen and free-thinkers, and general readers from all walks of life?

I have chosen here only a few such fragments, of which the most complete comes from the address presented to Frazer by A. E. Housman to inaugurate these lectures some seventy years ago. Housman made some play with the idea that Frazer himself was a magician, the King of the Wood and the custodian, as well as the author, of the Golden Bough. There, Housman continued, is to be found learning mated with literature, labour disguised in ease, and a museum of dark and uncouth superstitions invested with the charm of a truly sympathetic magic. There you have gathered together, for the admonition of a proud and oblivious race, the scattered and fading relics of its foolish childhood, whether withdrawn from our view among savage folk and in different countries, or lying unnoticed at our doors. The forgotten milestones of the road which man has travelled, the mazes and blind
alleys of his appointed progress through time, are illuminated by your art and
genius, and the strangest of remote and ancient things are brought near to the
minds and hearts of your contemporaries. (See Dawson 1932: xii-xiii)

It is some indication of the impression Frazer made on his readers that this
eulogy takes on the cadences of Frazer’s own rhetorical language. Housman spoke
on the whole for the educated middle class connected with the older universities
(though by no means all academics) and his praise reflects their interests—their
respect for learning, their literary culture, their national pride, their relationship
with colonized peoples and with their own working classes, their belief in progress,
their concern with their own social origins, their taste for historical legends and
classical mythology. Frazer wrote of the magician as the wisest and most
intelligent of his tribe, who was, therefore, chosen as its leader. His admirers
fancifully cast him in that role, as the repository of their myth and legend, a
magician, a seer or a prophet, and Frazer was happy to accept it.

As early as 1901, Wickham Steed, who was to become editor of The Times,
wrote to Frazer after meeting him in Rome. William James, who had met him
there at the same time, had found him ‘a sucking babe of humility, unworldliness
and molelike sightlessness to everything but print’ (quoted by Ackerman (1987:
175); original emphasis), but Wickham Steed saw him differently. ‘My dear
Frazer,’ his letter begins, ‘it seems rather like a profanation to drop the “Mr.” to
an arch-magician like you.’ And R. R. Marett went further, referring, if
mischievously, to the very formidable Lady Frazer as the flaminica dialis, the wife
of the priest of Jupiter. Jane Harrison spoke for the avant-garde classicists—Gilbert Murray, and later E. R. Dodds, whose interest in what was to
become his The Greeks and the Irrational was in part suggested by reading Frazer.
The classicists were blind, Jane Harrison wrote, until Frazer came ‘to light the dark
wood of superstition with a gleam from The Golden Bough...at the mere sound of
the magical words “Golden Bough” the scales fell [from our eyes]—we heard and
understood’ (Harrison 1925: 82-3).

And many less academic readers found inspiration in The Golden Bough. In
his obituary Fleure went out of his way to mention a miner in South Wales for
whom it was a treasured possession (Fleure 1941: 899), while Downie quotes Jane
Harrison’s account of meeting ‘a cultured policeman, a member of the Working
Men’s College, who said ‘I used to believe everything they told me, but, thank
God, I read The Golden Bough, and I’ve been a free-thinker ever since’ (Downie
1970: 64). On the other hand, a liberal clergyman, the Revd Montague Pollock,
wrote to Frazer that The Golden Bough was ‘wonderfully confirmative of one’s
faith in the inner validity of the Holy Scriptures...only to him who like yourself
can see and hear’, he told Frazer, ‘is the deep truth revealed’. In relation to
Frazer’s anti-clerical and basically anti-religious views, Sir Francis Galton
congratulated him on ‘the cleverness with which you indicate without expressing
conclusions at all to wound the feelings of simple orthodox persons’. For Frazer
was all things to all men. Hard-headed, if liberal-minded, colonial officials
welcomed his anthropology as a contribution to humane and well-informed
administration. 'Statesmanship may profitably go to school with anthropology', said Sir Frederick Whyte, the President of the Indian Assembly; and much of the British field research in the first half of this century was carried out under the auspices of such as General Smuts, for example, and Sir Hubert Murray, Gilbert's brother, the Governor of Papua. To these proconsuls, Frazer was able to argue persuasively in their own terms for the funding of anthropological research as a moral duty of imperial rule.

Very different from such men of affairs were provincial antiquarians, represented at their most charming in a letter from a Mr J. Parrot of Stockton-on-Tees, written in 1901. With the death of Queen Victoria in January of that year, the crisis of a royal succession, central to The Golden Bough, filled the British newspapers of the time, but for many the letter may still strike a sympathetic note:

Dear Sir,

Your books always fill me with an indescribable rest—carry me away from 'all the dreary intercourse of daily life'. Not that my life is unhappy...it is increasingly joyous since that event which your first edition of The Golden Bough came to commemorate—my marriage. That was the opening of the Golden Gate into the most delightful portion of my life.

You will understand me better when I say that I am not a newspaper reader, and the flotsam and jetsam of public opinion passes without effect on me, for I would sooner be concerned with finding a new fact about primitive man and fire, or the discoverer of a fire-split flint, than share all the dreary intercourse of parliamentary, municipal and social life.

Naive, perhaps, Mr Parrot's letter may seem, but it is revealing, for it touches upon a sense of discontent with modern civilization, a longing for other places and other times, which also troubled the poets of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Frazer understood this very well, and to some extent shared it. The language and apocalyptic vision of the Bible, he wrote, lifts us above 'the dull round of common life' (Frazer 1927a: 450), and he was always nostalgic for Cambridge, where 'remote from the tumult and bustle of the world with its pomps and vanities and ambitions, the student may hope...to penetrate through the little transitory questions of the hour to the realities which abide' (ibid: 441).

World-weary readers like Mr Parrot had already been well prepared for Frazer's 'voyage of discovery' by the poets they most admired: Wordsworth, for example, with his wish to exchange the worldly materialism of his own society for the spiritual vitality of 'a pagan, suckled in a creed outworn'; Matthew Arnold's Scholar Gypsy, escaping to the natural world of Bagley Wood from 'this strange disease of modern life / With its sick hurry, its divided aims / Its heads o'ertaxed, its palisied hearts...'; and Tennyson's unhappy hero in Locksley Hall, dreaming of the sensuous life of a tropical island:

There, methinks, would be enjoyment more than in this march of mind,
In the steamship, in the railway, in the thoughts that shake mankind.
There the passions cramped no longer shall have scope and breathing space;
I will take some savage woman, she shall rear my dusky race.

Frazer himself, of course, had no appetite for any such exotic experience. Downie (1970: 18) tells one of several similar, probably apocryphal stories of how, as a child, Frazer had fled howling with terror from the Wild Man of Borneo at a fair, and in his prime he readily found good reasons for not accompanying A. C. Haddon on an expedition to New Guinea. But for those who felt, like Mr Parrot, alienated from their own civilization, *The Golden Bough* came as a compendium, and vicarious experience, of other ways of thinking and feeling, older, more deeply rooted in human nature, and rich in symbolic content.

Hence Eliot, Pound, Lawrence and Yeats, to mention only the best known, used Frazer's anthropology to criticize the spiritual impoverishment of a civilization dominated by applied science—'an old bitch gone in the teeth, a botched civilization', Ezra Pound called it. For them, what Frazer had intended as a sustained critique of human irrationality in effect helped to restore the irrational, or at least the non-rational, to its place in artistic creativity. Frazer, ambivalent as usual, had made allowance for such a reaction, contrasting Renan's understanding of religious emotion, for example, with the arid rationalism of the German theologian Feuerbach (see Frazer 1931: 227). There was something for everybody in Frazer's anthropology. It strengthened Yeats's magical and theosophical beliefs, deepened Eliot's understanding of Christian spirituality and, conversely, directed D. H. Lawrence away from his residual Christianity towards his search for his own dark gods. For Eliot, *The Golden Bough* was a great artistic expression of religious disillusionment, 'throbbing...with the agony of spiritual life' (quoted in Vickery 1973: 236). D. H. Lawrence followed Frazer's 'savages' to New Mexico, where they freed him, he wrote, 'from the...great era of material and mechanical development...the great psyche of materialism and idealism which dominated me' (Lawrence 1936: 142). There again, Frazer had anticipated those who might regret the replacement of the old gods by what he called 'certain abstract ideas of ethers, atoms, molecules and so forth': 'Thus instead of being peopled with a noisy bustling crowd of full-blooded and picturesque deities...animated with the warm passions of humanity, the universe outside the narrow circle of our consciousness is now conceived as absolutely silent, colourless, and deserted' (see Frazer 1927b: 213). The gods that Frazer felt sadly obliged to discredit in the name of science were restored by the poets in the name of sensibility—of Christian or pagan spirituality, of intuition, of imagination, and of instinct.
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THE UNVOICED TEXT:
ALLUSION IN MALAWIAN SUNG POETRY

GREGORY VAN ALSTYNE

Introduction

Allusions are employed in various African oral art genres for a variety of purposes. Scholarly treatment of allusion has been limited for the most part to consideration of the strict denotation of the word (or phrase), leaving the further, personal and local associations, derived from local knowledge and experience, largely unexamined. In addition, treatment of allusion in African verbal artistry has overlooked the contemporaneous nature of its application. It is widely recognized now that an oral art text must be "captured" in actual performance, complete with all the attendant artistic blemishes and inconsistencies as well as the creative surprises that the vagaries of a live performance may entail. With the examination and analysis of the actual performance of a given version of an extant composition, it is revealed that the sung poem is highly sensitive to its immediate social surroundings. This fact is reflected in the allusive content of the text. Furthermore, what can be seen from the range of examples given below is that allusion is intimately tied to the content and ultimate meaning that inhere in the sung poem.

This article draws upon anthropological fieldwork conducted in Malonje village, Zomba, Malawi, between October 1988 and October 1989. During the course of this work I collected over 500 verbal art texts, none of which has ever been committed to print. That is, this corpus of sung poetry comprises an oral tradition.
Allusion may add a dimension of familiarity and intimacy to a narration or, in contrast, serve to encode meanings to be deciphered only by those privy to its particular system of communication. Not only does alluding to actual geographical features as part of the song or narrative's cosmography, as in the Sundiata epic of West Africa (see Niane 1965), bring the real into the imagined, it is dependent upon the individual members of the audience fleshing out the details in their minds' eyes. In fact, not everyone in the audience or taking part in an oral rendering of a sung poem knows the full extent of what is being alluded to in the text. For example, with reference to Gbaya storytelling in Cameroon, Noss (1972: 86-7) observes, 'it requires that they be familiar with what is alluded to and that through the allusion they supply their own dimension to the tale.... The world of the tale is normally the immediate world for whom it is told. Rarely is the tale about distant places and persons.'

Toponymous Familiarity

Noss's comment holds true for Malonje village stories. For instance, the nthano, or tale, intoned in the Chinyanja language, about a group of girls who are engulfed by a huge fallen baobab tree in which they have taken shelter from the rain, takes place along the banks of the Mulunguzi River, one of the major watercourses that springs from the slopes of the Zomba plateau not far from Malonje village. The area is well known, and can be visualized by every villager listening to or taking part in the 'singing' of the tale.

Paradoxically, detailed description is little used in those genres that are dependent for their imaginative actualization upon numerous allusions to familiar locations. The same can be observed for stock characters and places whose relevant associations are known intimately by the home audience but which often leave a conceptual gap for the ethnographer (cf. Scheub 1975; Seitel 1980). Likewise, the same can be said for the corpus of sung poetry I collected from Malonje.

In a medium of expression such as song, the narrative quality of the text is necessarily condensed in favour of direct allusion to extratextual phenomena that

1. Malonje village, the community in which these sung texts were taped, is multiethnic and bilingual. This is due in part to the propinquity of the village to Zomba, the former colonial seat of political power, to the area's historical prominence as a crossroads for different migrating ethnic groups, and to the village's location in a major population zone with the highest population density in Malawi. Most of the oral texts were collected in one or other of the two major regional languages, Chinyanja and Chiyao.

2. Chinyanja-speakers accurately refer to the telling of a tale as kuimba nthano, or 'singing (a) tale'.
are collectively known in greater or lesser degrees by those present and taking part in its performance. My chief field assistant said of Dr Banda, the Malawian head of state, that he has told his mbumba, or female political supporters, that although their songs consist of only a few different lines and appear to be simple, they mean a good number of things. In part this is because of the stylistic effect of poetic allusion.

Self-Reference and Local Allegiances

The most common allusion of those taking part in the performance of Malonje song is that of the village itself or the name of the chief (whose name, in any case, derives from that of the village). During the singing of a composition not only do the pair of song leaders make allusive reference to the village and by extension those who live in it, but also members of the group chorus may insert their own phrases in or outside the song text, identifying those who are singing as members of the village. In part this phenomenon derives from the performance of wedding songs when the villages aligned with the bride and groom compete to 'outsing' the other. Allusive self-reference to the home village of the singers serves to identify them as a cohesive group that has come to show the members of the other village 'what they can do'.

In this way the allusion is used both in the song itself and in extratextual insertions as a means of self-identification, common exhortation, and 'friendly' provocation. This leads to a certain repetitive banality and predictability in a number of songs, but at the same time invests the sung compositions with political and regionally rivalrous overtones that add to the meaning and intent of the song texts themselves.

During the recording of this material the singers were very much aware of the fact that they were being recorded. Many held the view that the 'rest of the world' would be listening to the tapes. In this way the number of occasions on which the singers utilized this particular stylistic device is probably over-represented in my recorded material. In fact, one of the 'big' women, the chief's senior sister (MZD), whose identification with the name of the village was as great as that of the chief himself, was a frequent contributor of such allusions.

These are not random allusions intended to fill otherwise empty spaces in a song. Rather, they are there both for the reasons given above and to serve an implicit political purpose. During the course of a taping session in which the

3. Also used as the generic designation for political songs, the word mbumba is the traditional kinship term denoting the female matrikin placed under the guidance and protection of an nkhoswe, or uncle/elder brother, the male head of an extended family. His mbumba refer to Dr Banda as 'Nkhoswe Number One'.

Chiyao women’s initiation song *Mkeka wa Kunsamala* was performed, a temporary resident of the village originally from Mangochi referred by direct allusion to her home district and traditional political leader, Traditional Authority Chief Nsamala of Machinga District:

*Ambe ndamire mkeka wa Kunsamala*
Give me, I must sit on (the) mat of Chief Nsamala

Everyone present at the singing session knew the meaning of her allusion, for a number of villagers have kinship ties with individuals currently living in Mangochi and have taken part in weddings and funerals there. It was repeated several times throughout the course of the first five verses of the song, at which point the chief’s senior sister moved along the line of singing and clapping women to ‘whisper’ in the errant song leader’s ear. The succeeding verses did not include the line. It was replaced by

*Ambe ndamire mkeka wa Kumalonje*
Give me, I must sit on (the) mat of Chief Malonje

This latter line featured in the sung verses for the remainder of the song (three additional verses). At the end of the composition the ‘big’ woman, who was serving as a member of the group chorus, inserted a spoken line in Chiyao as an admonitory epilogue:

*Tulamire mkeka wa ambudye Kumalonje*
We must sit on (the) mat of uncle Chief Malonje

It is clear that the inclusion of an allusion to the chief (and by extension his people) of an area some miles to the north of the village in which the composition was being sung, and who has no political or kinship ties to those present, was an egregious *faux pas* on the part of the song leader. She did not lead the next song.

When local villages are mentioned they are in fact usually destinations to which the persona, or character, of the song is travelling to perform a specific task; while allusions to Malawi, and the major population centres of Blantyre, Limbe, Zomba and Lilongwe are usually depicted as places to journey to for political events, simply to visit, or to escape problems in one’s natal village. In the Chiyao women’s initiation song *Nje-Nje-Nje*, however, Kawinga, a Mozambican locale near the border with Malawi, is characterized as a place emitting the unending sounds of war.4 It is a place from which to flee. Malawi itself is cited mainly in political and development songs, for obvious reasons, although it also figures in many other types of song. The names of the major cities of Malawi and of foreign

4. This composition was imported into Malonje village by Yao refugees during the independence war in Mozambique in the 1970s.
places, then, do not offer the same sort of regional competition for recognition, nor do they operate as focuses for individual and collective identity as do neighbouring villages. When localities lying further afield are alluded to in a text there is usually no special allegiance implied.

While the song leader from Mangochi transgressed through her use of improper allusion and was corrected, it should be noted that when she took control of the sung text in the capacity of leader she ‘naturally’ referred to her own home district and chief. She was doing only what she could be expected to do as song leader. She just picked the wrong context in which to do it. This points up the fact that not only do allusions flesh out the imagined world of the creative text with parts of the real world, but that the ‘real world’ has an impact upon that text that goes beyond the confines of a creative and recreational pastime. The real world is contextualized in the work of art, while at the same time the work of art is situated within and affected by the exigencies of the real world. In this case, the external world of village identity and domestic politics impinges on the content of a sung poem in the course of its spontaneous delivery.

Allusion to persons in sung poetry, however, is not limited to those to the village chief. There are many occasions during the course of a performance when the singers of the songs are themselves identified, either by their own self-reference or by those taking part in the antiphonal response. As with reference to the chief and village this may also be inserted from outside the sung text. Names of relatives, particularly the names of the performers’ fathers, may be inserted in the lines of the texts. Especially in initiation ritual the individual(s) leading the song may refer to the husband or ‘owner’ (Chinyanja: mwini) of the female singer, or to the mnamkungwi, or ritual specialist, who controls and ritually protects the ceremony. As a consequence the world of actual people, living and dead, comes to occupy a place in the sung repertoire of the village.

Political Personages: The Wider Canvas

Direct allusion to political leaders, e.g. the President or Ngwazi, Dr Hastings Kamuzu Banda, and to leaders of traditional districts is an established technique of song leadership. In mbumba, or political, songs mention of the Ngwazi is especially prominent; unsurprisingly, for these songs are performed in his honour. His name, moreover, features in many other types of song. Kwende ku Che Kamuzu or Kwende kwa A Kamuzu (Chiyao: Let’s go to [Mr] Kamuzu), or Ndikupita kwa A Kamuzu (Chinyanja: I am going to [Mr] Kamuzu) are phrases used frequently in the corpus of collected songs. Depending upon the intent of the persona of the song and the narrative context these phrases may mean going to dance and sing before him, going to Lilongwe, the administrative capital of the country, or going to see him personally. While it is in the nature of allusion often
to leave the ‘correct’ interpretation up to the individual listener, in such cases as these it may also serve political purposes by restricting or obscuring meanings.

Knappert (1982: 25) reports for Swahili poetry: ‘this old Swahili tradition of composing political songs with hidden allusions in cryptic language which only the initiated understand, is very much alive today’. So too, in contemporary Malawi, political songs contain allusions that only those privy to their meaning(s) can unravel. In these cases, though, the allusions are meant to relay messages to the political faithful. Hence, they are less restricted in nature.

The composition Walira Fokasi, sung in Chinyanja, provides a prime example of allusion to an actual event through reference to the actual people involved. The persons mentioned are Fokasi Gwede, formerly Superintendent of Police, Special Branch, and Fern Sadyalunda, a junior government minister. They were involved in a plot against the government led by the then Secretary-General of the Malawi Congress Party and Minister of State in the President’s Office, Albert Muwalo. Gwede and Sadyalunda were imprisoned while Muwalo was executed for treason. In the main chorus of the second verse the singers portray Gwede and Sadyalunda as contrite and sorrowful figures:

\[\text{L2} \quad \text{Walira Fokasi} \\
\text{Fokasi has cried}\\
\text{CH} \quad \text{Walira eyae-ee walira} \\
\text{He has cried eyae-ee (style) he has cried}\\
\text{[L1][L2]} \quad \text{Mai walira Fokasi uyo} \\
\text{Mother (!) that Fokasi has cried}\\
\text{CH} \quad \text{Walira eyae-ee walira-a} \\
\text{He has cried eyae-ee he has cried-d}\\
\text{[L1][L2]} \quad \text{Fokasi wadzimanga} \\
\text{Fokasi you have arrested (yourself)}\\
\text{CH} \quad \text{Wadzimanga we-ekha-a} \\
\text{You have arrested y-yourself-If}\\

5. Every line rendered by a leader pair is considered a line of verse unless included in a main chorus, which may be composed of both leader sung lines as well as chorus lines. When leader sung lines are represented singly they are still considered the same line of verse. In this case the lines performed by the leader pair are sung simultaneously though they have been rendered in separate ways. Leader one is always harmonized by leader two in the singing of a verse line unless otherwise indicated. The chorus lines are sung by the members of the group other than the lead singers who are taking part in the performance. For a key to the symbols used in the song texts see Appendix below.
Jeff Opland has observed of Xhosa oral poetry:

The imbongi, or for that matter any other Xhosa oral poet, does not tell stories in poetic form. Since the praises on which the poetry is based often commemorate events, however, izibongo do refer to actions, but they allude to them elliptically rather than narrate them explicitly in the manner of the epic. (Opland 1983: 146)

So too, in the sung poetry collected from Malonje village allusion to events, whether contemporaneous or historical, imagined or real, is elliptically expressed through pithy phrases and condensed images. In the mbumba song just quoted the story of political miscalculation and tragedy is left largely unexpressed. In fact, the only relationship between the text and the underlying event is the mention of two of the main actors involved. Otherwise, nearly all of the story remains subtextual.

Not only is the connection made highly elliptical in manner, but the singers refer to the dramatically imagined reaction of the miscreants to the events that have befallen them as a consequence of their rash actions. The incident is artfully portrayed. In other words, it need not have really happened that way. Here the elliptical relationship to the actual event is twice removed. The incident is simply referred to by means of condensed images rather then narrated in a linear fashion. Furthermore, the action pithily portrayed in the text is a creative reconstruction that need never have actually occurred. Finally, the spoken interjection at the end of the main chorus not only exhorts the singers to continue their common efforts at singing and dancing, but also serves as a moral counterpoint to the misdeeds alluded to in the song.
In the ngoma song rendered in Chinyanja Namulangeni there is reference to a historical figure:6

Siyo—mama—siyo—mama
Siyo (style)—women—siyo (style)—women

Tsiku anafa A Gomani—
(The) day (Chief) Gomani died—

Ndilbe mawu hoi-sa
I have no words hoi-sa (style)

Mention of the great Ngoni chief Gomani, who was shot by the British in 1896, alludes to far more than just his name. Implicit in this reference is the tale of Malawian resistance to colonial rule. Ngoni chiefs, like those of the Yao, were notorious for their bellicose stance against British imperial rule and for their reluctance to depart from ‘traditional’ ways and adopt ‘Western’ values.

According to the oral historical account believed to be true by those in Malonje village, the Ngoni chief was a major adversary of the British. Upon his capture, which he allowed to happen because he was tired, the British tried to execute him by firing squad. The bullets, however, simply could not penetrate him. The British then attempted to chop off his head with an axe, but this also proved futile. After these unsuccessful attempts to kill him, Gomani grew tired and told his captors to pick a blade of grass whereupon he would lie down and the soldiers would be able to saw his head from his body. This was duly done. Because he had proved such a difficult adversary the British buried his decapitated body and took his head to England where it was delivered to the Queen as a war trophy. This is felt to have been a fitting tribute to the Ngoni warrior.

The song’s male persona states that he was speechless at this period of history, though whether the person speaking witnessed the actual event or, indeed, was alive at the time is a moot point. Clearly, it was, however, a time of great trouble. The funeral of Chief Gomani would have taken more than three days, perhaps more than a week, while everyone mourned. During this period, the cattle were not taken out of their kraals and the people stayed inside their houses. Only ‘big’ people could have approached the boma, or headquarters, of the chief without being captured and killed by Ngoni soldiers. This is the cultural and historical baggage that is attendant upon the allusion to the famous chief’s death.

6. This type of song is sung by the Ngoni people. Traditionally, it was sung when the men returned from war (see Mphande 1966). The song discussed here is now sung at beer parties or upon the death of a chief. This song is not ‘traditional’ to Malonje village. It has been imported by its current performer.
In the corpus of Malonje song allusion does not confine itself solely to people and places. In a society that has always placed strong emphasis upon communion with the deceased in the form of ancestor veneration, the presence and occurrence of death has been accommodated and incorporated into a specific way of living and of viewing life. Although most villagers are nominally Christian, their respect for the dead, as expressed in remembrance ceremonies and cleansing rites, has seemed to represent the core of belief around which notions of Christian ideology have been appended. Belief in witchcraft and magic, although proscribed by the Christian churches, is also prevalent in Malonje village. Deaths, not surprisingly, may be attributed to witchcraft or evil intentions.

In the Chinyanja women’s initiation song Odi-Odi Tsekula, for instance, the song begins with a woman visiting a female age-mate who does not want to open the door to her. Both women are quite formal in their mode of address towards each other, suggesting unfamiliarity between them. The woman inside the house asks the caller why she has called upon her when she has never visited her before. Through oblique references to the dead, death and the graveyard she then alludes to the visitor’s intention to use bad magic. These allusions are given prominence as the first lines of various verses sung by leader one:

_Akufa sadzigwiriza ee-e-e nanga ine?
Dead people don’t grip firmly ee-e-e what about me?

Pakufa tidzangopita-a-a
When dying we will just be goi-i-ing

_Akufa sadzigwiriza
Dead people don’t grip firmly

_Akufa sadzigwiriza
Dead people don’t grip firmly

_Kumanda kuibe nsoni eee
At (the) graveyard there is no mercy eee

_Akufa sadzigwiriza
Dead people don’t grip firmly

To the audience the allusion to dead people being past the worries and cares of life reflects the visitee’s anxieties about the visitor’s unknown intentions. The visitee expresses the sentiment that death is the condition of being past worldly cares. After all, in the graveyard death is final. Thus it is implied that opening the door to a stranger may lead to death. In the fifth line of verse nine (sung by leader two) the visitor replies to the woman’s verbal prevarication:
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Mai mutondiona
Mother (honour) you do see me

This counter statement alludes to the fact that the visitor is carrying nothing visible with which to harm the visitee. The implication is that, after all, the woman can see for herself. Yet, those in the audience know that the person intending to do harm could poison the other during her visit. Alternatively, the visit could simply be a reconnoitring mission to see the layout of the house. A magical line could be drawn at the entrance to the house or a root buried in the ground between the house and the chimbudzi (Chinyanja: [roofed] pit latrine) to poison the unsuspecting walker.

In another women’s initiation song, performed in Chinyanja, the dead are likened to trees. Amai Ndaima Pano alludes to the frequency of funerals and the finality of death:

Amai ndaima pano, maliro ndi mtengo, sindinaone maliro a kale
Mother I have stood here, (a) dead person is (a) tree, I have never seen (a) funeral of (the) past

—ndaima pano, maliro ndi mtengo, sindinaone imfa ya kale
—I have stood here, (a) dead person is (a) tree, I have never seen death of (the) past

Maliro ndi mtengo
(A) dead person is (a) tree

This song, then, alludes to death. The female persona laments a death that has just occurred. She implies that funerals were scarce in the past. Her contention, ‘A dead person is a tree’, echoed by the chorus, refers metaphorically to the completeness of death, alluding to how a tree cut down falls to the forest floor:

[L1] Ukamva gubudu maliro ndi mtengo amai ndaima pano
When you hear gubudu (a) dead person is (a) tree, mother I have stood here

[L2] Ati ukamva gubudu maliro ndi mtengo amai ndaima pano
Ati (style) when you hear gubudu (a) dead person is (a) tree, mother I have stood here

CH Maliro ndi mtengo
(A) dead person is (a) tree

The finality of death is voiced in the idiophonic sound of a fallen tree, gubudu. The singer believes that death and funerals were more respected in the past. Death is now more frequent. Yet this presumption is based upon the observation that
people have become inured to the commonplace occurrence of death and burial. In the past they were not so inured as they are now. Then, a person could live to his or her teenage years before attending a funeral. As can be seen, the implications of these allusions are left largely unexplained. Yet they attain a concise summation of what they mean to express. The song alludes to a universal condition of man in the vocabulary and idiom of sung poetry.

Sexual Prohibition and AIDS

The female persona of the Chiyao wedding song Mkaitanda Ine enjoins her husband not to make sexual advances towards her in case he should contract a dreadful disease from such an unmindful action. This is expressed primarily through allusion. In the third line of the first verse the leaders set the backdrop for the cautionary statement:

\[ L1 \][L2] Mwanache mbeleche liso mbole-mbole
Child I gave birth yesterday take it easy

The chorus then provides the allusion:

CH Mkaitanda in-e-ee—
(You) do not provoke other thi-i-ings—

Kum’ona mwanache ’kwawa—
Seeing it child crawling—

Nikuianda in-e-ee
And then you provoke other thi-i-ings

Ngachidyog’opa chinyera kog’oya-aa
Without fearing dangerous ‘venereal’ dis-ease

Thus, the woman who has just given birth to a child is admonishing her husband to desist in his untoward actions. Not only is the sex act implied through euphemistic allusion, ‘other things’, but so is the traditional injunction against couples engaging in sexual intercourse before the new-born child is six months old. It is believed that should this injunction not be adhered to the man will become seriously ill and that if a traditional healer, or sing’anga, is not consulted right away the man may die. Through this premature act the man is believed to soak up the woman’s ‘unclean liquid’, which then enters his bloodstream. When the impure liquid ‘decays’ it poisons him. It is the ‘remains’ left inside the woman after the birth of the baby that is considered ‘dangerous’. It is clear that the
sexually contracted disease is considered deadly. In the last line of the song (the last line of the final main chorus) the singers replace the term chinyera, the traditional word for an impure ritual state of being, with edzi, or AIDS, the modern loanword for an equally deadly and mysterious disease contracted in the same physical manner:

CH     Ngadyidyog'opatu edzi kog'oya-aa

Without fearing this dangerous A-AIDS

Such a song as this, performed at a wedding by the 'big' women, serves as a mnemonic admonition to the newly married couple to observe the correct moral and ritual modes of behaviour towards each other. The message of wise counsel is couched in poetic language. It is not stated directly as in bland didactic formulas, but expressed by way of allusive reference. The allusive nature derives not only from the song's direct allusion to specific, but related, kinds of diseases. Rather, the opprobrious nature of such untimely actions are acted out verbally in front of the listeners. The allusive quality of the song attains its full force through the voice of the female protagonist. It is she who states her misgivings about the man's actions and who alludes to the consequences of such behaviour.

**Generic Cross-Reference**

Reference may also be made in sung poetry to other genres of verbal artistry. Allusion may display a self-referential aspect. As has been demonstrated, geographical place-names, historical personages and events, local chiefs, family members and moral injunctions may be alluded to in sung poetry. Poetic language, in the guise of another generic form, may also establish the allusive backdrop to a sung poem. In fact, without it the song may have no meaning at all.

For example, the women's wedding song Tsamba Likagwa, performed in Chinyanja, contains numerous repetitions of the phrase that makes up its title. If the phrase were absent, only personal names and terms of address would be left. The two-word phrase not only embodies the main semantic import of the song, but also alludes to a proverbial expression. To the audience the two words do not stand alone, but form the first part of the proverb, *Tsamba likagwa sabwerera mtengo*, that is, 'When (a) leaf falls it never returns to (the) tree'.

7. There is another extant Chinyanja proverb that begins with the same two words: *Tsamba likagwa manyazi agwira mtengo*. This may be translated as, 'When (a) leaf falls, shame holds (the) tree', and can be taken to mean that whatever actions a child may perform will also affect his/her parents and family; see Salaun 1969: 108 where, however, neither English translation nor exegesis is provided.
Most listeners, then, would know to which proverb it alludes and finish, in their own minds, the incomplete phrase. As this song is sung by young women at weddings it can be assumed that the proverb and the ability to ‘fill in the blank’, as it were, would be within the ken of most of those present. The allusion to the proverbial expression through the use of an incomplete portion of it, however, is only part of the semantic adjustment that a listener must make. The listener must know the meaning of the allusion and subsequently apply it to the contextual backdrop of the song text.

The allusion, then, not only refers to the form of the proverb, but also to its content. Just as when a leaf falls from a tree, it never returns to it; so too, when a person possesses something, he or she must nurture it, otherwise it will decay or be lost forever. As with most proverbs, the meaning is general enough to have almost universal validity even when applied to specific social situations. In this case, however, the listener has the song text to which to refer for the specific application.

The singer directly addresses the man and woman in turn and advises them that they must regard each other in this light. (The anthropologist is also referred to by name in the text, with reference to his relationship with his own wife.) Thus, in the context of a wedding song the meaning of the proverb alluded to in the text becomes an advisory note to the newly-weds to safeguard the sanctity of their marriage. The allusion is achieved through the partial provision of an extant proverb, the complete form and meaning of which must then be applied to the overarching and interacting contexts of the song’s text and the event at which it is being performed.

**The Anthropologist as Character Actor**

Less rarefied personages may also serve the poetic purposes of allusion. In a number of songs the visiting anthropologist features large as a contemporaneous allusion to present events. New songs can be and are composed to suit new occasions. Nevertheless, in some (and probably most) cases old songs are given new form and relevance by the inclusion of new and fresh allusions (cf. Gunner 1982). In one sense they are ‘new’ compositions, in that the people or events alluded to have never featured in a song in such a way before. It is through this poetic technique that current events can be included in an already extant repertoire. In fact, the established tradition of sung poetry proves highly sensitive to occasion and context. It is in the nature of Malonje sung poetry to incorporate the surrounding and immediate world of social and political life into the realm of creative expression. In a composition derived from a women’s initiation song, *Che Giregi Zikomo*, sung in Chiyao at a beer feast, for example, the anthropologist is thanked directly for a service he had rendered the song leader when she had been
ill. I give verses 7 and 8 here. Due to the improvisational nature of the sung text the second leader has a difficult time harmonizing with the main leader:

[L1]  
_Tinijijuga lipe-e—_  
I will beg (a) long gra-ass (blade)—

[L2]  
_Tinijijuga lipe_  
I will beg (a) long grass (blade)

[L1]  
_Ku Ingalande mkudya mmwedyi zikomo tinjijuga lipe—tinjijuga lipe—tinjijuga lipe-e_  
To England you are going you thank you I will beg (a) long grass—I will beg (a) long grass—I will beg (a) long gra-ass

[L2]  
——_ga lipe—ga lipe—ga lipe—ga lipe_  
——beg (a) long grass——beg (a) long grass——beg (a) long grass  
——beg (a) long grass

CH  
_Lipe amao-o_  
(a) long grass (blade) mother-r (!)

[L1]  
_Tinijijuga lipe-e_  
I will beg (a) long gra-ass (blade)

[L2]  
——_ga lipe_  
——beg (a) long grass

[L1]  
_Che Giregi zikomo nambo tinjijuga lipe—tinjijuga lipe—mumbere mtera mmwedyi—tinjijuga lipe-e_  
Mr Greg thank you but I will beg (a) long grass—I will beg (a) long grass—you have given me medicine you—I will beg (a) long gra-ass

[L2]  
——_ga lipe——ga lipe—ga lipe—nasalire—ga lipe-e_  
——beg (a) long grass——beg (a) long grass——beg (a) long grass——beg (a) long grass—I must tell you—beg (a) long gra-ass

CH  
_Lipe amao-o_  
(a) long grass (blade) mother-r

The anthropologist is referred to by his title and Christian name, Mr Greg. He is thanked by the persona of the song who also happens in this case to be the performer herself, for giving her medicine. In fact, the degree of referencing is less elliptical in this instance than is usual in sung texts. The situation alluded to is thereby rendered fairly distinct. Far less direct, though, is the metaphorical
allusion to the service rendered, an allusion that pervades the text in the phrase ‘the blade of long grass’.

The grass blade represents the ‘insignificant’ favour that she requested of the anthropologist, i.e. the provision of medicine. Thus, the favour is alluded to with two very different styles of reference. One is highly metaphorical, the grass blade, and could only be deciphered by those privy to the urgent occasion. The other is an almost prosaic rendering of what had occurred, the straightforward reference to medicine being provided. Furthermore, the text is as much an allusion to the present circumstances of offering thanks as it is to the original favour. Through allusion, then, the anthropologist and the blade of long grass are joined together in the composition as agent and action.

The anthropologist is also referred to in other texts in which he has not escaped some degree of irreverence. In their article on the inclusion of anthropologists in the traditional narratives of the Kuna of San Bias, Howe and Sherzer 1986: 889) state, ‘thus what these everyday little narratives do is fix and stabilise the identity of a certain problematic kind of foreigner as marginal natives [sic]’. Furthermore, laughter and trickery are seen as ways of ‘preserving equality by defeating dignity and social distance’ (ibid.: 888). To some extent this is also true for the placement of myself in the sung compositions of Malanje village. In the Chinyanja wedding song Chinangwa Changa, for example, the unpredictable anthropologist is accused of making off with the singer’s cassava:

[L1][L2] Chinangwa changa n’nasiya pa moto
My cassava I left on the fire

CH       Ee-eee
     Ee-eee (style)

[L1][L2] Ndikakwabwera ndipaza palibe
When I am coming back I find nothing there

CH       Yaya-aa
     Yaya-aa [nickname for a female age-mate]

[L1][L2] A Giregi ee-e-ee
Mr Greg ee-e-ee

CH       Ee-eее
     Ee-eее

[L1][L2] A Giregi ee-e-ee
Mr Greg ee-e-ee

CH       Yaya-aa
     Yaya-aa
The culprit normally cited in the song is an age-mate named Yaya. As can be seen, the chorus never wavers from its assertion that Yaya is the one who always makes off with the roasting cassava from the ashes of the fire. This is the usual rendition of the text. The leaders of the song, however, accuse the anthropologist of the recurring deed. This accusation, furthermore, is accomplished in the presence of the accused, so to speak. I was crouched in front of the singers recording the text.

The effect of this allusion is not to recall some event that occurred in the ‘timeless’ past but to situate the anthropologist within the current enactment of the song: ‘when the members of a society deal with anthropologists through humour, they do more than put individuals in their place. They also create that place, by situating an elusive and liminal social category’ (Howe and Sherzer 1986: 891). What is being alluded to at that moment, moreover, is the occasion happening there and then. A ‘special’ category of person is taking part in the present performance of a sung composition. That is the object of the allusion. Other associations may be adduced to provide further explanation.

The women are also ‘playing’ with me, as it were. As females who occupy the same generational level as myself these singers can be classified as potential marriage partners. Teasing, in this way, is characteristic of such a relationship. The allusion, however, is ultimately extratextual. The anthropologist is portrayed as a guilty protagonist in the event being acted out at the textual level, while the allusion created, intentionally through his referential inclusion in the text, is to his presence and participation in the performance of that text, that is outside of it.

The singers are, in effect, provocatively ‘pointing’ him out in the words of the song in order to underline his presence outside of the text. This action then accords, and at the same time recognizes, his singular status as special visitor. It is not that he occupies a ‘liminal and elusive category’ but, rather, that he is seen to participate in a number of intersecting categories that allow him to be utilized in a creative and entertaining manner.

This interpretation of the situation is given further buttressing by the inclusion of the anthropologist in the Chinyanja wedding song Kumanda Kulibe Chisoni, sung at a beer feast. The text of the song is also an allusion to an action and its implications, which are not spelled out in a narrative manner. The concise and oblique rendering of a statement in order to refer to an action that has occurred but is not textualized is a common stylistic trait of sung poetry. The consequence of such an occurrence may be stated in the text but the event may be and usually is left out of the discussion:

8. I prefer ‘special’ to ‘liminal’ as a qualifier because the people in Malonje village have lived and worked with Europeans for almost a century. Although Westerners are not deemed to be part of Malawian society, they certainly fit a category coterminous and coexisting with it. I was not part of a totally new and strange phenomenon, but a member of a known and, to be sure, stereotyped social category.
[L1][L2] A Giregi mulibe chisoni
Mr Greg you have no mercy

[L1][L2] Mwan'tengera
You have taken away my

CH Chibade-eee
Darling

Amama ndilire bwanji maliro?—
Mother, how do I cry (for) (a) dead body?—

Amama chisheri changa chapita dzulo
Mother, my dear one went yesterday

Amama ndilire bwanji maliro?—
Mother, how do I cry (for) (a) dead body?—

Amama chisheri changa chapita dzulo
Mother, my dear one went yesterday

The direct allusion to the anthropologist places him as a central actor in an unfolding drama. He has taken away the woman's loved one. What is left unstated is that the first person addressed (Mr Greg) is leaving with her husband who is in his paid employment. The woman plainly blames the situation on the employer. While away working in another location there is always the nagging possibility that the man will meet another woman who will receive the greater portion of his wages. If the husband has been the bread-winner of the family this can be serious—the thatch-roofed and mud-walled house can dilapidate in three years. Also, there may not be enough garden to support a single family depending upon its produce alone for food. Thus, there is the tragic likelihood that the first wife and family will starve. If the employer had provided her, as he has her husband, with a passport and transport she would be praising him instead. Clearly he has not. This is the main (unstated) import of her claim that he has no mercy.

There is, moreover, no mistaking in which camp the 'European' anthropologist has been placed. His direct inclusion in the text aligns him with White employers and the institutionalized system of migrant labour. Before independence (when passports were introduced) many men travelled to Northern or Southern Rhodesia (now Zambia and Zimbabwe respectively) with their employers to work as gardeners or cooks, or in other domestic jobs. In the song text the anthropologist has been conflated with the colonialist system. In part this is because he is conceptualized as being of a class apart from that of those in the village. After all he is European and enjoys what appears to be an enviable life-style. Certainly, he is envisaged to be as affluent as those other Europeans residing in the Zomba area
who have either been employed by foreign-funded government aid programmes or by Chancellor College, the largest constituent college of the national university, and who have in recent times been the largest employers of Malawians as domestic staff, including a number of people from Malonje village.

Yet once again, the inclusion of the anthropologist in the text must be seen as a form of humorous and artful expression. The singers of the song are teasing me because I am there, involved in the current performance. In contrast to the direct allusion in *Chinangwa Changa*, however, I am not characterized as taking part in a minor peccadillo, the jejune nature of which helps to enhance the humour. Rather, my metonymic association with an unthinking and impersonal system of labour exploitation has a more sobering effect.

Allusion, then, works in a number of interlocking ways in the song text cited above. The text explicitly states that I am taking away the woman's husband. Furthermore, it accuses me of having no mercy. What is left unsaid, however, is the substance of the allusion. The man has opted to remain in employment in an overarching capitalist system in which jobs are at a premium. He has chosen this option in spite of having to temporarily desert his family. The female persona of the song can only lament her personal misfortune. She and her children must reap the consequences of the man's action. The 'dead body' is the husband who may never return. The mention of my name cuts across this dramatic *mise-en-scène* of individual fortune set amidst an enduring politico-economic regime.

In one sense the direct allusion to the anthropologist serves to lighten the effect of the tragic import of the text. Seen in the light of the previously cited song the anthropologist can be viewed as a trickster figure who has light-hearted and humorous qualities, but who, in the dramatic portrayal of the present song, can take on the characteristics of an oppressor (cf. Basso 1979). It is humorous that the anthropologist has been allotted this role; but at the same time the contextual ambience is ambivalent.

Added to these levels of ambiguity is the fact of the anthropologist's presence and interaction during the performance. The composition was performed during the rumbustious and uncontrolled merry-making of a beer feast. Not only is the contemporaneous inclusion of the anthropologist in the song text an allusion to his involvement in its enactment, but it is also a reflection of the festival atmosphere that pervaded its public performance.

**Conclusion**

These examples underline the fact that the use of allusion in traditional Malawian song, whether to current objects and events or to those of the past, is a complex matter the full denotation and connotation of which must be 'teased out' from the ethnographic context in which the content of the song is placed. For each allusion has its own range of locally restricted associations that bring their own semantic
loads to bear upon the final meaning of the sung text. Each allusion, moreover, interacts with other allusions in the same text, and these must be combined to reach the final statement, as it were, of the composition.

In the past, treatment of allusion has been limited to consideration of the strict denotation of the word (or phrase), leaving the further personal, topical, and local associations derived from local knowledge and experience, largely unexamined. What can be seen from the range of examples given above is that allusion is intimately tied to the content and ultimate meaning of the sung poem.

It is in fact impossible to separate the concept of allusion from that of content. However, the manner in which content is illuminated by means of allusive technique is often through oblique reference and unstated inference. Inasmuch as the nature of language in sung poetry is characterized by compressed and allusive statement, it only serves to enhance the 'unvoiced' aspect of content. Even if the allusive device is directly stated, it still carries with it a load of cultural associations that most passive bearers of the oral tradition will call into play as a means of deciphering the ultimate message of its referent.

Thus allusion may be carried out by direct or indirect reference, but it will always leave some semantic residue unstated. It is this residue that, along with the surface content, will comprise the ultimate meaning of the sung text for the listener. This highlights the versatility of allusion for displaying current concerns in traditional texts as well as voicing moral codes of received knowledge in a new setting. Allusion is one of the most important devices used in the composition of sung poetry in Malonje village.

APPENDIX: KEY TO THE SYMBOLS USED IN THE SONG TEXTS

[L1] lead singer (harmonized)
L1 lead singer (not harmonized)
S1 singer (other than leader)
CH chorus (group)
! exclamation
honour honorific
style stylistic sound
'— ellipsis/elision
x— run-on (singer continues to following line without pause)
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THE PRESENT TENSE AGAIN

SIMON SINCLAIR

The use of the present tense in anthropology continues to receive critical attention. Taking issue with the work of both Fabian (1983) and Davis (1992), I should like to propose a way of understanding the use of the present tense in anthropology as part of the conventional dialogue found in all science.

Fabian’s Thesis

Fabian treats contemporary anthropology very much on its own, isolated from other sciences, and sees it as at a point of significant historical development. Working backwards from this position, he provides a historical account of anthropology (1983: 2-35), describing its origins in some evolutionary theories prevalent in Europe in previous centuries. These theories are said to have derived from the Judaeo-Christian tradition a tendency to regard ‘far away’ as ‘long ago’. The effect of Fabian’s historical approach is to create a chronological funnel, wider at the earlier end and narrower towards the present, ending (as far as he can see) blindly in the future. I think that Fabian’s isolation of anthropology from the rest

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of contemporary social and natural science not only provides a misleading historical origin for anthropology but also has serious consequences for his argument.

Fabian states that the absence of an adequate consideration of time in structural-functionalism and structuralism is part of the continuing (and probably unalterable) inability of anthropologists to acknowledge that the people whom they study are (or were) living on the earth at the same time as them (what he calls 'coevalness'). In anthropology there is 'denial of coevalness. By that I mean a persistent and systematic tendency to place the referent(s) of anthropologists in a time other than the present of the producer of anthropological discourse' (ibid.: 31). So, 'American anthropology and French structuralism, each having developed ways to circumvent or preempt coevalness, are potential and actual contributors to ideologies apt to sustain the new, vast, anonymous, but terribly effective regimen of absentee colonialism' (ibid.: 69). To this he notes 'the colonial involvement of British anthropology has been well documented, which is one reason why it will be little discussed in these essays' (ibid.: 174-5). This means that British functionalism is not analysed in detail, a rather surprising omission in view of the many criticisms of functionalism's failure to deal with the passage of time. It is not, however, Fabian's contentious history of anthropology that I wish to consider here but his views on the present tense.

Nowadays, the denial of coevalness by 'allochronism' (ibid.: 32) means using the present tense to talk about things that clearly happened in the past, so removing the referents from 'the dialogic situation': 'the present tense is a signal identifying a discourse as an observer's language' (ibid.: 86). The distancing and diminishing effect of the present tense is made worse by the habit of anthropologists, in their ethnographic accounts, of putting the people studied into the third person ('they') while implicitly putting the reader ('the dialogic Other' of the scientific community) into the second person ('you'), further distancing their informants by making them objects of study: 'pronouns and verb forms in the third person mark an Other outside the dialogue' (ibid.: 85).

Fabian then (ibid.: 105-41) describes the emphasis in science, including anthropology, on sight. He stresses the predominantly visual nature of scientific data and the importance attached to observations, and he approves pleas for more value to be attached to hearing and speaking. I mention this part of Fabian's thesis because I think that his own stress on the visual aspects of science may have diverted his attention from the pre-eminence of the heard and the spoken in scientific activity. Further, though these visual metaphors are partly due to the convention that scientific evidence should be communally observable, there is another aspect to their use that he has overlooked because of the errors of his main thesis about the present tense.

These errors are as follows. The present tense in anthropology, rather than separating anthropologists and the people they study, in fact brings them together—the use of past tenses is much more likely to cause such separation. The use of the third person, rather than excluding other people from the dialogue, in fact allows them entry to it. Removal of other people from the dialogue is,
therefore, not effected by either of the methods Fabian describes, but by either or both of two other methods: by using past tenses or by denying them personal qualities (principally either by denying them subjectivity or by interfering with their independence as participants in the dialogue).

As a preliminary to elaborating these assertions, I now summarize the way Davis (1992) has categorized the uses of the present tense in anthropology, as I find some instructive omissions in his account.

**Davis’s Account**

Davis’s account of the way that present and past tenses are used in anthropology is practical and realistic. He lists the ways he has found the present tense being used, using empirical examples from anthropological literature to illustrate, though not to derive, these categories. He then comments on some lack of clarity that may arise from the use of the present tense and suggests that past tenses might with benefit be used more often.

His discussion of the uses of the present tense is prefaced by the statement, ‘in English we have at our disposal a repertoire of eight uses of the present tense’, and then, apparently as straightforward amplification of this assertion, ‘people write eight kinds of thing exclusively in the present tense’ (Davis 1992: 206). He lists eight kinds of thing, grouped into three categories. The first three are participatory, as in synopses, liturgies and stage directions; the next two are observational, as in describing pictures, photographs and maps (with anthropological analogies); the last two are scientific, as in statements that are true by definition or that have been demonstrated to be true by induction and experience.

The three kinds of thing described in the participatory category are exemplified by extracts from operatic, religious and dramatic writings. In these formal, non-scientific enterprises, actions have a relatively fixed procedure and words spoken or sung are pre-ordained. Despite being put in the participatory category, such performed and spoken activities can only be partially or alternately participated in by the readers of these accounts (as audience, congregation or actors). Where liturgies and stage directions (two examples in this category) are followed, speakers and actors do not say what they as free agents think or do at the time but rather what they think or do as actors following a script. Synopses, the third example in this category, are provided by one knowledgeable observer for other observers, whose participation is dependent on their observation of actors, who are themselves constrained by a script. Synopses, in fact, quite apart from their directive educational force, represent a further shift away from unrestrained participation.

In the observational group, the things that are described in the present (pictures, photographs and maps) are all artefacts, explicitly permanent and continuous and available to anyone else present. Although for Davis case-histories
and significant incidents in ethnographic research are analogous in some way to photographs, it is clear that the things in this category that are discussed in the present tense are separate in both space and matter, though not in time, from the person discussing them. Given that the uses of the observational present that he describes seem therefore to relate to quite specific objects or analogous situations, it is confusing when he later states that 'we conventionally generalise in an "observational" present' (1992: 211). It would in fact seem more consistent (and hence logical) to put generalizations in the third, scientific group, along with laws and tautologies. But I do not think that calling this last category scientific is accurate. I shall propose that science depends on argument, and there is obviously little question of either laws or tautologies being the subject of disagreement and hence argument.

Unless I have very much mistaken what Davis means by his categories, I think there are five other important ways in which the present tense is used in anthropological writing and which, indeed, (with one exception) he has used in his article. Even if I have misunderstood him, I think it is worth drawing attention to these ways in which the present tense is used. My examples are taken from anthropological literature.

Other Uses of the Present Tense in Anthropology

Type 1. The present tense is used for reporting publicly observable data.

1a. These [spondylus shells] are freely, though by no means easily, accessible in the coral outcrops of the Sanaroa Lagoon. It is from this shell that the small circular perforated discs (kaloma) are made, out of which the necklaces of the Kula are composed, and which also serve for ornamenting almost all the articles of value or of artistic finish which are used within the Kula district. (Malinowski 1922: 367)

1b. The Andamanese belong to that branch of the human species known to anthropologists as the Negrito race. They are short of stature with black skins and frizzy hair. The Nicobarese, on the other hand, resemble the races of Indo-China and Malaya, and have brown skins and lank hair, and are of medium stature. (Radcliffe-Brown 1922: 2)

1c. So Bushmen survive in the most rigorous places; they survive in the dense, mosquito-riden papyrus swamps of the Okovango River, steaming like a jungle and dangerous with snakes and fever, where the River Bushmen live, the only Bushmen with plenty of water; they also survive on the vast, rolling steppes of central Bechuanaland, the territory of the Gikwe Bushmen, who for the nine dry months of the year have no water at all and do without it. (Thomas 1959: 26).
1d. The Gypsies or Travellers are dependent on a wider economy within which they circulate supplying goods, services and occasional labour. Unlike migrant workers moving from a single locality to another for ‘settled’ and wage-labour jobs, Gypsies operate largely independently of wage-labour. (Okely 1983: 49)

1e. Anthropologists do not write exclusively in the present tenses. (Davis 1992: 209)

These excerpts show the use of the present tense for describing objective factual data, available to anyone else present. There is obviously a range of factual objectivity in these extracts—the statements in 1a are not controvertible in the way those in 1d might be; especially with the passage of time, the situation may change, as implied in the statements in 1c. But, at the time of observation (and, by convention, also of writing) these certainly were facts, permanent and objective, as permanent and objective as any facts described in similar statements in natural science.1 There may, of course, be changes not only in the factual circumstances described, but also in the manner of description, or the categories used—the racial categories in 1b were important at the time of writing.

Type 2. The present tense is used for making observations into public spoken statements.

2a. ‘Poverty’, I was repeatedly told, ‘resides in the anus of the Brahman’. (Parry 1985: 621)

2b. Adalo, like the living, crave pork. (Keesing 1982: 128)

2c. Sharing rights for pregnant women are particularly emphasised by the Hadza: they have the right to ask anyone for food at any time and are believed to be at risk if they are refused. (Woodburn 1982: 442)

2d. There are those, like André, who really believe that the pygmies are inferior and are meant to be treated like slaves, but for the most part the villagers are much more sensible and realistic. (Turnbull 1961: 161)

The first of these excerpts is an example of reporting speech directly. The others show how speech is indirectly reported: they are examples of writing in the present tense what people have said in the present tense about what they believed or thought, at the time they spoke, which is in the past. Such beliefs and thoughts

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1. See for example Egan et al. 1992: 522: ‘The human immunodeficiency virus-1 (HIV) is neurotrophic and enters the nervous system soon after initial infection. One long-term consequence of this brain penetration is the development of progressive impairment of cognitive and motor function due to a direct effect of the virus on neurons.’
expressed in speech are not themselves publicly observable (unlike the facts that Type 1 statements are concerned with) although the speech is itself publicly observable, and may be about publicly observable things or events and may have publicly observable consequences.

Here the present tense is the tense in which the original statements were made. The author has heard the statement, translated it (and transformed it in other ways) and written it in the same tense as that in which it was spoken. The speakers may be unnamed (as in 2a), only implicitly named (as in 2b), generically named (as in 2c) or individually named (as in 2d). This lack of consistent attribution may lead to confusion with other types of statement made in the present tense, particularly those of Types 1 and 5, where originators of statements are usually not explicitly named.

Because the preparatory work for their studies did not involve much listening to other people talking, neither Davis nor Fabian uses the present tense in this way; for the same reason, nor do I.

Type 3. The present tense is used for reporting writing.

3a. As Lienhardt says, the action of thuic is relatively trivial, yet ‘the principle involved...is similar to that which obtains in symbolic action in situations which, by their very nature, preclude the possibility of technical or practical action as a complete alternative (ibid.)’. (Ortner 1978: 6)

3b. Whatever else it may also be, sacrifice can be regarded, as Socrates says in the *Euthyphro*, as being in a sense a ‘commercial technique’, a way of doing business between gods and men. (Evans-Pritchard 1956: 224)

3c. In his discussion of Mauss’s *fait total social*, Lévi-Strauss (1950, pp. xxiv-xxx) gives a special place to social anthropology within the social sciences, by virtue of the otherness and strangeness of the societies studied. (Lewis 1980: 218)

3d. Maxwell Owusu, in an essay ‘Ethnography in Africa’ (1978), argues, on the basis of writings considered exemplary, that almost all the ‘classical’ ethnographers failed to meet one basic condition: command of the language of the peoples they studied. (Fabian 1983: 32)

3e. Rosaldo, for instance, argues that even though Evans-Pritchard’s account of how he did his fieldwork reads a bit bleakly, that is a characteristically British style—‘tongue-in-cheek understatement’, perhaps even a deliberate attempt to exaggerate the overwhelmingness of the odds against producing such a fine book (Rosaldo, 1986: 89). (Davis 1992: 209)

In 3a, as in 2a, the writer is quoting directly, but this time from another writer and not a speaker, despite her use of the word ‘says’. Before quoting Lienhardt,
she introduces him in the present tense, as I introduce her in the present tense. In 3c, 3d and 3e the writers are reporting what other writers have written in the present tense, in a way identical to the indirect reporting of speech described in Type 2 above. The use of the present tense is combined with an acknowledgement of the past nature of the event of writing by the inclusion of dates (see 3c, 3d and 3e). Like Ortner, the authors of 3d and 3e are referring not to other speakers but to other writers, even though they are reported as speaking and arguing. Conversely, in 3b ‘as Socrates says’ could be expanded to ‘as Plato says (or writes) Socrates says’, because what Socrates said was recorded in writing by Plato in the *Dialogues*. In my terminology, Evans-Pritchard has conflated Types 2 and 3, preferring Type 2.

**Type 4.** The present tense is used for stating the writer’s personal position (views, beliefs, feelings), as distinct from the writer’s theories.

4a. I am personally rather tolerant of disorder. (Douglas 1966: 2)

4b. My two fears are distortion and inaccuracy, or rather the kind of inaccuracy produced by too dogmatic a generality and too positivistic a localized focus. (Said 1991: 8)

4c. I am divulging here practices and theories that the Baruya have striven fiercely to keep secret, prudently, obstinately concealing them from the whites, whose contempt and aggressiveness they fear more than anything else. (Godelier 1986: 51)

4d. In the end, I cannot accept what I appear to be granting now: that anthropology could ever legitimately or even just factually circumvent or preempt the challenges of coevalness. (Fabian 1983: 38)

4e. I should say that I think I understand Evans-Pritchard’s reasons for using the present tense so generally in the Nuer [sic]. (Davis 1992: 212)

There is obviously no equivalent of 2a and 3a here, because there is no need for writers to put an account of their own position at the time of writing in reported direct speech in the present tense. It is confusing and unnecessary to write, for example, ‘I believe that “I believe that...”’, so the excerpts here demonstrate the simple use of the first person in the present tense. The purpose of this use of the present tense is to be self-explanatory, to help the reader understand the writer and the writer’s position, which may make the statements in the writer’s theories (Type 5 statements) more understandable too. This aim is not always realized.
Type 5. Lastly, the present tense is used for making assertions of varying
generality or, in other words, stating theories. These assertions are not statements
of objective fact (Type 1), nor of what others have said (Type 2) or written (Type
3), nor of the writer's own personal position (Type 4). Based on all these other
sorts of statement in the present tense, they are rather new conclusions, which can
then themselves be argued about.

5a. The close relationship between parent and child, which has such a decisive
influence upon so many in our civilization that submission to the parent or
defiance of the parent may become the dominating pattern of a lifetime, is not
found in Samoa. (Mead 1943: 168)

5b. However, the obstinate fidelity to a past conceived as a timeless model, rather than
a stage in the historical process, betrays no moral or intellectual deficiency
whatsoever. It expresses a consciously or unconsciously adopted attitude, the
systematic nature of which is attested all over the world by that endlessly repeated
justification of every technique, rule, and custom in the single argument: the
ancestors taught it to us. (Lévi-Strauss 1972: 236)

5c. Though post-modern ethnography privileges discourse, it does not locate itself
exclusively within the problematics of a single tradition of discourse, and seeks,
in particular, to avoid grounding itself in the theoretical and commonsense
categories of the hegemonic Western tradition. (Stephen A. Tyler 1986: 129)

5d. Enlightenment thought marks a break with an essentially medieval, Christian (or
Judeo-Christian) vision of Time. (Fabian 1983: 26)

5e. The case for writing abstraction in the present tense is also a strong one. (Davis
1992: 215)

The present tense is used here in a way that is similarly assertive but less law-
like than that which Davis describes in his scientific category. These statements
are assertions, of a general or specific nature, which have been or will be justified;
they are the writer's theories, not the writer's views (which are Type 4). Unlike
views, theories are not simply an expression of the writer's position and can
therefore (unlike views) be detached from the writer for the purposes of free
discussion and argument.

There is obviously a danger that statements of Type 5 may be confused with
other sorts of statements made in the present tense, particularly with Type 1
objective statements. Something of this potential confusion may be seen by
considering the excerpts above, taken out of context as they are. For example, 5a
might be confused with a Type 1 statement, and 5b with a Type 4 statement. The
fact that a writer's views (Type 4) and theories (Type 5) both become Type 3
when reported may be a further source of confusion. For clarity in later
discussion, I shall call the method of reporting someone else's views Type 4 in
Type 3, and someone else’s theories simply Type 3. Given this potential confusion, every writer’s job is to be clear about the status, origins and authority of everything that he or she writes. Readers may then disagree with either the form or the content of the assertion or its justification.

The Basic Dialogue of Types 3, 4 and 5

Fabian’s contention that the use of the third person marks ‘an Other’ outside the dialogue implies that dialogue can only take place between two people, which is wrong both etymologically and in practice. Although originally dialogue meant a spoken discussion between two or more people, one person alone can conduct an internal mental dialogue. Discussion and argument, either external or internal, is the basis of science.

I have described above the use of the present tense in three related ways (Type 3, to report other writers; Type 4, to provide an account of the writer’s own position; and Type 5, to make assertions that can be argued with) and now suggest that these three uses provide the basic form of the written dialogue. The writer (as Fabian describes) is in the first person (‘I’), the reader is implicitly in the second person (‘you’) and other writers are in the third person singular or plural (‘he’, ‘she’, ‘they’). The present tense in such dialogue then has precisely the opposite effect to that which Fabian says it does: placing everyone who might have something to contribute to the dialogue in the present tense unites them (that is, the writer, other writers and the reader) in time and place (that is, in the reader’s present and the reader’s person). By the use of the present tense, the reader is enabled to take part in this conventionally created mental dialogue in the reader’s real subjective time. While the immediate exchange is between the writer and reader, placing other writers in the third person does not bar them from the dialogue but enables them to be heard.

Removal from the Dialogue by Objectification

In natural science (which Fabian and Davis hardly mention), dialogue may be conducted about Type 1 statements in the present, dealing with the publicly observable permanence of nature, or (as in history) about such statements in past tenses, which might deal, for example, with accounts of either the present writer’s or other people’s actions and observations. But whether in past or present, there is no question of inarticulate nature joining in the dialogue. In human sciences, the people studied may or may not be involved in the dialogue, depending both on
the nature of the question and the writer discussing it. The question of the measured height of a group of people, for example, is determined by using only publicly observable methods; to answer it, there is no need to listen to the group’s views on this or any other matter. But where the actions of a group of people are concerned, the writer may either continue to act simply as an observer (and write Type 1 statements) or may listen to statements about what they are doing and report them (as Type 2). The writer may then treat their statements in two ways, either as objective data (again, Type 1), or as personal views or theories (Type 4 in Type 3, or Type 3). In the first case, with other people’s statements treated as objective data, argument is about what they say (with them excluded from the argument); in the second two cases, argument may still be about them but they now have a voice in the argument.

Placing informants in the third person and what they say in the present tense does not, then, automatically include them in the dialogue. It is whether or not they are treated as having views or theories that determines inclusion and on what terms. Full inclusion is only granted if informants are considered to have theories, which can be argued with, as well as views, beliefs or feelings, which cannot.

A different way (not too whimsical, I hope) of considering these different roles in the dialogue of those present in the third person, provided they are allowed a voice, is based on the roles of the various participants in an English trial. Here the jury (readers) are addressed, as ‘you’, by a barrister (the writer), whose Type 5 conclusions they judge. The barrister uses the third person to refer to other counsel and their arguments (in Type 3 statements) and to witnesses and their subjective evidence (in Type 4 in Type 3 statements). But if people are not granted a voice in such a trial (i.e. if their Type 2 statements are treated as Type 1 data), the effect is quite different. In this case, the informants (that is, other people) cannot give evidence or argue about it, or judge the argument; they themselves and their statements now actually constitute the evidence exhibited, objective and inanimate.

2. For an example of some human scientists’ account of their actions, see Takei et al. 1992: 506: ‘We sought Mental Health Enquiry data on all first-admission patients discharged from psychiatric hospitals in England and Wales between 1976 and 1986 who received an ICD-8 or ICD-9 diagnosis of either affective or schizophrenic psychosis.’ Such accounts are, interestingly, often put in the passive voice: ‘An intravenous cannula was inserted into a forearm vein and sealed with a rubber bung. The cannula was kept patent by flushing it with Heprinse (0.5 ml, 50 units heparin) after samples of blood were taken and the first 2 ml extracted at each time point was discarded...’ Prolactin levels were measured by fluoroimmunoassay (LKB method) as described by Lovgren et al (1985) (Lucey et al. 1992: 518).

For an example of such an account given of other human scientists’ actions and observations, see Tyler et al. 1992: 481: ‘In 1983, close linkage was found between Huntington’s disease (HD) and a DNA marker (G8, locus D4S10) in two large kindreds, one from USA, the other from Venezuela (Gusella et al, 1983). The linkage was confirmed by studies in the UK (Harper, 1986) and numerous other countries; data pooled from a total of 70 families showed no evidence for more than one locus for HD (Conneally et al, 1989).’
Removal from the Dialogue by Denying Autonomy

Such denial of personal subjectivity by objectification is, therefore, one method of removing other people from the dialogue. Another method of removal by denying personal qualities is by interfering with the autonomy of the notional persons involved in the dialogue. For example, the reader (previously in the second person, ‘you’) can be removed from the dialogue with the writer (‘I’) by the latter’s use of the first person plural (‘we’, ‘us’, ‘our’), which forcibly associates the otherwise distinct reader with the writer. This conscription makes it more difficult for the reader to dissociate from, in order to argue with, the writer. Fabian is quite fond of this device, using it, for example, four times on one page (1983: 88). He also favours the use of the impersonal ‘one’ (e.g. ibid.: 78), an anonymous third person singular that is neither ‘he’ nor ‘she’, and so has a similar effect in preventing dialogue. Explicit identification of the reader as ‘you’ may also interfere with the reader’s own participation in the dialogue; to the extent that the reader could be anyone, ascription of a particularity (an opinion or a question, for example) denies the reader’s anonymous generality. This device is often used to set up arguments that the writer then easily disposes of (the ‘Aunt Sally’ or ‘straw man’ ploy).

To the extent that any academic argument in the present tense is with identifiable individuals rather than with groups of people, Fabian is right about the distancing effect of the use of the third person, but only in the plural. The ethnographic use of collective nouns, which may have an objectifying aspect, also limits argument, only permitting it on the assumption of the homogeneity of the group. Fabian frequently uses ‘anthropology’ as such an objective collective noun, using it five times in this way on one page (ibid.: 143).

These uses of ‘we’, ‘one’, ‘you’, ‘they’ and ‘it’ are all examples of rhetoric, which uses language itself, rather than argument, to convince and persuade.

The Errors in Fabian’s Thesis

I contend, then, that Fabian’s thesis about the present tense and the third person in anthropology is wrong. These linguistic forms, rather than distancing other people, are the conventional way of bringing together people who have, or have had, things to say and write on the subject under discussion. Fabian’s stress on the unbalanced preponderance of visual accounts in anthropology and his wish to promote the heard and spoken is consequently misplaced—the implicit stress in anthropological texts is already on the heard and the spoken of conventional scientific dialogue, into which is incorporated what has been written and seen (and touched and smelt), as well as what has been heard. Indeed, in anthropology of all sciences the privilege given to verbal communication, both spoken and written,
can much more easily be criticized than further encouraged. The use of visual metaphors in texts is no doubt partly demonstrative, as Fabian describes, but is also partly related to the fact that anthropological accounts, like other scientific accounts, are written and therefore read and that reading is dependent upon visual activity; the written dialogue is read and then transformed by the reader into the crucial internal dialogue.

The important point arising from this discussion is that these conventional conversational uses of the present tense (which include, confusedly, somewhere among them 'the ethnographic present') are not just found in anthropology but in all Western scientific enquiries, past and present (a point that I suppose Fabian misses because of his singular historical approach). I shall call this tradition 'the convention of academic scientific enquiry' for the following reasons: 'academic' describes its origin in Plato's Academy; 'scientific' means that it makes knowledge; and 'enquiry' describes the general process of approaching, rather than claiming, truth.

This man-made convention of scientific dialogue is one way round a practical problem that Fabian almost acknowledges right at the end of his book, when he states that the denial of coevalness ultimately 'rests on the negation of the temporal materiality of communication through language' (1983: 164), a real temporal materiality that means that even when we—I use the first person plural because I do not think there can be any argument—talk to one another in the so-called here and now, we cannot enter into precisely simultaneous exchanges of talking and listening. We talk in response to what someone else has said, which, however recently, is definitely in the past; but, for the purposes of communication, we assume that they still hold in their mind what they have just expressed in speech.

An Error in my Contention So Far

So far I have talked about the present tense as the only tense in which conventional academic scientific dialogue is conducted. As, however, a brief consideration of this sentence will reveal, some modification of this assertion is needed. Although the present tense enables listeners and readers to join the dialogue by aligning their own subjective present with the present tense of the dialogue, this subjective present has past and future, as well as present, aspects. Linguistically, these may be called 'primary' tenses in English, as they are in Latin and Greek. In the first two sentences of this paragraph I have used three primary tenses, the perfect tense ('so far I have talked about') and the future tense ('as a brief consideration of this sentence will reveal'), as well as the present tense ('is conducted', 'is needed'). For the remainder of this essay, I shall use the division of tenses into 'primary' and 'historic', where historic refers to all past tenses (e.g.
imperfect, ‘I was talking’; simple past, ‘I talked’; and pluperfect, ‘I had talked’) except the primary past tenses, the most common of which is the perfect.3

The Use of Historic Tenses in Anthropology

Fabian’s approval of practical and realistic methods of enquiry involves insisting on the accurate recording of linear time, on affirming coevalness and denying allochroicity. Given the real practical problem of temporal materiality, any such insistence in speech could only prevent spoken communication between people, and in writing would prevent scientific discussion.4 His positivist position on the recording of time is not even found in discussions about the nature of time itself, where the form of these discussions is as conventional as ever. Coveney and Highfield (1990), for example, describe ways in which time may go backwards, but their discussion and conclusions are both still in the primary tenses.

Using historic tenses is an important way of removing other people from the dialogue, distancing the reader from some people whom the use of the present brings close. This is a differential distancing, in that the reader may still be close (or indeed much closer) to the writer (and to the writer’s views in particular) but tends to become less so to others. The tendency to distance other people in this way may only be overcome by the sort of effort that Collingwood has notably advocated, the attempt at the subjective recreation in the present of someone else’s past state of mind (Collingwood 1989: 282-302).

Of the anthropological works that are written predominantly in the historic tenses, Fabian mentions Lévi-Strauss’s *Tristes Tropiques* (1973) and Turnbull’s *The Forest People* (1961); Barley’s *The Innocent Anthropologist* (1983) is also in this category. Compared to the average ethnography, these autobiographical accounts may be more chronologically and factually accurate, but they may also be uncheckably inaccurate. They are more emotionally evocative (more elegiac, lyrical and funny, respectively), a consequence of these three writer’s views being given greater prominence than their theories, which can only be derived from

3. I plan to discuss elsewhere other aspects of this dialogue and its dependence on a surprisingly large number of assumptions that are either unverifiable or wrong, a dependence which justifies the description of scientific dialogue as ritual. This discussion will include the contention that the uses of the present tense described above, with other primary tenses, constitutes an important and probably necessary aspect of both cognitive modernism and technological advance.

4. Scientific dialogue is usually conducted in the indicative mood, which implies reality (like the ‘is’ in this sentence), though other moods may be used. One example of the use of the subjunctive mood is my ‘could’ and ‘would’ in the sentence to which this note is appended, which imply a hypothetical or conditional state of affairs, though still in a primary tense; another is ‘should’ in 4e.
argument with other people. In other words, as regards such autobiographical narratives in historic tenses (but only as regards them), Fabian is right that another person in the third person singular is distanced from the dialogue, because in these books the dialogue does only have two people in it, the writer and the reader. With such autobiographical texts in the historic tenses, the reader is more closely aware of what happened as experienced (or, at any rate, described) by the narrator. This awareness produces an informative and emotional effect on the reader (similar to the effect of Type 4 statements of the writer’s position—views, beliefs and feelings—on the reader), both effects depending, as in fiction, on the writer’s approach to what is being described. Any such emotional effects, whether generated by reading in the armchair—as in these cases—or by being in the field, do not at the moment have generally accepted applications because of the lack of general acceptance in anthropology of a subjective psychology of emotion.

Where only historic tenses are used in non-autobiographical narrative, there is no dialogue between the reader and the writer at all—the latter has disappeared, leaving only objective statements, similar to Type 1, but in historic tenses about the past. This approach may be combined with the academic dialogue in the primary tenses, as is found in academic history and in natural science. An example of this combination of historic and primary in anthropology is to be found in another paper by Davis (1991: 12): ‘Uduk construed duration as a series of alternations; Kédang added to that a sense of direction, and hence of cycles of renewal. They contrast with Yemeni tribesmen who construed time as a necessary sequence of events, and who used a generative model to explain the setting of their lives.’

In both sentences, Type 2 information has been put in a historic tense, similar to Type 1 and treated objectively. Informants have therefore been excluded from the scientific dialogue in the primary tenses, both by objectification and by the use of historic tenses, and, in consequence, they can only be observed and talked about. It is no doubt historically correct that the peoples described were, in the past, seen and heard by observing and listening anthropologists who, also in the past, recorded what they saw and were told but, as historically correct facts, these are not live contentions that are easily discussed or are apparently worth discussing. This lack of argument is brought out in two different ways by the statement in the present tense in the second sentence (‘they contrast.’). First, the absence of the writer from this statement leaves it unclear to the reader whether it is of Type 1 or Type 5, whether it is an objective fact or the writer’s assertion. Secondly, contrasting (and comparing) is not generalizing (Leach 1961: 6)—generalizations are Type 5 assertions, the synthetic products of observation and verbal argument, provoking further observation and further argument.

The unusual effect of the passage is increased by the absence of the definite article for the collective nouns (‘Uduk’ and ‘Kédang’, rather than ‘the Uduk’ and ‘the Kédang’). To the use of historic tenses is added collective but apparently indeterminate objectivity, making an even greater barrier to the peoples discussed in the dialogue being admitted to it.
Conclusion

I have argued that Fabian’s thesis about the use of the present tense and the third person in anthropology is wrong. I have suggested that these and other conventions of academic dialogue allow anthropologists to give to the people that they study the same status that they give to each other, in a way that is currently precluded by using historic tenses. It is a different matter whether anthropologists do in fact grant equal status to the people they study, in academic dialogue as well as in the field. In the past, some anthropologists may have been prevented from being individually introspective or sociologically reflexive by incorrect notions about the people they studied being in important ways different from themselves, though even evolutionary errors do not deny dialogue. Anthropologists should not now easily dismiss the relatively egalitarian assumptions of their tradition of enquiry by treating the people they study as qualitatively Other because chronologically Over.

REFERENCES


48 Simon Sinclair


COMMENT

**DISPERSED ALLIANCE, TERMINOLOGICAL CHANGE AND EVIDENCE**

The general problem of Parkin’s recent article, ‘Dispersed Alliance and Terminological Change in South Asia’ (*JASO*, Vol. XXIII, no. 3, pp. 253-62), has been raised by its author in an earlier and related publication (Parkin 1990). There he discredited others for their ‘uniform reliance on slender and suspect evidence’ (ibid.: 70). These attacks against ‘such figures as Barnett, Carter and above all Dumont’ (p. 253) are now continued, so the question of ‘evidence’ should be discussed. Coincidences between Parkin’s article and my own comparative ethnographic work in middle India (1982, 1983) will not, however, be elaborated in the following examples of ‘evidence’.

1. Anyone who actually takes the trouble to read Dumont’s contribution of 1966 will have to notice how Parkin misrepresents essential statements. Dumont has never attempted ‘to prove’ that northern address terminologies ‘were as classificatory as’ the southern reference terminologies (p. 253). He has, moreover, repeatedly (1975: 198; 1983: 23, 160) renounced his publication of 1966. Parkin’s article simply ignores this radical shift.

2. The most relevant ethnographic data in Parkin’s article relate to ‘the rule of delay of three generations’ (p. 256) among the middle Indian Juang. Thus the ‘Juang-type system’ is born, representing the crucial ‘third stage’ (p. 258) of the overall scheme. In fact, these data are just a good example of invented ethnography. Neither McDougal (1963) nor any other ethnographer of the Juang has ever reported such a ‘rule’.

3. Who are ‘the Malto’ (p. 258)? In almost all his previous publications Parkin reified categories designed by linguistic experts (e.g. ‘the Munda’ or ‘the Koraput Munda’) as if they were social groups whose social norms and categories differed from those of speakers of other languages within the village, tribe or region where these linguistic categories could be applied. In a kind of escalation, in this latest article (and its predecessor) Parkin has now reified a language—Malto—into a social group when, it seems, the tribe called Sauriya Pahariya by officials and Maler by its members is meant. By this technique it will be impossible to detect other ‘evidence’ on ‘the Malto’, since the fairly large number of ethnographers of the Sauriya Pahariya use the correct name. Thus the uninformed reader is likely to think that the data on the group rechristened ‘the Malto’—including the Table, or caricature of a kinship terminology (p. 259)—were the result of the author’s primary ethnographic research. No evidence of the real sources is supplied. Since (after Parkin 1990), this is the second attempt to bestow reality upon a hitherto unknown tribe called ‘the Malto’, we can presume that evidence is created by repetition.
I will not bother further about South Asian ethnography here but concentrate my other comments on ‘typology and transformation’, i.e. the theme of the Moscow conference at which the paper on which Parkin’s essay is based was originally given. My own work on ‘dispersal’ or Zerstreuung (1985: 178) of invariant ties of intermarriage in South Asia will not be introduced, even though it deals with the by now familiar Juang and Jat, north, south and central Indian as well as Omaha marriage rules, and the equation, in contrast to the differentiation, of MB and WF. It was written in a foreign language, too difficult to be checked. Only those colleagues I had invited as guests to the Berlin Institut für Ethnologie had been forced to accept copies of the paper.

Carrying coals to Newcastle may be a better idea. More than two decades ago, a prominent representative of Oxford anthropology gave the following verdict:

What I wish to propose therefore is quite seriously that this kind of typology, i.e. one in which the types are defined by isolated features of named societies arbitrarily selected as paradigm cases, should be entirely abandoned. It is methodologically faulty, it misdirects research, and it has served no useful purpose. (Needham 1971: 16-17)

The substance of Parkin’s article is an example of such a type of typology, so little else need be said. Furthermore, it advocates a particular path of evolution among the terminological types. The lineal will be ultimately transformed into the cognatic type that is identical to the pattern of our own vocabulary of kinship. The shift is supposed to take time. FB is said to ‘switch...from the terminological companionship of father to that of MB’, but not in one step (p. 254). The hop, skip and jump of his performance are described as intermediary evolutionary stages.

The nineteenth-century evolutionists had also seen our own pattern of kinship vocabulary in the ultimate stage of their scheme. In comparison with Parkin’s article, I prefer their work, because they do not isolate kinship as the only domain. In contrast, the ‘diachronic approach’ of Parkin’s article elaborates historical transformations of marriage rules and terminological patterns unrelated to either the technological and economic sector or the political and administrative systems, not to speak of such sociocultural values as status. Had the scheme referred to these features, the diachronic sequence attained in the Table opposite would have been the outcome. The rather unusual sequence of developments on the side of the political economy, ordered according to the historical transformations in the field of kinship, would require some further explanation of the ‘diachronic approach’ advocated by Parkin.

My own evolutionary speculations of about a decade ago (1982: 97) refer to the tribal pattern as initial. The structure of terminology and alliance may be described as the repetition of intermarriage in every second or fourth generation. Such a highly sophisticated scheme would go together with the simple political economy of swidden cultivators as witnessed today among the Juang and others. In the course of diachronic change, the growing sophistication of the political
TABLE 1: Kinship Terminology and Alliance versus Values and Political Economy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Kinship Terminologies</th>
<th>Values and Political Economy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>'the Dravidian system we are all familiar with, from Morgan onwards' (p. 258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>'the Juang-type system, which retains some prescriptive features' (p. 258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4</td>
<td>'the Malto...poised between the last vestiges of prescription and individualizing north Indian' (p. 258)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 5</td>
<td>'the Jat system, terminologically north Indian, with the four-got rule ensuring dispersal' (p. 258-9)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 6</td>
<td>'standard north Indian terminologically with no particular tendency to renew alliances' (p. 259)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

economy would coincide with alternative schemes of simplification of terminology and alliance: either affinal prescription would be simplified and then imply immediate repetition of internarriage, as is well known in south India today; or the distance between alliances of different generations would lead to an individualizing scheme, as is well known in north India today, implying the end of affinal prescription and alliance by terminological and normative prohibitions of repetition and reversal of marriage ties. Both the simplifications could be traced back formally to the sophisticated tribal pattern.

1. I deliberately leave aside Stage 1 or ‘tetradic society’ (Allen 1986) since this scheme belongs to an analytical level altogether different from empirical cases. Like this pure case, the Juang and Njul-Njul schemes alternate kinship categories in adjacent generations. In Allen’s parsimonious model, the two-line scheme is retained, while in the Juang and Njul-Njul case alternate generation equations imply four terminological lines.
What do we compare when we compare ‘kinship terminologies’? Parkin’s article offers a straightforward reflectionist account ignoring all differences among societal types. A number of well-known Oxford and Paris analysts have, however, convinced myself and others of the value of a sceptical approach towards any given domain of ‘kinship’. ‘Kinship’ differs, as societies differ. Some of these differences include the following principles:

1. A term we call ‘kinship term’ may relate ego to another individual and denote alter’s kin type. Designating classes of kin types, the vocabulary may reflect the manner of ordering such individual relationships, as is the case in most European languages. Parkin generalizes the reflectionist approach, but many other authors will differentiate. Although common sense might assume that all ‘kinship terminologies’ depend upon egocentrically articulated references or addresses, common sense may not be the best of guides.

2. In other societies, such as the north Indian one, ego may apply a term to a class of alters that is not exclusively designated by genealogical space. My informants in coastal Orissa, for example, referred to a person as *phupha* (FZH) by the logic of oppositions and not because of (non-existent) genealogical links. His daughter would be ego’s ‘sister’ and ego’s daughter’s *phuphi* (FZ) etc. The simple reflectionist dogma does not apply but, at the same time, no other overall principle of order can be detected.

3. Prescriptive and classificatory equations (see Allen 1989: 176) may result in a single unified system of terms that is not only ordered by the egocentric perspective (see Dumont 1963: 5). An example of such a holistic system is ‘the Dravidian system we are all familiar with from Morgan onwards’, i.e. a system of two affinally interrelated terminological lines. Parkin ignores the order of the whole and the particular implications of holistic orders. He is only concerned with partial relationships and their transformations.

4. A fourth concept of a ‘vocabulary of kinship’ may offer the same type of system as the third one, but—in addition—relate the order of terms to orders of ceremonies, settlements, dances, groups etc., i.e. a general pattern of classification beyond the domain of ‘kinship’. The two-line order of the Garo in north-east India (Burling 1963: 348f) may serve as an example, but anthropologists unfamiliar with South Asia may be better acquainted with the four-line system of the Njul-Njul (see Elkin 1956 [1938]: 70).

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2. An as yet unpublished talk by Serge Tcherkézoff on terminological ‘type’ in Samoa (given at the same conference as the paper on which Parkin’s article is based) has cautioned me against such generalizations.

3. This is, of course, a reference to Dumont’s ‘global formula of exchange’ (Dumont 1971).

4. Essential is the holistic—and not the local—point of view. The terminological system of the Garo does not completely fit the marriage rules. I doubt if any empirical system permits such a complete fit.
The Njul-Njul alternate generation equations (see Allen 1989: 177) differ from those of the Juang, but the latter’s overall terminological order also implies two alternating terminological lines of affines for the elaborated line of kin. Another term gives a hint of a fourth line that is logically implied by the system. Quite different from the Njul-Njul order, the Juang system contains within each of the three central generational levels expressions of relative seniority for both male and female affines and consanguines, but these additions can be accommodated without contradictions within the overall four-line structure (Pfeffer 1982: 63).

Quite irrespective of these details, on the evidence of his JASO article Parkin would evaluate the Njul-Njul order—or any ‘Aranda-type system’—in the manner applied to the Juang case. The Njul-Njul scheme would be ‘obviously intermediate’ and ‘the WB of one generation becomes, of course, the MB of the next, but his son does not succeed to his position: MBS is never WB, and MB never WF, hence the regular terminological separation of direct affines and cross kin...the Juang [and Njul-Njul] system is clearly transitional, a symmetric prescriptive system in process of decay, preserving original features in the +1 and -1 cognatic terminology, but losing these in ego’s level and with separate affinal terms in all three medial levels’ (pp. 256-7).

I disagree with such an interpretation. Njul-Njul and Juang apply a holistic terminological scheme that is truly structural and does not separate a domain of ‘kinship’ from other domains of social organization. Parkin fails to take notice of the social whole. He equates systems of symmetric prescription with two-line systems. The sophistications of four-line systems are, therefore, viewed as ‘decay’, or at best as ‘transition’.

GEORG PFEFFER

REFERENCES


REPLY TO PFEFFER

My gratitude to Professor Pfeffer for his comments is eclipsed only by my astonishment at the confusion of thought that underlies practically all of them. I will start with the first of his objections, namely my supposed misinterpretation of Dumont. There is no question that Dumont introduces data from address usage at several points in his treatment of North Indian kinship terminology (1966: 96-103), which he initially sees as descriptive in type. For instance, he concludes his discussion of the term bhai, ‘brother’, which has a wide meaning extending far beyond the close genealogical specification implied by the English translation, by saying: ‘If I am right, this is equivalent to leaving the descriptive scheme and using its categories, or some of them, as if they were classificatory. This tendency might well be indicative of Dravidian “contagion”; it is clearly more developed in address than in reference’ (1966: 101; my emphases). And when discussing the treatment of ZH, FZH and MB, which he regards unambiguously as affines in the southern terminology, Dumont says that in the north too, the fact that they are addressed as pahuna, ‘guest’ (ibid.), means that they ‘are actually treated as affines, but the terminology [i.e. the reference terminology] does not register the fact’ (ibid.: 102).

I had acknowledged Dumont’s own misgivings about the feasibility of this comparison on two previous occasions (1990: 69-70; 1992: 12), but chose in the present case to focus, not on his later change of heart, but on the doubts he expressed right at the outset: ‘the postulate of the unity of India is seriously
challenged in the field of kinship’ (1957: 18). This did not prevent him from going ahead with the attempt none the less—as, of course, he was perfectly entitled to do. Indeed, my own position was and remains one of applauding the aim but of finding fault with the approach. Thus I do not think I was being unduly unfair to Dumont in choosing this as the best and most famous example of the sort of difficulty I was talking about. At all events, I have not ignored the matter in my work generally, but merely found a different, and earlier, statement of Dumont’s to cite.

As regards his second point, Pfeffer is evidently not quite so familiar with McDougal’s writings as he thinks. McDougal’s major work (1963) has plenty of references to the fact that marriage ties between spouse-exchange groups are discontinuous down the generations, in the sense that there are norms against the immediate repetition of alliances between the same alliance groups (ibid.: 158ff., 168, 174-5, 428, 429). This means that one cannot repeat the marriage of one’s father, as with cross-cousin marriage; and other, statistical data recorded by McDougal (ibid.: 160) suggest that the marriage of one’s FF is also avoided. This actually entails a three-generation rule of delay, since the two-generation rule it logically implies would come up against the strict opposition of alternate generations that is so crucial a feature of Juang life and thought: FFF is linked with one’s father and therefore belongs to a genealogical level defined as adjacent to ego’s, into which marriage is formally prohibited and whose own marriages ego does not repeat.

Such rules are by no means uncommon in middle India. They may sometimes be negative rather than positive, i.e. they impose a delay before realiances become possible, rather than actually enjoining repetition after the stipulated number of generations has passed. This does not stop them from being considered, or described as, rules. The Munda may even represent an instance of a positive rule, if a fairly explicit statement by Yamada (1970: 385) is anything to go by. Elsewhere in the area, the possible existence of such rules is supported by evidence of spouse-selection being directed by kin term (Munda, Korwa: goi; Santal: sangat; Juang: salirae) and, more circumstantially, of a rule against marrying anyone with whom no previous relationship can be traced (the Hill Kharia). The data assembled in my book (Parkin 1992: especially ch. 8 and appendix II) substantiates these matters fully, giving all the necessary references.

In fact, it would seem that Pfeffer is not terribly familiar with his own writings either. Two passages of his (1982: 97, para. 3; 1983a: 101, para. 3) can certainly be construed as accepting the existence of a three-generation rule among the Juang and other groups. Other passages (especially 1982: 56-60) are still more specific in mentioning delays of three generations before alliances can be renewed in a number of different groups. Many of his statements refer explicitly

1. Though in neither instance is the wording entirely clear, as is often the case in Pfeffer’s work. It is this, not the language in which it is written, that is the real reason for it sometimes being ‘too difficult to be checked’ (see above, p. 50).
to this practice as a ‘rule’, and two (ibid.: 57, on the Dangria Kond; ibid.: 60, on the Bhuiya) are based on his own field enquiries.

Pfeffer’s third comment, on the reification of linguistic names as ethnic groups, has no basis in my own writings. Indeed, in the preface to my major work (1992: ix), I expressly deny any intention to argue for any sort of linguistic determinism. I accept at many points (ibid.: ix, 4, 217, 225-6, 234-9) that Munda speakers, like Austroasiatic speakers generally, share much with immediate neighbours who speak different languages and that they cannot really be distinguished from them on other grounds. The chosen topic of that work was the comparative ethnography of a group of middle Indian peoples who all speak a Munda language, and as such the word ‘Munda’ was bound to appear frequently in it. This simply means that the term ‘Koraput Munda’, for instance, refers to ‘the peoples who speak languages of the Koraput Munda branch’ or (which comes to the same thing) ‘the Munda-speaking groups who live in Koraput district’: it certainly does not represent any sort of reification.

As for the term ‘Malto’, my employment of it in the article in question is admittedly looser than it might have been. None the less, as a general principle its choice can be readily justified in the present context, where it is mainly kin terms and terminologies that are being discussed. Given the embodiment of terminologies in language, ‘Malto’, being the term for the language of the Maler, seems more natural here than the ethnonym itself, just as one would normally speak of the Latin, not the Roman, kinship terminology (not to mention the Sanskrit, Hindi etc. terminologies). As for the complaint concerning absence of sources, these are given in full in Appendix II of my book (1992: 234-6; and in the notes, ibid.: 276), a manuscript copy of which Pfeffer has long possessed. It is hard to see why Pfeffer should decide that my table is no more than a ‘caricature’ of a kinship terminology: it shows just what it purports to show, no more and no less, namely the transitional nature of the pattern in the parental (i.e. +1) level of two terminologies, the part that is most significant to the argument currently being pursued, being in each case that part where the last traces of prescription are to be found.

It is when Pfeffer goes on to complain about my treatment of kinship terminology in general, and to offer his own disquisition on the topic, that we begin to meet with real caricature. At one point (p. 52), he calls my study a ‘reflectionist account ignoring all differences among societal types’, his train of thought apparently being that because, in his view, there is no separable domain of kinship, one has to anchor one’s study of it firmly to other sociological factors. This is an opposite use of the word ‘reflectionist’ to the one with which I am familiar. In my experience, it is usually applied precisely to those explanations for kinship terminologies that see them as epiphenomena of other social facts, such as (depending on the writer) descent or marriage systems, behavioural stereotypes, or status. McKinley, for instance, argues:

[the reflectionist tendency] assumes that the only way to demonstrate a relation between kinship terminology and features of social organisation is by locating the
points at which the terminology appears to be a direct reflection of some aspect of the social or behavioural system. In other words, a certain amount of one-to-one mapping or congruence is expected between terminology and social structure. Usually the terminology is treated as the dependent side of this relationship. (1971: 239-30; original emphasis)²

This careful definition might be called the restricted view. Under certain circumstances, the term 'reflectionist' might equally be applied to correlations with societal type of the sort that Pfeffer appears to be advocating. The debate is an old one, going right back to Morgan and one of his earliest critics, Kroeber. The latter, in a famous paper of 1909, was the first to advocate the treatment of kinship vocabularies in their own right, as autonomous systems of classification. This, in general, has always been my own tendency too. Indeed, I cannot conceive how any sort of reflectionism can be attributed to myself, either in this article, or in anything else I have ever written. My own position is and always has been that it is perfectly legitimate to restrict one's investigations to one particular aspect of what we call kinship; that if that aspect happens to be terminology (as is largely the case in my article), then to begin with it can be treated simply as a matter of classification; and that it is no more than prudent to concentrate initially on establishing the nature of the system before looking to see what correlations of a sociological nature might emerge from the data. I am certainly not hostile to attempts to establish correlations as such: I simply believe that the onus of proof lies on the author of them, and that they are much less easy to bring to fruition than is often realized. The major obvious exception is the possibility of correlating prescriptive terminologies with those systems of affinal alliance loosely but not entirely satisfactorily referred to as 'cross-cousin marriage'. While I accept the strictures of those who claim that such coherence, though logical, is strictly ethnographically contingent, there are certainly cases where the fit does obtain—including, in my opinion, the Juang and allied groups (as I define their systems). Yet not even this degree of recognition entails giving an existential priority to either kinship terminology or affinal alliance system, as a reflectionist approach would require.

In fact, Pfeffer's own attempts to set up a range of associations between kinship terminology and societal type stops just short of being reflectionist, since he does not go so far as to accord existential priorities to either. None the less, they bring him much nearer to such a position than anything in my work brings me. The correlations he suggests are considerably more ambitious than my own much more modest attempts to match—and only where ethnographically appropriate—affinal alliance system to terminology. I infer from the last paragraph on p. 50 that the intention of all this is to challenge the validity of the diachronic stages I had advocated for types of terminology by showing that the order does not correspond with his own evolutionary scheme of societal types. Whatever the

2. See also Barnes 1976: 385. Pfeffer seems to have understood the standard definition better on an earlier occasion (see his 1985: 701).
validity of this scheme as such, what it shows is simply the difficulties involved in establishing regular correlations between the two, difficulties that are severe enough to make most authorities content to assume that there are none. My diachronic suggestions, on the other hand, are based on transformations internal to the terminological data themselves that are both logical and, I believe, ethnographically justified. This is yet another reason for wanting to concentrate on terminology as a separate domain, a decision supported by the circumstance that a terminology is embedded in linguistic much more than in societal factors. Indeed, there is no evidence that I know of showing that kinship terminology differs comprehensively according to societal type. A simple example will suffice here. Pfeffer associates the 'Dravidian', i.e. South Indian terminological system, with 'caste order plus sophisticated government and economy based on plough cultivation' (p. 51). The doctoral thesis of one of his own students (Werth 1992) has shown that the wandering Vagri of south India have a terminology that is basically standard South Indian in type (though lexically Indo-European, not Dravidian). Yet they live by hunting, scavenging, begging, minor trade and such ritual services as healing, not at all by plough cultivation, and they can hardly be said to have 'sophisticated government'—whatever that is supposed to mean.

Pfeffer also appears to want to say (p. 52) that some terminologies are not only, or even not at all, egocentric, a view apparently based on the mistake of thinking that terminologies are egocentric because, or when, they chart genealogies (assuming this is what is meant by 'individual relationships'; cf. also the words 'genealogical space' in the following paragraph). Here, Pfeffer has got himself well and truly tangled up in an elementary confusion that has bedevilled anthropology for far too long. All terminologies are egocentric, simply because they are systems of classification centring around, i.e. seen from the perspective of, an imaginary person called ego. This has nothing to do with genealogy as such. Kin terms may delineate actual genealogical positions, and even particular analytical kin types, but they need not and frequently do not. What they always do, however, is to map out the indigenous categories ego uses for the people he recognizes as relatives.

These principles apply just as much to the English term uncle as to the Tamil term mamam: an English ego may have several uncles, each representing a separate genealogical position and a separate kin type. It is only when this English ego wants to define the relationship of one particular uncle more exactly for some purpose that he or she resorts to genealogy. In my view, those alliance theorists who risk the wrath of the extensionist school in distinguishing non-Western terminologies from Western ones because the former use category rather than genealogy actually understate their case. The distinction is a false one, though the real reason for this is the opposite to the one usually given. All kinship terminologies deal in categories, and all peoples have ways of describing relationships more exactly than reference to category is always able to do. One example of the latter, though it is not the only one, is genealogy. The distinction
is thus not one between types of society but between sorts of knowledge, i.e. between the contexts in and for which relationships are identified.

Pfeffer none the less appears to think (p. 52), on the authority of Dumont, that a separate class of terminology is defined by the possession of a holistic perspective. Again, I would say that all terminologies are holistic, in the sense that they form a discrete semantic domain. What Dumont is actually doing in the place cited (1983: 5) is warning us against the mistake of taking the genealogically minimal definition of a term as its chief meaning and the classificatory referents of the term as mere extensions. The example he gives concerns the relationship between two classes of +1 males who are minimally defined as father and mother’s brother in the typical Dravidian terminology. Its purpose is certainly to show that this is a relationship between two classes of affines (i.e. affines to one another) that in itself is structured not by their own individual relations to ego, but by their involvement in repeated affinal alliances with each other. However, none of this affects the circumstance that a kinship terminology is egocentric. Ego is also implicated in this arrangement, it clearly being Dumont’s intention to argue that ego’s relationship to the mother’s brother is just as affinal as that between the father and mother’s brother. Indeed, the entire analysis would lose much of its force were this not the case, given that ego’s father and mother’s brother will be affines to each other in any society, ours as much as among Tamils (this is true by definition, i.e. mother’s brother will always be ego’s father’s wife’s brother). Thus, with regard to the question of whether or not terminologies are egocentric, it matters not at all whether ego’s relationship with the mother’s brother is traced indigenously through the mother, exploiting links that are entirely consanguineal, or through the father, as mother’s brother’s affine. In either case, father and mother’s brother are defined in themselves—like their classificatory equivalents, where appropriate, and even though all are subsumed under a common term—precisely by their relation to ego. They are respectively ego’s father and mother’s brother, or, in Tamil, ego’s appa and maman, not each other’s. Dumont himself says, in deliberate and direct contradiction of his own question as to whether his account entitles one ‘to speak of a structure sensu stricto’: ‘but here lies the characteristic of a kinship terminology as compared with other kinship groupings, that it is a constellation revolving around the Ego’ (1983: 12; my emphasis).3

This in no way contradicts the idea of a kinship terminology as a whole, i.e. a discrete semantic domain. But the notion should not be confused with other classifications that are sometimes found alongside the kinship terminology. Although there are frequently terms for whole classes of relations, such as affines, cognates, and patri- or matrikin, these are not part of the kinship terminology as such, which, in Dumont’s famous phrase, ‘has not as its function to register groups; it is on the contrary the basic fact of its nature that it universally ignores them’ (1962: 92; original emphasis). Rather, they form a parallel classification

3. Here too, Pfeffer had more success earlier in interpreting Dumont correctly (see his 1985: 702).
supplementing, but not normally contradicting the terminology. Labels for phratries, moieties and sections are an obvious example. However, their presence is strictly contingent: it was the respective presence and absence of sections that led Dumont to distinguish the Kariera and Dravidian systems from each other as global and local forms of exchange (1983: ch. 5). In practice, it is mostly these, rather than kin terms, that one works with when attempting to establish correlations with ‘orders of ceremonies, settlements, dances, groups etc.’ (p. 52).

The Garo example given by Pfeffer proves, when examined, to have precious little to say about such things, Burling being mainly concerned on the pages cited with kinship terms and how they are used. Perhaps, as Pfeffer suggests, data on the Njul-Njul of Australia would prove more fruitful, though as I have never even mentioned them in print he is hardly entitled to say (p. 53) how I would treat their system. What is more remarkable about this part of Pfeffer’s critique is his attribution of a four-line ‘Aranda-type system’ (p. 53)\(^4\) to the Juang of central India, the main example of my article. I have already challenged this claim briefly in print (1992: 187). The point deserves developing at length, but suffice it to say here that the Juang terminology as recorded by McDougal (1964: 329) bears no relation to the hypothesis. One can find four terms in each of the three medial levels readily enough, but the specifications given for them do not correspond to a true four-line scheme: in particular, they are not joined by lineal descent to corresponding positions in the other levels. A number of terms are for affines only, another deleterious circumstance. Nor is any category of second cross cousin stipulated as alliance partner, as in most such systems. As already mentioned in my article, marriage partners among the Juang and similar groups are rather to be seen as GEG categories to each other. The vacuousness of Pfeffer’s hypothesis is shown by the passage in which he says that the Juang’s ‘overall terminological order also implies two alternating terminological lines of affines for the elaborated line of kin. Another term gives a hint of a fourth line that is logically implied by the system’ (p. 53; my emphases). Such language does not improve one’s confidence in the sort of reasoning being employed, since all it demonstrates is a fondness for deep but hypothetical mental structures as a way of compensating for what is really a complete lack of evidence.

Here, then, is a fundamental disagreement over how an important and (thanks to McDougal’s ethnography) well-described affinal alliance system is to be interpreted. Because he sees it as four-line prescriptive, and is therefore able to link it with a textbook scheme of kin classification, Pfeffer treats the Juang system as static. I, conversely, see it as closely related but by no means identical to the two-line symmetric prescriptive scheme of south India, and therefore as transitional between this and non-prescriptive North Indian. Pfeffer accepts the possibility of change between terminological types, but as regards India, he places the supposedly four-line system of the Juang not in any transitional position, but at the

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4. I draw attention to this phrase because it offends against Needham’s strictures as quoted so approvingly by Pfeffer three pages earlier.
evolutionary starting-point. Quite apart from the spuriousness of the four-line hypothesis, this would reverse the order conventionally assumed to be the most plausible, namely that it is two-line symmetric prescriptive systems, especially if they have extensive alternate generation equations, that have evolutionary priority over other forms (see Allen 1986 for the most developed account). Given all this, it is Pfeffer’s notion of the South Indian pattern as a ‘simplification’ of the supposedly four-line systems of middle India (p. 51) that needs justifying.

Such disagreements, and the confusion and lack of clarity I frequently detect in Pfeffer’s writings, account for my previous reluctance to put them to use in my own work, save to some extent ethnographically. This is important, because it provides an answer to Pfeffer’s remaining point, to the effect that I have disregarded some prior claim he has on this material (pp. 49, 50).5 I am happy to concede that Pfeffer has been actively studying middle Indian kinship for almost as long as I have. My own involvement dates back to the autumn of 1977, when I started intensive library research on the Munda. Pfeffer’s earliest writings on tribal kinship would seem to derive mostly from two brief field trips to Orissa in 1980-81 and 1982, heavily supplemented by literature research that presumably preceded them in part.6 It is also true that Pfeffer beat me into print on this topic by approximately a year: as far as I have been able to determine, his own first relevant publications are dated 1982, while mine are dated 1983.

There is, of course, a degree of convergence between our writings, but this is limited to generalities, including the existence of dispersed alliance in India. As regards the occurrence of this phenomenon among Munda speakers, my own views on the matter have certainly developed over the years, but I can point to some brief remarks in an article published in 1985 which, though they have come to seem unsatisfactory from many points of view, do show clear parallels with Pfeffer’s paper (Pfeffer 1985) published the same year.7 In my paper (1985: 716-17), I suggest that very few Munda-speaking groups have affinal alliance systems based on ‘the direct exchange of women between alliance groups, repeated generation after generation’, and that ‘the north Indian preference for avoiding close kin in marriage seems to prevail’. And my very first published paper, on

5. One would not normally bicker over such matters. When this complaint originally arose, however, it was made so seriously that it led to my being expelled from a wing of an institute whose hospitality I had been enjoying and in which, indeed, I had even been allowed to teach on occasion. I hope the reader will therefore forgive me for taking this opportunity to clear my name of the charges of ethical misconduct then laid against me.

6. See Pfeffer 1983b: 649n. An earlier field trip to Orissa in 1971-2, undertaken as part of the Orissa Research Project into the Jagannath cult, led to Pfeffer’s habilitation thesis (1976) and two other publications (see his 1978: 422 n.5 and passim; and 1982: 1 and Part I) on the Brahmins of Puri. It would appear that other members of the project had responsibility for the tribal dimension on that occasion, especially Hermann Kulke and Anncharlott Eschmann.

7. A revised account of my own paper can be found in my book (1992: ch. 7).
Levi-Strauss's treatment in *Elementary Structures* of Austroasiatic-speaking groups, shows me grappling with the intricacies of these systems, not as yet entirely clear as to their nature, but at least recognizing the absence of cross-cousin marriage in many of them, with in its place rules of delay before alliances may be repeated (1983: 80-83). Both circumstances automatically entail the dispersal of alliances for any one affinal alliance group. It does begin to look as if Pfeffer and I have been working in parallel to some extent, at least as regards such general points.

Yet neither of us, I think, can really claim priority even here, nor as regards fleeting comparisons with so-called 'Crow-Omaha' systems. It was McDougal who originally worked out the Juang system, in his excellent thesis, thirty years old this year (1963). Parry introduced Crow-Omaha kinship into the question of affinal alliance in India back in 1979, clearly alluding to the system in Kangra as one with 'Crow-Omaha-type rules of exogamy' (1979: 312; the local rules are described at 221ff.) and linking such systems with 'the development of a pattern of repeated alliances between descent groups' (ibid.: 313); in other words, the people of Kangra can be said to have dispersed alliance mitigated by the clear possibility of renewal in the long term. And it is Tiemann, I would say, who deserves most credit for having worked out, now well over twenty years ago (1970), not only the nature of the four-got rule, but its implications for the dispersal of alliances in north India generally (i.e. not just among the Jat). Nor should Trautmann's extensive and able treatment of Indian affinal alliance and terminology be forgotten (1981).

I wonder if Professor Pfeffer has received as few complaints from these authorities as I have. If, by whatever chance, he has received any at all, it is certainly not my intention to add to them here. But at least these few remarks may be enough to indicate that, in putting forward a claim to precedence concerning these matters, he is simply making a mountain out of a molehill that was never entirely his to begin with.

ROBERT PARKIN

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ANTHROPOLOGY AND MISSIONARIES

Editor's note: The following comment on the recent Special Issue of JASO on ‘Anthropology and Missionaries’ (Vol. XXIII, no. 2) was solicited by the editors. Dr Bowie’s D.Phil. thesis (Bowie 1985) is one of the few in Oxford in recent years to deal centrally with missions. She is also one of the editors of a forthcoming collection of essays on women and missions (Bowie, Kirkwood and Ardener (eds.) 1993).

Studies dealing with the interaction between anthropologists and missions, as well as anthropological studies of mission, are still so scarce that any addition to the field is to be warmly welcomed. The guest editor of the recent JASO Special Issue, W. S. F. Pickering, is therefore to be thanked for putting together these articles on ‘Anthropology and Missionaries’, with his introduction. It is clear from the papers selected for publication (and it is possible that the addition of those that had unfortunately to be excluded would have strengthened this impression) that anthropological perspectives and cultures vary as much as do those of missionaries and their host societies. While, for example, Joan Burke is able to present an insider’s view of the Roman Catholic Church and the Sisters of Notre Dame in Zaire, R. H. Barnes looks at inculturation in Indonesia from the outside.

The recent discussion in mission circles of ‘inculturation’ or the cultural accommodation of Christianity to a non-Christian, usually ‘tribal’ setting has obviously spurred anthropologists to look at missions anew, and to engage with some of the theoretical and practical questions asked by missionaries themselves. One might be forgiven, however, given the papers presented here, for thinking that the debate is confined to the Roman Catholic Church. The terminology varies, but similar questions are being addressed by Protestant missiologists, as Pickering indicates in his introduction (see also, for example, Scherer and Bevans 1992; Winter and Hawthorne 1992).

The question of the extent to which the missionary can, or wants to, use anthropological information about a host society, and conversely, the value to anthropologists of ethnographic data collected by the missionary are central concerns. Stefan Dietrich’s article on Pater Schmidt is a useful exercise in clarifying some of the differences between an anthropological and a missiological perspective, particularly as the writings of such anthropological missionaries as Aylward Shorter tend to merge the two. Dietrich’s reminder that the description, study and analysis of religions began in theology, and that the social scientist is therefore using a terminology that begs a different set of assumptions (such as the distinction between ‘religion’ and ‘magic’) is worth reiterating. I also would concur with Dietrich’s conclusion that ‘anthropology cannot answer theological questions, but perhaps it can be used by theologians to help in framing well the questions—and, in consequence, the answers’. Dietrich’s article underlined for me the continuity between pre- and post-Vatican II Roman Catholic emphasis on the ‘essentials’ and ‘inessentials’ of faith. Missionaries continue to manipulate or ‘exploit’ cultural knowledge in the service of Christianity, with indigenous
Christians as frequent participants in this process. Indeed, this raises various ethical questions for the anthropologist whose cultural expertise might be tapped, questions that are dealt with in the present collection only by Joan Burke, who was invited by her subjects to undertake her study in order to enable them to become increasingly conscious agents of their own history.

The value of localized studies is demonstrated in the essays by Macdonald and Howe. Archival material, official mission documents, the memories of those involved, as well as more conventional fieldwork, are all needed in order to evaluate the relationship between missionaries and locals in specific geographical and historical situations. These tantalizingly brief glimpses might, it is hoped, inspire other anthropologists to re-evaluate their own fieldwork data, or to undertake new studies of the interaction between missions and local cultures. While, therefore, the JASO collection is to be warmly welcomed it also reminds us of how much more could be done.

Kanogo (1993) and Basu (1993) have provided two of the very few contributions to the literature from the perspective of recipients of missionary activity (although they write primarily as historians rather than as anthropologists). Moreover, societies supposedly Christianized for many centuries are under-represented in current literature, despite the fact that they often pose a continuing challenge to the missionary policy of the church (see, for instance, Skar 1993). For the Roman Catholic Church in Wales the Principality is still mission territory, with many parish priests, most of whom are Irish, being members of the missionary order of the Oblates of Mary Immaculate (OMI). These priests are more resistant to the use of the vernacular (i.e. Welsh in Welsh-speaking areas) than are OMI missionaries in Cameroon, or in many other more ‘exotic’ mission contexts. And Gaelic-speaking priests do not seem to be markedly more sympathetic to Welsh-speakers and their aspiration to worship in their native tongue than priests from English-speaking backgrounds. There is also a vast amount of potentially very valuable comparative work that could be done on Hindu, Muslim, Buddhist and Bahai missionary activity. Given that the anthropological study of missions is in its infancy, however, the JASO collection constitutes an important contribution. I sincerely hope, though, that the papers that could not be included in the JASO Special Issue will be published elsewhere and become similarly accessible.

FIONA BOWIE

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Malinowski the Photographer

In discussing some of Malinowski's Trobriand field photographs, Terence Wright (JASO, Vol. XXI, no. 1, pp. 41-58) calls attention to his 'concern with imagery' (p. 50) and his 'familiarity with the characteristics of visual expression', as well as his practice of making drawings (p. 51). In her subsequent comment, Elizabeth Edwards (JASO, Vol. XXIII, no. 1, pp. 89-91) draws attention to the lack of integration between Malinowski's photography and his fieldwork, something on which, she points out, Malinowski himself remarked (p. 91). With reference to these two aspects of Malinowski's field photography I wish to remind JASO readers of his friendship with Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz, to which long-standing readers will remember having their attention drawn by Krystyna Cech in 1981. Known to Malinowski as Staś and more generally, after his own styling, as Witkacy, Witkiewicz was a renowned dramatist, novelist, painter and, we must add, photographer, whom Malinowski had known since childhood.

In her essay, Cech (1981) argued that knowing about Malinowski's early life, his friendships, his social circle and the intellectual and cultural life in which he was involved, is essential if one wants to understand 'Malinowski the man' (especially as revealed in his diaries). I suggest that knowing in particular about Malinowski's friendship with Witkiewicz may well be essential if one wants to understand 'Malinowski the photographer'. Having no Polish I cannot explore to their full extent the sources of further information about this relationship that are available (see, for example, the references in Cech 1981; Gerould 1981; Jakimowicz 1987; and Ellen et al. (eds.) 1988). What I can do is report the bits and pieces of information that I have been able to gather and that strike me as significant.

First, photography was more than a casual interest of Witkiewicz's. He had been taking photographs—of trains, landscapes and people—since he was fourteen years old, since before he and Malinowski became friends. The Witkiewicz
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scholar Daniel Gerould claims (1981: 3 n.2) that Witkiewicz was 'an excellent photographer' and reports him taking 'many photographic portraits of himself, his father, and his friends and associates' between 1905 and 1914. It is clear that photography was an essential aspect of Witkiewicz's artistic practice. I can do no better here than quote, from the English translation of Irena Jakimowicz's account of Witkiewicz's life and art, a passage that will provide food for thought for anyone interested in understanding Malinowski's field photographs:

> When speaking about artistic experiences of young Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz one cannot fail to mention photography; its impact was both significant and many-sided. In Witkacy's hands the camera played a two-fold function: an instrument of knowledge used for documentary purposes; and also of a medium opening up new creative possibilities. The photography allowed him to compile systematically arranged collections: whether of landscapes, locomotives, or of models who sat for his drawings and paintings, often photographed in the same costumes. Even in the early period the young artist started to take pictures of scenes deliberately arranged by himself. At the same time, however, the camera lens was a tool which revealed unexpected ways of handling objects: it not only 'perceived' landscapes according to the prevailing art nouveau style, but also anticipated matters yet unknown. Sometimes, when regarding a given face, it mercilessly exposed and enlarged the texture of the skin with all its flaws; at other times, it blurred the contours of the face, covering it with an idealizing mist. Some photographs acquire unusual qualities thanks to unconventional framing, in others, the face is repeatedly photographed in different modes, as if the artist wanted to make it more and more unreal. (Jakimowicz 1987: 10-11)

Was Malinowski interested in photography before he embarked on his anthropological career? Given Witkiewicz's intense interest, it is difficult to imagine that the two of them did not discuss photography at length, as they discussed everything else, perhaps even taking photographs together as Malinowski was later to do in the Trobriands with Billy Hancock. I can only speculate, but a trawl of the available primary sources—letters, diaries (including the unpublished parts of Malinowski's own) etc.—might tell us something.

The potential importance of this relationship between anthropologist and artist for understanding Malinowski's later field photographs is strengthened by a fact that has remained largely unremarked by historians of anthropology. As Cech relates (1981: 182), Witkiewicz accompanied Malinowski on his visit to Australia in 1914 to attend, as Marett's secretary, the meetings of the British Association for the Advancement of Science. Witkiewicz's trip was arranged to get him away from Europe, where his fiancée had recently committed suicide. According to

1. Krystyna Cech, who kindly read a draft of this comment, tells me that Malinowski was often the subject of Witkiewicz's photographic experiments. Examples of such photographs are to be found, she tells me, in a book of Witkiewicz's photographs published in 1986 (see Witkiewicz 1986); see also plates 9, 10 and 11 in Ellen et al. (eds.) 1988.
other authorities, however, the plan was not just for Witkiewicz to accompany Malinowski to and around Australia, but for him also to go with Malinowski to New Guinea as draughtsman and photographer to the "expedition" (see Degler 1974: 36; Gerould 1981: 13; Wayne 1988: xvii; Kubica 1988: 99; Jerschina 1988: 141). While it is not clear from the brief accounts these authorities give how serious this plan was, it does seem that for a while at least Malinowski was expecting to have someone else make drawings and take photographs in the field.

As it happens, Witkiewicz did not accompany Malinowski on his first field trip to Mailu. On the outbreak of war, Witkiewicz returned to Europe to fight with the Tsar's forces. By doing so he lost himself a greater part in the history of anthropology (our loss, not his, no doubt), but perhaps ensured Malinowski a greater place than he might have achieved if he had not carried out his first fieldwork 'alone'. It is remarkable, though, how the very fact that Witkiewicz was with Malinowski in Australia and was planning to go with him to New Guinea has been omitted from accounts of Malinowski's early researches. Even the published edition of Malinowski's diary explains who Staś is, but without mentioning his presence in Australia (see Malinowski 1967: n. 3), while Michael Young's (1988) authoritative account of Malinowski's first field researches does not mention Witkiewicz at all.

To return to the photographs. Given even the little extra information we now have, would it be too much to see Malinowski's 'visual sophistication', on which Wright comments, as a product, in part at least, of his friendship with Witkiewicz? And might the lack of integration between Malinowski's photography and his fieldwork, on which Edwards comments, be at least partly explicable as a result of his having to take on a task that he thought his friend Witkiewicz was going to undertake? Furthermore, if Malinowski did, as Wright elsewhere (1992: 21) suggests, 'evolve an exploratory use of the camera in the field' might not this owe something to the photographic experiments of his friend Witkiewicz?

Any influence that Witkiewicz had on Malinowski's field photography would presumably have been at its greatest at the time of Malinowski's first field trip to Mailu in 1914-15, while the remarks of both Wright and Edwards are directed towards Malinowski's later Trobriand photographs of 1918 or thereabouts. But there is no reason to suppose that Witkiewicz's influence would have waned completely by the time of Malinowski's Trobriand researches. Moreover, any attempt to understand Malinowski's Trobriand photographs would surely benefit from comparing them with his earlier, Mailu, photographs, while any attempt to understand the latter would have to take into account Malinowski's experience of photography before he first went to the field. Any complete account of Malinowski's field photography, therefore, will have to take into account his friendship with Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz.

JEREMY COOTE
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USEFUL ARTS: ARTFUL UTENSILS

STEPHEN HUGH-JONES


The new temporary exhibition at the Pitt Rivers Museum and the accompanying catalogue together make a sustained and largely successful effort to rescue baskets from the twilight of evolutionary and taxonomic ethnology, to recognize their aesthetic significance, and to give some recognition to the lives and values of the people who made, and still continue to make, them.

In the artistic stakes, pots definitely have the edge over baskets—find me a basket in a decent art gallery, name me a Bernard Leach or a Josiah Wedgwood in the world of baskets! Like sluggish tortoises, overtaken by ceramics, textiles, paintings and sculptures in the race towards high culture, baskets seem to have balked at the very first hurdle, the division between arts and crafts. Dry carapaces whose regular forms and geometric patterns bear silent witness to past life, they were picked up and placed in ethnological museums ruled by the strict taxonomic regimes of type, technique and provenance, or played second fiddle to tribal masks in galleries of ‘primitive art’. As head of the anthropology department at Cambridge, Jack Goody used to talk of ‘basket weavers’ as a shorthand for museum curators lacking in anthropological expertise—for him baskets seemed to epitomize everything that he felt was wrong about museums and material culture.
Stephen Hugh-Jones

Heirs of a pre-ceramic technology, light, strong, functional and flexible but also ephemeral and easily replaced, baskets have not fared well on the road to modernity either. The carefully woven fabric of each basket incorporates many hidden hours spent on learning skills and on fetching and preparing materials—the catalogue makes clear the impact of environmental degradation on the availability of materials for basketry and the sometimes extraordinary lengths that contemporary Native Americans go to obtain them. Made by poorly remunerated peasants or Indians whose time is not money, baskets were rapidly displaced by plastic and metal alternatives, both cheaper to make and tokens of a new identity. The fate of many a basket is summed up by a Yavapai Indian from Arizona in a quotation displayed in one of the exhibition cases: ‘Her father sold it 'cos Rena going to school, and after that maybe she marry a whiteman, don’t live like Indian, don’t want basket.’ The ‘best’ of these unwanted baskets found their way to museums and galleries, the rest were forgotten.

Squeezed into a relatively small area, the main exhibition is divided by region, but other cases cover prehistoric basketmakers, the different techniques and uses of basketry, the way increasing commercialization has transformed basketry form and function, and the lives and products of contemporary Native American basketmakers. Uncluttered by excessive commentary, the cases allow the pieces to stand for themselves as objects of beauty, displays of technique, and as ingenious solutions to practical problems in a workaday world. Some excellent and informative photographs taken by historical and contemporary collectors provide information about materials, settings and contexts and serve to restore the objects to the hands and faces of their makers.

The catalogue is lavishly illustrated, its ten colour plates highlighting the role of colour in pattern and design and illustrating both the subtle tones of natural materials and vegetable dyes and the possibilities opened up by the use of chemical substitutes. The catalogue’s divisions follow those of the exhibition but its text provides several further dimensions that add greatly to the appreciation of the objects displayed. After an introductory essay on the museum’s basketry collections and collectors and a clear summary of different basketry techniques, regional specialists ‘from Alaska to Tierra del Fuego’ provide succinct accounts of local variations in construction technique, form, function and basketry design in archaeological, historical and traditional contexts. In their different ways, however, the essays go well beyond the concerns of technology and tradition to provide accounts of the cultures and histories of both basketmakers and basket collectors and to examine the changing status of native basketry as part of the colonial encounter. What comes across especially interestingly, both in some of these accounts (notably that by Ann McMullen) and also at a material level in the exhibits themselves, is the way in which Native American basketry has been transformed through time.

Though basketry has always been an item of exchange and trade, in all the cases considered here, baskets were once largely produced for internal consumption within ‘tribal’ groups made up of people who lead lives that depended, to a greater
or lesser extent, on their use and who held a distinctive set of ideas and values in common as part of their own identity. In Amazonia this still largely applies, but elsewhere basketmakers have responded through time to a number of selective pressures that have altered radically both what they produce and the way their craft and its products are evaluated. These pressures involve not only the introduction of new techniques, materials and uses, and the displacement of baskets by new, alternative technologies, but also the increasing targeting of baskets to an external market made up of both users and collectors whose demands for 'authentic Indian basketry' have transformed quite radically the objects themselves. The wonderfully kitsch Passamaquoddy ash-splint strawberry basket made by Clara Keezer is but an extreme example of selective pressures leading towards miniaturization and decorative elaboration. The juxtaposition of the contemporary and the traditional and the exploration of the links between them are welcome and important features of an exhibition that places objects firmly in the context of the lives of the peoples who make them.

For many Native American groups, basketry is one of their most important and significant vehicles of aesthetic expression, a point that is clear from the displays and that is explored in Howard Morphy's stimulating concluding essay (a revised version of which appeared in *JASO* (Vol. XXIII, no. 1, pp. 1-16)). Rather than being set aside as 'art', baskets are firmly anchored in practice and practicalities—baskets are as beautiful as they are well made, serve useful ends and are integrated into culturally meaningful activities. The cases display an astonishing array of different basketry forms, each relating to a specific function—not just picking, carrying, harvesting, winnowing, sieving, straining, storing, but also carrying water and serving food and drink. There are also mats and cages, fire-fans, traps and toys, and even baskets for dancing and getting married with.

As hats, bindings and belts and as the support for feather head-dresses, basketry also figures as part of bodily aesthetics. This connection between bodies and baskets is not entirely fortuitous. Many Native Americans began their lives in the basketry cradles that Colombian peasants refer to as 'un moisés' ('a Moses'): a free-standing Yurok cradle complete with movable sunshade is a *chef d'oeuvre* of the exhibition—and baskets have served as coffins too. For the Trio and other Indians of lowland South America, human bodies are animated baskets and thus share the same repertoire of painted designs. As one exhibition case reveals, an informed reading can translate the intricate designs on Hopi ceremonial basketry plaques into the powers and attributes of Kachina spirits that are represented in the costumes of dancers. The Californian Pomo decorated their baskets with beads and coloured feathers in the manner of human bodies; given away as gifts and burned at funerals, these valuables inspired many copies that were sold in the expanding market for Indian arts.

Drawing on David Guss's exploration (Guss 1992) of the cultural significance of basketry for the Venezuelan Yekuana, Morphy argues that an appreciation of alien aesthetic traditions may allow us to see objects through eyes that can appreciate the meanings and values that lie behind form and function. The
problems here are those of scale. Guss deals with a culture at one moment of time while the exhibition deals with a continent and a long pre- and post-colonial history; Guss's weaving includes houses, the cases contain more collectable basketry. The exhibition faces up to these difficulties honestly: as the catalogue makes clear, museum collections are usually products of the whims, fancies, prejudices and logistical constraints of assorted collectors, and not usually representative samples of the objects produced by any given culture. But such difficulties severely constrain our capacity to appreciate other aesthetics at a glance. To go further requires extensive research—the catalogue contains an excellent bibliography.

REFERENCE


The main purpose of this collection is to overturn the usual unthinking assumption that human beings are naturally aggressive by focusing on a group of ‘peaceful’ societies and arguing instead for sociality as the key human condition. In addition to the editors’ introduction there are eight ethnographic papers, plus two on the development of sociality (in human beings and in human society respectively), and two on the theoretical problems of defining peace as a category and of identifying peaceful societies.

The editors and contributors are understandably opposed to the work of most biologists and psychologists, whose only resource in arguing for the innateness of human aggression is observation, not merely of human but of animal behaviour, analogies being drawn from the latter to the former. One problem with the analogizing approach has always been that animal societies are coterminous with the whole species, whereas human ones subdivide it—hence the inevitability of a degree of cultural variation, in attitudes to aggression as in everything else. Another is that only observed behaviour is recoverable for animal societies, yet it is wholly inadequate in understanding human ones. The editors quite rightly insist, therefore, that the focus should be on ‘humans as meaning-makers, rather than humans as biological primates’ (Howell, p. vii), in order to get beyond the idea of aggression as simple motor response. This leads to a stress on personhood, on ‘what it means to be a human being’ (ibid.), something which the new anthropology has made particularly its own.

Various authors occasionally recognize (Howell and Willis, p. 5; Howell, p. 58; Carrithers, Heelas, passim) that to regard peace as inherent in human nature may be as dogmatic as the traditional focus in some quarters on aggression. But in general, the dangers of over-correction are ignored in the rush to get across the point that ‘sociality, not aggression, is the key human trait’ (the title of Carrithers’ very programmatic paper). Actually, this does not say very much that is new, given that Carrithers defines sociality simply as the individual’s ‘capacity for complex social behaviour’ (p. 197): such has long been recognized, and not only in anthropology, as the basic human attribute, and is essentially what anthropology is all about. In practice, there is a tendency throughout the book to inflate this definition to mean social co-operation and the avoidance of conflict and of aggressive acts, even feelings. And here we hit a snag, for the continual implication that aggression and co-operation are somehow mutually exclusive can hardly be sustained.

For a start, it neglects the many examples of feud, or of conflict between affinal alliance partners, within what are clearly single ethnicities (cf. Leach’s observation, in Political Systems of Highland Burma (p. 153), that ‘to the Kachin...
way of thinking, co-operation and hostility are not very different’ or the Mae Enga
dictum recorded by Meggitt, in The Lineage System of the Mae Enga of New
Guinea (p. 101), that ‘we marry the people we fight’). In other words, sustained
conflict requires, and achieves, the co-operation of opponents reacting in like
manner rather than turning the other cheek. Secondly, while it may be true, as the
editors say (p. 4), that some aspects of, especially modern, warfare need not entail
aggressive feelings, all warfare demands a degree of co-operation between
participants. Modern armies, for all their stress on cold efficiency in killing an
often unseen, unheard enemy, are like mini-societies and are among the most
highly ritualized institutions of modern life, using ritual to enforce both discipline
and purpose. Tactics involving the closer combat associated with more traditional
forms of warfare also habitually require at least the encouragement and excitation
of aggressive feelings towards the enemy, even though these are commonly bound
up with the cultivation and expression of stereotypical grievances, be they political,
mystical or material in content. Finally, even if war were waged totally dis­
passionately, what of the passions commonly involved in insurrection and riot—the
intifada, say, or the activities of Class War? The basic problem is that knowledge
of exactly what inner states another person is feeling is notoriously difficult to
uncover, especially in collective activities subject to cultural expectations, and this
applies to aggression and its absence as much as to anything else. Aggression may
be a socially constructed act, not a biological or psychological necessity; the act
of defining it may be subject to Western ethnocentrism; and it may be absent from
the values of a good many societies. But it is just as surely present in others, and
may at times, or permanently, be their dominant structuring value.

By no means everything in the collection calls forth the urge to criticize.
Robarchek reminds us that avoidance of conflict need not entail absolute passivity,
but may engender passive resistance instead. From Gibson and Overing we learn
that eating may be regarded as a violent act, especially if, as is true of the Piaroa,
eating is necessarily cannibalistic (here, game is of one nature with humanity).
With Howell and Overing we remember that not all societies have institutionalized
sanctions against wrongful behaviour, as traditional Durkheimian orthodoxy
teaches—a corrective against any image of society as a bunch of fractious
individuals straining at the leash of social constraint. Both Chewong and Piaroa
actively value peaceful co-operation, and the latter, at least, regard it as a goal to
be striven for constantly, not a given whose presence can always be relied upon.
Less happy is the editors’ more generalized correlation between peaceability and
equality (p. 24; here, gender equality in particular). Away from such societies as
the Chewong and Fipa the matter is not so clear—the various ‘peaces’ of Rome,
the British Empire and the Soviet Union, for example, have been peaces estab­
lished by the one-sided force of a paramount ethnicity, and not characterized by
equality of treatment for all, even at the ethnic level, let alone between genders.

Certainly, as regards human peace and aggression, innateness would not seem
to enter the matter at all. While animals are simply predatory, acting with purpose
but without meaning in the anthropological sense, only humans seem to be capable
of both lethal intra-species violence and the outright valuation of peace above the satisfaction of other conceivable interests. Both qualities, as well as all points along the continuum that links them, require the conscious and collective construction of meaning, which will differ from one society to another. The present collection emphasizes this process of construction as regards peace, but despite the cautions expressed by Campbell and Heelas at the end, few of its contributors seem to find the categories of peace and co-operation themselves at all problematic, nor the assumption of their necessary association. This marks the essential difference between this collection and David Riches’ earlier and complementary volume, *The Anthropology of Violence* (Oxford, 1986), which achieved a greater degree of balance in seeing not merely violence but images of what constitutes violence as culturally constructed: arguing away the innateness of aggression does not deprive it of conventionality. To take it so much for granted that all humanity shares a single view of what peace actually is, or that it values co-operation in exactly the same ways, merely displays a naivety sharply at odds with the sophistication most of these contributors have demonstrated elsewhere.

ROBERT PARKIN


This book presents the corpus of data of Dillon’s 1973 thesis and uses it to discuss the conditions for the maintenance of an acephalous polity. The Meta’ are an acephalous group to the west of the kingdoms of the Bamenda Plateau. They are part of the regional system of the Cameroon Grassfields whose dynamics has been analysed by Dillon’s fellow student at Pennsylvania, J.-P. Warnier (*Échanges, développement et hiérarchies dans le Bamenda pré-colonial (Cameroun)*, (Wiesbaden, 1985)). Chapter 3 comprises a good introduction to the Grassfields and to Warnier’s regional analysis. One reservation, however, is that the concentration on the southern end of the Grassfields has led to the elision of the problematic Tikar influence of the north-western chiefdoms. This is unsurprising since the Meta’ are found in the south of the grassfields, but to mention the Chamba but not the Tikar creates an imbalance in the discussion. Hence the summary cannot be wholeheartedly recommended as an introduction to the subject.

Dillon presents a reconstruction of the Meta’ polity at the end of the nineteenth century before German influence was felt. Having described the economic system and the importance of patrilineal descent, Dillon gives an account of the ideal model of village-level leadership. This model was elicited through interviews with old men during fieldwork. He continues to describe some actual cases mentioned
by the interviewees, since these show how the ideal model worked in practice. Individuals may strive for power and seek to expand their influence. The distributed set of rights and powers meant that expansion had to be at the expense of others in a similar position in the lineage structure. At base, quarrels could be resolved by a recourse to force, but any fighting quickly triggered the most powerful conflict resolution processes, which rested on supernatural backing.

To call Meta' acephalous is not to say that they lacked chiefs. Dillon explains how village chiefs were powerful and respected but retained their power and respect only as long as they did not 'rule' or 'bear down' upon their subjects. They were foremost among a group of notables and could neither address the people directly nor act in their own right. Any attempts to do so would reduce the powers of other notables and hence be resisted by them. Since the notables spoke for and acted on behalf of the chief, he was rendered powerless to expand by the very powers vested in him. Dillon argues for a model of acephalous societies that combines Robin Horton's historicism with the results of the analysis of conflict resolution. Conflict may lead to fission unless balanced by such centripetal forces as the control of economics in the chiefdoms.

The Meta' were both producers of palm oil and important traders in oil, transferring it from the regions to their west to the kingdoms of the Bamenda Plateau. Trade, and its maintenance, was the major economic constraint on political structure and process in the late nineteenth century. First of all, the main commodity trade was a staple not a rare luxury good (such as iron, bronze or slaves), so that much of the population participated rather than a few specialist traders. Secondly, the need to keep trade routes open led to the strict control of slavery. It was a last resort to remove trouble-makers, or witches, and could only be undertaken after consultation with the senior kin of the person concerned. Attempts to circumvent this led to violence, the kin group of the enslaved person would defend them. Moreover, incursions from neighbouring groups led to defensive coalitions, which form the basis for the sense of unity of all Meta'. The only other arena for the unified polity was the ritual treatment of homicide. Power was held by the heads of patrilineal groups, which were usually co-resident. The dissemination of various ritual and political offices among the different lineage heads was the main force counterbalancing the centralizing tendency of a chief eager for power.

A major omission is that there is no discussion of the role of women. This probably reflects current interests at the period of fieldwork (1970). Granted that women's political action has been documented both to the north and to the south of Meta', one wonders what means Meta' women had of countering insult and other forms of oppression.

One of the puzzles left unresolved is that posed by Meta' witchcraft. The section that discusses it (pp. 185-91) describes Meta' witchcraft as occurring only between kin motivated by spite or jealousy, or by those who felt slighted, for example, by not receiving their due share of bridewealth. If divination diagnosed a case of witchcraft, then oaths could be taken and as a final resort the accused
person could be either executed or sold as a slave. This account sits uneasily with an earlier passage describing the rites to close a village to sorcery, which appears to enter from outside the polity. The relationship of sorcery, *sa*, to witchcraft, *izik*, is not discussed.

DAVID ZEITLYN


Brunton begins his analysis with a reconsideration of Rivers’s original diffusionist explanation for the scattered geographical distribution of contemporary kava use. Rivers had suggested that the arrival of a different cultural group (the betel people) with their easier-to-prepare intoxicant was the primary cause of the decline and eventual abandonment of kava in various Oceanic societies. Kava is found in various parts of Melanesia (including New Guinea, New Britain, New Ireland, the Solomon Islands, Fiji and Vanuatu), throughout Polynesia (except for Easter Island, New Zealand, the Chatham Islands and Rapa), and scarcely at all in Micronesia. Brunton considers three possible explanations for the fact that kava-drinking regions are interrupted by groups of non-consumers: (1) that there were never direct links between regions and that the psychoactive nature of kava was discovered independently in each area; (2) that there were direct links in trade or a migration occurred—in either case the plant and/or knowledge of its preparation were transmitted; and (3) that such links were indirect and that intermediary populations abandoned the use of the plant prior to European contact. On the basis of botanical, linguistic, ethnological and (rather scanty) archaeological evidence the author concludes that the third explanation is almost certainly correct. Having established this he proceeds to refute Rivers’s kava-people and betel-people theory partly on the grounds that the supposed exclusivity of the practices is contradicted by twentieth-century ethnographic reports. Arbitrary characteristics of kava drinking that recur in diverse regions are used to show how the complex diffused, for such factors cannot be adequately explained away by geographical and biophysiological restraints. Many of these characteristics (for example, preparation in the particular form of a drink, the belief that kava-related material culture should be kept from contact with the ground, and origin myths concerning the plant) link it with religion and ritual activity.

The significance of this is elaborated with data from Brunton’s fieldwork in Vanuatu (New Hebrides), mainly on the island of Tanna, during the 1970s. With the effects of contact with Christianity and the subsequent secularization and
profanation of kava drinking came problems of excessive use on the one hand and a religious reaction on the other. The latter, at least in certain parts of Tanna, resulted in revelations ordering its suppression in social and religious life. How far these findings from Vanuatu hold true for Melanesia in general is unclear. To be fair, the author does not overstate the possibilities of such comparison. The well-known themes of Melanesian cultural obsolescence and susceptibility to acculturation are seen by Brunton as significant in the region even prior to pacification and missionization. This is put forward as the key factor in the abandonment of kava in various areas of Melanesia. Kava usage in Polynesia is seen as more stable because the legitimization of authority is not a significant problem there. Clearly, this is a more satisfying overall explanation than Rivers’s, although Brunton does see betel-chewing as a factor in kava’s decline.

The book augments Brunton’s 1989 Man article ‘Cultural Instability in Egalitarian Societies’ with its in-depth treatment of the Melanesian manifestations of this trait. The accompanying tables of kava cognates with additional commentaries make for a rather abstruse part of the book, yet its rigour—including a database of 460 Papuan and Oceanic Austronesian languages—compensates for this disruption in what is otherwise a flowing text. The illustrations are disappointing in that neither the plant itself (Piper methysticum) nor any of the attendant material culture are featured. The two plates showing Tannese ritual are of poor quality. The lack of emphasis on material culture is also reflected in the text itself, though this is a common omission in modern anthropological writing. Despite these reservations the book is valuable, both in tackling the Melanesian problem of cultural instability from a novel perspective and in providing a study of intoxicant use for those of us interested in the wider comparative aspects.

RICHARD RUDGLEY


This smartly produced book, evidently the author’s doctoral thesis, would probably never have been published in this form in the USA, but would rather have circulated in microfiche or microfiche photocopy. This would have been a pity. It is written in a simple and refreshingly unpretentious style. In spite of a few repetitious passages and its uncritical summaries of what Sanskritists and Tibetologists have said, on the basis of texts, about the position of women in Buddhism, it is the first work on an interesting and very worthwhile subject. It should interest specialists on Tibet, on Buddhism and in women’s studies.
Havnevik’s research, based in one of two Tibetan Buddhist nunneries established in exile in India, was carried out in English over a relatively short period. No doubt an anthropologist working in the vernacular would have produced data of greater depth and subtlety. None the less, Havnevik does provide some new and interesting information, thereby demonstrating that it is just as important to ask the right questions as it is to ask them in the local language. Since she names informants and quotes their words at length, others will be able to use and build on her work. Two small examples may be mentioned here. Evidently, lay Tibetans believe nuns particularly appropriate as performers of the worship of the goddess Tara; in fact the Tilokpur nuns derive most of their income from such Tara rituals sponsored by the laity. Secondly, nuns who are rumoured to be having an affair with their lama are treated with great respect by Tantric practitioners as embodying the highest female wisdom. This is in accord with Tantric ideology, but one would never learn this from better-known authors, whether Tibetologists or anthropologists, who tend to write as if the values of celibacy and chastity are unequivocally upheld and never challenged within Tibetan Buddhism.

Havnevik is much more interested in the question of the nuns’ ‘secondary’ status as women and nuns. Much space is devoted to the question of how they can overcome this, and to the question of whether only women who are in some sense failures in lay life become nuns. There is no doubt where the author’s sympathies lie on these questions. Occasionally, one may convict her of anthropological naivety. For example, she comments on the disapproval Tibetans generally feel for certain nuns of Western origin who wear the monk’s yellow vest: ‘It seems to be a classic cultural impasse created by lack of communication on both sides’ (p. 204). The well-meaning assumption that more communication would resolve the issue could easily be turned on its head. However, Havnevik very plausibly identifies a vicious circle in which Tibetan nuns are caught. Because they are not respected as much as monks they receive few invitations to rituals; thus they receive few donations; thus they can rarely afford to invite high lamas to give the teachings that would command respect; and so they are not respected, because they are relatively unlearned; and so on. She also notes, however, that even if nuns do acquire some of the formal qualifications of the monks (that is, through study and spiritual retreats) they will probably still have secondary status, this being a reflection of women’s lower status in Tibetan society as a whole.

DAVID N. GELLNER
Ethnographic work on Nahuatl-speaking populations has accelerated extraordinarily in the past twenty-five years. When reviewing the state of scholarship on Mexico's indigenous population in 1967 Ralph Beals noted: 'for great areas occupied by the largest language group in Mexico, the Nahuatl speakers, we have absolutely nothing beyond a few casual observations, if even that'. Knowledge was restricted to the area around Mexico City, and even then one could only count Oscar Lewis's studies of Tepoztlan, William Madsen’s on Milpa Alta and José de Jesus Montoya Briones’s monograph on Atla.

John Ingham's *Mary, Michael and Lucifer* marks a major development in modern Nahuatl studies. More than any previous monograph on the area, Ingham's new work combines historical and structural insights concerning the problems of syncretism and acculturation in an elegant analysis that benefits from more than twenty years of fieldwork experience. His long-term commitment to Tlayacapan has given rise to rare and authoritative insights into the metaphysical constitution of the body, into ideas about conception and sickness, and into the relationship between these and indigenous views of the morally constituted community.

Ingham distinguishes between structural and semantic levels of enquiry. While tracing changes in the meaning the community gives to the world, as a result of nearly 500 years of post-contact history, he nevertheless notes the persistent social classifications inherited from pre-Hispanic times that continue to structure ideology and social organization. In his interpretation, sixteenth-century Catholicism not only encouraged the recognition of similarities between the saints and pre-Hispanic deities as a matter of expediency, but also assimilated a considerable part of the older structure on which belief and social organization were based. Indigenous conceptions of space, time and the relations between ethical categories have remained remarkably persistent.

After the Conquest, the Spanish reorganization of the community substituted barrios in place of the old *calpulli*, transforming their leaders into *mayordomos* who retained responsibility for religious celebrations and administrative matters. Ingham’s older collaborators recall the town being divided into twenty-eight barrios, each with its own chapel and local saint that had been substituted for a pre-Hispanic deity. Although the town is left with only thirteen barrios and seven functioning chapels, on some ritual and social occasions the town still acts as four principal barrios, thus recalling the pre-Hispanic pattern where each *calpulli* was organized within four larger wards.

Spanish pragmatism also permitted Tlayacapan to retain a modified form of the pre-Hispanic *Tonalpohualli*, or calendar, which instead of structuring the ceremonies of various Aztec deities now organized those of the Catholic saints who were attributed similar powers and jurisdictions. Barrios were left the
responsibility to organize, in the main, agricultural and life-stage festivals, while the large Christian feasts, fairs and carnivals were organized at the village level.

Tlayacapan family relations and spiritual kinship may bear less pre-Hispanic influence than is found in other domains of the local culture. The family is structured on an ambiguous metaphor of the Holy Family. When a woman is nursing and sexually continent, she is compared to the Virgin Mary, while the man when dutiful and self-denying, parallels the role of St Joseph. Nevertheless, male and female sexual roles and men’s behaviour in masculine groups lead to other aspects of life being compared to the relations between Adam and Eve. Ritual kinship is interpreted as a way of domesticating adverse behaviour that strays from the ideal roles represented by the Holy Family. Godparents are assigned at baptism, when a child is spiritually regenerated (after his conception through sinful sexual intercourse) and incorporated into the body of the church. The ritual of baptism and blessing purifies the child and introduces it into the spiritual community whose members organize and participate in Christian ceremonies and fiestas that closely associate them with the Holy Family and the saints. Although Ingham does not argue that metaphorical linkages between human and divine families may themselves be based on pre-Hispanic antecedents, evidence from the Huichol and Mayo suggests that this may be a more general characteristic of Uto-Aztecan classifications. As in other parts of Latin America, people who are not part of the moral community are identified with the Devil and seen as opposed to it. The different manifestations of demonic power, La Llorona, the Culebra de Aqua and Lucifer, are seen as derived from the evil pre-Hispanic deities, Chihuacoatl, Quetzalcoatl and Tezcatlipoca, suggesting that Christian ethics have wholly substituted more ambiguous pre-Hispanic categories, which probably did not distinguish absolute categories of good and evil. While Tlayacapan conceptual classifications illustrate a high degree of structural coherence, Ingham emphasizes the role of pragmatism in the choosing and manipulation of categories in everyday life, thereby acknowledging the historical dimension of the community’s existence.

ANTHONY SHELTON


Tzintzuntzan, a mixed Indian/Mestizo municipality on the shores of Lake Patzcuaro, Mexico, is one of the country’s few communities to have received intensive long-term anthropological attention, in this case extending over forty years. Brandes’s account of the dynamics and pragmatics governing the community’s religious celebrations draws upon earlier studies by George Foster
and others, to provide a historical description of the organization of fiestas and an interpretation of their changing importance for the community’s identity and cohesion. As Tzintzuntzan has become increasingly incorporated into the Mexican state, communal celebrations have declined while those that survived have become more elaborate. Surviving communally based ceremonies were refinanced to spread the burden from a few individual sponsors to larger segments of the community, thereby shifting the potential for competitiveness from individuals and families to wider, though still internal, community divisions. However, family celebrations centred around baptisms, weddings and funerals have also become more lavish, providing a new arena for competitively displaying both wealth and personal qualities.

Brandes challenges common assumptions about the timeless and intransmutable character of religious celebrations. In Tzintzuntzan, the church played an important role in reforming and reorganizing the fiesta system. During the 1930s and 1940s, the number of official positions for religious sponsors (cargos) was much reduced and the means of financing celebrations reformed. Some episodes that the church or civil authorities deemed unsuitable were discontinued while others were elaborated. Particularly noteworthy is the community’s adoption of a very elaborate ‘Night of the Dead’ celebration, encouraged and marketed by state and church agencies to bring more tourism to the town. The decidedly low-key celebrations described by Foster before the 1970s contrast markedly with later events, which have assumed many of the attributes of the more elaborate expressions found elsewhere in Mexico. Furthermore, although 90 per cent of the population of Tzintzuntzan is Mestizo, the community has come to identify itself strongly with a ceremony that has strong indigenous roots and has contested the authority of the local church to simplify it. Even the relative importance of one celebration to another can change. For example, the celebration of the miraculous image of El Señor del Rescate assumed greater importance than that of the feast day of the town’s patron saint, after the former was credited with saving the town from a smallpox epidemic in the late nineteenth century.

Not only does Brandes describe the fiesta system as an open institution subject to different internal and external exigencies, but, he argues, the competition and mediation of these diverse influences provides a rich medium for examining the power relations between different groups. Brandes offers a functional explanation for the fiesta system, arguing that it provides a means of reiterating the ideal parameters of socially sanctioned behaviour that are contrasted with their antithesis: a world of disorder, evil, ill-health and, ultimately, death. The fear in which villagers hold evil constrains their everyday behaviour.

Studies of such communities as Tzintzuntzan, where the working of social forces has been well documented over a protracted period, provide examples of how the effects of the indigenous encounter with the modern world might be better appreciated and of how the mechanisms underlying incorporation, rejection or partial assimilation might be explained and more general models of change devised. They may also eventually be able to help us explain changes in the
consciousness of identity, away from village or insular affiliation towards acceptance of a wider national identity. Brandes's work is an important contribution to the history and ethnography of Tzintzuntzan in particular, while providing a timely corrective to some widespread and false assumptions about Mexican fiestas in general.

ANTHONY SHELTON


Waterman's study of Jùjú, based on fieldwork conducted between 1979 and 1982, is a big book for its 242 pages. Each paragraph is saturated with description and argument, his summaries of anthropological and ethnomusicological theory are studies in precision, and he possesses a descriptive and analytical style, often dryly humorous, that cuts to the quick.

The text consists of two quite distinct halves. The first is a history of Jùjú that situates documentary sources and oral accounts in the wider history of West Africa's political and economic transformation. Lagos itself was a complex urban environment before colonization. Its distinct class and ethnic make-up in the early twentieth century structured the emergence of a proliferation of popular genres: the Brass Bands, Highlife, European popular and classical genres favoured by the 'Black Europeans', Brazilian popular musics adapted by returnee Yoruba slaves, and Christian church and north Nigerian Muslim styles. Rural-urban migration began to transform Lagos in the 1920s and '30s, and guitar-based 'Palmwine' music, which emerged in new migrant recreational contexts in the city, began to bring together diffuse stylistic currents, named Jùjú, in 1932. During and immediately after the Second World War, musical entertainment in the 'hotels' (bars-cum-brothels) of Lagos, and the emergence of new Nigerian élites provided patronage and performance contexts for Jùjú musicians. Waterman describes how the genre was subsequently transformed by the technologization of instruments (allowing for the expansion of the bands to incorporate electric guitars, talking drums and vocal choruses), and its involvement with foreign recording companies and the Nigerian media.

Ethnomusicologists have often talked in a simplistic fashion about the socio-economic context of music. Waterman points out that this not only reifies music as an irreducible object or essence, but it also ignores the fact that music is itself a context in which other things can happen. The second half of the book, an ethnography of musicians in Ibadan, examines this assertion. Jùjú is an
essential component of āryād rituals, neo-traditional events that celebrate births, deaths, weddings, namings and business launches. The ability of musicians to sustain the spatio-temporal ‘textures’ of the āryād is critical to the success or failure of the event, in which statuses and identities are transacted and negotiated through competitive ‘spraying’ (covering musicians and hosts with bank notes) and dancing. The aesthetic vocabularies and performance techniques that make Jùjú time ‘roll’ are complex, but Waterman’s own experience as an evidently accomplished Jùjú bassist is a fascinating key to his discussion of Jùjú aesthetics and techniques.

Musicians in Ibadan today are entrepreneurs, obsessed with technological modernization, the creation of new genres, and the crossing of religious and ethnic boundaries. Their role in successful āryād celebrations is vital to the social mobility of Nigerian entrepreneurial élites. Since the establishment of electoral politics in Nigeria, these élites have made intensive use of Jùjú musicians in their creation of clientage networks. Consequently, successful bands are highly dependent upon them for patronage—kitting out a nine-piece Jùjú band is an expensive business. It is not surprising that Waterman concludes that Jùjú performance encodes and perpetuates the values of this élite. Jùjú bands provide a model of a hierarchically organized whole, consisting at each level of interlocking instrumental textures united by a leader/soloist. This, Waterman argues, provides an apt metaphor of the unified heterogeneity of an idealized Nigeria: a hierarchical society whose inequalities are mitigated by the generosity of the rich and possibilities of social advancement for the poor. This is endorsed through the rags-to-riches mythologies of the ‘commanders’, ‘kings’ and ‘admirals’ of Jùjú, which obfuscate processes of class stratification in Nigeria’s oil-boom economy. Waterman’s final statement is, however, one of an ambiguity that lies at the heart of any performance, for musicians are indeed engaged in the hegemonic reproduction of dominant values, but at the same time their performance ‘preserves as well as conceals alternative readings’. Music can transform as well as reproduce.

The question is how. Waterman is less convincing here. Partly this is due to the fact that his study is essentially an ethnography of Jùjú musicians. Seeing Jùjú from this angle has the evident advantage of Waterman’s insider experience, and any ethnography is bound to select certain angles and perspectives at the expense of others. This approach, however, is inclined to under-represent the way in which the music is experienced by its fans, most of whom are the urban dispossessed, and (since band members are all men) the ways in which gender must affect the experience of Jùjú. ‘Listening’ is itself a performed event in which alternative readings are always possible. A phenomenology of fanship, for example, might have provided a view of how different popular genres (such as Muslim Nigerian Fuji) are seen in relation to one another, and the hopes and fantasies embodied by particular musicians. An account of how women experience Jùjú might have provided a means of assessing the socially transforming potential of a music that seems firmly embedded in male sexual ideology.
Waterman’s description of the way in which popular musicians shape notions of power and identity fills many gaps in the anthropological and ethnomusicological literature. The idea of a detailed ethnography of a popular genre itself breaks new ground. It will also be of value outside anthropology and ethnomusicology, in that variety of disciplines that share an interest in, and a stake in defining, ‘the popular’.

MARTIN STOKES


Constructing Knowledge is a collection of papers delivered at the conference on critical anthropology sponsored by and held at the Department of Cultural Anthropology, University of Amsterdam, in December 1988. Generally, the papers address the present situation of uncertainty in anthropology, which some have labelled the ‘crisis in anthropology’. They deal with such issues as anthropological authority, the identity of the anthropologist in the field, feminist critique, grand theory, cultural relativism and ethnocentrism. In other words, they address the problems created by anthropologists’ endeavours to acquire systematic knowledge of ‘other’ people.

One of the better papers is the editors’ introduction. Instead of the standard synopsis of each paper they have opted to contextualize them by providing a brief history of critical anthropology that could easily be extended into a book. Beginning with Malinowski’s critique of science their narrative progresses through anthropologists’ use of Thomas Kuhn’s idea of paradigm shift to attack anthropology’s scientific presumptions, to the founding of the critical anthropology movement with the publication of Dell Hymes’s Reinventing Anthropology (1974). They continue with a comparison of Marxist and feminist critiques and end their history with the critique of ethnography and the breakdown of anthropological authority in the 1980s. Their thesis is that postmodernist thought, with its tendency to undermine efforts at legitimation of the scientific project (i.e. anthropology’s crisis) is the product of a history of critical reflection. In other words, it is critical anthropology itself that has caused the crisis in anthropology.

In an interesting essay entitled ‘Anthropological Doubt’, Tom Lemaire deals with the contradiction at the heart of anthropology: it is a science rooted in a particular culture that claims to be universal in scope. He argues that fieldwork exposes one’s habits, ideas, concepts and values to other societies, and that in order to understand these alien categories one must entertain doubts about the
validity of one’s own categories. Self-criticism allows one to perceive or contemplate the existence of an alternative. In other words, for anthropology to be possible it must necessarily be self-critical. In a rambling essay drawing on his experience with Latin American and African peasants Gerrit Huizer asks ‘whether anthropology in crisis can learn from the way “men and women in crisis” [i.e. peasants] deal with crisis’ (p. 41). Peasants deal with it by understanding the causes of their situation and by a continuous spiritual revitalization. Unfortunately, it is the latter that Huizer stresses. Robert Pool presents the text of a fieldwork interview as the basis for some critical remarks about ethnographic representation. The author ‘participates’ in the interview as an observer, the interview itself being conducted by an interpreter. Pool points out that the use of interpreters is common, especially during the early months of fieldwork when the researcher lacks the necessary fluency, but that little mention of their contribution is made in the resulting ethnography. He discusses some of the problems of this method and suggests that the interpreter should, at the very least, be recognized as making a creative contribution in constructing the ethnography. After a couple of pages of babble Stephen Tyler settles down to make an obtuse comparison of the abstract ‘essentials’ of modernism and postmodernism. His dense poetical style, however, is a turn-off. The next essay, by Jonathan Friedman, is little better. Also written in a dense style, it takes anthropology’s concern with the ‘other’ as a search for Western identity, an identity which, he asserts, has been disintegrated by postmodernism. The next two chapters deal with feminist anthropology’s encounter with postmodernism. Annelies Moors compares the construction of difference in feminist studies in anthropology with that typified by Said’s Orientalism. Particular emphasis is placed on the characterization of Middle Eastern (Oriental) women in the anthropological literature. Annemiek Richters fails to deliver on her promise to answer the question whether postmodernism is ‘yet another masculine invention engineered to exclude women’ (p. 125) and instead provides a feminist critique of modern mental health diagnosis.

Perhaps the best essay in the book is that by Olivia Harris. In ‘Time and Difference in Anthropological Writing’ Harris begins by pointing out that although it is the individual who conducts fieldwork and encounters the world of the ‘other’, what is at issue is how the society of the ‘other’ and the anthropologist’s own society are juxtaposed, compared and brought into some sort of relationship. The fieldworker acts as a mediator. Time is a powerful metaphor of otherness that such anthropologists as Evans-Pritchard, Geertz, Whorf, Lévi-Strauss and Leach, among others, have used to construct difference and establish the relationship between their society and ‘ours’. Harris is not concerned with the ‘other’s’ conception of time, however, so much as she is with ‘ours’. She discovers that not only do anthropological discussions of time depend on (usually) unexamined comparison with ‘our’ time but that among anthropologists the concepts of ‘our’ time differ. This raises the important question, ‘What do we mean by “our” or “we”?’. All anthropologists invoke a broader collective self and Harris goes on to examine the implications of this invoked ‘we’.
Joke Schrijvers actively assisted a group of poor women in Sri Lanka escape their poverty by organizing a small collective farm. In the penultimate essay in the book she discusses the change in these women as they learn to stand up for themselves and the difficulties in dealing simultaneously with people in different positions of power, i.e. the Dutch government agency employing her and the women she was helping. The final article is a personal account by Johannes Fabian of some of the problems—such as revealing secrets, identifying informants, taking sides, exposing information to the powers that be, and so on—he struggled with in his initial fieldwork among the Jamaa of Zaire. He has few new insights to offer. I do agree, however, with his final statement, which seems to epitomize the entire collection of essays: ‘we need critique (exposure of imperialist lies, of the workings of capitalism, of the misguided ideas of scientism, and all the rest) to help ourselves. The catch is, of course, that ourselves ought to be them as well as us’ (p. 201).

CHRIS HOLDSWORTH

SCOTT ATRAN, Cognitive Foundations of Natural History: Towards an Anthropology of Science, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press/Paris: Maison des Sciences de l’Homme 1990. xii, 320 pp., Index, References. £35.00/$49.50.

Many anthropologists, especially perhaps from Oxford, locate classification at the core of their discipline. Thus, in their introduction to ASA 27, History and Ethnicity (London, 1989), Chapman, McDonald and Tonkin write of subsuming the classification of people within ‘classification in general—an area of expertise that anthropology has made its own’; and the word recurs many times in their brief text. Without disputing the suggestiveness and value of the term itself, one might wonder just how wide-ranging and well-articulated is that expertise. Atran’s book is about one of the most obvious sorts of classification, that of living kinds (plants and animals), but the issues it raises could not be called hackneyed.

Just as a kinship analyst can reasonably (I think) choose to concentrate on formal analysis of the classification of relatives while ignoring the practical significance of the categories, so Atran bypasses classifications based on the use or value of living kinds for humans (i.e. such taxa as fruit, weeds, pets, beasts of burden), as well as issues of symbolism. His concern is rather with the nature of folk biological nomenclature or ethnotaxonomies (sparrows and birds, oaks and trees), and with the relationship between these taxonomies and scientific ones. He is not an ethnographer, but an explorer, rather in the tradition of Dan Sperber, of the borderlands between anthropology, psychology and the history and philosophy of science.
Atran’s central claim concerns the plurality of cognitive subsystems. Back in 1975 he had contrasted Piaget, who believed that humans approached all domains of knowledge and experience with the same undifferentiated faculty of general intelligence, with Chomsky, who held that humans can draw on a number of distinct and specific cognitive capacities, for instance the one that enables a young child to master a language in spite of scrappy exposure to it. Atran favours Chomsky, and envisages 'many more or less autonomous psychological sub-systems' going into the making of culture (p. 50). In particular, the domain of living kinds, he argues, is cognized differently from the domain of artefacts, and it is partly for its blurring of the difference that he attacks the prototype theory of Eleanor Rosch and followers. The classification of living kinds conforms to a cut and dried hierarchy and contrasts with the ‘notoriously open-textured’ cross-cutting classification of artefacts. Are pianos musical instruments or pieces of furniture? Is a wheel-chair or a bean-bag or a car-seat really a chair? We do not ask parallel questions of a tiger, which is unambiguously an animal and which we conceive of as possessing an underlying essence or nature. A chair is a different matter, and here we do more readily think in terms of prototype plus penumbra of comparable objects, bearing a more or less close family resemblance to the focal type.

What general features are typical of folk biological classifications? The genus is often the smallest grouping recognizable without expert study, and in any case, within a given environment, many genera will be represented only by a single species. Thus the basic-level taxon is here called the generic-speciemne (e.g. horse), though this is not to deny the sporadic occurrence of finer differentiations. Between the unique beginner (animal, plant) and the generic-speciemne, the main level of grouping is the life-form (mammal, bird, tree, bush...) (on which see my review in JASO (Vol. XV, no. 2 (1984)) of Cecil Brown’s Language and Living Things). At a lower level there may well also be ‘family fragments’, groupings recognized by informants but often unlabelled. These may cross-cut life-forms, and are unsystematic in the sense that they do not form an exhaustive partitioning of a local flora or fauna.

A good two-thirds of the book deals with the history of systematics from Aristotle to Darwin, and some readers may prefer to skip from the end of part I direct to the conclusions. But the history is instructive. Aristotle starts not far from the scale and suppositions of unlettered folk the world over, dealing with fewer than 600 species from his own environment and only 30 exotics. Evidently a major feature of the story is the growth in the number of species included in scientific classifications after the voyages of discovery and the spread of printing. Tournefort in 1694 was already dealing with between 6,000 and 10,000 species of plants, but by reducing them to 600 genera he was harking back to the order of complexity faced by Aristotle. Moreover, in elaborating their hierarchies the naturalists were able to develop the covert ‘family fragments’ of the folk classifications, as well as draw on such metaphysical ideas as the great chain of being and evolution.
One purpose of the book is to champion the 'common sense' that produces folk taxonomies. Even in the scientific age common sense retains a role, not only for laymen but also for scientists, whose specialities presuppose that they understand the 'naive' notions from which the speciality developed. In any case, is it naive to hold that the generic-specieme dog is more real to us than the family fragment canine? Science is a curious social institution, to which participant observation of behaviour in laboratories is only one among the various possible anthropological approaches. On the basis of his cognitive approach, Atran aligns it, albeit almost in passing, not so much with other subcultures as with other such second-order elaborations of common-sense classification as totemism.

With its considerable range (45 pages of end-notes, 550 references) and its numerous critical comments on other scholars, this is scarcely an easy read. But it is a rich and provocative book that gives some insight into what a lot we should have to know really to be experts in classification.

N. J. ALLEN
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OBITUARY NOTICE

RONALD GODFREY LIENHARDT

17 January 1921 to 9 November 1993

It is with deep sorrow that we have to announce the death of Godfrey Lienhardt on Tuesday, 9 November 1993 after a short illness. From his arrival in Oxford in 1947 until his death, Godfrey was such a part of Oxford anthropology that it is difficult to imagine what it will be like without him. Oxford and the wider anthropological community has lost one of its greatest characters.

JASO also has lost a valued friend and supporter. Godfrey always took an interest in the Journal and its fortunes, and on a number of occasions chose it as the vehicle for publishing his work. We were particularly honoured to be able to publish his essay ‘Frazer’s Anthropology: Science and Sensibility’, the revised text of his 1991 Frazer Lecture, in our last issue.

Obituaries have already appeared in the Independent (17 November), the Guardian (19 November) and the Sudan Democratic Gazette (December) and we hope to be able to publish appreciations of Godfrey’s life and work in future issues. In the meantime, we are pleased to be able to publish on the following pages the text of an address delivered at his Requiem Mass.

The Editors

A Memorial Fund is to be established in Godfrey Lienhardt’s name. It will be administered by Wolfson College, Oxford, and used to foster research. Wolfson College is also to host an event, to be held on the afternoon of Saturday 7 May 1994, to commemorate and celebrate his life. Further details about both the Memorial Fund and the event are available from the College Secretary, Wolfson College, Oxford OX2 6UD, to whom contributions to the ‘Godfrey Lienhardt Memorial Fund’ may be sent.
THIS is an immensely sad occasion, but I do not wish to dwell on its sadness; nor would Godfrey have wanted me to. The time I am allowed is far too short to do justice to my subject, even if I were able to. A biographical sketch is out of the question; anyway, in my view, such dry bones are better confined to the obituary columns. Neither is this the time nor the occasion for an assessment of Godfrey’s significant contribution to anthropology; that is better left to the pages of learned journals. What I want to do in the few minutes available is talk about Godfrey as Godfrey. Such an approach inevitably depends to a great extent on personal reminiscences and impressions; something each of us individually has. I hope that by talking about mine, you will be able silently to recall and think about your own.

When putting together notes for this address, I found that I have absolutely no recollection of my first meeting with Godfrey. I know it must have been just over 30 years ago, but the transition from not knowing Godfrey to knowing him seems to have passed for me without memorable incident. I do remember when we discovered that our birthdays fell on the same day of the year—something we had in common with Radcliffe-Brown. We jointly celebrated the event thereafter. However, Godfrey was not necessarily that easy to get to know, for he could hold strong and not always entirely reasonable prejudices. Godfrey could be witheringly and hurtfully dismissive, and, for some, getting to know him required patience and determination. But once accepted into his circle they would find with Godfrey a deep, loyal and enduring friendship. Perhaps the best evidence for this is the extraordinary degree to which this loyalty and friendship have been affectionately
and steadfastly reciprocated—by you, and by many others all over the world who cannot be here today.

Godfrey loved being with his friends, and I doubt that he was ever happier than when surrounded by a group of them in one of the various pubs he frequented over the years. Conversation, and he was a great conversationalist, was an important art form for Godfrey. But it was not simply the conviviality of such surroundings that was important in drawing people to his side. When he was in hospital, something which occurred with distressing frequency in recent years, he could always be assured of a constant stream—flood, might be a better description—of visitors, many of whom travelled from London or further afield to see him.

What perhaps is remarkable is the wide range of Godfrey’s friends. You are not simply academic colleagues but people drawn from all sorts of backgrounds, ages and countries. Nor was his a closed circle; there was always room for more. Last June, a few days before the examinations, I took a couple of my students for a drink and a sandwich, and Godfrey happened to join us. When I had to leave, the two graduates stayed on for a long time; they were, they later told me, intrigued and fascinated by him. Godfrey also enjoyed the occasion and just before the beginning of this academic year he asked me whether I would be able to arrange for him to meet some of this year’s intake.

In many ways, you, his friends, substituted for the close family that he otherwise lacked, especially after the death of his brother Peter. He felt that loss very deeply and for a period became, by his standards, almost a recluse. I am certain that Godfrey would welcome the inclusion of Peter in our thoughts and memories today. However, as happens in even the most harmonious families, Godfrey was not above testing the relationships internal to his. You can probably think of your own examples. A particularly fine example was his plan—or threat—to retire to Madrid or Lisbon. This idea brought forth a volley of protests and objections, which, one suspects, was just the point of the ploy.

An aspect of Godfrey’s friendship was not only his generosity of spirit, but also a more material generosity. I do not wish to say much about this as it was always conducted with careful discretion and usually with total anonymity. I doubt that Godfrey ever thought much about money. His own needs were relatively simple: he ate sparsely—too sparsely perhaps; he dressed himself as often as not at Oxfam; and he cut his own hair.

There was a similar unworldliness in his approach to technology—perhaps best exemplified by his typewriter, an upright model of between-wars vintage which he never gave up using, despite the effort required to work the keys. However, in recent years, when he found it difficult to go out in the evening, he was persuaded to have a television set and fell for some most un-Godfreyesque programmes. ‘Coronation Street’ and ‘The Bill’ had become his favourites, he once confided with a wry smile.

It would be difficult for me to talk about Godfrey for long without the word ‘smile’ coming up. For me, one of the fascinating things about Godfrey was
watching his smile—or better, smiles. He had a whole repertoire of them that involved different parts of his face in various combinations. All had their own clear meanings which had to be learnt if one was to understand him. There was one which started in the corners of the eyes and ran across the bridge of the nose, which meant roughly: ‘I know that what I am saying is not exactly accurate but I am not going to spoil a good story for a ha’p’orth of truth.’ Another, in which the mouth played a more prominent part, indicated: ‘I don’t believe a word of what you have just said but I cannot be bothered to say so.’

If the smiles were a sort of disguise, he also wore a mask of apparent indifference to many things, matters that he actually felt quite deeply about but often could not bring himself to face up to. This could be infuriating and even, at times, seems to have deceived Godfrey himself. Although I have no evidence to substantiate it, this I suspect is what happened to the part which religion played in his life—the practice, if not the belief of which he turned away from, but to which, at the end, as this requiem mass held at his request indicates, he returned.

It does not seem long ago, and indeed it is a frighteningly short time only, since many of us were gathered at Wolfson College here in Oxford to mark Godfrey’s retirement. That event, a marvellous party, in itself is evidence enough of the affection in which Godfrey was held. It is a great sadness that the intervening years were marked by his increasing frailty. He himself had begun to realise that the time when he could continue to live alone was limited, and not long before his final illness was expressing some anxiety on this score. For those of you who had not seen Godfrey recently, you should know that he had become very frail. However, this was merely a physical decline; the mind remained strong and mischievous, and even until close to death there were flashes of that acerbic wit and hints of enigmatic smiles.

Godfrey is no longer with us in person, but I know that whenever a company of his friends meet, his name will be on their lips. Godfrey will be there in memory and in spirit. Knowing Godfrey has enriched my life and I am sure that it has done the same for yours. God bless him.

PETER RIVIÈRE
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1994-95

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THE 'PERSONAL ENEMY' IN AFRICAN POLITICS

EDWIN ARDENER

(with an introduction by David Zeitlyn)

Introduction

The text that follows comprises the abstract of a paper presented to the 1964 annual meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science (Section N) on 31 August 1964. Sadly the full paper is lost. It has not been published before and is now a document of considerable historical interest. It is published here with the kind permission of Mrs Shirley Ardener. Only minor editorial changes have been made.

'The "Personal Enemy" in African Politics' was written early in the period of independence of the once colonial African states, before any of the subsequent coups, civil wars and other bloody events that now affect our views of Africa. Yet it is an ironic tribute to Ardener's analysis that it makes somewhat depressing reading. For little has changed: the litany of reports on the radio and in our newspapers continues along the lines he describes here. Scandal rocks the government in Zimbabwe, suggestions of assassination and worse haunt ministers in Kenya.

Within anthropology, much has been done to explore the different African idioms and metaphors that frame discussions of politics in its local context. But despite such path-making work as that of Horton (1967), or more recently Werbner (1979) and Hallen and Sodipo (1986), which connect concepts of religion, personhood and politics, the link has not been made to a wider political domain as the term is usually understood in discussions of Europe or North America. It
is therefore to be hoped that Ardener’s paper may stimulate further discussions between anthropologists and political scientists. It is timely to publish this paper now because the changes that Ardener signals have begun to occur. A comparison between the bibliographies of two important works by Jean-François Bayart, the most eminent political scientist to study Cameroon, reveals a remarkable change between 1979 and 1989. More anthropologists are cited in the latter work, and they are cited alongside ‘orthodox’ political scientists. I am sure that Ardener would have approved this widening of the perspective.

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Political commentators of the weekly journal variety find themselves out of their depth when commenting on the personalities of African politics. More words have been eaten on the subjects of Presidents Nkrumah, Sekou Touré and Tshombe (to name only three) than will bear computation. The sight of the last of these embracing his bitter enemy Antoine Gizenga was the coup de grâce for many naïve observers. In similar quarters, the trend to one-party systems has been deplored, or as unthinkingly praised, while vociferous opposition within the parti unique has been unnoticed or misunderstood. In one African country, civil servants expelled from their employment for alleged political activities drink at the elbows of their former ministerial masters, in the same club, in apparent amicability. In another, soldiers apologize to the victims of an unconsidered assault. The nature of opposition and conflict and the conclusions to be drawn from them are simply of different kinds from those current in the West. The ethnocentricity of political observers is very marked, a result perhaps of their living in an essentially paper world of manifestos and the press. Faced with African situations, commentary tends to fall into a tedious rehearsal of cold-war clichés on the one hand, alternating with shock and bafflement on the other—especially from self-styled ‘friends of Africa’ who find it difficult to find a suitable political
bandwagon that will not turn round in its tracks, leaving them embarrassingly facing the wrong direction. Their Eastern counterparts have already coined the term 'tropicalism' to account for their own difficulties.

The African field anywhere, then, provides us with examples of the need to work with an adequate theory of conflict and opposition. I come now to a simple statement of the sort of direction in which, in my opinion, comprehension lies. Taken as formal systems, traditional and modern African political activity appear completely different in kind. On the one hand, we have those systems amply documented in standard works written or edited by Evans-Pritchard, Fortes, Middleton and Tait, as well as in more recent studies. Among the latter, one by the president of this section, Professor Lucy Mair (1962), is easily available to the general reader. Such systems, as is well known, range from complex balances of forces operating through families, lineages and clans, to simple systems of hierarchical authority headed by chiefs. On the other hand, we are today presented with a great number of modern state forms—with presidential and parliamentary arrangements, political parties, elections, and the like—which appear to be the image of such systems outside Africa. There has been no formal transition between the old systems and the new. Whatever 'social change' is, there can surely be no more critical case of it than this! The supposition of such a sudden change was reflected in the movement of the study of African politics from social anthropologists to 'political scientists'—whatever is precisely meant by that term—with the results that we have seen: the spectacle of shock, bafflement and the rest, and the departure of the first naive theorists from the field.

The fault has lain in the misconception of what political systems involve: such sudden 'social changes' are illusory, the exchange of one card house for another. The continuity lies in the forces of 'change' themselves: those conflicts and oppositions that are (as we have already suggested) not transition phenomena, but the essential material of social behaviour, of which formal systems are (we may go so far as to say) merely the epiphenomena. More precisely, they are attempts to describe parts of the pattern of opposition. Perhaps the formulations describe only part of the patterns: the patterns are not thereby abolished. They remain the primary analytical units of political study.

In turning to African politics, therefore, we may ignore both the traditional systems and the modern systems as such. The bases of opposition and competition may be sought for and found in various places. I have selected only one for this paper: the concept of the personal enemy. To members of this gathering it will perhaps be unusual to think in terms of your enemies. Even individuals who are in positions of potential conflict do not necessarily become conscious of personal enmities. In modern urban societies the situation is, in Simmel's words, 'comparable to the bottom of a ship which is composed of many watertight compartments—if it is damaged, the water can still not penetrate all of it. Here the social principle is thus a certain separation of the colliding parties' (Simmel 1955: 66). Such a separation did not exist in traditional African systems, and even today such a separation is only partially achieved. Indeed it is only partially
desired, for the well-known African respect for humanity is an expression of a tendency to retain rather than to minimize direct personal contacts.

In those African societies with which I am familiar, conflict is clearly personalized. In traditional circumstances no one is too poor or insignificant to lack 'enemies'. Very often these enemies are indicated by their positions in the social structure. In one society I know, men live in suspicion and fear of the families of their fathers' brothers—for these 'wicked uncles' inherit their brother's lands and property should his sons all die. The uncles are believed to hate the sons, and to wish to bring about their deaths by witchcraft. In another society men do not build near their own half-brothers for similar reasons. In Central Africa, says Gluckman (1956: 51):

| the village headman in most tribes is the centre of a constant struggle, both in terms of backbiting and intrigue, and of a war in the mystical world. For he is believed to attain his position and maintain it by using witchcraft against his rivals; and he himself constantly suspects that he is the target of the envious witchcraft of his rivals, and of those whom he has rebuked.

Gluckman gives the telling example of the Zambian headman who kept tapping an ulcer on his face and saying: 'it is the government, it is the government, it is the government'—meaning that because of his position under the government, he had been bewitched with the ulcer. Other enmities have a historical origin, but when they exist they may be perpetuated down the generations: when things go well in the family the 'enemies' are thought to be discomfited, when the family suffers injury or loss the 'enemies' are thought to be laughing or, and here we come to the core of the matter, even to have caused the misfortune.

It should not be thought that politicians operate outside this web. On the contrary, it is their business to utilize it and to understand it. They are also part of it. In the former British Trusteeship of Cameroon the early political movement was split between a KNC (Kamerun National Congress) majority and a KPP (Kamerun People's Party) minority. Their leaders came from the same village—a village ridden by sectional rivalries partly originating in an old conflict from the time of the imposition of German rule. In this village the KNC had a majority. Outside it the KPP dominated another village that had long been in rivalry with the first. Within the second village, however, the personal enemies of the KPP majority supported the KNC. This pattern replicated itself in fascinating detail throughout the area of the ethnic group concerned. The extension of the pattern beyond the ethnic group to the country at large followed similar principles. The rise of yet another party (the KNDP or Kamerun National Democratic Party) in another ethnic area, and its subsequent spread, again followed this pattern. Of course, at all stages in political party growth sectional rivalries of wider range, the so-called 'tribalism' or 'regionalism', were mobilized—so much is now recognized even by political commentators. These terms, however, are misleading. If they represented realities of the first level of analysis, the ethnic map would never fail
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to represent the political map. African politicians know that the problem is more fundamental.

A man begins his life with enemies; as he succeeds, they grow in number. A politician, like anyone else, carries his own opposition. The complex of political parties runs down to individuals, in opposition to others in relations of enmity and rivalry. The electorate perceives opposition in this sense. As a result, there need be no theoretical end to the formation of parties: no end to the crossings of the carpet, no end to the shifting permutations of alliance and treachery. The revival or stimulation of one enmity may move the whole structure. Some of you may say that something of this sort underlies all political systems. Yes, indeed, that is one of the points of this paper. But with African systems as at present constituted, we have the additional feature of the personalization of enmities. There is no doubt that at the lower party levels, and among the more unsophisticated back-benchers, the danger of witchcraft is felt to be an ever-present reality. The death of Adelabu, the minority NCNC (National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon [later, National Council of Nigerian Citizens]) leader in Western Nigeria, occurred in a motor accident, some 50 miles or more from his home town. No one held that the accident was physically engineered, yet his supporters wreaked vengeance on hundreds of enemies in Ibadan. It is of course an axiom that enemies may not 'exist', it is enough that they are believed to exist. It is not to be wondered that African leaders cannot, and do not, look upon opposition as a formal matter. The more free they are of such sentiments themselves, the more are they conscious of the peculiar basis of their public support. The less they are themselves so free, the less appealing is the notion of opposition. In either event, it is no occasion for surprise that the electorate would gladly be dispensed with by even the most enlightened rulers. As for a single party, they may well think that the ineradicable tendencies to opposition even within this might be enough for any system. It may be said by some of you (especially perhaps any there may be from across the Atlantic) that this is the usual pattern of trends towards dictatorship. If, by this, European examples are meant, the personalization of enmity produces something of another kind. Northern dictatorships are as insulated and impersonal as northern democracies; if perfect northern democracy does not exist in African states, nor at least does perfect northern despotism.

We come here to the final apparent paradox. If the existence of personal enemies is accepted by Africans of high and low status, so also is the need to live with some of them. Like the poor they are always present. Some may vanish from the scene, but others appear. Wickedness may even be renounced and a personal enemy become, at least temporarily, an object of trust. The coldness of the northerner, whose hates are impersonal, inhuman and (thus) consistent, is foreign. So, therefore, the friendly chats with those deprived of their employment, so the return to the fold of those denounced for the most heinous crimes, so the sudden amends to the victim.

It is to be regretted that time and prudence, since I am in Africa, do not permit further illustration of these principles here. I have talked of 'Africa'; I am
fully aware that countries in Africa differ in their political systems as in other ways; I am aware that the phenomena described are not restricted to Africa at the present time; I am aware too that our history and some of our more inbred communities illustrate similar features. This does not matter because I am making no adverse value judgements; indeed, such is the state of this subject that it is necessary to say clearly in any public gathering that there are many elements in the present African situation that are of great interest and of possible human value. The personalization of conflict is not necessarily a bad thing. Experience has shown that unconsidered violence has grown more widespread within countries in the West with the increasing depersonalization of social relations. It is a notable contribution from Africa that it should announce that even enemies are people.

Lest my conclusion should recall the statement of the clergyman in the 'Beyond the Fringe' sketch that, 'we must get the violence off the streets and into the churches', let me repeat my earlier remarks. Without an adequate theory of conflict and opposition, no comprehension of the forces at work in the new states, or in our own midst, is possible. This is a task for comparative sociologists of the most sophisticated kind, and not (if I may end on a critical note) for amateurs enmeshed in the values of formal systems, which are already inadequate to represent the realities of the countries of their birth.

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The international gatherings known as world fairs are often branded 'trade fairs'. The implication is that they are essentially commercial: the national pavilions are shops in which national goods can be bought and national industries invested in; only incidentally are they about cultural diplomacy. I attended the 1992 Seville Universal Exposition with just this attitude. The degree of corporate sponsorship of the pavilions, the involvement of trade ministries in running them and the fact that in some pavilions almost every 'exhibit' had a price-tag would seem to confirm such a belief. However, pavilion directors and exposition staff were at pains to deny the charge, at least in its stark form. I was regularly reminded that this was a Universal Exposition, the highest grade of fair, which serves to celebrate a particular aspect of human achievement, and which is held only occasionally. Thus 'Seville '92' commemorated Columbus's voyage five centuries earlier and was devoted to the theme of 'discovery', providing a licence for each nation to present its own unique contribution to the world. 'Trade fairs', by contrast, are the lowest grade of fair, organized with much greater regularity and accorded much less international attention. The Seville Exposition was, therefore, at least as much a matter of national prestige and international education as it was a matter of international commerce.

That the Seville Exposition was not simply a trade fair is something that I now fully accept. While it certainly was commercial, as an event its overall functioning was quite different. It was less a market for goods than a forum for identity-fixing. It was first and foremost a place of international exhibition, an arena for the display of nations. It does not follow that because goods were sold in the
pavilions, the pavilions were simply a means to sell goods. Rather, it would be more apt to see the goods as part of the national presentations and of the international competition between them. The ‘trade fair’ appellation is misleading because the rationale of the fair had much more to do with the selling of nations, their identities and their differences, than with the selling of particular products.

What convinced me that the fair was more a market of nations than of goods was a chance discovery of a rather literal instance of the sale of national identity: the purchase of the Danish pavilion by a Japanese rural municipality, Tamba Chō. In common with most other rural areas in post-war Japan, Tamba Chō has lost much of its population through migration to the cities. For many rural areas, this trend has been of such a scale, and has been sustained for so long, that depopulation has resulted, threatening the very social reproduction of some villages. That Tamba has been less affected than most is largely to do with its relative proximity to the Kansai metropolitan area, particularly to the city of Kyoto to which some of its population commute. It is, however, much more than a suburb of Kyoto, and has sought actively to develop itself as a distinctive ‘town’ in a number of ways. One of these, as we shall see, has involved the adoption of foreign motifs and even of foreign national identities. But Tamba has also drawn on a more recognizably Japanese source of identity in inviting other Japanese to make Tamba their ‘second hometown’ (dai ni furusato).

One notable feature of Japanese urbanization has been the tendency on the part of many migrants to remain connected to their natal village. While varying with income, sibling status and distance of outmigration, in general migrants return once a year or more to the village, visit ancestral graves with their parents, and join in village festivals. For many rural migrants the furusato left behind is the real home to which they hope one day to return. This involves a feeling of nostalgic longing that has been much written and sung about in post-war Japan. But in the 1990s, there are many Japanese for whom a remote little village of paddy-fields and persimmon trees, fireflies and cicadas, forms no part of a personal childhood past.

In offering itself to the population at large as a rural hometown, Tamba would appear to be directing itself to this new generation of metropolitan Japanese who, city born and bred, are no longer directly connected to the countryside through their life course. This self-marketing by rural places as villages-to-be-adopted, an increasingly common form of recruitment of tourists (as well as of customers for rural foodstuffs) in the 1980s and ’90s, has become an important aspect of strategies of rural revival and development. Urbanization may have denuded such places of their population but they retain an appeal—and even appear to enhance it—albeit now as a place to be visited rather than actually lived in. Moreover, those who visit are not just first-generation migrants, but also other urban Japanese who, as ‘furusato members’, are in effect symbolic migrants. But Tamba Chō's
development strategy is rather more complex than this would suggest. For it does not present itself as the little village in the mountains where visitors can find the ‘heart’ (*kokoro*) of Japan (a much-used term in this context). This is a *furusato* whose appeal lies elsewhere.

World fairs are the beauty contests of nations. In Universal Expositions it is the pavilion *buildings* that are the main focus of aesthetic judgement. At Seville '92 there were many exotic buildings, ranging from Arabian palaces and Southeast Asian Buddhist temples to high modern glass-and-steel boxes with cascading water walls. One of the more successful buildings of the fair—on the basis of much media comment at least—was the elegant Danish pavilion. The official guide described it thus:

The Pavilion of Denmark is a reflection of the Danish landscape, characterized by its many islands. When the horizon is broken, it may well be by white sails. The Pavilion itself lies like an island, surrounded by water in a pool. It is like a sailing ship with sails 32m high... The Pavilion is an example of Danish design and craftsmanship. Inside the pavilion, Danish culture, technology and art are shown through a gigantic multi-media show.

Upon entering the pavilion, visitors were told to take a cushion, find a place to lie down, and look up at the ceiling. The main lights dimmed and three mobile sails on the ceiling were illuminated; for the next twenty minutes a film on the natural beauty and agricultural productivity of Denmark was shown. Compared to some other pavilions, packed with exhibits and featuring crowd-pulling 3-D, wraparound or giant-screen (Imax) cinema (see Knight 1992: 22-3), this ‘Danish experience’ was low-key. While its building was striking, its queues were not long and its restaurant/bar was noticeably empty. I recalled my earlier conversation with staff in the Norwegian pavilion who complained that the Spanish visitors thought Norway a province of Sweden, couldn’t tell one Scandinavian country from another and only came to get another stamp for their exposition passports. In this ‘festival of nations’ some were better known than others.

Yet I soon discovered that the Danish pavilion was the object of international attention from a specific quarter. For while speaking to pavilion staff I learnt that the Danish pavilion had been bought by the Japanese town of Tamba in Kyoto Prefecture, where it would be reassembled after the exposition. The town had even sent a young man, Hiroshi, to work in the pavilion, to learn about it and about Danish things in general. It was through a long interview with Hiroshi, along with

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1. Most visitors carried with them a ‘passport’ in which to document their world journey around the site. Some even used their real passports.
some official pamphlets he provided, that I learnt the story of the Danish connection of a rural Japanese town.2

Hiroshi had just left university, where he had studied German, and had returned home to Tamba. The mayor’s son, whose idea the purchase apparently was, was a friend of his and encouraged him to go to Seville for a three-month spell. He explained to me how central ‘internationalization’ (kokusaika) was to the future of the town, and how even before its interest in Denmark, Tamba had established an ‘international exchange programme’ with an Australian town whereby youngsters from one town visited the other and were hosted by local families. Tamba also had connections with a German town and had sent there one of its young people—the mayor’s son—to do a full year’s apprenticeship in German wine-making. He returned to establish a local wine-making factory, which now produces ‘Tamba hock’, Tamba hokku! Other Japanese towns and villages have been successful in their wine-making, and my strong impression was that neither the Australian nor the German ties had proved wholly satisfactory. This did not diminish the mayor’s son’s belief in the relationship between ‘internationalization’ (kokusaika) and the ‘revitalization of the town’ (machi no kasseika). The mayor had sent him to study at a well-known American university and was apparently grooming him for the mayoral succession. The years abroad had made the mayor’s son fluent in both English and German and had also inspired him with a ‘vision’ for the future, one which now centred on the Danish connection.

The Danish pavilion would be used in Tamba in a number of ways. First, it would be a venue for weddings. Secondly, it would be a restaurant serving authentic Danish food. Thirdly, and more generally, it would be a tourist attraction. By providing the town with a landmark, it would attract the metropoli­tan population of the Osaka-Kyoto region. They would admire the strangely shaped, boat-like building with its ‘sails’ and its architectural allusions to the island character of the Danish landscape (a point in common with Japan), and they would have the chance to try Danish cuisine.

Senior pavilion staff in Seville, for their part, saw the deal in terms of cultural diplomacy. They were relieved at and proud of the deal. Unlike most pavilions in the fair, theirs would live on and continue to exemplify Danish genius. The building would henceforth serve as a sort of outpost of Denmark in Japan and contribute to Japanese understanding of Danish culture. Among some of the younger Danish pavilion staff there was amusement at the thought that the building would be used for Japanese weddings, as well as excitement among those who would have the opportunity to visit the pavilion in Tamba.

While for the Danes the translocation of the pavilion had international significance, for Tamba it formed part of a strategy to establish a specific cultural

2. This article is based on three principal sources of information: the long interview with Hiroshi, pamphlets on Tamba Chō, and my own familiarity with similar development strategies in other parts of rural Japan, especially Wakayama where I did two-and-a-half years’ fieldwork in the late 1980s. I have never visited Tamba Chō.
identity for the town in its competition for tourists. The furusato theme cannot by itself confer a distinctive identity on a town or village. Hence rural municipalities are engaged in a highly competitive struggle to develop 'brand-names' (burando) as a basis for marketing their goods and attracting visitors. The Danish pavilion would contribute greatly to the development of a distinctive ‘Tamba brand’.

To date, the most common means adopted to achieve this sort of diacritical identity has been for each municipality to exploit its own particular traditions. For example, Hongū Chō in Wakayama, where I have done fieldwork, while projecting itself as ‘a little furusato’ (chiisai na furusato), also proclaims to would-be visitors its 1000-year-old pilgrimage tradition, along with the mythological importance of the wider Kumano area of which it is part. The visitor is reminded that the founder of the Japanese imperial line passed through here as he fought his way to the Yamato plain where he established imperial rule. Hongū, in common with many other remoter places, also emphasizes its identity as a place of refuge for defeated warriors in the Middle Ages.

Tamba’s promotional literature also proclaims the depth of its past. It is a place of antiquity, for people have lived here ‘from the beginning of Japanese history’. Another example of the depth of its tradition is the Katsuragi autumn festival, which has been held ‘for over a thousand years without change’, and in which local men (many of them migrants who return for the occasion) carry the palanquins bearing their local deities around the town. Yet this kind of distinction is set to be replaced by one very different in nature. Instead of depth in time, Tamba increasingly prefers distance in space as the source of its self-definition vis-à-vis its neighbours.

The mayor of Tamba, prompted by his son, argued that what the town needed was a clear, attractive image in contrast to that of the ‘dark countryside’ (kurai inaka) that had driven Tamba’s youth to the cities. What Tamba needed was an image appropriate to the twenty-first century, and to this end it had decided to remake itself into a Danish town. A construction programme had been launched whereby such public buildings as schools, health centres and post offices were built or remodelled according to a ‘Danish style’. A new residential area of Danish-designed houses was also under construction. A new ‘urban resort recreation area’, to be known as the ‘Kyoto Denmark Park’, was also being planned, of which the Danish pavilion would form the centrepiece.

An ambitious programme of ‘social welfare’, aimed to raise Tamba to Danish levels, was also being enacted. First, the standard of municipal hygiene was to be raised by connecting all households to a piped sewer system. Secondly, the care of the elderly was to be improved—not by hiring more professional personnel but through such motivating measures as a one million yen reward for those who reach 100 years of age. Thirdly, civic apathy was to be countered and the civic participation of Tamba citizens boosted by the establishment of a municipal fax network, in which fax machines would be installed in all households. This new enhanced communication between the town office and its citizens was vital to the future, for only if the town acted ‘as one’ would there be progress.
What is being addressed here is the central problem in rural revival efforts in Japan today: the apathy of much of the local population in response to town office initiatives. Notwithstanding Tamba’s own claims to civic enthusiasm for its projects—its brochures mention local Australian netball teams and Danish folk dance troupes—the fax initiative suggests a local government rather desperate to achieve a greater degree of mobilization.3

Tamba is set to become a Japanese rural town with a Danish landscape at its core. But why Denmark? The official view would seem to be that Denmark serves as a model of a place that is at once agricultural and technologically advanced, whose people are active citizens, and in which care is provided for local people through advanced public welfare policies. Tamba—or at least the local government and other supporters of the scheme—is adopting Denmark, not so much because of any objective present-day similarity between the two places but because Denmark offers the municipality a model for its future. Denmark is both the key source of distinction for the new ‘Tamba brand’ and a template of self-imagination for municipal development.

There are many other examples of such international borrowings in the intense inter-local competition that is ‘village revival’ (see Knight 1993). The generalized rural decline in Japan is likely to be intensified by the prospective decline in agricultural support from central government. Tourism is seen as the way forward by many rural municipalities, but requires that they establish an effective appeal in a highly competitive market. One increasingly common strategy for establishing a distinctive brand-name has been for rural towns to take on identities from the international arena. In some cases, the idiom of nationhood is adopted in a direct and imitative manner: ‘passports’ are produced and ‘kingdoms’ and ‘republics’ proclaimed.4 More often it is a matter of borrowing particular themes and features. Thus domestic Japanese tourists find themselves beckoned by a Dutch village in Nagasaki, English farms in Hokkaido, Alpine meadows in Nagano, Swiss pensions in Wakayama, American ranches in Oita...and a Danish town in Kyoto!

3. That this sort of preoccupation on the part of Japanese municipal authorities is no recent development is suggested by Dore’s reference to village offices in the 1950s that ‘installed universal broadcast relay systems by which every house has loudspeakers—and often talking back apparatus’ (Dore 1959: 356-7).

4. These are generally done in a lighthearted way and are usually a means of highlighting other local characteristics. Thus the city of Kaya in Kagoshima, whose main product is the sweet potato, proclaimed itself the ‘Sweet Potato Kingdom’. Ideally the name should pun with that of a real country, but sometimes this can backfire. When Susami Chō in Wakayama, a producer of domesticated boars, declared itself to be the ‘Kingdom of Inobutan’, punning the word for pig, buta, with the name of the country, Bhutan, the Bhutanese government objected—not least to the passport’s logo in the form of two pigs!
One striking feature of the Seville world fair was the way many national pavilions stressed internal diversity as a positive feature. Many nations appeared to be drawing on their constituent regions or localities in a much freer way than one imagines was formerly the case. The implication was that national identities did not have to be at the expense of local ones, and could instead draw on them. Here I have presented an example of a locality putting to its own use—albeit in the name of ‘internationalization’—a foreign national identity. Two distinct theatres of difference come together, as one makes use of the ready-made identities of the other.

The domestic appropriation of a regime of extra-domestic difference is by no means unfamiliar. The ethnic trend in Western clothing fashions is one example, and the rise of international tourism as a domain of conspicuous consumption another. Indeed, that international fields of difference may be domestically applied is an argument that has been used to account for the raison d’être of anthropology itself. Thus Boon (1982) has accused anthropologists of being in effect traders in exotic difference who exaggerate the cultures they introduce to domestic clients. Moreover, recent anthropological studies of consumption have shown that the creative domestication of the foreign is not confined to those Western countries in which anthropology arose but also extends to the non-Western world that anthropologists have traditionally studied (e.g. Friedman 1990). Yet the example presented here of a Japanese town purchasing a national identity at a world fair and putting it to a very specific use shows that the domestication process extends beyond the domain of individual consumption of foreign goods to that of local institutional deployment of foreign images. In regional Japan at least, there exists a vibrant local market for global difference.

REFERENCES


Disorientations
A Society in Flux: Kuwait in the 1950s
Peter Lienhardt
Edited by Ahmed Al-Shahi

Disorientations relates to Peter Lienhardt’s studies in Kuwait from 1953 until his death in 1986. It was a time of great change - oil revenue was bringing a new prosperity to the country, immigrant workers were changing the nature of the population and yet the shaikhs still governed and brought stability through their power and influence.

A rich blend of anthropological observation and personal impressions brings the events of the period vividly to life.

Island of the Phoenix
An Ethnographic Study of the People of Socotra
Vitaly Naumkin

The author, a distinguished expert on the Middle East, presents a fascinating account of the results of 15 years of research into all aspects of the history, ethnography and culture of the inhabitants of this remote Yemeni island. Naumkin examines the contributions of Christians, Muslims, the Portuguese, the Arabs and the British to contemporary society.

Professor Naumkin is Deputy Director of the Institute of Oriental Studies of Russia, and President of the Russian Center for Strategic Research and International Studies, Moscow.
DEBATING DUMÉZIL:
RECENT STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE MYTHOLOGY

N. J. ALLEN

WOUTER W. BELIER, Decayed Gods: Origin and Development of Georges Dumézil’s ‘Idéologie Tripartie’ (Studies in Greek and Roman Religion 7), Leiden etc.: Brill 1991. xv, 239 pp., Selected Bibliography, Index. Gld120.00/$68.75.


GREGORY SCHREMPF, Magic Arrows: The Maori, the Greeks and the Folklore of the Universe (Foreword by Marshall Sahlins) (New Directions in Anthropological Writing; gen. eds. George E. Marcus and James Clifford), Madison and London: University of Wisconsin Press 1992. xviii, 217 pp., Works Cited, Index. $47.00/$16.95.

DUMÉZIL (1898–1986) was an intellectual anomaly. He operated in the disciplinary space that lies between Indo-European comparative linguistics, comparative religion, and half-a-dozen specialized philological disciplines, but would have liked to have been recognized first and foremost as a historian. Yet there is a case for saying that in spirit his work is closer to anthropology than to any other discipline.

He was par excellence a comparativist, concentrating on the older Indo-European world, but was far from ignorant about other cultures (in particular,
Chinese, Turkish, Caucasus and Quechua). He used written sources but, like many anthropologists, was interested in them largely for what they could reveal about the unwritten traditions that shaped them. His work does indeed bear on myth, ritual and pantheons, but it goes far beyond ‘religion’, in any narrow sense of the word. It bears on social structure, law, ethnomedicine, narratives of all sorts including pseudo-history, but above all on the ideology that provides the more or less unitary framework for all these aspects of society, and for others. And he advanced strong claims. In all the main domains of the Indo-European-speaking world, he claimed, the ideology transmitted from the original period of unity remains detectable in particular contexts—at the very least we are dealing with cultural processes extending over millenniums. Unless the early Indo-Europeans turn out to have been extraordinarily unrepresentative, Dumézil’s claim ought to affect how we think in general terms about non-literate societies and the possibilities for comparing them. Provided, that is, that his claim is justified.

There are many reasons why Dumézil’s work is controversial. Some of them are good, or at least reasonable, and relate to real issues on which he may have been wrong. For instance, I have argued elsewhere that his notion of a ‘tri-functional’ Indo-European ideology was incomplete: in addition to his three main categories or clusters of ideas (pertaining respectively to the sacred, to force and to abundance), we need to recognize a fourth, pertaining to ‘otherness’ and covering both transcendence/totality (which is valued) and exclusion/nothingness (which is devalued). Such an addition opens the way to certain other revisions (Allen 1991; forthcoming a). But the present discussion concentrates on the ‘bad’ reasons why Dumézil is too little appreciated.

Belier’s book, formerly a Leiden doctorate, will please those—and they are many, for instance most historians of early Rome (cf. Poucet 1988)—who would like to continue comfortably ignoring the challenge posed by Dumézil. Its aim is (somewhat oddly) to ‘reconstruct’ and evaluate Dumézil’s theory for its usefulness, but not to determine its correctness (p. xii). It is little interested in Dumézil’s intellectual roots, in the other scholars who have developed his ideas, or in the primary sources he analysed, and concentrates on summarizing or excerpting from the oeuvre. A chapter on concepts and methods is followed by four others organized by region and topic and tracing the changing formulations. The conclusion is—or seems to be, for the wording is muted and elusive—that Dumézilian theory, aesthetically pleasing though it may be, is of minimal scientific

1. The invitation to review the books listed above provided a welcome opportunity to take a broader look at a number of recent studies concerned with comparative mythology, particularly Dumézilian, but not exclusively so.
value, that it is too vague to allow of verification or falsification, and that its application is imprecise and inconsistent.

Looking back over his oeuvre (which amounts to some 17,000 published pages), Dumézil himself distinguished three main phases (see ‘Bibliographie’ in Cahiers pour un temps 1981: 340-44). From his initial Frazerian phase little remained that he still judged useful; in 1938 the first glimpse of the trifunctional pattern ushered in a quarter century of rapid exploration; and 1966 saw the beginning of the summing up, the phase du bilan (the 1980s seem to me to constitute a fourth phase). Starting with quotations from 1924, Belier concentrates on the second phase, and although he lists the later publications, he makes little use of them. This is to work the wrong way round. A better approach to assessing the oeuvre would be to start with the mature formulations of phase 3, and work backwards only where it proves necessary for particular purposes. As Dumézil himself often observed, phase 2 saw many changes in particular interpretations, but Belier’s implicit charge—that the changes somehow vitiate the mature work—is groundless.

Dumézil did not present himself as a theory-builder (‘je ne suis pas théoricien, ni “dumézilien”’ (1987: 121)), and Belier’s attack on Dumézilian ‘theory’ is in part a rhetorical device (an unconscious one?). Dumézil’s strength lay in his sensitivity to common patterns found in different contexts, and in the prodigious erudition he drew on while exercising this sensitivity. No doubt all intellectual activity involves some sort of theory, but in Dumézil’s case it was not so abstruse as to require much ‘reconstructing’. It consisted essentially of two things: the application to extralinguistic domains of culture of the venerable family-tree model of language relationships (an endeavour already well established in the nineteenth century), and a fairly straightforward abstract formulation of the similarities of pattern that he observed. Belier neglects other Dumézilians (the term is convenient) on the grounds that they have not developed the theory, merely used it. However, the contrast between theory and application makes little sense: most of Dumézil’s own work after the early 1940s consisted of ‘applications’, i.e. of the recognition of new contexts in which the trifunctional pattern is manifested, together with elaboration of previous analyses and exploration of the relationship between new and old.

Immersed as he was in the nitty-gritty of the texts, and little interested in theorizing per se, Dumézil’s account of the notion of fonction is less full than it might have been. Belier is quite wrong, however, in thinking that the word is synonymous with activité. Having established that it covers activity (1958: 18f.), Dumézil goes on to emphasize that there is more to it. To paraphrase, the functions supplied the proto-Indo-European speakers with a heuristic and/or with classificatory principles that applied well beyond the realm of social structure. The eighteen lines of Dumézil’s text that define the individual functions are not vague, and could well have been quoted in extenso. Belier might also have meditated on the final sentence of the passage: ‘these are not a priori definitions but the convergent teaching of numerous applications of the tripartite ideology’ (ibid.).
In other words, a function is a domain within an ideology, a unit within a structure of ideas. As I have argued elsewhere (Allen forthcoming b), function and ideology in Dumézil's writing are much like class and form of primitive classification in Durkheim and Mauss's, and an analysis of the early Indo-Europeans in terms of the former is no stranger than an analysis of the Zuñi in terms of the latter.

Belier's chapter on methods not only fails to come to grips with 'function', but also, by neglecting the later works, misses Dumézil's 'requirements of good sense', the rules that he recommends to those claiming to identify trifunctional patterns. The elements of an ensemble should be 'distinct, solidary, homogeneous and exhaustive', as well as obviously pertaining to the relevant function (1979: 72). The rules are not always easy to apply, but again they are not vague.

Belier sees Dumézil as having recourse to a number of 'auxiliary hypotheses' to explain departures from what his theory predicts. The language is again tendentious and prejudicial, as if Dumézil (the would-be historian!) should expect to find identical manifestations of the trifunctional ideology in all branches of the Indo-European world. For instance, one of the 'auxiliary hypotheses' is the 'Zoroastrian reform', which explains why the trifunctional list of Zoroastrian 'archangels' (the Amesha Spentas) differs from the polytheism reconstructable for earlier periods of Indo-Iranian religion. But the problem for the comparativist is to give an account of both the similarities and the differences: how could this be done without postulating some change? It is no use merely referring to one of the non-comparativist Iranianists who disputes Dumézil's position (which other specialists support).

Here and there one finds useful tabulations of information, but in general the book's organization is unhelpful. Thus chapter 3, on the 'Tripartite System', starts with a section on India, covering social structure and theological patterns in the Vedic hymns, but it is not until chapter 6, 'Tripartita Minora', that we meet the similar pattern of gods in the Mahābhārata. The implied distinction between major and minor manifestations of the ideology is arbitrary and misleading. There are many details meriting criticism, but the underlying problem is one of general attitude. By casting its vague pall of doubt over the whole undertaking, and by failing even to try to discriminate between the aspects of the oeuvre that are well founded and those that are not, this backward-looking thesis has little to offer those curious about the present status and future possibilities of the field.

Bruce Lincoln at least engages with the primary sources. Regarded by Mircea Eliade as his most brilliant student (so Wendy Doniger's foreword tells us), Lincoln devoted his doctorate to a comparison between early Iranians, as known from the texts, and East African cattle herders, as reported by ethnographers. The thesis as published (Lincoln 1981) combined Indo-Iranian lexical/ideological comparativism with a more materialist approach to pastoralism as a mode of
production. The first half of Lincoln’s new book expands the former interest and assembles a number of the author’s papers from around 1980. The main aim is to reconstruct proto-Indo-European conceptions relating to death and the Other World. The next hundred pages shift the emphasis from dying to killing. We move from the Iliad, via an overview article on war and warriors reprinted from Eliade’s Encyclopedia of Religion, to other forms of violence, especially sacrifice, and to forms of ideological oppression, for example of females in early Zoroastrian ethnophysiology. Whereas the first part of the book reflects, so we are told, the loss of a beloved grandfather, the second reflects a growing enthusiasm for Marxist political attitudes, especially for the analysis of myth as an attempt to legitimize domination. The last thirty pages, comprising ‘Polemic Pieces’, essentially constitute an attack on Dumézil, of whose politics Lincoln disapproves.

Lincoln is curiously ambivalent about his own earlier pieces: while he judges that they retain some value (p. xiii), he has agreed to republish them only at Wendy Doniger’s urging (p. 125). His unhappiness arises partly because the papers reflect a family-tree view of the Indo-European language group, which he now takes to be problematic, partly because (persuaded by an Italian friend) he now thinks common myths arise not from common descent but from common social structures and historical situations; and partly again (p. 124) because the essays pay insufficient attention to competing versions of myths. Neither of the first two objections is cogent, but if the third shows awareness of a tendency to oversimplify, then it has some substance. There is indeed a pervasive tendency to tidy up the materials so as to produce a neat and unitary picture. For instance, an essay on Druids maintains that for Celts and other Indo-European peoples ‘healing is a process precisely inverse to that of sacrifice’ (p. 181). All healing? All sacrifice? Precisely?

An additional reason for unhappiness ought to have been the number of mistranslations, a fault noted in these pages by John Penney (1987) in relation to another of Lincoln’s books. Rashly, the author alludes to his own ‘philological rigour’ (p. xiii), and seems to take pride in making his own translations (p. i n.); but the mistakes are often elementary ones. Here is a small selection: Greek pempō means send or escort, not lead (p. 23, 85); hikonto means arrived, not were off (p. 78); khreōntai (in the context) means use, not need (p. 190); horkion tannō means take an oath, not cut an oath! (p. 196); a sentence from Plato is curiously garbled (p. 49), and a passage from Aeschylus purportedly suggesting that Agamemnon and Menelaus are twins does not do so (p. 40); Latin cui plurima canities means ‘whose copious grey hair’, not ‘most of whose...’ (p. 63); Sanskrit yāna means vehicle (in general), not ferry-boat (p. 69). Since most of the essays are reprints, it is odd that such errors have not been noted and corrected. But perhaps not so odd after all, in a writer whose thoughts, according to Doniger’s foreword, ‘progress at roughly the speed of light’.

The opportunity might also have been taken, when reprinting a paper on warrior ‘rage’ in Homer, to inform the reader that Dumézil examined the essay (1983: 181ff.) and concluded that it was entirely mistaken. Does Lincoln have an
answer to the particular criticisms? He does take up a critique of his 1981 book by Mary Boyce (1987), who holds that ancient Iranian society was bipartite, consisting of priests and herdsmen but not warriors. Lincoln convincingly defends the trifunctional view of Dumézil and Benveniste. In doing so, however, he attacks the book by Wikander (published in German in 1938) on Indo-Iranian bands of warrior youth, disapproving of its 'ideological underpinnings and resonances'. These he exemplifies by the Swedish scholar's description of the god Indra as 'Führer' of the Maruts (storm spirits). But the German word is natural in the context, and the objection is ridiculous.

The final section consists of a TLS review from 1986 of the third volume of Dumézil's *Esquisses*, a discussion of Dumézil's methods as applied to the vexed question of 'The One-Eyed and the One-Handed', and an attempt to demonstrate that he condoned Turkish massacres of Armenians. The first of these pieces proclaims a shift of scholarly attention from traditionally academic discussion of the findings and legitimacy of Dumézil's comparativism to the ideological underpinnings of his life and work; but in so far as this has taken place, it represents a byway, not to say a dead end. Arguments about Dumézil's friendships during the 1920s and '30s are irrelevant to the intellectual challenge posed by trifunctional theory. Dumézil inclined to the Right, indeed to monarchism, whereas his political critics, such as the classicist Momigliano, incline to the Left; but no hard evidence exists to show that Dumézil's political views significantly affected his comparativism. As Lincoln admits, the matter turns largely on the interpretation of silence. It is perfectly true that Dumézil did not spice his academic publications with such comments as would commend him to a politically correct American academic in 1990; but why should he have?

As we have seen, Lincoln accepts the Dumézilian view of a proto-Indo-European tripartite division of labour, but he too, like Belier, fails to grapple with the application of the notion of 'function' outside social structure. All one learns here (p. 61) is that Lincoln doubts the Dumézilian view of the pantheon, partly because, as has been noted by others, the deities appearing in the 'canonical' trifunctional sets and the deities having reconstructable proto-Indo-European names do not overlap. This is to overrate the importance of etymology in cultural comparativism, and to ignore very many careful analyses that extend far beyond the gods. Where Lincoln does approach a Dumézilian theological formulation, his choice is unfortunate. Dumézil argued for a homology between two Scandinavian deities and two legendary heroes of early Rome, so that Odin the One-Eyed:Tyr the One-Handed:Cocles:Scaevola. Accepting this basic homology, Lincoln criticizes Dumézil's narrowness in developing it. But he would have done better to criticize the Odin–Cocles component. Even if Odin is first-functional, which I doubt, Cocles is not, and he does not clearly outrank Scaevola. For once, the similarities are most likely coincidental. Although Dumézil frequently returned to this analysis, it is among his least satisfying.

The last chapter of Lincoln's book exhumes a paper from 1927 in which Dumézil analyses certain massacres drawn from the myths of ancient Greece, India
Debating Dumézil and the Old Testament; but the attempt to elicit from it evidence of Dumézil’s deep moral deficiency is a flop. One wonders why Lincoln so desperately seeks such evidence.

The vacuity, not to mention the malice and ignorance, of the political attack on Dumézil is definitively demonstrated in the recent book by Eribon (1992). Best known for his biography of Foucault, Eribon had enjoyed conversations with Dumézil for some years before he edited the 1987 volume of Entretiens, which, together with the posthumous collection of Dumézil’s essays published in 1992, comprises the easiest and best introduction to the œuvre to appear so far. Stung by the groundless rumours that his friend had Nazi sympathies, Eribon has now produced a study of Dumézil’s university career and of the academic subculture in which he worked. He draws on many unpublished documents and letters, and has discovered a series of newspaper articles on foreign affairs, which Dumézil wrote in the 1930s under the pseudonym Georges Marcenay. We now know for certain that Dumézil approved of Mussolini. On the other hand, he abhorred Hitler and Nazism, and not only did he have a number of friends and supporters who were Jews, but his contemporaries in the 1930s detected in his work not the least whiff of antisemitism.

Two other recent books situate themselves within the Dumézilian tradition: Emilia Masson’s Le Combat pour l’Immortalité (1991) and Françoise LeRoux and Christian-J. Guyonvarc’h’s La Société celtique (1991). Educated in Yugoslavia, Masson interweaves her Hittite material with Slavic, using little-known sources from Belgrade libraries, as well as some material gathered by interviewing Vlachs in north-east Serbia. She is not suggesting any special Hittite–Slav relationship, merely that both are particularly archaic Indo-European cultures.

Although the Hittite language is certainly linked with Indo-European, specialists have generally held that the culture, and especially the religion, owe much more to the non-Indo-European cultures of the area—the names of the gods are of Hattic origin. Masson wants to view the religion too as essentially Indo-European, and a priori the idea is well worth exploring. Dumézil himself did little in this area. He frequently cited a famous treaty contracted around 1380 BC between Hittite and Mitannian rulers, since the gods invoked include the canonical Vedic trifunctional grouping of Mitra–Varuna, Indra and the Nāṣatyas. He also analysed in trifunctional terms the Hittite ritual for luring deities away from enemy towns, and encouraged the pioneering study by Sergent (1983), a paper inadequately acknowledged by Masson. As for the Slavs, while Dumézil was confident that the vast folklore material would be of value to comparativism, he thought the sources too scanty to permit reconstruction of an articulated theology (1968: 624ff.; 1983: 193ff.).
Since Masson opens by claiming to be working in posthumous collaboration with Dumézil, it is disquieting that she ignores his views on his own intellectual development, as well as his advice on prudent methods of argument. Masson’s earlier chapters, dealing with winter and spring festivals, draw heavily both on Frazer and on Dumézil’s work from the 1920s, treating the latter as authoritative; but Dumézil himself thought his early work had shown ‘un laxisme consternant, tant dans la détermination des éléments comparables que dans l’appréciation des ressemblances’ (1987: 118). The three functions, so central to his mature view of the specificity of the Indo-European heritage, hardly appear here before page 225, and his view of the relation between the three functions and the three levels of the cosmos (that they are distinct phenomena occasionally brought together), is simply ignored.

In fact, Masson’s view of Indo-European ideology departs fundamentally from Dumézil’s. Take her admiration for Nodilo (1834–1912), a little-known Croatian mythologist. One is always pleased if the reputation of worthy pioneers can be resuscitated, but alas there are good reasons why the Indo-European comparativism of Max Müller’s generation is generally judged to have achieved practically nothing. There is all the difference in the world between assembling Indo-European triads, as Nodilo apparently did, and following Dumézil in recognizing three functions, which are expressed in some triads and not others, and which may perfectly well underlie quartets, quintets (such as the Vedic gods), sextets (Amesha Spentas) etc. However, somewhat like her supporter, the Indo-Europeanist Haudry (who has been criticized with force by Dubuisson (1991)), Masson sees the three cosmic levels as more fundamental than the three functions, and as having provided the model on which the Hittites and other Indo-Europeans organized the world around them, their society, pantheon, life, even their bodies (Masson 1991: 199). ‘Collaborators’ who depart so radically and so grandiosely from Dumézil’s views need to give good reasons, and, in particular, Masson needs to explain why we should regard the three-level cosmos as specifically Indo-European.

The main straightforward trifunctional interpretation concerns the Hittite grouping Sun God, Storm God, Tutelary God (‘UTU-us, ‘U-as, ‘KAL) which Masson claims can be henceforth aligned with such canonical triads as Jupiter–Mars–Quirinus. However her trifunctional construal has a number of difficulties and is not helped by the unconvincing argument that the frequent coupling of the Sun God of Heaven with the Sun Goddess of Earth corresponds to Dumézil’s first-function dualism of Varuna and Mitra (both male!). Dumézil applauded the salutary paper by Sergent (1979), which rejected a good number of purported trifunctional analyses of Greek material, and I doubt whether, as is claimed, he would have welcomed Masson’s book as providing ‘confirmation’ of his most important theory (Masson 1991: 231).

As in Lincoln’s book (for example when he writes on humoural theory in the middle Persian Zād Spram), one can find interesting material. I was particularly struck by the photograph of an elderly Vlach matron demonstrating how, in the world above our own, belts are worn around the neck, while in the world below
they are worn around the knees. Might one compare the mythical Irish Lugaid, who had two or three red stripes around his body, one being round his neck (Dumezil 1983: 237f.)? But the challenge for comparativism is not to cite or expound interesting material—of which there is no shortage—but to be convincing.

While Masson writes as a recent convert (of two to three years standing?), LeRoux and Guyonvarc'h, two Celticists from Rennes, ‘discovered’ Dumezil in 1948, and in turn were often referred to by him. In their recent book (1991) they discuss social structure (druids, warrior nobles, commoners) and various other manifestations of trifunctionality drawn from Irish narrative, with a quick glance at the Welsh Mabinogion. Their interpretation of the educators of Cúchulainn is persuasive, but too often the argument is arbitrary, even wild. One cannot simply affirm that the sun or the yellow broom pertain to the second function (ibid.: 103, 184), or that boar, wolf, stag are trifunctional (ibid.: 178). A crux for comparativist approaches to Ireland is provided by the Tuatha Dé Danann, a group of mythic beings deriving from the pre-Christian pantheon. Their argument that Lúg is ‘“hors-classe” par le haut’ (ibid.: 92) is cogent (cf. Dumezil 1968: 189 n.), but the attempt to divide the five main male figures into a first-functional ‘triad of sovereignty’ (Lúg, Dagda, Ogma) and a pair of third-functional specialists (Dian Cecht and Goibniu) is not.

A number of the formulations are odd, for example that the third function is somehow negative and lacks intrinsic quiddity (LeRoux and Guyonvarc'h 1991: 33, 133), that the tripartite ideology is outside history (ibid.: 68), or that warfare is feminine because of the passions it arouses (ibid.: 95). The references are sometimes out of date, and the writing falls far short of the lucid organization and stylistic grace of its inspirer. For all the book’s good intentions, it may discourage more potential new readers of Dumezil than it attracts. Would-be friends may do more damage than overt opponents.

One such opponent is the Cambridge archaeologist Colin Renfrew. In his well-known book of 1987 (cf. his paper of 1989), Renfrew argues that the dispersal of the Indo-European speakers was associated with the spread of agriculture, and started not, as is usually thought, in the third to fourth millennium BC north of the Black Sea, but around the sixth millennium south of it. Our concern here, however, is only with chapter 10 of his book, in which he tries to cast doubt on ‘the whole edifice of Dumezilian scholarship’. The main argument is that, in

2. From a four-functional perspective, the obvious construal to explore would be: Lúg, god of all skills, fourth function (valued); Dagda, god of druidry, first function; Ogma, the great champion, second function; Dian Cecht, god of health (cf. the Násatyas), third function; Goibniu, the blacksmith, fourth function (devalued). (For a sample of high-class work by a Dumezilian Celticist, see Sterckz 1992.)
construing Indian and Celtic social stratification as descending from a common origin, Dumézil attributes to proto-Indo-European society a degree of stratification that, even at the later date, and a fortiori earlier, is archaeologically impossible. But Renfrew misreads the victim of his attack. Certainly, for Dumézil, the proto-Indo-European speakers had a conception of their social structure as founded on the distinctness and ranking of the three functions, but he was carefully and explicitly agnostic as to the concrete form or forms in which the conception was realised. One possibility among others was that the trifunctional pattern applied only to certain clans or families that specialized respectively in one of the three functions, while the mass of society was unspecialized (Dumézil 1958: 18). Renfrew cites the page but apparently stopped reading at line four. He also thinks that Dumézil needed to offer a concrete picture of the proto-society (Renfrew 1987: 245). But he was under no such compulsion. Though well aware of debates about the Urheimat, Dumézil saw them, rightly, as inaccessible to the methods he was using and essentially irrelevant to his problems (Dumézil 1958: 5).

Renfrew has other objections. Appreciating that the essence of the approach lies in seeing that A–B–C in one context resembles a–b–c in another, he doubts whether the similarities proposed are always persuasive and expresses doubts similar to those expressed by Ernest Gellner (1982) concerning Lévi-Straussian binary analyses (where the similarities would have the form: A–B resembles a–b). Of course, as we have seen, the Dumézilian literature contains a proportion of unconvincing trifunctional analyses, just as the Lévi-Straussian literature contains unconvincing binary ones. But undiscriminating doubts are valueless—the battle needs to be fought at the level of particulars and, unfortunately, non-comparativist specialists cannot always be relied on. Renfrew cites the Scandinavianist Page (1978-9), no doubt unaware that Page’s objections were answered at length (Dumézil 1985: 259-98).

Renfrew concludes that in so far as they are real, the similarities Dumézil finds are to be explained not by common origins but by a combination of coincidence, parallel development or global human proclivities (of a Lévi-Straussian nature), and that however rich they were linguistically, the proto-Indo-Europeans were probably ‘culturally rather simple’ (Renfrew 1987: 273). Anyone who can think this simply has not come to grips with the volume and, above all, the interconnectedness of the evidence. It is understandable that an archaeologist should be tempted to exaggerate the possibilities of his own discipline, but as regards ‘cultural simplicity’ it is, I think, more for archaeology to accommodate its interpretations to the facts established by comparativism, than vice versa.

Renfrew’s archaeological objection is repeated by D’yakonov in his brief ‘excursus’ on Dumézil (1990: 111-13). This senior and learned Russian philologist also maintains that Dumézil overemphasized the significance of language families, was wrong to limit himself to three functions (several others are suggested, in passing!), and sometimes made tenuous rapprochements. The third charge is true enough, and Dumézil was sometimes the first to criticize and discard his own proposals; the second shows a deep misunderstanding of Dumézil’s sense of
pattern or structure. The first raises a more useful point. A priori, it is entirely natural and reasonable to look for broader forms of comparativism that transcend the language family, and this is one of the things Dumézil was doing in his Frazerian phase during the 1920s. It would be perfectly reasonable also to work on a smaller scale, confining oneself for instance to the Indo-Iranian branch of the language family. However, as it turns out, the Indo-European family as a whole has, so far, offered a framework within which cultural comparison is particularly rewarding.

I should like to close with a brief discussion of a book that does not mention Dumézil but relates to this issue of broader-scale comparativism. Possibly the most influential paradigm for approaching myth (or ideology, cosmology, belief system...) is still Lévi-Strauss’s, and although in his foreword Sahlins optimistically refers to his former doctoral student as “initiating a paradigm shift”, Schrempp is essentially Lévi-Straussian. He starts from a sense of affinity between Zeno’s paradoxes concerning space or movement and certain tribal creation myths retailed by Lévi-Strauss, in which an original continuum gives way to discreteness when some primal element is deleted. This leads him, via the Great Chain of Being, to the Maori—for his doctorate he worked in Auckland, particularly on the Maori language. In the narrative mode of Maori cosmogony, Tāwhiri, the Wind, seems to mediate between discreteness and continuity (p. 78f.). But the Maori also have genealogical cosmologies, and Schrempp associates this dualism with Kant’s antinomies, allegedly unduly neglected by Durkheim. Finally he returns to Achilles and the tortoise by looking at some foot-races in North American myths.

A bare summary of themes cannot do justice to the sheer ingenuity of the argument, but one has to ask what it achieves. Dumézil and Lévi-Strauss helped each other in their careers, and greatly respected each other’s work (cf. Eribon 1992: 329ff.); Dumézil held that there was room for both approaches and deprecated attempts to award primacy to one or the other. However, unless individuals can think up totally new approaches to myth they have to choose between those on the market, and it seems to me even harder for Lévi-Straussians than it is for Dumézilians to attain results that will endure and that can be built on by others. Polynesia must possess a common cultural heritage—indeed Schrempp refers to a ‘shared inventory of mythological themes’ (p. 71). Would it not have been more useful in the long term to explore this historically and geographically specific and coherent body of material than to work at that lofty level of abstraction where Bororo, Greek and Maori face identical cognitive problems?

3. Compare the work of Lyle (1990) which, imaginative and adventurous though it is, is unpersuasive in its attempt to build Dumézil’s functions into an ideological schema applicable to most archaic old-world cultures.
One wonders if today's world-wide comparativism will fare any better than Frazer's has.

Debates about Dumézil will certainly continue. The notion that alongside their grammar and lexicon the Indo-Europeans transmitted a body of ideas is so obviously reasonable that it can hardly fail to go on inspiring research. Perhaps culture changes so much faster than language (or did in this case) that all such attempts will collapse; or perhaps the (approximately) fifteen volumes of the mature Dumézil will one day be subjected to a critique so devastating that nothing of substance remains; but neither supposition looks plausible. Ideally the debate will steer a middle way between blanket endorsement of the mature views (which would be wholly contrary to Dumézil's own example of self-criticism), and equally undiscriminating rejection: and ideally it will be equally scrupulous in its treatment of what Dumézil says and what the sources say. Revisions will certainly be needed, but the three functions, more or less in their present form, are scarcely vulnerable. On the other hand, the social organization of knowledge (with its disciplines, departments and careers) will make for difficulties, and to wear down the opposition to Dumézil may take even longer than it did to wear down the opposition to the theory of Continental Drift.

REFERENCES


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VALUES AND HIERARCHY
IN THE STUDY OF BALINESE FORMS OF LIFE:
ON THE APPLICABILITY OF DUMONTIAN PERSPECTIVES
AND THE RANKING OF CONTEXTS

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER

Elèves, I salute you! . . .
Continue your annotations, continue your questionings.

Walt Whitman

I

Dumont's Homo Hierarchicus (1966; transl. e.g. 1980) is about India and the system of castes. It has, however, been employed over the past fifteen years or so to discuss values and hierarchy in many forms of life outside the subcontinent. Dumont's theory of hierarchical opposition and the 'encompassment of the contrary' (henceforth, Dumont's theory) has been adduced to explicate forms of
life in Africa and South America, in the Rif (Jamous 1981), in Melanesia (e.g. de Coppet 1978, Iteanu 1983) and in eastern Indonesia (e.g. Barraud 1979, Platenkamp 1988), as well as in the comparison of Melanesian and other ideologies (Barraud, De Coppet, Iteanu and Jamous 1984) and of Indonesian ideologies (Barraud and Platenkamp 1990). Most recently, the following have appeared: an article about the Lio of Flores (Howell 1989); two consecutive issues of the Leiden journal, *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, edited by Barraud and Platenkamp (Vol. CXLV, no. 4, and Vol. CXLVI, no. 1); an essay by Barraud (1990a); and a special double issue of *Ethnos* (Vol. LV, nos. 3-4), edited by Howell, including essays by de Coppet (1990), Iteanu (1990), Barraud (1990b) and Howell (1990b). All these publications include more or less laudatory references to Dumont's theory, demonstrating that, in spite of the many difficulties that have been seen with it, both middle-career and younger social anthropologists take Dumont's theory of hierarchized idea-values to be a helpful heuristic resource (and perhaps more) in the analysis of varied forms of life from different parts of the world.

Dumont's influence has been less marked and direct on studies about Balinese forms of life. Boon (e.g. 1977: 92, 120, 148-9; 1990: 137, 161-8 *passim*) refers to Dumont's work, but generally either to illustrate a point that he himself wants to make that has no direct bearing on Dumont's theory, or to take Dumont's part against such of his critics as Appadurai (e.g. 1988). Clifford Geertz acknowledges (1980: 238 n., 125-31, 239) that his views about Indian Brahmins and kings, as well as his developing line of thought, derive from Dumont's 'seminal work' in *Homo Hierarchicus* and elsewhere. Such other writers about Balinese forms of life as Charras, Gerdin, Hinzler, Angela Hobart, Mark Hobart, Hooykaas, Ramseyer and Schaareman do not invoke Dumont's theory to explicate their materials. I have repudiated (1987: 196) an earlier reference to it (1985a: 245) as being unnecessary; while Howe (1989: 53 n.3) 'on the whole' accepts the criticism of *Homo Hierarchicus* that it overemphasizes one set of values (hierarchy) and the fixed and static nature of the “traditional” caste system.

The contrast between the employment of Dumont's theory demonstrated above and its almost total disregard by writers about the Balinese is arresting. Since at least 1914, Bali has repeatedly been asserted or argued to bear marked resemblances to, or to be comparable with, forms of life both of the Pacific (e.g. van Kol 1914: 343; Chegaray 1955: 196-8; Boon 1977: 111, 238 n.6) and of eastern Indonesia (e.g. Esser 1938: map 9; Schaareman 1986: 142; Boon 1990: chs. 5, 6; Duff-Cooper 1990a: ch. 2); while its system of the four estates (*catur bangsa*), under some aspects, is rather akin to representations of the Indian caste system. Perhaps the contrast is, at least partly, explicable by writers about the Balinese not

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1. Guermonprez (1987: 211 n. 14) is therefore inexact in ascribing to Boon the distinction of being the first in Balinese studies to draw the parallel. But perhaps Guermonprez has a restricted understanding of 'Balinese studies', since he credits (ibid., ix) their real inception to the Geertzes.
Values, Hierarchy and Forms of Life

having had the close institutional contact that forms part of the professional biographies of very many of those who espouse Dumont’s theory in their work. By ‘institutional’ is meant the research team Équipe de Recherche de l’Anthropologie Sociale: Morphologie, Échanges (Erasme), of the CNRS in Paris, of which Dumont was the founding director and de Coppet is the present director, and to which Dumont seems still to be very close.

One writer about an aspect of Balinese life, though, has had contact with Erasme, and he, Guermonprez, indeed espouses Dumont’s theory, in a conclusion to his book about the Balinese Pandé that, one understands (Guermonprez 1987: 198), was the only part of his thesis (1984) to be rewritten before it went to the printers. In section II below I outline parts of Guermonprez’s new conclusion, in which ‘the “discovery” in Bali of Hierarchy in Louis Dumont’s sense’ (see Guermonprez 1987: xiii) is explicited. In section III I consider how far Guermonprez follows Dumont’s theory, and whether and in what regards it was novel (see ibid.: 200) and useful for him to do so. In section IV I address the question, raised by the matters addressed in sections II and III: ‘Are (Balinese) contexts ranked?’

II

Guermonprez’s first conclusion to his study about the Pandé employed the notion of ‘social space’ borrowed from Condominas. This notion, though, suggests a multi-dimensional space without levels and underestimates the social fact that Balinese society is also an ordered, hierarchicized whole, in line with Dumont’s assertion (1966: 14) that hierarchy is the fundamental social principle (Guermonprez 1987: 199, xiii).

In Guermonprez’s view, the Maussian total social fact that is significant above all others in Balinese society is the temple. Furthermore, it is the only obvious order of the society that does not evince such immediately observable structural features as the prestations and counterprestations and the exchange of women by men that are manifest in many eastern Indonesian societies (ibid.: 200). However, to appreciate the significance of temples it is necessary to recognize that religious values impose themselves in all Balinese relationships and that they define a level and an order that are not reducible to one component, among others, of the social system (ibid.: 199).

Guermonprez, then, introduces the notion of hierarchy as the order that (necessarily) results from the putting into play of value (Dumont 1983a: 263). And he explains that the relationship to gods and ancestors (a totalizing expression, like gods/ancestors, justified by the way in which shrines, everywhere in Bali, always refer to a founding ancestral core and to what can be called the gods of the universe, including such elements of the geography of the island as mountains and
lakes (Guennonprez 1987: 202)) is absolutely central to an understanding of Bali. It is the pivot around which are ordered the values of the society and the levels that follow from them. With the idea of gods/ancestors is associated a value. The putting into play of this produces an order, hierarchy and levels (ibid.: 199-200). Thus there is a level of (Guennonprez calls it) the autochthonous, to which kinship and the village belong. This level is hierarchically integrated into the ultimate whole of the universe by its encompassment by the society of castes. At the former level, the idea-value, gods/ancestors, is put into play with an emphasis on ancestors; at the latter, the idea-value is also put into play, but the basic idea-value is separated into two poles: one, an ancestral pole, Majapahit; the other, a more explicitly divine pole, Siwa (ibid.: 203). The castes (bangsa), understood as the encompassing unities of concrete kin groups, derive from Majapahit. This is the master symbol upon which is based a totalizing theory of Balinese society as a unified social body of which the four castes are the hierarchically articulated limbs. But there also exist groups known as soroh, the members of which are all taken by their classification as such to be symmetrically related. Soroh (and the people who comprise them qua their constituent members) simply differ one from another, as mangoes, say, are all alike and just differ from papaya, which are also all alike (ibid.: 54). Soroh stand at the summit of the order of kinship. Hierarchy, though, imposes itself on soroh through titles. From soroh to bangsa—from a whole in itself, a Leibnizian monad, to elements only conceivable in their relationships to an encompassing whole—is the move from the level of the autochthonous to that of the castes. There is, moreover, a tension between soroh and bangsa that has a cosmic dimension to which the polemic (discussed earlier in Guennonprez’s book) over holy water (tirtha) draws attention (ibid.: 203-5).

Holy water (ibid.: 207) gives direct or indirect access to the universal whole. Pedanda, Brahmana priests, who in their daily meditation called Suryaséwana make holy water and who, of course, are at the head of the society of castes, evidence the ultimate encompassing order of which the god Siwa (pedanda may also be called siwa) is the pre-eminent figure, the second master symbol subsuming all the levels of the gods/ancestors idea-value (ibid.: 205). So origin-points (kawitan), which can be symbolized as house compound and other group temples, culminate in Majapahit, while Siwa, the apical deity, is the integral figure of all the gods/ancestors. At this point, Guennonprez introduces the lotus seat (padmasana), the place of the god Siwa as Surya, the sun god, usually located in the north-east corner of temples—the strategic angle where the shrines of the ancestors, which have ‘the head to the mountain’, and those of the gods, which have ‘the head to the rising sun’, converge. This seat objectifies the universal whole that designates the level of the society of castes (ibid.: 204).

The holy water that pedanda make is superior to that had from the gods/ancestors in temples. Pedanda are the purest and most direct descendants of Majapahit. They have access to the highest level of the values of the society of castes. Similarly, the holy water they make (or rather, that Siwa makes through them) has a universal value; that made by the gods/ancestors in temples does not.
But these two kinds of holy water are not incompatible; they are superposable, just as the ritual of the Brahminical priest can be superposed on that which the pemangku, the priest of a temple who is usually Sudra, orchestrates (ibid.: 205-7).

At the level of the society of castes, Siwa integrates the whole, gods/ancestors. From here come the world and holy water of the highest quality, a truly nourishing liquid. Below this level is found the deified ancestral core of Majapahit, constituted by the Javanese mpu, semi-divine beings who engendered the diversity of “the people of Majapahit” (wong Majapahit) hierarchicized in castes and title groups, and from where derives in particular the division between the Triwangsa (the three finest ‘castes’: Brahmana, Ksatrya, Vésia) and Sudra. This level exposes and orders the encompassment of humankind in the superior whole of the society of castes. Similarly, the idea-value Siwa exposes and orders the encompassment of the society of castes in the ultimate whole of the universe. Both Siwa and Majapahit are origin-points, but at different levels. The idea-value gods/ancestors traverses Balinese society from the domestic temples legitimating houses to the construction of the highest sky where Siwa is found; and it allows more and more inclusive levels to be distinguished. Three principal levels may be distinguished thus in Balinese ideology: the level of the autochthonous, that of the society of castes, and the level of the universe or cosmos (ibid.: 208).

III

Anyone familiar with Dumont’s theory will grant that Guermonprez appears to be very faithful to it. Thus he stresses that Balinese society is a unity (1987: 199, cf. viii, ix, x, 66 n.22), a whole, just as Dumont emphasizes that ‘sociologically, India is one’ (e.g. 1957: 9, original emphasis; 1983b: 106). Of course, the wholeness is a precondition for the application of Dumont’s theory (Dumont 1978: 105). The whole (globalité) is ordered and hierarchical (Guermonprez 1987: 199). This order results from “the putting into play of value” (Guermonprez 1987: 199, quoting Dumont 1983a: 263).

Hierarchy, in Dumont’s sense, consists of ‘two contradictory aspects of different level: distinction within an identity [and] encompassment of the contrary’ (Dumont 1983a: 263; see also 1980: 239). The part, that is, is identical to the whole, and the part is not only the whole which is not necessarily a part: A is evaluated as superior to B, and A stands for and includes B. An example from Guermonprez’s conclusion is as follows. The gods (ancestors) in a compound temple are identical, at the autochthonous level, with the apical god Siwa, but they are not only Siwa, and Siwa is not necessarily the gods in a compound temple. Siwa is valued as superior to the gods in a compound temple, and Siwa includes and stands for them. Siwa is positioned at the level of the total society and the cosmos. Between this level and that of the autochthonous there is the level of the
society of castes. Majapahit stands in a relation to this and to the autochthonous level that is analogous to the relation of Siwa to them. The relations, though, hold at different levels. These levels are created by the putting into play of the idea-value gods/ancestors.

Towards the end of his conclusion, Guermonprez gives various reasons why the ‘discovery’ in Bali of hierarchy in Dumont’s sense is important. Among these are that it permits the identification of idea-values and that these, Guermonprez suggests (1987: 210, 211), will release Bali from being a sociological curiosity, and will also introduce Bali to a comparative dialogue both with India and the Pacific and with societies in eastern Indonesia, from which it has hitherto been excluded. Things seem not to have turned out as Guermonprez hoped, however. While, for instance, both Barraud (1990b: 216) and de Coppet (1990: 149) refer to studies that reveal a more or less clear or explicit appreciation of the heuristic value of Dumont’s theory, neither Guermonprez’s study in general nor his conclusion (nor any of his other publications) are mentioned by them, nor are they cited in any of the post-1987 articles mentioned in section I above. When Bali is mentioned, a piece by Howe is referred to.

This ignoring of the only interpretation of aspects of Balinese ideology in terms of Dumont’s theory might seem odd, were it not that in three main respects (at least), Guermonprez renders his conclusion in a way that makes it unlikely to appeal to such writers as de Coppet and Barraud (and Platenkamp). First, Guermonprez employs an etic idiom when writing about his materials, by employing, without qualification, such categories as ‘kinship’, ‘caste’, ‘history’ and ‘religion’. The stance that this employment evinces is unlikely in the extreme to be acceptable to members of Erasme, or their associates, who are extremely careful in their use of such pairs of labels as ‘sacred/profane’ and ‘soul/body’ (see e.g. Iteanu 1990, Barraud 1990b). Indeed, one has written: ‘every society possesses a different conception of what is real and consequently develops a different and probably unique categorisation of its experience; how then can we understand society by imposing on it the Western conceptions of reality and Western society’s system of values?’ (de Coppet 1981: 198); to which is footnoted: ‘which categorises observed phenomena as “psychological”, “political”, “economic”?’ (ibid.: 202 n.15).

Secondly, in spite of Guermonprez’s employment of the idiom of Dumont’s theory, and especially its references to levels, the division of Balinese ideology into three principal levels is not accompanied by the description and analysis of any reversals or inversions. These operations, which are largely equivalents (Needham 1983: 96), are inseparable from the notion of levels—Dumont has it (1982: 224) that the ranking of idea-values ‘includes reversal as one of its properties’—and they are evidences of changes of levels (Dumont 1978: 106; cf. de Coppet 1981: 198-9, 202 n.16). Any analysis that employs Dumont’s theory with its references to levels but does not point to and then analyse reversals (inversions) as indicating changes of levels must, it would seem, be unfaithful to
a main plank of the theory. Perhaps Barraud (and Platenkamp) and other members of Erasme have taken the same view.\(^2\)

Finally, in spite of the idiom that Guermonprez adopts, the division of Balinese life into three is in fact rather conventional. It was adopted by Korn in *Het Adatrecht van Bali* (1932), still ‘a standard work for every researcher concerned with (the) Balinese’ (Schaareman 1986: 1). In Korn’s view (1932: 76-9, 227-8), Bali consisted of an ‘Old Balinese’ region and an ‘apanage’ region, the latter being divided into two zones. Later, Howe (1989), in a remodelling of Korn’s thesis, divides the island into three contiguous zones: the mountains, an intermediary zone and the southern plains zone.

This latter attempt to classify forms of Balinese social organization is, of course, subsequent to Guermonprez’s and at points it relies on the latter, though not on his rendering of his materials into the terms of Dumont’s theory. But both are conventional in this sense: from at least the 1880s until the recent past (see e.g. Jacobs 1883: 52; Hilda Geertz and Clifford Geertz 1975: 198; Clifford Geertz 1980: 45-7), writers have divided Bali into a Bali Aga (‘Original’ Balinese) and a ‘Hindu-Bali’ zone. Korn (1932: 2-3) had already criticized this overly simple division; and, if it was not inevitable, it is not very surprising that when he (and later Guermonprez and Howe) should have reconsidered it, because it was unsatisfactory, the division should have been expanded to a tripartition, the next more numerically complex mode of classification by division. Korn splits one of his two basic components into two. Howe interposes a medial type, that combines attributes of the original two, between them. Each is a familiar way of expanding a bi- into a tri-partition (Hocart 1970: 289; Needham 1979: 9).

Guermonprez does not adopt either of these strategies: he adds a level, that of the cosmos, to his two more basic principal levels. This approach is dictated by Dumont’s theory, as explicated by, for instance, de Coppet: ‘the whole, to which all social actions are geared, is society and universe combined’; ‘the cosmos...cannot [should not?] be separated from the society on which it relies for its existence’ (1990: 148). Or, as Barraud (1990b: 216) suggests, a non-modern society is a ‘socio-cosmic whole’.\(^3\) The strategy might also be thought consonant with the view that many writers about Balinese ideology have held to, namely, that it is a whole every aspect of which is pervaded by ‘religious values’.

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2. In fairness it should be said that Guermonprez (1987: 198, cf. 210-11) starts by saying that his ‘new’ conclusion is an introduction to further studies. It may be, also, that the refusal of Pandé to accept holy water from *pedanda* while accepting the supremacy of the god Siwa and using the Brahmanical ritual to make it for themselves, thus annulling an essential hierarchical relationship, is a reversal (ibid.: 206), perhaps Needham’s type 12, ‘abstention from normal practice’ (1983: 100, 116). But it seems not to evidence a change of level, or at least Guermonprez does not say it does.

3. The distinction between ‘modern’ and ‘non-modern’ is from Dumont (e.g. 1982: *passim*). On difficulties with this aspect of Dumont’s theory, see e.g. Needham 1987: 104-6.
I do not want to disparage these schemes because they employ tripartition. But although triality is a very common mode of classification by division in Balinese ideology, it is far from being the only or indeed the main one. Bipartition is also common and important, and so, more or less, are the divisions of an entity into from four to eleven constituent aspects. These aspects may be related one to another in various ways. They may be related symmetrically and/or asymmetrically, and by one of the modes of reflexivity and of transitivity. These may be dynamically expressed as periodic modes, and they may be reversed (inverted). Past analyses (see references in note 4, especially 1988a) show that these principles in different combinations order aspects of the contexts of Balinese ideology. The same combinations are evinced in different contexts, and different combinations are evinced by the same contexts.

Mention of contexts brings us to a further, and for the present purpose the last, major divergence between Guermonprez and Dumont's theory. Although Dumont (1978: 108 n.23) alludes to a 'variety of contexts and the conceptual differences that go with them', he later (1982: 225) came down heavily against contexts, because 'they are foreseen, inscribed or implied in the ideology [under study] itself', his preference being for 'different "levels" hierarchicized together with the corresponding entities'. None the less, Guermonprez refers to 'registres ou...contextes', i.e. 'levels or...contexts' (1987: 208). This is not permissible within Dumont's theory. But Guermonprez's elision of levels and contexts does make his reference (ibid.: 208) to levels that are 'more and more inclusive' intelligible. Levels, in Dumont's theory, are strata-like, standing one above another like the strata of a geological formation (see Needham 1987: 185, 144), or they are positions within a hierarchy. Neither strata nor such positions can have extension, and thus levels cannot be 'inclusive' to any degree. But contexts, of course, do so and may be. Guermonprez's equation of levels and contexts also lends support to the view that "level" stands for nothing in particular [in Tcherkezoff 1983]. Whenever the word is used, in relation to ethnographic data, it can be replaced by "context" (ibid.: 182).

Howell mentions (1990a: 137-8) that the members of Erasme maintain that 'complementary oppositions'—a phrase that has 'a more or less adventitious use as a term of expository rhetoric', but not one that is 'suitable for employment in comparative analysis' (Needham 1987: 101; see also Duff-Cooper 1991a)—'can always be replaced by hierarchical oppositions whereby one of the pair stands for the whole and thereby encompasses its opposite'. This, though, is an empirical and not a theoretical matter. Recourse to Balinese ideology and the opposites

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4. For definitions of these relations and for discussion of their places in Balinese ideology see respectively e.g. Duff-Cooper 1985b and 1991a; 1988a; 1990a: ch. 4; 1986a; 1986b.

5. I have elsewhere (1990d) suggested that these combinations of principles are probably the most satisfactory criteria by which to order forms of Balinese life, and I have done some of the preparatory work (1991c). The method is not new; in its essentials it is that proposed by Lowie (1917).
sun/moon and high/low, for instance, in which neither ‘sun’ nor ‘high’ can stand for the wholes ‘sun/moon’ and ‘high/low’ and therefore does not encompass its opposite, shows that what the members of Erasme maintain, as Howell describes it, is wrong. However, Barraud and Pia ten kamp (1990) have analysed comparatively the rituals of three of the societies written about in the issues of Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land- en Volkenkunde they edited, by authors who do not refer to Dumont’s theory, and say (ibid.: 106) that although their analyses ‘do not always coincide with those by the authors themselves’, who [it might be thought consequent] collected the data they analyse, they ‘do not question their [the original authors’] interpretation’. My attitude to Guennonprez’s second conclusion is similar: I do not question his interpretation, which of course was written from a particular point of view, that of Dumont’s theory. Allowing that it can be given an exact meaning, a point of view cannot be wrong. I do maintain, though, that it is unnecessary to invoke Dumont’s theory to understand Balinese ideology, especially when Guennonprez’s apparent attitude to holistic analysis is to disregard in his analysis almost everything that constitutes the whole as a way of life for Balinese people.

Had he paid more analytical attention to these other aspects, which include sex, rice-growing, and eating and defecation, among many more, he would perhaps have discovered that there is not one representation, physical or ideational, that is conventional among the Balinese that looks anything like encompassment (as depicted in Dumont’s second figure (1980: 242) of a rectangle in the centre of which there is a second rectangle): whenever pairs of opposites are represented, they are juxtaposed (like the half-male, right side, and half-female, left side, icon Ardhana ri śvara (and see also e.g. Hooykaas 1973: 232-3, 236)) as depicted in Dumont’s first figure of a rectangle cut vertically into two.

Furthermore, while Guennonprez suggests, in line with many writers about the Balinese, that ‘religious values’ pervade their lives, his view of these values is very impoverished. Everything that constitutes Balinese ideology comes from the gods, and everything, and not just what a particular sociological theory suggests, is to be

6. The first figure is supposed to represent complementary opposition, though the equality of the halves into which the rectangle is divided subverts it: most writers about such opposites maintain that they are unequally valued (e.g. Barnes 1985: 14). Pipis bolong, old Chinese coins with a hole at the centre that are used in Balinese offerings look somewhat like a Venn diagram, which is ideally suited to illustrate encompassment (Needham 1987: 134, fig. 2). But these are Chinese coins, and China is precisely an example of a society where ‘encompassment of the contrary’ is not the kind of opposition evinced (Dumont 1978: 108). This seeming divergence can be explained in at least two ways: representations like these coins do not reflect the kind of opposition the culture they derive from employs, or perhaps the interpretation of the form of the coins here is faulty. Given Leenhardt’s authoritative insistence (1975: xv) on the help that the plastic arts of a people can give in understanding their form(s) of life, I should say that the coins do not represent encompassment, which does not appear in China. Similarly, they do not do so in Balinese ideology which, to labour the point perhaps, seems not to discriminate this kind of opposition.
interpreted by reference to those values. Different writers have done this in
different and more or less compellingly cogent ways. My attitude has been, and
remains, that because everything derives from, is pervaded by, and is contained in
Ida Sang Hyang Vidhi, the high or highest Balinese god, everything is to be
interpreted by reference to Vidhi in various guises. Because of this derivation,
and because everything is therefore pervaded by Vidhi, Balinese ideology, I have
often maintained, is a sacred whole of which every aspect is ritual; or, it is a whole
that is, so to say, taken for granted by Balinese in the middle world (madyapada),
the realm of material human beings, and completely ordinary (cf. Jeremy and
Robinson 1989: 185). Either way, it can be seen as consisting in various contexts.
This is expectable: the strategy or style of ‘contextualizing’ (nganutang, literally
‘fitting’) is not ‘an analyst’s importation’, but one adopted by Balinese (cf. Hobart
1986b: 151).

Dumont complains (e.g. 1978: 108, cf. 102) that a certain style of symbolic
analysis confuses or elides contexts. Needham has shown (1987: 112-19) that
Dumont’s complaint, as he expresses it, makes no sense. But perhaps there is a
point worth considering, to which we have not been brought (cf. Duff-Cooper
1991a: 58 n.3) but have been further nudged by Guermontprez and his elision of
‘level’ and ‘context’: ‘Are contexts in Balinese ideology ranked?’ Considering this
question will once again emphasize a pons asinorum in the study of symbolic
classification, namely, ‘the importance of keeping the context…perpetually in view’
(Needham 1973: xxvii). It will also advance understanding of the analysis of
(Balinese) forms of life.

IV

The OED gives various meanings for ‘context’. The most relevant is: ‘the parts
which immediately precede or follow (something) and determine its meaning’.
More generally, and usefully, I take ‘context’ to be that ‘which environs the sub­
ject of our interest and helps by its relevance to explain it’ (Scharfstein 1989: 1).

Mark Hobart has written most extensively about ‘context’ in Balinese ideology,
and about the relationships of contexts to meaning and to power (1986b); and he
has discussed problems involved with making a theory of context in the light of

7. Guermontprez rejects this possibility with some superior and in places inexact remarks about
Vidhi (1987: vi-vii) and about those who take seriously what is said about Vidhi by, for
example, Brahmana pedanda and villagers, young and old, ‘educated’ (scolarise) or not. For
references to studies that do take seriously what is said, and written, about Vidhi by Balinese
people, see Duff-Cooper 1991d. See also Hooykaas (1973: 19): Vidhi is ‘the highest principle’
and ‘a generally used word’. One widely respected writer about aspects of Balinese life equates
Dumont’s theory (Hobart 1985). In the course of the former study, he makes a
cogent argument, first, for denying that contexts can be identified as ‘marriage’,
for instance, or as pertaining to the ‘village’ (desa). Thus he argues that it is
arbitrary to conclude that ‘one feature of an institution is essential and the others
ancillary’, especially when ‘which feature is to the fore’ for Balinese depends upon
Hobart’s arguments are even more persuasive when they are read in conjunction
with Needham’s demonstrations that ‘marriage’, ‘incest’ and ‘kinship’, among
others, are ‘odd-job’ words, ‘very handy in all sorts of descriptive sentences, but
worse than misleading in comparison and of no real use at all in analysis’ (1974:
ch. 1, esp. 44); and with Hocart’s assessment (1952: 25) that the result of forcing
the customs of alien forms of life into the familiar categories of religion, the state,
the family, medicine, and such like, has been ‘disastrous’.

Secondly, Hobart makes the persuasive case, after an examination of a
situation that arose where he was doing fieldwork, that ‘hierarchies were referred
to... All [involved] seemed to operate on the assumption that a correct hierarchy
existed... But...hierarchy did not exist as a fixed system of reference; various
elements in it were variably invoked to interpret the situation’ (1986b: 138). Let
us concentrate here on the report that all involved seemed to operate on the
assumption that a correct hierarchy existed. Adopting this line (in accord with
Traube’s remark (1986: 93) that Mambai do not hold to a uniform dogma about
conception and birth, but that ‘what individuals share are certain classificatory
principles, from which they construct variant representations’) will allow us to
make headway with answering the question posed at the end of section III.

In an essay entitled ‘Language Strata’, Waisman (1968: 119, 120) says that
we can look at things, pragmatically speaking, ‘from within’ by ‘formalizing’ the
enquiry. The approach is akin to that of Needham (e.g. 1978: 57) in his analysis,
to begin with, of myths: ‘we are not after types, but properties. If we can isolate
significant features, then we shall try to see what they are properties of.’ It is also
consonant with the approach adopted in my analysis of Balinese rice-growing, and
less explicitly in other studies, where the definition of ‘aspect’ adopted is, “‘the
way in which the planets, from their relative positions, look upon each other,” not,
it should be emphasized, “their joint look upon the earth”’ (Duff-Cooper 1989:
127). That is, it is probably preferable not to try to isolate this, that, and other
contexts and to establish their relative evaluation, which would always be open to
dispute by Balinese and non-Balinese alike. I suggest, rather, that we return to the
findings of analyses of social facts that constitute ‘aspects’, as just defined, of
Balinese ideology. These social facts were not defined in advance as pertaining
to this or that context. They were adduced as was found appropriate to establish
the associative settings (Scharfstein’s ‘environs’) of the matters being analysed.
These were defined, in a blurred way, by employing odd-job words.

The principles mentioned above (sec. III) that order Balinese ideology all
derive from Vidhi—‘Divinity as order, what orders’ (Hobart 1986c: 11; cf.
Swellengrebel 1960: 53)—construable in the guise of Sunya, the Void, as perfect
bilateral symmetry. Here, the two constituent aspects of Vidhi are identical one with another, and with the whole that they constitute (Duff-Cooper 1990c). Vidhi as Sunya also evinces perfectly reflexive and transitive relations. Other combinations have been arrived at through other analyses. These combinations have all been ranked (Duff-Cooper 1991c) by various criteria, among which are, summarily, (1) what more closely approximates Vidhi is evaluated as superior to what does so less closely; (2) a negated principle (e.g. irreflexivity, intransitivity) is evaluated as inferior to the principle of which it is a negation; (3) these negated principles are evaluated as superior to the third mode of each: the former implicate necessity, the latter only contingency; and (4) the modes of transitivity are prior, for aesthetic reasons, to the modes of reflexivity. The resulting ranking is shown in Table 1, which leaves out, because they are not directly germane to the present exercise, the concatenating relations, analogy and homology, and the operations—dynamic modes and reversal/inversion—that may be performed on the social facts in which the combinations were discerned (the latter operations, incidentally, not indicating changes of level or anything of that kind but contexts where misfortunes and/or deaths (see e.g. Weck 1937: 42-3) predominate).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>modes of partition:</th>
<th>division of an entity into from two to eleven aspects</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>relations in combination:</td>
<td>perfectly symmetrical, totally reflexive, transitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>symmetrical, reflexive, transitive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>symmetrical, reflexive, none</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>symmetrical, non-reflexive, in- or non-transitive</td>
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<td></td>
<td>symmetrical, non-reflexive, non-transitive</td>
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<td>asymmetrical, reflexive, transitive</td>
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<td>asymmetrical, irreflexive, intransitive</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>asymmetrical, reflexive, intransitive</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

8. Vidhi is also Sang Hyang Tuduh; 'tuduh' meaning 'what fate brings, lot, destiny' (Swellengrebel 1960: 52).

9. In an earlier study (Duff-Cooper 1990b: 293), the modes of reflexivity are judged prior to the modes of transitivity, on the ground that 'a mode of reflexivity is built into “simple” duality while the modes of transitivity necessarily implicate three entities'. This divergence shows that even when an analysis employs such notions as these principles, which have a surety that substantive matters of social fact generally do not possess, context can have a marked impact on the decisions the analyst makes and the findings (if any) to which s/he comes.
These combinations of principles, and, it may be presumed, others still to be discerned, give Balinese ideology its order. By 'order' is meant that aspects of Balinese ideology correspond more or less closely to Vidhi. They also render the present and earlier representations of it in order, in the sense that they attain their envisaged ends. These are: first, an enhanced appreciation of Balinese ideology as a totality; second, a way of comparing aspects of Balinese life with aspects of such other forms of life as the Japanese (e.g. Yoshida and Duff-Cooper 1989; Duff-Cooper 1992); and third, to pave the way for an ordering of Balinese forms of life anywhere (and, indeed, at any time). I have suggested, also, that 'the appearance and reappearance of these principles determine the texture (as it were) of each aspect of Balinese ideology' (Duff-Cooper 1991e: 201). A question with which to conclude the present section should now be considered: 'What is meant by “texture”?'

It is tempting, in trying to answer this question, to try to construct a typology by reference, say, to a combination, or to combinations, of principles and the types of situation, e.g. harmonious or acrimonious, in which they are discernible. This approach, though, would at once subvert the formality of the method adopted and would push us back towards definition, with all its attendant disputability, and the questions of power that such disputes implicate. It is therefore preferable to look at things as follows. An analyst, for his or her own purposes, more or less imprecisely defines an aspect of, say, Balinese ideology and its 'environs' to consider. As Frake puts it (1969: 132), when the appropriate changes have been made, 'there is no one way to separate the conceptual structure of a people into a finite number of discrete, clearly delimited domains'. Rather, and for preference taking our directions from Balinese people who know what they are talking about, we move about the form of life by a variety of paths (as it were), that are all more or less directly interconnected. In doing so, the analyst who employs the formal notions shown in Table 1, for instance, shines light on the interior of the whole from different angles. Doing so enables him or her to establish the various ways in which order—by which is here meant correspondence in transformation with Vidhi—is procured. What can then be maintained is that the order procured has different aspects, which are themselves finer or coarser approximations to, or which have finer or coarser correspondences with, Vidhi. These aspects can all be brought together and expressed synchronically and diachronically by a three-dimensional model (though not simultaneously unless more than one model is made) (see Duff-Cooper 1990b).

None of this precludes other approaches, of course. Indeed, they are to be encouraged because, as Mark Hobart puts it (1985: 50), knowledge is built up from

10. 'Context' and 'texture' are, of course, etymological cognates.

11. The verb 'to argue' is derived from Indo-European *arg-, to be white or bright, so that 'the outcome of a convincing argument is a proposition that throws light on whatever is at issue' (Needham 1983: 19).
a plurality of perspectives; though not any perspective—some are incoherent (e.g. Howe 1989), others are unnecessarily complicating and/or impoverished (e.g. the conclusion to Guermonprez 1987), and others again may bear so distant a relationship to social facts that it is hard to make out what they are supposed to be about (e.g. Boon 1990) (see respectively Duff-Cooper 1990d; sec. III, above; 1991f).

So it can no longer be accepted that the appearance and reappearance of the principles in combinations 'determine' the texture of aspects of Balinese life. Rather, they are themselves an aspect of those textures, now understood as the formative elements or constituents of contexts. These, and what for instance Rössier (1990: 293) refers to as 'specific cultural themes as well as specific patterns in religion, world view, ethos, and norms and values', which in some cases may be transformations, or the direct employment, of themes and the rest, that have a more or less wide incidence, contribute to us being able to say, 'this is Balinese, and fine', for instance, as Balinese people themselves do.12

V

Dumont's work about India, from which has come what I have been referring to here as Dumont's theory, is a contribution to the debate about what Appadurai (1986a: 357) refers to as the 'gatekeeping concepts' that 'define the quintessential and dominant questions of interest', such as, in India, hierarchy (ibid.: 360).

Dumont, of course, and according to Howell the Erasme team in general, privileges theory. Such privileging may in general be earmarked by hierarchy and essentiality (Ryan 1982: 130). It is certainly so in Dumont's work. Not only is it based on the hierarchical relationship between parts and whole, and between one part and its opposite; but his work also distinguishes 'levels' of professional social anthropological tendencies, which are implicitly ranked in a hierarchy, conventionally speaking. It is to the highest level of these tendencies—'the true nature of anthropology'—that he and his congeners in Erasme, we may assume, hold (Dumont 1978: 84-5). Furthermore, it has been suggested that Dumont is personally committed to hierarchy and totality, and that he is 'clearly against egalitarianism and individuality' (Needham 1987: 144). Moreover, Dumont

12. Cf. Boon 1990: 210 n.2: 'the Balinese' hypostatize themselves (and others'). On many of these formative elements or constituents, see e.g. Duff-Cooper 1988b, 1990c. These analyses, incidentally, show that Hobart's view that context 'is not an object but sets of relations' is too partial. But the relations among the relations and the more substantive things, pragmatically speaking, that combine to form contexts are indeed 'complex' (Hobart 1985: 48). On the complexity of the concatenating relations, analogy and homology, in the Balinese case, see Duff-Cooper 1991a.
explicitly states (1980: 219) that he believes that hierarchy is ‘essentially...a
relation that can succinctly be called the “encompassing of the contrary”’
(emphasis added).

Appadurai points out that in the study of South Asian society, the trope
tological hegemony of hierarchy is being loosened in two main ways, namely by ‘explicit
critiques’ and by a ‘proliferation of anthropologies’ (1986b: 757)—what Dumont
would perhaps refer to as ‘pseudoanthropologies’ or ‘antianthropologies’ (see
Dumont 1978: 84-5), subverting the position of ‘the true...anthropology’. The
flurry of papers from Erasme, and the special issues of *Bijdragen tot de Taal, Land-
en Volkenkunde* and *Ethnos*, and the rest, can be seen in part at least as an
attempt both to reduce the impact of those proliferating anthropologies on the
hegemony of ‘hierarchy’ in South Asia and to extend Erasme’s gatekeeping role
to other parts of the world.

Guermonprez’s view of his work on the Balinese Pandé in his second
conclusion is an explicit attempt to bring Bali (and of course his work and, it
follows, himself) into the comparative arenas of India and eastern Indonesia and
the Pacific. This attempt seems so far to have been unsuccessful. But more
interesting questions are suggested by Appadurai. While, he grants, most routine
ethnographies profit from those ‘summarizing metonyms’ like ‘hierarchy’ that
provide a point of orientation for the non-specialist reader, does such an attempt
as that of Guermonprez and the reanalyses conducted by Barraud and Platenkamp
(1990), for instance, reveal a relatively arbitrary imposition of the whims of
anthropological fashion on particular places? Do these impositions ‘cost us more
in terms of the richness of our understanding of places than they benefit us in
rhetorical or comparative convenience’? (Appadurai 1988: 45; 1986a: 358).

Readers must of course judge and answer these questions for themselves; but
I think that my answers to these questions will come as no surprise. In making
Bali look like India, as seen through Dumont’s eyes, and like the parts of
Melanesia and eastern Indonesia, and elsewhere, that the members of Erasme and
their collaborators have studied and/or reanalysed, I do indeed judge that the
employment of Dumont’s theory costs more in terms of the possible richness that
understanding of Balinese, and other, forms of life can attain, and gives us very
little, if any, theoretical and/or comparative benefit in recompense. This paucity,
in the main, derives from the theoretical and/or comparative propositions arrived
at (e.g. Barraud, de Coppet, Iteanu and Jamous 1984: 514-18; Barraud and
Plakenkamp 1990: 117-21) being premised upon and couched in the idiom of
Dumont’s theory.

Nevertheless, Guermonprez’s employment of Dumont’s theory brought us,
again, to consider ‘context’ in anthropological analysis and to the question, ‘Are
contexts ranked in Balinese ideology?’ Put this way, the question seemed to ask
for an answer through, at first, the construction of a typology. But this, like any
typology, would in principle be disputable, and I do not wish to get embroiled in
the matters of power which, Mark Hobart has shown (1986a: 15), ‘the definition
of context in Bali turns on’. But I do want to try to understand forms of Balinese
life in a way that does not privilege theory and that helps advance along the lines of approach that have been adopted before. The approach through the combination of those principles listed in Table 1 at once evades the problems with definitions and power that a typology of contexts would inevitably bring upon us, combines theory and social facts in such a way that the social facts are privileged, and through the approach 'from within' allows us to see at once both that the question 'Are Balinese contexts ranked?' is ill-framed and just what the relationship of the principles, in combinations, is to the aspects of a Balinese life in which they have been discerned (or by which they are evinced), namely an aspect of the formative elements or constituents of indigenously defined contexts of the form of life.

13. Boon is clearly incorrect when he asserts, in the sentence ending his note cited in note 12 above, that 'typology cannot be escaped'.

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COMMENT

PARKIN'S EVIDENCE

These further and final remarks on Robert Parkin’s JASO article (Vol. XXIII, no. 3, pp. 253-62) and on his reply (Vol. XXIV, no. 1, pp. 54-63) to my comment (Vol. XXIV, no. 1, pp. 49-54) will only reinforce my previous points about his form of evidence and add two further short points. More examples of Parkin’s methods can be found in his original article and in his recent book (Parkin 1992).

Having been accused by Parkin of unclear wording (‘Reply’, p. 55n.), I shall try to avoid all ambiguities.

1. The passage in Parkin’s original article that reads, ‘comparing like with unlike, for example northern address terminologies with southern reference terminologies in Dumont’s attempt (1966) to prove that the former were as classificatory as the latter’ (p. 253) is a misrepresentation. Implicitly and explicitly—‘the vocabulary...has no “structure” in the strict sense’; ‘we shall...call our system descriptive’—the very opposite was elaborated by Dumont (1966: 96), who anyway withdrew this contribution—‘I came to acknowledge that I had made a radical mistake’ (Dumont 1975: 198)—seventeen years before Parkin chose to criticize it.

2. Parkin’s thesis depends essentially upon ethnographic data on the Juang marriage system. He writes of ‘the rule of delay of three generations’ (p. 256). This ‘rule’ is Parkin’s invention. Several ethnographers, besides myself in my own primary ethnographic research, have discovered such a rule among other tribes but not among the Juang. Parkin’s constant mixing of ethnographic bits and pieces relating to several quite different tribes does encourage confusion,1 but in the present case he has explicitly named McDougal (1963, 1964) as his source, even though he carefully avoided a more detailed reference in the original article. None of the references in Parkin’s reply (p. 55) indicates a ‘rule of delay of three generations’, which is supposed to constitute Parkin’s ‘Juang-type system’ in his crucial ‘third stage’ of kinship evolution in South Asia. What exactly did McDougal’s dissertation report?

The fifth chapter, on ‘The Marriage System’, has an initial section headed ‘Marriage Rules and Preferences’, which Parkin has chosen not to consult for his reply. It informs us of two—and only two—such rules: ‘the first rule is that a man must marry a female belonging to a group which his own classifies as bondhu’, i.e. as hereditary affines; ‘the second rule divides the bondhu category into halves, one prescribed and the other prohibited. A man must marry a female belonging to his generation-set—his own generation or an even-numbered one’ (McDougal 1963:

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1. As far as I can see, none of Parkin’s publications contains a formal analysis of a single terminological system as a whole that would be applicable to a particular middle Indian tribe.
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155). As examples, the ethnographer explicitly names 'five...kin-types from which a spouse may be taken', and among these are 'na (e.g. FMBSD) and bokosini (e.g. FFZSD)' (ibid.: 157), i.e. members of the affinal group already allied with ego's in the second ascending, the grandparental generation. I am not sure if marriage 'rules of delay' could be stated in any clearer wording, and I fail to understand why Parkin continues to defend his contrafactual account. In the present context it is unimportant whether Juang marriage rules are 'therefore reflected in the terminology', as Parkin (p. 256) pointed out, even though in his reply he could not conceive 'how any sort of reflectionism' could be attributed to him (p. 57).

The Juang do not just exist in written sources, the people themselves can provide evidence of their rules. They can be reached from any European airport within forty-eight hours. The passage and a two-month stay in a Juang village costs less than required by the most modest standard of living in Western Europe. Altogether I have spent eighteen months in the middle Indian hills visiting most of the tribal areas in excursions (1972, 1978, 1980/81, 1982, 1983, 1987, 1988, 1990) lasting between two weeks and six months. Most of this time has been spent in the Phulbani and Koraput Districts of Orissa. On my next middle Indian excursion this coming winter I could visit the Juang in the company of established anthropologists from Bihar, West Bengal or Orissa in order to re-examine—for the third time—the Juang marriage rules as described by McDougal. Parkin must have had good reasons for avoiding travelling to South Asia so far, but he could be very helpful by suggesting the conditions under which he would accept ethnographic data from the primary accounts of other authors.

3. On many occasions Parkin has reified the linguistic category 'Munda' into a social group named 'Munda' (subdivided into such similar subgroups as 'the North Munda' and 'the Koraput Munda'). In 1985 he defined 'the Muná' as 'a group of tribes living principally in southern Bihar and Orissa, and speaking languages which are unrelated to Dravidian or Indo-European' (Parkin 1985: 705). The accompanying figure (ibid.: 706) introduces 'the Munda language family (after Zide 1969: 412)'. Parkin also complains that 'virtually no comparative work has been done on them as a group outside the realm of linguistics' (ibid.: 705).

The latter statement is correct. Apart from Parkin no anthropologist—not to speak of the tribals themselves—has ever been aware of Parkin's 'group'. Since the pioneering work of Sarat Chandra Roy on The Mundas and their Country (1912), anthropological usage has confused the sociological term 'Munda' to a group of this name, nowadays registered as a 'scheduled tribe' on the lists of several Indian states. Historians and administrators have discussed the well-known actions of this tribe in the nineteenth century, just as innumerable Indian anthropological reports have described the group itself. But middle Indian ethnography is poorly represented in Europe and the USA, and 'Parkin's group' has thus been able to survive in the most respectable journals.

Similar phantom groups have attracted previous scholars. In South Asia 'the Aryans' are the most popular such group. For decades Leach (1990) could not demolish the concept of 'Aryan invasions' some millennia ago. But the people
Parkin classifies as ‘the Munda’ can be personally consulted. The Gadaba of Koraput (who speak a Munda language) would not normally know of the existence of such tribes as the Munda, Santal, Kharia or Juang (who also speak Munda languages) as no form of communication is maintained. But most Gadaba identify themselves as part of the Desya or indigenous people of Koraput, who share totemic and status categories across the tribal boundaries between Jodia, Rona, Kondh and Ollari people, i.e. speakers of Indo-European or Dravidian languages. In the north, the Juang (with a Munda language) are seen as the ‘junior siblings’ of the Bhuiya, who speak an Indo-European language. Similar dual classification across the boundaries of the language family is found elsewhere.

The issue may be illustrated by an analogy. Anyone could define all the speakers of Germanic languages (including Swedish, Flemish and English) as ‘the Germans’ and write books and articles on their ‘social organization’ that would deal with such similar ‘subgroups’ as ‘the Scandinavian Germans’ and ‘the West Germans’ in Belgium, the Netherlands and Britain. Describing such a social universe would imply that, apart from the linguistic commonalities, these ‘Germans’ shared a unique social criterion when compared to, for example, the Finns, Walloons or the Welsh. But I am not so sure that the anthropological public or the people themselves would readily accept such a classification.

4. In both his original article in JASO (p. 259) and in another article in another journal (1990: 73) Parkin has introduced primary ethnographic data without any reference to the ethnographers themselves. In the course of a general, evolutionist argument he has assigned these data to a tribe he called ‘the Malto’ (and nothing else) without further explanations. No other author of any type of literature has ever called this tribe ‘the Malto’.

In his reply Parkin justifies these omissions as if his articles were not meant for a general readership: ‘as for the complaint concerning absence of sources, these are given in full in Appendix II of my book (1992: 234-6; and in the notes, ibid.: 276), a manuscript copy of which Pfefler has long possessed’ (p. 56). Following this hint, I purchased a copy of Parkin’s book and found there general references to the ethnographies of Sarkar (1933-4), Vidyarthi (1963), Bainbridge (1907-10) and Verma (1959) (Parkin 1992: 276), but no detailed indication of who was responsible for the specific data.2 In particular, nobody was identified as the author of the ‘terminology poised between the last stages of prescription and individualizing north Indian’ that ‘the Malto’ were supposed to frequent as representatives of ‘the fourth stage’ in the evolutionary scheme for South Asia

2. In 1987 Parkin kindly gave me a copy of a manuscript entitled ‘The Sons of Man: An Account of the Munda Tribes of Central India’. He seems to refer to this work now, but misses my point. I had always known that ‘the Malto’ did not exist, whereas other readers of his articles could hardly evaluate his evidence without being provided with a reference to the primary research and the correct name (Maler or Sauria Pahariya) of the tribe that was supposed to represent Parkin’s ‘fourth stage’. A lack of differentiation between primary, secondary and tertiary research is Parkin’s general problem.
presented in Parkin’s *JASO* article (p. 258). Having thus been forced to examine these sources in detail, the only account I have found that appears to fit is Sarkar’s (1933-4: 257-9), though when compared to Parkin’s table (p. 259), there are minor differences of spelling. The other sources differ or are irrelevant.

Sarkar was a meticulous reporter. His account introduced six different terminologies collected in six different villages among tribals he correctly introduced as ‘the Malers’. The six terminological schemes offered the vocabulary for 54 kin types within each of them. Sarkar also wrote on language—‘the Malers speak Malto’ (1933-4: 151)—but Parkin omits this reference. Parkin also refers to important variations in meaning among five out of the eight Malto terms supplied, and attributes them to ‘some dialects’ (p. 259). But neither Sarkar nor any of the other sources inform us about ‘some dialects’. Thus, instead of a reference to Sarkar’s elaborate ethnographic work, Parkin represents the ‘fourth stage’ in the evolution of South Asian kinship by eight terms, of which five have a different meaning in ‘some dialects’ unknown to any of the ethnographers.

It would be helpful if Parkin could correct or confirm my researches on his ethnographic sources. His ambitious hypothesis requires careful study of the data base. Having accused several renowned authors of a ‘uniform reliance on slender and suspect evidence’ (Parkin 1990: 70), he could explain why it was so difficult to detect the sources of his data on ‘the Malto’, and why his selection of eight terms out of Sarkar’s rich and informative ethnographic account should be the only basis of the hypothesized ‘fourth stage’ of the ‘evolutionary paradigm... for south Asia’. I raise these questions because the ‘system’, i.e. the eight terms published by Parkin, is supposed to be ‘especially significant for the overall hypothesis’ (p. 258).

5. A positive aspect of Parkin’s reply is the reunification of his ‘fifth stage’, i.e. ‘the Jat system’ (1992: 258) with his ‘sixth and final stage’, i.e. ‘standard north Indian’ (p. 259). He recognizes now that the ‘four-got rule’, as described by Tiemann (1970), has ‘implications for the dispersal of alliances in north India generally (i.e. not just among the Jat)’ (p. 62).

When I introduced Tiemann’s ethnography in the course of my evolutionary speculations on the dispersal of alliances (Pfeffer 1983: 115; 1985: 179), I could not have anticipated Parkin’s subsequent elaboration of a separate evolutionary stage for the north Indian subcaste named Jat, in contrast to a stage for the other people of north India. I selected Tiemann’s account of the Jat (1970) as a primary source for the ‘four-got rule’, because his work was easily available to German (and other) readers. Had I known the consequences, I would have chosen Blunt (1931: 60-62) or any of the many older, ethnographically more general sources, as I had done before (Pfeffer 1970: 83).

6. Parkin’s hypothesis of terminological evolution in South Asia proposes that prescriptive terminologies give way to cognatic ones. In several steps FB is supposed to ‘switch... from the terminological companionship of father to that of MB’ (p. 254). It would be helpful if Parkin could provide a single South Asian kinship vocabulary containing a ‘terminological companionship’ of FB and MB.

GEORG PFEFFER
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SECOND REPLY TO PFEFFER

Nothing in Pfeffer's latest set of remarks leads me to withdraw or change what I have said previously, though obviously some further clarification is called for. This is partly to deal with the extra points he has made, and partly because his attempts 'to avoid all ambiguities' now enable us to see a little more clearly the reasoning behind some of his objections and the slender basis of them all.

Dumont. It is astonishing that Pfeffer goes on talking about misrepresentation in the face of the passages from Dumont's text I had cited. His own new quotation makes no difference: it has long been clear to me that Dumont was not arguing for the identity of north and south India but simply searching for what similarities there were between the two areas; a legitimate exercise, though one bristling with difficulties. The tension this involved is revealed on the very first page of Dumont's article: 'I shall not be able to define a North Indian kinship system, but I shall try to express the similarities between North and South as a common, pan-Indian pattern' (1966: 90; my emphasis). There are many similar passages in the same paper. In the conclusion (ibid.: 113), one key point is partly italicized: 'it [the common pattern] consists essentially, if not perhaps exclusively, in the valuation, and in the consequent elaboration and ordering or patterning, of affinal relationships'. Far from being withdrawn in the paper of 1975, this phrase is quoted as something which 'is now widely acknowledged' (Dumont 1975: 197).

Although Sylvia Vatuk had, in Dumont's own words, 'made light of my differences between north and south' (ibid.: 198), what Dumont identifies as his 'radical mistake' (ibid.) is not, as Pfeffer would have it, his 1966 comparison of these two regions but a detail of his analysis, dating originally from 1962, of the Gorakhpur terminology. One might infer from this that the former too was faulty, but this is certainly not made explicit. In fact, it is only much later (1983: 23) that Dumont finally appears to feel that this invalidates the comparison he had attempted. But only in part, it seems, since even this withdrawal is restricted to the terminologies, i.e. to just one aspect of the original comparison.

Pfeffer cannot have it both ways: either I have misrepresented Dumont by attributing to him what he did not say, or there really was something amiss; otherwise, what was the point of Dumont's withdrawal, however partial, which Pfeffer is at such pains to stress? I should add that I have no hostility towards Dumont himself, nor towards his work on India; on the contrary, I think he has done more for the anthropology of the area than any other scholar. But this is one respect in which I cannot follow him, nor it seems would he himself any longer entirely desire one to.

Juang. Although I did not give the Juang marriage rules as reported by McDougal in my first reply, they appear in my original JASO article (p. 256), where I properly record saliray (inter alia eGEyZ) as the main category from which a wife should be taken. Although it is not the only such category, McDougal makes clear its priority in terms of affinal alliance, both through explicit statements and statistically (1963: 157, 162; 1964: 331). Pfeffer, on the other
hand, prefers to emphasize different terms, *na* and *bokosini*, especially their second-cousin specifications (p. 154, above), glossing over the fact (despite his reference to the +2 level) that they are also PM and CD respectively (McDougal 1963: 162). Focusing on them supports Pfeffer's own hypothesis that the Juang have a four-line, Aranda-type system (criticized briefly in my earlier reply, pp. 60-61). However, as McDougal also makes clear (ibid.; 1964: 331), the statistical significance of such specifications as potential marriage partners is actually very low. This far from exhausts the problems with Pfeffer's hypothesis, a detailed discussion of which is now available (Parkin 1993), but the passage above is particularly tendentious.

It should be obvious that my use of the word 'reflected', which also appears in the sentence following that cited by Pfeffer, is not accorded any explanatory force but is used normatively in both cases. I have never associated myself with the view that terminologies are dependent for their form on other factors of a social-structural kind.

As for Pfeffer's main objection, the three-generation rule is, as he admits, described in the literature on a number of groups, namely the Munda, Santal, Korku, Maler, Mal Pahariya, Hill Bhuiya and Hill Kharia (discussed with references in Parkin 1992: ch. 8, appendix II), to which we can now add the Sora (Vitebsky 1993: 38, 43, 48, 185). The failure of ethnographers working on other groups to report such rules certainly has to be treated with caution, but I eventually came to realize that many unclarities in their work could only be explained by taking the rules into account. This also applies to the Juang, though to a lesser extent, thanks to McDougal's very full and detailed ethnography.

What seems to happen in most of these groups is that alliances should not be repeated before the passage of three generations, which we might describe as a negative rule. Only in one case, the Munda, is there any suggestion that alliances should be repeated after three generations have elapsed, i.e. that they have a positive rule (see Yamada 1970: 385). The connection of the latter with positive marriage rules in the usual sense of the term is unclear, but I should be inclined to consider systems with a positive rule, such as that indicated by Yamada, as closer to prescription than those with a purely negative one. In some other cases—and the Juang is one of them—evidence that alliances are directed by kin term may indicate the existence of a positive rule of delay, but we cannot be certain. However, we can be considerably more confident about the existence of negative rules, among the Juang and elsewhere. I certainly agree with Pfeffer that McDougal does not use the word 'rule' himself (despite what Pfeffer appears to think, I have never said that McDougal does). However, I do not feel this affects the issue, given the weight of other evidence he produces. Here yet again, therefore, is a brief review of that evidence as I see it, which for the sake of variety I present in terms slightly different from those I have used before.

McDougal himself makes it clear that, at least when seen from the point of view of lower-order segments, generational delays in the immediate repetition of alliances are in operation here (e.g. 1963: 158, 168-9). Terminological conflicts
arise if alliances repeat those of the previous generation (ibid.: 159). McDougal is not specific about the number of generations. In a table in my book (1992: 176, table 2), I actually left open the possibility that it was one, which would suggest repetition of the marriages of the +2, i.e. grandparental generation. However, I expressed a preference for three in the text (ibid.: 171), a preference I continue to hold for the following reasons.

First, there are clear statements by McDougal himself (1963: 159 n.1) that the delay of a single generation is in no sense a norm, and indeed that it is actually usually more:

there is no special propensity for marriage choices to be related to [i.e. to repeat] those of close agnates belonging to the second ascending generation.... The marriage choices of persons in any generation are inclined to be related to one another, but unrelated to those formed by close agnates of all previous generations.

Secondly, only 10% of marriages in McDougal’s sample repeated those of the FF (ibid.: 160). For these two reasons alone, therefore, the indications are that the normal delay is longer than one generation. Thirdly, however, a two-generation delay, i.e. the repetition of the marriages of the FFF, would entail a six-section system with marriages between adjacent generations (the so-called ‘Ambryn’ system; cf. Dumont 1983: 206-8). Whatever its feasibility in a general sense, this would offend against at least one norm of the Juang system, which is that marriages between adjacent generations should not take place; besides, the Juang do not have six nor any other number of sections. This makes four generations or any other even number equally unlikely. Fourthly, a greater number than three would require greater local knowledge about previous alliances than is likely to be possible. Fifthly, the comparative ethnography of the area suggests three as the upper limit. For all these reasons, three is indicated as the strongest possibility in the Juang case.

Pfeffer’s reluctance to accept this may be connected with the fact that his own hypothesis of a four-line, ‘Aranda’ system requires a one-generation rule of delay. A delay of any greater number of generations, whether norm or rule, would have the disadvantage of further undermining a hypothesis that is already quite unacceptable on terminological grounds (Parkin 1993: 326-9). Yet it is precisely a delay of this magnitude that McDougal’s evidence indicates. Neither his failure to write down the word ‘rule’ nor the fact that all rules, including Juang ones, are broken on occasion can be considered material objections here.

It should also be made clear that, when it comes to the evolutionary hypotheses I have been putting forward, it is the existence of a delay in renewing alliances, not the actual number of generations involved or the existence of a positive rule stipulating precisely when they should be renewed, that is significant in distinguishing systems like the Juang from prescriptive South Indian on the one hand and non-prescriptive North Indian on the other. In the last resort, my evolutionary hypothesis does not even depend on the Juang—all the necessary
evidence is available from other groups. Even if Pfeffer does return from his forthcoming field trip with the information that the Juang have no positive rule of this sort, nothing material would change in this respect. In fact, I should be inclined to welcome such information, since it would provide further if minor support for my longstanding contention that the affinal alliance systems of many of these groups are transitional between prescriptive and non-prescriptive, and therefore that they provide a historical link between south and north India.

Conversely, Pfeffer’s own hypothesis that the Juang have a four-line, ‘Aranda’ system would benefit from a positive rule of some sort, since this would provide at least a marginal indication that this was a fully prescriptive system, as the hypothesis requires. Whether this would affect my misgivings concerning that hypothesis is another matter, given that the terminology as recorded by McDougal has no diagnostic features of a four-line system (Parkin 1993: 326-9). Alternatively, Pfeffer might find that there is no rule or norm of delay, even in the negative sense. This could mean one of two things: either that there is no direction at all to the formation of alliances; or that one is expected to renew alliances with the same alliance group in the immediately following generation, which if followed consistently would produce a system based on first cross-cousin marriage. Either outcome would make everyone look silly, since neither bears any relation to existing Juang ethnography, whether McDougal’s, Pfeffer’s or anyone else’s (and by extension, of course, nor to my attempts at interpreting it).

Munda. The term ‘Munda’ is of Sanskritic origin and therefore not original in any sense to Austroasiatic speakers, although it has come to be used by one tribe as an alternative to their own term ‘Horo’ (i.e. Roy’s group; cf. Pfeffer above, p. 154; also Parkin 1990: 17, 23). Having been applied first by administrators and then by early ethnographers, it was taken over by linguists as a designation for the whole branch of Austroasiatic to which the language of this tribe belongs. These are quite radical shifts in meaning, especially the second, though it is generally accepted even by anthropologists, including, it seems, Pfeffer himself. My use of the term simply entails a further extension, which I carefully described and justified in my main comparative work, together with other modifications made in the interests of avoiding confusion between the various possible uses of the term as they already existed (Parkin ibid.).

Whatever objections might be raised against such well-meaning modifications, given my numerous explicit disclaimers (cf. my previous reply, p. 56), the suggestion that I have been guilty of reification or linguistic determinism as a result is absurd. On the contrary, differences as well as similarities between Munda groups are recognized where appropriate in all my work, however condensed its presentation. Pfeffer’s objection depends on eliding the various meanings of the word ‘group’, though I should have thought a phrase like ‘a group of tribes’ could not possibly be confused with the idea of a socially bounded whole. What Pfeffer dismisses as ‘Parkin’s group’ (p. 156, above) is clearly the former, as the sentence of mine he quotes in his first paragraph makes clear. In the latter sense, I intend it simply as shorthand for ‘ethnic group’, a formulation
I actually chose—I did not make this clear at the time—because it had the advantage of avoiding another potential misunderstanding, namely the sometimes derogatory connotations, elsewhere if not in India, of the term ‘tribe’.

There are, of course, cogent reasons for concentrating on a particular language family when comparing kinship terminologies in a historical sense, given that these are aspects of language and that linguistic relationships have a historical aspect. This is one of the things I am interested in, and it explains the way I chose to present this material in the relevant chapter of my book (1992: ch. 7; cf. Pfeffer’s objection above, p. 153 n.1). To pursue the matter of my forms of presentation further, while I sometimes produce composite descriptions to save space, I do not indulge in ‘mixing ethnographic bits and pieces’ (p. 153 above). On the contrary, in analysis, where it really matters, I am careful to treat each group separately to begin with, only then seeing what correlations (and, of course, differences) might emerge. Chapters 4, 8 and 10 of my book (1992), dealing with respectively descent, affinal alliance and reincarnation, are exemplary in this regard.

Malto. I am the author of the phrase ‘terminology poised between the last stages of prescription and individualizing North Indian’, as should have been clear from the original context. The reason for concentrating on just the +1 level of the Malto terminology has already been given in my earlier reply (p. 56). As to the only other real query of Pfeffer’s here, the fact that Sarkar gives terminologies from six different villages, with considerable variation in form, is, I think, a not unreasonable basis for assuming that there may be some dialectal variation, to which unwritten languages are particularly prone. However, it is not something I am going to insist on, especially since it would actually strengthen the argument from redundancy if purely dialectal variations could be eliminated as an alternative explanation.

For the rest, Pfeffer’s basic concern seems to be to heap praise on Sarkar for his abilities as an ethnographer—which I do not remember ever having doubted—and to complain that he personally has been put to an unnecessary degree of inconvenience in tracking down my original sources. I fail to see why it should have been quite so difficult: the two earlier articles of mine that discuss this matter (Parkin 1990: 74; 1992: 276 n.2) contain all the information necessary for my sources to be traced. At all events, Pfeffer obviously managed to locate them in the end. Yet to what purpose? No material challenge to my hypothesis has resulted from all this trouble.

Jat. The significance of Tiemann’s article on the Jat (1970) is that he shows how the four-got rule, found there and elsewhere in north India, actually works. It was never part of my purpose in referring to it to suggest either that the rule was restricted to the Jat (hence the use of the phrase ‘the Jat and other groups of north India’ in my original article (p. 258)), or that the statistical tendency for lineages to renew alliances with one another in the longer term was a feature of north India generally, a conclusion which would certainly be premature.

Companionship. It is clear from the original context that the phrase about changes from prescriptive to cognatic (the typology is Needham’s) is intended to
be a general point on the evolution of terminological patterns. FB = MB equations are, of course, cognatic, and I was not suggesting that they were to be associated with South Asia. I pointed out at the end of the previous paragraph that north Indian terminologies are non-cognatic, in which respect, if not in others, they resemble their South Indian counterparts. Perhaps Pfeffer would none the less be prepared to accept a South Asian example of ‘terminological companionship’ between equivalent female specifications, FeZ and MeZ. There is at least one example in the literature, for which we must return to the Malto terminology. My immediate source is actually Pfeffer himself (1982: 90), though he has taken it from a homegrown ethnography. And the author of that turns out to be none other than that ‘meticulous reporter’ Sarkar.

ROBERT PARKIN

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MALINOWSKI AND THE IMPOUNDERABILIA OF ART ANP PHOTOGRAPHY

I was very interested to read Jeremy Coote's comments on Malinowski's photography (JASO, Vol. XXIV, no. 1, pp. 66-9). I agree that any full account of Malinowski's preoccupation with photography in his fieldwork should include an examination of the influence of Stanislaw Ignacy Witkiewicz. In fact, in a recent, as yet unpublished paper (Wright 1992) I have proposed that early contact with the Witkiewicz family could well account for Malinowski's photographic vision and powers of observation. Furthermore, his acquisition of these visual skills was to play a major part in the development of his fieldwork method of participant observation. Malinowski did not just take a camera to the field, he evolved his own photographic working methods during his fieldwork. I have described in these pages his photographic experiments with Billy Hancock (JASO, Vol. XXI, no. 1, pp. 41-58) and, as Coote suggests, photographic experimentation was not new to Malinowski, for he had participated in Witkiewicz's early experiments with natural light photography. Indeed, a good example is a photograph of Malinowski from around 1912 which displays a strong 'Rembrandt lighting' effect (reproduced in Miciński 1990: 96).

I believe that the success of Malinowski's fieldwork photography was due to both his visual awareness and his emphasis on observation and detail. At the same time, a combination of these characteristics can be seen to have been evolving into his methodology of participant observation. For Malinowski, the minute detailed observations recorded by the camera (which perhaps went unnoticed at the time) had special significance. These 'imponderabilia' had an important role in his post-fieldwork analysis where, he wrote, 'the control of my field notes by means of photographs has led me to reformulate my statements on innumerable points' (1935: 461). Similarly, participant observation paid particular regard to such incidental elements: the 'imponderable yet all important facts of everyday life are part of the real substance of the social fabric' (Malinowski 1922: 19). In Leach's words (1957: 120), 'Malinowski trained his fieldworkers to observe the apparently unimportant minute detail.... It is in the quality of the observation rather than in the interpretation that the merit of "Malinowskianism" lies'. I suggest that Malinowski's development of participant observation was informed by and indebted to his first-hand knowledge of the characteristics of photography.

In summary, we can perceive a gradual transition in Malinowski's fieldwork methods, determined by a variety of social and cultural factors, as well as personal influences, which brought about a new kind of visual enquiry. From the evidence of the Trobriand photographs, we can propose that Malinowski was not only the father of ethnographic fieldwork, but that his photographic innovations deserve wider recognition in the history of photography.
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BOOK REVIEWS


It is said that when two anthropologists who have worked on the same society meet they make every effort to avoid speaking to each other in the language of their field research area. The reason seems to be that linguistic competence offers an uncomfortable ‘objective’ index of how well one knows the given society. There lurks a paranoid fear that each grammatical error, every lapse or misuse of vocabulary, will be taken as an incriminating sign of limited understanding, of inadequate fieldwork, in short, of a botched job.

Similar things could be said about fieldnotes. How many of us would happily make ours readily available, filled as they are with evidence of embarrassing culture shock, puerile understandings, lack of rigour, all recorded in disgracefully unpolished, boring prose? Fieldnotes, every bit as much as linguistic ability, are an ‘objective’ indicator of competence, with the one advantage that they can be stored under lock and key at home, or even ‘lost’. Little wonder then that fieldnotes have for so long been one of the more mysterious areas of anthropological practice. Students are rarely shown them, much less instructed on how to keep them, but are instead expected simply to ‘get on with it’ when their turn comes to go to the field.

Roger Sanjek’s *Fieldnotes*, with contributions from more than a dozen American anthropologists, is designed to remedy this situation, and it is fittingly dedicated to ‘the next generation of ethnographers’. This accurately recognizes who this volume’s most interested readership will be. Post-fieldwork anthropologists will have derived most of the volume’s insights from experience, but students and others preparing to enter the field will find in it plenty of reassuring observations. For example, Jean Jackson’s survey of seventy anthropologists (mostly from the East Coast of the USA) exposes the considerable variation in what people consider fieldnotes to be. Some included only descriptive notes taken in the field, while others extended the term to cover recordings, transcriptions, photographs and virtually anything else of informative value deriving from the fieldwork experience. This then raises a contrast with memories. If one recalls something months after returning and writes an additional page into a field notebook while seated at a desk in Oxford say, does this qualify as a fieldnote? Are headnotes fieldnotes? One respondent to the survey simply replied, ‘I am a fieldnote.’
Fieldnotes can profitably be viewed according to theories of orality and literacy. They are written down and thus fixed, although they constitute an unusual sort of text since author and audience are generally one and the same person. One consequence is that fieldnotes are only fully intelligible to the individuals who write them. Lutkehaus’s account of her use of Camilla Wedgwood’s fieldnotes, in preparation for her visit to Manam Island thirty-five years after Wedgwood’s, clearly shows up the difficulties, though she also had some unexpected advantages as she was slotted into the local society as Wedgwood’s categorical granddaughter.

While fieldnotes are fixed, headnotes can change as a function of memory, fieldsite revisits and intellectual maturation. One of the problems, then, is that order may be achieved in the form of a definitive analysis of a society only to be contradicted by the ‘facts’ recorded in one’s fieldnotes. As Lederman observes, fieldnotes are dangerous because they threaten to contradict one’s confident ethnography.

There was some disagreement among contributors as to how ‘raw’ the data of fieldnotes actually are. Plath views them as very raw indeed and of a completely different order from the ‘write-up’ (i.e. the resultant ethnography). Clifford, by contrast, maintains that the very ideas of ‘raw data’ and ‘fieldnotes’ are just constructions, albeit central to anthropological practice since Malinowski. They create the all-important spatial dichotomy between here and there, data and theory, upon which modern ethnography is predicated. He contends that everything anthropologists write in the field is in fact already structured—partially ‘cooked’—on account of the training and theoretical questions with which anthropologists enter the field. Fieldnotes thus already possess many of the traits of finished ethnography.

Ottenberg describes how his supervisor, Melville Herskovits, commanded him to send back his typed fieldnotes every few months and how he resented this intrusion and often felt anxious about the resultant criticisms (which he later learned were written by Herskovits’s wife). Throughout graduate school he was reduced to feeling that fieldnotes were part of his intellectual childhood, an anthropological infancy with the Herskovitses as parents, one in which he was made to feel dependent emotionally and psychologically for approval.

This theme of fieldwork as rite of passage is the primary topic of Wengle’s Ethnographers in the Field. For this book he interviewed in depth a handful of American anthropologists to elicit their experiences during fieldwork. To this he adds one chapter analysing Malinowski through information provided in his diary and one chapter considering the pseudonymous German–Canadian anthropologist Manda Cesara on the basis of her published personal account of fieldwork in Reflections of a Woman Anthropologist. Wengle’s unexceptional contention is that fieldwork is a rite of passage personally, as well as professionally. Fieldworkers’ experiences of loneliness and isolation are in all cases ‘identity-dystonic’, meaning, as far as I can see, that they are plunged into alien situations where they cannot simply be themselves. He is particularly interested in his informants’ fantasies, as
well as in the practices in which they engaged in order to preserve their sense of self (including, in one case, the use of a vibrator powered by a transformer).

One American woman researching in a northern European fishing village took the trouble of bathing every morning in a plastic tub in front of the fire: 'atypical by local standards. But still, I did, every day, because it's American to do that.' This may seem ludicrously extreme, but Wengle coherently argues that such familiar practices as dressing for holidays or for certain meals, storing certain foods, reading novels, and eagerly meeting up with compatriots even though they are not of the type with whom one would normally keep company, are all examples of identity maintenance in the face of fieldwork.

His enquiries into his informants' dream and fantasy worlds provide unusual materials, even if the general theme of these has to do, unsurprisingly, with family and loved ones 'back home'. The question arises if all of the time and effort directed at identity defence affect the collection of data and the eventual writing of ethnography. Here the author shies away from any rigorous attempt to draw correlations or conclusions. In the case of Malinowski he briefly hazards the opinion (in a footnote) that *Sex and Repression in Savage Society* 'cries out to be read as (auto)psychobiography'.

Like *Fieldnotes*, *Ethnographers in the Field* will appeal most to students contemplating, or better still, doing fieldwork. It will help them prepare for what fieldwork holds in store emotionally. I found the psychological terminology hard to swallow, but the book does have the virtue of being brief and, in the middle chapters, devoted in the main to original narratives. This brevity distinguishes it from *Fieldnotes* which, swollen by five separate contributions from its editor, is about 150 pages too long.

CHARLES STEWART


This book, the promised account of Uduk religion, ritual and healing, signposted in Wendy James's earlier account of the Uduk in *'Kwanim Pa: The Making of the Uduk People* (Oxford, 1979), will surely take its place alongside *Nuer Religion* and *Divinity and Experience* as a classic of African religious ethnography. It is characterized by meticulous ethnographic detail, a sensitivity to historical context and a deep respect for the subjects of the study. James is scrupulous in recording and acknowledging the circumstances and limitations of her contacts with the Uduk, seeking to avoid generalizing from conversations with particular individuals and the temptation to present her own interpretations as universal truths. The
effect of many different, contextualized accounts is to present a picture of Uduk society, behaviour and belief as a dynamic force. There is a recognizable structure that acts upon, but is also constantly remodelled by, individuals within that society.

An ‘Introductory Essay’ outlines some key features of Uduk ethnography and gives a brief historical and geographical sketch of their territory. The methods of analysis and presentation stem in part from the nature of the material. Uduk ethnography simply will not yield a structural-functional account of a people with a coherent, discrete cosmos. There is no ‘seamless whole’ that can be taken as a working model of ‘culture’ (p. 3). Competing sources of power provide the framework for an analysis of Uduk moral and religious systems. This necessitates looking, as the Uduk themselves do, at the peoples and events outside their immediate language group and territorial area. Peoples who do not quite so obviously occupy an area of competing and shifting political and intellectual claims nevertheless form part of a wider system, and James’s account provides an analytical model that does justice to this wider context and to the role of individual agents: ‘not only do the small language communities receive ideas from powerful neighbouring or encompassing civilizations, but the people themselves appropriate and modify, and they respond intellectually, emotionally, and politically to some extent within the terms of reference offered them’ (p. 3).

The Uduk present an assorted jumble of Islamic, Christian, Nilotic and more local ritual practices and conceptual systems. These various religious groupings do not, however, give rise, either historically or in the present, to firm or absolute divisions within Uduk society. They can rather be viewed as a palimpsest on which an underlying and more unified ‘moral knowledge’ can be discerned. The term ‘moral knowledge’ refers to implicit certainties about human experience, from which the Uduk’s response to imported religion stems (p. 4). It should not be thought of as ‘a rigid and enduring system of encoded prescriptions for behaviour. It indicates rather the store of reference points from which a people, as individuals or as a collectivity, judge their own predicament, their own condition, themselves as persons’ (pp. 145-6).

The book is structured in three main sections. Part one, ‘The Archive of a Hunting People’, describes the Uduk understanding of themselves as a forest people, the source of much of their language, imagery and conceptual world. In a postscript to this part, James looks at recent philosophical debates about the role of the person and at the distinction between morality and religion in the light of the Uduk material. Part two, ‘The Claims of High Theology’, details the interaction between Nilotic prophets, members of the Protestant fundamentalist Sudan Interior Mission (SIM) and the Uduk. In the postscript to this section, Uduk encounters with and reactions to Islam are discussed briefly.

A fascinating and sensitive account of the problems faced by members of SIM in translating the Bible into Uduk highlights the distinctive role of their particular brand of Christian theology. Considerable emphasis was placed on ‘work with paper’, i.e. literacy and education for reading the Bible, and on verbal statements of belief, confession and repentance. It would probably be hard to find a people
in the Sudan for whom this approach could have been less familiar, for Uduk cults, many of which cross linguistic boundaries, are 'celebrated through symbolic action, movement, and music, rather than defining themselves in the explicit instructions and formulae of the word' (p. 219). The language consciously chosen by the Bible translators, who worked with Uduk converts on the vernacular terms to be used, is strongly dualistic, stressing notions of purity and impurity, good and evil, world and spirit, alien to Uduk thought. The missionary notion of God emphasized God's separation from humankind, and SIM theology stressed the separation of believers from non-believers, both in this life and in the world to come. Uduk traditional belief, in contrast, makes no distinction between the source of life and the life force in individuals and in the world at large. Rather than dividing the dead into those who dwell in eternal bliss and those in eternal darkness, Uduk see the next world (unlike the present one) as 'an earthly place close to home where all would be joined together again' (p. 229).

The expulsion from the Sudan of Western missionaries in 1964 led, after a period of stagnation, to a series of Christian revivals, prompted to some extent by a belief that Christ's second coming was imminent, but also by an accommodation to Uduk indigenous ideas and customs under the guidance of an Uduk pastor. James also records that the story of a dead and resurrected Christ holds considerable power for the Uduk, and finds echoes in the life of Leina, a prophet from the neighbouring Meban, who is also a focus of ritual action.

The third section of the book, 'The Ebony Speaks', describes the spread of the 'ebony order' among the Uduk and its place in divination and healing. The success of the movement is linked to its appeal to 'the wild', which resonates with older Uduk understandings of the natural world and human order. Aloysius Pieris has correlated the success of a 'metacosmic' religion, which moves away from its point of origin, with the degree to which it is able to accommodate the older 'cosmic' systems it meets (see An Asian Theology of Liberation, Edinburgh, 1988). Although the ebony order would not fit into Pieris's 'metacosmic' (world religion) category, his thesis is equally valid in this case of religious acculturation. The ebony order has obviously resonated strongly with Uduk 'cosmic' consciousness, enabling a new synthesis to become established.

An epilogue points to the role of women as guardians and repositories of the older 'moral knowledge'. They are marginal to the various religions and cults, which seek primarily to recruit young men, and through their kinship networks link representatives of the different religions. It is through women, therefore, that the largely implicit Uduk moral community exists and is held together, perpetuating their existence as a small people surrounded by more powerful neighbours.

FIONA BOWIE
Johannes Fabian’s new book is both an attempt to portray ethnography in a reflexive and non-interpretative manner and a treatise on the theoretical and methodological implications of such an endeavour. The work deals with a contemporary Zaïrean theatre group, Le Troupe Théâtrale Mufwankolo, based in Lubumbashi. In following this popular drama group through the creative vagaries of conceptualizing and performing a work of dramatic art, by means of various meetings and rehearsals, culminating in a filming and televised broadcast of the play in a local village, the author hopes to demonstrate as closely as possible the ethnographical antithesis to ‘traditional’ value-laden anthropology.

After preliminary ruminations upon the proper course that the ‘New Ethnography’ should take (more on that below), Professor Fabian begins his chronicle with a consideration of a proverb-like expression, le pouvoir se mange entier, that he had encountered during an earlier stay in the same geographical vicinity whilst engaged upon another fieldwork project. Not only is this sententious phrase rendered solely in the former colonial language, but it is found to have no direct translation in the various local indigenous languages and a shifting and amorphous meaning for those asked to explain its import and bearing upon the peculiar nature of ‘power’. The phrase, then, becomes the subject of the theatrical group’s next recorded performance.

In certain ways the subject of ‘power’ and ‘power relations’ infuse the pages of this book, albeit as interpretatively supplied by the reader. Hierarchy and negotiation are demonstrated in the way in which the play is gradually pieced together and shaped under the active participation of the group’s senior and junior members. The ‘content’ of the filmed dramatization takes place in a ‘traditional’ village under ‘traditional’ headmanship. In fact, the performance is ‘about’ chiefly authority and responsibility.

Also, there is always the metonymic reminder that the nationally broadcast version of the play will be interpreted by the viewing audience in such a way that its subject-matter will be scrutinized against the prevailing system of power in the country. In true Solomonic fashion the actors have to exercise utmost discretion under trying circumstances in choosing dramatic material to present before a politically astute audience, as well as in determining the eventual outcome of its plot. This subject of power, although prominently displayed in the title of the book, is in my view only a subtheme of it.

The book is really about how to approach the subject of cultural knowledge and the epistemological foundations of such an approach. In Fabian’s opinion, a diffuse view of the ‘core of cultural tradition’ is permitted through the mediation of knowledge by actual performances, an acting out, as it were, rather than a
discursive commentary on social life. Fabian also takes pains to avoid the theoretical pitfall of interpreting these ‘displays’ of ‘cultural tradition’, providing instead step-by-step verbal transcriptions of the events leading up to the final televised version of the play. The series of meetings and rehearsals that culminate in the last enactment are felt, correctly, to be every bit as legitimate and important as cultural performances and/or demonstrations of cultural praxis, as the final statement.

If the reader is inclined to look for an application of performance theory (if I may take the liberty of labelling it in so grandiose a fashion), or a discussion of the aspects of verbal poetics inherent in such modes of creative and artistic behaviour, he or she will not find it. Rather, the author would feel (I think due to an extreme reading of such studies) that these considerations are but empirically based and, as a consequence of harbouring theoretical biases, politically naive.

To some extent this is true, but the honourable quest for hermeneutic ‘purity’ must be set against what I feel is an inadequate attempt to marry an overt discussion of the role and method of ethnographic enquiry and presentation with an actual ethnographic context and record. Perhaps this is, in fact, the challenge for the ‘New Ethnography’ and its proponents (whose arguments are in most cases completely justifiable). In this the author is, therefore, constrained to present an anaemic ‘noninterpretation’ of a potentially exciting subject for study and analytic scrutiny.

GREGORY VAN ALSTYNE


Everywhere in South Asia religion is a complicated matter, but nowhere more so than in the Kathmandu Valley of Nepal, where Buddhism and Hinduism are thoroughly intertwined. For many Nepalis, as well as their observers, it has often been impossible to decide whether they are really Buddhists, Hindus or both, though there has been a definite tendency to label a large proportion of the people as Hindu and to identify their religion as just another variant of Hinduism. One of David Gellner’s principal aims in this monograph is to clarify the situation and to show that ‘Newar Buddhism’—‘the traditional Mahāyāna and Vajrayāna Buddhism practised by the Newars’ (p. 5), who make up the ethnic group most closely identified with the Kathmandu Valley—stands somewhere between Hinduism and Theravada Buddhism as practised in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia, but also differs from both of them.
Gellner carried out fieldwork in Lalitpur, the most Buddhist city in the Kathmandu Valley, and concentrated on religion, especially on the rituals that are the heart of highly ritualistic Newar Buddhism. Gellner's material on ritual is particularly impressive, both in its detail and in his grasp of the overall logic, which owes much to his enviable ability to make good use of indigenous texts. Except for some jarringly convoluted sentences (which could have been corrected by better copy-editing), the book is clearly written and organized, even if the sections on ritual may prove to be heavy going for non-specialists. Whether Gellner is always accurate in his reading of Buddhist material I cannot properly judge, but he is rarely mistaken about Hinduism, and he is particularly right to stress, in his subtle discussion of the relationship between the two religions in Nepal, that whereas Hinduism can easily accommodate Buddhism as a lower form of itself, the reverse is not true.

The leading subjects of Gellner's study are the Vajrācāryas and Śākyas, the Newar Buddhists, who are pre-eminently monks, though they are also married householders; Vajrācāryas also act as priests. Contrary to much received wisdom, the distinction between monks and householders does not define that between Buddhists and Hindus. Within the Newar caste system, as explained in chapter 2, Vajrācāryas and Śākyas together constitute a high-ranking Buddhist caste positioned alongside the Hindu Brāhmans and Śrēsthas; the other, lower castes include Maharjans and the rest of the ordinary Newars, who are not unequivocally identified as Buddhist or Hindu. Chapter 3 discusses the relationship between Buddhism and Hinduism, and chapter 4 examines the basic notions of Newar Buddhism, including the distinction between the Three Ways: the Disciples' Way (Śrāvakayāna), the Great Way (Mahāyāna) and the Diamond Way (Vajrayāna)—the last (and highest) being an esoteric path within the Great Way. Chapter 5, which looks at the basic rituals of Newar Buddhism, contains an exemplarily clear analysis of the fundamental rituals, themselves made up of a patterned series of elementary ritual actions, out of which more complex rituals are constructed. This analysis, suitably adapted, could usefully serve as a model for comparable analysis of Hinduism's basic rituals as well.

The bulk of Gellner's monograph comprises a detailed description and analysis of the monastic ideal in the Disciples' Way (chapter 6), the Buddhist householder and the guthis (socio-religious associations) in the Great Way (chapters 7 and 8), and the priesthood and the Tantric deities' cult in the Diamond Way (chapters 9 and 10). A level-headed discussion of the place of Tantra in Newar Buddhism, and its contemporary decline, follows in chapter 11; and there is a short concluding chapter 12.

Gellner's claim that Newar Buddhism is characterized by variant—higher and lower, esoteric and exoteric—interpretations of the same ritual is well-supported by his evidence. It deserves close attention from other scholars of South Asian religion, who have sometimes underplayed the diversity of indigenous interpretations that exists even when there is no overt stress on esotericism, which there is in the Newar case owing to its Tantric component. I am less happy, however, with
Gellner's predilection for typological classification, which sits uneasily alongside his emphasis on interpretative variation. Indeed, Gellner appears to have perpetrated in a new way the error so pervasive in earlier literature on Hinduism and Buddhism, for he has converted a fluid indigenous classification of Ways into an analytical typology that is imposed upon the data, much like others have imposed hard and fast distinctions between the 'great' and 'little traditions' (or cognate concepts). Gellner claims that his categorical division between Ways is 'emic'—unlike, say, Spiro's categories in his study of Burmese Buddhism (pp. 4-5)—and that the hierarchy of the Three Ways provides an integrated framework for Newar Buddhism. I find this unconvincing, however, for Gellner's categories, and the framework fashioned from them, have a fixity that they lack in indigenous discourse. Thus, for instance, we are told that the distinction between the Three Ways is reflected in the classification of deities (p. 113), but this grossly simplifies earlier and more complex analysis of the pantheon (pp. 73-83), and later we learn that many deities actually cross the divide between the Great and Diamond Ways, partly because they are subject to different levels of interpretation (pp. 253-7). Hence Gellner's own evidence shows that deities cannot be systematically and hierarchically assigned to the Three Ways without serious distortion. Or, to cite another example, although Tantric initiation and worship plainly belong to the Diamond Way, Gellner never explains how worship organized by guthis belongs to the Great Way, except in the broad sense that the latter encourages worship of all gods (p. 114), and the allocation of guthis to the Great Way seems to be determined by the typological scheme, rather than by the facts themselves. Gellner also makes considerable use of a Weberian analytical distinction between soteriology and social or instrumental worldly religion; although this is often helpful, I do not see how he can conclude that the analytical distinction 'may indeed be universally valid' (p. 337), except in the sense that ideal types, if defined loosely enough, can always be made to do some work.

There is, therefore, a tension in this monograph between the emphasis on interpretative variation and the dependence on typological classification, a tension that seems to prevent Gellner from seeing that although interpretation is consistently made with reference to the Three Ways, these referents are themselves kept fluid through the very act of interpretation. Nevertheless, for the quality of its ethnography and its ambitious attempt to make sense of an extremely complex religious field, Gellner's book deserves to be recognized as a major contribution to scholarship.

C. J. FULLER

Before 1818, the year in which the heads of Rajasthan’s princely states signed treaties with the British, a Rajput warrior guardian was a soldier and/or ruler who defended his realm and conquered new territory. Conquest and even death on the battlefield were his principal goals. The role of the warrior, however, conflicted with the woman’s domestic role, since, as a *pativrata* guardian (i.e. one who has taken a vow of devotion to her husband), a woman was responsible for his preservation and protection. The incongruity between a man’s caste duty to protect his community and a woman’s gender duty to protect her husband is reflected in the religious narratives of Rajput women. Drawing on her recent fieldwork among Rajputs, Lindsey Harlan examines the inherent tension in the relationship by exploring three types of women’s narratives, related respectively to *kuldevi*s (clan/family goddesses), *satimātās* (women who have immolated themselves on their husbands’ funeral pyres) and heroines. In addition to her analysis of these stories, she also discusses Rajput devotional practices in order to assess current indigenous constructions of caste and gender.

In her introduction and chapter 1, Harlan is concerned primarily with the manner in which Rajputs articulate their shared sense of identity. She states that they are keenly aware of being distinct, as being persons with royal blood. The worship of *kuldevi*s and the veneration of family *satimātās* both reinforce and express this sense of distinctiveness. Although a number of Indianists have analysed the Rajput *kul* as a kinship unit, in-depth study of *kuldevi* worship has been largely neglected. Similarly, there has been little scholarly treatment of contemporary *satimātā* veneration. By investigating these devotional practices, which are not merely emblematic of kinship, but also symbolize Rajput collective identity, Harlan provides an important contribution to the ethnographic literature on north India and to the understanding of Rajput religious behaviour today.

Chapters 2 and 3 look at *kuldevi* myths. The author comments that, although the *kuldevi* has only one task (to provide protection), she operates in two separate arenas: on the battlefield and in the home. In her martial form, the goddess is a consumer of husbands whom she sacrifices as warrior-protégés for the sake of the clan’s preservation. This contrasts with her marital form. In the image of a *pativrata*, she is a dutiful wife, a husband-protector, and guards the family against sickness, poverty and infertility. Although these representations are contradictory, Harlan persuasively argues that they are also viewed as symmetrical and complementary. Thus, positive conceptions emerge regarding the goddess’s protective functions. Moreover, Harlan not only illustrates how the problem of incongruity is resolved spatially by the myths (women usually stress the domestic role of the *kuldevi*), she also demonstrates that the goddess remains a powerful source of inspiration to women, a model of the *pativrata* ideal.
Chapters 4 and 5 explore the way in which the tension between caste and gender is represented in *satimātā* stories. It is suggested that these narratives differ essentially from the above variety only in one respect: they articulate the ethic of protection temporally rather than spatially. (On the other hand, Harlan states that, because women often contextualize *kuldevī* and *satimātā* stories by referring to stories of Rajput heroines, the latter operate simultaneously in both spatial and temporal dimensions. Tales of heroines are discussed in chapters 6 and 7.) Regarding *satimātā* stories, Harlan comments that the *sati* scenario creates a temporal solution to the problem of dissonance by condensing time. While the warrior’s death on the battlefield suggests failure on the part of the wife to provide domestic protection, this is negated by means of a further sacrifice, that of the wife on behalf of the husband. Thus, ‘the dying woman who has outlived her husband becomes a *sahagāmini*, one who “goes” at the same time. She is understood, retroactively, to have protected her husband throughout his life and death, both of which she has shared’ (p. 224). Because *satimātā* stories explicate the ethic of protection, Harlan shows that they continue, albeit obliquely, to inform and to sanction women’s domestic behaviour. For although self-immolation is prohibited today, in these stories (as in the narratives of *kuldevīs* and heroines) ‘women find paradigms that help them construct personal interpretations of *pativratā* duty’ (p. 51).

The book does have one problem in that it fails to analyse the relationship between knowledge and power. Although all Rajput women are familiar with stories of *kuldevīs*, *satimātās* and heroines, as well as with the rules that govern their religious customs, only noble and aristocratic women possess in-depth knowledge of these traditions. It seems that this is partly why high-caste Rajput families continue to exert influence in the community. Moreover, because *choṭā bhāī* (ordinary) Rajput women do not possess specialist knowledge and tend to have only a superficial understanding of these traditions, their families appear to be excluded from the local prestige system. This may also account for the fact that they remain socially inferior. It is unfortunate that Harlan does not address the issue of power. Nevertheless, *Religion and Rajput Women* is an important book and will be welcomed both by anthropologists and South Asianists.

GRAHAM DWYER


Gananath Obeyesekere is well known for his extensive researches into the ethnography of Sri Lanka and South Asian symbolic systems. The present volume
comprises the Lewis Henry Morgan Lectures given at the University of Rochester in 1982. Here Obeyesekere weaves his earlier findings into a theory of the production of culture. Starting from an ontological approach to culture, he unfolds his argument along two critical lines. One pertains to basic anthropological assumptions that exclude the individual (or the 'spider at work', the subject creating networks of cultural meaning) from the vision of the anthropologist (p. 285), while the other implies a critical review of the metapsychology of Sigmund Freud. As the title *The Work of Culture* suggests, Obeyesekere builds on Freud’s rules of the dreamwork in his own hermeneutical attempt to extract the rules of interpretation of cultural forms.

According to Obeyesekere, the ‘dethroning’ of consciousness through Freud’s discovery of unconscious processes deconstructs the radical hiatus between psyche and culture in the conventional anthropological distinction between ‘private’ and ‘public’ forms of life. (A detailed discussion of this point, especially concerning the position taken by Leach, had already been included in his earlier essay *Medusa’s Hair* (Chicago, 1981).) Concerning the notion of the unconscious, however, Obeyesekere examines Freud’s two models—the first and second topographies—in relation to their applicability to the study of non-European societies. Thus he rejects the second topography—the model of id, ego and super-ego—as being too constrained by contemporary Judaeo-Protestant values. Instead, he considers the earlier tripartite model of conscious, pre-conscious and unconscious to be a relevant analytical tool for the study of other cultures. He also argues that societies in South Asia have themselves dethroned consciousness in favour of realities dominated by unconscious thought (trance, possession etc.), and that Buddhism and Hinduism also contain knowledge of unconscious motivation, without having formulated theories about it (pp. 52, 253).

Apart from the usual objections to psychoanalysis as a ‘Western science’—a fact which, according to Obeyesekere, holds good for all anthropological theories (p. 219)—he considers the adoption of the pathological model of psychoanalysis by cultural anthropologists (Kardiner, Whiting, Spiro, etc.) to be a major drawback in its application. (A detailed discussion of this subject in the original lectures was excluded from the present book but will appear in the Spiro Festschrift being edited by Jordan and Schwartz.) For Obeyesekere, cultural forms are not merely epiphenomena of defence and projection but the results of processes of symbolic transformation.

Another problem arises from Freud’s notion of religion as illusion, in which Obeyesekere does not find any concern for the creative potential being part of both the dreamwork and the work of culture (pp. 18ff.). Borrowing the concepts of ‘progression’ and ‘regression’ from the French philosopher Paul Ricoeur, he identifies a dialectic in the formation of symbols pertaining to processes of distancing from or moving closer to archaic or psychogenetic materials. In this context he introduces the notion of ‘symbolic remove’, operative in the dreamwork as well as in the work of culture, as one of his key concepts (pp. 51ff.); closely
related are the analytically distinct terms of ‘personal’ and ‘cultural’ symbols (cf. *Medusa’s Hair*).

In the first of the four lectures into which the book is divided, Obeyesekere unfolds his argument in relation to the meaning of ritual on the level of individual action on the one hand and of collective representations on the other. Beginning with a confrontation between two types of ecstasies that he described at length in *Medusa’s Hair*, he presents the reader with a distinction between symptom and symbol on the basis of his concept of symbolic remove to archaic motivation: while the symptom is over-determined by motivation, the symbol is over-determined by meaning. He shows how the actions of certain ascetics are initially triggered by idiosyncratic conflicts that lead, in the course of ritual action, to the solution of these conflicts by creating a new cultural reality. In collective representations, on the other hand, one is confronted with another variety of performances not bound to individual motivations and life histories. Here, Obeyesekere presents two types of ritual performed in Sri Lanka: the serious drama *Killing and Resurrection*, in which the goddess Pattini tears off her left breast and throws fire on the city of Madurai in order to revenge her dead husband; and a new and vulgar drama called *Bambura*, in which allusions to genitals, copulation and castration abound (cf. his *The Cult of the Goddess Pattini* (Chicago, 1984)).

The serious drama, or dromenon as he calls it, has not been performed since the late 1950s and has instead been replaced by the vulgar or cathartic ritual. The themes of the dromenon, embodying cultural, religious and philosophical values, do not seem to be related on a manifest level to those of the cathartic ritual. But, Obeyesekere argues, there are several sets of symbols that cluster around latent themes widespread in the culture concerning fears of impotence and castration. Thus he identifies an unconscious equation of breast and penis expressed in the *lex talionis* reaction of Pattini to the death of her husband. While according to Obeyesekere both rituals contain similar motives (in one domain, at least), they move in different directions: ‘if a dromenon is engaged in a progressive movement away from the sources of infantile conflict and anxiety, the cathartic ritual moves in a regressive direction’ (p. 28).

In the second and third lectures, Obeyesekere examines South Asian mythologies under the same aspect of hidden deep motivational themes and their cultural treatment. He revives the discussion buried long ago relating to Oedipal conflicts and postulates a complex existing in multiple forms exhibiting family resemblances—a term he borrows from Wittgenstein in order, simultaneously, to criticize his highly relativistic position. Even Wittgenstein could not, says Obeyesekere, avoid admitting a common ground for all humanity, however ‘muddy’ the bottom may be. Still, the concept of the Oedipal complex is, like other concepts of the social sciences, a fictive one, according to the author. Comparing the symbolism of the paradigmatic Hindu Oedipal myth of Ganesha with Buddhist Sri Lankan mythology of the kings, he finds a striking difference between the models of filicide and parricide they contain. Both are related respectively to differences in Hindu and Buddhist family models, authority
structures and—in the latter case—historical dynamics producing patterns of interdependence between kings and monks.

The final lecture assesses the relevance of Freud’s metapsychology for anthropology. While stripping it of certain drawbacks, Obeyesekere regards it as a crossroads where three intersubjectivities meet: first, the relation between the anthropologist and his or her informants; secondly, the dependence of the ethnographic production on this intersubjective relationship; and thirdly, the production of anthropological theories in the context of academic debate. Included in this section is a discussion of the validity of ‘psychoethnography’ through case histories and myth associations.

Obeyesekere’s argument is far more complex than can be shown here. In a way, his perspective implies a critique of his own society as well as of certain aspects of anthropological tradition. Regarding the latter, he finds particularly lacking the dimension relating to human suffering, impermanence and death, or the experience he calls the ‘dark night of the soul’ (p. 11). His work is an attempt to integrate this dimension of the basic human experience with current debates in anthropology. In his own concluding remarks he expresses clearly the difficulty of reconciling these domains: ‘Freudianism per se is no solution. The trouble with the Freudian analysis of culture is precisely its inability to see man within the context of a cultural tradition and encompassed by the institutions of a society in which he is placed. The whole thrust of this work has been to partially redress the idea of the work of culture, that discontinuous movement from the ideational representatives of deep motivations to their transformations into culturally constituted symbolic forms’ (p. 289).

HELENE BASU


Hastings Donnan’s new book effectively serves as a case-study of the application of Islam and as a reminder that alternative theological agendas and cultural adaptations exist in specific cultural and historical locales. In the context of the village of Choaya in the north-western Punjab is found the complex interchange between a Muslim socio-religious order governed by the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence and the expression of Dhund culture and social organization. Donnan neglects to identify some particular cultural elements as fundamentally Islamic, so some previous knowledge of Islam is required. However, if we keep in mind the synthesis and negotiation necessary to the expression of Islam in any given context we may disregard this identification and consider it peripheral. Thus the irony in the rather grandiose title Marriage among Muslims becomes apparent,
and increasingly so when we consider Donnan’s thesis that the Dhund consider the most salient difference between themselves and others to be their marriage system.

Revelation about this system is suspended as Donnan contextualizes his study within a composite sketch of village life including religious, linguistic, historic and economic aspects of Dhund culture. In chapter 3 he traces the complementary life histories of male and female based on the dichotomy of female as liability and male as asset. Female liability is identified in both social and economic terms. With the centrality of protecting a woman’s virginity in order to ensure marriage-ability and maintain family honour, a woman is considered a social liability to her family, and in turn an economic liability because the seclusion necessary for her social protection curtails her wage-earning potential. What Donnan has established by the end of this chapter is that marriage preferences and choices for males and females are necessarily different, particularly since they tend to be specified by the families of the individuals concerned.

In chapter 4, Donnan proceeds to identify other criteria that the Dhund consider with regard to marriage preference and choice. Although he admits such a scheme to be problematic, Donnan attempts to organize factors relating to marriage choice into a hierarchy of determination. He subsequently undermines this attempt through documenting two family histories that illustrate how these preferences, based on aspects of religion, culture, kinship and geography, can have varying relevance in terms of actual marriage choice.

What Donnan establishes through this exhaustive survey is the inadequacy of focusing on rules or preferences to understand marriage choice, and how the same confluence of factors considered favourable in one context are wholly insufficient in another. Here he is able to justify his rejection of the rule-bound analysis of marriage and marriage preferences, which he sees as having concealed the complexity that underlies marriage choice. What is alternatively more suggestive, states Donnan, is to look at why particular preferences are advantageous in each situation, and to look beyond their immediate transactional value to the broader social, economic and political concerns that such negotiations and alliances fulfil.

CAMILLA GIBB


The inhabitants of the Polynesian atoll of Pukapuka deserve our sympathy. They have been hosts to many and various anthropologists and foreign observers during this century, to the point where their knowledge of their own history has been brought into question. The problem that inspired this ethnography concerns a
particular form of traditional social organization, known as the *akatawa*, which the island’s Council of Important People decided to revive in 1976. Unfortunately, data collected by various Westerners visiting the island over a period of several decades suggest that the *akatawa* probably never existed before 1976 and certainly never occurred at the time claimed by some knowledgeable Pukapukans’ (pp. 1-2). This discrepancy challenges the validity of both accounts of the past in a way that threatens their use in the determination of the future. Whereas without a historical precedent the Pukapukans might have found changing their socio-political organization in this way problematic, their use of traditional knowledge authenticated the new system. On the other hand, the suggestion that generations of academics might have missed such a significant feature of atoll life could seriously undermine their claim to the accuracy and thoroughness that form the basis of academic integrity.

Apart from this direct confrontation, though, much more profound questions arise concerning the nature of knowledge and its appropriation and usage. Borofsky asks what it is about the nature of historical knowledge that can lead to such different versions of a history. He approaches the problem by questioning ‘how different people construct different versions of the atoll’s past’ (p. 2). Essentially, this means showing how Pukapukan knowledge acquisition differs from that of Western academic anthropologists. Thus Borofsky wishes the reader to perceive ‘how Pukapukans, in the process of learning and validating their traditions, continually change them. And we see how anthropologists, in the process of writing about these traditions for Western audiences, overstructure them, how they emphasise uniformity at the expense of diversity, stasis at the expense of change’ (p. 2).

As Borofsky does well to point out, many social scientists have already emphasized diversity in the organization of cultural knowledge, nor is he the first to explain that contextual considerations shape the way we present knowledge to others. However, in writing what is essentially a comparative ethnography of Pukapukan knowledge acquisition, Borofsky brings these issues to life, exploring the ways in which knowledge is shaped by the process of learning. This gives us a different slant on what is now a firmly established body of literature about the authentification and revival of traditions. The contrast Borofsky draws between Pukapukan and anthropological ways of knowing and learning highlights academic arguments over the non-negotiability of textual historical accounts, an idea at the heart of the post-modern movement. Borofsky’s is not a dogmatic work and does not deal in power politics. It shows, in the best possible anthropological sense, how there are at least two sides to every story and many equally valid versions of every event. In a Pukapukan sense, knowledge acquisition does not often take the form of formalized teaching and learning, but is likely to be a more subtle blend of indirect copying by observing other people’s practices and picking up information during discussions about the way things are done. Memories may be confirmed or adjusted in conversation, so that a consensus account of history can develop that can include various people’s recollections and interpretations. This
contrasts strikingly with the formalized learning of anthropologists, which stresses individual written, and therefore much less negotiable, versions of times and events.

*Making History* provides a lively account of how, in preserving past traditions by resurrecting them, Pukapukans thereby altered them. In doing so, it places the previous ethnographic accounts of Pukapukan social organization firmly in a particular time and place. It also adds to a growing body of literature that questions the uses of knowledge and the role of anthropologists and historians in non-literate societies.

S. A. ABRAM


This short book, edited by Gehan Wijeyewardene, brings together two articles by Georges Condominas, a French specialist in Southeast Asian anthropology and history, originally published in French in 1974 and 1976. The first article, ‘Notes on Lawa History Concerning a Place Named Lua’ (*Lāwa*) in Karen Country’, is mainly concerned to point out the importance of a hitherto little-known site for the further understanding of state formation in the history of the northern Thai and proposes further study of the site and its area. The second deals with the evolution of Thai political systems in historical perspective and proposes a typology for them, consisting of local chiefdoms with an emerging class formation, political systems that are now conveniently labelled early states, and the Thai and Khmer empires. What Condominas calls the ‘social space’ under consideration is northern Thailand, Laos and Vietnam and the influence exerted over the area by Mon kingdoms and the Khmer empire. The time dimension is less clear: on the one hand, Condominas refers to documents and social events from the thirteenth to the sixteenth centuries, and on the other to ethnographic evidence from the twentieth century as well as to local mythology. He states his indebtedness to Braudel and his concept of the *longue durée* without explaining it further in respect of the area under consideration.

The epigraphic, historical, linguistic, archaeological and ethnographic material Condominas draws on in this second paper is rich. He describes effectively the internal composition of the various levels of socio-political integration and state formation, as well as the internal structures of these formations, the relations of rulers and ruled, and particularly the social structures, internal divisions and social conditions of the latter. However, the weak point in the essay is his rather
ambitious theoretical framework, which draws on a wide range of theories and combines them in order to come to terms with the different social formations at the margins of the established and centralized states of the Mon and the Khmer. This blending of a number of different anthropological theories can be justified because of the differences in state formations, but the evidence given for the postulated shift from feudalism to the Asiatic mode of production is unconvincing. Condominas's notion of the latter is anyway spurious and misleading, and not only because of its identification with the concept of 'hydraulic society'. His idea of feudalism, though less vague than Leach's, is also far from convincing. Here, Condominas refers to Bloch, Duby, LeGoff and others for his evidence, but the resemblances seem weak or too generalized. His special point of reference with regard to the relations between rulers and ruled in feudalism is the position of the peasantry within the socio-economic formation of emerging or formed states and systems of social bondage, from which he argues for a strong resemblance between the mass of the peasantry and European 'free peasants' in the Middle Ages and in later periods of feudal society. However, this concept is misleading in two ways. First, the idea of the 'free peasant' concerns a rather special relationship in European feudal history, where villeinage was far more common. Secondly, Condominas seems to be underestimating such traditional social ties as bonds of kinship, village life, religion and social obedience that are particular to the areas under investigation and that—on a comparative level—are characteristic of Asian societies in general. His references to feudalism and to the Asiatic mode of production are thus neither particularly convincing nor useful.

Despite the weaknesses of its theoretical framework, this account of socio-political formations and of relations between the different peoples in the areas under discussion is certainly interesting, at least to one who is a student of state formation but not a Thai specialist.

KLAUS HESSE


This book is a republication of a study that first appeared in 1965 and has been reprinted several times since. It is based primarily on fieldwork in Oklahoma carried out in the 1930s and more recently, but also draws on Alice Fletcher's 'The Hako: A Pawnee Ceremony' (1904) and a manuscript 'Ceremonies of the Pawnee' by James R. Murie, which was first published only in 1981 (see review of 1989 edition below). It complements, in certain ways, Alexander Lesser's Pawnee Ghost Dance Hand Game (1933).
The lost universe of the title is that of the Pawnee prior to their removal to Oklahoma in the 1870s. The concluding chapter is titled 'The Universe Regained: Ideas and Forecast'. The universe regained is that of Post-Industrial Man, and the chapter contains some rather eccentric comments on automation and the need for standardized apartments modelled on a modernized version of the Pawnee earth lodge. The main text is a mixture of ethnographic description and narration of experiences, both actual and typical, of Pawnee life based on informants' memories. In the course of 65, often very brief, chapters, the book covers such topics as planting and harvesting, human sacrifice, the buffalo hunt, camping routines, skirmishes with the Sioux, domestic life, ceremonialism, sorcery, and the manufacture of various tools.

There is indeed a great deal of original information here, and some readers have obviously enjoyed its narrative approach, but its aim of relating this narrative to problems of New York urban existence in the early 1960s has produced results that inevitably have dated. The mixture of descriptive ethnography, historical reconstruction, and semi-factual narrative places obstacles in the way of readers looking only for ethnographic and historical fact or scholarly interpretation, while the ethnographic passages may be felt to be an interruption by readers who only want to enjoy the story. Readers who can combine both interests will undoubtedly be best satisfied.

R. H. BARNES


James Murie, who lived from 1862 to 1921, was the son of a full-blooded Pawnee mother and a Scot who was captain of Pawnee scouts. He received four years of schooling at the Hampton Institute in Virginia. Later he assisted Alice Fletcher, George A. Dorsey and Clark Wissler. He collaborated with Dorsey in publications of Pawnee and Arikara mythology and acted as an independent researcher. Parks writes that 'most of what is known today about nineteenth-century Pawnee ethnography is attributable to Murie either directly or indirectly, since in addition to his own writings he worked with virtually every anthropologist who visited the tribe in Pawnee, Oklahoma' (p. vii). Although he served as an informant, he also provided access to older Pawnee, for whom he interpreted. His influence extended to Gene Weltfish (see review above) and Alexander Lesser, who worked with the Pawnee after his death but who used his manuscripts in their own work.

Although only one publication appeared under his name alone during his lifetime, he left behind a large unpublished record, including the manuscript of
'Ceremonies of the Pawnee', which he wrote after 1912 in collaboration with Clark Wissler for the Bureau of American Ethnology, completing it just before his death. For reasons which are not known, plans to publish it then came to nothing. In 1929, John R. Swanton arranged for Gene Weltfish to check Marie's linguistic transcriptions with Pawnee informants, which she did in 1930 and 1931. She revised the manuscript for publication, phonetically retranscribing the Pawnee, but again for unknown reasons the project was abandoned. Parks has retranscribed Weltfish's phonetic versions into phonemic ones and revised the translations. In addition to editing the manuscript, he has added an overview of Pawnee social organization and religion, indexes, an expanded bibliography and a biography of Murie. The book is divided into two parts. The first describes the ceremonial bundles, songs and procedures of the Skiri band. A substantial account of the ceremony of human sacrifice to the morning star is included. The second section provides similar information for the South bands.

*Ceremonies of the Pawnee* was first published in 1981 in two parts as one of the Smithsonian Contributions to Anthropology. Despite this late publication date, the monograph retains the solid scholarly feel of the earlier classic reports and bulletins of the Bureau of American Ethnology, with which in conception it is contemporary.

R. H. BARNES


This work consists of a short introduction, 41 maps, a bibliography and a ‘culture index’ that lists the ethnonyms of 3500 ‘cultural groups’ worldwide. One can use the atlas in two ways: one can turn to a map and find an indication of the ‘cultural groups’ that live in that part of the world, or armed with the name of a ‘cultural group one can look it up in the index and find out where it lives. After both processes, one can then look up a relevant bibliographic entry and discover more about the group in question.

An enterprise such as this is inevitably fraught with difficulties—several of which Price mentions in his introduction—and the book is a tribute to Price’s diligence and tenaciousness. Unfortunately, it is little else. The maps are drawn in outline only and the numbers that identify the ‘culture groups’ are scattered across a near featureless landscape (coastlines and major—though unnamed—rivers are shown). Price acknowledges that the maps ‘are intended to assist in the navigation of libraries rather than the navigation of South American rivers or African coastlines’ (p. 11), but without even national boundaries or latitude/
longitude indicators even navigating a conventional atlas would be difficult. The index of groups contains only one name for each, and while this is often the one by which they are commonly known in the literature it is of no help in difficult cases. (Yolnu/Murngin was one I tried but neither are listed.) Finally, the bibliography (some 1237 references) while large, is also eccentric. The latest reference I could find was dated 1986, which is admirable, but there are many, many more from the 1930s and 1940s than are acceptable. Moreover, several of the entries are not the ones one would expect; surely there must be a better work on ‘Gujaratis’ than Majumdar’s *Races and Cultures of India* (1961). According to the list of references, the most important works on the Maasai are a 1905 publication by Alfred Hollis and a 1930 article by L. S. B. Leakey.

It would be pointless for me to discuss either the enormous difficulties involved in trying to discern which are the world’s ‘cultures’ that are to be mapped (Price does this to some extent in his introduction, but his solution—that he follows the authors of the works cited in the bibliography in defining the group in question—is a dissimulation), or to point out the numerous resulting errors, inconsistencies and biases. Two examples should suffice. First, some of the bibliographic reference numbers given after a culture group’s name are wrong, so that, for example, the sole reference given for that well-known group in the ethnographic record, the inhabitants of the Isle of Man, turns out to be a 1964 article on Icelandic kinship terminology. Secondly, the bizarre assortment of language groups, tribes, ethnic groups and nationalities reflects neither the available literature nor the local situations, so that, for example, while the Gujaratis, Mizos and Marathis are each accorded a place among the cultures of the Indian subcontinent, no other group defined by state boundary is (Majumdar is again the cited authority on both the Mizos and the Marathis).

The *Atlas* is presumably aimed at libraries and, going by title alone, many librarians may well be tempted to buy it. There are, however, better ways of spending £35.

MARCUS BANKS


Wilhelm Schmidt (1868–1954) was one of the outstanding figures in German anthropology. This biography is, therefore, most welcome, especially since most articles on Schmidt, as well as the only other full biography, by Fritz Bornemann, are in German.
The book is divided into four parts, three of which provide a chronological narrative of Schmidt's life. Apart from his research and related activities (for example, his involvement in the Anthropos Institute, various journals and the Lateran ethnographic museum), we learn, for example, of his role as the field chaplain of the last Austrian emperor (1916–18), about his pastoral work, about his close relationship with Pius XI, and about his political writings. Schmidt's antipathy, placed within the historical context of nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Vienna, is extensively discussed, and Brandweie concludes that it was, apart from feeding on 'common prejudices', mainly 'political' rather than 'racial' (p. 242). The book ends with the story of the amazing intrigues directed against Schmidt during the last months of his life, intrigues orchestrated by his former pupils who by that time had taken over the Anthropos Institute and journal. Why this 'sordid affair' (p. 325) happened, Brandweie does not attempt to explain. The narrative is interrupted by a systematic consideration of Schmidt's The Origin of the Idea of God, especially of Schmidt's definition of culture, his view of anthropology as a historical discipline, his theory of culture circles, and his theory of primitive revelation and monotheism. Brandweie underlines the role of apologetics as a motivating force behind Schmidt's research and the importance of Thomism for his thinking.

It is a pity that Brandweie contents himself with only one aspect of Schmidt's view of religion. As important as primitive revelation and monotheism are, through his culture circles Schmidt ‘proved’ that they are only the starting-point of a larger developmental scheme of ‘degeneration’ of religion (the ‘second revelation’ being the chance to put things right). With this theory Schmidt refuted ideas of progressive evolution and criticized secularism and materialism as well as conditions and politics based on these mistaken Weltanschauungen. From this perspective it would be possible to relate Schmidt's academic work to his views on the issues of the times (his 'non-anthropological' and 'popular' writings) and his pastoral activities.

Brandweie succeeds best at giving us 'a feel for Schmidt as a person' (p. 5), for example his single-mindedness and perseverance in pursuing ideas and plans, a characteristic that made him such a successful organizer and gave unity to his work throughout his life, though it at times exasperated his colleagues and religious superiors. While we learn a lot about Schmidt's work, it seems that Brandweie, perhaps inevitably in a biography, chose to focus on certain issues while leaving others unexplored. One thinks of Schmidt's relation to wider intellectual and theological traditions (deism, the concept of natural religion, the history of the comparative study of religion etc.), the foundations of his analytical terminology and epistemology, and the reception of his theories in theology. In short, there is still much to learn about Schmidt.

STEFAN DIETRICH
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THE ACQUISITION OF HIGHER KNOWLEDGE
BY BALINESE OF WESTERN LOMBOK

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER

Gaining knowledge, according to this account, is a process that involves a teacher, a pupil and a (social) situation

Paul Feyerabend (1987: 110)

I

The standard injunction is 'Never go back', but in October and November 1990 I revisited Pagutan, western Lombok, where I had lived for about twenty-one months in 1979-81 doing field research. It was my first return since then. In

Editor's note: This paper was among those left unpublished at the time of the author's death in August 1991. It is published now with the kind permission of Dr Duff-Cooper's family and of the executor of his literary estate, Dr Gerd Baumann, who has also approved the edited text for publication. Copies of the original paper, as well as sets of Dr Duff-Cooper's publications and copies of various drafts and other papers, will be deposited, at the author's request, at the Institute of Cultural and Social Studies, University of Leiden, and at the University of Denpasar, Bali, Indonesia.

1. The original fieldwork was funded by awards from the then Social Science Research Council of Great Britain, the Emslie Horniman Anthropological Scholarship Fund and the Philip Bagby Fund of the University of Oxford, and was conducted under the auspices of the Indonesian Academy of Sciences (LIPI). I am most grateful to these bodies for their support. I funded the return visit myself. Unless specified otherwise, 'Balinese' refers to the Balinese of Pagutan.
the all-sudra village (kaklianan) of Baturujung (see e.g. Yoshida and Duff-Cooper 1989: 222-3), where about half that fieldwork was done, many changes had occurred. One of the most impressive was the number of young villagers, male and female, now attending university, not only the local Universitas Mataram (Unram) but also in Denpasar, Bali.

On my return visit, I stayed with I Nengah Semer, the then largely inactive head (klian) of the village. Much of our time together was spent discussing knowledge, its acquisition and some of the attendant benefits and drawbacks. When I visited Pedanda Gde Madé Karang and his local descent group (seturunan) at the Griya Taman some five minutes' walk away through the gardens to the west of Baturujung, recurrent topics of conversation were, first, the consecration (madiksa) as pedanda of two youngish brahmana from Cakranegara with whom I had been friendly before and, second, the number of young people in Baturujung now attending school or college, especially the number attending university.

This phenomenon and related matters were clearly of concern to people in authority. They were also of concern to the university students; much of their conversation centred upon their studies and topics connected with them. The present essay addresses aspects of these concerns, mainly those referred to by, for example, Jay (1969: 21) as 'a mental image' of behavioural acts, 'the contents of my informants' statements', their 'conception' of those acts. In the sections that follow I report not what was and/or is truly the case (if it makes sense to write of such) but what Balinese people think was and/or is the case concerning 'traditional' and 'modern' Balinese ideas about acquiring knowledge; the Balinese concern with knowledge; its acquisition; and some differences between those acquiring modern higher knowledge and villagers not doing so, as well as older villagers' views about some of its potential effects on village life.

In the present essay, 'knowledge' is to be understood as 'information obtained through instruction and the study of such media as texts, films, discs, notes and so on'. Not included, therefore, are the kinds of knowledge that their seniors impart to young Balinese, for example, in the rice fields and about making offerings; acquiring such knowledge does not generally involve the study of texts etc. By 'higher' knowledge is meant knowledge that is neither primary nor secondary, a homologue of, for instance, British 'higher education'. In other contexts, the epithet distinguishes between 'higher' and 'lower' knowledge as the Jñāna-kunda (e.g. 2, 3, 1) does: 'higher' knowledge concerns what is formless, immortal, stationary and yon; 'lower', what is formed, mortal, moving and here.

2. The 'traditional/modern' dichotomy is unsatisfactory analytically (see e.g. Rudolph and Rudolph 1967; Zurbuchen 1990: 134-5). It is not the less employed in the present study, descriptively, because the Balinese employ it, using Indonesian [Ind.] tradisi (or lama, 'age old')/modern (or maju, advanced). The dichotomy 'town/country or village' is also employed. This dichotomy is also analytically unsatisfactory because it 'simply reproduce(s) in a scientific context age-old ethnocentric ideologies about the apparent distinction between town and country' (Williams 1973: 1). However, the Balinese employ it, as Ind. kota/desa or kampung, to distinguish the two and it is used similarly below, i.e. descriptively.
II

Traditional Balinese ideas about the acquisition of knowledge are connected with dharma, 'sacred duty', i.e. one’s social function by virtue of birth into one of the four estates. On Lombok the dharma of Brahmana was, and with only slight modifications is, taken by most Balinese of whichever estate still to be, to deal with the highest, purest aspects of the mystical, what is niskala (timeless and usually unmanifest); while that of Ksatrya is taken to be to exercise authority over such jurisdictions of wide extension as realms or to act as officials to a ruler; that of Vesia to supply the material needs of Brahmana and Ksatrya; and that of Sudra to serve the three finer estates.

Brahmana and Ksatrya require higher knowledge to carry out their duties. Brahmana, both as potential pedanda, 'high priests', and after consecration, studied and were instructed by their mentors about texts (lontar) on cosmology, rites, and other matters. Ksatrya studied and were taught so that their behaviour would be modelled on that of sadhu, people who, according to Worsley (1972: 43-4):

sought no material advantage, pleasure or fame in what they did but strove only to protect the religious and moral law (dharma). Knowledge of the precepts of the dharma was the only reliable foundation for a successful reign for from such a knowledge flowed the discretion (nitiñācāra) in the conduct of affairs...so critical for the harmony and prosperity of the realm.

Neither vesia nor sudra in general required higher knowledge to properly execute their dharma, and they consonantly had no access to it (but see below). However, people of these estates who wished to become such 'lower' priests as pemanku, or less often dukuh (see e.g. Hooykaas 1973a, 1976, 1977), or for instance metalworkers, did have access to traditional textual and orally transmitted knowledge appropriate to the function. Similarly, Ksatrya who wished to become pedanda rsi, or people of any of the four estates who wished to become balian (local medicine-people) or dalang (shadow-puppeteers), or to dance, act, or play musical instruments, or those who claimed some such special status as pandé (see e.g. Guermonprez 1987), or who wanted to learn how to harm others by black magic as witches (léak) (see e.g. de Kat Angelino 1921), might have recourse to texts and other sources of knowledge bearing on their goal.

3. The four Balinese estates (varna, bangsa) from finest to less fine are Brahmana, Ksatrya, Vesia, Sudra.

4. Almost every part of the extensive body of Balinese literature, on which see e.g. Hooykaas 1979, is of greater or lesser importance for a pedanda (see Korn 1960: 134-6).

5. That villagers' views, both on Bali and Lombok, tend not to accord with the images of the former Balinese kings presented by dynastic chronicles (babad) (see sec. V below) is not relevant here.
Traditionally, Balinese cosmology and theology (sarva-surya and sarva-tattva) provided both a technology and a teleology, as science does for 'us'. So all this knowledge made reference to the mystical. Additionally, 'anyone who wanted to read manuscripts...should come to understand certain ordering principles of the universe' (Zurbuchen 1987: 50). None the less, the breadth and depth of the 'understanding' (i.e. higher knowledge) allowed to brahmana, and to a slighter extent to ksatrya, were markedly greater than that permitted vesia and sudra (ibid.: e.g. 52). When knowledge was linked to general social function, brahmana had more access to it than ksatrya, including pedanda rsi and kings, while vesia and sudra had no access to it. Where it was linked to a particular social function, the access of vesia and sudra to it was very restricted relative to that permitted brahmana and ksatrya. Of that latter class dalang and after them balian had perhaps the greatest access.

Taking 'understanding' as 'comprehension', whether someone fulfilling a particular social function understood the knowledge available to him or her is decidable only case by case. However, Hooykaas makes repeated reference (1977: 1-17 passim) to the insufficient education and lack of knowledge of pemanku; and by references to pedanda as 'literati' (1966: 12; see also 1973a: 13) suggests with Korn (1960: 152-3) but contra Lévi (1933: x, xxxv) that they knew (know) the meanings of the words they employ and grasp their purport, in contrast to pemanku who do not, as (one may infer) most others with access to higher knowledge by virtue of their intended or actual particular social function do not. Hooykaas also points out (1973b: 22), though, that pedanda boddha often do not know the meanings of the hand gestures (mudra) they make. However, in traditional and contemporary Balinese ideology, 'comprehension' does not signify what 'we' mean by the word (see sec. IV below; see also senses 2 and 2b of 'understand' in the OED). Whether Balinese comprehend higher knowledge acquired from texts and so on in 'our' senses is thus not relevant here.6

After the Dutch secured Lombok in about the middle of the nineteenth century, Balinese people were given access to Western knowledge in schools and institutions of higher learning. The pedanda and villagers, Pak Semer included, agree that this access was restricted to those who had traditional authority and were compliant, mainly brahmana and ksatrya. After the Japanese incorporated Bali and Lombok into their Great East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere (see e.g. Tsurumi 1982), they gave education—rudimentary Japanese and an introduction

6. By 'ideology' here is meant ideas and values in social action, not the delusions of, nor the deceptions perpetrated against, social classes, however defined. This line is not adopted to slight by omission the Marxist notion of ideology, but because there are more than enough anthropologists subscribing to a version of the judgement that what people say about their actions individually are frequently mere rationalizations 'called ideology at the level of collective action' (Habermas 1978: 311) or that there is a 'level of the real as opposed to the surface...forms which we experience' (Howe 1990: 48 n.3). I also have no wish presumptuously and hegemonomically to reduce Balinese people to silence (see Duff-Cooper 1990c: 152-3). On this topic see also the admirably clear remarks of Errington (1989: 9, 229-30).
to some of the leading ideas of wartime Japan—to those whom they judged fit to work for them non-manually and who were prepared to do so. But this knowledge hardly constitutes higher knowledge (though perhaps the Japanese thought it did in comparison with local knowledge); and they did not think it in their best interests to offer even their most senior Balinese collaborators entry to institutions of advanced learning. Indonesian independence from the Dutch in principle opened all levels of education to everyone. But only very recently have Balinese taken up the possibilities practically open to them (see e.g. Duff-Cooper 1990a: 329). Why has this been?

A major factor is the cost of education for people who in general have very little money even by Indonesian standards. Their impecunity (see e.g. Gerdin 1982: tables 9-14) derives not from spending money elsewhere but from them tending to receive goods or services in exchange for labour, or from it being pitiably little and needed to buy food or the ingredients for offerings (banten) or to pay debts. Also, villagers even today are often scathing about people who have acquired higher knowledge, or are taken to have done so, like ‘officials’ (pegawai). They are said, often, to be fools or parasites who live off the work of others, contributing nothing to it even when, as agricultural advisers for instance, they are supposed to be able to do so and are paid for doing so. These people, moreover, are usually associated with ‘town’, as opposed to ‘village’, and with the Islamic Javanese and Sasak. ‘Town’ represents for many villagers, as before, values opposed to and the reverse of the ethos of village life, as Islam is opposed to Balinese ‘religion’, where communaitism and brotherhood (should) reign. Villagers have their places (see Clifford Geertz 1983: 62), and it is an informed conjecture that they preferred to stick to them and work as they had ‘always’ done (see Duff-Cooper 1990a: 336-8; see also stanzas 2, 3 and 4 of canto 81 of the Nāgara-Kērāgama in Pigeaud 1960-63: I, 62; III, 94-5). Finally, perhaps people had no explicit reasons for not wanting themselves or their dependants to be educated, they just did not wish it.

All this time (from 1843 to around July 1946, and after), brahmana, ksatrya and others taking on more particular social functions had been acquiring higher knowledge in the traditional ways (see e.g. Korn 1960, Zurbuchen 1987, and sec. IV below). But there came a change: whereas ‘before’ (sané dumun), much of what they learnt was not to be imparted (aje wēra) to people unsuited for it by birth, suitability was ‘now’ (mangkin) taken to concern a person’s intellectual and spiritual qualities, as judged by his/her mentor, or because of his/her age more than estate. Thus, ‘many literati nowadays concur that aja wēra-type injunctions are meant to restrict certain types of knowledge, invariably mystic, magic, or esoteric in nature, to those persons who have studied enough to receive them, regardless of caste [sc. estate]’ (Zurbuchen 1987: 60).

This line, to which Pedanda Gdé does not but Pak Semer and others in Baturujung do subscribe (see Duff-Cooper 1990a: 335), is also that of the Parisadha Hindu Dharma, the organization that since the early 1960s has aimed to make Balinese ‘religious’ thought and practices uniform, or more so. Parisadha
publications like *Upadeca*, a ‘manual’ of instruction in Indonesian that standardizes Balinese religion (see e.g. Boon 1990: 157), arouse much lay and priestly interest that Schaareman rightly urges (1986: 44) should not be underestimated (as perhaps Hildred and Clifford Geertz (1975: 9) do). The loosening of the *aje wera* injunction is obviously a necessary part of the Parisadha’s general project. Perhaps this new attitude can be attributed, partly, to its influence.

Why such publications arouse so much interest, though, is difficult to pinpoint. Probably they do so for various reasons, one of which might perhaps be that more Balinese than is patent are ‘seekers after spiritual insight’ (Zurbuchen 1987: 54 n.26). However, ‘the present political situation’ (see Swellengrebel 1960: 72) is probably one important reason. If the political and cultural independence of Bali is under threat from Java (see Forge 1980: 221), the Balinese on Lombok are confronted with Islam on what Gerdin (1982: 175) calls ‘a massive scale’, and steadily more intrusively. In such circumstances it is understandable for Balinese to turn to such ideological themes as cosmology and the higher, purer world of their forebears and higher gods, themes that are practically powerfully unifying.8

In the present case, anyway, such a suggestion is more plausible than the attempt to reduce the extent and expense of rites also mentioned by Swellengrebel (1960: 73; see also Boon 1977: 240). Balinese have never in my hearing complained about the cost and the number of rites, nor does less appear to be spent now on rites than before, nor less often. On the contrary, expenditure on such obligations, often met, seems ready and generous (Pak Semer was said to have spent some Rp. 100,000 on Kuningan in November 1990). Zurbuchen, supportingly, mentions (1987: 242) that “it seems probable that the ceremonial density of Bali has increased” as its population has grown from between 500,000 and 800,000 at the beginning of the nineteenth century, through 1,100,000 in 1931 and 1,780,000 in 1961, to 2,475,000 in 1980.

A reduction in the number and the cost of rites follows from Parisadha attempts to make ‘religion’ more an affair of the head and the heart than of ceremony (Swellengrebel 1960: 73): ‘the greater the emotion the less the ritual’

7. Recently, for instance, the provincial government in effect compulsorily purchased a large area of rice fields to the north and north-west of Baturujung where some eighty bungalows for officials and others are being built. The quiet, dusty, one-lane track that ran along the northern edge of the village is now a two-lane, tarmac road busy with trucks and jeeps coming and going from the site. See also Zurbuchen’s report (1990: 141, 142) that at the official reopening of the restored Borobodur, ‘one of the most glorious of all Buddhist sites’, in January 1983, ‘an official blessing of the monument was given by an Islamic ulama chanting Koranic verses’.

8. It is not assumed either that those present at village rites pay much attention to them or that they have a precise understanding of the ideology behind a rite (see Needham 1981: 83). The fact of their presence, all together, is the point here (see below, sec. V). However, compare Mark Hobart (1986: 15): ‘the banjar [village council to which all married men belong and should attend meetings of] was generally seen [by villagers in northern Gianyar]...not as an expression of group solidarity...in a gentle Durkheimian way’.
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(Hocart 1970: 54). But that body is unlikely to make much headway in this direction if the number of Balinese continues to increase and if making Balinese religion more cerebral and emotional and less ceremonial is one of its aims, at least in the short term. An aspect of knowledge acquisition repeatedly stressed to me in 1979–81 and on my return visit is that one learns by doing. It was also often said that theory should derive from practice.

Whatever these tenets may offer for an appreciation of the interest just mentioned—perhaps the reading is the doing here, as the reading and comprehension of, for instance, *kakawin* are distinct (Zurbuchen 1987: 87-95)—they accord with the stress put on rites by the Balinese manual of instruction (*tutur*), *Jñānasiddhānta*. This text explains that knowledge includes ritualistic knowledge without which meditation would not even be proper (Soebadio 1971: 8). Hildred and Clifford Geertz, also, stress that Balinese religion highlights the ritualistic and dramatic aspects of Hinduism over its philosophical and mystical ones (1975: 9); while Boon goes so far as to suggest that Balinese writings may not be ‘primarily’ about their contents: ‘they sometimes seem more like performance in the medium of script, just as *wayang* [shadow puppetry] is performance in the medium of puppets’ (1990: 84).

Emphases can change, though, as they did from Vedic through post-Vedic texts. If the Parisadha aims to reduce the importance of rites concomitant with an increase in the importance of knowledge, it could in time succeed. Present-day knowledge acquisition, though, suggests it has far to go.

III

One reason given by senior Balinese like the *pedanda* and his younger brother Ida Ketut Sideman for studying traditional higher knowledge is that one’s *taksu* suggested it.9 *Taksu* has various meanings, e.g. ‘intercessor between gods and man’ (Swellengrebel 1960: 55) and ‘guardian of the ground (of a compound)’ (Goris 1960: 104), what Swellengrebel (1960: 55) terms *ngurah*. A *taksu* called Déwa Taksu Bungkah Karang is one of the ‘category of the intercessors’, ‘a humble assistant’ to a greater god (Grader 1960b: 224). My understanding is that the word refers to a personal, mystical being from whom one can receive guidance when one engages in ascetic activity (*matapa*; Ind *semadi*). In Pagutan, this means meditating at night in a pure state (that is, after bathing, putting on clean, formal dress, and using *tirtha*, ‘holy water’) at some place—a spring or

temple—considered *simbit*. In Pagutan a *taksu* is usually contacted in one’s compound temple (*mrajan/sangghah*). When asleep and dreaming, one may also get guidance from one’s *taksu* (Duff-Cooper 1987b). There is thus much point to the explication of *taksu* as ‘a Balinese word regularly used for a variety of connections with otherworldly forces’ (Zurbuchen 1987: 126 n.6).

Noteworthy, here, is that *taksu* also means ‘mysterious magic power’ and ‘magically endowed or inspired’ (ibid.: 172 n.45, 273). These renderings implicitly refer to Vedic *tapas* which, like *matapa*, is based on Sanskrit *tap*. *Tapas* as ascetic activity is the ‘“heated effort” of such asceticism but also...the “magical heat” that that effort produces’ (Kaelber 1989: 2, 3). Vedic *tapas*, moreover, is not only a ‘creative force...it is also destructive’ (ibid.: 45), rather as Balinese ascetic activity can be beneficial or dangerous. Also, ‘a close correlation...between tapas and knowledge is evident from the *Rg Veda* onward’ (ibid.: 61); as the *Jñānasiddhānta* teaches, knowledge derives from meditation, while ‘the knowledge that issues from tapas yields spiritual rebirth’ (ibid.: 67), an important aspect of the consecration of *pedanda* (Korn 1960: 139-40, 143). These parallels are arresting: ‘the four early Indian collections of *vedas* are not extant on Bali’, not even fragments of them have been found (ibid.: 135; see also Goris 1926: 144).

Another reason given for someone’s decision to begin acquiring higher knowledge is as a return to the gods for them granting that person some boon. In this case, s/he makes a promise, oral (*sesangl*) or written (*sot*), that if s/he is granted such-and-such, s/he will do something in return.

A local descent group’s traditional or habitual ‘occupation(s)’ may also influence someone to start acquiring higher knowledge. This requires only short

10. A spring in the western part of the gardens at the Gria Taman is *simbit*. Sick people may have to bathe there as part of their treatment by the *pedanda* as a *balian*. One may be presented with *anugrah* (a gift from the gods like a white puppy or a black, white and red rabbit, or a *ring*); things like rings may disappear from there if they are put off while one bathes.

11. Here and below the first term is the fine (*alus*) Balinese.

12. That marriage with a father’s brother’s daughter is an excellent marriage to contract (see e.g. Duff-Cooper 1984a; see also Boon 1990: 120), but is also considered to be too ‘hot’ to be entered into by many Balinese comes to mind here. *Tapas* is also essential in the production of rain and of fertility in the fields (Kaelber 1989: 15). My friend, ‘Pak manku Gedug, of Pura Segara, Ampenan, undertakes such ascetic activity and practices such regimes (*brata*) as eating no pork nor taking salt, and abstains from sexual intercourse (Skt. *brahmacarya*), and is regularly commissioned by the provincial government to lead the annual rain-making rite Pekelem (Duff-Cooper 1986: 176-8) held at the crater lake, Segara Anak, on Mount Rinjani.

13. In line, it seems, with the ‘indestructible’, eternal, quality of letters (*aksara*) (Hooykaas 1978: 76), a *pedanda* is necessary when one pays off a written contract; only a *pemanku* need officiate when one pays a *sesangl*. The repaying has two aspects: giving offerings to the gods in thanks for them granting the boon and doing what one promised to do if they granted it.
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The Balinese form of life assigns greatest importance to the past conceived more as a higher, purer place than temporally: 'factual historiography is alien to the Balinese and there is a tendency to mythologize important historical personages and events' (Grader 1960a: 163). As a model for the present and the future, what has 'always' been done by a group of people can readily be appreciated as an important influence on its members when they come to consider the roles they will play in its life and its relationships with members of other groups. As Hocart writes (1970: 117, 122), 'man is a traditional animal, and must always fall back on tradition.... Communities, like individuals, form habits, and...habits are more deeply ingrained than reasons'.

Not all members of a group, of course, may do what they have always done, or what they are expected to do, even though the consequences of dissidence may be dire for the dissidents and unhappy for their relatives (Duff-Cooper 1991a). Moreover, such groups cannot have a tradition of acquiring higher knowledge at a university (see sec. I above). Four of Pak Semer's great-nieces perhaps decided to attend Unram because their father was a student and now teaches there—but other young Balinese students attending university cannot be related to such a tradition (if following one's father is one).

The latter may have had their interest aroused in their subjects (usually law, economics or agriculture). 'Family' traditions (but see Duff-Cooper 1985b) have to be begun; and the pedanda mentioned that one of the recently consecrated pedanda did not come from a family where the eldest or at least one son followed his father, or mother, in the status. This ordnand's consecration, and the study that preceded it, must therefore be put down to his personality (the configuration of the qualities (guna) that determine or influence a person's actions, words, and thoughts (Duff-Cooper 1985a)). Becoming pedanda, though, is habitual for brahmana. 'Brahmana' may designate a group of agnates (soroh) by virtue of relationship to a male and female ancestor who together constitute an 'origin-point' (kawitan) (see Guermonprez 1987: 63, 54)—so perhaps the ordnand was in line with 'family' tradition, very broadly conceived.

No student, though, gave 'my interest was aroused in my subject' as a reason for having begun its study. Some averred that they were studying because they could not rely on former means to finance their (potential) obligations. Others, perhaps half-jokingly, said that they had fallen in with their seniors' wishes that they go to university to put off having to work; others again, to get out of working in the rice fields as their fathers and sometimes their grandfathers did and as their forebears had. I shall return to this below (sec. V). Here we simply note that, traditionally, Balinese generally 'play' (macanda-canda; Ind. main-main) only on such specific occasions as the day (manis galungan) after galungan or when a village temple (pamaksan) is in festival. 'Before', though, young Balinese men, even if married, if they had the means, spent much time and effort on such

14. One does not stop studying when one has achieved a particular status; study continues until death.
diversions as gambling (on cards and cockfights) and womanizing away from their natal village. For some, studying at university seems to hold out the possibility of like diversion. On my return visit, indeed, no student was seen to read a book, and one said he never did unless it was absolutely necessary. Unless they had classes, students whiled away the time chatting over coffee or soft drinks, listening to (rock) music, playing cards or board-games, and often flirting or courting. As the pedanda reprimanded me when I first visited the Gria, 'One doesn’t want always to be serious!'

As for not working in the fields, repeated reports (e.g. Mark Hobart 1980: 88; Gerdin 1982: 298; Duff-Cooper 1991b) show manual labour in general ranking low on the scale of Balinese values, with some tasks (e.g. portering, road maintenance) ranking lower than others (e.g. animal husbandry and rice-growing). Prestige is accorded to skilled, non-manual and ‘white-collar’ work, if not in itself, then because such work is associated with substances that can be transformed and gives access to the powerful; and/or because it is for powerful organizations, which are often themselves part of the Indonesian state apparatus.

Boon has it (1977: 184) that ‘the guaranteed lag in the hoped-for congruence of prestige and power...animates [Balinese] social life’, and Clifford Geertz (1980: 230) that ‘the whole dynamic of Balinese hierarchy involves attempting to draw near, by imitation, to higher ranks, and to distance, by dis-imitation, the lower ones’. To the extent that these and similar opinions (e.g. Hildred Geertz 1963: 53; Howe 1989: 67) are clear, their thoroughgoingness need not be accepted nor their sociological style and assumptions adopted (see Duff-Cooper 1991a, 1992) for it to be recognized that some Balinese people want a higher status.

When (enhanced) status comes with white-collar work, wealth—a regular, substantial cash income, a European-style house in town, car, telephone, subsidized medical treatment and, often, expenses-paid plane-trips to such centres of power as Yogyakarta and Jakarta where satu piring (literally ‘one plate (of rice)’, i.e. a basic meal) can cost Rp. 25,000—is expected to accompany it.15 A sudra can only very exceptionally attain the status, though not the wealth, associated with high/pure birth and its potential power (see e.g. Duff-Cooper 1988a). Also, traditional social functions having the status and (potential) power associated with the ability to achieve prosperity in general do not appeal as much as modern ones, for various reasons: for example, they generally do not lead to the wealth that results from white-collar work, and put most generally ‘the relationship to the outside is integrated as a superior value’ (Barraud 1990: 54). But s/he can (it is believed) achieve high status and the wealth that goes with it after university. A student may also think (as Pak Semer’s son, Pak Saridana, thinks) that s/he will

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15. My work, which stresses the importance of centres in Balinese ideology, tends to refute, post hoc, the burden of Clifford Geertz’s comment (1980: 187) that ‘the general exemplary-center-plus-replicas view of the Balinese...has yet to be treated adequately’ and demonstrates various ways in which ‘it is...at the heart of its structure’.
be able to achieve prosperity even more widely than via a traditional social function. So s/he studies.

Why do their seniors encourage them to study, and foot the substantial bills for them doing so?\textsuperscript{16} Why do others want their young(er) people to become, say, \textit{dalang} or \textit{balian}? The reasons here are, or appear to be, less heterogeneous than those just discussed. Being told by one’s \textit{taksu} that a child or grandchild, say, should be encouraged to acquire some higher knowledge as well as the tradition(s) of one’s local descent group figure largely among these reasons. They have been briefly considered. Seniors look to the welfare of those they are in authority over, and sometimes consider study, and the social functions it leads to, as a more reliable course to a substantial and prestigious living than other ways.

Pak Semer and others in Baturujung emphasized the value (\textit{argalaji}) of knowledge. It is not valuable \textit{per se}, but because it is linked to a goal (\textit{tetujon}). Nearly all the reasons considered for studying or encouraging someone to do so refer to the attainment of a goal, and one studies to attain it. The general social functions of brahmana and ksatrya (see above, sec. II) have prosperity in general as their aim. Particular social functions requiring higher knowledge also have as their aim prosperity, but it is more limited—to the local descent group of the functionaries and to the people for whom they exercise their functions.

The linking of knowledge to a goal, and that it should bring prosperity, is not unexpectable. It was so before, and it would be odd to acquire higher knowledge to do oneself and one’s relatives down (though some people reverse what should properly be one’s goal and study to harm others). Traditionally, too, knowledge led to, for instance, the bliss of liberation and to spiritual and material happiness (Soebadio 1971: 8; Hooykaas 1977: note 4k). (Similarly, at \textit{Atharva Veda} 19, 40, 4, for instance, heaven is said to be attained by one who has \textit{vidyā} or \textit{medhā}, knowledge or wisdom.)

Hooykaas makes the point (1966: 13) that a \textit{pedanda}’s ritualistic texts are written by those ‘\textit{nourris dans la griya}’ for others reared there. It is true that ‘before’ an aspiring ordinand moved into his teacher’s compound while now the student goes there for instruction, returning to where s/he resides to study. None the less, the point remains: traditional higher knowledge could be acquired in one’s own village or one where one had relatives, ‘modern’ higher knowledge must be gone and got, in town. People do go to get it, of course, rather as Balinese used often to, and sometimes still do, go to the forest alone to meditate or go on journeys (\textit{tirta yatra}) to purify their souls. Doing so is premissed on them and their seniors judging that there is a need for it to attain a goal. Villagers these days, of course, have learnt from radio, newspapers, magazines and television (and the foreign visitor’s talk), that the world is an even bigger and more complex place than they realized from, say, the \textit{Mahabarata} and the \textit{Ramayana}.

\textsuperscript{16} Pak Saridana’s education on Bali costs Pak Semer at least two million rupees, excluding fees, a year: Rp. 600,000 for lodgings, Rp. 1,200,000 allowance, and the rest on such things as travel, repairs to motor-scooter etc.
Why do students at university, and those who encourage them to become such, want to be a part of it? Apart from the reasons already mentioned, perhaps there is a feeling that Java and Islam cannot entirely be held at bay. It is preferable to join them to influence them rather than allow them to inundate the Balinese culturally and politically. This is not passive nor debilitating, but a positive reaction to the perceived situation made possible by the strength and vibrancy, and perhaps the ‘binding force’, of Balinese ideology, of which many values, often what we call religious, serve as ‘points of anchorage’ (Renard-Clamagirand 1989: 476). Charras (1982) demonstrates how fundamentally important ‘religion’ is for Balinese and how values that are less constraining can be jettisoned or radically changed in the face of new circumstances. It is also a positive response in that Balinese often aver that the fact that Muslims are politically superior to the Balinese indicates that the country is now ‘ruined’ (usak). Neither of these situations is compatible with other aspects of Balinese ideology: acquiring modern knowledge is a way of at least partially rectifying them.

Balinese people also want to be capable in the world. On the one hand, it goes against the grain for a right-minded Balinese to be ignorant (belong), an offensive epithet, and associated with the darkness and lowness of left-handed magic, when s/he can be knowledgeable and associated with the brightness and purity of the sun. On the other hand, young Balinese say that it is all very well for old men like Pak Semer to say that all Balinese and Muslims are brothers: he is wealthy, well-known and well-respected, so he and his family are secure; and if he ventures out, which he rarely does, he is unlikely to come to any harm. For them however, they say, the world is a potentially violent and dangerous place, in which there is always the possibility of coming to harm. They need knowledge to protect themselves against forces (religious, political and economic) that aim to harm them in the same way that one employs mantra and/or holy water to protect oneself and, if one is a priest or a balian or dalang, say, to protect other people from such beings as leak who wish only to harm others.17

IV

The fine Balinese words muruk and mapurukan, from *uruk (education, tuition, lesson, instruction) mean ‘to study’. ‘To teach’ is nguruk, and in low Balinese ngajah and ngajahin, from *ajah (education, instruction etc.). These words for ‘to teach’ also have the meanings ‘to drill, to coach’, and ‘to practise and rehearse’. Uning/tau, nawang mean ‘to understand’, and ‘be able, be capable, be clever,

17. They also, of course, have to be on guard against physical force; but the Balinese of Baturujung are renowned as fierce and brave fighters, when they have to be, so others tend to leave them alone (I was told) when they know with whom they are dealing.
know'; pawikan means ‘to be capable or expert in religious matters’ (cf. Ind. mahir, be capable or expert; memahirkan, learn by heart). Similar congeries of English words are covered by tutur (see above), which means ‘to remember, to memorize; to teach’. So, tuturs are ‘dogmatic instructions which are transmitted to (qualified) pupils’ (Soebadio 1971: 3, 4). Tutur also means ‘direction’ in a like sense (Hooykaas 1977: 102-3). Purukan/ajah-ajahan, pe-plajahan mean ‘a lesson or study, an essay or a treatise’.

These words, though not exhaustive, nevertheless show that teaching and being taught are matters of drilling and imparting information to the pupil, which the latter is supposed to copy and assimilate by rote. Understanding and being knowledgeable can be claimed for the pupil when s/he can replicate what the teacher does and when s/he can repeat what s/he was told by the teacher, as told, and what s/he was told to read etc., by the teacher, as written. When a pupil is able in (sc. knows) these tasks s/he is ipso facto capable and clever. Knowledge, it should be noted, is got through learning and copying, i.e. doing (see above, sec. III). Understandably then, the Balinese priest for instance, ‘will not give an analysis.... He comments upon his text and paraphrases its language’ (Hooykaas 1966: 132): ‘exegesis in any strict sense does not number among the functions of traditional [Balinese] textual and ritual experts’ (Boon 1990: 84). Neither are aspects of teaching or learning in Balinese life. That Balinese manuscripts embody old truths and ancient learning (Zurbuchen 1987: 84) makes it the more understandable: ‘truths’ and ‘ancient learning’ here are axioms that are not considered to require demonstration, but are accepted without proof. Or the proof is one is taught them. It is unsurprising, therefore, that ‘a far-reaching consensus’ appears to exist among pedanda (Hooykaas 1966: 132). If views are opposed, though, either Balinese people are unconcerned (see Clifford Geertz 1980: 196) or their statement is ‘muted through...acceptance’ in the interests of harmony and consensus (Zurbuchen 1987: 94).18

Traditionally, knowledge allowed the ‘one who knows’ to overcome the diversity of the world and the numerous pairs of opposites of which, under one aspect, it is constituted. This state is termed sandhi, and is akin to the Indian doctrine that ‘in the “one who knows”, all opposites coincide and become one’ (Heesterman 1985: 94). In this state one is ‘enlightened’, and by transcending one’s senses can attain a higher order of reality, that of Absolute Truth and Goodness (Angela Hobart 1983). This order is the realm of Ida Sang Hyang Vidhi, the high or highest god of the Balinese; it is achieved primarily through rites of one kind or another. University teachers may have attained this sublime state, or they may not. But, none the less, they are taken by their students and others to impart information that sometimes seems like Absolute Truth.

Teachers in general impart information about worlds apart from village life. Traditional knowledge is about the higher, purer world of the ancestors and higher

18. But compare Mark Hobart (1985: 115): ‘consistency, or coherence, is treated as at least as important as any correspondence [of assertion] to unverifiable past events’.
gods and their relationship with people and/or about the lower, less pure world of 'demons', and is imparted through cosmology, theology and other stories, poetry, performances of various kinds, and so on. University teachers tend to employ academic theories as vehicles through which to impart knowledge of the middle world, the world of people (mertyapada) that the Balinese inhabit, but which is often further from village life than the worlds of gods and demons.

'Sight...is the most important sense of knowing' (Angela Hobart 1983): 'Nawang and uning [see above]...are linked to the root tawang, and near homonym, ening. Both signify “clear”, “transparent”...meturah-turahan, “guessing”, is literally working out what something is in very poor light’ (Mark Hobart 1985: 129 n.6). To say that something is empirically true, wiakti, one usually requires visual confirmation (ibid.: 113). The major media of higher knowledge acquisition—lontar, books, film, discs, television, and copying—are consonant with this emphasis on sight, which in turn confirms the authority of, and confers it upon, these media. These of course include sound, both as commentary and oral instruction. The Balinese preference is for dialogue (e.g. timbal, ‘balance’): ‘it is considered arrogant to hold forth’, unless one is speaking to the young or with formal authority (ibid.: 118).

When a teacher instructs, especially through lectures, his or her position of authority is reaffirmed. In universities this position is further affirmed in seminars that, one student reported, are usually given by teachers, with any comments or questions coming from the speaker’s colleagues. Students are adjudged presumptuous if they comment or question: why make comments or ask questions if what has been said is clear? Since a teacher said what was said, it must have been clear, and the comments and questions serve only to draw attention to the (ill-mannered) student.19 This leads to the point that in such a form of life as the Balinese, those in authority are generally regarded to be those who ought to have it. So teachers teach because they ought to. They can be seen to teach and their studies can be read: how else might the matter be decided (see Duff-Cooper 1985c; Errington 1989: 166)? Only when one’s knowledge is demonstrably at the level of the teacher’s may one criticize and/or comment upon his or her ‘work’. However, since learning continues until death (Pedanda Gdél said he had been taught by his late father, the Pedanda Bhatara (bhatara: protector, god) a pupil never attains a level of knowledge equivalent to his or her teachers’). Korn writes (1960: 137-8) of a novice pedanda, the pupil ‘must take special care not to do, say, or think anything improper with regard to his mentor...needs to manifest complete submission to his mentor. He must attend to everyone of his words without ever...doubting their veracity’, and ‘when the pupil has come to the end of his studies...it may be that he imagines he knows everything...or...doubts the truth of the dogmas [he has been taught and has learnt]. Both attitudes are sinful’

19. ‘Ill-mannered’ is Ind. kurang ajar, ‘lacking education’. ‘Criticism’ (Ind. kupasan) also means ‘analysis’, ‘judgement’; bahasan, also meaning ‘criticism’ and ‘debate’, includes ‘contradiction’ among its meanings.
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This all differs only in degree from what (one is led by one’s instructors to think) is expected of students at a university and those preparing to take up other (traditional) social functions.

However, ‘the agent’s thoughts or feelings are seen as an active part of knowledge’ (Mark Hobart 1985: 123). Here is evinced a version of the familiar and cogent view that what counts for someone as knowledge depends to a great extent upon that person’s interests and values, and probably goals. In the present context, the student whose interests, values or goals are inconsonant with those of the teachers must find him- or herself in a dilemma. S/he must resolve this either by looking for another teacher or, in line with the tendency Mark Hobart also mentions (ibid.: 115), will probably accept of what s/he is taught only that which seems most fitting to his or her interests.

The process of acquiring higher knowledge differs in certain ways depending upon whether that knowledge is traditional or modern. The former is taught in Balinese, which employs register (see e.g. Kersten 1970; Zurbuchen 1987). Basically, finer language is used to address and refer to seniors, coarser or lower language to juniors, though these principles are adjusted to take account of the interlocutors’ relative ages, social intimacy or distance, wealth, education and so on. Indonesian by contrast, employed to impart ‘modern’ knowledge, does not have ‘levels’. In Pagutan, its employment is said to flatten out social differences. Traditional formal dress is generally worn when traditional knowledge is being imparted, and both teacher and pupil should have bathed and used holy water, and will generally have given offerings to their compound and, where appropriate, village gods so that the lesson(s), among other things, go well. Male and female university students usually wear trousers, which are equated with ‘civilization’ and ‘from the standpoint of national development’ are ‘valued...signs of progress and modernity’ (Zurbuchen 1990: 146), or if female a ‘modern’ or ‘advanced’ (maju) dress or skirt when they go in and when they are not attending religious rites in the village.20

In traditional situations, knowledge is usually imparted by a teacher to a student while both sit formally (masila) on mats on, say, a house verandah or in an open pavilion. The teacher adopts a superior point of the compass to the student (e.g. the former facing east or north-east, the latter west or south-west). In town, the teacher lectures from a rostrum placed on a platform at the front of the room raised slightly above the level of the floor where students sit at rows of

20. I have argued (Duff-Cooper 1989: 130) that in as much as everything in the Balinese universe derives from, is pervaded by, and is contained in Vidhi in various guises, all aspects of Balinese ideology, if any, may legitimately be considered as ritual. Town values are breaking up the holistic character of Balinese ideology for those who distinguish between, for example, religion and the ordinary or mundane (lumrah/biasa); see also sec. VI below. One influential Balinese from town (a lecturer in law at Unram and a former deputy head of the provincial department of religion) came to a village rite in trousers. This impropriety was roundly, though politely and in subdued tones, condemned.
benches and tables or on chairs with small writing-desks attached, facing the teacher. In traditional knowledge acquisition, a male usually instructs males, a female, females; except where 'gender' has been dissolved, for example in a female pedanda who may have both male and female students. Witches, more often female than male (Duff-Cooper 1984b), may also instruct males and females. In town, teachers may be male or female (they are usually male) and can teach males and females together. The difference here resides in all modern knowledge being seen in principle as suitable for both genders, while traditional knowledge is generally thought suitable for males or females and only rarely considered suitable for both, at least as concerns formal instruction (with or without texts) and putting it into practice. Here, for example, men play in the gamelan (gong), women dance; at rites, men cook the special food for the guests, women make offerings. Normally, women cook and men grow rice and tobacco, say, in the fields, though women (or male or female day-labourers) deal with the crop when it is brought home. Far more women than men are (said to be) witches, far more men than women balian, and so on.²¹

Instruction is paid for. Traditional knowledge may be given by a teacher to a pupil, when they are of the same local descent group, but the latter is expected to support the teacher materially when s/he can no longer support him- or herself and to share in the work and expenses of burying and/or cremating the teacher when s/he dies, in the usual way, though with the added obligation of being the teacher’s pupil. Or knowledge may be exchanged for goods, services or cash. These exchanges are 'equal': while the goods, services and cash are not interchangeable with the knowledge, nor the teacher for the pupil, and are therefore not in these regards symmetrical, they are clearly thought to compensate their donors for what they give in exchange for them.²²

In a university, the exchanges are less simple. Here, pupils (or their fathers or other close relatives) pay for the services of the university’s employees who impart knowledge to the pupils. Basically, though, the exchanges are dyadic (as they are in systems of asymmetric prescriptive alliance (e.g. Needham 1987: 189-90), which also implicate three, at least, exchanging parties). The pupil pays the university for his/her place, the university pays its teachers for their work, they

²¹ Dalang are overwhelmingly male, but in 1978–9 two women dalangs held wayang performances, and women musicians were sometimes seen in their troupes (Zurbuchen 1987: 120 n.12).

²² By 'symmetrical' and its cognates is meant a relation in which two entities are interchangeable one for another in specified contexts; 'asymmetrical' and other forms of the word refer to a relation where two entities are not interchangeable one for another in specified contexts. Two entities may be symmetrically and asymmetrically related one to another in different contexts. They may also be related such that in one context the relation holding between them is symmetrical, in another, asymmetrical, such that one entity is pre-eminent, and in yet another context asymmetrical such that the other entity is pre-eminent (see Duff-Copper 1991c).
impart knowledge to pupils. The pupils provide work for the teachers, who give labour to the university, which allows students to acquire higher knowledge.

The teacher–pupil relationship may be seen as an analogue of the parent–child and the ruler–ruled relationships. These are all asymmetrical in various ways. The language of traditional knowledge acquisition, Balinese, is consonant with this asymmetry, as are the non-linguistic conventions of position, dress and posture. Indonesian is a language that flattens out asymmetry; though this mode of relation is evinced by teachers’ greater command of their subject, by the relative ages of teacher and student and by the teacher’s use of monologue in lecturing, his or her positions (higher, at the front of the class when lecturing or at the head of the table or closer to the speaker in seminars, greater familiarity with the rector and other decision-makers in the university, perhaps even residential proximity to the campus), and more formal modern dress than that which the students adopt.

The exchanges accompanying these forms of knowledge acquisition are ‘equal’, however, in the first case and arguably so in the second. They are asymmetrical, though, in that neither the parties to the exchanges nor what each gives and receives are interchangeable one for another. Modern exchanges are more complex than traditional exchanges, but both kinds are basically dyadic.

One of the differences between students’ relationships with other villagers and the ‘normal’ relationships of villagers to other villagers is that they go into town and mix there with people who reside there, and with Muslims, far more than other villagers do. They dress as villagers do not generally dress; and their conversations, often in Indonesian, are more concerned with the outside, including their studies. Female students, moreover, are regarded as modern: they do not stay at home, going out only to market in Pagutan or to other villages with a female companion as circumstances require, but go to town, often alone and by motorbike.

These modes of behaviour differ from those of many but not all other villagers. Some villagers work in town and go there daily, from Monday to Friday, and one or two women go shopping in town alone, though they go by bus.

23. But not in all ways: father and son and mother and daughter are interchangeable in certain situations; rulers need the ruled and the ruled need the rulers (see e.g. Schaareman 1986: 40), at least as things stand; while Balinese teachers and pupils are the same by various criteria that apply to all material Balinese (Duff-Cooper 1985a).

24. Only students of modern higher knowledge are considered here. I could not observe the differences, if any, between the interactional modes of students of traditional higher knowledge and those who had taken up a traditional social function, nor were any effects (potential or otherwise) of such education on village life discussed with me.
These people wear town clothes when they go into town, and much of their conversation, especially that of the workers, concerns the outside. Noticeably, also, people who have spent some time in (say) Denpasar or another large conurbation, either working or because they were born there, and have later come (back) to live in Pagutan, bring town conventions with them and go on adopting them. These differences cannot be the effects of higher education in itself. Rather, significant differences may arise through someone studying in town, but they may also arise through other activities or circumstances. They all, though, derive from frequent or extended exposure to town.

When in the village, students tend not to gather with other villagers in the gardens (for instance) when the noon-day sun is highest or at dusk on small bridges across the irrigation ditches that run beside one of the major roads into Pagutan that pass Baturujung along its eastern boundary. What students chat about tends also to differ from the interests and concerns (as they are evinced in their chit-chat) of other villagers. These differences are only to be expected. But the exclusivity of students’ intercourse, from the point of view of villagers, is said by some older men to be likely to affect what they see as the sense of common village ways and goals and those common ways and goals themselves. This sense is also thought likely to be affected by students sometimes behaving as though they were ‘kings’ (raja) in other ways. One student, for instance, ‘married’ a second cousin (mindon), but sent her back to her natal compound three days later because her views of married life did not accord with his. He should have tried to make a relationship with her. Some of the female students take only a small part in the daily tasks that are women’s (e.g. cooking, washing-up, laundering, sweeping the compound, working in the gardens, rearing pigs, and going to market), and the majority of male students never work in the fields as their fathers and sometimes grandfathers do. Students spend most of their time chatting. The use of ‘Western’ cosmetics by both male and female students tends only to reinforce the view that like kings they are self-regarding and vain and less careful with what money they have than they should be.25

None the less, Pak Semer especially averred, the positions students would hopefully attain after graduation were expected to benefit the entire village by

25. Villagers in northern Gianyar, Bali, reported that kings were egocentric and capricious, and that ‘avarice, arrogance, envy and lasciviousness’ truly described some of their characteristics (Mark Hobart 1986: 5, 15). Significantly kings, also, were not regarded by most villagers as ‘part of village life’ (ibid.: 20; but compare Schaareman 1986: 40 and Schulte-Nordholt 1986: 11). Boon’s views about the roles of costume and make-up in Balinese life, although not all applicable to life in Pagutan, make allusions that are interesting here: ‘the costume applied...to a wedding couple ushers them toward the refined (alus) pole of values [of which a king is, with a pedanda, the epitome].... The outfitted bride and groom become divine consorts...spouses...and corpses are subjected to maquillage to prevent their theft by demons that threaten any and every exchange...makeup wards off mésalliance. Cosmetic activity accompanies dance, drama, and other performances thought vulnerable to hostile influence...cosmetics were likely another side of courtly battle’ (1990: 123-4).
introducing more wealth and experience into it and by providing villagers (all of
whom can trace relationship one to another through males or females, or both) with
contacts at centres of authority, which could then be built upon. If only, Pak Semer
repeated, students attaining such positions could see that neither then nor now need
they, nor indeed should they, behave like kings. What value has education (he
said) if it did not help one to mix (madukan; Ind. bergaul) with every kind of
people?26 One of his devices to overcome this (potential) situation was to borrow
a gamelan and have male students and other male villagers learn to play instruments
and have female students (and non-students) learn to dance, and have them give
performances together. It remains to be seen whether Pak Semer and others
consider that it works in the long term; however, the pupils coming together
(magabungan, ‘tied to form one’) as the gamelan association (seka gong) for
instruction twice a week for a total of eight hours clearly means, in Pak Semer’s
opinion, that it is having the planned effect in the short term by providing a context
in which students and non-students can learn a traditional function together and, as
members of the association of which all are a part, as equals.27

VI

In Balinese ideology, as in other forms of life, traditional and modern higher
knowledge are commodities, in three conjoined senses: they are items of exchange;
they are parts of different, but related, ideological worlds; and like other items of
exchange, varieties of both may be distinguished one from another by any one or
more of four attributes, namely description, location, when exchanged, and the state
of nature (then) obtaining (see Hahn 1984: 113).

The exchanges detailed above suggest that where traditional higher knowledge
is used as an item of exchange by one of the parties, the exchanges are ‘equal’,
asymmetrical and dual. Exchanges of modern higher knowledge evince the same
principles, but they are more complex. Given that exchanges of modern higher
knowledge are an accretion to Balinese ideology, and as such are a development of
it, this finding is consonant with the fact (as it seems in general to be) that ‘the
normal development of social forms is in the direction of increasing intricacy’ and
‘a greater complexity’ (Duff-Cooper 1990c: 134; Needham 1984: 229).28

26. Ind. pandai gaul, literally ‘clever, able, skilful, practised, a master (at) mixing (with)’ means
‘to have good manners’, ‘to know how to behave’.

27. Clifford Geertz (1980: 158) also refers to ‘the equality of members (of a seka) in the context
of the groups of which they are members’ (see also Hilda Geertz and Clifford Geertz 1975: 30-
31, 115-16, 165-6).

28. For a transformation quite the reverse of the normal course of events, see Needham 1988.
A valuable transferred from one party to another changes the parties into, or reaffirms them as, partners. Traditionally, these partners were all Balinese. In modern exchanges, the parties (teacher(s) and pupil(s)) may both be Balinese, but teachers are often Muslims and the university is an organ of the nominally plural but in fact heavily Javano–Islamic Indonesian state. Traditional exchanges are likely to contribute more to the integration of Balinese than modern exchanges, the parties to which are not all Balinese and which are therefore likely to be more disintegrative: as, for instance, Barth writes, ‘ethnic groups only persist as significant units if they imply marked difference in behaviour, i.e. persisting cultural differences. Yet where persons of different culture interact [as they do of course in exchanges] one would expect these differences to be reduced, since interaction both requires and generates a congruence of codes and values’ (1969: 15-16; see also Barth 1966). Perhaps Pak Semer and others are not anxious unduly about the potential effects of modern higher education on ‘traditional’ Balinese life.

This is especially so when the knowledge acquired at a university is itself fragmenting and disintegrative. Traditional knowledge is knowledge that ‘belongs’, here, in Balinese ideology (see Zurbuchen 1990: 133). It is true that when an individual acquires some aspect of it, his or her inborn worth is enhanced (as it is by the acquisition of some aspect of modern knowledge); but both the acquired status and the knowledge acquisition correlated with it are traditional parts of traditional Balinese life. This is a whole. Both this whole and its indigenously defined parts are total in Mauss’s sense (e.g. 1954: 76-7): they have what ‘we’ call legal, economic, political and domestic, aesthetic, and religious aspects. Modern higher knowledge acquired at a university, contrastingly, does not have an aspect that is ‘religious’. It is clearly taken to ‘belong’ in Balinese life, though. It introduces the notion of the secular, ordinary and non-religious in such a way that everything that is not directly seen to concern religion (agama) is rendered ‘ordinary’ (for example, the clothes students adopt in the village for all occasions apart from those (they designate) ‘religious’).

The acquired traditional knowledge that leads to enhanced status (but not necessarily or even usually to wealth) may be characterized as imaginative and fantastical; the modern higher knowledge leading to enhanced status (and, it is thought, to wealth) as cogitial and ratiocinative (see Duff-Cooper 1987b: 83). These characteristics are not of course exclusive. Traditional knowledge has technical and symbolic aspects (see Mark Hobart 1979: 5; Duff-Cooper 1988b: 152, 187 n.5); and it is rational, at least in the sense that it can be supported by argument, and it often works. Modern higher knowledge has imaginative and fantastical elements, as the many citations from the writings of Einstein, Mach and Planck cited by Feyerabend (1987: 192-218), for instance, show; while such modern scientific entities as electrons, quarks, light signals and spacetime regions, are theoretical entities akin to such gods as Balinese ideology posits (ibid.: 168-9). Moreover, if imagination and fantasy characterize the creative arts (e.g. Needham 1978: 51-76), then the (ratiocinative and cogitational) sciences are also characterized by these features, for ‘scientists...produce works of art—the difference being that their
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Material is thought, not paint, nor marble, nor metal, nor melodious sound' (Feyerabend 1987: 294).

None the less, whether modern knowledge is ‘art’ or ‘science’, symbolic classifications of the kind associated with such forms of social life as the Balinese (e.g. Duff-Cooper 1991c) often disintegrate or are very much reduced in scope in face of it (see Needham 1979: 70). This appears not to be so in the present case, at least given the findings outlined above, which show modern higher knowledge acquisition to be as much symbolic action as is the acquisition of traditional higher knowledge. It was seen, moreover, that present-day reasons for encouraging someone to study, or for studying, whether traditional or modern knowledge, bear marked parallels one to another and with aspects of knowledge acquisition commented upon in the Veda and later early Indian texts, and that they are all linked to goals.

Students tend to take a narrow view of these goals. They look to status and wealth. Still, though, their reasons have a communal aspect. Older Balinese tend to take a wider view. Thus the Pedanda, for instance, is against the dilution of the aje wéra injunction, but he is in favour of villagers studying, both at schools and universities, as a counter to the increasing Islamic influence over the affairs of Balinese. Pak Semer, for another instance, is for both these courses. He judges that study benefits the individuals concerned, will benefit the Balinese in Baturujung generally, and that it will be in the best interests of everyone on the island (as long as students don’t behave like rajas), who will in time view everyone, including those to whom the Balinese are generally practically and ideologically opposed now, as ‘brothers’.

The Pedanda’s attitudes cannot be put down to him being part of an entrenched, conservative élite, because the views he expresses do not aim to preserve a status quo (cf. e.g. Proudfoot 1980: 160). Perhaps the views of Pak Semer, and others in the village who think like him, have been influenced by the 1928 youth pledge for ‘one nation, one people, one language’ and by the forty-odd years of ‘unity in oneness’ (persatuan dan kesatuan) (see Zurbuchen 1990: 133) and/or by orthodox, basically egalitarian Islam, which has been having an increasing impact on Lombok (see Gerdin 1982: 53). What is certain is that the acquisition of modern higher knowledge is having effects (but see sec. V above) on village life, and that older Balinese worry about them. Doubtless, some would dismiss these worries as ‘ideology’, the rationalization of a leading member of a defeated and increasingly threatened ruling class (the Balinese); or else would deny them because there cannot be any consensus in a village of three hundred or more inhabitants (see e.g. Boon 1990: 72, 151, 152).29

It is more helpful to take seriously the situation, and the reasons and worries that are a part of it, by listening to what people involved in it have to say about it and to think about what they have to say. This essay comprises one way of doing so. In any case, though, it is not for me to try to prophesy how life in

29. See e.g. Hocart 1970: 40 on the value of rationalizations. Also, whether a consensus exists in a particular locality or context is a matter not of fiat or theory, but of empirical research (see sec. II above).
Pagutan will develop nor assert how it ought to do so. If these are matters for anyone to decide, they are for the villagers ultimately—as it will be for them (if they will) to tell people who ask what has happened there. But none of that prevents me from putting on record my pleasure that this small number of people should be engaged in what Baumann (1987: 3) calls ‘processes of local redintegration’, which aim ‘at restoring and renewing a local community to its state of wholeness as its members perceive it.... When national integration aims at making local communities part of a new whole, local redintegration consists of processes aimed at preserving, restoring, or renewing the community’s sense of wholeness, however it is defined’.

The acquisition of modern higher knowledge (and that about traditional music and dance) is a response to the constituent processes of the policy of ‘unity and oneness’ (which is defined at centres but takes place on the peripheries in places like Pagutan); it is a part of these processes of local redintegration. These two sets of processes have generated ‘tension’ (Zurbuchen 1990: 133). One can only admire the Balinese for their determination to overcome this opposition and the resulting tension by transcending it through the acquisition of modern higher knowledge.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

CULTURE AND ANTI-CULTURE:
THE SPECTRE OF ORIENTALISM
IN NEW ANTHROPOLOGICAL WRITING ON TURKEY

CHRIS HANN


More than forty years have passed since Paul Stirling completed his first fieldwork in a Turkish village and wrote up an Oxford D.Phil. as one of the ‘first batch of Evans-Pritchard’s Mediterranean pupils’ (Davis 1977: 243). Although many parts of the region have been studied intensively by later batches of anthropologists from the English-speaking world, of diverse theoretical persuasions, Turkey has been relatively neglected in recent decades. This may have something to do with its marginal position in relation to the conventional regional boundaries of modern anthropology: it is not European, but nor can it quite be considered mainstream.
mediterranean or Middle Eastern. Whatever the reasons, since the publication of Stirling’s monograph in 1965 it is hard to think of a single book-length study of Turkey that has attracted the attention of a wider anthropological readership.\(^1\) Against this background it is important to welcome four new monographs which complement each other in exciting ways. One can learn a lot from them about the changes that have taken place in Turkish society since the pioneering work of Stirling—and perhaps even more about changes in the themes and styles of anthropological enquiry.

Carol Delaney’s book is, like Stirling’s, based largely on ethnographic materials from a central Anatolian village. But the similarities end there. Paul Stirling’s approach can be characterized as empiricist and positivist. His book can be read as an application of the dominant anthropological paradigm of the period (‘structural-functionalism’), but it is devoid of any explicit theoretical agenda. Delaney, as the sub-title of her book indicates, is concerned with topics that were relatively neglected, if not totally ignored, by her predecessor. She is inspired by contemporary trends in American cultural anthropology, particularly in the work of David Schneider, and sets out to test some ideas derived from her background in theology and feminist theory. These differences make any direct comparison between the two books virtually impossible. It is likely that the respective settlements on which they focus resembled each other in many ways around 1950, and they may well be no less comparable today. But just as Delaney does not convey much information about land tenure and economic opportunities in the village that she studied near Ankara, so Stirling was silent about gender symbolism and procreation ideologies in the villages he studied near Kayseri.

On some points, of course, Delaney is able to build on Stirling’s earlier work, citing it occasionally in her own. For example, she is in full agreement with him that marriage is a relationship involving economic co-operation, sexual intimacy and the production of male offspring: the ‘notion of a successful marriage in terms of personal relations does not exist in the village’ (Stirling 1965: 114; cited by Delaney, pp. 109-10). But for Delaney facts are generally less important than

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1. This may seem harsh. I am aware that many noteworthy books and articles have been published, but it would be invidious to begin to list them here. Nevertheless, the overall picture seems to me rather thin, certainly in quantitative terms, when compared with other regions of the mediterranean. The relative difficulty of research access is certainly one major factor in this situation. Happily there are other signs of an improvement, besides the works reviewed here. The excellent monograph by Lâle Yalçın-Heckmann (1991) is excluded from this review as it deals with Kurdish rather than Turkish social organization. I am also aware of important recent studies in German by Werner Schiffauer (e.g. 1987) and Gabriele Paleczek (e.g. 1984). Unfortunately I am not competent to review them. Nor am I competent to survey work being conducted by large numbers of Turkish researchers in different parts of their own country.
ideas and interpretations. This is what makes her work original and refreshing, but it also betrays her weaknesses. Her title refers to the villagers' theory of procreation, which is viewed as providing an implicit key to almost everything else in their society, from marriage and property management strategies to beliefs concerning the state and the afterlife. She is surely right to seek central cultural symbols in this domain and shows great ingenuity in tracing their wider significance. These villagers liken the woman's contribution to the production of a child to the provision of the soil (or, more accurately, to the field enclosed by men) within which male seed is planted. The true generative role is played by the seed, which derives exclusively from men. This folk theory of procreation is linked by Delaney to the cosmology in which it is embedded. Islam, like Christianity and Judaism, for which the story of Abraham is equally salient, is a thoroughly patriarchal religion and its influence is pervasive.

After this statement of the general argument the rest of the book consists of five well-crafted chapters, beginning with gendered bodies and moving steadily outwards through household, village and Turkish nation to arrive finally at the universal Islamic community. Through all this Delaney is concerned not so much with a sociological analysis of male dominance as with a symbolic analysis based substantially on her own insights and intuitions, illustrated by her personal experiences during fieldwork, and supplemented by a wide range of texts. Sometimes the supporting data are apparently drawn from the villagers (for example, it is they who explain that the red colour of the bridal sash is a symbol of virginity), but much of the time they are not. One of the central issues is whether or not a Turkish rural woman can be considered a person in her own right. Even if villagers themselves might wish to answer in the affirmative, 'the logic implicit in their system of beliefs supports the other answer' (p. 279). In exploring this cultural logic Delaney makes relatively little effort to incorporate social and historical factors. For example, she places women's concern with embroidering covers for household objects firmly in the context of a general obsession with the covering of females for reasons of purity. She ignores the possibility that its present form might be a relatively recent development whereby rural women seek to decorate their homes in the styles of their urban counterparts (it is this that lies behind a similar concern with 'covering' among non-Muslim peasants in many parts of the world, including those among whom I have lived in Eastern Europe).

Delaney’s suggestions are most persuasive when they are contextualized and related to changing empirical circumstances. For example, I can readily agree that some men enclosed their womenfolk more drastically after the beginning of urban

2. Delaney makes little attempt to document this thesis ethnographically. The main evidence for 'seed and soil' as a folk theory is taken from Michael Meeker's study (1970) of the east Black Sea region, and the idea can be found in similar form in many other places inside and outside Turkey. Theoretical aspects of the argument she builds from this data to criticize Malinowski and other contributors to the so-called Virgin Birth debate are more fully developed in Delaney 1986.
migration, when previous patterns of reciprocity and complementarity in domestic divisions of labour were lost. However, there is a tendency, inherent perhaps in this sort of symbolic approach, to construct a 'Culture' that loses its moorings in society and in real historical time. Even by the standards of symbolic anthropology Delaney remains a little too fond of Manichaean dualisms. During a discussion of spatial arrangements in the household and village she argues that the entire world 'becomes an icon of gender as constituted within a specific ideology of procreation' (p. 238). She does not convince me on this point, any more than she does in attempts to establish the gendering of meals. Moreover, some apparently plausible suggestions seem to run into contradiction. The purity of women identifies them with the East, but Delaney also argues that:

At another level, however, women can be associated with the West. In their own cultural view, vis-à-vis men, women represent the seductive, attractive material aspects of this world, and since these aspects have been associated with the materialism of the West, women can come to symbolise the West. As the seductive attractions of the West are felt to be corrupting their country and must be controlled, so too must the distinctiveness and attractiveness of women be controlled. (p. 278)

She is at her most provocative when she extends her symbolic analysis into the realm of religion. In the last chapter, where the Kaaba stone at Mecca is said to bear 'a remarkable resemblance to a vagina, complete with labial folds and a clitoris' (p. 307), elements of her account might strike many readers as more revealing of the preoccupations of the Western author than of Islam; many Muslims themselves would surely find such an argument offensive.

The detailed discussion of the body and sexuality is certainly a major innovation in relation to previous ethnographic work on Turkey, and at the same time an advance on much of the mediterranean 'honour and shame' literature, though here again much of Delaney's symbolic analysis is open to question. Her claim that the usual position for sexual intercourse cannot be explained functionally but represents the traditional Anatolian plough (p. 49) is typical of a feminism that seems redolent of Frazerian anthropology in its methods. She was apparently able to engage male villagers in discussion of female orgasm, and also discusses such topics as oral and anal sex, relating them to her central themes. She acknowledges the difficulty of gathering accurate information on these topics, but reassures her readers that her account is 'the result of many discussions, many observations, and a certain amount of conjecture' (p. 43). Potentially sensitive subjects such as masturbation were raised by bringing magazine articles into the village as a basis for discussion. The author maintains a very emphatic personal presence in almost every chapter. She frequently illustrates a point by explaining how it emerged during her fieldwork: for example, she was properly able to understand how polluting the village women considered pubic hair to be after taking a bath herself with a local bride at the village laundry house. (It was surprising to learn in this context (p. 123) that some young villagers are now
abandoning the practice of shaving pubic hair, but no explanation for this change is suggested.)

I cannot see that it does any harm for the reader to know that the author has chosen her village as much for its aesthetic and emotional appeal as for its convenient proximity to the capital city (Stirling, in contrast, informs his readers that his choice of village was determined overwhelmingly by practical considerations). It is positively helpful to be told when the fieldwork took place (in the darkest period of martial law following the coup of 12 September 1980); and that Delaney lived alone in the village and, though known to have a young daughter, was known not to have a husband. But I am less sure that the reader benefits from an extensive exposure to the author’s personal intellectual odyssey, from Freud and Jung to Geertz and Schneider. The introduction makes it plain that Delaney is primarily concerned with contemporary Western debates about gender. The choice of Turkey for ethnographic investigation is almost incidental. (This would seem to be reflected in her bibliography; scarcely any use has been made of Turkish-language materials.) In any case, Delaney reminds us, ‘the point of departure for any ethnographic exploration is always one’s own culture; so, too, is the return’ (p. 5).

The contrast with Stirling’s work in a less reflexive age is strong, and it is apparent again in Delaney’s overt appeals to values. For instance, she reports that the local teachers have strong anti-Western views and comments that this is ‘disappointing’. (I suspect that for Stirling this would have been treated as a fact, to be reported without any evaluative comment.) Delaney sees the values of Islam as ‘a major obstacle to change’ (p. 322), and her own priorities for improvement are reflected in some of the suggestions she made to the villagers about how to make rural life more attractive: through increasing inter-village co-operation and improving plumbing and installing showers (p. 262). She is explicit about her refusal to accept what she terms the usual anthropological code of disinterested observation. When she identifies a young girl who merits further education she takes it upon herself to persuade the girl’s father, a poor shepherd, to grant the necessary permission (pp. 88-92). These and similar episodes, whether or not one agrees with her actions, make the book extremely readable. It is bound to be popular with students, and Delaney has a fluent, clear style of which even Evans-Pritchard might have been proud.

In some respects, of course, it is desirable that an author be open and explicit about the values she holds. Such frankness may facilitate the task of representation and on occasion help the reader to form a different interpretation from that of the author. For example, Delaney is critical of the young village men who would

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3. This episode is described in more detail in Delaney 1989. A comparable relationship is narrated in greater detail by Roper (1974). This account of rural Turkey by a Western female with no academic pretensions makes an interesting contrast with the books reviewed here. Delaney seems to be the only anthropologist to have used it, though not in this particular context.
not help her shift her domestic fuel, and of what she terms the general male ideal of passive repose. She comments too on the 'leisurely pace' all villagers seem to prefer when they have to work. This seems to me dangerous ground indeed: it is far from clear that the villagers themselves see their pace as leisurely, and perhaps if Delaney had done such work all her life she would see it differently. She comes close here to reproducing old and regrettable stereotypes of the lazy Oriental peasant (representations that are not born out in her own discussion of homosexuality, where it is clear that male passivity is strongly devalued).4 Certainly she does not present evidence to support her sweeping judgement that 'cooperation is not a social virtue among Turkish men' (p. 105). If people behaved unsociably towards Delaney herself, the reader might reasonably conclude that this had much to do with her own personality and behaviour, and particularly her strong desire to introduce alien values to the villagers. Perhaps too there are deeper human qualities in many friendships and marriages in rural Turkey than either she or Stirling have reported in their work to date.

Delaney has written a long book that offers a mine of useful information about many aspects of modern Turkey. In addition to the attention paid to gender and sexuality, it contains particularly rich accounts of marriage rituals, divisions of labour, various aspects of religious belief and practice, and the 'rhetoric of the nation' and secularist reformism in Atatürk's republic. These are all very important topics. However, Delaney's style also leads to the inclusion of too much trivia. For example, her detailed description of how tea is made and served—'in tiny tulip-shaped glasses set on small saucers with demitasse spoons' (p. 196)—does not seem to add much to any argument, feminist or otherwise. It is true that Stirling also presents a lot of material that is not directly related to an argument. Indeed there is a sense in which he deliberately avoids general argument of any kind. But it seems to me that his attempts to present systematic information about such subjects as kinship organization and land ownership provide readers with solid data that are entirely missing in the subjective stream of impressions offered by Delaney. Finally, it must be noted that she has been very badly let down by her editors and publishers. Almost every other Turkish word cited is rendered incorrectly. Turkish readers might reasonably expect a higher standard, not least when their national anthem is travestied (p. 275).

If Carol Delaney's book were not already a sufficiently hot potato to put in the hands of a male reviewer, Julie Marcus's book raises some similar questions in

4. Curious 'Orientalist' (in Said's sense) associations are also evoked by the poem by Katha Pollitt quoted by Delaney as an epigraph to her book. It celebrates the creative achievement of a (presumably Western) archaeologist investigating 'the heatstruck plains of a second-rate country...the rubbish heap of a poor Near Eastern backwater'.
more uncompromising fashion. In her preface Marcus declares that ‘within western knowledge today there is only one real question: that of gender’ (p. viii). A little further on she follows this up: ‘it is no longer possible to discuss history and the differences between cultures without coming to grips with the serious challenge posed by recent feminist critiques of knowledge that have demonstrated once and for all that gender is a hidden factor which always counts’ (p. 29; author’s emphasis). Edward Said (1978) is complimented for his basic insights into the politics of knowledge, and into the metonymical conflation of oriental and feminine in the writings of Westerners. But he is also rebuked for daring to suggest that race may be a more important dimension of discrimination than gender or class. In Marcus’s view these dimensions are inseparable.

The early chapters of this book are much indebted to Said. Like him, they focus upon literary representations rather than ethnographic data. For Marcus, all empirical realities are open to interpretation and it is an anthropological delusion to imagine ‘that by getting ever closer to our data we will somehow know and understand more, and that knowing more is knowing better’ (p. vii). It is vital instead to clear the ground by inspecting previous writings about the Islamic Middle East, and this occupies most of the first four chapters. Marcus selectively analyses the work of some of the best-known producers of Orientalist texts to reach some very Saidian conclusions: ‘there is a connection between imperial politics, emerging know ledges and the aesthetic forms through which worlds were represented both in art and through the authenticity of the museum and collectors’ worlds. Travel was the practice which made it possible and anthropology provided the scholarly face to legitimate it’ (p. 36).

This last claim is not supported with evidence. The only anthropologist actually named in these chapters is Paul Stirling, whose work is said to ‘epitomise the limitations of traditional ethnography applied in countries like Turkey’ (p. 3). He is chastised for ‘disconnecting’ the villagers he studied from time and place, and both he and other anthropologists (not named) are said to have ignored the specificities of ‘Turkish culture’. Marcus locates her own work not in their tradition but in that of the earlier travellers, with whom she has long been fascinated. As a feminist she offers separate chapters on male and female accounts, focusing in both on the use of costume. Such Western male imperialists as Harold Dickson and T. E. Lawrence, who seek ostensibly to construct rational and ‘scientific’ (Marcus’s quotes) accounts of oriental societies, are found guilty, as voyeurs and ravishers, of ‘cannibalising the Orient’:

The assumption of local dress by imperial males, in its attempt to appropriate the life force, the spiritual essence of the feminised other and the freedom of those living outside the restraint of rationality, is not only to consume their identity and to re-present it through the body of the self, just as some forms of cannibalism do, but is also an act of trickery and treachery. The act of ingestion is presented as an act of identification with, rather than the consumption of, the subordinated but admired entity. It is this that is dishonest. (p. 44)
It is all very different with female Western travellers who dress as men. In the case of Jane Digby the costume is said to signify authentic identification and acceptance, rather than 'the temporary ritual transvestism of the male visitor in the fantastic orient' (p. 51). Such female observers as Isabel Burton are complimented for suggesting that seclusion may have brought Islamic women certain advantages. But power relations are at work again in the actual use made of their data by the imperial Westerners, who place the subordinate status of women at the heart of the Christian European critique of Islamic society. Some of the points she makes about other female observers Marcus cleverly applies reflexively to herself as well; and the reader might apply some of them to Carol Delaney.5

The more substantive anthropological arguments are outlined in chapter five, 'Islam, Gender and Hierarchy', where the overlap with the work of Delaney is considerable.6 Where Delaney emphasizes procreation beliefs, Marcus stresses 'purity law', but both are concerned to locate Islam alongside the other great monotheistic religions of the region, and both draw on the work of Mary Douglas to give priority to the body and to an inner/outer dichotomy to explain the control of female sexuality. Both see gender separation as the basis for all social organization under Islam. Marcus is the more explicit in arguing that Christian attitudes to the body generate a different logical pattern, in which women are understood as less separate though no less subordinate; she suggests that in some respects women in Christian cultures have fewer resources and opportunities than Muslim women, though she also acknowledges the difficulties of generalization at this level. In her discussion of how 'the inner/outer body division translates into a dichotomous female/male society' (p. 86) Marcus perhaps achieves a more elegant theoretical formulation than Delaney. However, her ethnographical materials are much weaker, scarcely amounting to more than a few banalities about how men are associated with the mosque and women with the household, coupled with the warning that this is not to be confused with a public/private dichotomy. Much more than Delaney, Marcus is inclined to substitute for ethnography with extensive textual discussion. For example, her discussions of purity concentrate on the works of Islamic legal scholars wrestling with the problems posed by a dripping penis or by pus emerging from a boil, with no clue as to whether she actually encountered such cases during fieldwork.

5. Whereas Lady Mary Wortley Montagu was not willing to undress completely in the baths in eighteenth-century Istanbul, as noted above the late twentieth-century reflexive female anthropologist has now crossed this Rubicon (see Delaney, pp. 128-9).

6. The two scholars make negligible reference to each other's work. Marcus's Ph.D. was apparently awarded in Sydney in 1983 and Delaney's in Chicago in 1984. Delaney makes reference in passing to an article published by Marcus in this journal (wrongly named) in 1984. It is more curious that Marcus should be unaware of the numerous articles published by Delaney later in the 1980s (e.g. 1986), and also of articles from the same period by Nancy Lindisfarne and Richard Tapper (e.g. Tapper and Tapper 1987) which explore the very same ground as that investigated by Marcus in the later chapters of her book.
Marcus lets her readers know she is aware that one can only learn so much from texts, a point she notes in commenting on the limitations of Said and others who look only at legal texts rather than at the practical variation in their interpretation and use. She claims that she does wish to address material and social conditions in her work, and the reader therefore enters the final chapters of her book hoping that, with the main thesis now stated, Marcus might feel able to proceed to tackle some social realities. Unfortunately such hopes are almost entirely dashed. A chapter dealing with women’s space reverts back to Western representations and ‘the potency of harem imagery’ (p. 93). Selective use of historical sources concerning elite groups enables her to put forward rather speculative arguments to the effect that the so-called reforms of the late Ottoman period actually had the effect of limiting the previously considerable powers enjoyed by women in the extra-household economy, confining them instead to a private, domestic realm along European lines. Chapter seven then develops an argument similar to that put forward by Nancy Lindisfarne and Richard Tapper (Tapper and Tapper 1987), according to which the prominence of women in Mevlud rituals (celebrating the birth of the prophet) can be seen as the articulation of a female world-view, unbounded, egalitarian and therefore radically different from the male world that is centred around the mosque and market-place.\(^7\) The author attempts to demonstrate this further in an analysis of pilgrimage, where again the work of Lindisfarne and others would have been relevant (see the essays in Eickelman and Piscatori (eds.) 1990). Finally, the main arguments are recapitulated in a concluding chapter that also spells out more fully her intellectual debt to another male predecessor, Victor Turner, who is also viewed as regrettably gender-blind.

This very inadequate summary cannot do justice to Marcus’s work. There are stimulating arguments in most chapters, and you don’t have to be a feminist to appreciate them. The main points about power relations are well taken. So too are her reasons for rejecting conventional distinctions between orthodox and popular Islam. Some of the criticisms I have been making are points she also makes herself. But it is not good enough to make the occasional pious remark about going beyond the texts, you actually have to do so by presenting some ethnographic evidence. It is her signal failure to fulfil this basic aspiration of modern anthropology and her occasional suggestion that the ambition is misplaced.

7. Carol Delaney disagrees with such an interpretation, pointing out, quite correctly, that Mevlud rituals are held in commemoration of death rather than birth (p. 319). How can the reader evaluate the contrasting interpretations? The basis for Marcus’s claim, ‘I am certain that it has far greater meaning for women than for men’ (p. 127), is not made clear. Simply the observations of a witness? How many times was she a witness or participant, and in what conditions? The reader is given no information of this kind, and the voices of local participants are not heard; the reader is merely asked to accept this feminist interpretation as one possible reading.
anyway which make this the sort of book that is liable to give feminist anthropology a bad name.8

Above all it is a missed opportunity. The thesis on which this book is apparently based was called ‘Women and Religion in the Turkish City of Izmir’. Thus the reader might reasonably have hoped to find here some materials about contemporary urban Turkish women to complement Delaney’s village study. There are no such materials in this book. If they have been left out because the publishers feel that ethnographic evidence is less appropriate in a popular feminist series than autobiography and pseudo-scholarly jargon,9 I can only say that for me at least the publishers have got it wrong and Delaney’s publishers have got it more nearly right. There is practically no ethnography concerning Izmir, apart from a fragmentary discussion of one shrine; and even this is juxtaposed with the discussion of shrines visited in other parts of the country. There is no integrated account of any one of them, nor any serious analysis of the political context in which they functioned, or of the social and economic characteristics of the women who visited them. In her discussion of the cult of Hizr, stimulated by her visit to the shrine at Sammandag, Marcus condemns the Frazerian style of anthropology that would take the saint out of context and classify him with other ‘green men’ as vegetation gods. She argues that in consequence of such methods, ‘certain people are deprived of the possibility of understanding these aspects of their lives and the truth of their actions is known only to certain western scholars. Such methods have been long discarded, but they seem to reappear whenever the subordination of “oriental” culture is being reinscribed’ (p. 142). This is rich indeed considering that the symbolic structuralist account of Hizr promptly

8. It is possible that Marcus does not intend her work to be assessed as anthropology. Certainly it is the feminist theoretical aspect that is emphasized in the blurb, and the book appears in a series called ‘Women in Asia’, rather than as a specialist anthropology monograph. If this is the case, it should be stated explicitly that this is not anthropology. It would then be more appropriate to compare this book with other presentations by women of travel literature concerning the Muslim world (e.g. Mabro 1991, Tidrick 1989), and not with anthropology books at all. But Marcus wants to have it both ways. In spite of her repeated criticism of the practices and epistemological assumptions of ‘anthropology’, none of it supported beyond the brief remarks on Stirling noted above, she implies that her own mature feminist analysis has overcome these problems—within anthropology. In particular, references back to her thesis imply that anthropological evidence therein provides the warranty for the claims developed in the present volume; whether or not there are such materials cannot be determined by readers without access to the thesis.

9. As is so often the case, the word ‘structure’ is the cause of a significant part of this book’s indigestibility. For example, what is one to make of this: ‘a moral community symbolically structured by gender and by separation contains within it the option to structure the actual community structures and space according to the same principles. I think that this is exactly what the Turks do’ (p. 89)? Compare her claim in the concluding chapter: ‘both structural and post-structural forms of analysis are attempts to expose the lines of power through which the fundamental structuring structures of culture are enforced’ (p. 174).
developed by Marcus would also seem to owe everything to the Western scholar, and nothing whatsoever to local people. It is beginning to seem that the currently fashionable blendings of reflexive, structuralist, post-modernist and feminist elements are exhibiting some of the most serious deficiencies of earlier styles of anthropological enquiry.

Marcus is also guilty of a speculative and cavalier approach to history. In the chapter that ostensibly deals with the history of Izmir’s people, she is scathing in her dismissal of Western readings that have subordinated Turkish accounts. But she presents hardly any evidence to justify her own assertion that ‘the break between the classical world and Byzantium may not have been so great, but the break between Byzantium and the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is unbridgeable’ (p. 28). Whenever facts and evidence might seem warranted, Marcus either explicitly or implicitly seeks refuge behind the claim that the aspiration to ‘science’ is all a European illusion, based on unequal power relations. Yet many historians have written in either Turkish or Greek about the past of the city that was the subject of Marcus’s research. Her lengthy bibliography includes virtually no references to works in these languages, and suggests that more attention has been paid to the ethnography of Oceania than to that of Turkey. Doesn’t such a strategy, in distancing and mystifying the ‘Other’, risk effects similar to those of classical orientalism? The index to Marcus’s book confirms this impression: one citation for Paul Stirling, two each for Mary Kingsley and Agatha Christie, four for Edward Said, six for Australia, eight for harem, twelve for fantasy, eighteen for difference, and twenty-seven for sexuality. Since moral critique is one of the strongest threads running through this work, as through Delaney’s, it may be legitimate to ask questions of an anthropologist who publishes a book about gender hierarchy in Turkey that (quite apart from overlooking related specialist work by other Westerners, as noted above) makes virtually no reference to a large body of potentially relevant work by native Turkish scholars, and has virtually no space for the voices of the people with whom she worked. Give me ‘the limitations of traditional ethnography’ every time!

The importance of the legal realm is one of the leading subthemes of Julie Marcus’s study, and it moves to centre stage in June Starr’s. Again there is some overlap, but this time the views of the two anthropologists could hardly be further apart. According to Marcus (and here I think Delaney and perhaps most anthropologists would agree with her), the apparently dramatic changes in family law that accompanied the demise of the Ottoman Empire and the emergence of the modern secular republic were not in fact accompanied by many far-reaching changes in social practice. This is because they did not affect the core of the culture: ‘the new legislation did not touch purity law. The legislation which so
altered Turkish society thus left the gendered and sexualized basis of the moral community of Islam intact, and in doing so, it left women and men in basically the same relationship to each other as before’ (Marcus, p. 88). Starr begs to differ. Her conclusions and the data on which they are based remain essentially as in her earlier study of dispute settlement (Starr 1978). They confirm ‘the success of the Turks in developing a legal system that is secular and separate from the religion of Islam’ (p. xii). As the title implies, this transformation in the field of law is taken as a metaphor of more general social and cultural transformation. On the whole, Starr seems even more enthusiastic about the cumulative impact of these changes than in her previous book.

The main novelty of the present volume is the detailed historical discussion that takes up the first three chapters, stimulated by what the author sees as a general convergence of interests between anthropologists and historians in recent years. It shows Starr to be thoroughly familiar with the English-language history of the late Ottoman period as well as with the history of law in different European and Middle Eastern traditions. The establishment of a secular legal system dates from 1868, though much confusion remained between the jurisdictions of secular and religious courts for the next half century. Only in 1917 did reformers start to address the field of family law, when şeriat courts were placed under the authority of the Ministry of Justice. Throughout her careful discussion Starr emphasizes continuities and internal processes of reform: the Ottomans did not simply import European models, and even when Atatürk himself did so in the 1920s, with the introduction of the Swiss legal code, he could still be seen as building upon an authentic ‘liberal’ Ottoman tradition.

Paradoxically, however, where other anthropologists have identified long-standing cultural patterns persisting at the lower levels of the new nation state, Starr’s focus on the legal domain stresses the victory of ‘pragmatic secularism’ and the virtually complete abandonment of earlier cultural codes. Later chapters seek to integrate the historical account of political and legal changes at the national level with a full portrayal of what she terms ‘popular legal culture’ at local and district levels. Ostensibly she too works with a Geertzian definition of culture (p. xxxvi), and in a later chapter dealing with district courts she claims that ‘cultural ideas about the construction of legal arguments and about purposeful action enter into the judicial decision-making process’ (p. 157). Unfortunately this is asserted, rather than convincingly demonstrated through ethnography. Indeed, some of the cases discussed reveal very clearly the imposition of Atatürkist norms on local custom: for example, the case of the parent who is prosecuted for not sending his fourteen-year-old daughter to school, when her nimble fingers are required by her family in the tobacco fields. (Starr is incidentally quite wrong to imply that school attendance is obligatory until the age of sixteen.) Starr believes that during her fieldwork in 1966–68 she observed ‘an integrated state legal system at the district level, functioning compassionately and effectively within a well developed and articulated set of legal principles and guidelines’ (p. 150). In cases labelled Type B, ‘social relationship cases’ (as distinct from Type A cases, where there are clear
legal grounds for a disposition), the judges showed extraordinary patience as they attempted to cajole and reconcile litigants. But the judges themselves were a well-educated and well-paid professional élite, and the solutions they achieved were modern and intended to convey ‘clear symbols of the new norms of interaction, civility and gender relationships’ (p. 169). Thus the secular court system has successfully institutionalized ‘universal legal norms of individuality and equality’ (p. 19). In this context law has itself been ‘an instrument of social change’ (p. 90), and Starr concludes that there is no ‘misfit’ between this legal system and contemporary local values (p. 169). Villagers therefore turn to the courts whenever they feel aggrieved, rather than seek direct or indirect private justice (‘self-help’).

Not all of Starr’s evidence is fully consistent with this analysis, and it is worth examining more carefully the case she makes concerning Islam and gender relations, the areas that are central to the studies of Delaney and Marcus. Starr speaks of the ‘decline of the omniscient sacred community of Islam in Turkey’ (p. 183), and repeatedly points out that neither the new secular élites nor the villagers themselves invoke Islamic precepts in legal contexts, apparently making Turkey quite different from other parts of the Islamic world. She finds that ‘villagers have no conscious knowledge of Islamic solutions to [legal] problems’ and concludes that Islam has been ‘relegated to the religious sphere only’ (p. xli). It is not part of daily consciousness, and Starr speculates that the absence of the ‘practical signs’ (p. 179) of Islam in this region may have something to do with the nomadic practices of some of its inhabitants in the recent past (she provides no analysis to support this suggestion, arbitrarily citing Barth’s study of the Basseri as a possible analogy).

Such an analysis might have seemed persuasive in the 1960s, but since then the rise of ‘religious parties’ in national politics and a more general Islamic revival in the 1980s leaves little room for doubt as to the importance of Islam in the life of the nation. Starr is aware of these recent trends (she has made short visits to Turkey in recent years) but she has no satisfactory explanation for them. Having argued that by the 1960s there was ‘not much left at all’ of ‘Islamic notions of law and Islamic values’ (p. 177), she can only explain their re-emergence by attributing them to the work of urban intellectuals; and the reason the villagers built themselves a new mosque in 1986 was at least in part because they were stimulated by national politicians and by television. Many readers will find it plausible to detect greater continuity of Islamic values and morality in the preceding decades than Starr is here willing to admit.

Such thoughts are strengthened by a close consideration of Starr’s materials concerning gender relations and ideologies. She has argued consistently in the past that rural women have profited from the opportunities available to them through Turkey’s modern legal codes, for example through being able to initiate divorce proceedings in local courts. This rather contradicts the picture painted by Carol Delaney, who cites Starr’s earlier work just once (p. 105), and then only to note that it points to trends contrary to those she herself observed. According to Starr,
even in the 1950s women had gained a new ‘psychological space’, freeing themselves from the subordination embodied in traditional kinship roles. This is not rendered transparent through any kind of social movement or a new gender ideology, but it is none the less evident in the increasing divorce rate, the greater incidence of nuclear families, and the reduced birth rate. The cause of these positive developments lies in ‘the vigor of individual rural women in seeking better lives and the vitality of the legal system as a symbol of reform’ (p. 93). Atatürk’s purposeful action in targeting women as an oppressed social group was successful and brought about a new consciousness of self-worth. In sum, ‘women’s use of the courts, along with judicial willingness to decide cases in their favor, tipped the balance in gender relationships toward more equality for Turkish rural women’ (p. 112). In spite of these strong claims, it is not clear that such data as those illustrating a decline in household size allow one to infer a radical change of consciousness. Nor is it explained how female access to courts might vary according to class and ethnic background, and we do not learn much about how this affects what is going on outside the formal legal system. For example, it would be interesting to know how many daughters have to accept inequitable property settlements that favour their male siblings, in spite of the law’s requirement that they be treated equally. It almost goes without saying that the local élites, including the judges themselves, are exclusively male. And on Starr’s own account, in the three cases of alleged wife-beating with which she deals the judges applied pressure to ensure that the plaintiffs dropped the charges.

Many of the unusual features of this study may be explained by its location in and around the town of Bodrum, an area of Aegean Turkey with a substantial non-Turkish, non-Islamic population in the Ottoman period. Like many other districts of western Anatolia (but unlike the villages studied by Delaney and Stirling) the modern society has been formed through the integration of diverse immigrant groups as well as through the sedentarization of nomadic peoples (‘Turcomans’). But, although Starr claims at one point that it is ‘as typical as most small towns of western rural Anatolia’ (p. xxiii), she does concede that the proportion of people using formal legal machinery to solve disputes may be rather greater here than elsewhere. Bodrum was already rather special when Starr first went there in the mid-1960s. It was already beginning to attract Western-orientated artists and writers from both Europe and metropolitan Turkey, including an ethnographer who produced an account (Mansur 1972) that nicely complements Starr’s work from the same period. Starr concedes that the model of marriage as a ‘companionable relationship’, as demonstrated by these wealthy professional immigrants, remained entirely foreign to local women. More recently tourism has brought the invasion of disco culture and the companionable relationships of Mick Jagger and Princess Margaret, among many others. On the face of it, this is no longer (if indeed it ever was) a promising background for generalizations about ‘the position of women in rural Turkey’. Starr’s comment that tourism ‘is a useful comrade to the secularizing élites’, as they attempt to move Turkey closer to Europe, might also be oversimplifying an impact that is actually more ambiguous.
The case materials from village and district courts constitute the most valuable feature of the book, even though many of the cases discussed are repeated from earlier publications and the reader wanting more contextualization needs to refer back to her earlier work. We are again introduced to the 'representative' village of Mandalinci (this is a pseudonym, but confusingly it would seem that the real name is also used on occasion). Some aspects of this village do seem to confirm other ethnographers' data, such as the absence of structured 'action sets' in dispute settlement procedures, and the low profile of the muhtar (headman) and the council of elders. Some points are not quite clear: for example, we are told in chapter four that the villagers deny the existence of başlık, the traditional form of marriage payment, while in chapter five it is suggested that poor boys may have to delay marriage for many years to save the sums required for it; and the sons of the rich have to work for some six to eight years for their parents after marriage to pay off their debts.

Some of the characters Starr presents seem distinctly unusual, notably a 'loose woman' called Fatma and her exceedingly tolerant husband. On the other hand, much of her material from the village suggests that informal methods of resolving disputes were still just as important here in the 1960s as they probably had been in earlier decades in the village studied by Stirling. Starr distinguishes usefully between dyadic and triadic negotiations, and shows how the status of the aggrieved is likely to affect his strategy. For example, patrons and other household heads are more likely to be drawn in where there is some inequality of rank. Some disputes, including certain land cases, are just too complex to resolve through informal methods at the local level, hence the general willingness to have recourse to state officials and judges at the district level. In this almost idyllic situation of 'legal pluralism', Starr seems to imply that all law-enforcement agents, including the village-based gendarmes as well as the public prosecutor, the judges and the district governor (kaymakam), have the full confidence and trust of the rural population.

Starr's historical and ethnographic exposition is linked to an ambitious but eclectic theoretical argument. Law is approached as 'discourse', and also as 'a metaphor for the struggle between coalitions vying for control of the Ottoman Turkish state in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries' (pp. xxxiii–iv). The most direct influence would appear to be the late English historian E. P. Thompson, who approached law as an arena for conflict and even class struggle. In the Ottoman Turkish case the losers were the traditional gentry and Islamic élites, and the principal victors were the small farmers and women. Starr raises the important question of the relation between legal discourse and the legitimation of social and political orders, but only to insist repeatedly that secular discourses have prevailed over religious alternatives. There is no serious effort to address the class character of the present society. The invocation of an array of scholarly authorities, from Norbert Elias ('a European historian') on the role of élites in state formation, to Marshall Sahlins ('a cultural anthropologist') on the correct relationship between history and culture, does not add up to a coherent overall framework. More than
once I was confused by Starr’s use of such terms as ‘discourse’ and ‘symbol’. I was puzzled also by the comparison she makes at the end of the introduction between Turkish experience and the disintegration of the planned socialist societies of Eastern Europe. Most of her work seems to support the argument that societies really can be transformed from the top down by enlightened élites, the legal system providing one of the principal instruments for such secular restructuring in the Turkish case. She certainly does not view it in terms of a simple transplant from the West, for the ‘Ottoman way’ had undergone continuous reform in response to internal pressures from the early nineteenth century onwards. Nevertheless, in relation to other ethnographers Starr ends up placing more emphasis on discontinuity. She reported in her earlier work that élite values (including ‘populism’, ‘individualism’ and ‘gender equality’) were thoroughly entrenched on the Western Anatolian periphery by the mid-1960s and, if anything, she is even more emphatic in sticking to this line in the present book. Yet perhaps the fate of social engineering behind the former ‘iron curtain’, coupled with the abundant evidence of religious revivalism in Turkey itself, have begun to sow seeds of doubt. Starr is reduced to an invocation of Plato, proclaiming that ‘things are not usually what they seem’ (p. xxxvii).

One possible way out of these dilemmas would be to look more critically at the ‘centre versus periphery’ opposition that, as she notes, has been so influential in Ottoman Turkish studies. A fuller ethnographic account of the interaction between élites and villagers would help correct the impression of a simple, ‘top-down’ process of managed change. Starr several times points in this direction, for example in arguing that the legal system ‘both shaped, and in turn was shaped by rural actors’ (p. xli). She invokes Giddens on the subject of agency (only to differ from him in apparently viewing all rules as resources to be manipulated by actors (pp. 173-4)). But she has not yet provided enough information and analysis to fulfil these goals.

The book may prove useful for teaching legal anthropology, an area of the subject which has somehow never really attracted the numbers of students it deserves. But, with no new ethnography reported here, it probably has rather less to offer specialists on the anthropology of Turkey than her earlier book; and the new one is, in some ways, less well assembled, with numerous mistakes and infelicities in both English and Turkish. Nevertheless, one hopes that Starr will return to her evidently rich materials in further publications or, better still, carry out further fieldwork to test and reassess some of her arguments. It is valuable and provocative to find the Kemalist world-view commanding strong support from an anthropologist; and refreshing to find that at least one anthropologist is still able to write about Turkey without getting side-tracked into the analysis of orientalist representations, and yet without herself adding to the library of orientalist works.
Martin Stokes's first book has a sophisticated awareness of orientalist controversies. It also draws on the opposition between centre and periphery. A major novelty here is that his perspective on the latter comes mostly from the sprawling metropolis of Istanbul. As the first British anthropologist to bring out a full monograph on Turkey since Stirling (and like his predecessor trained in Oxford), the first thing one notes is that, unlike the other authors discussed here, he avoids altogether the limitations of a specific geographical focus. He pays relatively little attention to gender, but he does not avoid ethnography. His aim is to give an account of the urban condition in contemporary Turkey through a focus upon popular music, particularly the style or genre known as arabesk.

What exactly is arabesk? The opening lines of the book are wonderfully evocative:

Arabesk is a music of the city and for the city. It portrays a world of complex and turbulent emotions peopled by lovers doomed to solitude and a violent end. It describes a decaying city in which poverty-stricken migrant workers are exploited and abused, and calls on its listeners to pour another glass of raki, light another cigarette, and curse fate and the world.... As well as a musical form, arabesk is an entire anti-culture, a way of life whose influence, it is often said, can be detected as an aura of chaos and confusion surrounding every aspect of urban existence, from traffic to language, from politics to kitsch. (p. 1)

Stokes returns again and again to such evocations of mood. This music is a 'discourse of sentiment', and the sentiments are for the most part melancholic, bitter-sweet, and morbid. But people cannot articulate these feelings, which obviously poses problems for an anthropologist seeking a cultural understanding of emotion. Stokes solves the problem through a variety of techniques. He presents many arabesk lyrics in translation, he describes concerts he attended, courses of instruction in which he enrolled, and personal contacts with many of those involved in what has become a major entertainment industry. The evidence comes from his experience of bus terminals and of such institutions as recording studios and the private schools where music is taught to diverse audiences, as well as from the analysis of film.

But in addition to its emotional appeal to the individual 'heart' (gönül), this music generates intellectual and political emotions as well. To a much greater extent than is ever likely to occur with any popular music genre in a North Atlantic country, arabesk is embroiled in ideological debates that strike at the rationalist essence of the modern republic. Basically, it has been uncongenial to the Kemalist state, which views this culture as degenerate 'Oriental'. The forces that control this state, like modernizers elsewhere, have attached great importance to music and used it for nationalist legitimation purposes. Stokes perhaps makes too little of the virtually total suppression of traditional Ottoman classical music in the early decades of the republic, a suppression that cannot be fully compensated for by the carefully controlled revival that has been tolerated under more recent governments. He describes in detail how the baglama (a long-necked
Chris Hann

fretted lute, also known simply as saz) has become the national instrument; and how distinctive regional musical styles, such as the kemençe-based music of the east Black Sea coast, have been undermined by centralist homogenizing forces. Just as the precise boundaries between 'folk' (halk) music and the classical 'art' (sanat) music of the Ottoman high culture are in practice often rather difficult to disentangle, so the emergence of arabesk (from obscure origins in Egyptian film music) is seen as making available new cultural resources, effectively expanding options for musicians and audiences alike. Stokes does not employ the term 'discourse' in its rigid Foucauldian sense and is not deceived by the sharply antagonistic rhetoric sometimes used in critical debates. He is concerned with a complex, messy, practical world, in which boundaries are fuzzy and frequently crossed, for example by performers whose ideal may be to combine a career at the dominant state television corporation (TRT) with a lucrative private commercial network of arabesk recording. He is sensitive both to the powerful commercial interests that dominate the industry and to the political context of 1980s Turkey, in which the Özal government was accused by its detractors of breaking with Kemalist traditions through its open encouragement of arabesk.

It is made clear that 'official' musicians, who are expected to be open to Western influences and to be prepared to experiment with polyphony, are nevertheless, both for their own 'career' reasons and because of 'the belief that the Turkish people would never approve of any ideas which had their origin outside Turkey' (pp. 86-7), not at all so 'progressive' in practice. They must have been relieved to discover that this particular Westerner was more than content to respect the monophonic language of local tradition, the musical culture that draws together the diverse genres of sanat, halk and arabesk. This highlights the question of the fieldworker's status, which is in some ways even more problematic in this ethnomusicological study than in the community studies discussed above. Without ever allowing his own presence to become obtrusive, Stokes makes it clear that he was attracted to this music as an enthusiast. He clearly became highly proficient as a performer, but in the course of his research he inevitably came into frequent contact with representatives of officialdom who expected him to share their values (a dominant ideology?) and to condemn arabesk. This he could never do, believing the music to be an entirely legitimate popular response to the impositions of the state and industrialism upon urban society. Often asked for his views as a foreign 'expert', Stokes confesses to 'worries in my own mind about the role I was playing in changing the experience of the culture I was trying to study' (p. 17). Nevertheless, he seems to have been able to negotiate his own modest pathways, until he reached 'a position to survey, from an ethnographic perspective, a range of musical activity in the city, from discussions of cultural policy at the highest levels of the State Conservatories and TRT to domestic muhabbet and musical sessions' (p. 19).

Perhaps the most controversial chapter in this book is the final one, in which Stokes explores an affinity between arabesk and another, still more powerful discourse of opposition in the modern Turkish republic, that of traditional Islam.
(Why do Western ethnographers of Turkey tend to postpone their main discussion of Islam until a final chapter?) A detailed analysis of language and syntax identifies a 'common fund of symbols and metaphors' (p. 225) and makes the case for viewing arabsesk as a modern variant of the established Sufi practice of sema, an ecstatic form of music and dance. The analogy would be rejected by official Islamic institutions, just as Sufi practices have attracted the opprobrium of the orthodox in the past. They disapprove thoroughly of all the obvious secular habits encouraged by arabsesk, not least the consumption of alcohol. But although Stokes himself acknowledges that some of his arguments remain speculative, they constitute a powerful conclusion and a very valuable addition to other recent writings on Islam in Turkey (cf. Mardin 1989, Tapper (ed.) 1991, Toprak 1981).

Two of the book’s seven chapters (numbers three and six) may be somewhat heavy going for the reader who (like this one) has no ethnomusicological training, but even these offer rich rewards to those who persevere. The clarity of the text is admirable throughout and I noted only one instance of incorrect Turkish spelling (kadrolo sanatçı, p. 82, should read kadrolu sanatçı). A fuller glossary would have been helpful. My only other quibble would be the translation of yönetmen as 'director', when surely 'producer' is the usual English term in the context of the recording studio. But overall, in spite of occasional self-deprecating remarks about his 'shaky' command of the language, one has greater confidence in Stokes’s linguistic skills than in those of Delaney, Marcus or Starr.

There remain, however, some more fundamental issues raised in Stokes’s work that leave me with doubts about the general interpretation. As the author explains, the stereotypes of Western orientalism have been deployed by Turkish critics of arabsesk music. Stokes, of course, disapproves of such representations. Not only the musicians and producers of arabsesk culture, but also the varied audiences that consume it are seen by him as agents, actively engaged in negotiating their identities. But (echoing one of Delaney’s themes) he shows that the ideals expressed in the music (particularly clear in the film summaries in chapter five) are those of repose and passivity. What is not finally clear to me is how Stokes can uphold a view of arabsesk as an anti-culture without himself risking an endorsement of the distortions of orientalism. His concluding sentences are as follows:

arabsesk provides a focus for the despair of an urban society on the periphery of world economic systems, in which nearly everybody is faced with social and economic forces over which they have no control. Where this despair can be rendered meaningful and shared in song and ecstatic dance, some form of transcendence is always possible. (p. 227)

Music and dance are clearly powerful forms of communication, and the fact that young children and an extraordinary assortment of 'gender benders' are prominent among arabsesk performers is evidence that for some this music may be associated with the transcendence of conventional male sexuality. On the other hand, some of the most popular figures also fit into the familiar Western category of 'working-
class hero’, and their career paths (well known through the national media) simply the sort of ‘rags to riches’ narratives told everywhere. According to Stokes, the *arabesk* films themselves make it perfectly plain that alcohol consumption (though undoubtedly a ‘dense semantic act’) is ultimately escapist, and does not enable transcendence. Stokes is dismissive of the official, modernist, secularist discourse that would see the whole anti-culture of *arabesk* as no less futile and escapist, achieving nothing more than ‘short-term gratification’; but he does not seriously attempt to *argue* against such an analysis. Clearly he has found meaning and significance in the genre itself. He has found transcendence of the Western musical traditions in which he was educated, and which he had long found oppressive. But what kind of transcendence is really attained by local audiences? Personally I still find it easy to sympathize with the rationalist critics, who may experience less of the exquisite emotional release afforded by *arabesk* stars at *muhabbet* gatherings, but whose analysis of the social and political significance of the genre seems close to the mark.

The series in which this fine book appears is entitled ‘Oxford Studies in Social and Cultural Anthropology’, which I suppose is in itself a sign of changing times in British anthropology. To my mind Stokes really does achieve an innovative synthesis in this book: cultural meanings are subtly explored against the evidence rather than imposed by the observer, and the author pays careful attention to the full social and political context. At the same time I hope it is still premature to identify the demise of the community-focused enquiry; indeed Stokes himself is clearly superbly equipped to follow up this study with one that would examine music-making more intensively within one urban locality, in which closer attention to such variables as class and region of origin, plus of course gender, would complement the more macro-orientation of the present book. At any rate, there is no doubt that in his first book Martin Stokes admirably realises the stated goal of this new Oxford series, namely to set ‘the criteria of excellence in ethnographic description and innovation in analysis’. Moreover, despite my more critical comments on the others, all the books reviewed here together mark a useful advance in anthropological understandings of modern Turkey.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

CULTURED FOOD

JEREMY MACCLANCY


UNTIL very recently, our food was considered something fit to eat or to reject, not to study. It was professionally correct to examine the use of edibles in exotic settings, but not at home. The attitudes of Westerners, especially the urban classes, to what they eat was not considered worthy of sustained investigation. Like several other topics that could be included within 'an anthropology of modern Europe', food was considered to be such an already understood part of our common lives that research into its meaning and uses could not turn up anything new. Only the more exotic practices within our modern societies were studied in a serious manner, and even then only sporadically. But, as all bar one of the
books under review reveals, these ignorant attitudes are at last becoming curios of the past.

A major problem for anthropologists of modern Europe is that the societies they study contain a high proportion of educated people who, if they can be bothered, may criticize all but the most incisive of ethnographers’ reports as trivial and platitudinous. And if these intellectuals of their own society compare their anthropologists with their novelists, they may well find the books of the former superficial, pretentious and poorly written. Compared to the ethnographers of distant and little-known areas, those who study ourselves face a harsh and well-informed jury. The criteria of acceptability are jacked up, and an anthropologist of Western food who dares to tell us something we already know shouldn’t even make it into print.

For instance, some members of this extra-academic public found Mary Douglas’s structuralist analyses of British eating patterns (e.g. Douglas 1972; Douglas and Nicod 1974) inconsequential. Indeed, questions were asked in Parliament about whether the taxpayer should be funding research whose major ‘discovery’ was that the biscuit served as a coda to the main daily meal. Perhaps even worse, the distinguished psychologist who reviewed for the TLS the book Douglas edited on the anthropology of drink (Douglas (ed.) 1987) thought it platitudinous, if not just plain silly:

Much of it reads like a parody of sociology and anthropology. It is, unintentionally, the only one of the five books [under review] that is consistently humorous. Consider for example...‘In emphasizing the meal as an occasion of social relationships, the bourgeoisie deny the primary, material function of eating and maintain the integration of familial with the more disciplined areas of life’—in other words people like talking as well as eating. (Sutherland 1988: 880)

Non-structuralist academics, who had their own worries about Douglas’s work, criticized the synchronic strictures and strongly over-systematizing tendencies of her approach. As they perceived, she was not scared to invent meanings for the culinary patterns she witnessed, especially when the consumers she was studying were resolutely silent about the connotations of mealtimes and their contents. Douglas, it became clear, was also happy to isolate what she considered to be a ‘system’, to lay down its boundaries, and to outline its structure, without referring to the ideas and attitudes of the users of the supposed ‘system’. She was at the same time charged with disregarding history, with ignoring politics, with failing to acknowledge the structural constraints on ingestion, and with being so arrogant as to be prepared to generalize, on the basis of one brief study of four working-class families, about the gastronomic behaviour of the whole of Britain (see, for example, Goody 1982: 29-32; Mennell 1985: 13-15; and the book by Charsley under review). As one of her critics, Sydney Mintz (1985: 200), put it, ‘the relation [she claimed] of so-called grammar to eating is only a cute artifact of description’.
Today her deeply formalized and at times counter-intuitive method seems suitable only for a history of the anthropology of food, not for its contemporary study. It seems that it once had intellectual weight only because structuralism was then in vogue, and because it was thought that any further work by an academic capable of producing *Purity and Danger* had to be of interest. All the more depressing then, that several of the contributors to Furst’s otherwise interesting collection of essays have resuscitated her ideas. But as *Jurassic Park* has reminded us, bringing dinosaurs back to life doesn’t make them any more attractive, it just shows how out of date they are.

Charsley doesn’t wish to beetle off after brontosauri. He is too concerned with theoretical innovation for that. While investigating the Scots wedding industry, he realized that the symbolic centrepiece of the feast had never been properly studied. Though the attention of any extra-terrestrial ethnographer would immediately be drawn to the extraordinary structure, cost, and cutting of this tiered confection, no anthropologist, whether of Britain or of food, had so far bothered to analyse in any depth the traditions surrounding the wedding cake. The anthropological result of Charsley’s research into the cultural history of this material item is a tentative model of change. He wishes to suggest that an established object is more likely to condition use and meaning rather than vice versa, and that object and use normally condition meaning. He shows that the sorts of symbolic interpretations which anthropologists like to make are extraneous to cultural development, while folk historical explanations are but *post hoc* rationalizations couched in a historicist mode.

While admitting there are exceptions to his generalizations, he submits that ‘objects come first, their uses follow, and human imagination playing around both occasionally proposes meanings’ (p. 132). To anthropologists used to dealing with less rapidly developing societies, Charsley’s thesis may appear highly provocative, if not edging on the nonsensical. Of course, his ‘model’ of cultural change makes most sense when referring to objects in a malleable society with a highly competitive market economy that values innovation. But even when dealing with this sort of society, Charsley seems to be taking too little account of the way already established, socially recognized contexts may influence the uses to which a novel object is put and the meanings it is given. It is true that people may create new contexts for new objects, but these novel frames for action and meaning are themselves embedded in other, pre-existing contexts.

It is very tempting to think that Charsley’s thesis is, more than anything, a consequence of the nature of his sources. Though he has been scrupulous in his documentation of the development of the cake, his account of its history is constantly dogged by the lack of contemporary commentary about its possible meanings. Given this paucity of relevant evidence about the history of British baking, challenge to, or confirmation of, his thesis will have to await more richly documented histories of other items of native culture.

Camporesi has the opposite problem. A distinguished social historian of food, Camporesi is excellent when discussing the social symbolism of edibles and its
associated rituals in preindustrial Italy, showing how the act of eating at weddings and seasonal feasts was regarded metaphorically as a form of copulation; how bread was viewed as a magic talisman against the forces of darkness; how peasant rituals centred, regardless of the time of year, around a great cooking-pot suspended over the hearth; and how a nationwide bourgeois cuisine developed in the last century. Where he falls down in this collection of essays (some of which are unnecessarily repetitious) is in his accounts of modern eating practices; he seems to think that a sharp eye and a sharper style are sufficient qualifications for discoursing in an authoritative manner on the way Italians eat today. They are not sufficient, as the systematic study of contemporary foodways evidenced in the other books under review suggests. If good historians wish to wax anthropological about present society, they need to be good anthropologists as well.

The blurb on the cover of the book by Mennell et al. accurately states that it is ‘a comprehensive overview of the sociology of food’. The topics covered range from eating disorders to studies of famine, from home economics to the impact of colonialism on food, from the use of food in total institutions to restaurant-going. There are further chapters dealing with nutritional trends, the development of culinary cultures, lay beliefs and practices about food and health, differential patterns of food consumption according to age, sex, and class, as well as with the world of waiters and with food technology and its impact.

It is, however, nothing but an overview, little more than a bird’s-eye glance at the terrain already covered by food researchers: whole sections of various chapters read like lists of the relevant literature; in many parts, researchers’ work is mentioned briefly but not assessed. Thus a newcomer to the sociology of food could only use the book as a pointer to the papers published on the topic rather than as a critical guide to them. The only exception is the chapter on food in the sexual division of domestic labour where the authors, for once, are prepared to write whole paragraphs evaluating in an informed manner the work that has been done within this sub-field.

With all the best will in the world, I find it very difficult to avoid the feeling that this book originated as a report designed to fit a certain brief. And since the authors twice refer to ‘this report’ in their text, it is hard not to think one’s suspicions are well-grounded. If they had only expanded their text and given more space to constructive judgements of the work they were listing, this book could have been recommended to people who wished to gain a critical understanding of the field. As it stands, it is of most use for those who wish to know what sort of work has not been done and needs to be done.

Fiddes’s initial query is why we have made meat the king of all foods. His answer is that eating the flesh of other animals is conventionally taken to symbolize our domination of the natural world. Carnal consumption is a gastronomic manner of expressing our superiority over all other animals. It is a daily way of asserting our apical position in the food pyramid: we eat others, others don’t eat us. Since domination is the key term in this culinary logic, it
should not be surprising that, as Fiddes details, sexual chauvinism is often expressed in meaty terms.

For some, the implicit authoritarian anthropocentricism of meat-eating is too much to bear. Rejecting the idea that God made animals for our purposes they prefer to regard homo sapiens as merely one particular species which shares this planet with so many million others. Indeed, as the American poet Gary Synder has argued, perhaps we should regard Man as an 'entertaining animal', put on this earth to amuse and delight his fellow inhabitants. Either way, the point is clear: some people become vegetarians in reaction to the bloodthirsty arrogance of human carnivores.

Fiddes fills out this frame of meat-eaters versus vegetarians by discussing the history of carnivorism, its cross-cultural incidence, our attitudes to eating others (cannibalism), and our attitudes to eating pets (pseudo-cannibalism). He concludes by detailing the different sorts of arguments—economical, nutritional, ethical, and ecological—that meat-eaters and their enemies use to defend their culinary habits. Like any good ethnographer of a complex society such as our own, Fiddes does not restrict himself to relying on a clutch of prized 'informants'. Besides interviewing farmers, butchers, vegetarian campaigners, and 'members of the general public' (I should like to know how he chose those), he has plumbed trade journals, checked out advertisements and the popular press, looked at recent novels and films, and even read the relevant academic literature. To think it was only ten years ago I heard a respected don saying at the seminar he was chairing, 'We tried working on novels but found there was nothing to get out of them'! We have to thank imaginative anthropologists like Fiddes that the ethnography of Britain now being published is no longer so hidebound in its methods. If Meat is indicative of what we can say about our own society, then I look forward to more.

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THE JOKING RELATIONSHIP AND KINSHIP:
CHARTING A THEORETICAL DEPENDENCY

ROBERT PARKIN

I

Although the anthropology of jokes and of humour generally is a relatively new phenomenon (see, for example, Apte 1985), the anthropology of joking has a long history. It has been taken up at some point or another by most of the main theoreticians of the subject and their treatment of it often serves to characterize their general approach; moreover, there can be few anthropologists who have not encountered it and had to deal with it in the field. What has stimulated anthropologists is the fact that societies are almost invariably internally differentiated in some way and that one does not joke with everyone. The very fact that joking has to involve at least two people ensures its social character, while the requirement not to joke is equally obviously a social injunction. The questions anthropologists have asked themselves are, why the difference, and how is it manifested in any particular society?

This is a revised version of a paper first given on 26 June 1989 at the Institut für Ethnologie, Freie Universität Berlin, in a seminar series chaired by Dr Burkhard Schnepel and entitled 'The Fool in Social Anthropological Perspective'. A German version was presented subsequently at the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Völkerkunde conference in Munich on 18 October 1991 and is to be published in due course in a book edited by Dr Schnepel and Dr Michael Kuper. In the present version certain aspects of the material argument have been modified, though the style of the original oral delivery has been left largely untouched.
Consider for a moment Western society, which, despite its veneer of equality, is certainly not without differentiation of a hierarchical kind. One does not generally joke with the same freedom—if at all—with one’s boss, professor or parents as one does with fellow workers or colleagues of roughly equivalent status. Conversely, to not joke or respond to a joke may in some circumstances be taken for unfriendliness, i.e. joking may be an expected form of behaviour, just like not joking. This is even more true of societies that are organized more fully on the basis of kinship. It is not, I think, that roles in such societies are more heavily structured; rather, the structure is openly recognized and positively marked. As Dumont has often remarked, hierarchy is given its due: it is not suppressed by the ideal of equality, as it is in the West. I will return to this contrast later. For the moment the inference is as follows: the more completely a society is ordered by kinship the more expressive and stereotyped the joking seems to be, especially on ritual occasions, which themselves dramatize the society’s structure and values.

It is such joking relationships that I want to concentrate on here. They normally take place between kin types, i.e. between individuals standing in a certain relationship of kinship to one another, though there are some such relationships, especially in Africa, between different clans and even between tribes. They are characteristically continuous but apt to be especially marked on ritual occasions at which both referents are present. Indeed, the joking is usually public, involving groups rather than individuals. It may be partly verbal, with much sexual innuendo, or it may be also physical, involving pushing or tripping up the other person, throwing ashes or cowdung or water at him or her, trying to expose the other person’s lower body by pulling off their clothing, destroying or stealing his or her property etc. Usually, there are several such stereotypes in any one society, of different intensity and kind. They need not be symmetric, and there is one much discussed form that is characteristically asymmetric, namely the avunculate, to which I will return below. Normally there are limits beyond which joking should not go, but within those limits there is the obligation not only to joke but also not to take offence. However, there is a degree of hostility involved in joking, and breaking the limits may lead to serious fights, or at least to bad feeling.

Joking relationships often strike the anthropologist as one of the most spectacular forms of ritual behaviour. Less noticeable, because much less spectacular, are their converse, that is, relationships of respect or of complete avoidance, though these are no less significant. Again, they constitute the behaviour appropriate, at all times, with certain kin types (different ones from those with whom one jokes), the only exception being that avoidance behaviour is occasionally subject to reversal in ritual situations. Again, the intensity and content of such relationships may vary, even within the same society. Avoidance may be total, i.e. no speaking to, or even in the presence of, the other person, no direct eye contact, no physical contact or passing of objects to one another, no staying in the same room together (especially if the referents are of opposite sex), nor letting one’s shadow pass over the other person, not even passing in front of
him or her oneself—all contact in such cases has to be via a third person. On the other hand, respectful conversation, discreet glances and some proximity may be allowed. But such behaviour should not be thought to denote hostility, as joking very often does: Radcliffe-Brown (1949: 134; see also 1952: 106) cites the case of the Australian Aborigine who must avoid his mother-in-law totally but still regards her as his best friend, because she has provided him with his wife.

As already noted, there is one form of joking relationship that is especially prominent in the literature, namely that which sometimes occurs between a mother’s brother and his sister’s son. Commonly called the avunculate, this has been reported from Sub-Saharan Africa especially, as well as from parts of Oceania. It is generally asymmetric, in the sense that the junior partner, the sister’s son, is the active partner, his mother’s brother the passive one, able neither to respond in kind nor to take offence. In the typical avunculate the sister’s son is at liberty not only to joke with and insult his maternal uncle but also to steal and destroy his property, virtually at will. Sometimes his claims against his mother’s brother may extend to his inheriting his widow after his death.

Although the mother’s brother–sister’s son relationship is often strongly marked, it does not, of course, always involve joking of this sort. In much of eastern Indonesia, for example, a mother’s brother often has mystical influence over his sister’s son, which is reciprocated not with extravagant behaviour but with respect, gifts, ritual services, and so on. The relationship between wau and laua among the Iatmul of New Guinea, centred on the ritual called Naven and made famous by Gregory Bateson (1958 [1936]), also seems to exclude joking as such (the only joking Bateson mentions takes place between brothers-in-law, and even this is obviously mild and casual (ibid.: 80, 208)). The wau, the mother’s brother, indulges in much buffoonery, aping the antics of old women, and showing exaggerated submissiveness to his laua; but at the same time he is clearly the more active partner, from whom his laua, his sister’s son, frequently hides through supposed embarrassment. Thus while not active, the laua is not subordinate either. The result is a graphic demonstration of the ritualization of such relationships, but it is hardly the avunculate as normally defined. Perhaps this simply shows the arbitrariness of the concept, joking being but one means of marking what is ritually a very fertile relationship.

In fact, explanations for the sorts of joking involved are virtually absent from anthropology, and accounts of joking are often missing from ethnographic reports. Explanation therefore concentrates on the question of who jokes with whom, a question that inevitably leads to a consideration of social structure, especially kinship. There are several theories, especially for the avunculate, though a commonly invoked theme is the significance of marriage or, more accurately, affinity. I will now consider the main ones.
An early explanation for the avunculate saw it, like many other phenomena, as a survival of an earlier age in which the whole of mankind was ordered exclusively by matrilineal descent, i.e. human society was ‘matriarchal’, to use the contemporary phrase. The matriarchal theory was developed in the 1860s virtually simultaneously but independently by Morgan and Bachofen, though it was popularized by McLennan, apparently under Morgan’s influence (see Trautmann 1987). Although challenged by Maine, Fustel de Coulanges and Darwin, it was for a long time popular, the view being that the present, ‘patriarchal’ age developed from it and was, of course, superior. When the avunculate began to be discovered in field situations, therefore, it seemed at first to fit the matriarchal theory. Since it involved ego stealing his mother’s brother’s property it was regarded as a form of inheritance, even though this could only be by anticipation, as it were, since the mother’s brother was still alive. And even if the society’s jural institutions were now predominantly patrilineal, this simply meant that the mode of descent and inheritance had changed from being matrilineal at some time in the past.

It was not until the 1920s that Hocart and Radcliffe-Brown set about demolishing this theory. One major problem was that in many societies with matrilineal descent the mother’s brother is an authority figure, especially if the family is structured for residential purposes along matrilineal lines. And no role or relationship involving authority is likely to entail joking at the same time, especially of such a violent kind, and especially if the junior partner is the more aggressive. Eventually this theory went the way of the matriarchal theory itself, as anthropology reacted violently away from any form of ‘conjectural history’, especially if involving uniform ‘stages’ of civilization. Just the same fate befell Rivers’s explanation for the avunculate (1907), that it was a survival of a previous era of cross-cousin marriage, in which a mother’s brother gave his daughter in marriage to his sister’s son, this daughter now being replaced by his property. Hocart’s short article on the subject (1923) was mainly devoted to debunking the matrilineal theory, though he did also offer a suggestion for the asymmetry of the avunculate. In Fiji, he said, the sister’s son is ritually of higher status. In Mozambique too, this was found to be true of the BaThonga—a group studied by Junod and much discussed in this context (e.g. Radcliffe-Brown 1924)—where the sister’s son is ritually cared for by his mother’s brother, who performs a sacrifice for him when he is ill. In return for this care and attention, a sister’s son steals his mother’s brother’s food and, when the latter dies, claims his property and widow as his own. Hocart shows us his characteristic obsession with ritual in his own explanation of the avunculate. ‘Snatching’ only occurs on ritual occasions, and although the mother’s brother may not retaliate, his children may and do so, usually by giving ego a beating. But despite this violence, Hocart rules out hostile intent, for these cross cousins are ‘gods to one another’. It can truly be said, I think, that Hocart saw gods everywhere, and despite his undoubted brilliance, few
have wanted to follow him in his very non-social-structural explanations. None the less, this reminder of the ritual aspects of the avunculate is very useful, and we will return to it later.

Radcliffe-Brown’s explanation was influential for a long time, though his star too is now in eclipse. For him it was, as ever, all a matter of maintaining social cohesion (see his 1924, 1940, 1949 and 1952). Both joking relationships and avoidance relationships were in general designed to avoid conflict wherever there was ‘social disjunction’, as there was between affines, for instance; and through them ‘social equilibrium’ was created and maintained. He recognized the element of hostility inherent in joking, and also that avoidance need not suggest hostility. He also recognized that potential marriage was one important basis for joking, especially where there was cross-cousin marriage, or what I, following Dumont, prefer to call positive marriage rules. As is well known, in such cases ego is expected to marry into a particular, predetermined kin category, and as a consequence he in a sense inherits his affinal relationships. Thus the direction of marriages is predictable, at least as to category, and since it may involve ritual and material exchanges as well, is potentially conflictual and hostile. Joking gives expression to the distance involved, as well as assuaging the hostility by directing it into avenues in which it can be controlled.

For Radcliffe-Brown this set of ideas was no less applicable to the avunculate. He was later (1953) to object with some bewilderment to Dumont’s argument (1953) that sister’s son and mother’s brother were really affines, but even he recognized that the relationship stemmed from the marriage of ego’s (i.e. the sister’s son’s) parents. However, Radcliffe-Brown had also identified, quite correctly, the fact that the dichotomy between joking and respect or avoidance was also very commonly one between sets of alternating generations (another matter I shall return to). That is to say, relations between parents and children entail authority and hence exclude joking, but relations between grandparents and grandchildren normally exclude authority and are easier; indeed, not even sexual joking is necessarily excluded. The avunculate, however, is an apparent exception, in that joking takes place between referents of adjacent generations—mother’s brother is of the parents’ generation in relation to ego. Radcliffe-Brown’s explanation starts with the observation that ego’s mother is inclined to be less authoritarian than his father; he then combines two favourite concepts of his, the ‘extension of sentiments’ and the ‘unity of the sibling group’, and finally, he argues that ego’s easier sentiment towards his mother is transferred on to her brother, who indulges ego’s insults and violations of his property out of regard for ego’s mother, his sister.

Radcliffe-Brown here edges very close to psychological explanations of the social quite at variance with the Durkheimian tradition that he was otherwise so anxious to promote. He also betrays the legacy of Malinowski’s teaching, in which the nuclear family was the foundation of everything else, by a series of extensions outwards. Moreover, Radcliffe-Brown’s explanation, though intended to be a universal one, is really only good for patrilineal societies, or at any rate for
those in which mother's brother has a non-authoritarian role; and even in these there is much variation in practice. His idea of the resolution of potential conflict is also brought into doubt, if sentiment is enough to drive ego to destroy his maternal uncle's property.

Radcliffe-Brown was later to see the position of the mother's brother as an ambivalent one, rather than one of just indulgence towards his nephew. There is now 'both attachment...and separation', for although the relationship remains indulgent, ego is an outsider to his mother's brother's descent group—put another way, there is both conjunction and disjunction. One notices that sentiment and extensionism are still present in this revised theory. What the joking relationship is really intended to express or resolve in such a multivalent relationship suddenly becomes very unclear, making either it or the explanation itself superfluous.

III

Though usually bracketed with the descent theorists in the great kinship debates of the 1950s and after, Radcliffe-Brown allowed at least a moderate degree of importance to the institution of marriage, and more generally, affinity. Its importance was dramatically increased by one later writer, and suppressed entirely by another. Lévi-Strauss (1968 [1945]) accepted Radcliffe-Brown's basic precept that the joking relationship, or rather what he called the 'system of attitudes' as a whole, was designed 'to ensure group cohesion and equilibrium'. But against Radcliffe-Brown he argued that the avunculate, or its absence, could not be traced to the presence of patrilineal and matrilineal descent respectively. Indeed, in these terms its presence could not be predicted, as even Radcliffe-Brown had recognized: but what could be predicted was the fact that if the father-son relationship was one of authority in any one society, the mother's brother-sister's son relationship would be indulgent, and vice versa—whatever the content of these two relationships, they were always contrasted.

This Radcliffe-Brown would have accepted, though it cannot really be said that it has been borne out ethnographically as an invariable rule. But for Lévi-Strauss, the structure was the important thing: it was not a matter of mother's brother and sister's son only, but of ego's mother and father too—the famous 'atom of kinship', from which all elementary structures derive. Here, the incest taboo and exogamy are both accounted for, as Lévi-Strauss intended. Moreover, in an elementary structure (or, if one prefers, with cross-cousin marriage), the mother's brother pre-exists the marriage that carries the structure forward into future generations—thus there is no 'problem' of the mother's brother to be explained, as there had been for Radcliffe-Brown and other early writers. Similarly, Lévi-Strauss demolished the problem of the relation between behaviour and kinship terminology, which for Radcliffe-Brown had meant seeing the latter as a mere
epiphenomenon of the former. Instead, Lévi-Strauss regarded the two as interdependent, though not homologous, since their configurations did not match entirely, as Radcliffe-Brown had assumed. Unfortunately, Lévi-Strauss did not go beyond his basic point of view, that the two were to be seen as separate but related systems obeying a common underlying structure.

Jack Goody criticized this point of view for its concentration on the senior generation at the expense of the vertical, i.e. intergenerational, dimension. For Goody, marriage and affinity had nothing to do with the matter—nor, we may add, with virtually anything else—it was descent that was important. In an article published in 1959 he compared two Ghanaian societies, the LoWiili, with patrilineal inheritance rules, and the LoDagaba, with matrilineal ones (they both had double unilineal descent in Goody’s words, i.e. both patrilineal and matrilineal descent groups). Indeed, for him the descent group was defined by the fact that it held material property in common. In a society with patrilineal descent groups, a male ego’s mother has no rights or property to transmit to him directly, through matrilineal inheritance. However, he has ‘residual rights’ in his mother’s patrilineal descent group, i.e. from his mother’s brother, and it is this that the avunculate, with its ritual stealing, expresses. This really explains nothing, since no reason is given why the exchange should take this extraordinary form, and not merely consist in a direct transfer with or without ritual. Goody realizes that this will not work for matrilineal societies, and here he invokes just such an ordinary and, one may say, normally surreptitious transmission of property between father and son as the counterpart to the avunculate and its ‘ritual stealing’. It is well known, or course, that fathers in a matrilineal milieu often seek to divert some of their property to their own children despite matrilineal inheritance rules, which they often break in doing so, and Goody admits that there is nothing ritualized about this among the LoDagaba.

Dumont (1961) heavily criticized this attempt to interpret a privileged relationship between descent groups as what he called a matter of substance, i.e. as a matter of ego’s relationship with his mother’s brother, regardless of the marriage of his parents. He stresses, as Hocart did, the ritual aspect of the relationship. For example, among the LoWiili, ‘the sister’s son has not only the right to “snatch a leg of the sacrifice” but also the duty to perform certain ritual services which have for their effect the making of “hot things cool”, that is to say of calming the anger of his uncle’s ancestors’ (ibid.: 79). Whereas Goody had separated them, Dumont, quite properly, wants to consider them together. For Dumont, ‘the “snatching” is a privilege rather than a residue, a ritual recognition of the indispensability of the nephew” (ibid.), and, more generally, it ‘affirms in the face of the corporateness of the lineage the necessity of a help from outside’ (ibid.), i.e. the ultimate dependence of lineages on one another for marriage partners. Among the LoDagaba, with their matrilineal rules of descent, there is a parallel relationship, involving what Goody merely calls a ‘joking partner’. Here, obviously, though Goody chooses to ignore it, is the true analogue of the avunculate in this society; residual inheritance has nothing to do with the matter.
In passing from Goody to Dumont, we are passing from descent theory back to alliance theory, and thus also back to Lévi-Strauss. It is with the alliance theorists that we encounter attempts to interpret joking relationships in general, both symmetric and asymmetric—not just the avunculate, as was the case with the British school, excepting, to some extent, Radcliffe-Brown.

Both Lévi-Strauss and Dumont were, of course, pupils of Marcel Mauss. Mauss (1928) was perhaps the first to point out the extent to which joking was a form of social control—in ridiculing behaviour, one could direct it. More fundamentally—and in line with the arguments of his most famous and influential work, The Gift—he regarded joking as a form of exchange. Joking relations corresponded to reciprocal rights. If these rights were unequal, the joking relationship would be asymmetric, as was the case with the avunculate; and this asymmetry he explained through a ‘religious [or, as we would probably prefer to say today, ‘ritual’] inequality’. Radcliffe-Brown was soon to add to this that avoidance could also be interpreted as a form of exchange, and he offered examples (1940: 207-8; see also 1952: 102). Thus among the Zande of the Southern Sudan, blood-brotherhood and the exchange of names involves joking; among the Yaralde of South Australia, on the other hand, it goes with avoidance. Here, in fact, we have the elements of a system of contrasts involving the whole of society.

And what is the basis of this system of contrasts? For Mauss, it can be summed up in one word, marriageability—not, let us note straightaway, marriage, for actual marriage partners rarely seem to have a relationship of public joking at any rate. Thus one jokes with potential marriage partners (e.g. cross cousins) but avoids, or treats respectfully, those with whom marriage and sexual contact are quite out of the question (e.g. one’s mother or mother-in-law). Actually, it is not enough to say simply this, for marriageability normally only applies to opposite-sex relationships. To take account of same-sex ones, one needs to shift away from considering marriageability towards considering relations of actual or potential affinity in the global sense intended by Dumont: thus, cross-culturally, brothers-in-law are more likely to joke than brothers. Yet even this is insufficient, for there are many exceptions; for instance, in many societies one may not joke with one’s father-in-law any more than with one’s father. To show more exactly what is involved, we need to examine a particular ethnographic example. I have chosen that provided by the Juang, a tribal group of central India (see McDougal 1964; see also Parkin 1988, 1992: ch. 9).

The Juang divide the universe of kin in two different ways, one vertical, the other horizontal. The vertical dichotomy separates agnates, called kutumb, from
potential and actual affines, called bondhu. The horizontal dichotomy is really one between sets of alternating generations. One set consists of the generations adjacent to ego's, i.e. those of his parents and children. The other set connects ego's own generation with alternating ones, i.e. those of his grandparents and grandchildren. These two generation sets have no specific names, though they are called generically bhaiguli, literally 'group of brothers'. Combining the two dichotomies gives a fourfold classification, though these are not sociocentric classes of the sort well known in Australia.

Juang marriage is a matter of what McDougal calls 'classificatory sister exchange' between patrilineal local descent groups residentially grouped into villages. The prescribed category of spouse is a saliray, which although translatable not as 'cross cousin' but as 'sibling's spouse's sibling', still expresses a situation in which groups of siblings intermarry. In terms of the two dichotomies outlined above, one can only marry an opposite-sex referent who is a bondhu relative and who belongs to one's own generation set. And this includes the whole of that set in principle, including the alternating generations. The term saliray, like many other Juang kin terms, covers kin types not only in ego's generation but also in the alternating ones, such as (in the case of saliray) father's mother’s younger sister and son’s son’s wife’s younger sister. There are, none the less, certain exceptions. For example, a wife’s younger sister is marriageable (normally in a second marriage) but a wife’s elder sister is not. Marriage to a kutumb, i.e. an agnatic relative, or with a member of the opposite generation set is formally not allowed, though the second of these rules is frequently violated.

Joking and non-joking broadly follow this structure: joking is basically confined to one’s own generation set and to bondhu relatives, restraint being appropriate with agnates and all of the opposed generation set. Joking takes place especially on such ritual occasions as the mutual dancing visits between affinally linked villages, at which parents literally capture visiting girls as brides for the youth of their village. While there is no regular feuding, affinal villages are prone to quarrel as well as to marry and joke, and some supposedly kutumb villages are actually originally bondhu villages with whom one’s own has quarrelled.

Let us take matters one generation set at a time. As regards the consanguines of one’s father’s generation, the greatest respect is reserved for one’s father, one’s father’s elder brother and his wife, and one’s father’s elder sister. Relations with one’s mother’s sisters and their husbands are a little easier, since they normally live elsewhere and have no authority over one, but there is still no joking. There is no avunculate, but the villages of a mother’s brother and a sister’s son owe each other ritual services and prestations at life-crisis rites. Classificatory father’s younger brothers are often in practice joking partners, especially since, despite belonging to the generation above ego’s, they may in fact be younger. But the joking is milder than it is within ego’s generation set—it is only verbal, not also physical, and only takes place between same-sex referents, not across the sex line. Moreover, it is purely informal and does not take place on ritual occasions, when the two generation sets are rigorously opposed to one another. As regards affines
of one’s father’s or children’s generation, however, there are no exceptions to the rule of non-joking, and across the sex line (e.g. a male ego with his mother-in-law or son’s wife) relations approach total avoidance.

Thus joking, especially formalized joking on ritual occasions, is confined to one’s own bhaiguli. Yet even here there are particular exceptions, and again, especially across the sex line. Though the generation of one’s grandparents is usually a suitable one to joke with, there can be no joking between a woman and her father’s father or a man and his mother’s mother, since these are classed as agnates. On the other hand, classificatory mother’s father for a woman, and classificatory father’s mother for a man, are bondhu relatives and potential marriage partners (they may in fact be roughly the same age as ego).

Ego’s level is similarly complicated. Primary joking partners are those belonging to the class of potential spouses, mostly saliray or sibling’s spouse’s siblings (more specifically, elder sibling’s spouse’s younger siblings), together with their opposite-sex siblings, who are, of course, ego’s same-sex siblings-in-law. Also, joking partners are wife’s younger sister and husband’s younger brother, who are potential second spouses for male and female ego respectively. However, wife’s elder sister and husband’s elder brother are banned as both marriage and joking partners, partly because, like elder siblings generally, they tend to be assimilated to the parents’ generation: an elder brother is, in this society and in much of India generally, the ‘natural’ heir to one’s father, as is husband’s elder brother to one’s husband’s father. There is no real joking between spouses or between siblings, i.e. within the nuclear family, even within one’s own generation (this being common cross-culturally according to Apte (1985)), where relations may be described as neutral.

The most marked joking, and the most marked avoidance, undoubtedly occurs with opposite-sex bondhu relatives, according to whether or not such relatives are also potential spouses. Joking and avoidance between same-sex bondhu relatives follows this pattern, being applied respectively to the analogous same-sex relatives according to relative age (i.e. you may joke with wife’s younger brother as well as wife’s younger sister, but not with wife’s elder brother any more than with wife’s elder sister). Relations between agnates tend to be more neutral, especially within the nuclear family, i.e. non-joking does not necessarily imply avoidance, nor even great respect, as among siblings. Thus among the Juang the joking/non-joking dichotomy broadly reflects the social structure, but is more marked where relations are potentially or actually affinal, whether particular referents are marriageable or strictly not marriageable.

It is evident from Mauss’s review (1928) that the explanation for joking in terms of potential or actual affinity can be applied very widely to kinship-based societies,
even those lacking the positive marriage rules of the Juang or similar groups. In such societies, potential affines, and actual non-affines, are usually clearly defined, and joking and non-joking express not the individual's personality but a kinship role that is very often shared with others. Joking is characteristically ritualized and takes place especially on ritual occasions and between well-defined groups, not purely between individuals—this in itself, of course, promotes group definition. It is often, as well, an ingredient of the equation between marrying and fighting that is frequently found in the anthropological literature, especially in societies with positive marriage rules.

Comparisons between ritual and drama are perhaps too obvious to be more than commonplace. None the less, one is reminded of Mauss's later work on the category of the person (1938), in which the individual exists less than his personnage (literally 'role'), i.e. his position in society, especially the kinship structure. Mauss was fascinated by the mask as representing different roles, and by the recirculation of the same souls through different generations, uniting different physical individuals. He might have added joking as another manifestation of the role. For Mauss, history had progressively weakened the personnage and allowed the development of the individual personality in its place. Of course, history—to continue in Mauss's evolutionary spirit for a moment—has also progressively devalued kinship as the basis of social organization. With marriage choices in the West no longer confined by kinship category or any other injunction, except negatively, there has ceased to be a class of potential affines or of potential spouses. Put another way, this potential now lies in the whole of society, apart from a few near kin types, and even outside it. Marriage—to the extent that it is still regarded as essential at all—is now a matter of property considerations or romantic love (or at least companionship), certainly not of category or of structural segment. And affinity has to obey the same chance factors, since it only exists after the marriage has been concluded, not also before, not even potentially in any meaningful sense. Joking has become similarly arbitrary, a matter of personal relations even within groups of people not otherwise internally differentiated. If any comprehensive explanation for joking in modern societies is ever to be produced, it will have to be couched in terms of structures of a different sort from those obtaining among kinship-based societies; and in a society like ours, these are generally very elusive.

Finally, what of the importance of joking to anthropology itself? It cannot be said that joking has generated any special theory to explain itself: rather, it has been used to illustrate theoretical approaches that had already been developed for other reasons. We have mentioned many examples here: the 'age of matriarchy' theory, Rivers's cross-cousin marriage theory, Mauss's theory of exchange, Radcliffe-Brown's theory of social cohesion, Lévi-Strauss's structuralism, Goody's descent theory and Dumont's alliance theory. Despite their often profound differences, most of the figures we have been discussing—except, in their different ways, Hocart, Bateson and Lévi-Strauss—are linked by one thing: their devotion to the study of social structure to the exclusion, relatively speaking, of ritual. That
is to say, ritual is seen consistently as an epiphenomenon of the social structure, however the latter may be interpreted, and has no existence apart from it—it merely supports it. Joking, however, belongs in the domain of ritual, and its study has suffered accordingly.

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NANCEE OKU BRIGHT, Mothers of Steel: The Women of Um Gargur, an Eritrean Refugee Settlement in Sudan. D.Phil.

This is an ethnographic study of the lives and experience of Eritrean refugee women in Um Gargur, a settlement in eastern Sudan established in 1976. It is based upon fourteen months of fieldwork and builds upon the findings of my 1985 M.Phil. thesis, 'A Preliminary Study of the Position of Eritrean Refugees in the Sudan', for which I conducted two months of research in Um Gargur. While the M.Phil. thesis was a comparative study of Um Gargur and two other cases of resettlement in Africa, here I am concerned primarily with questions of gender, everyday life, and how processes of change and realignments of power impact upon women in displaced heterogeneous societies.

After more than a decade in exile the people of Um Gargur continue to be fiercely nationalistic and as unresigned to remaining refugees as they are to assimilating into Sudan. There is also a growing trend towards Islamic conservatism in the settlement. This, coupled with the fact that Um Gargur is
composed largely of mistrusted ‘strangers’, means that women experience more restrictions in Um Gargur than they did in their communities of origin. The aim of the thesis is to examine the effect of displacement and exile upon gender roles, social infrastructures, traditions and perceptions, as people of disparate origins, occasionally with conflicting beliefs and mores, negotiate a way of living together. The title ‘Mothers of Steel’ is taken from a riot instigated by women when charges were introduced for water. As the women revolted, their children shouted, ‘Our mothers are steel, our fathers are monkeys!’ This represented the main crisis point between men and women. Yet although the title derives from this incident, women, as they feed, nurture, socialize their children and keep their families intact, have clearly become ‘mothers of steel’ in the eyes of their children since they have lived in Um Gargur.

Chapter one introduces an overview of the settlement and shows that women’s deliberate exclusion from all formal institutions leaves them at a disadvantage despite the fact that over 50% of them are household heads for much of the year. The following chapters examine how categories as diverse as politics, honour, health, and economics, impinge on the lives of the refugee women and their families, and argue that in contexts of displacement, where social realities are constantly being redefined, these categories all have a moral dimension. In chapters three and four I show how limited employment opportunities in Um Gargur have meant that the majority of men continuously resident in the settlement have lost their roles as providers while women’s roles have taken on a new symbolic significance. The society attempts to compensate for men’s loss of status by placing greater restrictions upon women. Women’s reactions to this are varied, but significant numbers of them have redrawn the parameters of ‘honourable’ behaviour to allow themselves more flexibility. Women establish ties, not unlike kinship bonds, which traverse ethnic and religious boundaries and offer limited economic power and physical and psychological support. In chapter five I explore the tensions between traditional beliefs and practices and ‘Western’ models of health care.

While society’s notion of what constitutes honour has calcified in reaction to a situation of extreme social dislocation and jeopardization of ‘male’ and ‘female’ behaviour patterns, I show in chapter six that the women of Um Gargur have recognized their common plight and responded by renegotiating their identity, whilst at the same time being the primary agents—through myths, songs, names, and stories about Eritrea—in the construction of their children’s identities as Eritreans. In the conclusion (chapter seven) I introduce the story of the aforementioned water riot to illustrate how radically women’s perceptions of their own power have altered, and how their children now perceive them. I suggest that though the process of change has been slow, the pressures faced by the community have meant that women’s reconceptualization of their own roles has been inevitable.

This thesis contains a detailed ethnographic account of dual descent among the pastoral, Herero-speaking, OvaHimba, who live in the north-west corner of Namibia, bordering Angola. The system of dual descent is fully discussed and set within the context of the primary values (reconciliation with God and the ancestors, male reproductive power, and the acquisition of cattlewealth) perceived to be important by the OvaHimba.

Chapters 2-7 describe the material life of the OvaHimba. The herding of cattle, sheep, and goats, horticulture, and the food products derived therefrom, are described in relation to both dual descent and the values in which a food hierarchy, as well as attitudes toward economic activity, are rooted.

Chapters 9-16 contain detailed description and analysis of matrilineal and patrilineal kinship. Particular aspects of social life governed by dual descent such as admission to kinship groups, the extension or limitation of perceived matri- or patriclan/lineal relatedness, residence, marriage, religion, inheritance, division of kinship groups, and dispute settlement, are described as they work or function on the ground. But it is also demonstrated how these various practices are given coherence and meaning by contextualizing kinship within the framework of OvaHimba values.

Through detailed analysis and examples, the ethnographer presents OvaHimba values and society as strongly male-focused, and the system of dual descent as an institution which subtly articulates these values. Throughout the thesis the ethnographer argues that in order to understand dual descent within the OvaHimba context, it must be studied in relation to the overarching cosmology and values of OvaHimba society.


This is a study of social grouping patterns in and around Nenagh town. In the Introduction, the significance of the present study for Irish ethnography is argued for through a review of the existing literature. In chapter 1, the social grouping patterns which used to obtain in the locality in the pre-war times are described, focusing on informal social mixing. It is shown that the period is characterized by various practices explicitly manifesting social divisions especially by class and religion within the local population. In chapter 2, various aspects of the post-war social change are described as background to understanding the current social grouping patterns. In chapter 3, the current social mixing patterns in sporting clubs, pubs, and homes are described. It is argued that contrary to what the dominant ideology claims, there exists statistically significant social segregation along class, religion, local/outsider, and farmer/urbanite lines, and that the main
mechanism involved in the reproduction of such differentiation is the formation of
different tastes in different social groups. In chapter 4, how localities of various
levels are constructed as 'local communities' through the language of community
in relation to the dominant ideology as well as actualities of social differentiation
are described. It is emphasized that the symbolic construction of a local
community is not simply a matter of utilizing those elements which are universally
shared by its putative members as community symbols and thereby expressing and
promoting the integration of the local population. In the Conclusion, the main
findings of the present study are summarized, and their implications for cross-
cultural comparison in western European ethnography are discussed.

GEORGIA KAUFMANN, Family Formation and Fertility in a favela in Belo Horizonte,
Brazil: An Analysis of Cultural and Demographic Influences. D.Phil.

This study considers factors that affect a woman's fertility and chances of marriage
in a favela in Belo Horizonte, the third largest city in Brazil. In 1987-8 participant
observation and a microdemographic survey were conducted while living in Alto
Vera Cruz (AVC). The thesis is concerned with the processes of family formation
and fertility, both of which are associated aspects of biological and social
reproduction.

The familial organization found in AVC is contrasted with theoretical concepts
of patriarchal and matrifocal families. It is found that the marital status of women
is indicative of their status and security. Additionally, residence is found to have
important implications for the welfare of women. Women living in housefuls
enjoy a better standard of living than women residing neolocally.

The status of women is further related to their pattern of employment. Gender
relations define the type of employment and economic contributions to the
household. The domestic economies of married, cohabiting and single women are
unequal. The differences between these groups of women are further borne out in
an analysis of fertility and contraceptive practices. Married women are
consistently more successful in all spheres of action than other women; they are
better educated, more financially secure, more efficient contraceptors, and are more
highly respected. The cohabiting and single women began their reproductive
careers earlier, are less well educated, poorer, and less likely to be contracepting
efficiently.

These differences between women resident in AVC are related to the broader
issues concerning the construction of gender in Brazilian culture; traditional
expectations dictate that women are required to be repositories of virtue, and men
sexually aggressive. With the erosion of these traditions which confine them to
their homes, women make easy prey for men. The pattern of family formation and
fertility is seen as an outcome of the development of rapid urbanization, associated
social changes, and the clash of these developments with a cultural heritage that
is repressive for women, especially those who are darker skinned.
SAVED ASKAR MOUSAVI, The Hazaras of Afghanistan: An Historical, Cultural, Economic and Political Study. D.Phil.

The Hazaras are one of several ethnic groups inhabiting Afghanistan. Today they may be found living in regions throughout Afghanistan, although the majority still inhabit the areas of Central Afghanistan traditionally inhabited by them and known as the ‘Hazarajat’. The map of Afghanistan no longer includes an area actually called the Hazarajat, so that an accurate description and demarcation of it in today’s geography of Afghanistan is somewhat difficult. But the Hazarajat is generally considered to cover the three central provinces of Afghanistan, Bamiyan, Orozgan and Ghour, and parts of Herat, Farah, Kandahar, Ghazni, Parwan, Baghlan and Balkh.

The Hazaras are Muslim, and Shia in the majority. They speak Farsi, though with their own particular accent known as the ‘Hazaragi’ dialect. Their ethnic origins are as yet uncertain and under debate, despite their obvious Turkic–Mogholi features they are of mixed ethnic composition, and of quite ancient origin. In terms of numbers they form the second largest ethnic group in Afghanistan. However, as a consequence of the discriminatory and segregationist policies of ruling Pashtun–Afghan governments, they remain politically, economically and socially the most underdeveloped group in Afghanistan society. Due to their geopolitical location inside Afghanistan, they were able to live virtually autonomously until the 1890s, after which date they were ruthlessly subjugated. Their resurgence during the 1980s highlighted the potentially determining position enjoyed by the Hazaras, along with their defensive potential in the face of an invading army.

The study of the Hazaras of Afghanistan is not only of interest to the specialist, but provides the best introduction to the study of Afghanistan in general. Its location at the centre of Afghanistan not only accords geopolitical significance to the Hazarajat, but also provides its inhabitants with a unique cultural and tribal heritage. Just as Afghanistan is located at the crossroads of Asia and is often referred to as the ‘heart of Asia’, so it would not be inappropriate to compare the relationship of the Hazaras to Afghanistan with that of the heart to the body.

The study of an isolated people and society, such as the Hazaras, is bound to be fraught with complexities. At the same time, because of the very socio-political system holding power in Afghanistan the study of the Hazaras had until recently been discouraged to the extent that they have remained unknown, as a people, to many of their fellow countrymen. The very presence of such complexities and obstacles, however, render such a study ever more exciting, enlightening and desirable, though frustrating and sad. This study is by way of an effort in the direction of redressing the present intellectual imbalance. In the following pages I have adopted an entirely new approach to the study of the Hazaras and have undertaken a discussion of issues which may prove controversial. As we say in Farsi ‘the truth is bitter’, and I fear that under the present circumstances I may be accused of bearing bitter fruit.
The thesis is divided into seven chapters, plus an introduction and a conclusion, making in all nine chapters. The introduction provides the point of entry to our discussion by raising issues and questions which will be addressed throughout the rest of the text; issues such as the problem of 'national identity' in Afghanistan, or changing the name of Khorasan to Afghanistan. The introduction also provides the theoretical framework underlying the new approach, through which alone in my opinion, it is possible to comprehend and gain access to the Hazara people and their society, and to Afghanistan. The general background and questions outlined here pre-empt the correct reading and understanding of the chapters which follow, with the aim of pointing the reader in the right direction towards finding the answers to the questions posed.

Chapter one deals with the debate on the origin of the Hazaras. Although this debate has up to now followed a traditional line of enquiry, here I have attempted to classify the various existing views, to summarize critically each in turn, and finally to arrive at a new conclusion. Debates on the origins of all human groups are on the whole based largely on non-verifiable suppositions, and rarely lend themselves to finite conclusions. What I hope to have achieved here is to arrive, by looking critically at existing theories, at a more plausible view.

Chapter two looks at the cultural and social structure of the Hazaras, discussing religion, language, art, social structure, population and geographical location. Here I have taken a critical look especially at the views currently held on the religion, population and geographical location of the Hazaras, in order to propose a new understanding of the significance of these factors. Chapter three looks at the socio-political relations and mode of production of Hazara society. Here I consider agriculture, animal husbandry, commerce, and industry in the Hazarajat, and go on to outline and analyse the socio-economic changes that have taken place in Hazara society over approximately the last one hundred years.

Chapter four, which covers the most important and influential period in the recent social history of the Hazaras, looks at the socio-political transformation which has taken place since the tragic events of the 1890s, analysing their causes and consequences. Here, I review three existing analyses of these events, highlighting the particular weaknesses and shortcomings of the first two theories.

Chapter five looks at the social changes in Hazara society after the events of the 1890s, studying in particular Hazara communities which have formed outside of Afghanistan since that time. Chapter six moves on to look at the development of Hazara society between 1919 and 1978, revealing the tragic conditions endured by the Hazaras during these years; conditions the extent of which will come as a surprise even to many people in Afghanistan itself.

Chapter seven, which is the last major chapter of the thesis, reviews and analyses the social conditions, changes and developments in Hazara society, the new role of the Hazaras in the struggle for resistance which has been taking place since 1978, and the totally unexpected resurgence of the Hazaras since that time as one of the most significant political parties active in determining the future shape of Afghanistan. Finally, the conclusion firstly provides a summary of the
principal issues discussed, and secondly outlines the importance and indeed necessity of the study of the Hazaras, emphasizing particularly the significant role to be played by them in the future of Afghanistan.

LIDIA DINA SCIAMA, Relations between Centre and Periphery in the City of Venice: A Study of Venetian Life in a Lagoon Island. D.Phil. (Thesis restricted until June 1997.)

This thesis is an anthropological study of the island of Burano and of its interaction with Venice. In the first part I analyse economic and cultural factors that characterized Venice's modernization and examine the reasons why industrial development in the internal coast of the Venetian gulf is now generally viewed as the main cause of the city's environmental problems. Due to its position near the north-eastern margins of the lagoon, Burano, which is often described as 'an island of fishermen and lacemakers', was at first excluded both from the benefits and from the disturbing changes brought about by industrialization. However, at present its inhabitants fully share in the consequences of pollution and the decay of architectural fabric that have affected Venice's historical centre. Buranelli's negotiations with the city's bureaucrats are often conducted in a defensive manner, and, while they generally take pride in being Venetian, they at the same time hold a strong sense of a separate collective identity, and they often express a feeling of difference, especially, as they maintain, in their attitudes to kinship and to social and family structure.

In the second part of the thesis I examine the history of Burano's lacemaking. The nature of relations between the craftswomen and their managers, mostly from outside the island, illustrates ways in which the organizers aspired to exercise full control over the workers' sexuality as well as over their productive activity. Discipline was largely based on a strong emphasis on 'shame'. For the Buranelli, however, 'shame' is not conceived of as a counterpart to 'conscience', but is itself one of its manifestations—since it derives from strong internalization and awareness of religious and behavioural norms. Although, by combining a patriarchal outlook with Christian attitudes to female virtue, the enforcement of shame apparently aided the men's control over their wives and daughters, pressure on the women to behave according to norms imposed from outside the island ultimately undermined the men's self-esteem.

Gradually, since World War Two, Burano's lacemakers have largely dispensed with the mediation of outsiders and of conventual institutions and have successfully entered an international lace market. Nevertheless, memories of past poverty, exploitation and shame have acquired a strong political dimension, and still frequently affect the islanders' relations with Venice. The Buranelli's rejection of earlier hegemonies thus shows how, in societies in which honour is a prominent value, isolation and poverty, as well as awareness of others' negative
perceptions of their sexual behaviour, may all be contributing factors in the formation of collective identities.


This monograph is based upon one year of anthropological fieldwork conducted in Malonje village, Zomba, Malawi during the period October 1988 to October 1989. During the course of this fieldwork I collected over 500 verbal art texts of which, at present, over 420 have been transcribed from tape, translated, and provided with exegetical commentary. Almost all of these have been performed by women. None of them have ever been committed to print. That is, this corpus of texts comprises an oral tradition.

This thesis concentrates upon an analysis of the poetical forms of the texts, indigenous conceptions of their generic classification, their mode of performance in specific social contexts, and what modes of thought (derived from statements and ideas about contextual appropriateness, performative style, content and aesthetic evaluation) may be manifested in such examples of verbal artistry. All of these aspects indeed occur within a wider world of social, economic and political forces which are both mirrored in the content of these texts but also affect the social composition of their performance. In other words, these poetical forms are part and parcel of the everyday life of the village, its political structure, its economic needs and its system(s) of belief.

The main purpose of this study is to examine how the verbal artistry contained in the corpus of Malonje sung poetry is expressed, in what ways it embodies a system of poetics, and how it is conceived and practised by those who perform it. All of the texts provided as examples in order to demonstrate various points made in the main body of the thesis are excerpts from full compositions transcribed from tapes of their actual rendition in performance. Attention to their exactness of transcription has been emphasized in order to highlight the creative impulses, innovative quirks of fancy, and performative vagaries of live public renditions of verbal art works, which, if left to ‘cleaned up’ and condensed versions acceptable to implicit Western aesthetic tastes, might otherwise, indeed would, miss out on how the creative process is engendered by and takes place in actual performance.

In fact, regional divergences such as the pronunciation of ‘w’ in place of the characteristic dental fricative ‘w’ have been retained if rendered in such a way during live performance. In like manner ungrammaticalities have been faithfully recorded and represented in transcription. Extratextual insertions having nothing to do with the main body of the verbal art work but everything to do with its performance have also been included. The full compositions from which these examples have been excerpted along with their exegeteses are supplied in an appendix provided for each chapter.
Malonje village is multiethnic and bilingual. This fact derives in part from the propinquity of the village to the former colonial seat of political power (indeed, the Malawian Parliament still convenes in Zomba at certain times of the year), its historical prominence as a crossroads to different migrating ethnic groups, and its inclusion in a major population zone recording the highest population density in Malawi. Therefore, it should come as no surprise that the oral texts collected from this village have been rendered for the most part (a few have been sung in Arabic and Chilomwe) in the two major regional languages, Chinyanja and Chiyao. In many instances these songs may be expressed in both languages during the same performance. For example, a folk narrative told to an audience of mixed ethnic background in Chinyanja may (and usually does) feature songs sung by the main protagonists of the story in Chiyao, this in spite of carrying on dramatic dialogue in the former language.

The content of this corpus of sung poetry is wide in scope as well as diverse. As this region of Malawi has served as migration route and settling point for several ethnic groups the provenance of many of the texts collected has been from elsewhere in the region. For instance, several waves of Yao migrants/refugees from Mozambique have settled in Malonje village over the past few decades. Mention is made in songs to the war raging on the other side of the nearby border from whence some of the recorded singers have fled. Other current topics such as literacy, women’s development and AIDS are mentioned in these texts as well as the enduring topics of witchcraft, sorcery, kin relations, marriage, migrant labour, and endemic hunger. Views of everyday life and the pressing concerns of the contemporary Malawian world all find their place in the content and idiom of poetic expression as voiced by the people of Malonje village.
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BOOK REVIEWS


David Napier’s previous book, *Masks, Transformation, and Paradox* (Berkeley, 1986), was a fascinating cross-cultural study of the iconography of the Gorgon head. The ideas it developed, and the impressive skill with which they were presented, suggested that Napier might successfully use the same approach in the study of Western art. *Foreign Bodies* is, in a sense, the anticipated sequel. Of its five chapters, one is concerned with the depiction of the Gorgon in ancient Greece, one with seventeenth-century Italian architecture, and two with contemporary art in the United States. However, the theme that tenuously links these essays is not (as it was in the earlier book) the significance of a single symbol in a variety of contexts, but rather the capacity (or incapacity) of a culture to incorporate what is alien to it—a subject that is explored in very literal (i.e. corporeal) terms in the two essays where the field of reference shifts from art to medicine.

Napier’s underlying thesis is that ‘as a culture, we set up rules that proscribe any experiential venture beyond what is already known’ and so distance ourselves from possibilities ‘that are actually quite close and readily available’ (p. xxv). The argument is developed throughout the book, but Napier is most persuasive when discussing contemporary art, particularly the refusal of the avant-garde to countenance any serious challenge to modern Western notions of individual authorship and property rights. Despite conscious identification with the ‘primitive’, avant-garde artists continue to place ‘their unique names in bold print at the base of each work’ thus revealing not only a ‘metaphysical concern with Platonic individuation and “naming”, but...the avulsion of individuals from objects in the environment that results from such thinking’ (p. 32).

Against the focus on the uniqueness of individual experience characteristic of the Western tradition are placed the ideals of ‘symbolic connectedness’ and ‘selective dissociation’. Napier argues that dissolving the distinction between the symbolic and the actual, or between metaphors and other forms of signification, contributes to selective dissociation—a loss of self which leads to engagement in a ‘complex and highly dynamic world of symbolic activity’ (p. 198). It is by no means clear how this takes place, and it might be argued that dissociation is more likely to be an impersonal than an interpersonal experience; but Napier, who shows little interest in the structure of the transpersonal or in the importance of communication, does not specify the conditions under which loss of self produces a corresponding gain in contact with others or even with the Other.

The conclusion that ‘there are observable dissociative processes...[that] are not the negation of self-consciousness, but the deliberate recreation of the self through the engaging of metaphors that enable us selectively and creatively to imagine’ (p. 199) may be vague, but the targets of Napier’s increasingly pointed essays are not.
Plato, Descartes, Freud and Reagan, the Judaeo-Christian tradition, monotheism and millennialism all become the focus of criticism as Napier seeks to explain the failure of artistic and therapeutic programmes in contemporary America. Whether one goes along with Napier’s argument is largely a matter of trust. No one is likely to be in a position to evaluate all that Napier says about topics as diverse as minimalist sculpture, Attic black-figure cups, Balinese ritual trance and the immune system of the human body, and for this reason it is important that his readers should feel that they are being given a balanced and accurate account of the subjects discussed. Unfortunately, Napier does not always inspire such confidence. The chapter on ‘Bernini’s Anthropology’ exemplifies the problem, and for this reason it is worth examining in some detail.

Napier observes that, when seen upside down, Bernini’s design for the piazza of St Peter’s is similar in shape to the wombs depicted on Gnostic gems. Following up the insight, Napier argues that this type of intaglio may have provided the formal symbolic design on which the piazza was based, and that the idea of employing the symbol may have been something that ‘Alexander VII and Bernini privately discussed before submitting their revised oval design for the Piazza to the Congregazione in March 1657’ (p. 119). The crucial steps in Napier’s argument are as follows. First, the French antiquarian Peiresc gave Rubens an intaglio depicting a womb with a key placed on an altar. Second, it is ‘a type of intaglio for which we have other examples’, such as the four in the British Museum (the only examples illustrated in Napier’s text), which also ‘depict an altar upon which stands a womb with a key’ (p. 119). Third, the meaning of these gems was known in the seventeenth century, so that Bernini, the Pope and their advisers could have appreciated the symbolic analogies between the womb and the piazza, between the key and the porch of St Peter’s, and between the altar and the church of St Peter’s. Fourth, the interpretation is transformed ‘from speculation to probable truth’ when one realizes that Peiresc knew Athanasius Kircher, an adviser to Alexander VII, and that Peiresc ‘could have had such an influence on the papacy and on the application of an intaglio to an architectural scheme’ (p. 126) since he had earlier interpreted a medal that influenced Bernini’s design for the baldachin in St Peter’s.

Napier’s juxtaposition of the intaglio and the piazza is a characteristically brilliant piece of observation, and, if one sets aside the general inadvisability of interpreting objects upside down and the fact that ovals and quadrilaterals were a commonplace of Roman baroque architecture, the argument is quite appealing. But on closer inspection it emerges that the sources are misrepresented, and that every stage of the argument depends on the omission of important evidence. First, the intaglio Peiresc gave to Rubens has not been found, but it was described by Peiresc. To say simply that it ‘depicts a womb with a key placed on an altar’ is highly misleading given that Peiresc describes a womb with butterflies’ wings (not mentioned by Napier) on an altar on which is depicted a cock and a phallus with legs (neither mentioned by Napier). Peiresc makes no mention of a key (although modern scholars infer that one was probably shown between the womb and the
altar), but he does describe the winged phallus, cock, and snail on the obverse of
the intaglio (which Napier does not). Secondly, no other examples of intaglios
showing a womb with a key placed on an altar are discussed in the sources to
which Napier refers because Peiresc’s intaglio is now considered to have been a
Renaissance fake (a fact Napier obscures). As the standard work, Campbell
Bonner’s Studies in Magical Amulets, Chiefly Graeco-Egyptian (Ann Arbor, 1950),
observes, ‘the fact that the vessel [womb] rests upon an altar and has wings
attached to it marks it as a forgery, because not one of the many genuine uterine
amulets has these characteristics’. Other faked intaglios showing a womb with a
key placed on an altar may perhaps exist, but none is mentioned in the literature.
The four genuine gems from the British Museum do not (as Napier claims) ‘depict
an altar upon which stands a womb with a key’: none shows an altar, and in the
source from which the illustration is taken they are clearly labelled as ‘uterus and
key symbol’. Thirdly, seventeenth-century collectors knew that the gems depicted
a womb, but Napier’s sources give no grounds for the belief that any correctly
recognized the key. The secondary literature is prudishly reticent on the topic, but
the correspondence between Rubens and Peiresc (to which Napier does not refer,
and presumably has not read) reveals that Rubens saw no key and that when he
wrote to Peiresc asking what was shown between the entrance of the womb and
the altar, Peiresc replied that, having compared the intaglio with others, he took
the lines beneath the womb (which modern scholars identify as a key) to represent
semen. The womb/key/altar symbol is thus a chimera: altars do not appear on the
genuine gems, and the key, which does, was not correctly identified in the
seventeenth century. Fourthly, since Peiresc died in 1637 (a fact Napier omits) his
potential influence on the papacy in 1657 was indirect. There is no reason to
suppose that he shared his passing interest in the intaglio with Kircher (whom he
had not yet met) but, should he have done so later, he would probably have
discussed it (as he did with Rubens) in connection with a bizarre theory about
snails and the female genitals—a line of speculation that was, as Rubens (no
prude) remarked, ‘quite indecent’. If therefore, as Napier imagines, Bernini and
the Pope discussed using Peiresc’s understanding of the intaglio as the basis for
the piazza, they would have spoken not of the symbolism of altars and keys, but
of snails, and butterflies’ wings, and of the divine, flying phallus.

It is easy to make slips in the handling of sources, and almost all icono-
graphical interpretation is highly speculative anyway, but Napier’s unwillingness
to distinguish fact from fantasy remains disquieting for it suggests an alarming
indifference to the trust a reader is required to place in an author—especially one
as daring, creative and wide-ranging as Napier himself.

MALCOLM BULL

This excellent book originated in an Oxford D.Phil. thesis supervised by John Campbell. The fieldwork was carried out in 1983 and 1984 in a remote village on the Aegean island of Naxos, and might have resulted in another local study of a "traditional" society. But Stewart was fortunate, as it turned out, in having an issue on which he wanted to focus: the role of exotiká, "demons". These demons did indeed prove to open the door to an understanding not only of "his" village, but of Greek culture more generally. Anthropologists will be pleased to see a book that combines proper fieldwork with a serious analysis of texts spanning a millennium and more (his texts range impressively from ninth-century ecclesiastical manuscripts from Mt Athos to reports by nineteenth-century travellers and twentieth-century folklorists). Historians will welcome the book for its contribution to their investigations of mentalité.

The first two chapters offer an introductory ethnography of Naxos and of Stewart's village, Apefranthos, which acts as a general orientation for those not familiar with modern Greece. Stewart sketches the socio-economic setting, the configuration of gender-roles, and the local saints and festivals that form the religious framework within which he places the exotiká. In this and the other ethnographic sections of the book, Stewart displays an attractive openness as to how he went about getting information, and about the precise contexts in which people told him things. We think, for example, of the occasion on which a close acquaintance, somewhat under the influence of alcohol in the small hours, produced on a cigarette box a sketch of his standing in relation to heaven and hell; the sketch is quite rightly reproduced (p. 114). This technique not only makes for anecdotal vividness, it also allows the reader to assess the quality of what is reported.

The principal argument of the book, broached in chapter 3, is that the exotiká are to be seen not as an area of folklore or quaint superstitious belief, but as powers that have to be interpreted in the context of Orthodox Christianity. In other words, the often malevolent demons are manifestations of the Devil, as saints mediate the power of God. In pursuit of this argument Stewart rejects the pervasive assumption that the exotiká are part of folk/popular, in contrast to official, religious belief. He argues, surely rightly, for the interrelationship between official, doctrinal religion and local practices, and thus gives proper weight to a historical analysis of Orthodox traditions about the Devil and to official Church rituals and texts. From the point of view of the villagers there are not separate great and little traditions, but only their one tradition.

This is an attractive argument, which has much to be said for it. We are, however, a little worried that the case is pressed too hard. As Stewart admits (pp. 159-61), the case works best at a macrocosmic level, while at a local level exotiká
can grant favours to people (as saints can) and saints can be invoked by means of spells (as exotiká can). The hardline folklorist would perhaps suggest that the suggested relationship between the macrocosmic and microcosmic is not obviously supported by the fieldwork presented here and seems rather arbitrary: that is, the link between exotiká and the Devil is much less close and tidy than Stewart argues it is.

Another problem is that Stewart does not raise questions about the exotiká in light of his analysis of gender relations within the village (pp. 66-75). For example, he states that the stories could be told to mixed or even wholly male audiences (p. 108), but most of his actual informants seem to have been women. We wonder if anything more could have been made of this, along the lines of James Taggart's *Enchanted Maidens: Gender Relations in Spanish Folktales of Courtship and Marriage* (Princeton, 1990), a book cited by Stewart. Then there are several important issues on the conceptual level. First, Stewart proposes that Greek ideology exhibits two levels, one of religious authority, and the other of political and military power, but does not follow through on this suggestion with respect to our understanding of the position of women. Second, his suggestion that 'the community of nereids represents an imaginary social structure that reverses the position of women and men alike' (p. 177) requires further comment, given that nereids are clearly both female and destructive, attacking young women and babies (pp. 173-6), and often harming or killing the men with whom they dance or have intercourse (pp. 4, 175). (On this latter point, Stewart does not remark on the particularly interesting reversal of the positive macrocosmic relationship of God and a mortal woman, resulting in the virgin birth of Christ, and the negatively regarded microcosmic unions of nereids and mortal men, which can also produce unusual children (p. 175).) Finally, it is rather striking that the great majority of the exotiká (neuter plural) are in fact groups of monstrous females (see Stewart's useful list in his appendix 1), with a minority of (mainly) singular males. John Gould (*Journal of Hellenic Studies*, Vol. C (1980), p. 56) has noted the existence of such collective female monsters in ancient Greece as something requiring comment. We mention this here, not necessarily to suggest continuity, but to note a similar and in both cases asymmetrical pattern.

The wider context of belief in exotiká is also depicted. Stewart acknowledges that today 'public interest in these demons appears to be on the wane' (p. 108) and notes that most of his informants were older people, who themselves often set their stories a generation or more back. Here the issue of great and little traditions recurs. Educated Greeks, and the official line of the Church, reject exotiká as primitive superstitions. Apéiranthos is not immune to such attitudes: many villagers have emigrated to Athens and risen in society, but maintain links with their ancestral village (many have registered to vote there, and many return each summer). Those who have stayed are naturally influenced by the attitudes of a class to which they may aspire. As Stewart argues, this Gramscian explanation in terms of hegemony is indeed more satisfactory than conventional explanations in
terms of individual rationality and the superiority of models drawn from natural science.

*Demons and the Devil* operates admirably both at the village level (of Apeiranthos and of other places for which records survive) and at the broader Greek level (both in terms of social class and of religious organization). The *exotiká* can no longer be seen as a topic of marginal importance. But like most anthropologists and folklorists of Greece Stewart operates with the assumption that Greek culture is impermeable to the outside world. He does, like Margaret Alexiou, trace elements of his picture over long stretches of time, but only in relation to one minor motif (human sacrifice at the foundation of a building) does he admit the possibility of diffusion of tales (p. 89). Is the association of modern Greek nereids with water to be explained simply in relation to the fact that classical Greek nereids were water nymphs? Or should one rather note the prevalent connection between women and water. In the world of the Grimms’ fairy tales, for example, fire belongs to men, and water, especially in wells and streams, appertains exclusively to women (see Ruth B. Bottigheimer’s *Grimms’ Bad Girls and Bold Boys: The Moral and Social Vision of the Tales* (New Haven and London, 1987), pp. 24-35). Closer to Greece, it would also be very valuable if Greek anthropologists paid some attention to Turkey (difficult though that is because of the barriers of modern nationalisms). The world described earlier this century, especially in Asia Minor, in Richard Dawkins’s *Modern Greek in Asia Minor* (Cambridge, 1916) and in Frederick Hasluck’s *Christianity and Islam under the Sultans* (Oxford, 1929) was destroyed by the fiasco of the Greek invasion of Turkey and the exchange of populations of 1922–23, but before then there was a wealth of creative borrowings from Turkey (Stewart notes (p. 62) the shadow-puppet character Karangiózis). How many of the *exotiká* were common currency for Greeks and Turks alike? And how far in the ‘lingua franca’ of the Levant was the *gorgóna*, half-woman and half-fish, which may attack ships at sea, calqued upon ‘frankish’ (European) ideas of mermaids? These are questions to which there may be no answers, but it is one of many merits of this stimulating book that it turns one’s mind to an even broader canvas.

**SIMON PRICE and LUCIA NIXON**


This collection of essays sets out a bold agenda for the anthropology of contemporary Pakistan. As its editors argue, earlier ethnography of Pakistan had become peculiarly limited in its regional and theoretical scope. Until recently, the
mainstream anthropology of the country was preoccupied with the Pakhtun peoples of the North-West Frontier Province, its theoretical capital locked into once vital but increasingly wearisome debates about tribal segmentary politics and agnatic rivalry. The neglect of rural communities elsewhere, notably in the Punjab and Sindh, precluded intellectual dialogue with other South Asian anthropologists, hindering the development of any regionally specific social theory appropriate to Pakistan’s Islamic cultures. More surprisingly, few anthropologists working in Pakistan had addressed its major social and economic transformations effected through massive labour migration and urban expansion occurring within the country’s turbulent history of less than half a century. It is on these neglected issues of migration and urbanization, with particular reference to problems of communal identity engendered by demographic displacement, that the ten essays of this innovative volume resolutely concentrate.

The magnitude of migration to Pakistan’s urban centres is most visibly manifest in shanty-town squatter settlements (katchi abadi) around such cities as Karachi. Two Dutch anthropologists, Frits Selier and Jan van der Linden, report on their recent surveys of refugee housing in such settlements, drawing upon a major research programme on this topic at the Free University of Amsterdam. Both authors provide valuable information about migrants’ personal and collective strategies in investing in such illegal housing, although their stark sociometric approach might have been rendered more comprehensible with greater reference to indigenous explanations of the rational life-choices they ascribe to urban refugees. Their essays do, however, highlight many interesting questions—about the variable deployment of housing as symbolic and material capital in contexts of status insecurity—that other urban anthropologists might pursue.

Status preoccupations among urban migrants are also the subject of Michael Fischer’s ambitious essay on marriage choice in Greentown, Lahore. Composed of refugees and rural migrants, the residents of this new community have had to reconstruct traditional networks of kinship and affinity within a social universe of strangers. In contrast to common realliances among kin groups in rural Sindh, Fischer reports an avoidance of marriage with affinal relatives in Greentown, indicating a novel strategy of dispersed alliance coexisting with close cousin marriage. Following local explanations of marriage choice in terms of relative family ‘honour’ (izzat), Fischer isolates this notion as a ‘primary cultural parameter’ of social status, ultimately reducible to an index of ‘control’ over dependents, which he argues is open to increasing ambiguity in the evaluation of marriages between strangers. Patterns of in-marriage and out-marriage in Greentown are thereby related to alternative strategies of consolidating existing prestige or gambling on its increment, by respectively reducing or exploiting such status ambiguities. Despite this intriguing use of informational models of ambiguity, Fischer’s general argument does seem flawed by his gross reductive treatment of the moral discourse of ‘honour’. As we learn in Jan van der Linden’s earlier essay, the notion of izzat embraces incommensurate qualities of appropriate modesty and self-respect—‘something in the heart that cannot be seen’—as much
as overt status, prestige or power. Like comparable notions of honour in the Mediterranean, the rhetorically versatile discourse of izzat may be employed equally to deflate or reinforce status pretensions, of which manifest ‘control’ over dependents is only one aspect of a compound moral evaluation. Yet Fischer is to be commended for foregrounding the significance of such reputational notions that match status in the language of honour, which clearly demands further research in Pakistan.

Broader perspectives on migration in the economic and political history of Pakistan are presented in two synoptic essays by Omar Noman and Hamza Alavi. Noman provides a masterly overview of the complex effects of labour migration to the Gulf states in recent years, when as many as two million migrant workers were contributing in remittances as much as 15 per cent of Pakistan’s GNP. Hamza Alavi’s rigorously argued essay—on shifting coalitions of interest and patronage underlying the emergence of increasingly violent ethnic politics in Sindh—similarly illuminates the highly complex and contentious manoeuvres of regional separatist movements in Pakistan.

Other contributions treat processes of migration and urbanization as an explanatory background for examining specific cultural institutions characteristic of modern Pakistani society. Pnina Werbner’s chapter on ‘Factionalism and Violence in British Pakistani Communal Politics’ manages to make analytical sense of the highly personalized and volatile constellations of local-level ‘party gamesmanship’ (patti bazi), endemic in all Pakistani urban communities, through a subtle combination of Barthian game theory and Mancunian network analysis. Wenonah Lyon’s study of the social stratification of medical practice in Lahore, derived from fieldwork in the same community of Greentown treated by Michael Fischer, also brings ethnographic light to a practically applied problem: the declining response of this community to a subsidized medical clinic, which she relates to a mismatch of status expectations in the interactions of doctors and their patients. In explicating this breakdown in the symbolic rather than technical communication of medical knowledge, Lyon shows that the urban poor, while universally respecting Western allopathic medicine in preference to traditional Asian techniques of healing, regard it as a material stock of pharmaceutical ‘cures’ rather than as a clinically Informed regime of curing; hence the professional qualifications of doctors are considered secondary to the kind of goods they proffer and the manner of status interaction through which their clinical seances are conducted. A further reading of her well-documented case material might also suggest that the most valued material tokens of medical care (pills, saline drips and injections) have been absorbed by the urban poor into their own petty-gift economy of reciprocal favours and services, comparable to similar small tokens of sympathy and celebration exchanged at rites of passage.

Finally, there are several informative chapters examining the significance of Islam in the light of Pakistan’s contemporary social and political upheavals. Saifur Rahman Sherani’s ‘Ulema and Pir in the Politics of Pakistan’ analyses the significance of spiritual ‘masters’ (pir) in popular politics, exploring the
problematic relationship of these mystical leaders to orthodox preceptors of Islam (the *ulema*), as well as the extraordinary electoral powers they command through the votes of their devotees. Akbar Ahmed’s chapter, on the infamous Hawkes Bay incident of millenarian mass suicide in 1983, documents the potentially cataclysmic powers of Shiite spirituality, latently rooted in a sectarian ideology of martyrdom but triggered by conditions of social instability, here related to overseas labour migration. A contrastively irreverent approach to Islam is given in Hanzia Alavi’s passionate diatribe on behalf of his beleaguered sisters against Pakistan’s religious leaders as ‘custodians of ignorance’ and malicious ‘mischief-makers’ in their repression of women’s freedom. Alavi is an unabashed progressive rationalist who has little patience with ideological or scholarly apologies for Islam’s patriarchal gender relations, and he certainly presents a horrifying catalogue of violent abuses against women under Islamic legislation. Yet his humane and forthright convictions sadly pre-empt understanding of the evident appeal of resurgent Islam to so many women as well as men in contemporary Pakistan. Nevertheless, his outspoken defence of the embattled women’s movement in his country is properly included in this collection, which gives its readers a multifaceted perspective on the many social, moral and practical dilemmas that now confront Pakistan.

Although only a few chapters in this diverse book fully achieve the theoretical and comparative promise of the editors’ introductory essay, all valuably contribute to a vital display of interlocking research programmes entailed in the still nascent anthropology of modern Pakistan. Given the dearth of recent ethnography on this country, and in view of the global significance of processes of migration and urbanization that it exemplifies, *Economy and Culture in Pakistan* provides an indispensable contemporary ethnographic guide to a region of great importance in the developing world.

PETER PARKES


Although having the same title as Nirad Chaudhuri’s recent volume, Western’s book is very different from that cultural memoir. Having started apparently as a social geographical project, it uses interviews with a number of Barbadian Londoners. The older generation had been recruited in the 1950s by London Transport and the NHS; now self-consciously almost middle-class, their children either professionals or in business, they give a powerful and moving account of settlement in Britain. Belying the Bajan reputation for humourlessness and prickly sensitivity, Western’s informants recall in wryly ironic idiom their early struggles for housing (in the time of Rachman), for job promotion (before the Race
Relations Acts) and personal acceptance (at the time of the Notting Hill riots). They describe the way in which they now identify themselves as British: like the Nuer (or anyone else), segmentary categorization places them as Bajan relative to Jamaican, as West Indian relative to Asian, as Black relative to English, and as British against the rest.

Deliberately selected by Western as ‘successful’ people, they are hardly representative of Black Britons—certainly more ambitious, perhaps more conservative, and with a qualified approval of Margaret Thatcher, having a distrust of ‘Brixton’ and ‘the wrong type of West Indian’. They are ambivalent about affirmative action and even about the annual carnival. Yet they are hardly parochial snobs, even if they now live in the suburbs and their thoughts have turned to flower gardening, shopping malls, the education of their grandchildren, and even, in one case, golf. The geographical aspects (of housing, movement within London, areas for work, of friendships and return holidays) are not over-emphasized and the book is refreshingly engaged, albeit at times rather under-theorized. Is there anything special about Barbadians—the ‘Little Englanders’ of Caribbean satire—compared, say, to Jamaicans or small islanders? Perhaps some valuing of education, ‘good behaviour’, self-discipline, self-sufficiency and entrepreneurship—what is generally described in the Commonwealth Caribbean as ‘respectability’? And what can we say of those who failed—racism, happenstance or personality? Does it make sense to describe Bajans as being successful in Britain, Jamaicans as having failed? Is there a Bajan struggling to get out of every Jamaican? Or the reverse? Or both?

Western’s warmly engaged book claims to offer no more than people’s own self-presentations. And he does this very well indeed, allowing his own liberal values, professional interests and ethnicity (White English, American domiciled) to provide a sympathetic sounding-board for his informants. The ironies of Black British experience are brilliantly illustrated in his reproduction of a Punch cartoon from July 1982. Over the garden fence of an obsessively neat suburban house, a rather prim elderly White couple inquire of their Black neighbours (similar age, similar house, similar appearance, he in tie and sleeveless pullover, shirt sleeves neatly rolled up, patiently watering his flower bed, she knitting demurely beside him in a deck-chair, their tortoise basking on the trimmed lawn): ‘We’re sorry to bother you, but Dorothy and I are rather concerned as to whether or not you will be rioting this summer?’

ROLAND LITTLEWOOD
PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED


ARNOLD, DAVID, *Colonizing the Body: State Medicine and Epidemic Disease in Nineteenth Century India*, Berkeley etc.: University of California Press 1993. xii, 354 pp., Index, Bibliography, Glossary, Figures, Tables. $45.00/$18.00.


Borec [Revija Zgodovino in Antropologijo], nos. 5-7, 8-10 (1993).


Brock, Peggy, *Outback Ghettos: Aborigines, Institutionalisation and Survival* (Studies in Australian History; ser. eds. Alan Gilbert, Patricia Grimshaw and Peter Spearritt), Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 1993. x, 180 pp., Select Bibliography, Index, Maps, Photographs. £30.00/£49.95.


Critique of Anthropology, Vol. XII, no. 4 (December 1993).


DAVIS-FLOYD, ROBBIE E., *Birth as an American Rite of Passage* (Comparative Studies of Health Systems and Medical Care), Berkeley etc.: University of California Press 1993. xii, 382 pp., Index, References, Tables. $14.00.

286 Publications Received


REDDY, G. PRKASH, *Danes are Like That! Perspectives of an Indian Anthropologist on the Danish Society*, Morke, Denmark: Grevas 1993. 172 pp., References, Plates. No price given.


STEINER, CHRISTOPHER B., African Art in Transit, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 1994. xv, 220 pp., References, Index, Maps, Photographs. £35.00/$16.95/$54.95/$19.95.


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