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Introduction

Terms of reference commonly used to identify peoples in history, such as 'nation', 'state', 'ethnicity' and 'community', have of late acquired a renewed importance for anthropology. On the right relation of these terms rests much of the attempt to reformulate our subject as a central contribution to the study of complex societies. This is not a new aspiration. But it has been given new urgency and possibility by the volatile activities of ethnic and religious groups in contemporary societies, which have renewed consciousness both of the artificiality of the political units and structures in which we live, and of the relatively recent construction of these units in Europe, as elsewhere. This consciousness has come at the very time that kindred subjects, such as population studies and economic and social history, have been exploring the possibility that analyses based more closely on the institutions and values of particular communities and cultures may have greater explanatory power than the large, standard units - typically nation-states - commonly used hitherto. The way European history is written has begun to change accordingly.¹ There is thus at

¹ The impact of local history, especially following the stimulus of historical demography, may be seen in a wide range of 'macro-level' analyses, from the primarily demographic (Coale and Watkins 1986) to those addressed to major social and economic transformations (Aston and Philpin 1985).

I am grateful to the Wellcome Trust and the American Council of Learned Societies for supporting the research on which this paper is based.
at present a potent intellectual, as well as topical, stimulus for anthropological collaboration on the nature of collective identities and their transformations over time.

Anthropology is not, of course, the simple beneficiary of these trends. It is itself a field of Western historiography which came into prominence in the nineteenth century in conjunction with the two main configurations called into question by the developments just mentioned: the ideological sanctity of the nation-state, and the idea that all countries should progress according to models of rapid economic growth. To the first, anthropology made important contributions in the form of cultural materials with which nationalism could be fashioned, for example, folklore, philology and evolutionary theories of man's social and biological development, as well as in connection with colonial administration. With regard to the second, anthropology has long shared in a wider, instrumental attitude to culture which sees differences between peoples as a consequence of characteristic historical solutions to practical problems, for example in relations between the sexes, or in the organisation of labour. As Sahlins remarks (1976), this attitude is a founding and reductive impulse underlying the subject from the nineteenth-century evolutionists to Malinowski and into the post-war era.

As both the cohesion of ethnic and national entities and the panacea of modernisation have come increasingly into question, the ambivalent position of anthropology - on the one hand, championing the causes of particular peoples while, on the other, seeking a role in the lucrative business of development studies - has been increasingly exposed to view. Anthropology's role in the creation of collective identities, past and present, deserves further scrutiny. This article considers a positive side of anthropology's nineteenth-century legacy in the field of ethnic and state formation. My procedure will be to examine in depth the accuracy of the view which Jacob Burckhardt (1958), perhaps anthropology's most distinguished forebear in this field of study, put forward of Machiavelli's History of Florence. The interest of Machiavelli's analysis is not only that it provides a model discussion of the role of kin and related vital systems in the formation of states which stands up very well to what recent anthropology and historical demography have to say about renaissance Italy; central to his History is a thesis which has been presented of late (pace Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983; Chatterjee 1986) as an anthropological contribution breaking new ground in the study of nationalism and state formation, viz., the analysis of nations and states as imagined communities, seeming fabrications and ideological constructs.

The stage is set by a brief review of the common ground between recent social anthropology and the historical study of nationalism. Both stress that collective identities are selective and artificial constructs. Both incline to a critical attitude, especially as the history of peoples' 'self-determination' often

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2 On Burckhardt's anthropological contribution see Kroeber (1952: 144-51).
suggests that identities are purpose-built for the interests of elite groups. When the debris left by such deconstructions are cleared away, a second point emerges: central to the seeming artifice of ethnic and national identities are matters in which anthropologists have long specialised, notably peoples' use of vital relations in marriage, kinship and natural symbolism as an idiom with which to determine group composition and legitimate identity.

The theme of seeming artifice which unites recent approaches finds a common progenitor in the figure of Jacob Burckhardt, the nineteenth-century cultural historian still recognised for establishing renaissance Italy as the veritable fount of Western culture. Historians, philosophers and others continue to follow Burckhardt in assigning to renaissance Florence three fundamental developments in Western historiography: the transition to the modern idea of the state, the transition from chronicle writing to history, and the emergence of statistical records as arbiters of group identity over time (Burckhardt 1958: 95ff. and 247-51). One of the questions which interested Burckhardt was how it was possible for the Florentines to take these steps in the fraught context of the petty tyrannies, precarious republics and greater dynasties of the time, in which cities and states (Florence, Venice, Lucca, Pisa etc.) were more or less continuously at war. Or, as we might phrase it now: how did the idea of the modern state and its history first emerge from a context of ethnic rivalries?

This prologue leads on to the storia itself, in the Florentine version which Machiavelli completed in 1527 (1977b). I have focussed on his account for three reasons which mirror the three developments just mentioned. First, the theory of the state to which Burckhardt refers is, of course, Machiavelli's. Secondly, Machiavelli's History was written after, and in the light of, his principal essay on the state, The Discourses of 1517 (1977a), and it is now regarded as interesting historiographically for catching contemporary changes in the methods and purposes of history-writing in mid-transition (Philips 1979). Thirdly, the History is in essential respects a record of families. Florence is shown to be composed of them and of the factions and classes made up and led by certain of them. The story of Florence consists of alliances and dissensions articulated by marriages, deaths, departures and returns, and new generations. The story is told replete with vital imagery. It is therefore appropriate to assess Machiavelli's account (and thereby Burckhardt's) by comparing it with the historical demography and ethnography of Florentine family systems on the basis of the statistical and genealogical records which Machiavelli and his contemporaries kept.

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3 On the transition to modern political concepts, see the summary remarks by Skinner (1978: II, 349-54); on historiography, Wilcox 1969; on statistics, Volle 1980.
1. 'The State as a Work of Art'

Why do the nations so furiously rage together,  
And why do the people imagine a vain thing?  

Psalms 2: 1

Although the relation between two of the above-mentioned terms - ethnicity and state - now seems to excite most interest, the leit-motiv of this relation remains the cult of national identity, or nationalism, a nineteenth-century invention. Nationalism proposes a number of criteria as incumbent in national membership and as legitimising the claims of national movements which ethnographers have recognised in the self-definition of groups more generally. These criteria come in varying combinations, according to case: common birthright, elaborated in terms of blood, race or other symbolism of natural and vital processes; common language, territory or longstanding historical association, pointing possibly to autochthonous origins; identification of the individual with the collective good, such that group betterment is the product of individual moral agency; and investment of criteria such as these with intrinsic and sacred significance. Nationalism transforms these conventions by projecting them on a large scale, claiming that groups so constituted have, automatically and everywhere, the right to self-determination.

Much scholarly energy has been devoted to deconstructing theories of self-determination. The impression which first emerges from the many attempts to step back and compare histories of ethnic and national populations is of the great vanity of this concept. First, there is futility: in most cases these populations do not attain the statehood 'promised' by nationalism (Gellner 1983: 43ff; Kedourie 1961: 99-101). Secondly, there is conceit: the argument that self-determination derives from transcendental sources (natural right, divine sanction) or primordial ones (autochthonous origin, linguistic purity, ancient enmity) is also a glorification and may appear to place the legitimacy of national and ethnic identities beyond discussion. The third impression is of insubstantiality. The right to ethnic and national self-determination is claimed usually by some part of a population, often privileged.

Legacies of the period of European imperial expansion and contraction provide familiar examples of ways in which advantaged groups may be created: administrative and military castes drawn selectively from local populations; radical differences between families and communities consequent upon the unequal colonial development of local resources; the division of cultural allegiances between parochial interests and the European metropole; and the division of peoples by a crazy quilt-work of colonial-cum-national boundaries. Where criteria of territory, descent and privilege have proved historically pliable, claims to transcendental and primordial

4 Kedourie (1961) gives a concise review; for more recent discussion, see Anderson 1983 and Chatterjee 1986.
rights are likely to appear cynical. Indeed if peoples' identities are bound up in particular historical divisions, histories and anti-histories, they could as well be described as formed out of mutual dependence as by self-determination. But if avowed self-determination is so transparently vain in all these ways, we are even further from an explanation of why people should imagine themselves thus with so much energy through so much of history.

Pointing out the historicity of ethnic and national bodies does not put an end to the matter, since whatever historical trappings people adopt, their faiths, grievances and perceived room for manoeuvre become constraints in terms of which they live. And it becomes necessary for them to conceive a course of action or rationale, however contrived, for dealing with these constraints. Some are perhaps more grandiose, and harmful, than others. As Burckhardt says:

> The modern political spirit, surrendered freely to its own instincts, often displays [the] worst features of an unbridled egotism, outraging every right, and killing every germ of a healthier culture. But wherever this vicious tendency is overcome or in any way compensated a new fact appears in history - the State as the outcome of reflection and calculation, the State as a work of art (1958: 22).

When we examine the 'success stories' of 'self-determination' - meaning those groups that have attained statehood - their existence appears bound up with conceit and selective dependence no less than the stories of those peoples still seen as living under the yoke of others.

The boundaries of contemporary Latin American states still provide occasions for nationalist fervour, as recent events show. Their origin lies in no higher principle than the administrative convenience of the old Spanish colonial provinces, which the small 'revolutionary' strata of merchants and landowners retained when they ousted the Spanish in the early nineteenth century. As Anderson remarks (1983: 50), all of these states, and likewise the U.S.A., 'were creole states, formed and led by people who shared a common language and a common descent with those against whom they fought' - 'creole' here being defined as persons 'of (at least theoretically) pure European descent, but born in the Americas'. Creole society intermingled, of course, with indigenous Indian and black slave populations, on whose land and labour it depended. And creole identities, whether cast in terms of liberation, colonialism or race, are still defined in opposition to these other groups.

Another oft-cited case is Japan. The small group of samurai who seized power in 1868 did so in order to restore the imperial dynasty and secure Japanese sovereignty against European encroachment. The dynastic principle was matched by the oligarchic consolidation of the families of these men, secured by group-centred marital and financial controls, the disenfranchisement of their fellow samurai as a legitimate power-holding class and the importation of English cultural and Prussian administrative and military
models.\textsuperscript{5} Ironically, this group was able to act effectively against the majority of its fellow samurai because the class as a whole had come to be associated with ineffectual resistance to European influence. A selectively revitalised and modernised Japanese identity was subsequently turned, in a series of wars from 1894 onwards, against precisely those groups to which the Japanese traditionally opposed themselves (Chinese, Koreans) and against the more recent barbarian presence (Dutch, American, Russian, British) to which Japanese imperialist nationalism was by now related.

2. Images of Collective Vitality

Anthropologists may look equably on the extrapolation of common descent, dynasticism and similar vital charters in modern national and international affairs, of which the Japanese and Argentinian cases are examples. Almost forty years have passed since Lévi-Strauss reminded us that the names and faces composing groups may change, their alliances and antipathies may be expressed by different means and in different media, but their systematic nature can only be understood because the logic of oppositions endures. And it was Lévi-Strauss (1969) who insisted that the imaginative use of vital processes constitutes the elemental stratum of legitimate group identity.

To build up groups solely and strictly by natural means - i.e. fertility - is a gradual process, although a certain momentum may be acquired with time. Substantial common identity, population size, structure and reproductive capacity may, however, be acquired rapidly by reclassification: where, for example, speakers of related dialects may be said to share a common language, and therefore to constitute one group; where provisional arrangements consequent on different peoples moving into a new setting come with time to constitute a genealogy of group relations; or where genealogical segmentation, marriage alliance, fictive kinship and similar devices commonly used in domestic and community relations across a wide historical and territorial extent are seen as constituting one family, blood, polity, race or nation.

It is not surprising, then, that images of collective vitality should retain their integrative value in modern settings. The selective construction of historical identities remains at base a relation between the reproduction of groups (whatever the means employed) and the displacements of circumstance. The wider purview in which anthropologists are accustomed to seeing these definitional processes should encourage us to separate the 'imagined' character - or in Burckhardt's phrase, the 'artfulness' - of ethnic and state communalities from the limited historical perspective of nationalism and its critique. The latter comprise a relatively

\textsuperscript{5} There is a careful portrait of the evolution of this process in the first volume of Mishima's \textit{The Sea of Fertility} (1976); more generally, see Anderson (1983: 89-93).
recent development of a much older, recurring process. Lévi-Strauss has not, however, left us with a comprehensive theory of the transformations which occur in the idiom of collective vitality with the emergence of complex societies. The modern re-working of vital idioms as a basis of larger political identities should surely occupy an important place in such a theory. Indeed, anthropology in important respects begins with this problem.

The emergence of European civilisation greatly occupied the evolutionary theorists of the later nineteenth century, to whom the beginnings of anthropology and its interest in society as imagined in terms of vital processes are now customarily attributed. In explaining the moral and material progress of Western society, writers such as Bachofen, Morgan and McLennan stressed the emergence of monogamy from the inchoate corporate sexuality and solidarity which they supposed to characterise primitive peoples. They correlated with successive stages of this evolution the gradual emergence of definitive features of advanced social and political organisation, such as the development of private property from corporate family holdings and the formation of civil societies as opposed to those based on sacred and familial law. The logic of marriage, kinship and family as the basis of collective action was traced in ancient legal, tribal and city structures and contrasted with the growth of individualism, natural law and Christianity, which were thought to effect their breakdown (e.g. Fustel de Coulanges, n.d. [1864]; Maine 1963). The artifice inherent in peoples' self-constructions is a recurring source of wonder, and often admiration, in these writings. In passing, we may call particular attention to Maine's point that civilisation only became possible by the elaboration of legal fictions, especially adoption (which allows the artificial creation of family ties) and the incorporation of foreigners (from which developed the ius gentium) (1963: 24-6).

Burckhardt's renaissance studies, written in the same period as these anthropological classics, stand in an important relation to them. The methods followed by Burckhardt's contemporaries generally combined fragmentary observation of contemporary 'savage' peoples with philological and exegetical study of ancient texts in order to project general histories of mankind in the form of successive stages and types of civilisation. Burckhardt's focus in history was later, and more confined. Where his contemporaries devised stages leading up to modern civilisation, he identified Florence and Venice as sites in which the emergence of modernity could best be observed. Available to Burckhardt in these places were archival sources which included many contrasting period accounts: family histories, government papers, property taxes, diaries and the successive chronicles and histories written by and of the inhabitants. These sources permitted a different approach to historical change from the teleologies written by his contemporaries, in which each stage of civilisation, having sown the seeds of its own internal contradictions, found itself revealed and, ipso facto, overturned by its successor. Instead, the Florentines themselves became agents
in history: creators of their state and its institutions, developers of their own individual characters and conscious contributors to the place of Florence in history. In Burckhardt's approach, modern developments, although contrary to older family and factional loyalties, do not simply displace them: they are not mutually exclusive, even if contrary; they exist simultaneously even if evolved differentially. In his view (1958: I, 102-4), the greatest exponent of this vision of state formation, 'as a living organism', was Machiavelli.

3. The Vital Model in Machiavelli

Niccolò Machiavelli, writing the history of his native Florence, begins with a remark on a seemingly disparate subject, the great fecundity of northern Europe. His observation was, however, pointed and political in a way unlikely to be lost on his contemporaries. The barbarian invasions which brought down the western Roman Empire were echoed in the overweening power which French and German princes exercised in Italy, down to Machiavelli's own time. He considered the excess reproduction of northern manpower, together with the discipline with which it could be deployed, a worthy subject for contemplation by Florentines and other peoples concerned to preserve themselves. The greatness of Florence was, in sharp contrast, marred by internal dissensions. The factional politics of its major and minor families divided and reduced its numbers, and weakened its resolve. The consequences were manifest particularly in its external relations: the disadvantageous pay-offs and treaties into which it entered in order to retain at least some of its interests and the insufficiency of its army, which forced it to rely on mercenaries and foreign generals.

7 Istorie, p. 72; History, p. 35. In this and the references that follow I have, for the convenience of the reader, given pages both in the Istorie (1977 [1527]) and its translation History (1891 [1527]); parallel arguments in the Prince (1952 [1517]) and Discourses (1950 [1517]) are indicated by chapter number and book and discourse numbers respectively.

8 See, for example, Istorie, pp. 224, 252, 286-8; History, pp. 147, 168, 197-9. The association of the greatness of peoples with their demography is fundamental to one of Machiavelli's best known themes, that states are founded and endure according to their innate force, especially force of arms. For this reason an expanding population is necessary to cities and states (Istorie, pp. 72, 137-8; History, pp. 35, 80-1; Discourses, bk. i, disc. 6; bk. ii, discs. 3, 4, 8, 19; Prince, chs. x, xxvi). Conversely, mercenaries and foreign assistance are in general to be avoided; either they fail to do your bidding, or their success leaves you at the mercy of their superior force (Istorie, pp. 134-5, 416-19; History, pp. 79, 300;
According to Machiavelli, the peoples of northern Europe, wishing to resolve their population surplus while preserving and perpetuating greatness, divided their numbers without internal strife by mobilising large segments of the population for military expeditions in which they established colonies and new states. The founding and early history of Florence had been similar. Machiavelli writes:

Amongst the great and admirable orders of former kingdoms and commonwealths (though in our times it is discontinued and lost) it was the custom upon every occasion to build new towns and cities; and indeed nothing is more worthy and becoming an excellent prince, a well-disposed commonwealth, nor more for the interest and advantage of a province, than to erect new towns, where men may cohabit with more convenience, both for agriculture and defence. For besides the beauty and ornament which follows upon that custom, it rendered such provinces as were conquered more dutiful and secure to the conqueror, planted the void places, and made a commodious distribution of the people; upon which, living regularly and in order, they did not only multiply faster, but were more ready to invade and more able for defence.9

Thus the greatness (grandezza) and fecundity (generativa) of peoples is not mere reproductive abundance, but their orderly development in all spheres, underwritten by the capacities inherent in an expanding population. Put another way: the historical identity of peoples consists in their relative greatness.

The means by which greatness may be acquired and held is a central theme in all three of Machiavelli's major works,10 and in this

Discourses, bk. i, disc. 21, 43; bk. ii, disc. 10, 11, 20, 30, 31; bk. iii, disc. 43; Prince, chs. xii, xiii.

9 Istorie, pp. 137-8; History, pp. 80-81; Discourses, bk. ii, disc. 2.

10 Greatness is emphasised particularly in Machiavelli's Preface to the History (Istorie, pp. 68-71; History, pp. 22-5). In the text he applies grandezza to individuals (e.g. Istorie, pp. 400, 543; History, pp. 287, 393), families (e.g. Istorie, pp. 251, 486, 509; History, pp. 167, 352, 370), and states (e.g. Istorie, pp. 70, 83, 332, 542; History, pp. 25, 42, 232, 393); likewise Prince (Preface, chs. iii, ix, xxvi) and Discourses (bk. i, disc. 6, 33; bk. ii, disc. 13).

This listing is not exhaustive and represents only a small part of Machiavelli's treatment of the theme, since he makes use of a variety of expressions, only some of which can be considered in a short paper. For instance, terms referring to ruling groups (e.g. grandi, potenti) suggest greatness, especially as they are cognate with descriptive phrases such as popolata e potente, grandi e meravigliosi, grande e potentiissime, fatto grandissimo etc., which refer not only to ruling groups but to those they lead; yet it is clear from his consistently negative reference to ruling factions.
respect, at least, his interest in Italian history follows period
convention. As Gilbert (1977: 140) notes, when Giulio Medici com-
misioned Machiavelli to write a history of Florence in 1520, he was
following a practice which ruling factions had adopted in the pre-
ceding century. Vernacular chroniclers, over an even longer period,
had written to perpetuate the memory of great persons and events,
mythical origins and divine interventions, in terms of which the
virtue and continuity of city-states was demonstrated (Green 1972).
The revival of classical models in the fifteenth century reordered
these accounts in linear narratives punctuated by observations and
orations showing the greatness of peoples as conforming to broad
natural, moral and political precepts. The point of history-
writing remained closely bound up with the legitimacy which stylized
reinterpretations of past greatness conferred on contemporary peo-
lies and their leaders, and with the lessons of the past which could
be seen in current affairs.
Machiavelli's History incorporates something of the best of
both traditions. He inherited the theme of greatness not only from
past Florentine chronicles, but from the main classical sources,
Aristotle, Polybius and Livy. He used the vivid, if at times di-
gressive style by which chroniclers compounded event on event to
bring together elements of contemporary greatness and decline which
illustrated classical themes: that families and peoples have an in-
herent moral and political character, also perpetuated in their
customs and education; that power and position do not automatically
convey greatness. A related set of terms, having to do with
strength (forza) and virtue (virtù), are considered below under note
3l.
As might be expected, the informal and untechnical nature of
Machiavelli's terminology requires attention to sets of terms, in
the context of recurring examples to which they are applied. There
are a number of perceptive studies which have developed this
approach to which I am indebted: Gilbert 1984; Price 1982; and
Wood 1967.
11 Peoples may be identified by their abiding tendencies to repub-
lican or monarchical government (Prìncipe, ch. v; Discourses, bk. ii,
disc. 4). Machiavelli continually uses phrases which posit the
vital nature of the state: uno vivere politico, uno vivere civile, uno vivere libero. Machiavelli remarks in the Discourses (bk. iii,
discs. 43, 46) that fundamental and enduring differences character-
istic of families and peoples do not spring solely from the blood
(nascere solamente dal sangue), since intermarriage would bring
about variation; hence one must look also to the preservation of
family traditions, to which the considerable body of genealogical
records and family histories kept by the Florentines attests (see,
notably, Alberti 1969). Inherent characters are treated only in
passing in the History, usually in terms of the strata into which
families tend naturally to divide (e.g. Iistorie, pp. 69, 213, 221;
History, pp. 23, 139, 145). 'Virtue of arms' and 'generosity of
are like life cycles, the vitality of even the greatest being brought down by umori (humours, i.e. internal discord and conflict);¹² that these humours are natural tendencies 'arising from an ambition in one to command, and the aversion of others to obey';¹³ and that humours proceed by means of self-interested conspiracies, secret payments and favoured family connexions (the modi privati of political action), as opposed to open military and administrative endeavours (the modi publici). Machiavelli's recurring example of the modi privati is Cosimo Medici.¹⁴

The bulk of the History recites a story of conflicts, amply illustrating these themes. Florentine dissensions began in a dispute between two families over a marriage contract.¹⁵ The entire community divided into factions according to families supporting one side or the other, each having by tradition formed alliances within and without the city. As opponents multiplied, so did occasions for slights, injuries and violence. A recurring pattern of feud involving conspiracy, assassination, war and the flight of families, either temporarily or in permanent migration ensued. The success or failure of any one family induced other family realignments and sometimes the absorption of the domains of defeated parties, at least until those expelled had reorganised and enlisted sufficient external and internal support to make a return or there were other shifts in familial politics. Machiavelli remarks that in each Italian state the affairs of the whole are determined by a small number of families or their heads, amounting to no more than forty or fifty citizens; as the survival of any one family perpetuates the memory of conflict, so the conflict itself is perpetuated.¹⁶

12 Istorie, pp. 325-7; History, pp. 227-8; Discourses, bk. i, disc. 2.
13 Istorie, p. 212; History, p. 138. Machiavelli uses umori to describe dissension and fighting generally; although particular individuals and families are sometimes picked out (Istorie, pp. 160, 290, 308; History, pp. 97, 199, 213-4), reference is usually to the shifting factions in which families are allied (Istorie, pp. 212, 261, 271-3; History, pp. 138, 176, 184-5).
14 Istorie, pp. 451-3; History, pp. 326-7; Discourses, bk. iii, disc. 28. On Cosimo see: Istorie, pp. 308-15, 453-63; History, pp. 213-20, 327-35; Discourses, bk. i, disc. 33.
15 Istorie, pp. 142ff.; History, pp. 83ff.
16 Discourses, bk. i, disc. 16; Prince, ch. xiii.
Given that Machiavelli lays such stress on the mortal dangers which dissensions carry for states, it is at first puzzling that he attributes greatness not only to states, but to persons, families and ruling groups which are the very agencies of internal division. It is clear from his examples that he expects the interests of these entities to conflict. 'There was no greatness to which [Florence] might not have arrived', he remarks, 'had it not been obstructed by new and frequent dissensions'.

Discord provided enemies with opportunities: 'the Venetians were jealous of no other obstruction to their greatness but the union of those [i.e. Medici and anti-Medici] parties', and so they assisted Cosimo when he was briefly in exile. Discord weakened the Italian states collectively: the famous division between the Guelphs and Ghibelines (i.e. Church and Imperial factions), when it spread from other states to Florence, simply followed lines already laid down by local family dissensions and became an aspect of their perpetuation. When we turn to the families and followings to which the successive 'malignant and factious humours' and 'dangerous and mortal diseases' of state are attributed - the Buondelmonte and Uberti, the Donati and Cerchi, the Ricci and Albizzi, and the Medici - these groups are described as *grandezza, famiglie potentiissime, ricchezza, nobilità ed uomini potentiissime*; but also in terms of *ambizione* (ambition), *superbia* (haughtiness), and *insolencia* (insolence).

The issues raised in Machiavelli's *History* are thus something more than customary period historiography. It is true that he upholds convention by maintaining the central theme of greatness: there is praise of many past Florentine values, institutions and actions, including several fulsome passages about the Medici, and his book was addressed by convention as well as commission to members of that ruling family, whose present power doubtless inclined them to join in deploring the dangers implied by continuing dissension. However, the priority and significance which Machiavelli gives to dissent separates his account from those of his peers. Apparently Machiavelli wrote a history of greatness which lays primary emphasis on tumult and decline!

In his preface, Machiavelli cites the 'dissensions, intrinsic animosities and the effects which followed from them' as the main justification for his work, and he goes so far as to say that 'if anything in history be delightful or profitable, it is those particular descriptions'. The paradox is, however, only apparent, as Skinner (1978: I, 181) points out with regard to a parallel section of the *Discourses*:

Machiavelli starts out from the orthodox assumption that one of the main aims of any Republic which values its liberty must

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17 *Istorie*, p. 146; *History*, p. 87.
18 *Istorie*, p. 332; *History*, p. 232.
19 *Istorie*, pp. 143-4; *History*, p. 85.
20 *Istorie*, p. 69; *History*, p. 23.
be to prevent any one section of the populace from seeking to legislate in its own selfish interests. He then suggests that, if we genuinely accept this argument, we cannot at the same time uphold the conventional view that 'tumults' and civic discords are inevitably damaging to the freedom of a Republic.

How, then, does Machiavelli reconcile the two images of greatness he presents: one in which the inherent vitality of states is weakened, perhaps fatally, by internal conflict, and the other in which this vitality owes its existence to the same source?

3.1 Grandeza

Given the volatility of families, factions and states, it is not surprising that the legitimacy of rule should be contentious and that people seek to have the interpretations and lessons of historians in their employ. The historian does not, however, gain much control over the interpretative process. 'Actions which carry greatness', Machiavelli observes, 'however they are performed, or whatever their outcomes, always seem to bring men more honour than blame.' In other words, greatness has a self-defining tendency. For example, we may imagine a group which gradually establishes a hold on legitimate power. It thereby attains a position from which it can influence subsequent events. If it successfully aligns itself with tradition and keeps its external and internal opponents at bay while representing themselves as ill and divisive humours, that group then becomes great. The failure of such groups to emerge over time likewise becomes proof of the absence of greatness in a given people. Evidently, such 'self-determination' allows considerable scope for the abuse of power.

The historiography of greatness thus returns us to the several elements of modern ethnic and national identity outlined in Section One. Greatness involves: (1) an appeal to inherent characters; (2) an original vitality of peoples and places; (3) the manipulation of historical ties of descent and marriage; (4) a central role assigned to the moral and political agency of certain individuals and the small, privileged factions to which they belong; and (5) the artful interpretation of (1), (2) and (3) according to the dictates of (4). The onus in accounting for greatness is plainly on the nature of the 'artful interpretation'.

Two general sorts of artifice are recognised in the History, both pertaining directly to greatness. Machiavelli uses industria to refer to the products of men's imaginations and labours, which distinguish the man-made from the natural. As we have seen, greatness owes not simply to having a large population or a fertile spot, but to the more or less systematic development with which people build upon their vital charters. The other meaning of artifice is

21 Istorie, p. 71; History, p. 25.
deception, for which Machiavelli adopts several terms: *frode* (fraud), *inganno* (deceit), *congiure* (conspiracy) and *intenzione* (design). The grey area in which these two general meanings overlap is very important to Machiavelli for, as we have seen, at the basis of his concept of history are animosities intrinsic to peoples in both their greatness and their decline, in consequence of which they enter into plots against one another. Are there points, then, at which the development of vital, intrinsic sources of greatness require deception in the affairs of men? In what circumstances do such actions destroy greatness? These questions arise in Machiavelli's discussion of each of the elements of greatness just listed.

a) Vital Charters

The Florentines, Romans and northern Europeans were great, in the first instance, because of their fecundity and fertile situation; their 'arts' were the military discipline with which they expanded upon them. Pisa and Venice, in contrast, became great despite their 'malignant', 'sickly and waterish' locations. Their greatness was made possible by an influx of peoples: Genoan refugees fleeing the Saracens turned Pisa from a minor to an important local force, and Venice was created as a free republic out of diverse groups fleeing the successive invasions of Italy that began with Attila. On close inspection, however, the assimilation of foreigners turns out to be no less crucial to the greatness of Florence. Drawing upon mythologies given in the vernacular histories, Machiavelli says that Florence was established as a colony of Fiesole, but then peopled by Romans; it was then swelled by inhabitants from surrounding areas subsequently conquered, who were brought to Florence. When Machiavelli refers, for instance, to the Albizzi as an ancient Florentine family, their source turns out to be Arezzo. In the period between the fall of Rome and the establishment of the republic, Florence admitted a succession of foreign princes and their retainers. The *generativa* of the early period of Florentine greatness relied, it appears, on a pattern of continuous assimilation.

Beneath these examples lies the paragon of the Roman republic, discussed at length in the Discourses. When the Romans gained military advantage over a neighbouring people, such as the Samnites, they granted them many rights of citizenship, entering into alliance with several of their families but retaining headship for themselves. In this way they increased their numbers and strength and obtained reliable allies in subsequent fights with the Latins and Etruscans, whom in due course they likewise made associates (compagni). When Rome subsequently expanded outside Italy, however, they established their sovereignty by making peoples in these places subjects (suggetti):

since they were used to living under kings. Those Italian

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compagni of Rome suddenly found themselves surrounded by Roman subjects, and oppressed by the great state, which Rome had become... and when they saw the deception under which they had been living [lo inganno sotto il quale erano vissuti], it was too late to remedy their condition.24

Their rebellion succeeded only in reducing them to a subject status. Here, then, deception is the crux of Roman greatness, which proceeds by an adroit policy of absorbing the lives and identities of other peoples.

b) Virtù

When Machiavelli sets out the different kinds of state in the Prince, he distinguishes, first, peoples long under hereditary rule, those annexed by them, and new dynasts; in the second category are republics. Of the Italian instances of the first which he holds up to his readers, only a minor one, the Duke of Ferrara, was of a long-standing dynastic family. The main powers in Italy are all, as he says, misti (mixed): they acquired and retained rule by a combination of fairness, force and connivance in which they made their subjects' best interests at least appear to coincide with their own. King Alfonso of Aragon could successfully annex Naples because the people were long accustomed to dynastic rule; Francesco Sforza, a hired general, acceded by force and marriage to the Duchy of Milan on the death of the last reigning male descendant of the ruling Visconti family; the Visconti had attained their power previously by similar means.25 In respect of republics, the main case is of course Florence. There, following the success of the modi privati of Cosimo, a merchant family retained its power by artfully preserving a facade of republican institutions.26

Such a view of the 'art' of statecraft may well appear to end in cynicism. Machiavelli attributes the following argument to a successful agent provocateur:

observe the ways and progress of the world; you will find the rich, the great, and the potent arrive at all that wealth, and greatness, and authority, by violence or fraud; and when once they are possessed, you will see with what confidence and security they gild over the brutality of their usurpations, with the unjust (but glorious) title of acquests.27

Such sentiments have often been thought to represent Machiavelli's own view, but the admiration he sometimes expresses for the Sforzas and Medici of the world reflects his candid assessment of their historical role: their strength is the due consequence of other

24 Discourses, bk. ii, disc. 4, 13.
25 Istorie, pp. 118-19; History, p. 67; Prince, chs. i, ii.
26 Istorie, pp. 45ff.; History, pp. 328ff.
people's relative weakness and the dissipating effects of dissen­sions. Thus the inherent vitality of peoples which, as we have seen, may be developed by the adroit use of foreign personnel, may also be usurped and directed by foreigners. Although Machiavelli notes these facts with all candour, he does not prefer them, especially with regard to Florence, as is shown by his scathing criticism of the use of mercenaries and foreign generals, and his glowing recitation of the spontaneous indignation and violence with which the Florentines expelled would-be foreign despots, for example, Walter de Brienne in 1343.28

To this point we have seen that, in Machiavelli, the inherent vitality on which a people's greatness and identity rests reflect the growth and development of its population, their disposition towards certain forms of political organisation and the art with which leading groups make use of these vital resources. The association of greatness and vitality in Machiavelli is thus not fundamentally biological or genetic, but a politics and culture reflecting a contemporary picture of nature and man's place in it:

Nature having fixed no sublunary things, as soon as they arrive at their acme and perfection, being capable of no farther ascent, of necessity they decline. So, on the other side, when they are reduced to the lowest pitch of disorder, having no farther to descend, they recoil again to their former perfection: good laws degenerating into bad customs, and bad customs engendering good laws. For virtue begets peace; peace begets idleness; idleness, mutiny; and mutiny, destruction; and then vice versa, that ruin begets laws; these laws, virtue, and virtue begets honour and good success.29

Needless to say, cycles of greatness describe not only states, but families and persons.30

Machiavelli derived this cyclic picture from classical sources - as indeed he derived the Roman model of state expansion discussed above - and the Galenic imagery of bodily humours, both of which are aspects of such cycles. As Whitfield (1947: 92-105), Wood (1967: 260) and Gilbert (1984: 179) have all remarked, Machiavelli's concept of virtù (virtue) is central to the classical model. Virtù refers to the innate force of will in certain men, some 'inde­finable inner force', as Gilbert says, which can be inculcated in the collectivity by education and military discipline. More generally, virtù refers to evidence of political and military ability, drive, efficiency and determination, such as follow from such capacities.31 States may continue for a time on the foundation of laws

28 Istorie, pp. 188-205; History, pp. 120-32.
25 Istorie, p. 325; History, p. 327.
30 See for example, Istorie, p. 251; History, pp. 167-8.
31 On this see Price (1982: 443). Machiavelli also follows classical usage in opposing virtù to fortuna (fortune, destiny); in the Prince (ch. xxv) the natural analogy which underlies his model is
and government which the activities of virtuous men have given them; but they will fall, as the natural cycle is, into indolence and internal dissension, unless there is some necessity which makes them overcome their intrinsic animosities, at least in the short term. One solution is to induce necessity by artifice: a policy of permanent expansion is a good recipe for continued greatness, since it maintains discipline and increases a state relative to others.  

c) Congiure

Such a policy assumes, of course, a number of prior conditions: that it is in fact possible to overcome internal factionalism, and that the people have not already fallen prey to usurpers and tyrants, whether native or foreign. Virtù thus has to be manifested internally before it can be made a basis of relations between peoples or states. The overweening ambition of any one section of the populace must be restrained; where it has gained the upper hand, means must be found for its removal. Machiavelli addresses these issues again and again in his works, particularly under the heading of conspiracies, or congiure.  

The organisation of conspiracies follows a pattern that might be expected, on the basis of preceding discussion of the way in which greatness, or collective identity, is defined. Conspiracies are generally the work of a small number of men of standing (uomini grandi o familiarrissimi del principe), who seek to gain control, or change the course, of affairs of state. Usually they have sustained, or fear, attacks on their greatness, which Machiavelli notes are perceived as attacks on basic sources of vitality: their persons and property, especially women's honour. Since the family is the first unit of organisation upon which all of these matters reflect, as well as the primary setting in which inherent character is transmitted, it is not surprising that injuries and conspiracies alike follow the tendencies shown by leading family members and extant patterns of descent and alliance. The cases on which Machiavelli dwells at length in the History - the assassinations of the Duke of Milan and of Giuliano Medici - follow in the first case from the honourable reaction of a group of young noblemen to the womanising and of the tyrant Duke, and in the second from the failure of a marriage alliance and a subsequent wrangle  

expressed in terms which return us to the starting-point of generativa: 'it is better to be impetuous than cautious, for fortune is a woman, and it is necessary, if you wish to master her, to conquer her by force; and it can be seen that she lets herself be overcome by the bold, rather than by those who proceed coldly'.

32 Discourses, bk. ii, disc. 4.

33 Walker remarks (Machiavelli 1950: II, 154-5) that Machiavelli's longest sections in the Discourses and the Prince are those on conspiracies; Machiavelli shows similar concern in the History by taking dissension as his central theme (Discourses, bk. iii, disc. 6; Prince, ch. xix; also for example, Istorie, pp. 193-201, 502-7, 512-25; History, pp. 127-9, 365-9, 372-81).
over property between the Medici and another potent Florentine family, the Pazzi. In both cases, an immediate moral and material incident provided a vehicle for a deeper and more widespread fear of tyranny.

The virtù necessary to carrying a conspiracy successfully to completion is similar in many respects to military discipline: discretion and courage rely on artful planning and execution, including a willingness to use fraud or other extraordinary means; powerful commitment follows from recognition that failure of the enterprise means the loss of everything; and danger drives conspiracy inevitably towards violent means, ending in the death or banishment of either conspirators or enemies.\(^{34}\) Wood (1967: 165) notes that Machiavelli associates virtù especially with those who found, preserve or expand a state militarily, or those who conspire successfully to take and secure control over states.

Successful conspiracies, according to Machiavelli, are very rare. To begin with, 'one rarely comes across men so indignant at an unjust act as to endanger themselves by seeking vengeance'.\(^{35}\) Even then, conspirators must have such mutual confidence that they are willing to lay down their lives for each other. There is also the matter of the self-defining quality of greatness: it is only advisable to contemplate conspiracy against a prince or faction if he or they are objects of general hatred, such as could lead to general endorsement of a conspiracy, should it succeed; but where such hatred exists, there may be an inclination to leave the task to others who appear better placed; and great men and evil tyrants alike, by their reputations, inspire fear and respect that will weaken the resolve of conspirators and encourage others to curry favour by informing on them. The failure of a conspiracy, in turn, strengthens the hand of ruling groups; and so on and so forth. All this returns us to the ground of intrinsic animosities which, by dividing a people, provide ample leverage for those factors which generally lead conspirators into disaster.

When we turn to the History and ask, 'Who conspires?', the answer is always: members of opposed families and of the factions in which they are allied. Machiavelli, in tracing the story of a given feud, carefully lists the families to be found on each side and sees in one incident the continuation of generations of animosities.\(^{36}\) Again and again he remarks on the attempts

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\(^{34}\) On the theme that necessity engenders virtue, compare examples of conspiracy (for example, Istorie, pp. 301-5; History, pp. 364-9) with Machiavelli's comments on military prowess (for example, Discourses, bk. iii, discs. 8, 12). Just as conspirators may resort to secrecy and deception against a tyrant (for example, Istorie, pp. 199-201; History, pp. 127-9), so fraud is legitimate when 'dealing with an enemy that has not kept faith with you' (Discourses, bk. iii, disc. 40).

\(^{35}\) Discourses, bk. 3, disc. 6, on which the following summary of Machiavelli's account of conspiracies is based.

\(^{36}\) Machiavelli writes: 'And that nothing which is humane may be
of families to cement alliances by marriage and the intrigue with which this is surrounded.\textsuperscript{37} The favouritism and nepotism which characterise the \textit{modi privati} provide a friable power base; favourites are even more likely to conspire dangerously against their patrons than are injured parties, while promotion along family lines breaks down the moment there is no common adversary.\textsuperscript{38} Wise leaders avoid creating favourites and 'kill the sons of Brutus', i.e., remove those family lines which have conspired against them; in Florence, this generally meant banishment.\textsuperscript{39}

Machiavelli's account of greatness, or in other words, of the historical character and identity of the Florentines, may be summarised as follows. Greatness begins in intrinsic characters (\textit{fortuna, generativa, virtù}) and is subject to no less intrinsic forces (\textit{umori}) which bring about a decline in vitality. But history shows that greatness develops differentially according to the art and agency of different peoples, which enables them to overcome, or at least stay for a time, the effects of \textit{umori} and of fundamental insufficiencies in native population, resources and leadership. Inherent vitality, in becoming great, transcends its own limits. The life of the state, or greatness as the creation of particular peoples, depends in certain crucial historical instances on conspiracies, which are turning-points in collective life. Are conspiracies devoted chiefly to private and factional gain? Or do they succeed in balancing the tendency of great persons and families to become insolent and tyrannical? Does \textit{virtù} triumph? Machiavelli does not pose the contest of \textit{umori} and \textit{grandezza} in order to resolve it, but to arrive at a historical verdict.


\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{38} \textit{Discourses}, bk. iii, disc. 6; \textit{Istorie}, pp. 453-5; \textit{History}, pp. 327-9.
\item \textsuperscript{39} \textit{Discourses}, bk. i, disc. 16; bk. iii, disc. 3; \textit{Prince}, chs. iii, iv; \textit{Istorie}, pp. 203-4, 219-20, 315-6, 323-4, 485; \textit{History}, pp. 131, 144, 220, 226, 351.
\end{itemize}
3.2 Umori

Vital events and relations served Machiavelli at two levels of argument. First, there is the co-ordinating analogy to nature: the image of the body politic, with its life cycle of fertility, growth, humours and decline. This structure is not purely rhetorical, since its second and simultaneous role is demographic; the growth, virtue, dissension and conspiracy which animate the body politic are effected by changes in the composition and distribution of the families and factions which are the political body's members. The coherence of this model was pointed out by Burckhardt (1958: 102), although it has sometimes been viewed sceptically. Recent studies of the social and historical demography of Florence, addressed chiefly to the century and a half preceding Machiavelli, now give further and striking support to the picture he has left us, by showing how the two aspects of Machiavelli's vital logic coincide.

First, the fall from original fecundity suggested by Machiavelli is attested by the instability of birth-rates and the contemporary topicality of Florentine sub-fertility (Herlihy 1980). Secondly, Machiavelli, having observed that Florentine manpower was insufficient, then adduced from Roman and other cases that the preservation and development of greatness is achieved by the absorption of other peoples. And so Florentine sub-fertility was compensated for a time by the absorption of young people from the surrounding countryside; later, increasing immigration from more distant parts of Italy and from Germany became common (Cohn 1980: 113). Thirdly, Machiavelli's term for the weakening of Florence was umori, i.e. an intrinsic susceptibility to certain maladies. This was a powerful and apt image, given that the History was written about a century and a half after the Black Death, during which time plague and other epidemics recurred. Disease was probably the main factor destabilising Florentine population growth, since it struck younger age-groups heavily and repeatedly, thereby compounding checks to fertility inherent in local marriage patterns (Herlihy 1977).

The fourth support for Machiavelli arises from the nature of these checks, which reflect the strategic importance of marriage and family relations in the political definition and differentiation of groups. Aggregate analysis shows that social strata and the consolidation of power in certain lineages over time were articulated by patterns of endogamous marriage (Cohn 1980: 58ff.). The historical ethnography of particular lineages shows that alliance between groups and their respective honour, prestige and economic condition were often focussed on family links perpetuated through arranged marriages (F. Kent 1977: 93-9; D. Kent 1978: 49-61; Klapische-Zuber 1985: 80-87). The effects of these institutions

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40 Hexter (1957) and Gilbert (1984: 177) point out that Machiavelli's use of the term stato does not simply equate with 'the state' in the sense of 'the body politic'. This is true of this one term, and it reflects the fact that Hexter's argument is confined to the Prince, in which the state is naturally bound up more with the person of the ruler.
and values on fertility appears to have worked by restricting the number of childbearing years that husbands and wives were able to spend together in marriage. The micro-demographic model of Florence outlined by Herlihy and Klapische-Zuber (1985: 81-3, 202-31; also Klapische-Zuber 1985: 117-31), chiefly on the basis of the Florentine castato of 1427-30, suggests the following combination of factors.

Men tended to marry in their early thirties, by which time they would have been able to establish their worth as potential household and lineage members. Women, in contrast, married much earlier, often in their teens. The age difference between spouses influenced fertility in several ways. First, given an average life duration of about forty years, husbands were likely to die while wives were still in their reproductive prime. Secondly, the preference for young brides and the conflicting pressures put on widows on their own and their husbands' families meant that widows were much less likely than men to remarry. Thirdly, the pattern of male mortality, together with preferred family alliances, restricted the pool of eligible husbands relative to the numbers of women in younger cohorts. The demand for suitable grooms greatly influenced the cost of dowries in turn, limiting the number of daughters a father could afford to marry off. Contemporary diaries remark on the difficulty of marriage consequent upon the politics and economics of Florentine families (Guicciardini 1965: 29) which can also be followed in the workings of the state dowry fund (Kirshner and Molho 1978) and the remarkable increase in the number and population of nunneries (Trexler 1972).

Finally, the overall pattern of family and factional politics displays a cyclic pattern in which, as Machiavelli noted, the older nobility were gradually pushed aside by merchant families, which proved more adept at clothing their basically oligarchic politics in the institutions of the republic (D. Kent 1975). Rather more families figured in this process than Machiavelli suggests, and the role of marriage and descent needs to be considered in relation to the neighbourhoods and quarters into which the city was divided. But the strategic and fragile role of affinal links and the precarious and artful means by which certain families developed and maintained patterns of patronage are well-attested by more detailed recent studies (D. Kent 1978; Bulard 1980).

4. Concluding Note

The preceding pages have, following Burckhardt, considered Machiavelli's History of Florence as the locus of a major transition, the emergence of modern concepts of the state from a context of ethnic rivalries. To remark on Machiavelli's modernity in this way is not to assimilate his account of Florence to collective identities as we might now define them, but to specify the point of translation between his categories and our own. If we wish to understand the history of the paradox outlined in Section One of the simultaneous
'self-determination' and 'mutual dependence' of contemporary ethnic­­ities and states, we can recognise it in its fifteenth- and sixteenth-century dress as the conflict between grandezza and umori, by which Florentines suffered or prevailed over one another and defined themselves in relation to other peoples and states. I have tried to show how Burckhardt's phrase 'the State as a work of art' follows from Machiavelli's text and how it aptly describes the formulation of this conflict in the History. The main themes of recent anthropological and political enquiry into ethnic and state formation are at least prefigured - and often very subtly and effectively rendered - in the works of these two earlier writers.

The theme of artifice has, of course, a long association with the name of Machiavelli. So much so that the terms 'machiavellism' and 'machiavellian' have come to have rather peculiar meanings. Sometimes they refer to the thesis that effectiveness alone counts in the affairs of men ('the ends justify the means'). But they are also applied, willy-nilly, to the many sinister developments of this thesis that have been wrongly attributed to Machiavelli. The importance of vital imagery and relations in Machiavelli's historiography is an important check to such reductive and cynical readings. On the one hand, Machiavelli recognises that the politics and brute facts by which one nation or faction may dominate another are likely to be accompanied by selective interpretations of the inherent, vital criteria of legitimate authority to suit those in power. On the other, his awareness of the artifice by which collective identities are constructed does not keep him from subscribing to the continuing and fundamental value of the vital charters of particular peoples and places. Machiavellism, properly speaking, is the politics of virtù, i.e. a process by which the greatness and artful devices of some persons and groups become the vital charters, define the limits to growth and determine the continuity of wider polities.

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41 See, for example, Gilbert 1977 and Raab 1964.

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A TEXT IN ITS CONTEXT:
F.E. WILLIAMS AND THE VAILALA MADNESS

Introduction

The Vailala Madness of the Gulf Division of Papua New Guinea (c.1919-c.1930) has often been cited by scholars as a vivid example of a cargo cult, but it has seldom been studied in detail. The only person who paid much attention to it during the period of its existence was Francis Edgar Williams, who was the 'government anthropologist' in that area. The major problem with studying the Vailala Madness is understanding it through texts such as his and learning how to use these texts for a more general understanding of such 'revitalization movements'.

This article gives considerable attention to Williams' history and career, since the information he provided was selected and shaped by his complex character and the social and cultural milieu from which he came. This will highlight some of the problems involved in using the texts on the Vailala Madness as a basis for contemporary theories about the development of revitalization movements and cargo cults.

Francis Edgar Williams

Francis Edgar Williams held the appointment of 'government anthropologist' to Papua New Guinea from 1922 until his death in a plane.

I should like to thank Dr A.F.C. Wallace and Dr Igor Kopytoff, of the University of Pennsylvania, and Dr Jeremy MacClancy, of the University of Oxford, for their helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article.
crash in 1943. His story has largely been ignored in anthropology. This is due in part to the way his theoretical orientation changed over time and the way his writing reflected a constant battle to reconcile his job with his anthropological background. The problem Williams confronted is one faced by any anthropologist interested in doing applied work: how does one reconcile the pervasive anthropological tendency to support an attitude of cultural relativism and the observer's role as a researcher with a government position which exists to make political as well as cultural decisions for others? Another reason is surely that because he stayed clear of university life he had no students to reinforce and remember his contribution. Regardless of what kept him out of the anthropological limelight, unravelling Williams' work by placing it in its historical context and in relation to Williams' personal experience will, as we shall see, be quite helpful in understanding the Vailala Madness texts.

a) His Upbringing and Education

Williams was born in Malvern, South Australia, in 1893. He was a student at the University of Adelaide, winning top honours and the Tennyson Medal for Classics, and was elected to a Rhodes Scholarship in 1915. He enlisted in the army and served as a lieutenant in France during World War I and as a captain in Persia. Although he never explained in his writing why he became interested in New Guinea, it is possible that his army travels and his upbringing in Australia made some contribution. After the war he went to Balliol College, Oxford on his Rhodes Scholarship, his tutor being Robert Ranulph Marett (Elkin 1943: 100).

A review of Marett's work reveals some appreciation for the functionalism which was in vogue in the 1920s, as well as a deep interest and admiration for Edward Burnett Tylor who, with his stress on origins and evolution, predated the functionalist school. But Marett by no means disregarded the move in anthropological theory away from the evolutionary, developmental, Tylorian approach towards the synchronic approach of functionalism. As he wrote:

Fortunately it is beginning to dawn on the representatives of civilization that an imported faith cannot be substituted for a home-grown credulity except by means of a slow and deliberate process of psychological grafting. Such a technique can be mastered only by the help of an anthropology which applies to each primitive society what is known as the 'functional' method of studying their indigenous culture ...[we] describe this method as 'holistic'.... It is opposed ...to a method of origins which traces the back-history of the various factors (Marett 1932: 104-5).

This statement distinguishes the methodology of Tylor from that of the functional school, but it also implies that an 'imported faith' can be implanted via the functional method. This is a curious notion, since a study of indigenous culture using the strict
'functional method which was so enthusiastically practised at that time would have insisted that everything observed was vital to the culture as a whole and could not be changed without the whole system falling apart. What Marett was implying but not articulating was a 'modified functionalism' which was to become a carefully presented theoretical focus in Williams' later works.¹

Marett favourably acknowledged his student's 'modified functionalism' as a necessity for successful administration. He said Williams' approach 'hits a happy mean between too much and too little sympathy with the native point of view' (1928: ix) and that

in its capacity of protector of aborigines, the administration must save the native from himself no less than from inopportune interference, whether well-meaning or not, on the part of the white man... indulgence tempered with firmness offers the only means of reconciling stone-age humanity to its new lot (ibid.: x).

Marett's interests in this modified functionalism, a respect for native ways balanced with administrative interference to 'save the native from himself' and his great respect for Tylor all come out clearly in Williams' work.

The only other direct academic influence on Williams that can be discovered in the literature was a series of seminars he took with Malinowski in 1934 which is mentioned in a footnote in the obituary Elkin wrote on Williams (1943: 95). But from long before that experience Williams was working with Malinowski's and Radcliffe-Brown's concepts of function. As we will see later, the needs of the individual were a major concern in his Vailala Madness study, reflecting Malinowski's assertion that 'every institution contributes... toward the integral working of the community as a whole, but it also satisfies the derived and basic needs of the individual' (Malinowski 1939: 292). And in his essay 'Creed of a Government Anthropologist' (Williams 1977) Williams reworked Radcliffe-Brown's 'organism: culture' analogy which he thought overstressed the idea of integration and system.

¹ This sort of modified or generalized functionalism had also been developed implicitly in the work of Rivers in the early 1920s. In his contribution to Essays on the Depopulation of Melanesia, Rivers wrote, 'It may be constructive, to consider for a moment how far it would be possible to modify the old customs and institutions of the people, to preserve enough to maintain interest while removing all those features which conflict with the ideals of modern civilisation' (1922: 107). I am indebted to Dr George Stocking for drawing my attention to this text.
Another major figure in Williams' career was his administrative superior J.H.P. Murray, the Lieutenant Governor of Papua. Murray took up his post in 1908. His stress was always on the government's obligation to the 'natives' and their development through European enterprise. In 1918, he set up the Native Plantations Ordinance, which allowed the planting of coconuts on a larger scale. The following year he introduced a Native Tax, the money raised being used for the natives' own benefit, i.e. in setting up mission schools, paying the government anthropologist and producing a monthly publication, *The Papuan Villager*, which ran from 1922 to 1941. His stress throughout was on government control and 'peaceful penetration' (Ryan 1972: 806-7). He held a rather typical administrator's view of native people as incapable of holding responsible positions, running their own government or caring for themselves. He needed to find an anthropologist who would be willing to evaluate, make decisions about, and perhaps interfere with, the natives' lifestyle, and therefore he could not employ a devout functionalist. Williams, as we have already mentioned, did not discard functionalism altogether, yet he had sufficient confidence in administrative decision-making and in his own qualifications to feel he could decide what would be best for the 'natives', and this made him the most appropriate person for the appointment.

Deciding that interference is occasionally necessary for the administration of native peoples is one thing, but how one should actually carry it out is another. Williams' feeling was that Christianity was not the proper substitute for native rituals and customs - his alternative suggestions included cricket and football (Williams 1932: 223). Murray, however, firmly disagreed with Williams on this point. In his 'Introduction' to Williams' *Vailala Madness*, he writes, 'I note that Mr Williams seems to doubt that Christianity is a sufficient substitute for the old ritual; in this he differs from Dr Rivers ... and incidentally from myself. It is not clear what he would recommend as a substitute' (1923: iv). But Murray was usually very supportive of his government anthropologist's views, and he must have come to approve of them more and more as Williams became increasingly critical of the functionalist position during his career.

Williams' book on the Vailala Madness was written when he had come fresh from university with a strong functionalist perspective. Much later, after years of experience, he wrote a very interesting article entitled 'Creed of a Government Anthropologist', which illustrates clearly his change in orientation. It also shows his attempts to resolve the conflicts that arise from being at the same time a colonial government worker and an anthropologist (a problem which underlies his works on the Vailala Madness, but is never articulated within them). In this article he suggested that society is in part a system and in part a 'haphazard agglomeration' which could afford to lose some parts without causing a serious threat to the whole (1977 [1939]: 150). While he sincerely appreciated the functional school for the attitudinal change it brought to...
anthropology - away from an obsession with the 'quaint, amusing, obscene and blood-thirsty' towards a realization that everything in the society is important - he had come to feel that functionalism over-stressed systematics and that it had the wrong attitude about the applications of anthropology (ibid.: 400, 408).

In order to make his ideas understood he created 'new' analogies to counteract those of the most famous functionalists (e.g. Radcliffe-Brown's analogy that society is like an organism), which he had used in his earlier writings. Williams called a house a cultural microcosm, for when it accumulates too much property the excess, or 'tooglies' as he called them, are stored in the attic. They could be called 'domestic survivals'. Williams noted that a true functionalist would not recognize 'survivals', because if an item is not functional, then it is not part of the system. But culture, he said, is like our houses, 'clogged by an accumulation of the superfluous, or what might be called cultural junk', which is part of the culture but not of a 'system' (ibid.: 406). The reason for this, he said, is because culture is a 'product of an age-long history of chance' (ibid.: 405). He asserted that wherever one finds an individual victimized by the larger society, then interference is called for, and this includes activities such as sorcery and head-hunting, for example. In 1935 he wrote an article on Papuan head-hunting in which he insisted that sorcery's 'principal effects are to spread suspicion and enmity through and through society', adding that 'governments will assume the responsibility of protecting the weak against such imposition, and it is my conviction that they are justified in using punishment as a measure to prevent it' (1935: 227, 230). He realized that on this issue he was directly opposing Malinowski's assertion that 'sorcery on the whole is a beneficient agency, of enormous value for early culture' (quoted from Malinowski's Crime and Custom by Williams [1935: 228]).

Williams thought that a government anthropologist would be the best judge of what is suitable for the culture in question and that a person in such a position should work as both an objective observer and a critic and reformer (1977: 410): 'our much wider experience and scientific knowledge may enable us to see defects which remain hidden from the native himself' (1935: 411). Williams would have said that all these 'defects' should be treated as 'cultural junk' and be discarded.

The notion of 'survivals', as well as the notion that culture arises from a history of chance, makes one think of E.B. Tylor's contributions to anthropology. Let us recall that Marett, Williams' tutor at Oxford, stressed Tylor's ideas in his own writing and presumably in his teaching as well.

Having outlined key aspects of Williams' biographical and theoretical background, we can now turn to the Vailala Madness itself. The most extensive description of the movement was written by Williams very early in his career. A follow-up article was written after many more years in the field, around the time he wrote his articles involving notions of 'modified functionalism'. This should be remembered as we consider the movement itself in more detail.
The Vailala Madness

a) Williams' Description

The Vailala Madness was past its peak when Williams arrived in Papua as Assistant Anthropologist in 1922, and hence a description of its early and most 'infectious' development is missing from his report. Luckily we have brief but consistent diary-like descriptions of what was happening in the area during the 'hottest' period of the madness, which were sent to Williams by G.H. Murray (not to be confused with J.H.P. Murray), the Acting Resident Magistrate of the Gulf Division. Murray's reports began on 10th September 1919 and continued until 22nd May 1920, and they appear as appendices to Williams' book (G.H. Murray 1923).

Gilbert was the brother of Hubert (J.H.P.) Murray, the Lieutenant-Governor, and after his time in Papua he became Professor of Greek at Oxford (Cochrane 1970: 36). The reports he wrote indicate that the very first news of the Vailala Madness was brought to him at the Government Station on 10th September 1919 by an unnamed visitor, reporting 'extraordinary conduct on the part of the natives from Keuru to Vailala' (Williams 1923: 65).

Williams wrote The Vailala Madness and the Destruction of Native Ceremonies in the Gulf Divisions in 1923, after living in Papua for one year. While the 'symptoms' were not as frequent nor as wild as they had been when G.H. Murray described the 'lunacy' and 'insanity' in 1919, the movement was still very much alive. In Williams' 1934 article 'The Vailala Madness in Retrospect', he said that he could not provide a precise date for its expiration, but could only say that by 1931 some of the 'native ceremonies' which had been discarded during the 'madness' began to reappear, which 'effectually closed the way' for its continuance (1934: 385).

Unfortunately, information on the distribution of the Vailala Madness is scarce, but it seems that large areas of the Gulf District of Papua were peppered with it. For example, Williams mentioned how the village of Orokolo resisted the movement, while a village only a mile away, Arihave, was a 'hot bed' of the cult (1923: 9). He did not try to find out why it was adopted by some villages and not others. What seems to be missing from the available reports are descriptive profiles of individual villages, including the states of the people living in them. We could call this an 'ethnographic void', for it makes it quite difficult to test how the material fits into later theories on how and why such movements develop. For the Vailala Madness, reasons for variations in its distribution and in how the 'madness' manifested itself in different villages must, unfortunately, remain mysteries.

G.H. Murray wrote (1923) that the movement originated in either Arihave or Nomu in August or September 1919 and spread eastward under the name of the Vailala or Orokolo Kavakava (madness). It spread rather selectively along the coast and then moved forty miles north along the Vailala river among villages not distinguished by the extant literature.

Williams and G.H. Murray both suggested that a single 'originator' must have been responsible for starting the 'madness', but
Williams and the Vailala Madness

they disagreed about who that individual was. G.H. Murray suggested that the originator was Kori, a man of Arihave and Nomu, but after interviewing the local people, Williams insisted that he was Evara, a man who lived in the village of Iori on the lower Vailala (1923: 28).

The movement was seen by these observers in very linear terms: it began with a single person in a single village with a single psychological make-up, and then it spread and died out in a sequence also. Williams did not discuss the way in which contextual and historical factors (for example, the colonial occupation in which he had an acting role) may have created the setting for the first 'mad' individual(s) to act out a precedent for proper Vailala Madness behaviour. Williams' discussion of origins centred on a description of Evara.

Whether or not Evara was the very first person to experience the 'madness' (a reputation of which he himself was apparently very proud), he was certainly one of the key figures and leaders in his area. Williams interviewed him and wrote about the parts of that experience and the parts of Evara's personal history that he found most significant.

Williams' informants told him that the Vailala Madness spread rapidly through supernatural means. He disregarded this explanation and rationalized instead that the movement spread because visitors to 'infected' villages watched people's behaviour, learned of the doctrine and then reproduced the ceremonies at home. In addition, he said the movement 'extended so rapidly' because some leaders (he called them apostles) actively proselytized the new doctrine, occasionally even using force (ibid.: 30-1).

Behaviours associated with the 'madness' included twitching and shaking and moaning and uttering a mixture of Pidgin-English and nonsense syllables. The Papuans called the movement 'Head-he-go-round', 'Belly-don't-know', 'the Gulf Kavakava' and, of course, 'the Vailala Madness'; they called people who displayed these behaviours 'Head-he-go-round men'. Williams preferred to call them 'Automaniacs' (ibid.: 4). Schwimmer, in his introduction to a volume of Williams' work which he edited in 1977, criticizes Williams' use of this word:

It is ... unfortunate that in his analysis of ritual, Williams keeps on using absurd, even semi-literate terms such as 'automaniac'. The cult leaders, in a state of divine or spirit possession, made involuntary movements which communicated themselves to their audience. In Williams' day this phenomenon was known as 'automatism', applying to the involuntary movement not only of persons but also of objects, as in spiritualist seances.... The noun automaniac is incorrectly formed from automatism (Schwimmer 1977: 38).

If the word 'automaniac' is unfortunate, it might be imagined that the constant reference to 'madness' is worse. Madness implies insanity and loss of control and calls for a cure. However, in the context of Williams' beliefs and eventual conclusions regarding the unfortunate destruction of prior native culture, such
a word would become extremely instrumental. Williams suggested that 'Head-he-go-round men' fell into three categories:

1) Those who fell into the condition quite involuntarily. Some of these may be in greater or less degree 'mental' cases.
2) Those who, for motives of their own, simulate the Madness without giving way to it.
3) An important intermediate class of those who voluntarily induce the Madness and, for the time being, surrender completely to it.

It may be pointed out that the term 'Automaniac', which will be used generally as synonymous with 'Head-he-go-round Man', is in strictness applicable only to the last category (1923: 9).

The people who fit into the second category feigned the symptoms, he said, and could be recognized because their faces did not look 'nervy' (ibid.: 8-9).

The language spoken by the 'Automaniacs', which had been described as half Pidgin-English and half gibberish, was called 'Djaman' (German), and the people said that it was the language spoken in Raboul (ibid.: 6). Williams stated that 'Djaman' was unlearned and that people claimed that it rose from the stomach of its own accord. He called this a typical case of primitive 'ventriloquism' (à la Tylor in Primitive Culture). He said too that the people would often blurt out Pidgin phrases which had a 'plantation ring' (ibid.: 6). Williams presented several short 'cases' in the book for illustration. Here is one example:

At Vailala, December, 1922.

A young man, Karoa (of fine physique and appearance), was displeased because several others and myself had entered the 'ahea uvi' without consulting him. He poured forth a volume of gibberish which contained a good many Pidgin-English phrases, but was intelligible to nobody.

When his harangue was finished he stood aside, stuttering and mumbling in the familiar manner suggestive of teeth-chattering; he made a few symmetrical gestures with both hands, but for the most part motioned with his right hand before his solar plexus as if encouraging his stomach to rise. Meanwhile he heaved long sighs, and looked genuinely distracted. Finally he moved across to the flag-pole, and stamped round and

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2 Papuans were taken for a short time at the turn of the century to work with geologists doing oil-surveying work at Raboul, near the Vailala river, for the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (Cochrane 1970: 48). Worsley has suggested that the 'natives' heard about 'Djaman' from their visits to Raboul, which had been German territory before 1914, and also through rumours which had circulated about the war. 'German', he says, 'was favoured as an anti-Government tongue' (1968: 88).
round it, shouting such phrases as - 'Hurry up!' 'What's-a-matter?' 'Come on boy!'. Many people present watched Karoa closely, and, as it seemed, with a touch of fascination.

Williams observed that the beliefs, practices and material 'paraphernalia' associated with the Vailala Madness (the doctrine) lasted longer than the physical symptoms. Fundamental to the doctrine was the belief that a steamer ship was to arrive with the people's deceased relatives and many gifts. The gifts would include tobacco, calico, axes, knives and food, and early in the movement some thought that rifles would arrive, with which the whites in Papua could be overthrown. The ancestors were expected to be white, and white men were often mistaken for them. Williams thought this stemmed from 'an imaginative hypothesis to explain the appearance of a totally strange variety of humanity' (ibid.: 16). He suggested that the former was 'typical of the native's desire to imitate the white man, and of that deplorable contempt for his own race'. He quoted Evara saying, 'brown skins were no good' (ibid.: 17). The idea that blacks would become white after death most likely resulted, he added, from missionary influence.

Williams then described the 'heaven' from which, according to a 'Head-he-go-round man' of Vailala West, the dead relatives were expected to come. He described the elaborate feasts which were set out for the ancestors, the houses (called 'offices') and flagpoles from which the ancestors' messages could be received, the new rules set out by the cult leaders, and the divinatory powers of the 'Automaniacs' (ibid.: 17-33).

Part of the doctrine of the Vailala Madness involved the destruction of all the old ceremonies and their associated material objects. To Williams, this was the most perplexing and infuriating aspect of the whole cult, and rather than discussing it as an aspect of the doctrine, he devoted the entire second half of his book to it, trying to convince readers that the destruction was a tragedy:

They have got in into their heads that the old customs are no good: they swallowed the notion wholesale in 1919, when they were mad, and they have not got it out of their systems yet.

No more thoroughly deplorable instance could be found of the power of suggestion than this, when at a time of uncontrolled excitement, age-long traditions were thrown aside in favour of the absurdities of the Vailala Madness....

They cannot as a rule bring forward any reason of a logical kind, but will in the great majority of instances say that the 'Head-he-go-round Men' had told them to give up the ceremonies, and that they had done so without question.

Two other explanations are offered not infrequently: first, that the ceremonies are discouraged by the missionaries; second, that there is too much work to do for the white man (ibid.: 38).
Williams disregarded the reasons given to him for the destruction of ceremonies, but he never presented his own explanations. Rather, he spent a great deal of time describing the old rituals and then justifying his conviction that maintenance of the old ways was imperative.

Williams' lengthy detailed descriptions of the symptoms and behaviours of the Vailala Madness are crucial sources for anyone interested in either Papuan history or 'revitalization movements'. The choices he made as to what descriptions should be given and how the data should be organised, presented and analysed surely arose from his personal, practical and theoretical interests, as was noted earlier in this article. Certainly these should be considered carefully by all who use his historical accounts of the Vailala Madness, for we have no other studies to read for comparison.

b) Williams' Explanations

i) Vailala Madness 1923: Cult as Pathology

Early European scholars of 'culture' have tended to treat cult behaviours as pathological. The language in Williams' book, as well as in G.H. Murray's descriptions, shows that these two were no exceptions to this. Not only were 'native' peoples considered ill, but they were also considered child-like. Williams suggested that the nervous and physical 'symptoms' of the Vailala Madness should be attributed to the natural mental instability of the native and the phenomenon of 'mob psychology' (from William McDougall) in which an excited group loses all self-control. These characteristics plus, again, the 'imitative character of the madness' allowed for its quick spread (ibid.: 12-14). Since Williams conceived of the cult as symptomatic of illness, he felt he needed to provide a cure. The cure would have to be formulated according to what we might call his 'theory of the needs of the native mind'. This he offers clearly in the book's conclusion.

Williams concluded by calling for the revival of the old native ceremonies because he felt they were essential for the well-being of the Papuan, who needed them for a legitimate emotional outlet and a contrast to daily routine (ibid.: 55). He suggested that in primitive religion, faith, doctrine and philosophy are certainly secondary to the ritual:

Where a ceremony may be carried out punctiliously in all its details and with a singular intensity of emotion, the participants may be going through it blindly, and with no realization of the meaning or symbolism which civilized observers will read into it.

The inability of the native to explain ceremonial acts is a familiar difficulty to anthropologists. It is not that he wishes to conceal anything, but that he has nothing to reveal (ibid.: 58).

It was because of this conviction that Williams believed that Christianity was both unfairly and impossibly trying to substitute
its doctrine for 'native' ritual. Although his opposition to Christian teaching was new in the context of the 1920s, it did not really come from a pure cultural relativist position but rather from a position that the native had not developed enough to be able to handle doctrine safely. He was really only feeling that the 'native' was childlike and unable to digest such quick developments, or in his own words: 'It is to snatch away the baby's milk bottle and offer it a pound of steak' (ibid.: 60):

Without seriously advocating any such measures, one might suggest that the Christianity that would succeed among the natives would be one with a minimum of perplexing doctrine, but full of sacrifice, communion feasts, flagellations and the like. The poor native hates thinking, but he loves carrying on (ibid.: 62).

To support his feelings theoretically he turned to functionalism. All efforts, he suggested, should be made to maintain the old rituals and discourage the new cargo cult, for since social functions (art, religion etc.) are so closely intertwined, even the removal of one part would destroy the rest. Like a true functionalist, he wrote in this, his earliest work: 'You have only to remove one wheel to stop the watch, or one stone from the social structure to have it tumbling about your ears' (ibid.: 64).

ii) Vailala Madness, Williams 1934: Revised Explanation

In 1934, when Williams wrote his follow-up article on the Vailala Madness, he was still using some of the illness metaphors to speak of the behaviours, but his perspective seems to have been different. He no longer saw the cult as a horrible disease which, according to the functionalist paradigm, would result in the total downfall of the people's culture. His experience there over the years proved to him that the cultures of the Gulf division of Papua were still very much intact, if only a little changed. The movement had virtually ended by then and its doctrines had started to pass 'into the form of legends' (Williams 1934: 377). In this later article he even suggested that the practices associated with the Vailala Madness doctrine, with its offerings and flagpole messages, 'had the markings of genuine ritual' (ibid.: 379). It may be questioned whether he would have had the same change of attitude had the movement not safely declined by then.

It would seem unlikely that direct intervention by the colonial government or by factions within the society could have taken place without being mentioned by Williams in his 1934 article. However, Glynn Cochrane, in his account of the movement's history, describes how the administration did indeed repress the cult by imprisoning its leaders in the villages. This, he says, destroyed its 'organizational framework' and led to a 'return to anomie' (1970: 66). Cochrane does not tell us where he acquired this information, but since he tells us in his 'Prologue' that he had access to unpublished governmental records in Papua, it is possible that this was the source. If he is right, then Williams had concealed this information from us. What could this mean? By 1934 he appeared to
be taking a more sympathetic view to the fading cult - or was this just what he put into print after the apparent threat had subsided, just as people will forgive and forget friends' undesirable characteristics in death? It seems impossible, but perhaps Williams' superiors acted without his knowledge. Or could Cochrane have made a mistake in his research on this issue? Again we can only guess, but our observation of discrepancies (such as this one) can only be possible and our guesses can only be more informed once we have studied Williams' biography and the complex situation in which he was writing and working as best we can with the limited resources that are available to us.

The idea of the Vailala Madness as illness fits with the goal of Williams' 1923 book, namely to find a cure quickly and end the development of the madness before the people died without their old cultural artefacts and rituals. The attitude in the later article leaned towards the modified functionalism he discussed in his still later article on the 'Creed of a Government Anthropologist'. He hinted at the importance of studying culture change long before it was a recognized subject of interest in anthropology. He ended his 1934 article as follows:

The Vailala Madness came as a violent shock to the societies of the Gulf Division, and the adjustments and reactions afford material for the study of culture in a state of unusually rapid metabolism.... There are more than enough native societies undergoing change at the present day, and the study of these has, I believe, a special importance, for here if anywhere we shall have a chance of discovering how elements of culture begin and how they grow (Williams 1934: 379).

Williams never produced any single theory about such movements of cultural change, but certainly no model had been provided for this in anthropology at that time.

Examples of More Recent Theories of Cargo Cults: The Vailala Madness as Evidence

One of the first examples to provide a 'systematic analysis' of a movement involving rapid culture change was made by Ralph Linton in his article 'Nativistic Movements' (1943). He defined as a nativistic movement 'any conscious organized attempt on the part of a society's members to revive or perpetuate selected aspects of its culture' (1943: 230). The peoples Linton studied in North America had a very different history and different contact experience with outside cultures from the peoples of Papua. The movement he studied consequently involved a different underlying strategy or goal, as the definition suggests, for surely the people who experienced the Vailala Madness were not working toward any amplification of their culture as it existed in the past. This is not to say that elements of their culture (e.g. traditional myths) did not blend with
Christian doctrine to form a new ideology and practice patterned in part on the old (Wilson 1975; Thrupp 1962; Cochrane 1970; and Eliade 1962). But part of a nativistic paradigm involves the expelling of foreign powers, and this was certainly an aspect of the ideology of the Vailala movement as described by Williams. A.F.C. Wallace accounted for any discrepancies neatly when he suggested that cargo cults 'are antinativistic from a cultural standpoint but nativistic from a personnel standpoint' (1956: 278).

A far more comprehensive framework for studying these types of movement was provided in Wallace's article. He suggested that Linton's 'nativistic movements', the Vailala Madness, other 'cargo cults' and a score of other genres of cultural movements are simply variations of a larger category he called 'revitalization movements', and he suggested that these all follow the same process of development. He defined a revitalization movement as 'a deliberate, organized, conscious effort by members of a society to construct a more satisfying culture' (ibid.: 265). One 'subclass' of the revitalization movement is the 'cargo cult'. Cargo cults, he suggested, 'emphasize the importation of alien values, customs, and material into the mazeway, these things being expected to arrive as a ship's cargo as for example in the Vailala Madness' (ibid.: 267).

Wallace stressed how the individual's perception of his or her culture, environment and self ('the mazeway') can change to reduce a situation of extreme stress, and that this is the revitalization process (ibid.: 266-7). He outlined the structure of this process, which involved five somewhat overlapping stages. A reading of Wallace's article (with details about these stages) and Williams' text allows one to see how neatly the Vailala appears to fit within the scheme. The data offered in Williams' account fit beautifully into Wallace's model; it appears, therefore, to verify the 'response to stress' theory.

Theodore Schwartz, however, in his article on cargo cults, disagreed with Wallace's notion that cognitive stress is of central importance. He asserted that contact with the European culture was all that was needed to trigger the development of this type of revitalization movement. His argument centred on the idea that there had always been tremendous cultural emphasis on the acquisition of wealth in Melanesia, and that the doctrine of the cargo cult explained why the European worked so little and received so much cargo from distant places while the Melanesian worked very hard for the Europeans and received so little. The doctrine then provided the means whereby the Melanesian could obtain supernaturally the cargo he deserved (Schwartz 1976: 162-4; see also Lawrence 1964.

3 Note that some writers insist, on the basis of comparative research, that 'expelling' was not the essential desire, but that attaining moral equality was; see, for example, Burridge 1960.

4 The five stages of the revitalization process revealed in this model comprise: 1) Steady State; 2) Period of Increased Individual Stress; 3) Period of Cultural Distortion; 4) Period of Revitalization; 5) New Steady State.
Burridge 1960 and Jarvie 1964 for similar arguments). Schwartz refers to his theory as one focusing on a notion of 'relative deprivation', which Aberle (1962) concisely defines as 'a negative discrepancy between legitimate expectancy and actuality'.

Schwartz also disagreed with Wallace on the nature of cult 'symptoms'. Rather than seeing the behaviour as 'pathogenic', resulting from actual neuro-physiological pathology, Schwartz said that it is 'pathomimetic', an imitation of pathological symptoms which are culturally patterned. The behaviours are modelled on pathogenic behaviours displayed at some time by individuals in the culture (e.g. epileptics, people ill with cerebral malaria, intoxicated people); they need not indicate social decay nor cognitive stress. Williams' ethnography may again be seen as 'historical evidence', but this time it supports hypotheses of relative deprivation.

Worsley dedicated an entire chapter of his book *The Trumpet Shall Sound* to the Vailala Madness (1968: 75-92), and in it he reviewed and paraphrased many details about the movement from Williams' texts. He ended the account by selecting a modicum of evidence suggesting Papuan hostility to colonial occupation and then wrote:

But if avid for the White man's goods and knowledge, the natives saw the White man himself as the major obstacle between them and their goal... The movement, then, expressed powerful native resentment at their social and political position in the new order of things (1968: 88-9).

Worsley picked carefully through Williams' text in search of supporting evidence for a theory of cargo cults as pseudo-political protests, and he found what he was looking for.

The point here is not to choose the correct or most convincing analysis of cause but to illustrate how difficult the explanatory part of a discussion of cult activity which took place in the past can be. One could select a variety of other authors to make the same point. These authors are often divided on the grounds of degree of generality or specificity. The extreme 'generalists'

This is only one of several attempted classifications of cult studies (see Smith 1959; Christiansen 1969; and Burridge 1969). Burridge (1969) divides the different explanations into four groups: 'Psychological/Physiological, Marxist' (seeing them in terms of conflict and competition between groups and classes); 'Hegelian' (particularly interested in the larger shape of relations and the role of the prophet); and 'Ethnographic' (trying to explain why the movements occur within a very particular context). Possibly the first three groups are all representative, in different ways, of the 'generalist' approach, while the 'Ethnographic' is 'specific'. While some works fit fairly easily into these classes (e.g. Worsley, Thrupp and Lanternari as 'Marxist'), others are not so easily labelled. Wallace's work is discussed by Burridge within his discussion of the 'Hegelian' approach, but his stress model is also
argue that we can understand mankind and culture change better if we collate all our cross-cultural data on millennial movements, cargo cults, revitalization movements etc. and compare and contrast the movements' patterns and processes. Those in favour of specificity argue that this broad kind of picture is deceiving and that we can only understand a movement within a particular cultural and historical context. People who fall into either of these camps or somewhere in between have referred to the relatively famous Vailala Madness and in doing so have focused on the same small body of 'historical' texts. It is ironic, but also rather unconvincing, when a variety of causal and descriptive theories are supported by texts composed by a single author who was himself selective in his descriptions. The few who have discussed Williams' own explanations have generally ignored the way their character changed through time.

More studies of culture change should be 'specific' in a different way, beginning with the contexts of a primary document's creation - in particular, the people behind the texts. Burridge has criticized writers in this field by saying that 'most are eclectics, fishing in a variety of psychologies and sociologies and ultimately imposing on the data their own millenarian intuitions' (1969: 118). He adds that this results in a plethora of explanations which echo the same points over and over again. At least proper ethno-historical and biographical work would lead to 'fishing' in a more informed direction.

Conclusion

This paper has underlined some of the difficulties in the study of a relatively old account of what we could now call a revitalization movement. The Vailala Madness has come and gone, and all we are left with are essentially two texts composed by one person, F.E. Williams, a complex character whose role as 'government anthropologist' in Papua New Guinea put him in an intellectually difficult position. There is a challenge for the historian of anthropology interested in examining primary documents to investigate further the manipulation of texts by Williams, based on a thorough psychologically oriented. Jarvie's work emphasises the prophet ('Hegelian'? ) and yet has a very Marxist ring. Inglis (1957; 1959) argues against general analyses in theoretical terms, but her work itself is not 'Ethnographic'. Belgrado van Fossen's paper fits into its own class, which we might call 'Cosmological'. The problems with classification are never-ending.

6 Wilson (1975) sensibly suggests that while it might not be useful to use the general comparative method to get a broad notion of cause, no final explanation of a movement can be made without specifics (e.g. mission activity, local myths, study of specific leaders, the nature of culture contact etc.).
understanding of his personal history and socio-cultural milieu. In terms of anthropological theory, there is, unfortunately, no way of understanding in retrospect the underlying psychological states of the individuals involved in the Vailala Madness (the crux of the 'cognitive stress'-relative deprivation' debate), nor the political or social motivations of these people, as one could perhaps do with a contemporary cult. The details we have of the movement can help to verify a behavioural process, but they certainly cannot tell us much about cognitive states. Thus supposedly contradictory theories all find the Vailala Madness a useful example.

On the whole, there has not been as much anthropological attention given to cargo cults and other revitalization movements recently as might have been expected. The tendency in and strength of anthropology has been to stress continuity rather than change. Williams said that the 'stability of native custom has been practically a maxim of anthropology', and he saw that new cults argue against this (Williams 1928: 4-6). The Vailala Madness was thus a challenge for an anthropologist studying in the 1920s, a challenge which Williams attempted clumsily but courageously to resolve by the concatenation of prevailing functional theories with some of its antecedents in his notion of 'modified functionalism'. Although culture change is now considered an important topic in anthropology the challenge is not over.

TAMARA KOHN

7 It is interesting to note that only four per cent of the works in Wilson's comprehensive bibliography were written after 1967 (Wilson 1975). This topic of interest in anthropology appears to have been at its apogee in the 1950s and early 1960s.

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... 1977. 'The Vailala Madness' and Other Essays (ed. with an introduction by Erik Schwimmer), Honolulu: The University Press of Hawaii.
Daniel Miller’s new book is excellent and deserves to be widely read not only by specialists in material culture, but also by all anthropologists and social scientists who are concerned with the cultural characteristics of ‘modern’ society.

Miller’s basic problem is this: we have inherited a tradition of cultural critique which decries the consumer society, seeing our headlong pursuit of the material embodiments of an affluent lifestyle as a profound cultural sickness, for which capitalism is ultimately responsible. Because this critique is from the left, it incorporates the standard leftist humanism. Under socialism, according to this brand of humanism, soulless materialism will vanish, and, no longer bemused by consumerist fetishes, human beings will relate to their world, and one another, in a new and truly ‘natural’ way (‘not through a glass darkly’). But Miller correctly sees that leftist humanism is an anti-humanism in disguise, since it is based on a systematic contempt for the man in the street, who is regarded as a zombie, a dumb creature whose brain has been removed and replaced by advertising imagery. He will only be saved once he learns to switch off the T.V., stops dreaming of a fitted kitchen and spends his time in adult education classes or, failing that, engaging in approved varieties of working-class ‘popular’ culture (pigeon-fancying, cultivation of enormous, inedible marrows on allotments and so on).

Miller wants to reconcile socialism, as a programme for social justice, with an unsnobbish and essentially sympathetic appreciation of the struggles and triumphs of the people who live in advanced capitalist societies. Such people, like it or not, formulate their life-goals and mediate their personal relations in a
symbolic language of 'objectifications' which is intrinsically linked to the expanded possibilities of consumption provided for in advanced industrial societies.

Miller's defence of consumerism is based on a Hegelian precedent, since, in Hegel - but not in Marx - 'alienation' is regarded positively, as an expansion of the self into the world, and is only a precursor to 'sublation', the reincorporation (i.e. consumption) of the expanded and 'alienated' part of the self. Hegelian 'alienation' can be translated also as 'objectification', but 'objectified' culture - that is to say, 'modern' culture which manifests itself, as no previous culture has, in a vast mass of products - is not 'alienating' in the Marxist sense because the 'meaning' of the product is accomplished not in its status as a 'produced' thing, but only, following purchase, as an element, brought in from the outside, which expands and develops the social person of the consumer.

This argument is the core of Miller's book, but there is a great deal more to it. In the first chapter he outlines the Hegelian theory of alienation/objectification, which he goes on to contrast in the second with the more familiar Marxian ideas of alienation, fetishism and reification. Miller argues that the 'estrangement' of the subject in the (alienated) object is intrinsic to Marx's social critique, but even if one accepts the terms of this critique, the original Hegelian idea still has validity as an element in a cultural interpretation of objectification and consumption, whereas Marx concentrates exclusively on production and exchange. Baudrillard's attack on Marx's 'productionism' is cited at this point, although Baudrillard is prey to romantic illusions of his own. Next, using Munn's work, Miller introduces the idea of objectification as a cultural process, and the first part of the book concludes with a discussion of Simmel's analysis of 'modern' objectification via the mass of consumer goods and the all-pervading role of money power as the means of rendering desire in objectified form.

This might sound rather tough going, but the author has gone to considerable pains to ease the reader's burden. Miller has the ability to deal with complicated ideas in a direct and unfussy way. He needs all his expository wits about him in the ensuing chapters, which attempt to construct a programme for present-day material culture studies.

Having looked at the psychology of early object experience in the work of Klein and Piaget, he turns to anthropological studies of symbolic transactions in objects (Mauss, Weiner) and ultimately to the history and sociology of consumer taste. Here the presiding big name is Bourdieu, which is only natural, but Miller also finds opportunities to deal with an extensive and scattered historical and sociological literature which has never been brought together in this way before. There are sections dealing with the social history of suburban housing, the evolution of the motor-scooter as a symbol of the aspirations of 'mod' youth culture and the tortuous history of 'calico' cloth, produced originally as part of a drive towards import substitution before becoming a mainstay of the
export economy of Britain during its manufacturing heyday. Other subjects dealt with in passing are the rise of the 'industrial designer', the nature of the fashion system and the results of surveys of the contents of middle-class Chicago homes.

The result of this conducted tour through the byways of economic history, design studies and the new literature on consumption is not only an interesting series of chapters to read, but a big bibliography at the end of the book, one of the greatest possible scholarly utility. In the final part, Miller seeks to construct a new 'positive' theory of consumption, opposed to the anti-consumerist left humanism, which can be used to interpret the symbolic dimensions of 'the work of consumption' (i.e. self-construction via consumer choice) in modern society.

Miller's book is part of a general movement to reinstate consumption as a legitimate activity and a serious subject for academic inquiry and social theorising, after a prolonged period during which the emphasis has been placed almost wholly on production. It is particularly welcome because it succeeds in formulating this new perception of the relationship between political economy and culture in an organised and lucid way, virtues which most of the other contributions to this subject conspicuously lack. Even if it were not an original contribution to ideas (which it is) Miller's book would be a monument to heroic patience in the exegesis of texts which often hardly deserve such scholarly forbearance.

But possibly Miller has gone too far in effacing himself and conducting his argument in terms of a series of commentaries on other peoples' ideas. There is the possibility that readers will read Miller (who is not famous or trendy yet) in order to get the goods on writers who, rightly or wrongly, have acquired droppable names, such as Baudrillard, or who are notoriously stodgy, not to say boring, such as Hegel or Simmel. One has to get to page 190 of a book which is only 217 pages in all before encountering two whole pages on which there are no citations. Those two pages, dealing with modern consumption, are among the best in the book, and I would have preferred more like them. The impact of Miller's argument is substantially lessened by his determination (bred, no doubt, from his experience as a university lecturer) to cram in the whole of the 'syllabus' before allowing himself a moment to speak to us directly. In particular, it seems to me that the analysis of the 'work of consumption' remains sketchy and that a deeper phenomenological analysis of the phases and modalities of object-sublation are urgently needed.

What kind of critical response will this work evoke? While I would like to give it an unequivocal welcome as it stands, there is no doubt that if one considers some of the issues raised in it from a more general point of view, some difficult questions seem to emerge which are not answered in the text.

One such question was raised by a friend of mine with whom I was discussing the book over dinner. He denounced 'objectification' theory as a casuistical apology for private property. The coincidence in time between the appearance of Miller's book and the current rethink which is occurring in British Labour Party circles...
on such subjects as the 'right' to house purchase or share-ownership in private companies seems too neat to be put down to coincidence alone. Is Miller really on about 'material culture' as a purely academic problem, or is he playing a political game, along with Gould, Kinnock and their ilk? My view is that it is possible to read Miller's text in an academic spirit and that it would be unfair to conclude that this is no more than a political tract for the times masquerading as something else. But it must be admitted that the book is open to a very definite, and occasionally obtrusive, political reading as well.

It is also rather disquieting that Miller's defence of consumerism in its expanded 'modern' form rather skates over the global north-south issue, since our consumption is supported (so it is often claimed) by inadequately rewarded production elsewhere, and also over the obvious ecological or 'green' issues of pollution, depletion of non-renewable resources, and so on, all patently problems which can be traced to the environmental impact of the consumerist life-style. We could objectify ourselves to death, one day.

Even if one should take the view that the prosperity on which consumer society rests is not actually 'paid for' by exploiting the Third World and that there is, moreover, no unequal north-south distribution of scarce resources, the fact would remain that this is perceived to be the case, so much so that the residual hostility between the advanced capitalist and high-consumption societies of the 'free world' and their socialist and Third-World antagonists may ultimately be based on the resentment of the poor against the rich and the fear which that resentment provokes in the hearts of the rich themselves.

The defence of the consumerist life-style is a key element in global political confrontation and cannot be treated adequately as an outgrowth of the individual consumer's free act of self-objectification through the mediation of material objects. And moreover, the international, inter-regional and ideological tensions which constitute the political dimensions of contemporary mass consumption are recapitulated in miniature within advanced countries themselves. Envy and resentment are widely expressed by deprived groups in Britain and similar countries, whose lack of access to material symbols of personal achievement and self-realization is a deeply felt affront.

For every consummated act of self-objectification through symbolic consumption, there are myriad frustrating episodes of coitus interruptus through the impenetrable shields of plate-glass windows and expensive packaging. The down-side of consumerism derives directly from the way in which consumerism creates symbolic value, as Simmel correctly pointed out, through the 'resistance factor' which has to be overcome before an act of consumption can take place. Consumers consume up to the marginal limits imposed by their purchasing power; every consumption decision therefore becomes at the same time an acceptance of limitations, a compromise with relative failure. Miller pays insufficient attention, it seems to me, to the dialectical relationship between consumption as a means of self-realization and incorporation of symbolic value,
and the simultaneous creation of a 'negative' self whose contours are defined by the economically imposed limits on increasing personal consumption indefinitely. There is no simple solution to this - redistributing income more equally, for instance - because the basic fact of economic limitation on this particular mode of self-objectification is intrinsic to any pattern of income distribution whatever.

I would suggest that consumption as a satisfactory form of objectification can only be realised in conjunction with a second process which is the elaboration of symbolic culture in a non-objective, internal mode of pure imagination. This elaboration thrives in conditions of restricted access to material goods, as the record of anthropological enquiry shows.

The archetypal image of such an internal elaboration of culture has been provided by Hesse in *The Glass Bead Game*. This kind of parsimony with objects, reducing them finally to patterns of imaginary glass beads, stands at the opposite extreme from the anti-elitist consumption ethos promoted by Miller. But elitist or not, Hesse's image of cultural consumption and objectification on a plane of purely imaginary structures (whose limitations are set only by the fertility of the human imagination, and not by purchasing power or the productivity of the material economy) indicate the only available pathway towards the liquidation of the social dilemmas of consumerist societies and their inherent injustices which haunt Miller's concluding pages.

In this connection, it is a notable fact that Miller identifies only three examples of a truly accomplished 'objectification' - and that two of the three (Hagen body art and Gawa canoes) come from non-industrialised societies, only one from the industrialised world (women's fashion sub-cultures). Although the emphasis throughout Miller's book is on objectification through material culture as a phenomenon of 'modern' societies, it is clear that the notion of 'modernity' is, in the final analysis, unhelpful. The existence of the 'mass of goods' signalled by Simmel and celebrated, if anything, by Miller has not resulted in highly differentiated, nuanced and symbolically elaborated consumption practices but rather the reverse, i.e. the dull and repetitive recourse, by the majority of consumers, to a restricted spectrum of heavily advertised 'brand-name' goods. These, much as Baudrillard suggested, function for the most part as pure signifiers signifying only themselves and their taken-for-granted (but never focalised) characteristics. One does not need to follow Baudrillard in his romantic speculations about primitive men and their awesome powers of authentic symbolic intercourse to find merit in the idea that restricted consumption possibilities enhance the likelihood that whatever consumption does take place is likely to be invested with complex meaning and to be utilised in the process of self-construction in a symbolically charged social setting.

Meanwhile it would be sheer hypocrisy for most people to claim to be indifferent to the material abundance which is available to the wage-earning members of our affluent society and others like it.
This inescapable fact is the firm rock on which Miller's book is founded, and it provides the basis for a searching re-examination of orthodox thinking about consumption.

ALFRED GELL
The unity of theory and practice which has so prominently characterised Marxism has made it a great source of inspiration to countless numbers of people since the time of its inception in the middle of the nineteenth century. It is, however, equally true that this unity has brought to Marxism practical, political pressures which have limited the effects of its other source of strength: theoretical practice. The subordination of theory to ideological needs, as is well recognized today, has proved disastrous. However, this unavoidable link with political practice, which accounts for its great achievements as well as its failures, makes every theoretical reading of Marxism rather hazardous.

To evaluate the contribution of Marxism to any branch of human knowledge such as anthropology requires a careful consideration of the political exigencies with which Marxism is neatly interwoven. This is so despite the fact that theoretical practice, the search for truth, has its own relatively independent position, which is by no means subservient to the ideological imperatives in Marxism. This is particularly true of Marxism's founders, whose scholarly works are clear examples of the fact that the relationship between theory and practice, science and ideology in Marxism, beyond a certain general point, is in no way straightforward and transparent.¹

¹ We should remember Marx's publicly announced response to the
Maurice Bloch's book, *Marxism and Anthropology*, is a sad example of a simple functionalist interpretation of the relationship between theory and ideology in Marxism. In discussing the relevance of Marxism to anthropological topics, the book certainly does Marx and Engels 'both too much honour and too much discredit' by transforming certain historical sketches which they drew in their studies of historical developments into an evolutionary theory of history which was to serve their socialist cause. The theory itself is based on a reductionist conception of society as 'a social system for production'.

II

Bloch describes Marxism primarily as a politically-motivated attempt by Marx and Engels to construct a new version of human history which would serve the exploited and oppressed in their struggle against the capitalist system. This theoretical construction would have revealed to the former 'the nature of the oppression to which they were subjected, and how it had come about' (p. 2). Through the revelation of 'the general forces which govern the history of man' (p. 3), pressure which he felt the publicity of his findings was bringing to bear on him on several occasions. At the end of his famous Preface to *A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, while acknowledging the unfitness of his views with established interests, he defended them as 'the result of conscientious investigation lasting many years. But at the entrance to science, as at the entrance to hell, the demand must be posted: *Qui si convien lasciare ogni sospetto; Ogni vita convien che qui sia morte* [Here you must abandon all division of spirit; and here all cowardice must perish]' (Marx 1969 [1859]; the quotation is from Dante's *The Divine Comedy*, translation from Prawer 1976).

It was in defence of this relative autonomy that Engels, in a letter to Lafargue, went so far as to recommend the non-interference of ideological aims in the objective investigation of social phenomena. Recognizing fully the political commitment of the scientist, Engels nevertheless warns him of mixing the two. 'A man of science', Engels writes, 'has no ideals, he elaborates scientific results, and if he is also politically committed, he struggles for them to be put into practice'. It was such emphases on objectivity in the study of society that led Engels' critics to label his approach positivist (Walton and Gamble 1976: 56).

2 A phrase taken from Marx's letter to the editors of a Russian journal, *Otechestvenye Zapiski*, in 1878 (Marx 1983 [1877-8]). It included a significant warning against the rigid interpretation by some Russian leftist circles of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe as sketched in *Capital*.

3 All unattributed page numbers refer to Bloch's book.
the transitory nature of prevailing ideas and institutions such as private property would also have been shown. So it was both the negative aspect of rewriting history, denying capitalist institutions any claim to permanence, as well as its positive dimension of demonstrating the work of 'the general forces' which drew Marx and Engels to anthropological sources. By using these sources they were 'to show how capitalism and its institutions have been produced by history and how it will therefore be destroyed by history' (p. 27, emphasis added).

However, the unfolding historical processes Marx and Engels were supposed to reveal as the main theoretical thrust of their radical political practice could not operate in 'primitive' societies, the traditional subject-matter of anthropology. This was because of the nature of the general historical forces to be revealed by Marx and Engels, which consisted of a continuous lack of fit between 'the system of concepts and values' on the one hand and 'the process of production' on the other. This incompatibility is itself the result of the division of society into social classes around which the Marxist theory of society, the author argues, is built.

Now since 'primitive' society was defined by the founders of Marxism as classless, no class division can be seen through which these incompatible processes, which were regarded as the source of historical change, operate. In other words, by incorporating anthropological findings into the construction of an early, classless stage in the history of mankind, Marxism, an evolutionary theory of class society, was left without an adequate theoretical means of dealing with 'primitive' societies. This incorporation was the unfortunate result of the combination of 'rhetorical' and the 'historical' use of anthropological sources in Marxist theory. Bloch praises Marx's and Engels' use of anthropological data in order to show the diversity and transitory character of capitalist social institutions within which the lives of their contemporaries were organized. Against this use of anthropological findings, which he calls 'rhetorical', he places the 'historical' use of these findings in constructing the early stage of human history. However, he regards the 'historical' use of anthropological sources as disastrous for Marxism, since the creation of a classless society imposed a disunity on human history as outlined by Marx and Engels.

As a result of this inconsistency, more and more Darwinian and 'utilitarian' notions had to be adopted into the Marxist theorization of 'primitive' society, a fault for which Engels is particularly blamed. However, the borrowings of heterogeneous, biological or other non-Marxist elements by Marxists increased later on to compensate for this theoretical inadequacy. The latter became even more rigid, with the reification of Marxism as a unilinear, evolutionary five-stage theory, in political-theoretical discourse not only in the Soviet Union but also in many Marxist circles around the world after Stalin's arrival in power. According to this theory all human societies have already passed or will pass through consecutive stages, from primitive to modern communism. This was despite the fact that although the first stage of this evolution, i.e. the classless one, was accounted for by biological, ecological and other eclectic factors, the rest, namely the era of class society, is
explained by the incompatibility between 'social system' and 'technological system'. This rigid evolutionary view seriously hampered the fruitful influence of Marxism in anthropology for decades to come. For example, Marxist anthropology did not start to flourish in France during the 1960s until the theoretical legitimacy of this rigid evolutionary approach was effectively questioned by French Marxists, most prominent among whom was Louis Althusser.

III

It is noticeable that both the 'rhetorical' and the 'historical' use of anthropological sources attributed by Bloch to Marxism are in fact historical. The first, the 'rhetorical', is to establish the historical forms which do not exist in any particular place, and the second, the 'historical' one, is to establish the historical forms which existed in the past. When Bloch describes as disastrous the mixture of the negative and positive historical use of anthropological data, which he defines as 'rhetorical' and 'historical', in the hands of Marx and Engels as well as other Marxists, he actually argues for the negative historical use of anthropology in Marxism against the other, positive use of anthropological findings, which he rejects. As mentioned earlier Bloch fully recognizes Marx's and Engels' attempts to establish the historicity of their contemporary capitalist institutions by bringing to the fore the antithetical features of 'primitive' peoples such as their 'gentile constitution', 'lack of individualism' etc. In this way the historical nature of the facts about capitalist society were established so that they could be incorporated into an evolutionary theory of society, which is what Bloch claims Marxism is all about.

Thus Bloch neglects essential parts of the picture of primitive classless society in his presentation of Marxism, while in a long chapter on 'The Present-Day Standing of Marx's and Engels' Anthropology', he confirms the authenticity of the main parts of the picture against recent anthropological findings. In other words, Bloch to a large extent approves of Marx and Engels when they speak, say, of communal property, lack of profit-making, or kinship-based obligations. But he implies that these characteristics of primitive society should have been left theoretically untreated by the founders of Marxism, since these features are incompatible with the class divisions which are the foundation of Marxism (p. 54).

This contradictory position not only arises from a confusion on the part of the author as to Marx's and Engels' historical subject of study and the explanation they gave of this subject. It is also related to his double-standard evolutionary position in reading Marxism. That is, although Bloch expresses his sympathy every now and then with those disillusioned with a rigid evolutionary interpretation of Marxism, he reads only an evolutionary sequence into it. The author's opposition to the classificatory historical approach, which was quite prevalent in many Marxist circles and up to the early 1960s had effectively hindered the use of Marxist
analytical tools in various branches of human knowledge, including anthropology, is therefore half-hearted. What he rejects is not the notion of social evolution, which he regards as meaning 'that there are general laws governing human history' (p. 65), but that of the rigid interpretation of a fixed, unilineal, five-stage evolutionary sequence which had to be replaced by several multilinear evolutionary paths. So by excluding 'primitive' society from his evolutionary scheme, Bloch can sympathetically quote (p. 150) the anti-evolutionary comments of such authors as the French Marxist anthropologist E. Terray to use against Morgan, to whose work Terray goes to great pains to give a non-evolutionary reading (Terray 1972).

IV

As is well known, the rapidly changing circumstances in the period during which Marxism was formed fostered an acute sense that human institutions as well as natural and creatures were evolving. Due to the prevalence of this evolutionary approach, the relationship between every human institution and its past was regarded as an integral part of its existence. In Terray's words: 'Just as in the Middle Ages anyone who wanted to be heard on any subject had to express himself as a theologian, so at the end of the nineteenth century "transformism" became the universal language of the biological and human sciences' (Terray 1972: 23).

Such a historicist approach becomes even more apparent when the directions in which these changes moved became matters of concern to these observers. Those among whom these changes fostered hope or disappointment could hardly afford to be left uninspired by the historical prospects the large-scale changes seemed to unfold. To Marx and Engels, who expected and struggled for revolutionary change in the structure of capitalist society as a whole, history was, inevitably, the arena in which their grandiose hopes were to be materialized. If for young Hegelian radicals it was where the pure form of the State was to be realized, for the philosopher's revolutionary pupil and friend Engels, it was the arena of human emancipation from exploitation and oppression.4

Moreover, the dynamic character of Marx's and Engels' analysis of society, as well as its large-scale focus, the structure of society as a whole, inevitably bestowed a historical dimension upon the theoretical practice which has characterized Marxism until now. To examine the expropriation of the objective conditions of the reproduction of labour - Marx's main theoretical concern in writing Capital - not only required a holistic view of society but also a historical one. As the penetration of capital into various spheres

4 It is this political content of Marxist historical orientation which does not seem to have been sufficiently appreciated by Althusser in his otherwise important critique of historicism and humanism in certain versions of Marxism (Althusser 1972).
of social production was a historical process, so was its theoretical presentation.

The depiction of such a process entailed the analysis of earlier, that is, forms of social reproduction into which capital had broken through. This analytical use of historical forms is particularly prominent in that part of Marx's Grundrisse (commonly known as Formen) which deals with pre-capitalist forms. What Marx is concerned with here is this: 'the relationship of labour to capital or to the objective conditions of labour as capital, presupposes a historic process which dissolves the different forms, in which the labourer is an owner and the owner labours' (Marx 1964: 97). It was the unity of labour and its conditions of reproduction in a classless society that attracted Marx and Engels to 'primitive' society. For obvious reasons this fascination, which is exemplified by the great interest which Marx and Engels showed in Morgan's reconstruction of the gens in the early stage of human history, was both theoretical and ideological. Analytically as well as ideologically, a society in which the objective condition of labour is still the property of the labourers and leadership has not yet turned into rule is the logical start or end of an intellectual journey which it was vital for Marx and Engels to take in order to objectify their contemporary capitalist exploitation. The succession of historical forms under which Marx examines, however briefly, the conditions of the reproduction of labour does not assume any more significance to him than an abstraction from certain historical developments.

If the variety and transformations of historical circumstances under which labour is reproduced is used by Marx in Formen to objectify the domination of capital in his contemporary society, Engels' preoccupation in The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State is the monogamous family as an institution, characteristic of civilization, within which male dominance is reproduced. This domination is historically illustrated by depicting its antithesis as reflected in the 'gentile constitution' of the earlier stage of development of human society. This was when households headed by women were the foci of communal life rather than the centres of private ones. It was a society in which blood ties governed the relationships between its members and there was 'no place for ruler and ruled. In the realm of the internal, there was as yet no distinction between rights and duties' (Engels 1970 [1884]: 316).

Many anthropologists across the political spectrum would agree (cf. Gough 1975) that Morgan, Engels and, as we have every reason to include him, Marx too have proved to have been speculative in

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5 Terray refers to Emile Bottigelli, according to whom, 'Marx read [Morgan's] Ancient Society between December 1880 and March 1881 and took no less than 98 pages of notes' (Terray 1972: 21).
this historical reconstruction of the development of the monogamous family. However, there is no reason to believe that temporal ordering of the material, technological or otherwise, was the prime aim of Engels in his account of the historical development of the family. On the contrary, Engels more than once conditions (ibid.: 193, 201, 203, 204, 209) his assessments of the materials available to him by their temporal nature. So there is not much, if any, justification in saying that in *The Origin* 'Engels more or less tells us that the scheme presented is not likely to be changed by new discoveries' (p. 96) when Engels himself has already told us that 'unless important additional material necessitates alterations, his [Morgan's] classification [of prehistoric order] may be expected to remain in force' (Engels 1970: 204).

Moreover, as Engels himself confesses, 'the picture of the evolution of mankind through savagery and barbarism to the beginnings of civilisation that I have sketched here after Morgan', though at that time having incontestable features because they were 'taken straight from production, nevertheless ...will appear faint and meager compared with the picture which will unfold itself at the end of our journey. Only then will it be possible to give a full view of the transition from barbarism to civilisation and the striking contrast between the two' (ibid.: 208-9; emphasis added). The 'end of our [historical] journey' for Engels was a clearer objectivity about the present situation which could only be recognized through its 'contrast' with the past.

This is equally true of *The German Ideology*, which Bloch regards as the first text in which Marx and Engels formulated their evolutionary theory of society (p. 21). It has to be remembered that *The German Ideology* sprang out of Marx's and Engels' critical reviews of a number of Young Hegelian philosophers, particularly Feuerbach, who had radicalized Hegel's philosophical views by treating consciousness in its own terms while arguing for its replacement by a pure form (Marx and Engels 1969 [1845-6]: 18-9). The aim Marx and Engels set for themselves in *The German Ideology* was, therefore, to establish that ideas and various forms of human consciousness do not have an independent existence and, consequently, should be seen externally not in their own terms but in terms of their condition of production. The conditional existence accorded to ideas and the social institutions which supported them did not, in Marx's and Engels' view, reduce their effective existence by regarding them as the mere 'epiphenomena' of something at the 'bottom' of society which Bloch considers to be 'a system of organization producing the goods on which people depend for their life' (p. 22). Far from that, the denial of independence to human consciousness would only have brought it into relationship with its condition of existence whereby 'the whole thing can be depicted in its totality (and therefore, too, the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another)' (Marx and Engels 1969 [1845-6]: 42).

Nor did such a reductionist view of society lead Marx and Engels to look at the evolving historical process which would unfold its essence through successive stages to those who need to be assured of its promises! Marx's and Engels' first reference to historical forms in *The German Ideology* is clearly made to
demonstrate 'the first premise' of their materialist approach to the study of human society (ibid.: 19). They try to show that different stages of the 'division of labour', which they use rather metaphorically to imply various economic, political and ideological contradictions in each stage (ibid.: 52), carry different forms of ownership. The 'tribal', 'the ancient communal and State' and the 'feudal' forms of ownership are accompanied by different levels of development of the 'division of labour' in society. But there is nothing beyond the sketches of historical developments suggested by Marx and Engels which can be abstracted and legitimately turned into 'a general historico-philosophical theory, whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historical' (Marx 1983 [1877-8]: 136).

Despite their constant hope for historical changes for the betterment of humanity Marx and Engels never sought in human history anything other than the real effects of individuals acting in their own societies. Indeed, it was to deny history an absolute power, bestowed upon it by Hegel and his followers, which unravelled itself through successive stages, that Marx and Engels emphatically stated in The German Ideology: 'History is nothing but the succession of the separate generations' (1969 [1845-6]: 38).

To present such a reductionist as well as evolutionist conception of society as 'the central characteristics of anthropology' of Marx and Engels is a great misrepresentation of their significant anthropological contribution. As far as The German Ideology is concerned, the main aspects of this contribution are to establish: a) the dependent social existence of various forms of consciousness and the social institutions within which they are organized, and b) the relation of determination which exists within each social totality between ideas and social institutions on the one hand and the economic structure of the society on the other. What Marx and Engels were always concerned with in their study of human society was a differentiated social totality (cf. Marx 1973 [1857-8]).

Within this social whole, it is true, Marx and Engels considered the effect of production of means of subsistence on other spheres of social reproduction as, on the whole, determinant. But nothing is a greater betrayal of the subtlety and complexity with which they saw this relation of determination than to assume that they regarded it as one-sided and as reducing other aspects of social life to the level of 'epiphenomena' of economic factors. After all, it was their awareness of the real effects of their German opponents' philosophical illusions that led them to spend years of hard intellectual work in repelling them. In fact, in several well-known letters Engels, in the last years of his life, warned his socialist contemporaries against a narrow interpretation of the materialist conception of history (cf. Engels' letters to Bloch, Schmidt, Borgius, Mehring, in Marx and Engels 1979). He even accepted his and Marx's responsibility in not paying sufficient attention
to the effects of other, non-economic factors on social situations (see Engels' letter to Bloch, ibid.).

It was pointed out above that what is meant by the 'division of labour' in *The German Ideology* is not, contrary to what Maurice Bloch would have us believe, purely the economic structure of the society, but also the process of its reproduction. It is equally true of the phrase 'mode of production' which, Marx and Engels write, is not confined to the sphere of economic production: 'This mode of production must not be considered simply as being the reproduction of the physical existence of the individuals. Rather it is a definite form of activity of these individuals, a definite form of expressing their life, a definite mode of life on their part' (Marx and Engels 1969 [1845-6]: 20; original emphasis). To fail to consider the metaphorical meanings of these expressions, such as 'division of labour' and 'mode of production', which has led Bloch to read into the first 'the social organization of production' and into the second (in the *Formen*) a 'social evolutionary stage' (p. 35), amounts to neither more nor less than the impoverished Marxism which the book represents.

The foundations of Marxism were laid by Marx and Engels as a political and theoretical challenge to the social inequality which characterized the capitalist system in which Marxism was born. Thus class division in capitalism, and by extension in other social and economic systems, constitutes a prime concern in Marxism at which a great deal of theoretical effort has been directed. Class division in Marxist terms starts with unequal appropriation by one section of the society of the labour of another. The appropriation or, to use another term for the same thing, exploitation of one class's products of labour by another class requires the loss, partially or completely, of the control of the exploited class over the objective conditions of its reproduction of labour to the exploiting class. So for Marxists the analysis of class formation in any society means examining the reproduction of social totality as a whole and determining objectively the control exerted by one part of the population over the conditions of the producers' reproduction of labour. That is to say, despite Marxism's main concern being with class division, it provides a novel analytical means of studying social differentiation, irrespective of its stage of development.

However, since exploitation requires the unequal distribution of social products among the various classes into which the society is divided, its discussion inevitably involves some account of the development of productive forces and the consequent rising productivity of labour. But this development, though increasing the technical division of labour, does not require, in Marx's and Engels' view, any class division. The significance of technological developments for class division lies in the fact that the amount of surplus labour which can be squeezed out of the producers' hands at any particular time depends on the level of productivity of labour. Therefore technology only provides or denies the ground for the development of class divisions in society. Besides, the very dialectics of class formation in human society, something which, in the Marxist conception, has to be specified within a certain historical context, negates the present class composition, not
ideologically but theoretically, by subjecting it to a diachronic examination.

So Marxist analysis of class formation in any particular society is bound to come up with a) something different having existed before and b) something else which will emerge in the future. Thus the classless stage, even if - and Bloch should admit that this is controversial - the evidence for such a primitive communism were not presently available, is predicated upon the dialectical methods Marx and Engels employed in their approach to the problem of social class. It is therefore quite conceivable to speak of a classless society, both in the past and in the future, as the latter was Marx's and Engels' main aim in their political struggle. Bloch's claim that the notion of a classless society cannot be integrated in Marxism arises from his mechanical conception of history, which can only be set in motion by incompatibility between the system of production and the idea.

VII

The holistic and at the same time diachronic features of Marxism would have made any Marxist analysis a historical one. However, if economic determinism and political fatalism are not kept at bay in any such attempt, Marxism can easily be turned into a kind of philosophy of history which will inevitably deprive it of all its theoretical strength: it will become an easy political target to pick up or knock down. Bloch seems to me to be guilty of such an easy choice. Far from what he reads into their writings, neither Marx's or Engels' historical investigations are designed to provide us with a historical guarantee of the materialization of their aims nor for that matter, those of their followers. The connection between theory and practice in Marxism is not as straightforward and transparent as Bloch would have us believe.

Another point to be mentioned here is that although to return to 'the sources' in any discussion of Marxism seems to be inevitable, such an intellectual journey cannot be effective unless it is made as part of a dialogue with contemporary debaters. There is no such thing as 'the essence' of Marxism to be discovered, and whatever one may find significant in these sources is connected, directly or indirectly, with what others have already found important in them. Thus the relevance of Marxism to contemporary anthropology has unavoidably to be sought through contemporary Marxist debate on economic determinism, reductionism, historicism etc. As a consequence, leaving aside for the most part contributors such as Gramsci and Althusser and the important questions they have raised, as the author evidently confesses as his intention (see Bloch's 'Preface'), is an arbitrary way of presenting Marxism.

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Introduction

Robert Paine (1969), writing on friendship, noted that whereas anthropologists focus on kinship to the neglect of friendship, kinship and friendship are related in many cultural practices. They are, as an intrinsic value of human life, woven into the fabric of social, political and economic exchanges. Thus the patterns of friendship in many cultures can be expected to vary according to certain structural relations which determine their development in a sociopolitical function of domination or equality in performances.

This view is very much reflected in attempts to distinguish between male and female patterns of friendship (Nelson 1974; Lindholm and Lindholm 1979) and to emphasise the context-sensitiveness of friendship development (Herzfeld 1981, 1982; Jacobson 1981). For instance, Herzfeld (1981) hints in his studies of Greek towns in Crete and of Pefko that differences in social norms encourage the Cretans to see friendship as an extra-communal, spiritual kinship, whereas in Pefko, friends are socially inferior to kin. In Herzfeld's view, friendship is formulaic:

... under the guise of representing events in personal terms, it actually recasts them stereotypically. Thus, the attribution of friendship to political allies is in fact a metaphor for the instability of that relationship, which may, in addition, be essentially one of asymmetrical patronage (Herzfeld 1982: 655).

The use of metaphors or labels to describe friendship patterns in various cultures is not generally uncommon. What are less often emphasised in the literature are the context and dynamics of the linguistic usages (Jacobson 1981). For instance, in order to
indicate closeness in friendship, a southerner in the United States of America might say someone is a cousin even though the person is not a cousin according to basic genealogical criteria (Holland 1982; Lawuyi 1983). Similarly, a black American can describe a fellow Black as a friend as 'brother', even though they are not related. The term 'brother' signifies relations other than that of fictive kinship. In labelling their relationships to others, Blacks have invariably taken into account the situation of encounter and the impression and knowledge of people (Holland 1982).

In this paper, I wish to examine the notion of 'brother' as a label for friendship among a 'black' group known as Seminole Freedmen. The observations made are in respect of year-long participant-observation research in Wewoka, Oklahoma, in the United States of America, where the Seminole Freedmen reside. The fieldwork began in May 1983 and ended in May the following year. The paper is divided into three sections. The first considers the ethnographic setting for ethnic relations in Wewoka. The second is a brief description of my encounter with two Seminole Freedmen at a bar-room. Both Freedmen, in spite of the conflict between them, referred to me as 'brother'. The meaning of this is explored in the third section of the paper. The thrust of my argument is that the general semiotic understanding of 'brother' takes on a specific orientation in the context of anthropologist-native relations. For in Wewoka, where being black encodes a complex set of social and moral propositions, 'brother' serves two diametrically opposed semiotic functions: it homogenizes a black anthropologist with the native black group and heterogenizes on the basis of untested knowledge of the anthropologist, who is an outsider. The homo-/hetero-genization process is comprehended from the dimension of friendship, herein defined as shared body of knowledge and presuppositions which allows 'brothers' to predict what they can and cannot do. 'Brother' is thus a term in which a person qua person acquires meaning through the roles ascribed to friendship.

The Cultural Setting

Wewoka lies within Seminole county in the state of Oklahoma. The county has an area of 639 square miles, and in 1930, according to the 1980 U.S. Census figures, had a population of 79,621. Many people came to settle here because of the discovery of oil in the area during the early 1900s. But by 1980, the population had decreased to 27,743. This is because of the shift away from oil to the livestock business. In 1984, a large portion of the county was still non-industrialized and rural. The major link with the outside world is land transportation. The railway that passes through only picks up goods, not passengers. There is no seaport, and the airport in Seminole city, a few miles from Wewoka, handles small aircraft traffic only.

Seminole county headquarters is located at Wewoka. The city's population is, in the 1980 census, estimated at 5,480. This
represents an increase of only 196 over that of the previous decade. The adult population has been growing, but some of the younger generation, forced by lack of jobs, education, and recreational facilities, have had to migrate to the bigger cities in the state. Essentially, businesses thrive only on small profits, several shops have closed down and been relocated to such neighbouring cities as Seminole and Holdenville. Unemployment is high, especially since the remaining companies do not, in my estimation, expand enough to absorb one hundred new employees every year.

Ethnic distribution across Seminole county reveals much about the sociological implications of this little-industrialized economy on the organization of social relations. There are 21,453 Whites, 2,162 Blacks and 3,718 American Indians in the county. Of these figures, which are taken from the 1980 census data, only 3,683 Whites, 993 Blacks and 759 American Indians live in Wewoka city. The number of Blacks in Wewoka is higher than that in any other town in Seminole county. They are the major labour force recruited into the white-controlled establishments in the area. Many of the American Indians, by contrast, seek for and are recruited into employment in the Seminole Nation of Oklahoma.

The 1980 census estimates also show that two-thirds of the black population in Wewoka are under 65 years of age. This percentage is, of course, judging from the emphasis on black labour, higher than that of any other racial group. These Blacks usually only have a secondary education. Those with a higher education are, rather, to be found in cities whose environments are conducive to their pursuits as lawyers, administrators, doctors and engineers. Their link with Wewoka is mostly restricted to the occasions of funerals, the inauguration of pastors or deacons, marriage arrangements, and the Christmas season.

Whenever the blacks and members of other racial groups come home, they swell the number of those local residents who patronize the 'street'. The street embraces three major buildings at the junction of Cedar and Mekusukey streets. The businesses located on the street include beer parlours, gaming machines and discos. On non-festive occasions, the clients are mostly retired citizens, disabled soldiers or the unemployed. Businesses are maintained by the trickle of money slotted into juke boxes, the sale of beer and card games.

The ambience on the street is relaxed; indeed, to be on the street is considered fun. People dance, drink, smoke and gamble. Although fun or play is sometimes associated with unhealthy excitement, individuals are expected to exercise self-control. To have fun, individuals must tolerate the street talk - the abusive, insulting, derogatory, endearing speeches of 'mother-fucker', 'fuck your ass', 'asshole', 'darling' and 'honey' - which can elicit the response of excitement or anger. To respond angrily, even when a person to whom you have lent money, calls you a mother-fucker, is regarded as demeaning. Self-control is applauded.

With the sociological import of the street as a place of leisure, a forum of inter-ethnic and racial relations and as a place where identities are continually being restructured (Lawuyi 1985), as an anthropologist studying ethnic relations I was naturally drawn
into the street also.

Quite understandably, while I was still regarded a stranger few people wanted to associate with me. I would sit down in the bar and drink my beer alone, or invite people so willing to join me. As time went on, I developed my own friendship network. This included the young and the aged, male and female, university and non-university graduates. We would sit down and talk and sometimes dance to the music from the juke boxes. Any time I felt tired and wanted to sit down, I would be teased back to the dancing floor. It was difficult to obtain any peace, as the following incident shows.

At a bar, where I had gone to enjoy myself drinking beer and watching domino games, a black man, 27 years old, walked to my table and accused me of talking to his girl-friend who had just walked past my table. I thought he was either joking or drunk and would have ignored him except that he challenged me to a physical duel after sniffing contemptuously, 'you nigger'. I was still explaining myself to him when an onlooker joined in the dialogue and dared my antagonist to lay a hand on his 'brother' and see the consequences. My 'antagonist' withdrew from me and called my 'rescuer' a 'mother-fucker'. The quarrel ended after another onlooker bought drinks for the three of us.

My rescuer and I became friends after the bar-room incident. But then, whenever I met my protagonist on the road or in the bar, he would greet me with the Afro-American expression 'Hi brother'. I was caught in a double bind: myself against my 'brother', my 'brother' and I against my brother.

Among the Seminole Freedmen, the term 'brother', like that of cousin, can describe fictive or non-fictive relations. Both can, on the fictive level, enter into the kinship system as a designation for members of an extended family system that always includes three generations of kin. However, none of the terms plays a significant role in inheritance, as usually the eldest male child becomes the principal inheritor of his father's property.

The Seminole Freedmen were originally black slaves who escaped from their white masters and took refuge in inhospitable places like the swamps, river banks, mountains and forests of Florida (Porter 1971; Gallagher 1951; Opala 1981). The members of a band constitute the most inclusive political unit in traditional Seminole Freedmen society. The society then was located in Florida among the Seminole Indians, with whom the Seminole Freedmen formed a political alliance (Opala 1981; Genovese 1979). The alliance on several occasions fought white men who sought to restrict their freedom and dispossess them of their property (Coe 1974; Gallagher 1951; Opala 1981). The fighting unit was not often the individual band (Coe 1974), yet there were occasions when it acted alone in marauding neighbouring white settlements for survival goods like food and guns (Genovese 1979). Each successful raid emboldened the spirit of resistance against slavery and, more importantly, encouraged Blacks still working in the white cotton and coffee plantations in the south, especially in North and South Carolina and in Georgia, to work towards their own freedom (Willis 1963; Sefton 1972). As new immigrants joined the bands, their population grew.
Another process which facilitated the growth of the bands was intermarriage between the free black slaves on one hand, and between blacks and Indians on the other. The latter, inter-racial form of marriage was of politico-economic significance in that it legitimized the civic rights of the free slaves and was fundamental to their economic subsistence. The free slaves were leased lands by the Seminole Indians. After farming on the lands, the Seminole Freedmen compensated the Seminole Indians with at least one-third of their harvests (Covington 1978). This politico-economic relationship continued until 1832 when, in pursuance of the removal policy of Andrew Jackson, the Seminole Indians were induced to sign the Treaty of Payne's Landing at Fort Gibson, Oklahoma (Howard 1984). The treaty required the Seminole and the free slaves to relinquish their lands in Florida and migrate to Oklahoma, their present home. Although the Seminole Indians and the free slaves resisted the removal, they were nevertheless defeated and eventually relocated (Hudson 1976).

In short, the band was both a political and an economic unit. Its size varied from time to time in response to the vagaries of war and demographic shifts. It was organized around a male leader, usually the founder, who was succeeded by a male member of the band who was rich and powerful. Polygyny was extensively practised. Descent was bilateral. Members of co-resident lineages from the same sib recognized a closer kinship among themselves than with a co-resident lineage from a different sib that belonged to another band. In acknowledging a common affiliation with other lineages of their sib the Seminole Freedmen always refer to their African ancestry (Lawuyi 1985) as well as to their band, which today is either Dosar Barkus or Bruner. Members of these bands are spread into settlements such as Turkey Creek, Noble Town, Scipio, Thomas and Bruner. Each of these settlements is located near creeks or streams from which water can be drawn for drinking or for washing clothes.

All in all, each kin group is an independent unit and only relates to others horizontally through related sub-groups. Kinship is a mode of ordering rights and duties and besides is a means of ensuring social integration. However, it must be noted that because of the discovery of oil in Wewoka and its environs, as well as the growth of major towns in the Seminole area, many of the Seminole Freedmen settlements have become incorporated into big urban centres. Consequently the Seminole Freedmen settlements are now open to all social groups. Hence the settlements no longer rigidly mark Seminole Freedmen ethnic identity.

The terms 'brother' and 'cousin' would ordinarily be used to cover lineal and collateral kin in descending generations. But in other social contexts the terms cover non-kin. A brother or a cousin is different in the local fictive idiom from a 'buckra' or outsider. The terms describe a role prescribed or not, involving people in a certain form of socio-economic and political relationship. In this sense, the Africans and the Seminole Indians regarded each other as brothers, whereas the whites, the common enemy to those who had experienced colonial domination, are 'buckras'. The use of the term 'brother' or 'cousin' in the fictive sense therefore
implies a frame within which people are bonded in socially established meanings. Within this frame, to call one a brother or a cousin is to signal an intention or expectation. Much more is required of a brother than of a cousin.

Developing Friendship

In the light of the above discussion, the bar-room incident draws our attention to the conventional social-structural problem of opposition and complementation. This opposition is evidenced by a characteristic weakness of the formal organic bond between myself and my antagonist. Terms like 'nigger', which he used, are introduced into discourse when people become irritated, annoyed or provoked. In such instances of annoyance or dissatisfaction with another person's action, 'nigger' calls attention to a certain category and its associated cultural value (Basso 1979). The individual who is a 'nigger' becomes a non-person, one with a negative value from which the user seeks to dissociate himself or herself. Hence the use of 'nigger' signifies a lack of bond. Without it there is a tendency towards the negation or disruption of relations between 'insider and outsider', between husband and wife, and between generations (Balikci 1968).

In contrast, the complementary aspect of the bar-room encounter is evident in the exchange between myself and my rescuer. From the day he rescued me, I bought him drinks, he bought for me too, and we became friends. Patrons of the bar asked me about his movements and usually refused to believe that I did not know his whereabouts. Though the 'rescue' operation did not entail any specific obligations, the friendship that developed involved an effort to maintain it through adherence to the rules of balanced reciprocity (Reina 1959; Price 1978).

Aside from the exchange in beer, money and other material goods, the bar-room encounter has another significance that is rooted in the question, were the subsequent greetings by my former antagonist genuine or ironic? If ironic, how is this indicative of friendship? My view is that the term 'brother' is a denotational symbol for a certain sort of behaviour. Its meaning depends on the linkage of context and culture and the link between the antagonist, the rescuer and I. The Seminole Freedmen's culture limits the number of interpretive options we are permitted seriously to consider (Shweder 1977), just as, from Pefko rhetoric on friendship, the citizens' imaginations and expectations are trained on acceptable criteria for social identities in a perceived hostile environment (Herzfeld 1982). Among Pefko citizens, the rhetorical stratagems are supposed to resolve the paradox of their selfhood: do they belong to Pefko or to Crete?

The 'brother' label must have been a means by which my rescuer and antagonist both wanted to objectify their relationships with me, for it was through this label that we came to integrate our separateness by a sense of sharing. What we shared are meanings
that are not necessarily in behaviour itself. Though the meanings 'may seem to be inextricably part of the event, once an interpreta-
tion is made ... this phenomenological illusion should not mislead
us into thinking that meanings are discovered' (Shweder 1977: 641).

In my relationships with my antagonist and my rescuer there
are two seemingly disparate manifestations of friendship which are
first, the skin-colour classification, which linked me as an Afri-
can with a Black American community, and secondly, the attributive
characteristics of Black American cultural knowledge. As Holland
(1982: 16) points out, such attribution
can be construed as supporting a central point suggested by
the present data, namely that Americans use two distinctive
knowledge systems in the process of interpreting behaviour.
As derived from the research described here, one knowledge
system has to do with situation, that is with the routinized
or institutionalized aspects of life in the society, of people
with whom one associates. The other has to do with person,
that is, with the knowledge that one has about the character-
istics of specific individuals, of types of individuals, and
of humans in general, that transcend situation.

Knowledge of the situation in the bar-room revolved around
my skin-colour. The black skin is, in Wewokan society, a major
criterion in contrasting spheres of racial relations (Lawuyi 1985).
Blacks form a 'family' that distinguishes them from the 'Whites'
and the 'Reds'. Within such a 'family' is the domain of friends,
the people who sometimes greet each other as 'brothers' or 'sisters'.
The domain of friends is not, however, restricted to the Black
family, since certain Whites and Reds fulfilling certain expecta-
tions are also regarded as friends. In fact, even in my own case,
the wish to incorporate me into the 'family' circle is often count-
ered by some of my negative attributes. One of such negative attri-
butes is my 'funny accent'.

With my funny accent I could not pass as a bona fide member of
the 'Black family'. On listening to my accent a barrage of ques-
tioning usually follows: 'Where are you from?', 'How did you come
here?', 'Are you from Africa?', 'Do you still live in trees?', 'Why
do you have robust health when other Africans are dying of hunger?'.
These questions raise what Crapanzano would describe as 'ethno-
graphic confrontation' (1977: 6). It suggests that at the instance
of my encounters with fellow Blacks there was a disruption in our
senses of our selves which is the 'reflexive awareness of a cent-
ered unity and continuity, an identity that oscillates between re-
ification and resistance to reification' (ibid.: 7).

There was a general tendency on the part of my informants to
consider my movement, speech and eating habits as African. Even my
laughter was African. Seldom do they remember my nationality and
they cared even less - except for the educated ones with university
degrees - about my ethnicity. Africans seemed to them to share a
common culture; they were an indivisible entity to my informants.
It was on this African platform that we shared a common identity,
since those who regarded themselves as having an African origin can
hardly remember the ethnic setting from which their ancestors were captured and sold as slaves.

My rescuer was one of those who considered himself an African. He had in the past contemplated travelling to Africa but had shelved the plan for lack of money. He had worked in Washington D.C. for several years as a government employee and had, he said, met and interacted with several Africans. The memories he had of the contacts helped to structure our relationship: he saw in me an opportunity of being informed about several African cultural practices he had heard about or had read in books. In fact, before the bar-room encounter we used to discuss African problems.

My antagonist, by contrast, had worked in Newoka all his life. On finishing secondary education, he was employed as a guard in one of the industrial plants in the city. When we met in the bar-room he was unemployed because the general economic situation in America had led to severe retrenchment of workers. Hence, idle and without any work, he took to visiting the street. On the street, home brew, drunk in company, eliminated his thoughts about losing his job. Also, making passes to women was one way, in my opinion, of reasserting his manliness. There was no room in his world for identification with people outside the circle of friends he was used to. Indeed, despite the ideal attitude in the community that a person should mind his own business, the common expression of his latent hostility is to challenge people for having taken what was his. I was a victim of one of these hostilities because in his view I took his girl-friend. Hence I became a symbolic substitute for the job. And since my African identity had no meaning—until, as he confessed, after the encounter, when we had become friends—I did not fulfill his expectations of those relationships he classified as close or friendly. This led me to search for what friendship is to several of my informants.

The Conceptual Basis of Friendship

In my view, between why and how people form friendship is a cognitive structure that influences the strategies adopted before and after such friendship (Bourdieu 1977). The structure allows for the fact that gifts, words, challenges and even women that are exchanged in friendship relations receive their appropriate meaning from the response they trigger off, even if that response is a failure and is unable retrospectively to remove the intended meaning of the exchange. I discovered that in Newoka, occasions such as New Year's Day, and Valentine's Day, are times for the exchange of gifts, when being friends becomes instrumental to symbolic or material exchanges, especially where costly articles like clothes, wrist-watches and even food were items of exchange. The costs of the articles seem to place a higher value on friendship. This is because, where the friendship has lasted a long while, those involved are linked by a knowledge structure of beliefs and propositions that provide generic categories. As a friend of mine who gave
me gifts at Christmas said:

Oh yah! I have plenty friends. We are supposed to treat other people like you do yourself. A friend is somebody who treats you right, treats you as you treat yourself. You treat them lovely like I do you [reference is to me]. If you come to my house, I treat you. If I am cooking or getting ready to eat, I put on the table and offer you something to eat.

There were other people that talked to me on how to recognize friends. Their statements reveal that a stereotyped sequence of actions and knowledge of persons is productively used in the conceptualization of friendship. Thus a friend is one who adjusts to an elaborate code of behaviour; such a friend treats the partner like himself or herself and thereby dissolves the conceptual distinction between self and other. Friendship also encourages performances such as the feeding and housing of friends. As a matter of fact, even when a friend's visit is unexpected, the setting is one that remains open and ready to do something for the sake of the friendship.

Yet true friendship takes time to develop. The following excerpt suggests that friends are tested, and that the perceived scores on such tests become feedback information that is moulded into explanatory accounts which excuse or justify continuity or change in friendship. A male friend said:

Really, it takes me a while. I don't make snap judgements. A friend is somebody you can really depend on ... um ... have concern for you. Somebody you can share thoughts with and you don't hear them everytime you turn around.

It occurs to me that a very important element in friendship is trust. Trust comes through friends performing well on tasks which reinforce belief and suppositions about what a true friend should do. The context of such performances matter, as it accounts for the production and consumption of the meaning of behaviour. The Black who perceived me as a brother can, in another context, regard me as a nigger. Meaning in this context is in the realization of what the codes (i.e. brother and nigger) stand for. Where attempts are made to account for these codes, friendship is bounded by familiar roles adopted and acted out. As a female friend indicated:

I have a good friend in Brooklyn, New York. We shared our training together and we have been friends, in fact sisters, since 1943 till now. She calls more than I do and we share thoughts. You cultivate these friendships and they seem to go on, more on and on.

In a nutshell, meaningful friendship is created through a fixation of imagination on at least an instant of behaviour. The correspondences to the fixated image of the friend, as for instance phoning regularly to inquire after one's welfare, account for the detachment of the meaning of friendship. Indeed, from such fixated
images come the notion of deviancy or unfriendly acts. Hence, in my research, I noticed that when people hear that their friends stole, raped, killed or travelled abroad they were surprised that such had happened without their knowledge or had never happened before. The reactions to the information sometimes take the form 'No, it cannot be my friend!'; 'I can't believe it'; 'That can't be true!'. These are expressions of surprise based on what has been established as standard expectations from friends.

As long as the fixated image is not contradicted by any other behaviour, there is no basis for surprise. The ability to predict what friends are capable of doing goes a long way in understanding the degree of the friends' commitment. As an elderly man, 66 years old, told me:

A dog does not promise, yet is committed. We do not know whether a dog trusts or has confidence yet it is man's best friend. A dog will follow you, will protect you, will defend you. I remember on one occasion, my uncle went fishing and slipped into the water. It was his dog that saved him.

At the end of a long story, the informant concluded that the dog was well trained. Actually the dog was trained to discriminate between familiar and non-familiar objects and to place value on its friendship to the master. The value becomes a cultural knowledge that is, in turn, used to understand the behaviour of friends. For when a friend does not call or visit, does not inquire after one's welfare and is unpredictable in behaviour, the label of 'friend' may either be withdrawn or may be rephrased as that of a 'fair-weather' friend (Jacobson 1981).

Discussion and Conclusion

A central issue in my relationship with my former antagonist and my rescuer is their objectification of me as a brother.

In this paper, the situation in which 'brother' would appear to have two different meanings has been analysed as an important part of Black American culture, though at a level of abstraction higher than that of the cognitive models of individuals. The structure involves a basic set of assumptions about testing situations, predictability in behaviour and social categorization. In my view, brothers whose behaviour can be predicted are those that have been tested. The performance of brothers on such tests invariably lead to the labelling of persons as friends, cousins, or fair-weather friends.

On the one hand, I was a brother to my rescuer, who had met and interacted with other Africans and, consequently, saw me as a member of the African group. On the other hand, my former antagonist, lacking any experience similar to that of my rescuer, did not initially perceive me as a brother. I had to prove to him that I was indeed a brother.
Of course, the bar-room encounter was not in itself a deliberate test of friendship. However, it set up the interpretative frame within which messages of friendship were to be understood; brothers do not fight or quarrel but rather assume a responsibility for caring for each other. The frame, as encoded in the 'brother' label, thus contrasts with at least one other frame, that of outsider. Brothers are, of course, friends because the history of performances - so regular as to be predictable - heightens awareness of the act of expression and, in so doing, challenges brothers into greater responsibilities to each other. The labelling helps explain differences in relations between brothers and non-brothers rather than reifying them. It also reminds us that people are trying to work out solutions to basic problems of human existence.

OLATUNDE B. LAWUYI

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BOOK REVIEWS


Badcock extends here his earlier criticisms of contemporary social theory for being - well, for being trivial, cosy, euphemistic, tendentious and unscientific. Rather than simply applying classic-al psychoanalysis to current concerns, as in his previous *Madness and Modernity*, he fuses analytical perspectives together with socio-biology and games theory to suggest that psychoanalysis can form a bridge between evolutionary biology and sociology. Psychological states can be understood as representations of evolutionary strategies. Freud is placed firmly in the ranks of Copernicus and Darwin (a suggestion Freud himself had offered).

E.O. Wilson has termed altruism the 'central problem of socio-biology'. If humans pursue biologically determined interests as the theory maintains, why do they nevertheless continue to sacrifice themselves for others? If success is all about 'fitness' (promoting the reproductive success of the individual), why do we assist others to reproduce and indeed take on ourselves the care of their offspring? Badcock starts his discussion of altruism with speculation on the nineteenth-century reinterpretation of natural selection as a group rather than an individual phenomenon - a phenomenon which he suggests is 'resistance' in the classical psychoanalytical sense.

Indeed he suggests that the 'holistic prejudices of modern sociology', the consideration of mentalités, collective representations or whatever, are a type of self-deception, ultimately serving the interests of the social scientist whilst clothed in various assumptions of public benefit. Trivers has suggested that simpler organisms 'deceive' others to gain advantages, a process which can be carried out more efficiently through self-deception, which he equates with the 'unconscious' of the psychoanalytical tradition. Badcock suggests that what is popularly termed as 'altruism' is an instance of this self-deception. If simpler organisms sacrifice themselves for near relatives ('kin altruism'), this is because their ultimate interests - replication of their genes - are best served in this way. 'Induced altruism', i.e. being persuaded by others to sacrifice ourselves through language, ethics and government, is a later evolutionary variant of this. Of particular interest is his development of Trivers's model to consider the socialisation of children by their parents. Rather than it being a somewhat uncertainly motivated induction of offspring into social life, it consists of strategies ultimately induced by biological self-interest: to encourage children to be altruistic to their cousins is in their parents' genetic interest more than it is in the child's.
Badcock's exposition is a little thin on the population genetics and mathematics we need to fill in the gap between our games-theory oriented evolutionary ancestor and contemporary social actors. Thus his discussion of the mother's brother in matrilineal societies (where paternity is uncertain) who concentrates his interest on his own genes (in his sister's child) remains plausible, certainly testable, but here it is ultimately unproven. Badcock's style remains confrontational and polemical, ultimately revealing quite clear political positions (side swipes at the Women's Movement, socialism and so on). His stage-one social evolution is an extension of kin altruism with pseudo-kin groups led by a 'father'; revolutionary societies employ induced altruism which cloaks the unconscious self-interest of the few, whilst it is only liberal capitalism that encourages pragmatic and 'in the open' reciprocal altruism. Ultimately we are all motivated by self-interest, or rather gene-interest.

Badcock repeats throughout the book that his 'reductionist theory' (not a devalued notion here) is a blow to our *amour propre*. And so it is. And no bad thing either. However, his eschewing of either the sociology of knowledge or any sophisticated epistemology leaves open the question of the biological *determination* of institutions as opposed to the notion of some *compatibility* between the social and the biological. The extent to which free-floating conceptual thought is possible on his model remains uncertain. However, given his psychobiological denunciations of other theorists, it might not be unfair to mention the other problem which all reductionist schema offer to the critic - the status of the theory itself. If society and sociology alike are determined by the exigencies of evolution, what is the evolutionary reason for the evolutionary theory itself? How is it privileged over other theories? Perhaps sociobiologists are able to have more children than Durkheimians...

He does not consider the usual critiques of sociobiology (Sahlins, Gould, Kitcher), and psychoanalytic accusations of 'resistance' are rapidly mounted against straw men and straw societies. If ants milk aphids (ultimately a type of kin altruism), why do Dinka milk cattle? Apparently because the Dinka identify the cattle with themselves (and their parents) and can only bring themselves to kill them by projecting their parricidal impulses onto a punitive deity (parent) who enables them to kill the cattle (parent). Otherwise they rest content with milk. This is certainly a possible psychological mechanism, but to what extent is it an 'explanation' of transhuman or nomadic pastoralism?

The book should not, however, be neglected. In spite of its rather simplistic conclusions and second-hand pop Darwinism, there is much to provoke sociologists. True, it is readily amenable to our usual criticisms of sociobiology (not to mention the assumption of 'adaptionism' in non-humans, the biologists' Panglossian equivalent of 'functionalism' in the social sciences): (a) taking a human institution, finding 'parallels' with it in the biological domain, and then declaring the institution is only a biological impulse, (b) the equation of past origin with present utility. But Badcock does challenge the taken-for-granted psychological
assumptions of orthodox sociology: the vague assumptions of natural impulses to avoid incest, to promote solidarity, parenthood and altruism. In its thinly elaborated dynamic the book does offer suggestions as to how these behavioural institutions may have developed. And in that it is considerably less biologically determinist than some anthropological assumptions. If Badcock's conclusions are uncojenial and his reasoning Sloppy, his concerns are vital.

ROLAND LITTLEWOOD


By and large this collection is a chronicle of the perceived promise of 'cognitive science' and ethno-psychological approaches as more creative and valid paradigms for generating knowledge claims about psychological functioning in general and the affective domain in particular. Disenchanted with Mill's Canons of Inference and tough-minded empiricism, the thrust of social constructionism is towards behavioural models generated through enhanced sensitivity to cultural, social, organizational and especially lexical factors as key elements influencing patterns of interaction among dependent and independent variables of interest. Here, editor and philosopher of science Harré taps into the broad and nebulous spectrum of lexicalized psychological activities connected with the construct of emotion(s). Spanning a thirty-year research record, Harré has carefully selected fifteen papers illustrating how diverse constructionist strategies account for and one hopes enhance our understanding about the nature and function of human emotions as activities embedded in and mediated through social and cultural processes. It should be noted that the papers selected rely exclusively on human emotions and lexical problems about usage and meaning of affective terminology. Excluded are considerations of affective activities as vital elements in the vertebrate biogram or attention to affective states, displays or other processes of communication that are not lexicalized such as touching, posturing, eye movement and pupil dilation, scent and other non-verbal physical and biosocial modes that play an important role in the perception and interpretation of affective functioning.

The volume is divided into three sections. The first set of six papers is largely confined to definitions and discussions about the domain variables of interest and how they are (should be) treated within the theoretical and methodological parameters of social constructionism. Two papers by Armon-Jones develop the central 'Thesis of Constructionism' and explicate the 'Social Function of Emotions'. Issues pertaining to lexical specification
of affective displays and/or states, specific emotion terms and discussions about affective terminology, and how meaning is inextricably embedded in language habits socially mediated within diverse cultural and social settings, are explored in other papers. Harré's introductory chapter, 'An Outline of the Social Constructionist Viewpoint', is justifiably ambitious but much too short. In it he attempts to overview traditional theories of emotion, and tries to define the construct and then demonstrate how key variables such as local language habits and moral systems are culturally relative. He goes on to propose conditions for emotion-term usage as a basis for a general theory of affective functioning, including a section on methodology for directing future research programmes. While his discussion both captures and builds on the substance of the entire collection, it is best read as an intuitive and provocative summary rather than as an introduction.

Parts II and III are essentially analyses of case material focusing on familiar affective constructs such as anger, envy and loneliness and how they are constructed and used through discourses in familiar or contrived social settings. The importance of temporality, Zeitgeist and cultural relativity is nicely illustrated in the joint contribution of Harré and Finlay-Jones on the use, decay and likely re-emergence of historical terms such as 'accidie' and 'melancholy' in contemporary characterizations of individual levels of psychological performance. Where Part II focuses on Western milieux, the last section is primarily a cross-cultural elaboration of the earlier papers. Here the reader is led through a sample of culture-specific emotion terms and activities with associated problems of semantic equivalence across cultures and socially constituted settings within the same ecocultural and linguistic systems. Of particular note is Heelas's Herculean survey of emotion terms and settings in the ethnographic record and a comprehensive analysis of patterns, process and meaning involved in 'Emotion Talk Across Cultures'. For the novice interested in ethnotheories of emotion, this survey is a major source and leads in the right direction. Unquestionably, the most substantive paper in the volume is based on ethnopsychological research on emotion in Micronesia. In her piece on 'The Domain of Emotion Words on Ifaluk', Lutz carefully illustrates how the professional anthropologist uses ethnographic skills and linguistic tools to explore folk taxonomies pertaining to concepts of self, emotion terminology and meaning as dynamic correlates of social structure and organization in the diverse contexts of everyday psychological functioning.

In his preface to this volume Harré submits the book as a coherent approach to the problem of understanding and accounting for human emotions. However, by excluding and/or failing to come to grips with the literature linking perceptual as well as cognitive activities to overall patterns of psychological functioning we must conclude that this effort remains a bit coarse and incomplete. Nonetheless, it is a solid contribution and a valuable tool for those interested in ethnopsychological understanding and the interpretation of emotions as both cultural and social phenomenon. My major concern with the volume as a whole is its place in the market and pedagogical contexts. Since nearly half the papers have
been published elsewhere, professionals and advanced students will receive little new information for their investment. On the other hand, the novice to social constructionism and problems related to cross-cultural, especially ethnopsychological and more interpretative approaches may be intimidated as well as bewildered without a solid substantive orientation to the philosophical and methodological issues involved.

JOSEPH C. BERLAND


Ever since its first appearance as Les Fonctions mentales dans les sociétés inférieures in 1910 (and, in its authorized translation, as How Natives Think in 1926) Lévy-Bruhl's first and main work of a series of works on the topic of primitive mentality has occupied the minds of Westerners. The reception of the book was mainly negative at first and, in retrospect, it appears that the readership was not ready to appreciate the true value of Lévy-Bruhl's work until the early 1930s: among British anthropologists Evans-Pritchard was one of the first, publishing, in 1934, a critical though appreciative evaluation of Lévy-Bruhl's ideas (reprinted in JASO, Vol. I, no. 2, pp. 39-60). In view of the long-lasting and profound impact Lévy-Bruhl's theory of primitive mentality has had on anthropological thought, the intention of this review can hardly be to present and critically assess the main ideas of How Natives Think yet again. The fact that it is now available in an affordable paperback version is probably sufficient to provide the final stimulus for those who always wanted (but never found the time) to study Lévy-Bruhl, and for those who feel it would be useful to read him again, to put their resolutions into practice.

Added to the new edition is an introduction by the American professor of anthropology, C. Scott Littleton, entitled 'Lucien Lévy-Bruhl and the Concept of Cognitive Relativity'. Littleton succeeds, I think, in persuading the reader that Lévy-Bruhl 'thoroughly deserves to be recalled from the intellectual limbo to which he has generally been consigned' (p. v). He first considers Lévy-Bruhl's work in the context of the milieu and thought of his time and then discusses the main ideas and concepts of How Natives Think, thereby helping to eliminate many of the basic misunderstandings which still linger about it. In further sections of the introduction he investigates the more or less direct influence of Lévy-Bruhl's ideas on three sub-divisions of anthropological thought: cognitive, structural, and symbolic anthropology. Finally,
he assesses the value of Lévy-Bruhl's ideas for future studies. That the primary intention of Littleton's essay is to introduce *How Natives Think* to an American readership and that it focusses on discussing the impact of Lévy-Bruhl's ideas on American rather than on British or French anthropology ought not to put off the British reader; it may even provide an interesting new perspective. Those who want to pursue the matter in other directions will find abundant and valuable references in the introduction's bibliography.

One main point of criticism, not to be found in Littleton's introduction, may be made here. *How Natives Think*, paradoxically, reveals a lot, not about how primitives think, but about how Western intellectuals have been inclined to think about other cultures. Lévy-Bruhl, one gets the impression, is ultimately most interested, not in other cultures as objects of study in their own right, but in his own society and in how men of his style think. In this context, *How Natives Think* has to be read as one example of a great number of studies, especially of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in which other cultures (that is, cultures apparently lying outside the realm of the interpreter's common sense) serve as stimulating contrasts for interpreters to reflect upon their own societies. As with Lévy-Bruhl's primitive and civilized mentalities, many of these studies are characterized by the construction of opposed pairs: Morgan's *societas* and *civitas*, Maine's 'status' and 'contract', Tonnies' *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*, and Durkheim's mechanical and organic solidarity, are only a few examples. Usually, one side of these pairs represents the author's own society (or one aspect of it), whereas the other side is presented as the trademark of the other culture, though in most cases it appears to be no more than the author's mental construction of the opposite of the first side. Other cultures in these studies are, therefore, characterized and defined, not according to their own intrinsic characteristics, but, negatively, in relation to the interpreter's own culture (or what he thinks to be characteristic of it).

It is to the great credit of Lévy-Bruhl that, until his death in 1939, he never ceased to attempt to clarify his concepts and theories and to reformulate or abandon them if he considered it necessary on account of the criticisms made. In the context of the criticism made above it is good to find that in his later publications Lévy-Bruhl himself pointed out that through the study of the mentality of other cultures he hoped to achieve greater knowledge of the scientific Western style of thought. And in his *Notebooks*, written in 1938-9, he finally reaches the following alteration of the main thesis of *How Natives Think* (here cited from Littleton's 'Introduction', p. xxi):

... let us expressly rectify what I believed in 1910: there is not a primitive mentality distinguishable from the other by two characteristics which are peculiar to it (mystical and pre-logical). There is a mystical mentality which is more marked and more easily observable among primitive peoples than in our societies, but is present in every human mind.

If only all anthropologists could show such an open and flexible
mind in addition to their other qualities as Lévy-Bruhl showed in his profound and sometimes ingenious scholarship.

BURKHARD SCHNEPEL


The present collection of twelve papers includes ten which are commentary and two which are fragments taken from the work of Baudrillard and Castoriadis. The value of the anthology lies in its presentation of a succinct introduction to the work of these two thinkers with special reference to two important but not yet translated works (Castoriadis's L'Institution imaginaire de la société and Baudrillard's L'Echange symbolique et la mort); and secondly in the 'reconstructive explorations' which it charts. Only those concerns which relate to the positions expressed by Castoriadis and Baudrillard will be mentioned in the limited space available for the present review.

Fekete's introduction and the papers by Márkus and Wernick examine the emergence of a post-structuralist paradigm which is located in relation to other schools and movements which preceded it. Márkus identifies the two principal schools of mid-twentieth-century philosophy - the anti-subjectivist and linguistic philosophy - as together having undermined many of the preoccupations and social concerns of those which went before them. The critique of the Enlightenment and Metaphysical schools and the reorientation of the object of philosophical enquiry away from its centring on individual consciousness to the tissues of intersubjectivist discourse, have austere political impiquations. Classical structuralism under the aegis of Lévi-Strauss has long been criticised for its conservative stance, a charge which has been extended to Althusser, on the grounds of his consigning the subject to an iron-like historical determinacy, and his constructing a picture of the futility of action and the indeterminacy of meaning within its onslaught.

The implications of post-structuralist thought, a movement which Fekete rightly sees as the second moment of structuralism, compounds the agonies of humanism and history while offering no alternative programme on which to base an ethic of freedom and moral assertion. In the work of Castoriadis and Baudrillard the moral revolution loses the authority by which it guarantees its programme to be replaced by the machinations of the cybernetic model. In the same way that the Lévi-Straussian programme was motivated at its instigation in Tristes Tropiques by a concern with human
dignity and the possibilities of liberty but finished in their nullification in later works, so Castoriadis and Baudrillard began their work as members of the group Socialism ou Barbarie aiming at a critical recantation of Marxism, but finished by resigning themselves to their disenchantment with the constructions of the discourse.

The papers by these two authors translated here give a good indication of their critical work on Marx highlighting their implications for political action. For example, Baudrillard questions the classical exposition of the relation between use value and exchange value in Marxist theory. Marx uncritically assumed the overdetermination of exchange value by use value and thus arrived at a 'natural theory' where value is expressed as a direct function of the utility of an object, and determined by market forces. In this view desire is a natural quality which subsists between the human subject and the utility of the object; value is implicit in it, and its utilisation is achieved through an individual consciousness reaching out to expropriate the object, once this value has been recognised. The act of recognition is itself given the status of an action based on a quality of human consciousness which is articulated by the same laws which prescribe the exterior world. Marxism thus rests on an empirical epistemology which, while naturalising the world and constituting it as essentially unproblematical, reproduces with an increased virulence the tyranny of the signified over the signifier orchestrated along the lines of the domination of use value over exchange value, while the latter is itself reduced to an effect of the former. Baudrillard sees this as another example of the fetishisation of utility presenting a new theology which imparts meaning and legitimation to orders and institutions. Within the terms of a Marxism constituted by these effects, historical materialism can only provide the reverse of a functional description of political economy, which beginning with the terms of classical economy inverts orthodoxy for a radical programme, constituted as its mirror image.

For Baudrillard and Castoriadis the order which is taken for granted is itself the effect of a particular discourse. Use value is only constituted once certain objects have been ascribed their utility and this process of fixing meaning is a function of classification. It is thus the signifier that determines in each case the signified while use value in the final instance becomes determined by exchange value. Once value has become relativised, the objectivity claimed by Marxism falls away, leaving it as one discourse among others whose illusory legitimacy is based on a similar bad faith programme. Value is ascribed by a process which relates one signifier to another, but to merely describe the resulting codes and equations precludes the essential questions raised by the results of this method. Castoriadis is equally sceptical of the profound silence of symbolic methods in the face of such questions as to the choice of one symbolic system over others, the relation between a signifying system and a system of objects, and the reason and process underlying the autonomisation of symbols. Castoriadis answers such questions by posting an oblique order or orders which he calls an 'imaginary' which forms the centre and point of
departure for the codes which manifest themselves to 'experience'. Castoriadis identifies the pre-industrial simulacrum as Christian theology, while Baudrillard examines the claims of utility as the simulacrum that succeeded it.

The final point to mention here is the resulting picture of institutions which Castoriadis offers in the wake of the collapse of their empirical constitutions. They are seen as formalisations of 'socially sanctioned symbolic networks in which the functional and imaginary dimensions are combined in a variable relation, and in varying proportion' (pp. 14-15). This is a similar conception to that held by Lyotard, who sees them as the repositories of formalised language games, and the rules which govern them. In this Castoriadis claims an eminently postmodernist stance which not only marks his work as governed by the language paradigm but which suggests Baudrillardian cyberneticism as the dominant model on which society is predicated. While post-structuralism elects silence as the appropriate attitude to that which is not communicated, it teaches the cultivation of incredulity towards all communicative genres and doubt to the 'narratives' which they tell. The present collection is a good testament to the originality of this attitude, an exploratory evaluation of it, and, at times, a frightening vision of modern society, although a vision whose transparency commends hope for a non-sentimental and as yet unclear humanism.

ANTHONY SHELTON


This book should be required reading for anthropologists who are all too often ignorant of history and do not perceive the need to study the peasant societies of Europe. The book is clearly a product of long research; it contains much information and is very erudite. At the same time it remains an unsatisfactory one, especially for the anthropologist.

Ample warning of this is provided by the title in which the word 'superstitious' might be taken to suggest the irrationality of the French peasant mind. In fact, Judith Devlin argues against this suggestion and concludes (correctly) that 'superstitious beliefs and practices were often less strange and unreasonable than they seem at first sight' (p. 215), but does so for the wrong reason. She looks for explanations in the realm of psychology and comes up with some very unconvincing answers. Nowhere in the book does she show any understanding that these 'superstitious beliefs' form a part of the belief system of the peasants, which is governed
by logical principles. Popular religiosity, demonology, magic etc. are parts of the French peasant cosmology, a system which cannot be explained by psychology alone, or even mainly by psychology. The importance of this publication for anthropologists lies in the fact that it shows how much immensely interesting material can still be found and analysed. It is to be regretted that the author does not have more understanding of our discipline, although she lists some of its books in her bibliography. It is a pity that she did not pay much attention to the works of medievalists either, since the works of Le Goff and Gurievich (The Categories of Medieval Culture) would have helped her to avoid many conceptual mistakes. It is unlikely, for instance, that she would have described French popular religiosity as 'a peculiar cosmology' not really religious, because 'based on many vague and unorthodox ideas' (p. 7). One can find a better understanding of the 'peculiar cosmology' of peasants (in this case Polish) in Ludwik Stomma's Les Campagnes insolites (Paris: Verdier 1985). In this reviewer's opinion the main problem remains Devlin's unfamiliarity with the principles of mythical thinking. She does not seem to realise that the wanderings of Christ and St Peter on earth (discussed in the chapter on 'Popular Religion') are in fact parts of an initiation myth repeating its ritual schema. Beliefs about werewolves did not persist because of 'people's appreciation of the dangers of their environment and their ignorance of nature' (p. 73), but rather because of the complex set of relationships between temporal and spatial beliefs present in any cosmogonic (and, in more developed mythologies, cosmic) myth. Monstrous animals and half-men half-beasts simply had a well-defined place in the peasant cosmology in which the space was clearly divided into the familiar, organised and safe earthly world and its exact opposite which was a part of 'the other world'. Such errors are plentiful since the author conducted thorough historical research without, unfortunately, having more than a very rudimentary anthropological knowledge. It is, therefore, a curious book which shows the great need for cooperation between anthropologists and historians - still largely anathema for both professions in Britain.

W.T. BARTOSZEWSKI


No one questions that the Basques are a distinctive people with their own distinctive history. What is questioned is the nature of that distinctiveness and the content of that history. This seemingly recondite area of study has great contemporary relevance
because politicians in the Basqueland justify their opposed positions by direct reference to aspects of the Basque past. Basque nationalists stress their linguistic and anthropological difference from their European neighbours and emphasize their historical independence, while Basques who regard Spain as their patria argue that the Basques were never united and that their internal differences were as great as those between them and surrounding peoples. In this context of argument and counter-argument, where every academic text takes on political tinges, the learned contribution of an (apparently) neutral foreign academic is all the more welcome.

Collins, sensitive to this political manipulation of otherwise arcane matters, proceeds very cautiously. The period he covers - from prehistory to the end of the Middle Ages - is notorious for its dearth of data and primary material, a lack exploited by some to make highly speculative interpretations. Collins picks his way carefully. But his account is not always easy to read, since he must frequently attend to specialized but contested historical points. At times The Basques reads like a test-case in how to assess historical evidence. His own interpretations are logically constructed and their assumptions openly stated. Wisely refraining from hasty generalization, he gives us a considered tale of the present state of Basque studies for this time-span: what can, and what cannot, be said, and what remains irreducibly ambiguous. The physical anthropological, archaeological, and linguistic evidence so far presented is insufficient to answer questions about the origins of the Basques, though they seem to have descended from the indigenous Neolithic/Bronze age inhabitants of the Western Pyrenees. The Basques were not (as has so often been made out) isolated mountain-dwellers who resisted the approaches of others, but in fact cooperated closely with the Romans. It is not until the sixth century that the Basques, possibly because of population pressure and the end of trade with the Romans, began to raid villages to their south and to expand northwards into the area now known as Gascony. Nothing can be said about the Basque pagan religion, and the date of their conversion to Christianity is still unknown. As Collins rightly stresses, we are completely ignorant of how the tiny Pamp-lonan kingdom and its Navarran successor were ideologically supported - a necessary conceptual prop for the establishment of monarchy in an area where egalitarianism had been the rule.

Unusual for books on the Basques, this history pays equal attention to events both north and south of the Pyrenean watershed. Collins iterates that a sense of common Basque identity appears never to have existed. He takes pains to ascertain to whom contemporary chroniclers were referring when they mentioned the 'Vascones' or 'Vascoenium', and his minimal definition of the Basques as those who spoke the Basque language seems a justifiable compromise within this tortuous, confused field of study.

Despite his liking for meteorological metaphors (our understanding is 'clouded', 'obscured by mists of time', leaving us in 'evidential darkness'), Collins writes clearly, without pretension, and without jargon. The first chapters especially are a model of how to interpret sparse, dubious historical data anthropologically.
It would be very interesting to see how politicians in Basqueland react to a Spanish translation of this exemplary text.

JEREMY MACCLANCY


At first glance, Anthony Smith's book will not look like a promising prospect to the modern ethnographic fieldworker engaged in work concerning the everyday importance of ethnicity. If the price tag isn't uninviting enough, the antiquarian photograph on the jacket is identified as 'tribute bearers of the Sogdian and Cappadocian delegations, on the Apanda at Persepolis, symbol of ancient Persian glory'. To cap it all, the pithy sentence from Durkheim on the epi- gram page is sandwiched between two somewhat oblique chunks from Yeats and the Book of Amos.

Such a prejudiced approach to the wrapping, however, should not prevent the prospective reader from looking inside. For here is a work on the nature and history of ethnicity and ethnic group formation that will fascinate and provoke all anthropologists working in the field. Between the opening question 'Are Nations Modern?' and the closing comments on 'Ethnic Mobilisation and Global Security', Smith manages to cover vast expanses of time, space and bibliography. As if the range of the book were not impressive enough, the author also manages to maintain a consistently high standard of readability.

Drawing most of his examples from the so-called 'Ancient World' and pre-modern Central Europe (i.e. Eurasia after the dinosaurs but before Napoleon), Smith expounds an entirely convincing case concerning 'ethnie'. These peoples, defined as 'ethnic communities' or 'named human populations with shared ancestry myths, histories and cultures, having an association with a specific territory and a sense of solidarity', are shown to have been widespread throughout history. This admirably concise and erudite excursion into the past, however, is only half the story, and Smith completes the book with a second half that shows the reader how 'ethnie' have shaped and been shaped by the modern world.

Perhaps the best aspect of this book is the way in which the cultural aspects of the cohesion of ethnic groups are apparently effortlessly linked to the technological, ecological and political changes which time has wrought on humanity. As with all the best history, the reader is left with a feeling that 'it couldn't have been otherwise...'.

The chapter on 'Ethnic Survival and Dissolution' is where the analysis really begins to come into its own. Here we find not only the demise of the Phoenicians discussed in two pages of
mature-of-fact sociology, but also a marvellously potted history of the English in half a page. A quotation from the latter will give a taste of the style:

By the time of Chaucer, state administration required greater linguistic and legal standardisation, and this meant filtering elite culture downwards through an amalgamation of tongues. It also meant the creation of British mythologies and the re-writing of history, starting with Geoffrey of Monmouth in the late twelfth century. Even then localism and regional tradition together with the lack of a powerful state priesthood, with its own literary heritage and mission, impeded the growth of an English nation. This, of course, was supplied later, with Henry VIII's reversal of the subordinate and provincial religious position of England as a Papal 'fief', and by the subsequent tide of Puritan ethnic nationalism. Interestingly, the period of confirmation of an English 'nation' is also the moment when a dynastic mythomoteur cedes place to a more popular, island symbolism, in which England is endowed with a cultural mission and a sense of community.

The 'Survival and Dissolution' chapter is followed by two others ('The Formation of Nations' and 'From Ethnie to Nation') which form the core of the book. It is in these central chapters that Smith's exposition comes closest to being a thesis or theory in its own right. Here the mixture of 'the invention of tradition' school with some hard-headed sociology and a large slice of pains-taking historical research almost becomes more than the sum of its parts. That it never quite does so in no way detracts from the importance of the book, however. In charting a course between the crude rocks of primordialism and modernism, Smith delivers us into the calmer, richer waters of proper case-study. Thanks to his skillful piloting, readers involved in ethnographic studies of ethnicity will put down this book with a much clearer understanding of the history of the phenomenon than they had when they picked it up.

CHARLIE DAVISON


The pedagogical need for textbooks about the various topics which are often, divisively, discriminated by social anthropologists and sociologists is far from being one of which this reviewer is convinced; while the grounds upon which they might be justified as a
but scholarly necessity are even less compelling. Yet there is clearly a demand, in some quarters, that such supposed aids to learning and teaching be produced. Notoriously, many of the resulting texts are far from good enough to fulfill their aim. Making Sense of Development, by contrast with those textbooks which one can only presume to have been written and published solely with an eye to the financial main chance (as there is often little else which recommends then), is a very good book of its kind.

The author's stress throughout the book is on the 'active creative and difficult business of theorizing; that is, on making sense'. He is also concerned to show that contemporary theories of development are constructed with reference to the work of some of the major social theorists of the nineteenth century, namely Durkheim, Marx and Weber; that 'theorizing development' is not a narrowly technical exercise, but one which is 'creative, complex and problematical ...'; and that 'current interpretations of the Southeast Asian scene both draw on classical and contemporary theories and are themselves creative, complex and problematical' (p. ix). The text is divided into four parts, and it is authoritatively, informatively, in places provocatively and suggestively, and generally extremely clearly written. The bibliography ranges widely yet appositely; the index is useful. Preston's general conclusions about development - which is, according to the author, simply a cant term for pervasive social change, how to make sense of it, and how people can control and direct it in ways which are perceived to be best by the various groups involved in it - are encouraging. He asserts that neither the 'orthodox' view of development as 'a rather obvious goal and one to be secured via technical-manipulative social science' nor the 'radical' (Marxist) emphasis on schemes of 'revolutionary disengagement followed by the building of socialism' took account of the complexity of the business of development, nor of the diversity of the interests of the various groups involved, nor of the difficulty of specifying and securing changes, nor of the 'historical' scale of the processes involved in the whole business' (p. 269, original emphasis). Most cogently, Preston suggests (p. 270) that 'the familiar search for a general theory or strategy of development must [therefore] be abandoned as the task is incoherent'. Rather, theories of 'development' must be 'situation-sensitive and problem-specific efforts ...'; above all, perhaps, it should be recognised that the whole endeavour is pervaded by values: both those of the groups of people whose form of life is under consideration, and those of the analyst and of the context of which he or she is an aspect.

The author of Making Sense of Development is laudably frank about where he stands in relation to his material - the nature of social theorizing; classical social theory and social change; contemporary theories of development; and 'Lessons for the Future?' - and he makes many points which will, one hopes, be taken to the heart by the students, presumably undergraduates in the main, to whom the book is addressed. Preston could perhaps have made clearer to his readers that making sense of development, as of any other aspect of social life, is generally best guided by social facts. It is true that the author's concern is mostly upon not what his
sources say, but upon the way in which they say what they do, and this is perhaps one reason why Gellner's *Thought and Change* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson 1964) serves him well as a 'specimen text' (e.g. pp. 8-13). Yet in the present reviewer's experience, students are somewhat reluctant to get to grips with social facts; every opportunity, it might be thought, should be taken to encourage them to do so.

Of the important points which *Making Sense of Development* throws light on, only two can be recited here. The first is that the brand of economics called Monetarism is the ideology of social conservatism, as is made clear by the originator of such economics, Milton Friedman, who, in *Capitalism and Freedom* (Chicago: Chicago University Press 1962), suggests that *laissez-faire* capitalism is a necessary condition of political freedom. This crude reworking of nineteenth-century liberalism, which Preston well adjudges 'rather depressingly stupid' (p. 118), is not only anti-welfare state, but also rabidly anti-socialist: as capitalism is a condition of political freedom, socialism is therefore incompatible with political freedom (cf. p. 119). These attitudes are, of course, familiar from the policies of Monetarist administrations currently in power in the United States, in Europe, including Britain, and in Japan; and from those Third World countries where it has been official policy, whose governments have reduced much-needed social programmes with calamitous results and have suppressed political movements of the left.

The second point is related to the first. It is that in its original form Keynesianism was at once an economics and a politics, a Political Economy. It showed, among much else, that academics and others who have a more or less direct influence upon what Mauss called the 'conscious direction' of forms of life necessarily have choices and make judgements of value. Not only does this run counter to the (false) claim of Monetarists, as it often is, that their decisions simply articulate the exigencies of reality; it also suggests that if giants like Keynes, and Mauss, thought that the political, broadly understood, was a legitimate field of academic concern, we would do well to think again about the trend among many present-day academics to eschew the political in their work. This matter is particularly germane when, like *Making Sense of Development*, we are concerned with states in Southeast Asia such as Indonesia, which is run by soldier-politicians mainly, it seems, in the interests of themselves, their families, and their cronies in all parts of the national administration throughout the country. Naturally, since such work is to be 'situation-sensitive and problem-specific', analysts must first have a close familiarity with the form of life to be considered. But once this much acquaintance has been acquired, it can (some say should) be used to address political questions. Such questions, of course, need not replace the important and fascinating questions that social anthropologists, say, and some others, have for some time asked of social facts (ethnography). Rather, political questions add another facet, so to say, to the questions about social organization, symbolism, classification and so on that social anthropologists and others are more usually and traditionally concerned with. In principle, of course, such
writing has no more authority than anyone else's about such matters: the social anthropologist is not in any way privileged in this direction. But other matters being equal, it has as much authority as others', in the light especially of Preston's most cogent argument that thinking about 'development' is not a narrowly technical exercise, but one which is akin to serious thought about anything; while the change of aspect which an anthropologist can bring to bear on 'development' can perhaps operate as an incitement to the analytical imaginations of others.

These two points will not perhaps be taken by many JASO readers, nor by many others either. But they are matters which cannot properly be evaded by the practitioners of a humane discipline, even if, in the end, they decide against the positions adopted here. That these positions can be aired even summarily in this way, though, shows that the book under review admirably confronts its readers with questions which are at least as important as the others which students of social anthropology and sociology are generally asked to reflect upon. Yet Making Sense of Development remains a textbook. As such it would not figure prominently among the books which this reviewer would have his pupils spend their limited time reading and thinking about, nor their limited resources on acquiring.

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER


This is a well-written book on the ethnography and social development of the Sadama, a Cushitic people of Sidamo in the southwestern part of Ethiopia. As a social anthropologist, Hamer had lived in Sidamo in the late 1960s. He studied the history, culture, social, economic and political organization of the Sadama extensively. He also learned Sidaminya, the language of the Sadama, although his knowledge of it was not adequate for the purposes of his fieldwork, which was carried out with the help of an interpreter/assistant.

Hamer's methodology involved interviewing and participant observation. The ability to establish effective relations in fieldwork situations, most important to social anthropology (as it is indeed to many other disciplines), is exemplified to the full in this work. For instance, Hamer found that ownership of a Land Rover did not create a gap between him and the people or endanger his acceptance by them in any way. On the contrary it brought him closer to them as 'an important factor in reciprocity' as it enabled
him to assist farmers, participate in rituals involving distant kin, and in taking the sick to the clinic (p. 8).

The book covers several aspects of Sadama society. The central aspect is the conflict between the individual's self-interest and community obligation. Hamer's analysis of Sadama society illustrates the view that it is wrong to assume that communalism is the way of life in the African continent in general. The conflict between self-interest and community obligation is seen primarily in economic terms. The sequence of chapters begins with a discussion of the people, their location, and the characteristics of their physical environment. Then, by examining mythology and descent group pedigrees, Hamer gives an outline of the origins and history of the Sadama in broad terms. Kinship ties constitute the form for distributing and protecting resources, as well as for allocating the labour to make them productive.

There are aspects of linkages by marriage that constitute alliances between families in different descent groups. These include the mutuality between mothers and sons, the mediatory role of the mother's brother, and the ritual support from maternal cross cousins. Hamer found that the economic transaction of bridewealth during marriage changed form in accordance with the political and socio-economic changes in Sadama society. As the Sadama experienced the introduction of a cash economy along with political integration into the Ethiopian state they modified their social organization to suit these changes. The degree to which hierarchical relations existed and affected the relations of production is expounded as Hamer examines the structure of descent community, access to property, relations within and between generations, and social inequality. Social inequality, formalized by hierarchy, highly pronounced in Ethiopian society in general, actually serves to minimise conflict:

Thus there is ample opportunity for conflict between self-interest and affiliative obligation, which leads to the question of what prevents interpersonal rivalry and conflict from being extended to clan and lineage relations? One possibility would be a structure of inequality between clans, giving some clans control over others (p. 55).

There are two major social groupings, cultivators and artisans. The artisans are of three categories: ironworkers, leatherworkers and potters. There is no differentiation of status among the cultivators of the Sadama (unlike other groups, such as the Dime of Southern Ethiopia, who distinguish between chiefs and priests with divinely attributed tasks, as 'pure', and the commoners defined as 'nonpure', and then artisans who are all 'impure'). All cultivators are equal in status - i.e. they are 'pure'. The artisans on the other hand are 'impure' - smiths and tanners (all male) are considered more impure than potters (all female). The artisan clans were endogamous and thus separate from the superior cultivators' clans.

Hamer's analysis does not go beyond the period when a cash economy was introduced and the Sadama became incorporated into the Imperial State, and the introduction of new beliefs resulting from Christian proselytism. The 1974 Revolution and its consequences
in Sadama are not included. What Hamer's work does provide is a lucid background to the Sadama, who by historical accident (in terms of the sequence of events and structural changes linking the peasantry to the state and 'international capitalism') have developed their own means of coping with the changes and making them beneficial to themselves. Hamer argues that such changes have been favourable to the Sadama (who were not colonized in the strict sense) in contrast to the peasantries subjected to colonialism in other African nations. The Sadama had adapted themselves to changes incurred by outside forces by setting up their own self-help associations. Hamer has been successful in demonstrating that

It is unrealistic and ethnocentric to assume that Third World peoples equate development with becoming like western industrial peoples ... Sadama ... through their self-help societies have in the past and continue in the present to make many of their own choices among alternatives for change .... To establish an ideal balance between herding and horticulture, the people have been prepared to undergo and adapt to drastic changes, such as learning a new language, switching from grain to ensete production, incorporating people from other ethnic groups, and fighting to the death those who would prevent them from obtaining these optimum conditions (p. 233).

One thing to be regretted about Hamer's work is that it took as long as twenty years to produce.

ASTIER MESGHENNA

AHMED AL-SHAHI, Themes from Northern Sudan [BRISMES Series 1], London: Ithaca Press (for the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies) 1986. 145pp., Bibliography, Index, Map, Tables. £15.00.

This book consists in a collection of ten papers which al-Shahi published in a variety of journals between 1969 and 1985, brought together for the first time. As the title of the collection suggests, it is not an attempt at an ethnographic monograph or a sustained analysis of one theme in Northern Sudanese society. Rather it is a conglomeration of essays on various topics, some overlapping, some only tenuously connected with each other. Some of the papers are carefully empirical, detailed and local, such as the first one, 'Politics and the Role of Women in a Shaygiyya Constituency: A Case Study from the General Election of 1968'. This is a study of voting patterns with a self-explanatory title. Others, such as 'Educational Cross-Currents', consist in the author contemplating Arab values in general and sharing his own personal experiences.

Al-Shahi's most discussed theme is the centrality of the
Khatmiyya Sufi order to political and community life among the inhabitants of the Northern Region in general and the Shaygiiyya in particular. Sudan was unusual among Islamic countries in the way in which Islam was introduced to it, largely through peaceful propagation by fakis, Islamic holy men, and their followings, known as tarigas. This legacy continues, with Sufi tarigas remaining important up to today. Party political affiliation in Northern and Eastern Sudan still follows the dominant local tariga. However, by concentrating on the Khatmiyya order in its heartland on the Nile, al-Shahi fails to elucidate much of the real significance of the Sufi orders. These can only be understood by making a comparison with some of the other tarigas in Northern and Western Sudan, such as the Sammaniyya and Tijaniyya. The Sammaniyya is a small order with little political significance and with much of its following among the Kababish of Kordofan, and the Tijaniyya is a huge but non-political order that stretches from the Nile to as far away as Morocco. The Ansar, the main political force rivalling the Khatmiyya in Sudan, is not a Sufi order at all but the institutionalised following of the Mahdi and his successors. Riverain Sudanese society stands in tremendous contrast to the other Sudanese communities that live in the savanna and the desert, and the extent to which these differences are reflected in the ideology and the organization of the tarigas is a fascinating theme that al-Shahi does not touch upon.

Nevertheless, the importance of the Khatmiyya for Shaygiiyya life is well brought out. Its conservatism, its ability to survive years of siege by former President Nimeiri and the strength of its following among women are discussed in several essays. Since the publication of this collection, the Khatmiyya (in its party-political form as the Democratic Unionist Party) has regained a share in government, following the April 1986 elections, when the DUP carried almost every constituency in Northern and Eastern Sudan. Al-Shahi's papers were all written before the fall of the Nimeiri regime, and they stress how the traditional political institutions were surviving his one-party rule. Subsequent events have completely vindicated al-Shahi's account.

Other themes addressed include hospitality, tolerance, economic change, educational narrow-mindedness, and spirit possession (the zar). Only the latter paper, concentrating as it does on women and ex-slaves, begins to erode the picture that has been built up of a thoroughly comfortable and conservative society on the banks of the Nile.

The papers in this collection are narrow geographically, thematically or both. This is not a problem in itself, but the themes dealt with all deserve a wider treatment than al-Shahi brings to them here. The themes are played to one setting only. The collection leaves the reader wanting - and hoping - to hear more on these subjects.

ALEX DE WAAL

This is the third book in the series *Research Monographs on Human Population Biology*, of which the general editor is G.A. Harrison.

It immediately strikes one as a beautifully produced book, cloth-bound in Oxford University's dark blue, with high-quality paper, a typeface that is easy and pleasant to read, and a pleasant balance between text and illustrations.

The content of the book is nothing short of astounding. From the first page to the last the reader is treated to a non-stop feast of facts about the peoples of South Africa and their relationships to the environments in which they live. The book starts with a description of the environments themselves - the coastal plains, the high veldt, the mountains - and the patterns of rainfall and insolation so relevant to an understanding of human adaptations.

The arrival of human beings marks the start of the book's real content, with a description of the available evidence and theories of the manner of settlement of this vast area and the different subsistence strategies of the settlers - hunter-gatherers, pastoralists and agriculturalists.

This was how South Africa was when the colonists arrived. The latter, mainly from the Low Countries, saw coastal South Africa as a wonderful land on which to continue their traditional agricultural practices. Gradually, as their population grew, they abutted on the Khoi, and the now widespread Baster peoples arose through mixing. Other hybrid communities arose in quite other ways and places - the Griqua, Cape Coloured and Mesticos, for example. In these ways South Africa came to be the racially diverse place it is today. The morphological and genetic characteristics of the various populations are described, and an effort is made to assess the extent of mixing through genetic markers and to demonstrate cultural and technological adaptations.

The authors clearly wrote this book with considerable enthusiasm, and one detects throughout an unusually genuine attempt to synthesise relevant data and offer explanations. Besides this, the book is a compendium, and the tables of genetic polymorphisms and the extensive bibliography will make it a useful work of reference for the population biologist. But its main home should be on the shelves of anthropologists, social and physical, who have an interest in the diverse peoples of Southern Africa.

V. REYNOLDS
OTHER NOTES AND NOTICES

AUSTRALIA IN OXFORD

The Australian Bicentenary is being marked in Oxford by three exhibitions, supported by a book. The publication, entitled *Australia in Oxford*, is not strictly a catalogue, but rather a collection of eight essays, six of which concern themselves with the Australiana materials gathered from throughout the University and presented in the exhibitions at the Ashmolean, University, and Pitt Rivers Museums. The first exhibition (*Australia in Oxford: The Visual Image*) is concerned with historical visual materials on paper; the second (*The Natural History of Australia*) with geology, flora and fauna; and the third (*The First Australians*) primarily with Aboriginal art and artefacts, supported by other documents of anthropological interest.

While the exhibitions might at first appear to be modest - particularly that at the Ashmolean - one is struck by the exceptionally important Australiana documents held by the University. The Sherardian Herbarium, for example, possesses a unique collection of dried plants collected on the coast of Western Australia by William Dampier in the last year of the seventeenth century (71 years before Cook), making it the earliest documented collection of Australian flora. The Rhodes House Library has contributed items from its remarkable collection of the papers of Captain Charles Sturt who, from 1828, led a series of expeditions into the interior of Australia, the first in search of the mythical inland sea in which so many of the first settlers believed.

What is important, of course, is the fact that the settlement and exploration of Australia was essentially a nineteenth-century phenomenon - in some ways Australia was for the nineteenth century what North America was for the eighteenth - and that British attitudes to its Antipodean colonies reflected all the ideas of the age of empire. In a useful essay on Oxonians and the Australian universities Richard Symons has taken up again some of the issues discussed in his *Oxford and Empire* (1986), documenting the close and continuing ties between this University and those in Australia, and reminding the reader that the exchange is by no means one way.

It was inevitable that in the mid- to late-nineteenth century Oxford's new scientific and anthropological institutions should


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take an interest in Australia's natural history and Aboriginal culture, the latter assuming an important place in the development of Darwinian evolutionary theory on account of its perceived primitiveness; Balfour and Tylor, for example, saw the Tasmanian Aborigines as representing the final remnants of Paleolithic man.

The provenance details of many of the items of Aboriginal material culture reflect a varied pattern of collecting and donation. Many of the most interesting came with the original Pitt Rivers gift in 1884; the Hardy collection was acquired by purchase in 1900; and other items were collected and presented by Baldwin Spencer himself. Particularly intriguing is the Tasmanian model raft of reeds collected in 1843 by Sir John and Lady Franklin and donated to the University by the Eton College Museum in 1893; Lady Franklin's museum of natural history, housed in a diminutive Greek temple, still stands today on the outskirts of Hobart.

From an anthropological point of view the two most engaging essays are those by Elizabeth Edwards on the visual representation of the Australian Aborigines, and Howard Morphy's on the Aborigines and the development of anthropology, which inevitably concentrates on the work of Baldwin Spencer. The Pitt Rivers exhibition includes a small selection of his working notes and papers, presided over by W.E. McInnes's particularly good portrait loaned by Exeter College.

This concentration on Aboriginal culture in the exhibition is doubly appropriate as the Aboriginal question - expressed particularly in terms of land rights - has become a key issue in both the national and international attention focussed on the Bicentennial celebrations, as the result of well-justified Aboriginal agitation.

Edwards' essay begins with some reflections on eighteenth-century representations of the Australian Aboriginal, but as this material is well-documented - notably in Bernard Smith's brilliant *European Vision and the South Pacific* (not *South Seas*, as stated in the bibliography) - the author quickly passes on to the far more interesting (and for the general reader unknown) issue of the Pitt Rivers's holdings of nineteenth-century photographs of Aboriginal people. The essay documents the rise of the ethnographic mode of photography, treating the subjects dispassionately as further specimens of physical anthropology. The most evocative are the photographs of the Tasmanian Aboriginals, with their expressions of vacant resignation, perceived as members of a dying race notable as the most 'primitive' on earth.

Howard Morphy's equally important essay seeks above all to impose a perspective upon the study of Aboriginal culture. Despite the immense influence of Baldwin Spencer's and Gillen's books in setting a new standard in anthropological method, Morphy analyses the rather limited post-Darwinian linear-evolutionary approaches of Pitt Rivers himself, and of Frazer, Tylor and Spencer, which inevitably saw Aboriginal culture in all its aspects as representing early stages of human evolution, thus drawing inevitable conclusions.

The Bicentennial, of course, celebrates the first European settlement of the Australian continent, which almost by definition marks the beginning of the end for the indigenous inhabitants and their culture. The essays reviewed here are concerned with
European perceptions of the Aboriginals and it is to be regretted perhaps that more attention could not have been given to Aboriginal perceptions of the Europeans, and the effect these have had on their material culture. There are a few items in the Pitt Rivers exhibition which might have stimulated some such discussion. One of the most visually surprising of the twenty-five spears exhibited is that employing a head of green bottle glass (Daly River, acquired 1900), but most thought-provoking of all are the two large pictures on canvas which flank the entrance to the exhibition space. Both were acquired in 1987 from the Warlukurlangu Artists Association, and the captions attached seek to explain in conventional terms the stylised imagery of myth and ritual.

But these are not traditional paintings on bark (which in their traditional context had a built-in obsolescence and no value as art objects) but rather modern works rendered permanently on canvas to be marketed commercially. They are in themselves very fine and attractive pictures and in Australia such works are seriously collected (consider, for example, the Holmes-a-Court collection of contemporary Aboriginal art in Perth). Nevertheless, they represent a significant shift in attitude and define a new status quo which deserves more discussion. Morphy concludes his essay simply with the observation that 'the difference in this case is that the Aborigines have learnt to broadcast their culture themselves'; but the question as to what that culture has really become could well be taken further.

GERARD VAUGHAN

The Pitt Rivers exhibition, The First Australians, together with the exhibition in the University Museum, The Natural History of Australia, are continuing into 1989.

LIVING ARCTIC: HUNTERS OF THE CANADIAN NORTH

A remarkable exhibition is currently on show at the Museum of Mankind. Living Arctic: Hunters of the Canadian North is the first comprehensive display in Europe of life in the northern territories of the American continent. It confronts the visitors with, and tries to draw them into, the environmental conditions which the indigenous peoples have faced and adapted to for several millennia. As we enter the exhibit, we are immediately surrounded by the sound of howling, rushing wind, and in front of us is the panoramic view of a northern settlement, its blue darkness only briefly changing to a pale twilight. The first impression is of a hostile environment which seems to push man to the limits of his possible existence.
We can easily comprehend that the indigenous inhabitants must have acquired an unusual affinity and closeness to their surroundings to be able to survive. But who would choose to live here? It goes entirely to the credit of the exhibition that once we have gone through it, we are in sympathy with and even understand the emotional attachment felt by the people for their land, its animals and its climate.

The peoples represented are the Indian groups of the Subarctic, the Cree, Naskapi, Dene, and Métis, and the Arctic Inuit. While the subarctic and arctic environmental zones differ from each other, they both share the almost continuous presence of the cold, the long, dark winter, and a short, but light summer. The people who inhabit the two regions have in common that they live primarily by hunting and trapping, and have learned to use the extreme conditions to their advantage. Traditionally, the land alone nourished them and provided most of their possessions. Even nowadays, the migrations required by the hunt, in order to follow different animals in winter and summer, are considered an essential part of life, although it is usually combined with some time spent in a settlement.

The resources available traditionally seem limited to us who are used to an environment that can naturally provide a wide variety of food and material to build and embellish our domestic surroundings. Animal products once were dominant. Meat and fat were the main source of food, for the Inuit even the only one. Skins provided material for clothing and tents, bones and antlers could be used as building material and for tool-making. This natural limitation imposed by the environment has brought about material cultures which impress us with their talent to capture the essential and express it in elegant form: this is particularly evident in Inuit ivory carvings, but also in Cree quill work, and even in the plainly functional shape of the drums used throughout the area.

The exhibition focuses on a presentation of the contemporary life of the people of the north. Their integration into present-day Canadian society is continuously referred to, with both the problems and successful solutions this has brought about. Yet the present is constantly seen in light of the past. The history of the various groups, their traditional values, and in particular their contact with Europeans - fur traders, early explorers, missionaries, finally the expanding Canadian state - it is all told in words which often are those of the Indians or Inuit themselves. The discovery and eventual exploitation of the northern territories by Europeans is a dominant theme of the exhibit. It makes clear that from the earliest encounters to the present there has been a fundamental lack of understanding. That works both ways, but has been particularly harmful to the indigenous people. Mobility is the essence of the hunters' lives; they have to move to follow the game and fish they depend on. A settled existence, however, is the Europeans' desired form of life, even if they abandon it for short periods. Whether seen with sympathy or denigrated, the inhabitants of the arctic and subarctic are inevitably considered as people of the past, following a life style which is outdated and irrelevant. Indian and Inuit quotations used throughout the display try to make
a different point. To them, their traditional way of life has been and still is a successful adaptation to the world they know.

The objects shown are both historical and contemporary. The museum's own collection includes material acquired 250 years ago by Sir Hans Sloane, the British Museum's main founder. It is fully complemented by artefacts made as recently as two years ago, showing a continuity of craftsmanship and design, while changes are nevertheless assimilated. This aspect, of successfully adopting change, runs through the entire exhibit. Far from being an anachronism, these people seem to take up the challenges of the present with increased vigour and confidence. Political moves towards self-determination are documented throughout. In recent years these have been successful to some degree; the Canadian government has, on the whole, realized the particular needs of a culture that depends on the migrations of land and sea animals, thus on the accessibility of vast areas of land.

Before leaving the exhibit, time should be taken to try out one of the video games near the exit; the museum's news release says they are 'the first interactive videos ever developed for use in anthropology'. The excited comments coming from the throngs of school-children playing with them indicate that they are a success.

Hugh Brody's book complements the exhibition.* It is not a catalogue, but rather elaborates on the conceptual themes of the display. There also is a children's book and a set of four wall-charts available from the Museum bookshop.

RUTH BARNES

So far no closing date has been set for Living Arctic.

ANTHROPOLOGY AND NURSING

The second annual 'Nursing and Anthropology' conference took place in London on 29 April 1988. It was a day filled with an exciting mixture of nursing and anthropology across a wide range of topics and domains. It seemed to a nursing instructor from another culture, where nursing and anthropology share a relatively close disciplinary relationship, a particularly appropriate conference to present at this time. Nursing in Great Britain is entering a new

phase in its pursuit of professionalism. Nursing education, motivated by Project 2000, is being transferred, in some areas, from hospital-based schools to Polytechnic Institutes. This focus on didactic as well as clinical practice education will help identify the contributions which anthropology can make to nursing research in methodology and conceptual approaches to problems and topics.

The conference was divided into three sessions. In the first session, folk medicine in Ireland was clearly portrayed as a unique blend of old and new - a solidarity within against outside forces; and child care in a Zimbabwean village was explored as a thoroughly family affair complete with an elaboration of the complex links between kinship and health and illness.

In the second session the practical, caring aspects of nursing in such settings as hospices were discussed, as well as the self concepts with which nurses regard themselves. The papers for the final session outlined the interface between anthropology and nursing in the realm of ethnography, both as a research method and as a means of studying social policy issues, and nursing education.

All of the topics and approaches clearly pointed to the natural alliance between nursing and anthropology. Both are focused upon the holistic study of human beings from universal norms, through social institutions, to individual behaviours. Nursing and anthropology have a relatively long history of interaction, but often individuals from one field have no idea what can be learned from the other. Both of these disciplines are concerned with many of the same questions and closer collaboration between the two could result in a wealth of data not conceived of in either field.

A slightly disappointing note may have been sounded by Rosemary Firth in her closing remarks wherein she seemed to be suggesting that nurses were busy enough without getting involved in other pursuits. One wonders how prevalent this attitude is in Great Britain. In an editorial in The Spectator of 28 May 1988 entitled 'Carry on Nurse', the anonymous author stated, 'Nursing is predominantly a practical craft, and only in its farthest and most specialised reaches does it require anything approaching a highly trained intellect'. While the editorial made some arguably accurate points in defence of practical training being as valid as academic training, I would suggest that with rapid advances in medical science and technology, nurses require both academic and practical knowledge, and a highly trained intellect is absolutely vital when dealing with the life-threatening problems of human beings.

In general, then, the conference was a great success and the writer looks forward with anticipation to next year's offerings.

MARGOT T. STOCK
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This issue of *JASO* has been specially prepared to mark the retirement of Godfrey Lienhardt as Reader in Social Anthropology at the University of Oxford. Godfrey's contribution to anthropology needs no emphasis here; former students and visitors to Oxford will indeed know how much the character of anthropology at Oxford has owed to his presence.

We are particularly pleased to publish this Special Issue because Godfrey has always taken a keen interest in *JASO*, and has been over the years a source of encouragement and ideas for successive editors as well as contributors. A number of his own papers have also appeared in *JASO*, and this year we have published in our Occasional Papers series (no. 7) a collection of essays in the social anthropology of religion presented to Godfrey by some of his colleagues and former students.

The papers below derive from the most recent colloquia in an annual series convened by Godfrey at the Oxford Institute of Social Anthropology over the past five or six years to discuss matters of inter-disciplinary, anthropological and personal interest. Earlier colloquia concentrated on topics in the study of religion, while more recently they have been devoted to the subject of names and their uses. The papers to be found here thus reflect just part of the range of interests into which Godfrey has inveigled colleagues, students and others in recent years; similarly, the authors are only the latest representatives of the widely drawn 'colloquial constituency' that he created. We are grateful to John Penney, co-convener of the last three series of colloquia, for agreeing to act as Guest Editor for this Special Issue.

We take this opportunity to offer our best wishes to Godfrey on his retirement and look forward to his continuing active participation in the affairs of the Anthropological Society of Oxford.

The Editors
In the Hilary Term of each of the last three years, Godfrey Lienhardt has organised a series of colloquia on aspects of names and the use of names. A widespread interest in such matters was first recognised in the course of conversations between Godfrey and others - not all of us anthropologists - in quite casual circumstances, and it then seemed a good idea to bring together a group of people to consider various general questions through reference to particular problems within their own area of expertise. The sessions were to consist of a short paper followed by a relatively informal discussion - whence the designation 'colloquia'.

The first series, 'Personal Names', was highly successful, so that there was a ready response to the proposal of a second series, 'Forms of Address and Reference', that followed naturally on from the subject-matter of the first. For the third series, the topic was place-names - the actual title 'Words and Places' being borrowed from a work by the Revd Isaac Taylor MA (a nineteenth-century scholar with decided views on such matters as the absurdity of naming American cities 'Memphis' and 'Thebes') that Godfrey had chanced to find in an Oxfam bookshop. A full list of the talks given in the three series appears below.

The colloquia proved popular, and among the more regular attenders the suggestion was from time to time made that the papers might be collected and preserved for a wider audience. This the editors of JASO have put into effect by preparing this selection as a special issue of the journal, appropriately dedicated to Godfrey, the principal convener of the three series. It is hoped that the issue will, like the reformed Bunthorne's conversation, blend amusement with instruction, to serve as a reminder of enjoyable occasions to participants in the colloquia, convey to others something of the interest and attraction of the series, and above all to pay
affectionate tribute to Godfrey as the inspiration of the whole enterprise.

The response of the participants to the editors' invitation was so great that it has unfortunately not been possible to publish all the contributions submitted - apologies on this account are due in particular to Tom Butler, Anne Coleman, Paul Meyer and Margot Stock. The issue does, however, include one paper that was not delivered at a colloquium - that by Francis Deng, which is a close pendant to Godfrey's own. One or two of the items collected here are just summaries, but they have been included as an indication of the range of the series and the issues discussed. The arrangement of the papers does not correspond to the series of colloquia, for in view of the large measure of overlap of interests and concerns, a thematic ordering has seemed more appropriate: first, African personal names, then personal names in the Mediterranean area, and finally aspects of place-names.

Contributors have been encouraged to keep their papers close to the original oral presentation, with a minimum of notes and references, in an attempt to recapture something of the flavour of the colloquia. What cannot be reproduced in print but will be well remembered by participants is the stimulating effect of Godfrey's presence and mischievous comments.

J.H.W. PENNEY

The following papers were read in the three series:

'Personal Names', Hilary Term 1986
Roger Just, 'A Shortage of Names: Greek Personal Nomenclature'.
John Penney, 'Individual Names and Family Names in Ancient Italy'.
Jon Arensen, 'Changes in Names in the Life Cycle of the Murle'.
Jackie Waldren, 'House Names as Metaphors of Social Relationships in Majorca'.
Wendy James, 'Mortal Names: The Uduk Example'.
Jeremy Coote, 'Names and Naming among the Eastern Nilotes'.
Ahmed Al-Shahi, 'Some Arab and Arabic Personal Names from Northern Sudan'.
Godfrey Lienhardt, 'Social and Cultural Implications of Some African Personal Names'.

Guest Editor's Introduction
Guest Editor's Introduction

'Forms of Address and Reference', Hilary Term 1987
Charles Stewart, 'The Role of Personal Names on Naxos, Greece'.
Tom Butler, 'Kinship Terms and Ceremonial Titles in Modern Bulgaria'.
John Penney, 'The Late Classical Origins of the Polite Plural'.
Ahmed Al-Shahi, 'Forms of Address among the Riverain Peoples of Northern Sudan'.
Tim Ferris, 'Forms of Address in Indonesia'.
Paul Meyer, 'Some American Forms of Reference and Address'.
Anne Coleman, 'Your Eminence: Some Forms of Religious Address'.
Jackie Waldren, 'Forms of Reference and Address in Majorca'.

'Words and Places', Hilary Term 1988
Peter Rivière, 'The Social Classification of Space in Amazonia'.
Jeremy Coote, 'Custom and Customers: Shop Names in West Hampstead'.
Margot Stock, 'An Indian Legacy: Names and Places in Canada and the United States'.
Anne Spokes Symonds, 'Oxford Street Names'.
Wendy James, 'The Naming of Places on African Maps'.
John Penney, 'Cities and Founders in Antiquity'.
Julian Roberts, 'Calling Each Other Names: Britons and Saxons'.
Jackie Waldren, 'Old Words and New Places in Majorca'.

SOCIAL AND CULTURAL IMPLICATIONS
OF SOME AFRICAN PERSONAL NAMES

This essay was suggested by two different conversations. One, with John Penney, was about whether social usages in naming, still found among peoples near to their purely oral traditions, might throw light on obscurities of personal names and relationships in ancient inscriptions. The other conversation was with Macar Aciek Ader, a Dinka studying in Oxford, and concerned how much of the Dinkas' understanding of their history, values and form of society was passed from generation to generation through their personal names.

In his short book *English Ancestry* (1961) Sir Anthony Wagner, then Garter King at Arms, wrote that in the modern world industrialization, demographic mobility, the decline in importance of kinship and descent, and the erosion of older social hierarchies, might have been supposed to have relegated the study of genealogy to 'the scrap-heap of forgotten studies'. But on the contrary, he had found that 'the mobility and fragmentation of much modern life' had increased the genealogists' professional business, for 'Cut off from his roots by profound changes in ways of living, by migration far from home and by loss of contact with his kindred, modern man seeks more or less consciously to reconstitute human links which may restore to his life lost dignity and meaning' (ibid.: 6). It would appear from this that what professional genealogists are being asked to do today is much what students of early inscriptions are attempting for the peoples of past civilizations: to discover and partly bring to life the names of dead national or cultural forebears.

Some of those now searching for their ancestors may hope to find a 'lost dignity' in historically notable family connections.
with people of reputable status, character or talent; some may prefer the discovery of quite humble, even criminal (if distant, of course), ancestry to complete genealogical anonymity, but to know the names and relationships of their ancestors rarely has any direct bearing on the conduct of their own lives. For the Dinka of the Southern Sudan, it still has. Yet how far, Macar Aciek Ader and I considered, might the last forty years of endemic civil war in the Southern Sudan, and the political and economic disruption of their traditional way of life, be hastening younger and future generations of Southern Sudanese along the road which Wagner's 'modern man' had taken over the last two hundred or more years? What would Dinka 'become' if oral memory, and their language itself, were impoverished by human dispersion through war, modern education, and new kinds of work away from home? Already many Dinka words well known to adults forty years ago, and richly allusive and evocative in relation to their history and culture, are not familiar to many of the younger people. Nearly twenty years ago in Khartoum, I found that the expressions 'children of one belly' and 'children of one penis', which only twenty years before that had been taken for granted by children to distinguish those related through a mother from those related through a father, were considered coarsely archaic - 'Chaucerian' was the word a Dinka friend used - in educated circles. The loss of such words and turns of speech deprives some personal names and relationships of part of their cultural and historical meaning.

This is, of course, what has happened in our own society. Let me take my own full name, Ronald Godfrey Lienhardt. 'Ronald', according to the book, comes from roots in Norse meaning 'Might, Power'; but my parents, if they knew it, or found it out, never told me so. It has certainly been no exemplar. 'Ronald' was fashionable around the time I was named (1921), and was a clearly British-sounding name. My father, a Swiss, was sensitive to anti-German popular feeling - even extending to dachshunds - during the Great War. My mother liked the sound of the name (she did not like names as 'Herbert', etc., of whom she seemed to have known too many), and associated 'Ronald', I suspect, with the then romantic 'matinee-idol' Ronald Colman. If so, she never told me and, later, thought it absurd to call a child 'Elvis', for example. 'Godfrey' is, of course, the Anglicized form of 'Gottfried', my father's name. In German, its association with God and Peace is there on the surface more than in 'Godfrey', but the name was not chosen with that in mind. 'Lienhardt', according to some perhaps dubious derivations, refers to the boldness of a lion, but I was never told so and I doubt if most of the family believes it or cares about it, conscious as they are of being Lienhardts. It is somewhat ironical that after baptismal precautions against

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1 Which has become even more oppressive since this was written.

2 My older cousin Walter has since told me with amusement that there is a cave in Switzerland called the Lienhart Höhli, sometimes said to have been occupied by stray companions of Richard Coeur de Lion.
having me thought to be German (or, for my father, more sinisterly 'Prussian') at school I was at once nicknamed 'Fritz' as an affectionate form of address. I think that for my school-friends' parents, from whom they must have picked up the name, 'Fritz' was the comradely German equivalent of the English 'Tommy'; for me it sounded acceptably volatile. To be nicknamed 'Kraut' would have been a different matter. In the army in the last war, however, 'Fritz' would have been rather unsuitable, so for some I became 'Leo'.

I excuse this long personal comment because here I am fairly sure of my facts, and in order to make a contrast with African naming. If my parents had told the vicar that they wished me to go through life as 'Mighty and Powerful God's Peace Lionbold', he would, I certainly hope, have objected. Those names would have carried a message, but an embarrassing one, so my first names could only be used as personal names because those original fossilized meanings were long dead in them. For the Dinka (as for many other Africans), in almost all names the 'meaning' is still alive: and there were then few or no non-Dinka words with etymologies known only to a learned minority.

We, also, have names which still retain something of their meanings as common words. For women particularly, there are the flower names - Violet, Rose, Lily etc. - some of which perhaps sometimes incongruously carry a sense of delicacy and sweet scent with them; and there are the month names - April, May, June - but not usually the months which suggest the cold fall of the year and winter. 'Christmas' for a man exists but sounds somewhat eccentric in English, though 'Noel' is quite conventional. More comparable in principle with some African custom was the Puritans' conscious and determined effort to make personal names preach a virtue or recall and acknowledge a sin. Miss Withycombe (1977: xl) for example writes: 'Foundlings were obvious subjects for the ingenuity of Puritan ministers, and they were freely given such names as Helpless, Repentance, Lament, Forsaken, Flie-F ormation'. And she mentions an American christened 'Preserved', whose surname was 'Fish'. Yet on the whole most of our names today, for most of those who bear them, have become meaningless sounds, except as designating particular individuals.

In Africa the case is very different. Ebo Ubahakwe (1981: 99), writing of the Igbo of Nigeria, comments: 'An indigenous African name on the whole personifies the individual, tells some story about the parents or family of the bearer and in a more general sense, points to the values of the society into which the individual is born. Unaware of these facts, some Western scholars are puzzled that Africans make a "fuss" about names' [emphasis added]. Those names thus endow the individuals who bear them with social personality. With this in mind, I turn now to some Dinka names, starting with Macar Aciek Ader, with whom this particular 'fuss' started.

The three names 'Macar Aciek Ader' mean respectively 'Black Ox, Man of God, Tether (Cattle)'. For non-Dinka, the words in translation
seem less like a possible personal name than do the meaningless
sounds, 'Macar Aciek Ader', of which it is composed. But for the
Dinka, whose thought is permeated by their interest in cattle, the
meanings of the words are alive in the name itself. This is not to
say - it would be ludicrous - that people add up, as it were, the
meanings of the words of which a personal name is composed whenever
they hear or use it. But 'Macar' means something, 'Aciek' means
something, 'Ader' means something; when put together they only make
sense as a person's, and a man's, name. Where English names are
both names and ordinary words, the difference between the name and
the word can be made by the use of the capital letter or definite
article. If you want to call a plumber, you do not look up 'Plumber'
in the personal column of a directory; 'the Plumbers of Cowley'
would mean a well-known Cowley family, 'the plumbers of Cowley'
suggests a guild of plumbers. But if in a Dinka cattle-camp you
say 'bring Macar', only the context will make clear whether you
want a black ox (as distinct from an ox of some other colour) or
whether you want to see a man called 'Macar', rather than another
man, called, say 'Malwal' (from a red-brown ox).

Every adult Dinka man has at least one name which refers at
once to him, and to one of the colours and configurations of colour
in cattle, for which the Dinka have a vast repertoire of words.
Some relatively few of these colours, and thus the personal names
that go with them, have special social values. They may be associ­
ated, if not very strictly, with seniority of birth or descent, or
as the most fitting sacrificial victims for particular divinities.
Cattle boldly marked with black and white have an imaginative
affinity with the black and white of a stormy, lightning-streaked
sky, and have marked liturgical importance in relation to God in the
Sky and the spiritual phenomena of that upper region. The ox Majok,
a name for one such configuration, is regarded as one of the finest
of sacrificial offerings, and is the appropriate gift from the
father for the initiation into manhood of a first-born son. Macar,
a black ox, is also a liturgical colour, but for different reasons.
It suggests a birth late in the child-bearing life of the mother,
or the historical memory of such a birth, and a black ox is the
appropriate sacrifice for that aspect of God which presides over
the ending of things. 'Aciek', the second name, indicates that
Macar's father is likely to have been born after a long delay,
when worry about childlessness had led Macar's grandparents to
seek the help of a man possessed by God, an aciek, literally
'creator'. 'Ader', his grandfather's name, implies that he was
born after a previous child or children had died. Its meaning,
'Tether (cattle)', in this context refers to the tethering of
cattle to pegs, as the Dinka do when they bring them in from graz­
ing, and when they reserve and dedicate a beast for sacrifice for a
particular spirit or purpose. Here as a personal name it is a meta­
phor for restraining death, by promised sacrifice, from striking
again. So we may suppose that somewhere along the line the family
has suffered from a fear of childlessness, been favoured with
divine help, and mourned a premature death.

When my friend Dr Francis Mading Deng ('Francis Brown-Speckled
Ox Sky Spirit') named his first-born Donald, he did so partly
because 'Donald' sounded euphonious with 'Deng' (for he will be so known, not, as traditionally, 'Donald Mading'), partly because with a diplomat father and an American mother, 'Donald' would spend a good deal of his life among anglophones, but partly also because he had ascertained that 'Donald' came from roots meaning 'world mighty'. Thus he gave his son an honorific name, associating him hyperbolically with his own father, Deng Majok, a renowned paramount chief of powerful character, along with the line of his descent. Dr Deng has kindly supplied me with this further comment on his father's names:

His personal name at birth was Deng. During his early childhood, Deng acquired a dog to which he was so attached that he shared his milk and food with the dog, something the Dinka look upon as revolting. When Deng could not be persuaded to give up the habit, his grandfather teased him by calling him 'Deng Majong' - 'Deng the doggish'. The name Majong stuck with Deng all his life. The neighbouring Twic and Rek tribes, misinterpreting 'Majong' to be the Ngok Dinka version of 'Majok', 'the Pied, Black and White', the most senior colour-pattern assigned to the eldest son of the first wife, began to call him 'Deng Majok'. Deng was attracted by the name, especially as it gave him a colour seniority which was not his, but that of a half-brother, who though younger was regarded as the senior son of Chief Kwol Arop and heir to the paramountcy. Since Deng Majok did in fact usurp tribal leadership from his supposedly entitled half-brother with the intervention of the British, this perversion of his name gave his position a ring of legitimacy which was otherwise at best controversial.

A Dinka name even in its simplest form thus carries, and is intended to carry, a message, both for the child given it, to whom it will be explained later, and for that child's own children. Though the detailed circumstances of any particular naming would not normally be known outside the family and those who share its affairs (for the Dinka, however, quite a wide circle), those with one or more of the same names know that at some time their families along with many others have had some powerful experience in common. From one end of Dinkaland to the other, for example, 'Aciek' would indicate that there had been some strong connection with a holy man; Godfrey's, and such, have no common ground of this sort; but Elvises still commemorate a known culture-hero and his ethos. Dinka names constantly reaffirm their common culture and common interests. Ours, if anything, emphasize our diversity of origin and background. It is noticeable that sometimes people who would disclaim any belief in astrology feel some affinity when they find that they have a sign of the zodiac in common, and if one of a person's given names were always the appropriate sign of the zodiac, that in itself would serve as some introduction when meeting strangers. It was a very long time before I found out that my colleague Peter Rivière, Radcliffe-Brown, and I were all born on the same day of the year.

In small societies of Brazilian Indians, the stock of possible personal names is as small as four, and it might be expected that
there would be few names in very small societies where individuals are always in close personal contact and can differentiate by looks, gestures or context. It is not usually difficult here to know which of two, or even three, Johns in the same company of friends is meant at any given moment. But some very large societies also tend to limit the number of acceptable names by administrative or religious rule, as though a society's stock of names were an index of its religious, ethnic or national integrity. According again to Miss Withycombe's *Oxford Dictionary of English Christian Names*, by German law a child may not be given a name which cannot be proved to have been used before (presumably particularly in Germany), and Christian ecclesiastical rules require a baptismal name to be chosen from names of saints or others with Christian credentials.

Even then, proportionately very few of all permissible names are commonly chosen in practice, and preferences change from time to time. Miss Withycombe notes that in the later thirteenth century, the names Henry, John, Richard, Robert and William accounted for 38% of all those recorded; and the lists of the ten or so commonest names given yearly in *The Times* newspaper, suggest that most *Times*-reading parents prefer their children to have at least one name which does not single them out, since it is shared with many of their coevals. A very singular name may embarrass a child, and perhaps a name chosen by many readers of *The Times* may be assumed, by the upwardly mobile, to be approved by 'Top People'. In societies like that of the Akan of Ghana, where every child automatically has one name taken from the day of the week on which it was born, or the Bari neighbours of the Dinka, where one of a child's names follows inevitably from its birth-order in the family, its nominal homogeneity with very many others of the same speech community is assured. There may be names which are usually given only to those in families of higher status, but they also will have one name placing them in a situation they have in common with many of lower status. Since all Fante and Ashanti are given day-names, Robinson Crusoe's 'Man Friday' may have been a Ghanaian king, whereas in English it suggests inferior status.

I do not know how many names there are among the two million or more Dinka, but theoretically they would seem to be limited only by the uncountable range of features of the natural or social environment which have traditionally been accepted as suitable for personal names; these names reflect the natural and social world the Dinka know. Praise-names derived from cattle-colours give scope for imagination and invention; they give pleasure as literary creations but, as I shall mention, they tend to be relatively ephemeral. There are no names at all for days in Dinka, and so no day names, and none automatically mark seniority in birth, even though there are important social distinctions between eldest, middle and youngest children. But however many personal names there may be, they are all, with very, very few exceptions, recognizably *Dinka* words. There is some overlap with the kindred Nuer, but even there it would always be possible from a census list to distinguish between a Nuer and a Dinka population. Except for Christian Dinka (and still fewer Muslims), foreign names were not adopted, for the Dinka sought little or nothing from neighbours unlike themselves. British
officials were known to most of them only by the cattle-names which
they had given them; their aeroplanes similarly were 'sky-canoes'
for the Dinka and their bicycles 'iron donkeys'. So in 1947, after
half a century at least of one or another kind of foreign govern-
ment from the north - Turko-Egyptian, British, Sudan Arab - they
were scarcely culturally or linguistically colonized. The turmoil
of the last thirty years, while emphasizing their rejection of
political domination, has doubtless modified this cultural exclus-
iveness, and for many of them made some sort of pidgin lingua
franca necessary.

When, or very soon after, a child is born, the family (in
which the paternal grandparents and the midwife have important
roles) choose a name. God 'creates' (cak) the child, the family
'create' it as a person of that name. This one name is the basic
name which the child will carry through life and after death, what-
ever others may be acquired on the way. That name is usually short,
a word of one or two syllables, with the gender distinguished
(though not invariably) by a prefix. This almost curt directness
of the given name is in marked contrast to names among some African
peoples of other language-groups. The Igbo and the Yoruba of
Nigeria, for example, have large numbers of personal names which,
by compounding ideas and proverbial references, are in effect whole
sentences, even sermons. There are I think few didactic Dinka
names like (to select some names at random from Ebu Ubahakwe's
book [1981]) 'Colleagues Never Speak Well of Each Other', 'There
Is Nothing That People Cannot Negotiate or Talk About', or 'No one
Understands the Thoughts of Others'. These suggest a world of
secrecy and intrigue quite different from that of the Dinka, who
in principle, at least, believe in being straightforward and forth-
right with others.

Worth more systematic attention, are the many words not
chosen as personal names. The Dinka take quite a number of their names
from those of birds and animals, for example, but I have never
heard of anyone called by the word for that bird of ill omen, the
owl, or for eaters of carrion.3 Again, what the Dinka call thiel,
'spiteful envy and jealousy', though frequently alluded to in songs,
is not in my experience given as a personal name; whereas, accord­
ing to Dr John Beattie (1957), among the Banyoro of Uganda there
are many names based upon these vices. They suggest that Banyoro
suspect neighbours of wishing to harm them, possibly through witch­
craft and sorcery, and in some way, Dr Beattie says, protect them­
selves by openly voicing that suspicion. The Dinka also have
notions about witchcraft and sorcery, and abhor them, but they play
little part in their daily lives, and are not a source of the con­
stant anxiety which seems to be felt among many other African
peoples. They are regarded as un-Dinka, in the sense that drawing
a knife in a fight is (or rather, perhaps, was) regarded as un-
British.

3 I am told by my friend Emmanuel Bol Kuanyin that 'Vulture' is
used, though not common.

4 I have since heard of 'Thiel', but again it is rare.
A final example of contrasting African styles in naming also comes from the Igbo, who have very many names spelling out the attributes of God, many concerned directly or indirectly with wealth and material prosperity, and some derived from occupations. The Dinka had no occupations in the sense of trades, so there were no personal names connected with specialization of labour, or interest in material wealth, except in cattle, which themselves had spiritual rather than material value. Dinka are commonly named after divinities which at some time have affected the family; but among them these religious names are simply taken over from divinities, whereas among the Igbo they are often didactic, pious generalizations and moral adages. I cannot imagine among Dinka such names as the Igbo's 'The World Is Not a Bad Place' or 'God Is Not Bound By Individual Wishes'. Such differences more than hint at the connection between a people's stock of personal names, and traditional sentiments and mores in a way not paralleled among ourselves.

The given single name very usually commemorates a dead relative or ancestor, and this again is of some comparative importance, since African societies seem to differ very markedly in their use of personal names for commemorating their dead. Then there are names which draw attention to special circumstances of birth, some of them experienced at some time by almost all other Dinka families; some denote qualities (Agoth, 'bellicose'), or situations (Mum, 'confusion'), and others recall spiritual agencies, tribal sections, places or material conditions which have either at the time of the birth, or of a previous birth, strongly affected the well-being of the family. Many common names, as I have mentioned, refer to creatures or things of everyday observation. Thus there are Agany, 'monitor lizard', Akwei, from kwei, the black-and-white fish eagle, Ding, from a fish. Many such names also have an immediate association with the colours of cattle, as for example Makwei, a black-and-white ox. There are names taken from things and activities around the homestead or the cattle-camp: Kuot, 'a gourd'; Mawien, after wien 'twine', a name (like Ader) meaning a child born in the context of a death, since in mourning Dinka replace their bead waist-girdles with twine; Kuol, a small bitter cucumber growing wild in homesteads and used in rituals; Arop, 'dung-ash', also so used. Of situational names, Moroor or Manoon suggests a birth or conception in the grass forest (roor) or the grass (noon). Koriom, 'the locust', indicates birth in a time of famine. Examples of spirit names are Deng, as I have mentioned, associated with the rain and ubiquitous as a sky spirit among the Dinka; Garang and Abuk, both spirits and the Dinka's Adam and Eve; Cyer, the planet Venus, or a comet; and many names following from the tutelary divinities - 'totems' - of the numerous different clans of the Dinka. Ring, 'flesh', is an outstandingly important divinity and common name in some priestly clans, and Aiwel, or Longar, or both, occur in those clans which claim descent from that original priest and culture hero of the Dinka. Twins are usually given special names, Ngor and Can being most usual for boys. Dinka associate twins with birds, disposing of them in trees at death if they die young, according them respect, as sky-related, and speaking of them as having 'flown'
rather than died, so twin-names indicate that those who bear them must receive special treatment. Those whose birth immediately follows that of twins are called Bol, if male, and Nyibol, if female, which suggest an increase, or exaggeration, of something. As in many other African societies, names which record a preceding death are very common, for example Akec, 'it is bitter', after the death of a parent; Dut, 'consolation', (perhaps after the gift of a 'cow of the consolation'); or Manhiem, 'of the (body) hair', which is allowed to grow during mourning.5

There are now a large number of Dinka who have received European Christian names in the course of their education (though particularly in Protestant missions, somewhat recondite Old Testament names were often chosen); and some families have been at least nominally Christian for some three generations. Where a Christian name is taken, in ordinary educated usage it is added to the Dinka given name, so a boy called Bol at birth, later adopting the Christian name John, will be known to most of his educated acquaintances as John Bol. Bol, let us say, is the son of Ding. In traditional Dinka usage, he is Bol Ding, or among intimates called by a nickname or ox name; in educated usage, he is referred to as John Bol Ding. His father also may be a Christian, known to his educated friends as, say, Edward Ding. But I doubt if as yet, at least, it is at all usual for a Christian name from a previous generation to be incorporated genealogically. John Bol Ding therefore does not become John Bol Edward Ding. If, as I suppose, these Christian names remained genealogically supernumary, even though between educated Dinka they were a usual means of identification, it suggests that they did not as yet signify anything of lasting historical importance to the Dinka. They indicated primarily (though now very importantly) that their bearers had been in contact with missions and schools, and related them only to those others of similar background. For what are still the great majority, they convey nothing else about a person's history or social personality as a Dinka, for they signify a partial assimilation to a world scarcely known to their ancestors.6

And it is possible, by dropping the Christian name, to try to reject that assimilation. When African states became independent, Christian names which had given their bearers some sort of place in the foreign colonial structure of society were often deliberately repudiated. The Ghanaian poet who had made his name as George Awoonor-Williams changed in mid-career to Kofi Awoonor, and who remembers Kwame Nkrumah as 'Francis'? On the other hand, President Hastings Banda, whose attitude to European culture and values remains quite different from that of some other African nationalist leaders, has happily retained that name while taking an indigenous honorific title. Comparable is the atavistic way in which, according to Dr Al-Shahi, northern Sudanese of slave origin who do not know what

5 I am sorry that space does not allow me to incorporate here more valuable information from Emmanuel Bol Kuanyin.

6 Christian Dinka often, perhaps most usually, address and refer to each other by Dinka names in their personal relations.
their own ancestors were called, after emancipation adopted names which are of more ancient, classical status in Arabic than those of their former masters. A change of personal names would thus seem, in Africa now as in the Middle Ages in England, to indicate a shift in the distribution of power and status in a society. And there are indications in some African families that what might become a kind of family surname, in African states as in mediaeval Britain, is tending to replace older systems of single, uncompounded names. Those are too complex for bureaucratic tabulation, in a telephone directory, with names like Ding Deng Ding, Ding Deng Deng, Deng Deng Ding, Deng Deng Deng, and so on.

There are also nicknames, like those familiar in the West, which draw attention to a personal peculiarity of appearance or habit. The name of Deng Majok or Majong already mentioned, initially given to tease him about his pet dog, will suffice as an example, since it was probably preserved only because he was a well-known chief, and then its real provenance and history was probably not known outside the family. Such a common nickname as Manhom, referring to someone with a large head (nhom), would only be preserved if the bearer were of historical significance on other counts. But there are also names which mean a great deal culturally to all Dinka during at least part of their lifetimes, but which do not seem long to survive their deaths, except for some very outstanding individuals. These are the names by which Dinka men are praised in song and salutation by metaphorically associating them, through the colours of their oxen, with innumerable aspects of the social and natural world around them. They attracted my attention, as indeed they interest the Dinka; and more generally in the day-to-day affairs of the cattle-camp, a stranger gets the impression that it is possible to find any Dinka whose name or part of it is not directly or indirectly associated with cattle-colours. But (as I was rather surprised to find) when one comes to look at genealogies, such names figure less prominently than they seem to in daily life. I and others have already written about these praise-names at some length, so to show how they are formed I give one more example from those supplied by Dr Deng, and from the hundreds, possibly thousands, that may have existed.

Praise-names are constructed as follows. Let us suppose that a man's display ox, or one with which the inventor of his praises wishes to associate him, has a pattern of black and white spots with the basic name makuac, directly related to the spotted pattern of the leopard, kuac. The praise-name of the owner of that ox might refer to anything which the praiser sees as similarly spotted, or which he associates with the leopard. Hence, to give Dr Deng's examples, he may be praised as 'Respecter of Girls', because the leopard is thought to be more passive towards women than towards men, or 'Wild Cat', after a skin from that animal worn at dances, or 'Piercer of the Skin', because the spots look like holes in the skin, probably of animals speared, and thus carrying with it the idea of prowess in hunting. Some such name may be used to praise

7 See Ahmed Al-Shahi's article in this issue.
many different men, or may be used for the same man - Lanbar, 'Tall Game', for a man whose ox is coloured like the elegant giraffe, is an example. But a gifted composer has scope for originality, and the names can be poetic riddles, or a kind of nom de guerre. They are important for self-esteem, and for showing what the Dinka observe and admire in the world about them. But a list of personal names preserved genealogically from the past would scarcely indicate these intense Dinka interests, and the metaphorical cattle-names would present a problem to a later translator of Dinka songs. I suggest that they tend not to be preserved as the names of particular individuals because (in this respect like adopted Christian names) they have no relevance for establishing a Dinka's position in the system of values and traditional structure of Dinka society, as a member of a particular family, of a particular place, belonging to a particular lineage of a particular clan. They do not, like the recitation of the full name through agnatic ancestors up to the clan-founder, announce some of a person's rights and duties, or encapsulate the social background of the bearers.

Dinka clan names are not given as part of the full name, but for any Dinka to know a person's clan was, and probably largely still is, a matter of life and death. At marriage, according to the Dinka rules of exogamy, the elders must ensure that the prospective bride and groom cannot trace any relationship by descent on either the father's or the mother's side, unless this relationship is judged to have become very distant and a ceremony is performed to sever it. Otherwise the marriage may be incestuous, and a source of illness and death. Already twenty years ago, Dinka exiles in Khartoum were beginning to be unsure in some cases. For the collection and distribution of marriage cattle also, a wide range of kin is involved, and for this an extensive knowledge of names and their genealogical status is essential. Similarly, in cases of homicide, it is necessary to know which are, as it were, Montagues or Capulets, since homicide if uncompounded by compensation in cattle, demands blood vengeance, and blood vengeance may develop into feud which can outlast the generation in which the homicide occurred. The clan also defines the religious practices, prescriptions and proscriptions of those who belong to it, and even when Dinka were guests in Oxford, it was well to ask about clan-based food taboos. To break those also could be a cause of sickness and death.

So to place a Dinka socially, it is not enough only to know a person's individual line of descent. You have to ask also what clan he belongs to, which may or may not be apparent from the name of the founder. The way in which this is asked is itself of some interest for resolving what would seem to be a paradox of personal naming; the way in which names are required to identify individuals while also merging them into the common identity of their various social groups. For the literal translation of the question 'What is your clan?' is 'You are a person of the children of the family of what colour (type, kind)?', where the word used has the primary
meaning of the colour of animals. And as I have said, what 'colour' you are in this sense decides whom you may marry, and may decide, in a homicide, who is likely to kill or be killed by whom. At this level the particular individual designated by his personal names is of secondary importance; and the statement attributed to various Oxford figures when rebuffing an unwanted acquaintance - 'It's not you I dislike, it's just your type' - would seem to Dinka to be in the nature of human relationships.

REFERENCES

In his essay 'Social and Cultural Implications of Some African Personal Names' Godfrey Lienhardt quotes passages from personal information I had provided him for the purpose. The stimulating substance of the article and his request for comments made me decide to share with him some more intimate information on how I came to be called Mading.

The story goes back to my maternal background and the circumstances under which my parents married. My father's marriage to my mother, Achok, was complicated by the relationship between Kwol Arob and my maternal grandfather, Mijok Duor. Achok's lineage, Dhienagou, had been the divine leaders of the Bongo section of the Ngok. As a result of a blood feud, Mijok's grandfather, Maluk, had migrated from Bongo to Abyorm at the time of Kwol's father, Arob Biong. Maluk's father, Dau, and Arob's father, Biong, had maintained cordial ties as leaders of prominent lineages. Maluk had therefore been well received and honoured by Arob Biong and the whole of Abyor. He and his descendants had quickly established themselves as exceptionally gifted in the skills of war, talented with words, renowned for wisdom, and as divine leaders, endowed with curative powers. From that time on, they had been close associates and advisors to the line of Paramount Chiefs. Achok's father, Mijok, who was a member of Kwol Arob's age-set, Koryom, was the latest in the line.

Although I was still very young when my grandfather died, I have a sharp, loving and most admiring memory of him. Everything I have also come to know of him confirms the qualities for which I remember him. Even allowing room for flattery, the flowing words

1 See Godfrey Lienhardt's article on pp. 105-116 of this issue.
which were told me by elders in different contexts cannot fail to
impress me about him and my maternal background. 'Your maternal
relatives were our Divine Chiefs,' said Monyluak Row, an elder from
the Bongo section of the Ngok. And he continued:

Any illness or disaster that befell the tribe was cured by
them. Today, if the descendants of Maluk returned to Bongo
and claimed the Chieftainship, people would step aside and say
to them, 'Yes, this is your position. Take it.' Your matern­
al kin have always been known for wisdom and verbal skill.
For instance, with your grandfather, Mijok Duor, if he were
absent from his age-set for consultations, they would say,
'We must wait for Mijok before we begin the talks.' The same
was true of your uncle, Ngor. When his age-set, Chuor, used
to meet and discuss, Ngor used to be waited for if he were
away. He is a man who weighs words this way and that way.
The whole of Abyor recognized him as Mijok Duor, his father.
'Your maternal kin were the centre of the very ancient Bongo,'
said Achwil Bulabek, the Chief of Abyor. Maluk Atokbek, son
of Dau, was the man who immigrated into Abyor tribe. That is
why you hear of the war song of Abyor: 'Milk the Cow, Ayan, of
Maluk, the son of Dau; Milk Ayan of Maluk, the Buffalo.' When
your great grandfather, Arob, was the chief, he called your
maternal grandfather and said, 'Mijok, here is my son (Kwol);
take good care of him.' Mijok and Kwol were of the same age,
Koryom. They were also very close friends.

'Your grandfather, the elder called Mijok Duor, was a man of exceed­
ing wisdom and verbal talent,' commented another elder, Matet Ayom.
'He was a man who spoke extremely well and said words of great wis­
dom. He was also a close friend of your grandfather, Kwol Arob.'

According to my maternal uncle Ngor, after two of Mijok's senior
daughters died while in opposition to their proposed marriages, he
declared in front of his ancestral spirits and God that he had
abandoned cattle, normally acquired through marriage. He therefore
gave his subsequent daughters away in marriage for virtually no­
thing. Then, he changed his mind when his daughter, Achok, came
about. He slaughtered a bull to propitiate God and his ancestral
spirits and performed other rituals to signify his change of mind.
Ngor's account continues:

Mading, it was then that a man called Kweng came and said, 'I
want the daughter of Mijok Duor.' Kweng spoke to his mother,
Achai, from your clan Pajok. Achai came to see the girl. She
saw Achok and approved.

When the people came to negotiate the marriage, Father
said, 'Achok is the daughter with whom I intend to raise my
children. If a man wants to marry her, he must make a betroth­
al payment of twenty cows. As she has not yet reached puberty,
this payment will only be for betrothal. When she reaches
puberty, I will then say my word.'

Kweng's people went and returned with twenty cows and two excellent bulls: a huge tawny bull and a dark bull with a white stripe across the shoulders (Mabil). They were brought. I was now old enough to be aware.

Deng Majok subsequently saw Achok at a dance and proposed to marry her. Chief Kwol Arob refused, partly in deference to his nephew, partly because Deng Majok had already married several wives in close succession, and also because of the intimate friendship between him and Mijok, which he feared the proposed marriage might disturb in various ways.

It should be noted that Deng Majok and his father were already known to have developed considerable animosity over the issue of succession, Chief Kwol Arob preferring Deng Abot, who was younger than Deng Majok, but whose mother Kwol Arob considered his first wife in a rather controversial contest of seniority between the wives. Deng Majok had decided not only to press his claim for succession to leadership, but working in cooperation with the Arab Chief, Babo Nimir, and the British administrators, to force his father into retirement and assume control. The conflict over the proposed marriage was therefore a part of a wider problem between father and son.

Although Kwol Arob refused to be personally involved in the marriage, he sent their age-set to Mijok to explain his position and to ask him not to interpret it as an objection to his son's marriage into the family. Indeed, the mission of the age-set was to persuade Mijok to accept Deng Majok, even if his father was not involved in the arrangements. Uncle Ngor had this to say about the visit of the elders to his father:

The age-set Koryom, which was the age-set of both your grandfather, Kwol Arob, and my father, came to our home at Nok-Jur. They came on horses. They all gathered there and tethered their horses. Father slaughtered in their honour and after entertaining them said, 'Gentlemen, my dear age-mates, what brings you? Is anything the matter?'

They said, 'We have something to tell you.'

He said, 'Very well! What is it?'

They said, 'You have lost two of your daughters. This issue of Deng Majok is going to associate your daughter with blood. No one will be able to face the feud of Deng Majok. Please, give up the cattle of Achai. Your daughters are still small. They should not be confronted with this. We say, leave the girl for Deng.'

Mijok said, 'Gentlemen, is that why you came?'

They said, 'Yes!'

He said, 'Is the man for whom you are speaking without a father's voice behind him?'

They said, 'There is no one to speak for him with the tongue. [By attacking Kweng] Deng himself has spoken with the spear. And he stands alone.'

'But where is the voice of Kwol?' he asked.
'Kwol has excused himself to us,' they said. 'He said, "Gentlemen, my age-mates, I am out of this. Deng is putting Mijok Duor and me in a potential conflict. Should Mijok accept, Deng will not be able to match the aspirations of Mijok. So, I had better keep out of it."

Mijok was torn between father and son. On the one hand, he was a loyal friend to Kwol Arob, and on the other hand he admired the leadership qualities of Deng Majok and wanted to give him his daughter. When members of their age-set urged him to do so, he decided to give Deng Majok the girl. He returned the cattle of Kwol's nephew and asked Deng to pay only the cattle for the clan spirits and receive his wife. By now, Achok had reached puberty, but as she had been betrothed before puberty, it was still necessary to sacrifice a bull for the spirit of Agorot that would otherwise endanger the marriage. According to my uncle Ngor:

My father then called his relative, Dau Maluk, and said, 'I have given the girl away. Give me the bull, Mading, to be sacrificed for the spirit Agorot. Give me Mading with horns yet untampered with [according to the traditional way of training horns to grow into desired shapes]; that is what I want. That is the bull we should sacrifice for Achok's Agorot.'

Dau Maluk went and released Mading. My father called the members of his clan and said, 'Let us take this Mading to be sacrificed in Deng Majok's home. Let us go and invoke Mading; let us go and pray to God.'

He left with a number of people. Among them was a man called Chol Minyuon, an elder. And with them was Miyar Kac, an elder. He called a number of elders. And they went. They stood their sacred spears in the ground and prayed. My father said, 'God, what I have to say is not much. We ask you to give Achok a son whom we shall name Mading after the bull we are about to sacrifice. That is all we ask of you.'

My father and the elders with him prayed over the bull, Mading. They prayed and prayed and then sacrificed him. Then they left. They said, 'It is now up to God to decide whether to accept our prayers or to reject our word.'

To ensure that any grievances the maternal relatives might hold against my father for not having discharged his obligation in paying the bridewealth would not afflict me with any curse, my grandfather sought spiritual atonement with his relatives. Uncle Ngor's account explains:

After you were born, my father convened the elders of his clan and said, 'Chol Minyuon, do you not see anything pleasing to your heart? You will die. And I will die. And all of us assembled here will die. I have only one word to tell you. Is there any other name besides Mading?'

They said, 'No, there is only Mading.'

He said, 'Then I am giving you a lamb with which to wash your hearts and pray to God and say, "God, our hearts are now
pleased; we no longer have anything bad in our hearts, now that we have our Mading. He will one day hear all these words.'"

Days passed. You continued here. Then word came that your family wanted the baby to be brought home to be seen. So Achok took you. Then she stayed longer than was expected. Word came that you had been given another name. My father said, 'Is that truly so?'

People said, 'Yes!'

So my father sent a number of women. They took with them beer and different kinds of foods. When the women went, they were told of the other name. Kwei said that the child had been given the name of Arob. It was then said that Mading had been renamed to be Arob Biong (after Kwol Arob's father).

The women came back and told my father the story. He said to them, 'Are you sure that you heard it quite accurately?'

They said, 'Yes, we are sure we did.'

My father took his spears and left very early before dawn. He arrived before your father was out of his sleeping hut. He sat outside. When the women got up and saw him, they said, 'What is the matter?'

He said, 'Nothing! I was just passing by to visit Achok before proceeding to Abyei.'

Deng Majok was then told, 'Awut's father is outside.' He got out of his hut and went to see him.

'Father, is all well?' Deng said.

'Yes, I was just passing by to see Achok and continue on my way. I am going to Abyei.'

Deng said, 'Very well.' A bed-seat was then brought out and he sat.

My father then said, 'Would someone call Deng Makuei for me!' (The villages of the two brothers, Deng Majok and Deng Makuei, were next to one another.) Deng Makuei was called. He came and joined them.

Then my father said to them, 'Sons of Kwol Arob, this tongue of mine was once invoked by Monydhang Biong [Kwol Arob's uncle]. He said to me, "Mijok, come and let us consecrate our tongues." We blessed each other's tongue. Then he said to me, "Should Kwol fail to become the Chief, you will be the one to inform me in the hereafter." I was the most senior member of our entire age-set, Koryom; Kwol was a much younger member of the set. His uncle was concerned that their clan might rob him of the Chieftainship since he was that young. It was I who secured the Chieftainship for your father, Kwol. If I have suddenly become an outsider to this Chieftainship, then let me know at once.'

They said, 'What is the matter, Father?'

He said, 'That daughter of mine, Achok, who is in your home, is not here because your father, Kwol Arob, went and sat down to arrange her marriage to you. Nor have you paid for her. All I wanted from the marriage was to purchase the Head [of Deng Majok] which ... drove away the cattle of my daughter's
marriage. That was the Head I bought and appealed to God. If God has now judged in my favour and has shown me the fruit of his judgment by giving me my Mading, how could you think of naming him Arob Biong? If you people have the spiritual power to ask for your grandfather, Arob Biong, to be reborn, why don't you pray so that Achok begets Arob Biong for you next time? As for this Mading of mine, never ever call him by any other name. Right now, I am taking my daughter, Achok, and the baby, Mading, with me.'

They said, 'Father of Awut, how could you act so severely?'

'Say no more!' he replied. 'Keep your silence, I do not want to hear any more!'

Mading, my father was a tough man. He was a man who could be so severe that once a word had come out of his mouth, he would never retract it. He stood up and went to the door and said, 'Achok, come out with the baby, we are going. After all, you came only to show the baby to the family.'

People all gathered and pleaded with him: 'Father of Awut, you cannot take the baby this way. At least, leave Achok to be brought to you by others.'

Then he said, 'I will leave her on condition that she comes this very day and does not spend another night here.'

Achok was brought to our home that same day. We spent the night. The following morning, Deng Majok got onto his horse and went with a number of elders to see my father. They spoke to my father and said, 'Father of Awut, why allow your heart to be angered by such a trifling thing? Even if the child is called Mading, as you wish, would he not still be Mading, son of Deng? There is no issue. He will be Mading as you want him to be.'

Father said, 'Very well, my son, that was all I wanted. If you have now come and apologized, the issue has ended there. We will not quarrel any more.'

Deng Majok returned and told his family, 'I do not want to hear the child called Arob any more. He will be Mading.'

I grew up wondering why I was the only son in the family without an ancestral name and it was not until my late teens that I learned of my silent name - Arob. By that time, there were so many half-brothers with ancestral names - Kwol, Arob, Biong, Allor, Mondhang, Kwoldit, Dongdeb, Bulabek, Jok, etc. - that I began to cherish the uniqueness of my name in the family. When I go to know more about the background to my name, my appreciation was infinitely enhanced.

Indeed, my name has always symbolized my grandfather's investment in me and expectations for my future. I have felt this very strongly from my early childhood, but it became even stronger the more I got to know about the background, and Uncle Ngor has been one of my most moving informants. Let me try to provide deeper insight with another extended quotation from him:

Then you became ill when you were still an infant. You were beginning to walk. My father was extremely fond of you. He
would watch you keenly as you played around. And very often, he would want you to sit on his lap or hold you and bounce you about as he chanted words of praise for you.

One night, while you were severely ill, he did something. It was raining very heavily, with frightening thunder and lightning. He decided to take you out in the rain that night. My mother objected; but he insisted. She cried as she tried to restrain him from going outside with you. At one point, he said to her, 'Ayak, did I not fetch you with my sacred cows?'

'Yes,' she said.

'And how could you question my ancestral duty? Open the door and let me go out.'

She opened the door and he went outside with you in his arms. Then he prayed: 'God, why are you thundering this loudly, is it in your heart to take him away from me? If you are thundering because you want to take him, then I pray that you take me instead and leave him for me. Take me this very moment as you are angry, raining, and thundering. And if you should decide not to take me, then let me return into the hut and let your water, which has fallen on him, be a blessing so that he can sleep well tonight and wake up tomorrow morning smiling and playing for me to see.'

You were crying as he held you and prayed that way. The next morning, you woke up miraculously well. He held you in his hands and seated you in his lap. And he smiled into your face as he saw you so well and smiling.

Then the following night, he woke up my mother and said, 'Ayak, are you awake?'

My mother said, 'Yes!'

Then he turned to me and said, 'Son.'

He said, 'Get up and sit here. Listen to my words very carefully. Did you not witness what happened last night?'

I said, 'Yes, I did.'

He said, 'Well, I surrendered myself to redeem Mading, I will die. And after I am dead, what you hear happening in Abyor about the Chieftainship will come true. Don't you hear that Deng Majok will take over the Chieftainship from his father, Kwol Arob?'

I said, 'Yes!'

He said, 'The Head [of Deng Majok] that imposed its will on me will probably make that happen. And should it happen that way, this Mading of mine will one day force his way and find a position there. When you grow up, never complain to your brother-in-law, Deng Majok, that he has not paid your sister's bridewealth. Never tell him. It is Mading who should eventually be told. Deng must not be told.

'And you, Ayak, when you used to say that we should give our daughter to Kweng, I am going to die and you too will die. You and I might have found in Kweng's wealth a great deal for our own consumption, but what about something to be found by our children in the future? We do not know which of us two will die first. But even when we are both gone, Mading will not miss inheriting from my own Head, I, Mijok Duor. From
these two Heads, something will emerge in him. Should he inherit from the Head of his father, Deng Majok, that too will have become mine. And should he inherit from my own Head, that too would have become mine. That was all I wanted, my dear wife, Ayak, daughter of Deng Ngor.

'With Mading, I have compensated for the loss of cows. This tribe is ours. It is I who control the disease of cattle. And it is I who control the disease of man. That is why the tribe has flourished and multiplied this much. And yet, we have not found the central place in this section of Abyor. Chieftainship is inherent in us and it has continued to be attracted to us. But we have not found the centre in this tribe. Now, I have found the centre. I wanted to enter the centre.'

A few years later, he announced that he was dying and wanted the rituals of death to be performed. Since he looked well people did not believe him. But he was right; death quickly fell upon him. I was then back at home and in school. As he lay dying, people urged him to have me fetched and taken to him, but he refused. 'I do not want Mading to be involved in this,' he said. 'I have already given him my blessing.'

I have given this intimate and detailed account because I believe it substantiates in a concrete manner the point Godfrey Lienhardt has made in writing that 'For the Dinka... in almost all names the "meaning" is still alive: and there were then few or no non-Dinka words with etymologies known only to a learned minority'.2 Those most interested in the social significance of the name make sure that the person bearing it knows the background, the motivations, and the expectations associated with it. In my case, I was made well aware of all that, and there can be no question of its profound impact on my outlook.

FRANCIS MADING DENG

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2 See p. 107 above.
The Murle people live in the south-eastern Sudan adjoining the Ethiopian border. They number about 40,000 people and belong to the Surma language-family. They live on the flood plains of the Pibor River, and this terrain alternates according to the season between swamp and desert. Due to the harsh and varied environmental conditions, the Murle practise a transhumant life-style. Cattle are the focus of their economy, but they also hunt, fish, gather wild fruit, and grow grain.

The Murle still retain much of their traditional culture. The area in which they live is remote, and the outside world has had little influence on them until the present war. They are a proud and independent people. They live and function in small family units, with the eldest brother in each family acting as the head of the homestead. Above this basic family unit there is virtually no central authority, and each family makes its own decisions. In times of war or of hunting the people will temporarily band together, but soon afterward will again divide into their separate family units. There are also age-sets to which every man belongs. These age-sets are the basis for a man’s friends and social life and operate beside and in addition to the family units.

My wife and I lived and worked among the Murle people at Pibor for eight years. Our work was primarily linguistic, but my wife did make a personal project of gathering information on Murle names. This paper is a descriptive summary of the information which she collected.

**Birth Names**

A Murle woman giving birth is assisted by several women who serve as midwives. The woman gives birth from a standing or kneeling position.
position, and one of the midwives is given the job of catching the child. The newly born child is not given a name immediately at birth, but this is done at a naming ceremony called konyit. The parents of the child set the date for this ceremony approximately one month after the baby is born. Much food is prepared, and relatives and neighbours are invited to the ceremony. After the people have gathered, the father of the child announces its new name. Then an important member of the family takes butter and pours it around the fire where the food is being cooked. This butter is regarded as a blessing upon the new child and upon the family. The food is now distributed to the guests, and after eating they are free to leave, although many will spend the greater part of the day sitting around joking and singing.

The close relatives of the child are the people primarily responsible for choosing the name, but sometimes the midwife who catches the child also makes suggestions. There are a number of bases for choosing a name, but it is essential to realize that a Murle name always has meaning. Names can be taken from a number of different categories. Often something observed by the midwife or the mother during late pregnancy is chosen for the name. These are usually common things seen in everyday experience, resulting in names such as Tutu 'hyacinth', Korok 'homestead', Konyi 'male goat', and Tolu 'beehive'.

Another category of names are those which relate to the mother's experience at birth. Examples of these are Tilalo 'tears', Kadaai 'I am dying', naame 'wait woman', and Anyan 'God has given me'. Sometimes names are given which denote some characteristic of the newly born child such as Koli 'black', Logodok 'big head', Motti 'fierce', and Moomo 'sickly'. Occasionally a child is deliberately given an unlovely name so as not to draw attention to the child. This is usually done if the mother has already lost another child and fears for the life of the second. It is believed that a nice name would draw attention from evil powers who may kill the child. So this naming is an attempt to deceive the evil powers into thinking that the parents do not really care for the child. Examples of such names are Kaaka 'bitterness', Looch Doon 'dirt', Agoor 'green snake', Kuduvaan 'vulture', and Guzul 'hyena'.

Because of the transhumant life-style of the Murle, both places and seasons are always in focus. There is therefore an extensive vocabulary regarding these areas of interest. Children are often named after a place, a certain season, or a seasonal event which occurred at the time of their birth. They are given names such as Lukurinyan 'the place of his birth', Loom 'rainy season', Tawan 'flood', and Agorkoormo 'green unripened grain'. Usually people do not know their age, and this is especially true of older people. However, if a person is named after a widely known event such as a flood, drought, or epidemic which can be dated through government records, it then becomes possible to assess his age. Since all men in a given age-set are approximately the same age, it is then possible to ascertain the ages of those in the same age-set.

Occasionally a child is named after a relative who has died. This is done to honour and remember the deceased, but the child is
not thought to be a reincarnation of the dead person. Normally a child is not given the name of any other living person. However, there is an exception to this in which the child is given the name of the midwife, the woman who catches the child at birth. This is considered a great honour, and the child becomes like a godchild of the midwife. My wife Barbara was asked by one of her Murle friends to 'catch' her first child. She did so, and the child was named Bafura, the closest the Murle could come to pronouncing Barbara. The mother frequently came and asked for cloth, milk, and food for baby Bafura, and my wife was obligated by custom to give these things.

Foreign names are becoming increasingly common as the Murle begin to interact with other neighbouring societies. Some of these are well-known Dinka and Nuer names such as Macar and Lual. These names have meanings in the original languages, but the meanings are usually unknown to the Murle. With the coming of Christianity to the area, some children now receive biblical names at birth. Due to the resistance of the people to Islam, I have not found any children bearing Arabic names.

Up to this point I have been discussing the first name a child receives at birth. However, a child may receive several secondary names from people close to the child. These are used as nicknames to refer to the child. In most cases their usage dies out, but in some cases the nickname may actually take precedence and a person may become known by his secondary name.

The Murle language does not have gender, so any word can be used for either a boy or a girl. If I hear the name Guzul I have no way of knowing whether it refers to a male or a female. However, some girls and boys are given names which have words meaning 'woman' or 'boy' as part of the name, such as qaacun 'your woman', qaaitin 'cow woman', qaaruben 'blind woman', and Logoco 'this boy'. However, even this cannot assure that the person referred to is a man or woman. B.A. Lewis, who worked among the Murle as a government officer, used as one of his main informants a man called qaacinol 'lame woman'. So a man can go through life with a name which we would consider a woman's name.

There is a great deal of individualism among the Murle people, and this is reinforced by the fact that each has a different name. People do not normally have the same name as anybody else, so there is no confusion when a name is used as to who is being referred to. There are of course exceptions, such as two people being named after the same flood, or the case of a person being named after a midwife who is still living. Because names are seldom used twice, there are literally thousands of names in existence at any one time. Although names may be similar, there are usually efforts to make them different in some way. The names Logoto 'it is a boy' and Logoco 'this is a boy' are similar in both pronunciation and meaning, but the subtle difference between them is enough to differentiate them.

The Murle names all have meaning, but even after studying the language for eight years I could only understand about half of them until I asked for an explanation. Because of the large number of different names required, the people sometimes use rare words and unusual linguistic forms to come up with new names, and this can
frustrate a foreign linguist such as myself. Often names are very obscure words which are synonyms for more commonly used words. At times a single word stands for a much wider meaning than can be symbolized by the single word, as in the name Anyar. Literally this means 'give me' but is understood by the Murle to mean 'God has given me a child'. In other situations several words or a phrase are compacted together into one word having several morphemes of meaning but without the usual grammatical endings. Qaatiin is made up of the two morphemes 'woman' and 'cow', but the proper grammatical phrase should be qaa ci tiinu. Even the Murle themselves do not always understand the meaning of another person's name until they ask them to unravel it.

**Calf Names**

The name given at birth is usually the name used by a person for the rest of his life. However, as a person passes through various stages in life he will obtain other names. When a boy reaches the age of 8 or 9, he is given a calf by his father. This is a symbol that he is growing up, and this calf is the start of his own herd. At this stage the boy takes a name based on the colour of his new calf. The new name is a riddle based on the calf's colour. The boy's friends have to try and work out the colour of his calf based on the riddle.

One has to have a good understanding of the Murle world in order to solve these riddles, and I was seldom able to do so. One boy told me that his calf name was Gol Rii, which literally means 'road shade'. After I failed to solve the riddle he explained that the local safari ants walk in a long trail until they wear a deep groove into the ground. Eventually the ants raise the soil on the sides of the groove, and they are walking in shade and are protected from the hot sun. These ants are coloured a deep red and therefore the boy's calf is the colour red. Another boy told me that his name was Rigis Kul, which means 'hanging tail'. This riddle was easier than the first, and I was eventually able to guess that it referred to a giraffe; this meant that his calf was spotted red and white. The boys have a lot of fun with these names and they refer to each other by them. Using these names with each other is evidence that they are growing up.

**Ox Names**

When a boy reaches about 18 years of age he receives his name ox. Many years ago the Murle had an initiation ceremony in which boys were initiated into manhood. However, this ceremony disappeared over eighty years ago, and the only important feature which remains is the name ox. Upon receiving this ox the boy takes a new name which is his manhood name. This ox is very special to the boy as it is a symbol of his becoming a man. The new name is a play on words based on the colour of the ox, but the words used are from the Toposa language so that most people do not know the components of
the word and even less its true meaning.

The Toposa are considered to be the enemies of the Murle, and
the two ethnic groups are presently separated by a 150-mile buffer
zone. However, there have been associations in the past and a few
old men know the Toposa language. It is significant that some of
the Murle dance songs also use the Toposa language. The Murle men
memorize these songs from generation to generation but usually have
no idea what they mean. When I was given an ox name based on a
yellow ox, the young men had to find an old man who knew the Toposa
language and he was able to come up with the proper wording of my
new name Anyan 'yellow lion'.

The ox name is not normally used by people in referring to
each other. The name is not kept secret but is frequently shouted
out in praise songs and at dances. However, the meaning of the
name is not usually given out except to close friends in the age­
set and occasionally to outsiders like myself.

Teknonymy

After a man marries and has a child he is often referred to as the
father of that child rather than by his personal name. My oldest
child is called Lisa, so I was often called Baatilisa. This name
was used by people when formally greeting me, but most people
dropped this respectful form and referred to me as Jon. Children
often use such a term in addressing an older person since it would
be disrespectful to call him by his name as if he were their equal.
This term is also used in formal gatherings such as a council meet­
ing or in a church. More than once I missed my cue to speak since
I was expecting them to call me Jon and instead they used Baatilisa.
It is considered a term of respect since it is an honour to have a
child. The same principle holds true of women when they become
mothers, and my wife was often referred to as Yaatilisa.

Even though boys and men receive new names at various stages of
their lives they are usually referred to by the name they were
given at birth. When I was asking some older men for their calf
names some of them had to think for a minute, as it had been so
long since they had used them. In my case I took an ox name a
number of years after I arrived in Murle land. However, everyone
continued to refer to me as Jon, and I doubt if more than a few
people even remember my ox name.

There is an exception to a person being referred to by the
same name all of their life. If a person is converted to Christ­
ianity they usually take a new name. When a visiting church leader
came to Pibor and baptized some young men they suddenly had new
Christian names taken from the Bible. They looked upon baptism as
a rite of passage into a new phase of life, and a name change was
thought to be appropriate. I still called them by their old names,
but gradually I was forced to change since they continually correct­
ed me and other Murle were referring to them by their new names.
At the same time others took a Christian name, but people continued to call them by their old name. I think it depended on the person himself correcting people as to which name he preferred.

The identity of a Murle person is closely tied to his name. A personal name shows who he is, and since names in Murle have meaning it tells a little about his birth or when or where he was born. The later names based on cow colours show a person's station in life. Being called the father of somebody is even one step higher. Eventually when a man or woman grows old the personal name is often dropped, and they are referred to as Ji ji 'grandfather' or Abe 'grandmother'. These are considered to be titles of great respect and mean that the person referred to is being highly honoured.
Northern Sudan encompasses a vast and complex cultural area with a diversity of peoples, of modes of living and of social and cultural traditions. This article is concerned with the nature and meaning of names among the riverain people, who constitute part of a larger cultural entity whose peoples are commonly known as 'northern Sudanese'.\textsuperscript{1} With a few exceptions, the riverain people exhibit some uniformity in their cultural and religious traditions, derived partly from Arabism and Islam. The personal names of the riverain people reflect and reaffirm their shared interest in Arab culture and Islam. Thus, personal names not only assume historical, cultural and religious meaning for the riverain people but also affirm their identification and connection with Arabs and Muslims.

I should like to express my thanks to my wife, Anne, who made valuable comments on earlier drafts of this paper. Also, thanks are due to the Ford Foundation and the Nuffield Foundation for their grants to undertake research among the Shaygiyya tribe of Northern Sudan. I have followed the conventions of \textit{Sudan Notes and Records} in transliterating Arabic words. In view of the citation of many Arabic names, I have decided to make the text less cumbersome by omitting diacritical marks for the most part. The two letters M and F, which the reader will encounter in the text, are to designate names for males and females respectively.

\textsuperscript{1} The term 'riverain people' is commonly used to denote the tribes which inhabit both banks of the River Nile extending from the Egyptian border south to Khartoum. On the other hand, the term 'northern Sudanese' covers a wider geographical area and encompasses sedentary and nomadic peoples, as well as town-dwellers.
elsewhere. There are also personal names and nicknames which are peculiar to the riverain people and which give the northern Sudanese nomenclature its distinctive flavor. The discussion of these two aspects is not intended to be an exhaustive treatment of the subject. Rather, I shall concentrate on some specific aspects of personal names and nicknames which are common among the riverain people and with which I am familiar.

Among the riverain people it is customary for a person to be addressed by their personal name or ism (for example, male: Ali, Muhammed, Hasan; and female: Fatma, Arafa, Sakina). But if asked about further identity, then the person will cite their personal name and nasab or genealogy. Thus, for example, the name Muhammed Hasan Ali indicates that Muhammed is the son of Hasan who in turn is the son of Ali. This is unlike the practice in Western nomenclature where the second and third names of a person are not necessarily those of their father or grandfather. Among Arabs, as well as northern Sudanese, such indications of genealogical links between a person and three or four ancestors are historically true statements of ancestry. But beyond these four links, and in order to avoid confusion due to a similarity of names, people often adopt the name of the ancestor of their lineage, clan or tribe. While recognition of a person's belonging to a particular tribe, through the addition of the name of the ancestor of that tribe (e.g. Ja'ali 'of the Ja'alliyin tribe', Mahasi 'of the Mahas tribe') is identifiable nationally, the name of the lineage or clan will be known only within the tribe.

True or fictitious descent from a common ancestor, and the subsequent use of his name as part of the full name of a person, is not only employed to establish a person's kinship identity, but also to define their traditional status, rights and duties as a member of a particular family, lineage, clan or tribe. In the traditional organization of the rural population of the riverain tribes a person's genealogical designation is particularly significant in relation to their rights of land ownership and residence. Moreover, the use of tribal names (such as Shaygi, Ja'ali, Mahasi, Dongoliawi, Hadendowi) provokes in jest praiseworthy or derogatory associations and gives rise to a contentious social classification of tribes. Thus, a Shaygi and a Ja'ali will each regard himself as superior to the other.2

One variation of the tribal name which is common among northern Sudanese and Arabs in general, is the repetitive use of the name of an ancestor as a mark of respect or to commemorate the death of this ancestor, e.g. Muhammed Ahmed Al-Hasan Muhammed Ahmed. Such a personal name can be confusing as others may use the same separate

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2 The genealogical designation of a person's name ends in -i. But in certain cases, peculiar to northern Sudanese, -ab is added at the end of the name of the ancestor (e.g. Hashmab, Nkairab, Kinaishab) denoting 'the descendants of'.
names in a slightly different sequence. To avoid this confusion either the tribal affiliation of the person or his nickname will be added to the personal names. It is not proper, and even impolite, among the riverain people to address a person to his face by his personal name unless the speaker is very much the social superior. This also applies to addressing older women. Therefore, in speaking to superiors, equals or near-equals, it is obligatory to use, as a mark of respect, secular or religious titles. Among such titles are those of kinship terminologies such as: jiddi 'grandfather', abū 'father', ammi 'paternal uncle', and khâlî 'maternal uncle'; those of religion such as hāji 'pilgrim', fākî3 'man of religion' and khâlîfâ4, a deputy in a religious order; and those which are secular such as sayyid 'master' or, in a religious context, 'a descendant of the Prophet', shaikh 'village headman' or, in a religious context, 'a man of religion', 'omda5 'head of a district' and ustâz 'teacher'.

The use of a nickname gives an indication of the unusual personal attributes or idiosyncrasies (abstract, physical or social) of a person, and it can be assumed that a nickname has its origin in reality. While a personal name is given at birth, a nickname is acquired and sometimes, when it is added to the personal name, it may become perpetuated like a surname. Invariably a nickname requires the use of the prefix abū- or umm- (literally 'father of' or 'mother of'). Thus:

- abu saffâ
- abu jidairi
- abu shanab
- abu faz
- abu likailik
- abu surra
- snuff-taker
- a spotty-faced person
- a big-moustached person
- a lazy person
- a fat-bottomed person
- a fat-belly-buttoned person

3 Fâkî is a corruption of faqîh 'a jurist'.
4 Khalîfâ is a title conferred by the head of a religious order on a follower in view of his zeal and dedication to the spreading of the order.
5 With the abolition of the system of Native Administration, this title is no longer used.
6 Snuff, sa'âät, is commonly used among northern Sudanese. The snuff is taken as a lump and placed between the inside of the lower lip and the front of the lower jaw.
7 Jidairi is the diminutive of jidrî 'smallpox'.

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In the case of female nicknames, I have encountered two which were given at birth as first names: Umm Raid 'a long-necked woman' and Umm Ukhwan 'a woman with many brothers'.

In the case of twins of different sexes their first names are frequently Al-Tom or Al-Tema, meaning simply 'the twin (M)' and 'the twin (F)'.

Sometimes a person's personal name is not used in the normal mode of address; instead, they are addressed by the name of their eldest (or only) son and occasionally by the name of the eldest daughter if there are no sons. This also requires the use of abu- or umm-. Thus, abu Al-Hasan 'father of Hasan' or umm Al-Hisain 'mother of Hisain'. The use of this combination, as a mode of address, is a mark of respect and it is less common among northern Sudanese than among Arabs elsewhere.

Urbanization has led to the growth, alongside the customary personal names, of nicknames based on geographical location which indicate either a person's place of birth, residence or an abstract quality. For example:

Ali Dongola (M)
Hasan Korti (M)
Muhammed Al-Asari (M)
Dar Al-Na'im (F)
Balad Al-Nabi (F)
Aeqa (F)
Makka (F)
Medina (F)

Ali of Dongola town
Hasan of Korti town
Muhammed the Egyptian
the home of plenty
the country of the Prophet
Asia
Mecca
Medina

Moreover, it is not uncommon to use the occupation of a person as part of his personal names. Thus: al-jazzar 'the butcher', al-garmadi 'the plasterer', al-hajjar 'the stone-mason', atuli 'the porter' and al-warrag 'the writer of charms'. These occupational names tend to evolve into a family name and are transmitted through generations irrespective of the person's actual occupation. This is not dissimilar to such English names as 'Butcher', 'Baker', 'Goldsmith', 'Fowler' etc.

As in most Arab or Muslim societies, many personal names (both male and female) of the riverain people have Islamic associations or connotations. As the term 'Islam' means the submission or resignation to the will of God (Allah), the prefix 'abd- 'slave' is commonly added to personal names. Thus the name Abd Allah 'slave of God' is the most direct composite name denoting this submission. There are

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8 The implication of this nickname is that the person is in the habit of complaining persistently about a disorder of his intestines.
other personal names which are derived from the attributes of God, such as: 
Abd Al-Rahman 'the slave of the Compassionate', Abd Al-Karim 'the slave of the Generous', Abd Al-Jalil 'the slave of the Sublime' and Abd Al-Rahim 'the slave of the Merciful'. Names of prophets also figure in personal names: for example, Isma'il (Ishmael), Ibrahim (Abraham), Isa (Jesus), Musa (Moses), Nuh (Noah) and Sulaima (Solomon). But, as one might expect, the names of the Prophet Muhammed and those of his descendants figure most prominently in personal names. Thus, for example: Muhammed (the Prophet), Abe and Khadija (the Prophet's two wives), Al-Abbas (the Prophet's uncle), Ali (the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law), Fatma (the Prophet's daughter) and Hasan and Hussein (the Prophet's grandchildren).

Other personal names which have a religious association are those of the first four caliphs (Abu Bakr, Omer, Othman and Ali) in particular, and those of the Ommiad and Abbaside caliphs (such as Mu'awiya, Yazid, Al-Amin, Al-Ma'mun and Al-Mu'tasim).

The riverain people, and northern Sudanese in general, share these names with other Muslims but they are impartial to the religious and political overtones associated with these names highlighted by Islamic sectarianism. For example, the Shi'ites will not use, as the northern Sudanese do, the names of the first three caliphs as they claim that they violated the rule of succession to the leadership of the Muslim community after the death of the Prophet. To the Shi'ites the fourth caliph, Ali, the Prophet's cousin and son-in-law, should have succeeded the Prophet. Thus the names of Ali and his descendants are commonly used among the Shi'ites, and these names are called upon in times of need and distress, as well as being used in oaths.

But more specific personal names and surnames used by the riverain people that have a religious association are those connected with Sufi orders. The surnames Al-Mahdi, Al-Mirghani, Al-Hindi, Al-Sammani and Al-Majdhub indicate that the person is a descendant of the founder of a Sufi order and by extension a follower of that order. In particular, the use of the personal names Sirr Al-Khatim9 'secret of the seal', Khatmi10 (belonging to the Khatriyya Sufi order) and Mirghani (the family name of the founder of the Khatriyya Sufi order) among the Shayghiyya and other tribes indicates their bearers' association with the Khatriyya Sufi order.

What is significant about religious names and titles is that they are a means of identification, they confer religious status and power (particularly titles), and their use is claimed to bring blessing to the bearer.

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9 Sirr Al-Khatim is the title assumed by the founder of the Khatriyya Sufi order, Sayyid Muhammed Othman Al-Mirghani, as he claimed that God revealed that his order was the 'secret of the seal' and khatim al-turuq 'the seal of all orders'.

10 The feminine form (Khatriyya) of Khatmi is also given to women as a personal name.
In addition to the tribal and religious names, there are personal names and nicknames which have a variety of associations. In the lists that follow are some examples of these associations.

1. Animals, Birds, Insects
   - **Tumsah (M)** crocodile
   - **Al-Rihawi (M)** the grey crane
   - **Al-Nahal (F)** the bees
   - **Al-Anag (F)** the ewe
   - **Khad (M)** camel
   - **Al-Dabi (M)** the snake

2. Military Ranks
   - **Sanjak (M)** head of a company
   - **Jawish (M)** staff sergeant

3. Trees, Herbs and Perfumes
   - **Sandaliiyya (F)** sandalwood
   - **Al-Nakhli (F)** the date-palm trees
   - **Al-Hall (F)** cardamom
   - **Rayhan (M)** sweet basil

4. Colours
   - **Al-Asrag (M)** the black
   - **Al-Ahmarr (M)** the fair colour (lit. 'red')
   - **Khadra (F)** blackish-green
   - **Halabi (M)** fair colour

5. Objects
   - **Ballas (M)** earthenware jar
   - **Barud (M)** gunpowder
   - **Kaboun / Kabeul (M)** capsule
   - **Al-Tur'a (M)** the canal
   - **Al-Shubbak (F)** the window
   - **Taya (F)** temporary camp

6. Physical Appearance
   - **Fanduk (M)** fat buttock
   - **Kadamur (F)** ugly
   - **Agra'a (M)** bald
   - **Al-Rawga (F)** the beautiful
   - **Al-Bi'aw (M)** the small

7. Character
   - **Al-Musahi (M)** the generous
   - **Gaddal (M)** proud

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11 Both Sanjak and Jawish are Turkish military titles which were introduced with the Turco-Egyptian conquest of 1820-1.
So far I have been elaborating on some common personal names and nicknames to be found among the riverain people. However, there are specific names associated with certain social groups, particularly with ex-slaves and gypsies, which are distinctive and indicate their social difference and inequality in power and position. People who are neither ex-slaves nor gypsies will not use these specific names. Two names which indicate that the person is a gypsy or of gypsy extraction\(^{13}\) are ḥalābī 'from Aleppo' (a town in Syria) and ḥamār\(^{14}\) 'reddish colour'. In the case of ex-slaves, on the other hand, their names are derived from the nomenclature of their ex-masters. Their original names have been lost but, since their incorporation into the culture of the riverain people and their emancipation, they have adopted Arabic names, some of which

\(^{12}\) It is likely that these names indicate that the person was born on that particular day or in that month.

\(^{13}\) Gypsies claim that they have come from Upper Egypt but the name suggests that they are from Aleppo, a town in Syria. The popular theory is that gypsies, after leaving India, came to the Fertile Crescent (Syria, Iraq, Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon) and from there some went to eastern Europe and others went to Egypt and north Africa. This would account for the claim by Sudanese gypsies that they came from Upper Egypt.

\(^{14}\) Though the colour ahmar (literally 'red', but referring to people with light-coloured skin) is specifically associated with gypsies, there are riverain people who, in terms of colour, look like gypsies, but they will not be classified as gypsies as the latter's identity is not only associated with skin colour but also with occupation (being blacksmiths and hawkers), obscurity of origin and certain behavioural patterns.
are classical. In the past, slaves, who lived with their masters, adopted the names of their masters, so this represents a shift in their identity and status. A further change, which is now common, is that younger, educated ex-slaves have dropped their ex-masters' surnames and have adopted names which are not commonly found in the repertoire of names of their ex-masters.

However, ex-slaves continue to be identified as a distinct social group through, among other attributes, their traditional personal names and nicknames. These names indicate social difference and inequality. Some of these personal names which I found to be in current use are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abd Al-Bayyin (M)</td>
<td>the slave of the Eloquent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd Al-Tamm (M)</td>
<td>the slave of the Perfect</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abd Al-Farraj (M)</td>
<td>the slave of the Reliever</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khadim Allah (F)</td>
<td>the slave of God</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allah Atana (F)</td>
<td>God's gift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allah Itaya (F)</td>
<td>God's gift</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Rubb Yajud (F)</td>
<td>God's generosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rubb Jud (F)</td>
<td>God's generosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jad Al-Rubb (F)</td>
<td>God's generosity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allah Jabu (M)</td>
<td>God brought him</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajin Allah (F)</td>
<td>in God's anticipation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Allah Ma'ana (F)</td>
<td>God be with us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khadim Al-Faki (F)</td>
<td>the slave of the man of religion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khadim Sidha (F)</td>
<td>the slave of her master</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izz Battna (F)</td>
<td>the pride of our house</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Some personal names are associated with the characters of the ex-slaves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mafhumın (M)</td>
<td>knowledgeable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mablul (M)</td>
<td>wet (i.e. weakling)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ashmana (F)</td>
<td>needy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surrur (M)</td>
<td>joyous</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamm Zina (F)</td>
<td>her beauty is complete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safi Al-Niyaa (M)</td>
<td>clear intention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Batran (M)</td>
<td>the vain one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Malk (M)</td>
<td>the king</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Malka (F)</td>
<td>the queen</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

15 Though the prefix 'abd- is used among the riverain people in conjunction with God, the Prophet and attributes of God, it is interesting to note that certain attributes of God came to be associated with ex-slaves only. In theory there is no differentiation in the use of these attributes.

16 This term is commonly used to refer to a female ex-slave. The term khādim is from the Arabic root khadama 'to serve'. Prior to their emancipation, slaves were employed as domestic servants by their masters.
Moreover, some personal names are associated with objects:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al-Ratina (F)</td>
<td>pressure lamp</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sumait (F)</td>
<td>beads</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murjan (M)</td>
<td>coral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tawm Shain (M)</td>
<td>ugly bull</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rayhan (M)</td>
<td>sweet basil</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jaz (F)</td>
<td>paraffin</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ajaj (F)</td>
<td>swirling dust</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Jazira (F)</td>
<td>the island</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Murfin (M)</td>
<td>morphine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tayir (M)</td>
<td>tyre</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayy (M)</td>
<td>mountain ram</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Huruz (F)</td>
<td>charms</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

There are still other names peculiar to ex-slaves:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mabruk (M)</td>
<td>congratulations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mursal (M)</td>
<td>the messenger</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kasba (M)</td>
<td>gain</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tagil Mizana (F)</td>
<td>heavy (weighing) scales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salatin (M)</td>
<td>Slatin17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yaslam Laina (M)</td>
<td>to be preserved for us</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fakhur Taj (F)</td>
<td>the pride of the crown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Izz Thabat (F)</td>
<td>the glory of firmness</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While traditional names persist among the riverain people, educated northern Sudanese are introducing new names, particularly in urban centres, and this practice is spreading to rural areas. Many of these new names are classical Arabic ones, including male personal names such as Sami, Sabah, Ma'adh, Hisham, Ayman and Haytham, and female personal names such as Suhair, Shadiyya and Rudaina. These names would not have been used by their parents or grandparents. On meeting a villager recently I told him that our mutual (educated) friend has a daughter by the name of Rudaina. His reply was: 'Where did he get this name from, and what does it mean?' Names, like fashions, change with time and circumstances. However, the repertoire of personal names among the riverain people remains one of the idioms through which Islam, Arab culture and social differences are expressed. Genealogies of the riverain people are a testament to the repetition and constancy of these names.

**AHMED AL-SHAIH

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17 Sir Rudolf Karl von Slatin Pasha, Baron (1857-1932): a famous Austrian officer who served in Egypt and in the Sudan under Kitchener, becoming Inspector-General of the Sudan after the reconquest.
A SHORTAGE OF NAMES:
GREEK PROPER NAMES AND THEIR USE

One common understanding of a proper name is that it should designate an individual person or thing. In the village of Spartohori (Meganisi, Lefkada) I was acquainted with five men called Georgos Politis, five called Nikos Zavitsanos, three called Gerasimos Aryiris, and so forth. Moreover, out of a total adult male population of permanent residents which stood in 1980 at approximately two hundred and five, twenty-eight (or one in seven) were called

1 Spartohori is one of three villages (Spartohori, Meganisi, Vathy) on the tiny island of Meganisi (20 square kilometres) which lies off the Ionian island of Lefkada (Lefkas) between it and the west coast of mainland Greece. Field work was conducted between 1977 and 1980, and was made possible by a series of generous grants from the Philip Bagby Bequest, University of Oxford, and subsequently by the SSRC. My thanks are due to both bodies.

2 This rather cumbersome formula needs apology. Like most villages in rural Greece, Spartohori has been subject to considerable emigration, both overseas and to urban centres in Greece, mainly Athens. Many if not most Spartohoriots resident in Athens and elsewhere return regularly to the village, and some are amongst the most active and prominent in village affairs and should certainly be considered members of the Spartohoriot community. On the other hand, their number is obviously somewhat difficult to calculate (some, for example, might be resident in Spartohori for three or four months of the year and frequently between times, others for only a few weeks of the year, others after an interval of several years). In order to give an exact number, I have restricted myself to what I have elsewhere referred to as the 'core' population, i.e. those
A Shortage of Names

Georgos, and while somehow everyone else always seemed to know which Georgos was being discussed (presumably because there were sufficient contextual clues), I did not. For a professional coffee-shop eavesdropper, i.e. a field-worker, this was a considerable disadvantage, and to be told when I timidly asked 'Er ... which Georgos?' that they were of course discussing that Georgos did not help matters. I began to feel there was a rather unfair shortage of personal signifiers, and part of this essay will try to discuss why that should have been so.

It must be admitted that the way people are generally named in Greece follows a pattern whose basic features are familiar throughout Europe and the Europeanized world: that is to say, every Greek possesses both a given or Christian name (his or her onoma) and a family name or surname (his or her eponymo). In a relatively small and largely endogamous community such as Spartohori, however, these two names, even if used in combination, are often insufficient to specify a particular individual - hence my five Georgos Politises etc. - and it is worth pointing out at this stage that one difference between the Greek manner of naming and that employed in most other European countries is that normally Greeks are limited to these two names since they receive only one given or Christian name.3 On official documents, however, including the taftotita or identity card which Greek citizens are required to carry, greater specificity is given by the inclusion of both one's father's and one's mother's names: thus one could be identified as Georgos Politis son of Nikos and Maria. (And in fact the middle initial that frequently appears, for example, in the names of Greek writers and scholars does not stand for a second Christian or given name, but for the Christian name of their father in the possessive or genitive case.) Greek officialdom remains a touch ethnocentric about this, for although the disembarkation card that one must complete on arrival in Greece is conveniently translated into English, French and German, a certain confusion sets in when the Greek asks for 'name of father' and the English, French and German asks for 'middle name or name of father'. I have always been called Roger, but in fact Roger is the last of my three Christian names, the first two being Francis Pelham which were also my father's two Christian names (and my grandfather's two Christian names). On my first trip to Greece I naively attempted to fill out the disembarkation form as accurately as I was able, entering 'Francis Pelham Roger' as my given name(s) and 'Francis Pelham' as my father's given name(s) - though admittedly the latter pair were not simultaneously my middle name(s) which in accordance with my passport would be 'Pelham Roger'. This was solemnly corrected by the

Spartohoriots whose only place of residence is Spartohori. Even this number fluctuates, however, since families might spend a period of their lives in Athens (or overseas) before deciding to return to the island; moreover, of the core population, many of the men are sailors and thus absent from the village for months on end.

3 This is not without exception amongst the middle class and in urban areas, but it is the norm.
immigration official. 'Francis Pelham' was struck out of my given name(s) leaving only 'Roger' (in fact my third given name) and 'Francis Pelham' was left on the next line as my middle name(s) or name of father. I protested that this was a mistake. Both my father and I had the same Christian name(s), and then I possessed a further middle name, 'Roger', not shared with my father. This was declared an impossibility on the grounds that if my father's name(s) was Francis Pelham then this must be my 'middle name(s) or name of father', erago, Roger was my given name. I now make a point of con- forming to this expectation.

The use of one's parents' Christian names in addition to one's own Christian or given name (singular) is, however, largely an official one. In Spartohori children were occasionally referred to as, for example, O Georgos tou Petrou (Petros' Georgos), and wives were occasionally referred to in a similar manner, for example I Maria tou Petrou (Petros' Maria), but these, I think, were genuine cases of description rather than of naming as such.4 Certainly adult men were not referred to as 'son-of' anyone. What in Spartohori (and in rural Greece in general) takes the place of a middle name, or rather, fulfils some of its functions by enabling one to distinguish onomastically between, say, the various Georgos Politises, is the paratsoukli or 'nickname' of which there are two sorts: personal nicknames acquired and carried by individuals, and family nicknames which come very much to resemble surnames with which, I believe, they are historically connected.

In what follows I shall try to make some brief comments on each of these types of names: Christian or given, or surname, and paratsoukli or nicknames.

Christian Names

On the billboards of Melbourne (possibly the third largest Greek city in the world) there is at the moment [Spring 1988] a rather clever advertisement for a particular brand of ouzo. It reads 'Such-and-such ouzo: for every Con, Nick and Haris'. The advertisement is clever, I think, because it transposes an English cliché into a Greek context but in reference to Greeks who have themselves been transposed into an English (or at least anglophone) context. But there is also a hidden irony, for the cliché on which the advertisement trades is a fossilized one. Not many (or Australians) are these days called Tom or Dick or Harry. 'Tom' has perhaps made something of a come-back in recent years, but the 'traditional' anglophone male names cluster around David, John, Peter, James (and, in Australia, Robert) whilst at the same time the anglophone world is also full of Shaynes, Waynes, Jansons, Garys, Bretts and whatever else ephemeral fashion has dictated for a particular generation. I do not know how many 'Christian' names there

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4 In some areas of rural Greece a woman's attachment to her husband was marked by the actual loss of her own Christian name and the adoption of her husband's with a feminine suffix (see Campbell 1964: 186).
are for male anglophones, but there are an awful lot. Not so in
Greece, however, where fashion has played a lesser part and where
'Con, Nick and Haris' have pretty wide currency. Again, I do not
know how many Greek Christian names are actually in use, and I
imagine an exhaustive list would run into hundreds, but they are
nevertheless a more limited set and not much open to increase by
invention. In fact my two hundred and five adult male Spartohoriots
shared a total of forty-five Christian names between them. That is, I
suppose, a reasonable array, and roughly one Christian name for
every four men; but of those two hundred and five males, twenty-
eight were called Georgos, seventeen were called Nikos, sixteen were
called Gerasimos, twelve were called Stathis, twelve were called
Michalis, eleven Andreas and ten Spiros (as it happens 'Con' and
'Haris' do not seem to do particularly well in Spartohori). The
point is, however, that in Greece a Christian name is supposed to
be indeed a Christian name - the name of a saint which tags its
bearer as a member of the Christian community. This has certain
social and ritual implications which I shall come to shortly, not
the least being that what is traditionally celebrated in Greece is
not a person's birthday but his or her name-day - the day of the
saint whose name that person bears. But the requirement of a
Christian name has the obvious effect of warding off the
vagaries of fashion.

Not, however, entirely. Vicky is now a fashionable girl's
name, and to the best of my knowledge it is an importation and owes
its popularity to a certain Greek pop-star. Olga, too, is not an
uncommon women's name in Greece, and if it sounds rather un-Greek
this is because it was borne by a Queen of Greece who was not her-
self very Greek. More interestingly, however, Greece's rediscovery
of its classical past, which can be dated roughly from the end of
the eighteenth century and coincides with the move towards national
independence, resulted in a recurrent fashion for classical names -
Odysseus, Penelope, Leonidas, Herakles, Sokrates etc. The Church
(whose hierarchy was against revolution and independence from the
Ottoman Empire) also pronounced against this pagan fashion, and
I have been told that during the recent period of the Junta (1967-
74) efforts were again made to prevent children from being baptized
with un-Christian Christian names. But a note of caution is needed
here, for, historically, pagan and Christian names have genuinely
fused. In common with its equivalents in the rest of the Christian

5 Olga of Russia (1851-1926) wife of George I, King of the Hellenes.

6 A Patriarchal Encyclical of 1819 (from Gregorios V) concludes
with the following: 'And the innovation introduced, as we have
heard, of giving ancient Greek names to the baptised infants of the
faithful, taken as a despising of the Christian practice of naming,
is altogether inappropriate and unsuitable ... parents and god-
parents in future are to name at the time of the holy and secret
rebirth with the traditional Christian names, to which pious par-
ents are accustomed, the names known in Church, and of the glor-
ious saints that are celebrated by it' (quoted in Clogg 1976: 88).
world, Maria is probably the commonest woman's name in Greece; but Eleni (i.e. Helen) would be one of the competitors, and what name more redolent of Greece's mythological past than that? Yet there is, of course, a St Eleni - just as, indeed, there is a St Socrates. One can often have one's Hellenism and sanctify it too. But there is not, I think, a St Odysseus, and for those who bear non-Christian Christian names a delightful piece of pragmatism solves what might have been a problem - one simply celebrates the saint's day whose name phonetically resembles one's own most closely.

But it is not only the canonical set of saints' names which limits choice or invention. Within village communities two other factors play a part: one is the question of divine patronage; the other is the existence of a hereditary naming system.

Every village has a church. Every church is dedicated to a particular saint. With greater or lesser credulity that saint is held to be the village's patron, and his or her icons mark the entrances and exits to and from the village. Dedications and vows are made to patron saints for it is common knowledge that they do not dispense their favours entirely gratis. One way of paying one's dues is to name a child after a saint. The village church of Spartohori is dedicated to Agios Georgios. I suspect this explains the preponderance of the name Georgos in Spartohori (28 cases out of 205). The second church outside the village (to which the cemetery was attached) was dedicated to Agios Nikolaos; more to the point, Agios Nikolaos is the patron saint of sailors, and the Spartohoriots have always been seafarers, originally in wooden caiques in which they traded around the Ionian Islands and as far afield as Italy, as fishermen (an occupation which they still pursue), and nowadays as crew on cargo ships and tankers sailing literally from China to Peru. This, I think, explains the popularity of the name Nikos (17 cases out of 205). Moreover, some 'local' saints have wider jurisdiction - or rather particular icons or shrines of a saint are deemed miraculous and exert wide influence. One such miracle-working shrine is that of Agios Gerasimos on the island of Cephalonia (where the saint's body lies in its sarcophagus) not far south of Meganisi. Gerasimos is a popular name in Cephalonia, but also throughout the region including Meganisi and the village of Spartohori (16 cases out of 205).

As for the hereditary naming system, it is normal for first-born sons to be called after their paternal grandfather. This means that names will alternate down a line of eldest sons (Georgos, Nikos, Georgos, Nikos etc.); it also means that first-born male cousins will bear the same name after their common grandfather (as will first-born third cousins after their common great-grandfather - if the system survives intact that long). Thus within a small village community the retention of names within a family will combine with the tendency to use locally efficient saints' names to limit further the stock of names in actual currency.

7 'Georgos' is the demotic form of 'Georgios', the saints always being referred to by the archaic (Church Greek) form.
The naming system, however, is far from being a rigid one. First, it is only eldest sons whose name is predetermined. Second sons are often named after their maternal grandfather, but this is not a strict requirement. Eldest daughters are usually named after either their maternal or their paternal grandmother, and some effort is usually made with both boys and girls to cater for both sets of grandparents, but again the requirements are not strict. The 'system' (if so it may be called) could better be described in terms of an effort made by each family to keep its stock of names alive. Thus if some particularly beloved uncle or aunt has recently died or emigrated to Australia or America, the next child born to a family may well be named after that uncle or aunt in order 'to keep the name alive', even if this means giving him or her priority over a grandparent. Such commemoration or perpetuation does not, I think, have metaphysical implications for the Spartohoriots; it is, nevertheless, a matter of some importance and in extreme cases even a first-born son may be named after someone other than his paternal grandfather should the family have just suffered some acute loss. Conversely, an aged grandfather may have his name carried on not by a grandson but by a granddaughter if parents fear they may be unable to supply a male successor in time or not at all - hence a Georgos becomes a Georgia. The only prohibition is that sons and daughters are not named after their own father or mother.

I have suggested that the combination of this hereditary naming system with the use of locally efficacious saints' names limits the Christian names in actual currency: thus in Spartohori Georgos is a popular name because it is the name of the village's saint, and once someone is named Georgos it follows that this name will reappear amongst his descendants. Sometimes, however, it is the appeal to a saint which actually disrupts the hereditary system (and once again it should be stressed that the 'system' is more a matter of conventions and preferences than of 'rules'). In a number of cases I discovered that a first-born son had been called Georgos or Gerasimos when I thought they should have been called Petros or Andreas after their grandfather. It turned out that their parents had remained childless for a number of years after marriage and had turned either to the village saint or to the miracle-worker in Cephalonia after whom they were then obliged to name their child. (I might add that such stories were repeated rather gruffly by the men who in my presence attributed credulity in the powers of the supernatural to women alone - nevertheless the

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8 See Herzfeld 1982 for a discussion of the relationship between 'rules' and apparent exceptions in Greek naming systems, and also for variants in other areas of Greece.

9 Again, this prohibition is not a universal rule throughout Greece. The second son of the current president of Greece, Andreas Papandreou is named after his father. For rural examples see Herzfeld 1982: 296.
children were called Gerasimos or Georgos, and their grandfather had to wait for another child.)

The question of who actually names a child is, however, an interesting one. From all of the above it is clear that the parents choose the name. Ideologically, however, this is not so. According to Church dogma, and according to the villagers' own construction of the situation, it is a child's baptismal sponsor, his or her nonos or nona, who has the right to bestow a name on the child whom he or she is baptizing. Here again I must return to the point that in rural Greece a Christian name is supposed indeed to be a Christian name; for it is the ceremony of baptism and the bestowal of a Christian name that marks a child's inclusion into the Christian community and his or her achievement of full human status through spiritual rebirth, and it is not until that ceremony at which the child is introduced by his or her sponsor into the Christian fold that the child has a right to bear a name. The Spartohoriotas were quite punctilious on this score. The wife of a friend of mine had recently given birth to their first child, a son. Some weeks after, my friend, Andreas, made his reappearance in the coffee-shop (for in Spartohori even men are required to shun public life for some forty days after the birth of a child).10 Andreas's aged father was called Gerasimos. It therefore followed that Andreas's son would be called Gerasimos. Having offered Andreas the conventional felicitations on his paternity, I inquired (merely to confirm what I knew would be the case) what his son was called. There was a rather embarrassed silence, and Andreas then said, 'He doesn't have a name.' Not realizing that I had committed a social solecism (or worse), I barged on by saying, 'Well, he'll be called Gerasimos, won't he?' There was an even more embarrassed silence, after which Andreas muttered, 'Probably.' About three months later, Andreas's child was baptized. I went to the baptism, and of course the child was baptized Gerasimos by his sponsor. On the way back I called into one of the coffee-shops in which two old men were talking, one of whom was a relative of Andreas and had also been to the baptism. To my astonishment the other old man asked what name the child had been given. 'Gerasimos,' replied Andreas's relative. 'Ah, Gerasimos,' said the other, rolling it on his tongue as if he'd never heard it before, 'a good name!!'

Surnames

Forty-five Christian names, then, accounted for the two hundred and five adult males permanently resident in Spartohori, but with seven names (Georgos, Nikos, Gerasimos, Stathis, Michalis, Andreas and Spiros) accounting for over half that male population. The total number of surnames or family names represented in the village also seems at first quite generous: twenty-eight in all. Of these, however, three were unique to individual nuclear families (recent

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10 It is normal in rural Greece for women to remain at home and certainly not to enter church for forty days after childbirth and until they have been churched.
immigrants to the village) and of Spartohori's total of one hundred
and eighty-six households occupied year-round by at least one per-
son, just over half could be accounted for by only five family
names: Aryiris, Zavitsanos, Politis, Ferendinos and Konidaris.

The paucity of surnames in Spartohori can be explained, of
course, by the fact that the village is a relatively isolated,
relatively closed, relatively endogamous community. Moreover, when
marriages have been contracted with outsiders, it has been more
normal for women to leave than for men to come in. The situation
is not very different from what one would find in a small agricul-
tural village in England, or Ireland or many countries besides. It
would be interesting to know, however, at what stage the bulk of
the Greek population started to use surnames. I suspect there is
no clear answer to this since much must have depended on region and
on status. The great aristocratic Byzantine families were of course
named; in the Ionian islands the noble families recorded in the
Venetian Libri d'Oro (subsequently burned by the French revolution-
aries) have names which are old enough. Moreover, a census of
landowners on Meganisi made by the Venetians in 1720 and a book of
baptismal records for the church of Agios Georgios in Spartohori
from 1730 onwards record family names - many of which are still
carried by the island's present population - which shows that even
the peasantry was equipped with them by then. Quite how fixed
these surnames were is perhaps another matter, for they show a con-
siderable resemblance to what is now a parallel system of family
nicknames and I suspect their generation followed a similar pat-

11 Again Spartohori's fluid demography necessitates this cumbersome
phrase. The actual number of houses (in good repair) in Spartohori
stood at 252, but of these 18 were permanently closed up (their
owners being overseas or permanently resident in Athens) while 48
were occupied on a seasonal basis only.

12 For the normal reasons of patrilineally inherited property -
houses and land. Earlier this century, however, Meganisi was the
recipient of considerable immigration.

13 The problem of determining the date of 'fixed' surnames is well
illustrated by Angelaki E. Laiou-Thomadakis in her discussion of
names (1977: 108-41). In Macedonia in the early fourteenth century
peasants were designated by two names, a baptismal name and some
other - a profession, an indication of geographical origin, a nick-
name, or an indication of relationship with someone else. Clearly
trade names persisted into the next generation or generations to
become 'family' names, but 'the stability of this family name is
not very great' (ibid.: 123).
Admittedly, most Greek surnames (like most English surnames) 'mean' something (e.g. Mavromatis, 'Black-eye'); but in fact many of the names carried by the Spartohoriots are simply place-names or names of origin (e.g. Zavitsanos, 'from Zavitsa'; Sklavinitis, 'from Sklavina'), and historically, Spartohori and the island of Meganisi were the recipients from the end of the seventeenth century of a growing population of refugees and/or outlaws from mainland Greece and also from the other Ionian islands. That those who settled on this hitherto uninhabited and conveniently out-of-the-way little island should have become known by their place of origin is not surprising. The surname Thiakodimitris is a nice case in point, for Thiaki is the local form of the name Ithaki, i.e. Ithaca. Thiakodimitris thus means something like 'Dimitris from Ithaca' - and indeed the Thiakodimitris family did come from Ithaca in the nineteenth century.

The Skiotis (or Sikiotis), which accounts for nine households in Spartohori, is another interesting case, for after the fall of the Aegean island of Chios to the Turks in 1695, some twenty-two families of refugee Roman Catholics were eventually settled in Lefkada (which the Venetians had taken in 1684), and the island of Meganisi was made over to them for their support. For various fiscal reasons these Chiot families were constituted as a separate 'nation', the 'Nation Sciotti', i.e. the 'Chiot Nation'. Now it must be that the surname Skiotis presently carried by Spartohoriots on Meganisi means 'Chiot' and is connected with these historical events. But here we strike another point of some importance in the acquisition of surnames, for these Chiots who were settled in Lefkada already possessed surnames which appear in the Venetian records. Moreover the island of Meganisi was made over to them for their support and they were empowered to collect tithes. No mention is made of the Chiots ever having actually lived on Meganisi which, at the time, was about as desperate and uncomfortable a place as could be found and not fit, I think, for Catholic gentry even if they were refugees. It is much more likely that those Spartohoriots who now carry the name Skiotis are not the descendants of the Chiots themselves, but the descendants of those who worked their land on Meganisi for them. They were the Chiots' 'men', and having no surname of their own (or perhaps none that it was wise to own) became known as the Skiotel.

This process of the servant taking the master's name was not, I think, uncommon in rural Greece. What might perhaps represent an extreme case occurs with a very peculiar surname found only on Meganisi (though not in Spartohori) and in Corfu and Messolonghi -

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14 Meganisi was allegedly uninhabited up to the Venetian conquest of 1684 and subsequently became settled by refugees of various sorts from mainland Greece (then Albania) and also, it would seem, by outlaws and pirates from both mainland Greece and the other Ionian islands.

15 For the history of these Chiot refugees see Svoronos 1940.
The Meganisiots were all convinced that this was in fact the Scots name Douglas (which according to one old man proved that the Douglasses were Greek). It is possible, however, that a less radical version of the hypothesis is true. Corfu came under British rule in 1814, and after the outbreak of the War of Independence in 1828 mainland Greece received its share of British romantics and soldiers of fortune of whom Lord Byron, who died at Messolonghi, is but the best known. It is by no means inconceivable that a name like Douglas was transmitted to the locals.

Nicknames

The point of the above is that inasmuch as surnames amongst the peasantry seem often to have been adopted as a result of particular circumstances or experiences, they begin to look very much like the Παπατσουκλία or nicknames which currently constitute a sort of parallel system to the official surnames on everyone's identity card.

As I have already mentioned, however, nicknames are of two types: personal and family. Personal nicknames are acquired in a manner probably familiar to most of us. They refer to some particular characteristic of their bearer, or (more commonly) to some little history. Thus one man, always known as Psim, had in his youth and during his military service once addressed a young woman seated next to him in a railway station as 'Ψυχή μου' ('My soul'), an affectionate but very familiar appellation which, in the Meganisiot accent, almost contracts to 'Psim!', and at which she, being a better class of young lady, took offence - or at least so the story goes. He has been Psim ever since. Moreover, he is the only Psim on Meganisi. This proper name thus serves to give him unique specification, and in fact every man on Meganisi has a Παπατσουκλί - though such nicknames are more often used as terms of reference than as terms of address. Not every man, however, has acquired his own and personal Παπατσουκλί. Many, perhaps even the majority, carry the nickname of their father (or grandfather or great-grandfather). Thus my friend and protector in Spartohori was universally known as Gregoris Politis Tsigaras ('Cigarette'), just as his son was Georgios Politis Tsigaras - the nickname having originally derived from Gregoris's grandfather to end up functioning as a second surname for his descendants. Indeed, before the requirements of officialdom fixed every one with a surname, one might presume that this was exactly what a surname was - an hereditary nickname. Many men, however, carry two nicknames - a personal nickname and their family nickname. Quite how a personal nickname becomes converted into a family nickname so that it is transmitted to the next generation to displace the hereditary nickname

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16 Daglas was one of the commonest family names in Katomeri, but there was no Daglas in Spartohori. There appears, in fact, to have been relatively little intermarriage between the villages of Meganisi, which hold each other in mutual contempt.
derived from some earlier ancestor I do not know. Clearly, however, the conversion does occur, and I can only guess that it is (or was) a somewhat uncertain process which depends on the fame (or notoriety) of an individual and consequently on the likelihood of his descendants being known after him.

The result, however, is that those five families whose official surnames account for over half the village have in fact fissioned over time into smaller agnatic groupings designated by family nicknames, and it is these nicknames which really count. As I mentioned at the outset of this essay, there were five men in Spartohori called Georgos Politis; there was only one, however, called Georgos Politis Tsigaras. Moreover, though every Politis might assume himself to be related to every other Politis in some way or other (just as almost every Spartohoriot is related to every other Spartohoriot in some way or other), a Tsigaras knows that those who share his family nickname are indeed his relatives, the descendants of a common ancestor probably within living memory.\(^{17}\) And, of course, such knowledge is important in a community which is largely endogamous but which also respects the extensive rules of consanguinity and affinity set down by the Orthodox Church. Nowadays a Politis might well marry a Politis; but a Tsigaras would never marry a Tsigaras. If the rule of exogamy is important to the definition of kinship groups, then the\(\textit{paratsoukli}\) functions as a better label for the group than the official surname. Indeed, I suspect that all that has happened is that state control and the requirement of a legal identity have helped to make endure a family name that once would have changed every three or four generations.

\section*{REFERENCES}

SVORONOS, N.G. 1940. '\textit{Hii Proaftyes en Lefkadi}', in \textit{Afieroma is K. Amandon}, Athens.

\(^{17}\) For the technically minded, possession of a common\(\textit{paratsoukli}\) was offered to me by an informant as the definition of the (agnatic)\(\textit{soi}\) since possession of a common surname was considered far too common.
Visitors to Greece are often struck by the small number of personal names in currency. Even tourists lured there on package holidays, which insulate them from local culture, have been heard to remark that 'most men are called either Nikos or Kostas'. This hyperbole may, in itself, serve as evidence for the attitude of mild disparagement with which (European) foreigners view the redundancy of names in Greece. It is as if the Greeks were trapped in a state of undifferentiatedness from which we ourselves have escaped.1

Similar critical remarks are addressed to Greek cuisine which is said to be quite all right, so far as it goes: Max Headroom does not stand alone in spoofing the daily fare of Greek salad and moussaka. In these instances lack of variety alone signals the 'lack of fit' (Ardener 1971: xvii) between our culture and Greek culture. It is the peculiar enaction of familiar practices that attracts interest. Such is often the case in the anthropological study of European societies which lack impressively exotic and anomalous customs (Just 1973).

In point of fact, the pool of Greek personal names is roughly the same size as in most other European countries. The difference rests in the frequency with which certain names are bestowed. The question thus becomes not, 'Don't the Greeks have a larger selection of names?', but rather, 'Why, given a wide range of names, do

1 Herzfeld (1987: passim) isolates this as one of the basic strategies by which Europeans state their difference from ethnographic subjects: 'Others' homogeneity marks their fundamental inferiority, our internal differentiation a familiar and complex excellence' (ibid.: 150). I would like to thank Michael Herzfeld for his helpful discussion of matters presented in this paper.
they repeatedly select the same names?' This question has been dealt with numerous times in the ethnographic literature on Greece (e.g. Hardie 1923; Bialor 1967; Herzfeld 1982; and see Just's article elsewhere in this issue) and it will be touched upon only briefly in the following discussion of naming practices on the Cycladic island of Naxos. The main objective here will be to consider a broader variety of names and means of reference than just baptismal names. These will be studied in the order in which they are applied to individuals during the course of life. This enables us to see how Christian names are juxtaposed with other sorts of names in an overall naming system which is many-tiered. This particular approach also reveals how all these different names, both in themselves and in their use, provide a commentary on the individual's development.

Infants on Naxos, as in most parts of Greece, are not baptized immediately after birth. Parents may wait two to three years or even longer before allowing a godparent to bestow a Christian name upon them in the elaborate church ceremony. In almost all of these cases the eventual name of the child is known to both parents and the community at large because the first four children are named after their grandparents in a specified order. This custom directly accounts for the repetition of personal names. According to the view of the Church, which is echoed by most villagers, it is the godparent's prerogative to select a name for the child. In practice this option is rarely exercised toward unexpected ends, and children emerge from the ceremony of baptism with the name which everyone anticipated but refrained from uttering until that moment.

Baptismal names are sacred and for the most part shared in common with a saint or holy figure of the Orthodox tradition. With the exception of a few names taken from illustrious ancient fore-runners (e.g. Perikles) people receive the names of those whose images may be depicted on icons. Just as the ineffable formlessness of Divinity makes Him an unsuitable subject for iconographic representation, so there are no humans named after God. The Bible indeed states that humans were created 'in the image of God' (kat' eikon Theou) but this iconicity is generally understood as only a partial and refracted resemblance. In names, the light of Heaven filters down to the human community through the prism of the saints, who are viewed as closer and more similar to Divinity.

In the period before baptism villagers do not call infants by any proper name. This is not necessarily the practice in Athens, where I have heard unbaptized children addressed by their eventual name. On Naxos an infant is called simply moro ('baby'), a neuter

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2 Fieldwork on Naxos was carried out over a sixteen-month period in 1983-4. Most of the data reported here were collected in the mountain village of Apeiranthos (population 2,850). For support during the period of field research I am grateful to the Philip Babgy Bequest (University of Oxford) and to the Fulbright Foundation.
noun, or else bebe in the case of boys and beba in the case of girls. These names represent the new-born child as barely incorpor­
orated into humanity. They are either neuter beings or else dis­
tinguished only by gender, male-being or female-being. In the case
of bebe/beba the foreign provenance of the terms perhaps under­
scores this conviction that the child does not yet belong to the
Greek Orthodox community. In a society where baptismal names
evidence both a sacralizing and humanizing dimension these circum­
locutions train attention on the value and importance of the avoid­
ed forms.

In this early stage the child may also be called a drakos
('snake, dragon'), a designation associating it with animals, the
supernatural or even the Devil, instead of humanity (cf. Alexakis
1985). People say that this ensures the strength and good health
of the infant. In general, parents do not fear the consequences
of postponing baptism. This is surprising given the importance of
baptism in establishing the child's chances for salvation, not to
mention simple membership in the Christian community. Should an
infant fall ill or suffer serious injury, effort is made to baptize
it before it dies. In these cases it is usually possible to call a
priest, but in emergencies there exists a practice of aerovaptisma
or air baptism, where the child is held in the air by a lay person
and consecrated in the name of the Holy Trinity. Children who die
without the sacrament of baptism are thought to go neither to
heaven nor hell, but to wander about in the space between heaven
and earth. In some parts of Greece they are said to manifest them­
selves to parents and other close relatives or else to torment the
priest who neglected to baptize them.

The forms of reference used for infants may be seen to express
the marginal and unindividuated state which such young children
occupy in contrast to the Christian community which so names them.
They are variously animals/spirits, neuter beings, or at most

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3 This expression could be called apotropaic, but that seems
rather a general and worn-out term. A locution such as drakos is
precisely the opposite of a euphemism; instead of calling something
awful by a pleasant name, it calls something good by an awful name.
A new term, 'cacophemism' (from Ancient Greek kakophemia), might
usefully be introduced into English.

4 In former times, but less so today, the belief in telonesia was
widespread in Greece. This word means literally 'toll houses' but
was strongly associated with the souls of unbaptized children.
Theologians, beginning with Origen, held that after death the soul
encounters a number (sometimes twenty-two) of customs houses at
which the person's 'moral baggage' was scrutinized. Some situated
these toll houses in the seven heavens leading to paradise (Every
1976; Dieterich 1926: 4). More generally, telonesia were thought
to be astral phenomena such as falling stars. The idea that unbap­
tized infants also hovered between heaven and earth may explain the
conflation of these two seemingly unrelated ideas (cf. Politis
1904: 1236; Dieterich 1925: 19).
It is not until baptism that the child becomes a proper human being, a *Khristianos*. At this rite, which is preceded by up to four exorcisms, the child is forcibly separated from the realm of the demonic and then 'sealed' in the ceremony of chrismation as an inviolable container filled with Holy Spirit. It is perhaps worth noting that this corps of demons, which lurks just beyond humanity, opposes the Christian community by its very namelessness (Detienne 1978). In numerous exorcism texts (for possessed adults) the priest is enjoined foremost of all to discover the name of the demon causing the damage. One such sixteenth-century text records the following directions to the officiating cleric:

Instructions for those possessed by demons: How to ask so that the demon will tell you its name. At this point seek to find out the name of the evil spirit. Seek to make him tell you: how many are with him, and to which class he belongs, and what the name of his leader is; under which power and authority he is; in which place he dwells; to whom he is subordinate; when he comes out; and what sign does he make when he comes out of the person? Be mindful when you are enquiring. Say, 'In the name of the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit; see and give'.

It is precisely the power of holy names which causes the otherwise nameless demons to identify themselves and surrender. In Orthodoxy the tendency of names is toward implosion; all beings incline toward one name. This trajectory is evident, for example, in the term 'Holy Trinity' where, according to the theology of the Orthodox Church, three persons (prosopa) share only one essence (ousia) and one name. This tendency toward onomastic singularity (which parallels the spiritual quest of humanity to merge with God) also appears in the practice of naming a vast populace after a limited number of saints. Demons, on the other hand, tend toward entropy and indistinguishability. To succeed in naming them at all is to exercise control over them.

At baptism only a personal name is bestowed and this name, never the family name, will be used in church to refer to the individual. The Christian name allows the child to be recorded in the Book of Life; it founds the possibility of salvation. In Greece, at least up until recently, a certificate of baptism was the equivalent of a birth certificate. Before the state every person has three names: their baptismal name, the name of their father in the genitive form, and the name of their family. For men the family name takes the nominative case while for women it is placed in the genitive form indicating that females are 'of' a particular family in contradistinction to the men who 'are' the family. The Church insists on the personal name in its proper form, the one stating connection to a saint. Someone commonly known as Manolis or Manos becomes Emmanouil in church; a Mitsos or Dimitris becomes

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5 The full text of this exorcism is transcribed and translated in my doctoral thesis (Stewart 1987: Appendix II).
Dimitrios. In keeping with this saintly orientation, individual birthdays are not observed. One celebrates on the feast day of one's saint, usually by receiving visitors at home who drink to one's health and long life.

In Apeiranthos the first son ideally takes the name of the paternal grandfather, the second son that of the maternal grandfather. The first daughter is named after the maternal grandmother and the second after the paternal grandmother. Subsequent children (a rarity nowadays) may be named after a grandparent's sibling or a selected saint. This naming system differs slightly from the pattern found primarily, but not exclusively in northern Greece. There, the first daughter receives her father's mother's name. Only with the birth of a second son or daughter does the mother's side gain recognition. The naming pattern on Naxos, which may be found on most of the Aegean islands, corresponds to the dowry practice whereby the bride provides the house in which the newly-wed couple will live. In northern Greece the groom traditionally provides the house. Women on Naxos thus occupy a distinctive role which is recognized in the naming system. The first daughter inherits the family house which in many cases was the house built for her homonymous grandmother. Below it will be seen that property and possessions are not the only inheritance of grandchildren.

Kinship is reckoned bilaterally, but with a slight bias toward the patriline. Second cousins with different last names (i.e. with a uterine link) are allowed to marry much more easily than if they share the same surname. When asked to define the term so$ they agreed that this referred to one's ascending relatives, both through the father and through the mother - one's cognatic kindred. In common usage, however, the term so$ refers mainly to the father's side. If one wishes to refer to the mother's side, one says specifically 'the mother's kindred' (to so$ tis manas). The father's kindred is, in terms coined by the Prague School of linguistics, unmarked and generalized while the mother's side is marked and must be referred to explicitly. In the widest unmarked sense, so$ may refer not just to relatives ascendant through the father, but to all those sharing the same surname. As it excludes the mother's side this is a narrower definition, but it may be a much wider designation if a great many villagers happen to share that last name. In other contexts, when asked if all people named Glezos (a common family name) were related to each other, villagers answered flatly 'No'. No one can remember back far enough to establish an apical ancestor and in some cases they seem to be quite certain there never was one. Generally speaking, people know very little about ancestors more than two generations ascendant. The advent of photography may change that.

Legal and ecclesiastical names both operate indexically (Herzfeld 1982: 290). They align a person with groups and classes of beings determined by governmental and cosmic orders well beyond the village. Such names say little about the qualities of individual persons; they are low on connotative content. At the village level formal names are hardly ever used for the indirect referential purpose for which bureaucracies seem to have designed them. Asking
for someone by their proper name (Christian + family name) baffles villagers unless they have some contextualizing knowledge to draw on (such as having seen you together with that person the day before). They know and refer to each other by distinctive diminutive forms of the Christian name (there was only one Mitsakas, from the Christian name Dimitrios) or else by a variety of nicknames. Formal names are known, but they do not have the referential force and accuracy of informal names. Knowledge of the wide variety of nicknames, indeed the possession of one or more sobriquets oneself, forms a part of village identity. Foreigners are not expected to possess any mastery of local nicknames, just as they are not expected to understand the distinctive village dialect. Nicknames operate on a village-internal level and state autonomy from broader church and state organizations.

As the villagers all know each other from birth, no ritual of introduction has come into being in the village. Contact with foreigners has always been sporadic in this central mountain village, and those outsiders who did visit the village usually did so in the company of a local resident. This villager would then be responsible for explaining to co-villagers who the stranger was. Rarely do people approach the stranger directly to ask questions. The foreigner's identity thus passes immediately into the custody of the village community in a process similar to that involved in the creation of the villagers' own idiosyncratic nicknames. In both cases, identity is apportioned according to collective opinion and may be considered a statement of village control (cf. Pina-Cabral 1984).

Where baptismal names work according to a principle of indexicality, nicknames (paratsoukli) metaphorically convey a greater degree of descriptive information about their bearers; they are 'individualizing rather than classificatory' (McDowell 1981: 16). Usually these names are ironic, if not insulting, and people are not meant to be aware of their own nicknames. Use of the nickname in direct address is a form of affront. They are used mainly to refer to a person not present. Exceptions to this rule are those nicknames which simply append the surname to the Christian name, a paractice also found on Crete: Phlorios Glezos becomes Glezophlorios and Iannis Galanis, Galanoianis. The more insulting nicknames may exploit personality or physical peculiarities in an ironic fashion. One man with a megalomaniacal bent was called Onassis, while a young man who wore stylish clothes was called Markas ('brand new'). The carpenter with whom I lived drank and tended to quarrel violently. He was called 'Little Saint'. A tall, thin man was given the

6 According to Bernard (1968-69: 66) the word paratsoukli comes from a combination of Greek and Turkish formants and means 'pot-handle'. As he points out, this is reminiscent of the American frontier usage of the word 'handle' to mean nickname. CB radio jargon has recently revived this sense of 'handle'. The retention of a Turkish word here correlates with Herzfeld's (1987: 116) observation that self-knowledge is often encoded and negotiated in a linguistic register marked by Turkish lexemes.
name 'Two-Drachma Piece' (Diphrangos) because he switched from wearing the traditional costume of breeches to European-style clothing (called phrangika 'Frankish'). He was so tall that he did not just amount to a Frank, but to a double Frank (di-phrangos).

At death the progressive individuation discernible in the various naming conventions is gradually reversed. That grandchildren carry on the names of members of the older generation when these latter go to the grave is one source of contentment for the elderly. Grandchildren inherit houses and property which, ideally, they will keep up and earn a living from, just as their grandparents did. Of course, with the younger generation emigrating to Athens in pursuit of higher education and civil service jobs, this ideal is increasingly going unrealized. As yet, however, these economic and demographic changes have not weakened the conviction that descending alternate generations perpetually resurrect each other (Hardie 1923; Kenna 1976: 31). The father of a young man who died while in the army bitterly lamented the fact that his son had not married and had bequeathed nothing (den aphiše tipota). He pointed to the son's photograph and to his uniform which he kept hanging in his coffee-house and said, 'If you don't leave anything, you don't count.'

No one denies that the child inherits much from its parents, but this is little remarked. In discussions of personality traits and family resemblances the primary point of comparison is with the homonymous grandparent. Even if there is no great physical similarity, subtle traits such as one's gait or laugh are singled out as specific inheritances. In order to illustrate this principle of generational alternation one woman recited the following proverb: 'From the thorn comes the rose, and from the rose comes the thorn.' This perceived connection between alternate generations may also help us to understand why houses and landholdings are so infrequently sold. At any given moment in time these objects are suspended

7 It is interesting to note, without insisting upon any historical connection, Benveniste's observations arising from his study of the words for grandson and grandfather in various Indo-European languages (1973: 190ff). He found that the term for grandson means 'little grandfather' in Old High German, Old Slavonic and Old French. According to him: 'In many societies we find the belief that a newly born child is always the reincarnation of an ancestor going back a certain number of generations. They even believe that, strictly speaking, there is no birth, because the ancestor has not disappeared, he has only been hidden away. In general, the process of reappearance is from grandfather to grandson. When a son is born to somebody, it is the grandfather of the child who "reappears", and this is why they have the same name. The young child is, as it were, a diminutive representation of the ancestor which it incarnates: it is a "little grandfather", who is born again after an interval of a generation' (ibid.: 191). Following Benveniste's lead, Szemerenyi has proposed for the Indo-European word for 'grandson', *nepos, an original meaning 'little') master grandfather' (1978: 51).
between past and future generations; those holding them at present are, in a sense, only tending them and it is not their right, or rather, it is just not right to sell them off.

A grandchild is said to 'hear' a particular grandparent's name. Maria² hears Maria¹'s name all her life, even after Maria¹ has gone to the grave - which, assuredly, will be before Maria³ is born. By then, Maria¹, the original bearer of the name, will be forgotten. The same naming system which resurrects one also, in time, consigns one to oblivion (Herzfeld 1982: 292). It is true that names may be used to remember a person after their death and even to assist their soul on its journey to heaven (Danforth 1982). A surviving spouse or a child may take to church a loaf of bread (called prospóra 'offerings') over which the priest will say blessings reciting the names of family members, those living as well as deceased. Morsels of this bread may be used by the priest in preparing the Eucharist. Likewise, during the year on a number of occasions called Soul Saturdays, the relatives may ask the priest to read a prayer for their deceased by the family tomb, but they usually concentrate only on those who have died fairly recently; the others are considered 'gone'. They have come to rest in a place near to God. Among the living they are no longer referred to by name, just as 'the forgiven' (synkhorémenos/i).

The role of names on Naxos can best be summarized by reference to an Apeiranthos proverb: 'Everyone has their own [traits] as well as those they inherit!' ('O kathámenas ekhei to diko dou kai to patroo patrooníko dou' [Zevgoli-Glezou 1963: 98]). This much is conceded although most individuals would prefer to consider themselves as unique. In one male villager's view everyone has their own tastes (gousta), their own good humour (kephi) and their own character (khout). These are gained and demonstrated in the course of maturation and they determine a person even more strongly than inherited traits. This conviction points up the strong admiration for individuality and uniqueness present in village thought. When a person dies, it is said, their soul departs with the first exhalation but their idiosyncratic 'character' not until the third and final gasp.

Consistent with the broad outline I have given, personal names on Naxos can be said to express a commentary on the phases through which an individual passes in the course of a lifetime. In so doing they embody a tension between the individual and the social which is similar to that recognized by villagers in relation to their own lives. It might be said that, in this last regard, the role of names on Naxos is not far different from what it is in any number of societies. Be this as it may, the study of Naxiot naming practices does afford some very real insights at the level of local cultural expectations concerning ontogeny and eschatology, the processes of coming into being and then finally coming to rest in the world beyond.
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In Deia, the mountain village in Mallorca in which I have done fieldwork and lived for many years, people are referred to by different names in different circumstances. Each person has at least one or two Christian names, two surnames, a diminutive, a nickname and a house name. When people talk about one another, Christian names are always accompanied by descriptive names - a house name, a profession or some other attribute which distinguishes that person from any other. Throughout the village vernacular we hear references to En Joan de Ca'n Marc (John from the house of the Marc family), Na Joana de'l Metge (Joan the doctor's daughter), En Toni Tronar (Tony from the house of thunder) and Toni Ferrer (Tony the ironmonger's son). Personal names acknowledge one's membership in a family, a church, a particular social dimension, that place to which one is born. The house names which associate people to previous generations become metaphors for social relations past and present. The place is the combination of all these words and names that give it life and meaning. These conceptual constructions form the worlds of meaning which are shared by and determine the members of a community.

Children are given a Christian name usually based on the name of a grandparent. First-born sons are given the name of their father's father, second-born sons their mother's father's name. A first daughter is named after her father's mother and the next after her mother's mother. Additional children are named after saints or godparents. If a child dies, his or her name will be given to the next child born to that family.

The names used in each village are those derived long ago from
the saints most revered by that particular village. In Deia, the patron saint is St Joan (St John); Joan and the feminine form Joana are among the most common names in the village. Then the Virgin Mary, the Virgin of Lluc, St Francis of Assisi, Santa Catalina Tomas, St Anthony, St Peter, St Bartholomew, St Michael and St Sebastian are the most significant in Deia experiences. The Virgin of Lluc is a small stone Marian figure housed in the chapel of the seventeenth-century monastery at Lluc in the north of the island. A yearly celebration held there is one of the few occasions shared by people from all the villages on the island. Lluc has been named by some 'the peasant capital of Mallorca'. Many men and women pledge to make the annual pilgrimage to Lluc by foot, if their prayers are answered. St Anthony and St Francis are the protectors of animals. Santa Catalina was a girl from the neighbouring village of Valldemosa who, it is said, escaped from the Devil by hiding in the trunk of an olive tree. St Sebastian protected the village from the plague (which killed some forty per cent of the island's population in the eighteenth century). The passing of each year in a person's life is celebrated not on one's birthday but on one's saint's day, acknowledging the fact that one's life on earth is a celebration of those who went before and those who will follow.

Since at least grandparents and grandchildren, and probably a number of first cousins, share the same name there are innumerable diminutives or adaptations used so that each one has a personal reference albeit based on a shared generational name. So we have Francisco, Xico, Xesc, and Paco all based on Francisco; Xesca and Paquita for Francisca; Toni and Tonita for Antonio/a; Cati and Tina for Catalina, and so forth. Sometimes the parents or, on occasion, the priest will make the distinction by baptizing a child with two Christian names: one recognizing the grandparents and another from the name of the saint on whose day the baptism takes place. So we have Catalina Maria, Maria Magdalena, Maria Rosa or Joan Josep. A name like Maria del Carmen usually means that the girl's father or grandfather was a fisherman: St Carmen is the guardian of the seas. In the 1980s some young couples are 'breaking with tradition' and giving their children names of popular members of royal families or well-known film or television personalities: Vanessa, Elizabeth, Carolina and Stefania have become popular names for girls, and Carlos has been given to many boys in families where this name was previously unknown.

A person is addressed by his or her Christian name or its diminutive, but the Christian name which all children are given at birth, and with which they are welcomed into the community of God at baptism, and the surname, which recognizes their parentage, are only

1 There are similar saints worshipped throughout Spain (and in other Catholic countries) but the particular combination is different in each village or town.
part of a person's social identity. Each person has at least one *malnom*, literally 'bad name' or nickname, and is also recognized by a *renom*, a house name that places him or her within the social context known as 'the village'; for example, Miguel Coll Jaume is the official name of Michael the son of Mr Coll and his wife Margarita Jaume.² He is also referred to as Miguel Malerte (Michael the porter), a nickname based on his first job of lifting heavy cases on to the daily mail coach to Palma. He is also known as Miguel de Sa Fonda (Michael from the Inn [that his parents owned]).

The nickname is an individualizing as well as a socializing device. This can be based on a distinguishing physical characteristic, idiosyncrasy or action that is associated with a particular person, or in some cases one of his ancestors. A boy or girl is often nicknamed by sibs or his or her school-mates. As Michael Kenny wrote, 'nicknames help to personalise relationships but there are no fixed rules for applying or transmitting them. A nickname can be used as a form of social satire behind which lurks scorn and sometimes envy but it is not an insult except when used in the recipient's presence' (Kenny 1961: 89).³ The nickname also has a social dimension. It is a sign of inclusion in the community that a nickname is coined and used by everyone (except the individual), and members of that community are those who understand the reference. Nicknames are not necessary for someone from another village or town who can be recognized by their Christian name - Alfredo, Esperanza, Roberto - or by their surname - Gimenez, Chicano, or Apestinguia. These are names that identify people from other towns, and although they may have married villagers their names will continue to identify future generations as descendants of someone from another town or village.

Nicknames seem to be given more to men than to women. Married women can be individually identified through reference to their natal house, their husband's name or his nickname, and unmarried girls are described by their Christian name followed by their mother's or father's house name. A few women will be marked out by nicknames to reflect some significant aspect of their personality or achievements, for example one older woman is called Radio Popular - she is the richest source of gossip in the village. Another woman, who has recently entered politics as the Cultural Minister of the village, is referred to as Na Thatcher.

² Women do not change their names at marriage.

³ I cannot agree with David Gilmore (1983), who sees nicknames as being used to express envy and aggression. On the contrary, I would suggest that by acknowledging with a nickname idiosyncratic characteristics, behaviour or appearance, the society is socializing that which could otherwise become destructive to social relations.
Deià is similar to other small communities in that each person living there knows every other person and his or her antecedents. This is quickly evidenced when you ask one person for the name of another and you are told: 'That is Miguel Figuera'. Then I use his name: 'Bon dia Sr Figuera', and am told: 'My name is not Figuera; my name is Miguel Ripoll Colom'. After many inquiries, I discover that Figuera was the name of Miguel's grandfather's house, and although Miguel lives in a different house, he is known in the village by Figuera rather than by the name of the house he actually lives in. Now this may be just one form of a nickname, as many writers (e.g. Lison-Tolosana 1983; Pitt-Rivers 1971; Kenny 1961) of Spanish ethnographies suggest, but in Deià a person may have a nickname and a house name. A house name used to describe a person acknowledges that person's relationship to other people in the village.

The house name identifies an individual in relation to a family (past or present) and functions as a surname in conversation. The actual cognomen is reserved for official papers and is very often not used by many in the community. There are twenty-two typical Deià surnames used in innumerable combinations, which present no lack of cognomen variation by which to identify people, but house names and nicknames are far more informative. Young men commented that they were never referred to by their cognomen until they entered military service. After thirty years of relying on the telephonista (the local switchboard operator) to connect them with En Miguel Fornes (Michael from the baker's house) or Joanina Fidivella (Joan the noodlemaker's daughter) the villagers were most concerned when they had to remember one another's surnames in order to find a telephone number in the book.

Every house (Catalan casa) in the village has a name. This name may be selected by the owners but more often house names are created by the village. House names can be based on the occupant's surname, e.g. Son Bauza, or profession, e.g. Ca'n Mestre (the teacher's house), or trade, e.g. Ca'n Fuster (the carpenter's house), or his

4 This is obviously a very provocative subject, and the similarities as well as the differences between the authors' interpretations are an indication of the variety of approaches possible.

5 The contraction Casa (de), meaning 'house of', combines with the definite article and is reduced first to Ca and then contracted as follows: Ca'n before a name introduced by en (personal article, masc.); Ca's before a name introduced by es (reference pronoun); Ca'l before a name introduced by el (in Mallorquin this only applies to substantives except in the town of Pollensa where, as in Catalan, it precedes masculine names); Son before the names of large estates (from Catalan co que és d'en 'that which is of' [masc.]); Ses before plural names, e.g. Ses Casasnovas 'the new houses'.

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Christian name or nickname, or the physical characteristics of the location of the property, e.g. Casa D'amunt (the upper house), or it can record some special occurrence in the life of the occupant, e.g. Ca'n Dotze (the house of twelve), which was built with the money won in a card-game where the winning hand was a ten and a two. Most house names hold a depth of local history and geography; for instance, Sa Tanca means 'the enclosure' and is a house built in an area of the village where sheep were enclosed in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. House names are occasionally altered to reflect the living reality of the village: the house of a tradesman whose grandson becomes a doctor will become 'the doctor's house' in the village idiom, and that name will be passed on to the future generations.

In Deïa, however, the word casa does not mean just a house but also the people associated with it and family members. A named house can be made up of a number of separate households (domestic groups). 'One house' may mean a related group of people all with the same patronym, or merely a nuclear family, or it can mean a solidly structured and socially recognized organization as in the estates of the past. The grouping together of different households under the name of 'one house' points up the shared property which binds them together and sometimes drives them apart. The house encompasses the smaller parts which are the various households that have developed from a core house. Usually only one child stays in the natal or core house and works with the parents. At marriage the wife or husband is brought to that house. Other brothers and sisters either marry into other core houses or set up their own households. Each new household is part of one or both core houses.

When one moves house, one's house name usually moves with one. Miguel de Ca's Fornes (Michael of the baker's house) moved into Ca'n Pere Juan (the house of Peter John), his wife's maternal great-grandfather's house, at marriage. He and his wife are each referred to by different house names, but we find his brother, his sister, and another sister, all of whom live in different households, referred to as de Ca's Fornes. Therefore one can say that a house is made up of many households. Ideologically the members are perceived as one house despite the fact that it may be composed of many different and independent physical structures.

Everyone in the village is associated with a named house and identified in the village idiom by that house name. Unlike surnames which are transmitted patrilineally, house names can be perpetuated by men, women, or adoptive members. One's house name links one with genealogically or economically related households. The village labels people as descendants or kin (in the broadest sense) of a known family by a house name. Often house names endure beyond the life of the owners and their kin. They are usually carried on by the new owners because it makes the transfer of deeds much simpler but, more importantly, it is maintained by the village as a means of placing newcomers into the existing idiom and not having to acknowledge the loss of its members through death and migration. Many foreigners who reside in the village are identified by the name of the house they rented or bought many years ago,
giving them a kind of fictive kinship within the village idiom. House names acknowledge the attachment of each person in the village to someone else either living or dead and represent a continuity of people, land and families - 'the community' - over time. Each generation manages to identify the most dominant personalities and activities of their period by the selective perpetuation of some house names, the altering of others and the re-allocation of existing names to new domestic groups (newly married locals or foreigners). House names used by the village might be changed if someone in a future generation attained professional status, accomplished some memorable action or somehow became identified as different from the house with which their family had been associated.

There are few instances today of people actually living in the house with which they are associated. Most house names go back at least three or more generations. This system of identifying and associating each person in the village with others by house names that evoke tales of generations of associations, activities and occupations maintains a sense of continuity despite the changing actors. Newly built houses may be given names which have a special meaning to their owners, but the village will inevitably identify the people that live in those houses with the names of their family houses, or if that is lacking (if they are newcomers or foreigners) they will soon be dubbed with a village nickname, or their Christian name of trade will be used if it is different from any other in the village. The writer Robert Graves built his house in 1929 and wanted to call it 'the distant house' because it was built outside the main village. Few people then knew how to write Mallorquin so names were spelt phonetically, and Graves's house is called Ca'nallun although it should have been Ca'n A Lluny. Both names are irrelevant to the local Deianencs, who have always referred to it as Ca'n Graves.

When the people living in a house are identified by the profession, name or trade of one of the actual occupants, this usually indicates that it is the achievements of the living person which give the name to the house; e.g. Ca'l Metge (the doctor's house) or Ca'l Bisbe (the bishop's house). In these examples the doctor and the bishop are both respected public figures, and the names of the houses they occupy (whether by purchase or lease) will be elevated to those of the present occupants' position and carried by the doctor's family and the bishop's employees into future generations. By looking at changes in the house names used to label groups over time, one gains a sense of the accomplishments of individuals which affected village membership and the social status values in operation at any particular period.

Maria Coll was always known as Maria de sa Casa D'amunt (the upper house at Son Coll - the estate her father and grandfather managed). At the age of thirty-five, about ten years after she had been working as a dressmaker, she became known as Maria la Modista (Maria the dressmaker).6 Had Maria married as well as becoming a

6 Maria's new descriptive name is in Castilian rather than Mallor­quin, an indication that her dealings are mostly with foreigners.
dressmaker it is unlikely that her trade name would have replaced her house name. Had she had children it is more than probable that at least the girls would have been known by the house name of Casa D'amunt. Without husband, children, sibs, aunts or uncles with whom she can share the Son Coll connection, Maria's inherited house name stops with her. It could be said that the village has relieved her socially and idiomatically of the obligation to carry on the family name, marry or have children and they have given her a 'here and now' existence. Married women who combine dressmaking or hairdressing or business with their family life are not recognized in the village idiom by these references. After women marry, the family-bound character of their lives puts a limitation on individuality, and all the metaphors used to describe them are related to reproduction and nurturing. The life-cycle expectations for women are clearly articulated in references such as 'daughter of', 'wife of', 'mother of', and culminate with the use of Madonna or Doña, the most respectful terms reserved for women who have fulfilled all of the above roles.

The most common practice in the marriage of two local people is that each keeps their own natal house name. Male children will carry on the father's house name and daughters their mother's. If both children are known by only one of their parents' house names, it indicates that that house is more significant in village life than the other house. If a local woman marries someone from another village or town, her husband and the resulting children will be known by her family house name unless the profession or trade of her husband is more unique or prestigious than the house name she carries. The change of focus in village values and activities can be seen in the house names used to describe people at different periods.

For example, Toni Ferrer married Magdelena Burote; they named their house Ca'n Antoinette but the village refers to it as Sa tanca d'en mitge. This tells us that Toni the ironmonger's son married Magdelena the official's grand-daughter; they named the house they built after their daughter, who was born in France (so Antoinette instead of Antonia), but the village called the house after its location in an area that was once a sheep enclosure. The names used by people to describe this household are indicative of the information that is transmitted through the use of house names: lineage, occupations, endogamy or exogamy, place of birth, geographic and economic developments over time etc.

The names that people and houses are known by present a social and economic history of the village. The practice of grouping together people who share blood, marriage or merely employment ties brings history into the present. The first settlers in Deià were Cistercian monks and nobles who were given these lands by Jaime I for helping in the conquest of the Moors and the creation of the kingdom of Mallorca in 1229. All those who came to live and work in Deià, as well as any Moors who were captured and made chattels of these estates, were given house names as a means of identification. Of the twenty-two most prevalent surnames in Deià only five are not derived from the names of nobles who arrived with the conquest. The largest estates that once formed the core of the
village and gave employment to most of the people bear the surnames
of their first owners. Each estate had a contracted tenant farmer
and his family living on the premises in separate quarters of the
main house; *missatges* were workers regularly employed and housed on
the estate, and *jornales* were daily labourers. Owners were referred
to as ets Senyors de Son Moragues (the owners of the estate of the
Moragues family), the tenant was l'amo de Son Moragues, and the
employees were known by their Christian name and the estate name,
e.g. en Lluc de Son Moragues.

A house built in the village by the tenant would be referred
to by his Christian name followed by the name of the estate he
managed, e.g. Ca'n Lluc de Son Moragues (the house of Lluc from Son
Moragues), Ca'n Jordi de Son Canals (the house of Jordi from Son
Canals). This name and means of identification would be carried by
tenants, employees, their children and into further generations.
In the past, seating at church services was by houses with the
senyors in the front rows, then the tenants and behind them any
other men who were employed by that estate. The wooden benches
they sat upon were donated by the estate owner and bore his house
name. Women sat at the back of the church with their children,
mothers, sisters and neighbours on stools they carried from home.
The seats of the stools were embroidered with the initials of the
woman's Christian name and her surnames.7 The woman's social
identity was derived from her parents' house or from her husband's
house or his house of employment, depending on which was most signifi-
cant in the village reckoning at that time.

Large estate owners contributed to the maintenance of the
church and sent their employees to carry out repairs. Builders
employed by large estates had a lifelong commitment to that estate.
It was always two of the builders of the large estates that volun-
teered to dig the grave for a deceased member of any of the house-
holds associated with that house. The maestro (master builder)
would notify the priest to announce a death by ringing the church
bells, he would order the coffin from the carpenter, and then go to
the house and attend to the preparation of the deceased for the
coffin. The builders would dig the grave, and after the burial
they would make a new cement covering and carve the name and birth
date of the deceased on it. Later, a tombstone bearing the patro-
nymics of the husband and the wife of a house was placed over the
grave and marked the family or house burial plot, in which at least
three generations could be buried.

When a woman marries and has children she can be buried in her
parents' tomb or in her in-laws' tomb. The decision is often based
on space and the quality of the tomb, status symbols rather than
altruism (the tombs closest to the church denote those families
which held wealth and power when the cemetery was built; later

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7 Today people say that 'everyone sits together in kin groups on
any benches that are free', but observation shows that there is
still a tendency to leave the benches in the front of the church
(those which bear the names of the estates of the past) free for
older men and those who arrive late.
small family chapels were built by the most able and influential). If there are no children there is no new surname composed of each parent's patronym. Women do not change their surnames at marriage, and only through the surname given to children is the union of the two families recognized. People say that if there are no children there is no blood connection to join the two families, and they remain separate even in death. The wife will be buried in her family plot and the husband in his family's plot. The occasional exceptions to this practice are seen to coincide with the preference for matrilocality at marriage. The woman's house more readily extends the term family to include the husband of a daughter than does a man's house to a barren daughter-in-law.

Connection with a house is also a person's only access to the political sphere. Participation in village decision-making comes through being a member of a household which makes one a vecino, literally 'neighbour', and gives one legal rights in the village. New members of old houses have ready-made support if they want to enter politics. People say: 'We vote for a family - a house - not a particular candidate. Each house knows its own friends.' A house name does not refer to just a building and the ground it occupies but is a metaphor for social relations past and present which guarantees a place within village life.

Conclusion

One's heritage is indicated by the house names with which one is associated, but one's physical characteristics or other distinguishing elements are the basis for the nickname. Most people have both a nickname and a house name, and although it is the surname that acknowledges parentage, it is not the means by which people are grouped together in the village idiom. A nickname is an individualising device which acknowledges a person's accomplishments or idiosyncrasies and momentarily separates them from the social matrix to which all people are connected; it also identifies the members of a group for those who understand the references. A house name is a reference to a person and their connection to other people past and present. When one house name is perpetuated and another no longer used, it suggests that the remaining name refers to a house that is better known or esteemed for one reason or another in the present village circumstances. The use of house names stimulates an awareness of each house's place in the local hierarchy. A selective process subtly prunes away the names of less significant activities and personalities at any particular period and replaces those with more relevant names, so that the village idiom continues to be updated without altering the overall size and continuity of the vocabulary.

House names are the means by which the village clusters people together into meaningful social groupings that go beyond day-to-day

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8 Campbell (1976) describes a similar concept among the Sarakatsani.
social and economic concerns and identify individuals in relation to a series of households that have developed over generations from a common core. This recognizes some sort of bilateral lineage or descent group, based on rather ephemeral criteria but is nevertheless a descriptive and selective device which acknowledges this generation's connection with previous generations and maintains the basis by which individuals are always associated with a collectivity and can perceive themselves and others as members of their own community. These house names which associate people with living groups and to previous generations become metaphors for social relations past and present.

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REFERENCES

CITIES AND FOUNDERS IN ANTiquITY

Commemorative naming may seem a straightforward matter to us, in an age when maps of the world, and particularly those parts of it settled by Europeans since the Renaissance, are so thickly bestrewn with the names of monarchs, lords, generals, explorers, scholars and the like, but to name a city after a person would no doubt have seemed surprising to Romans of the early republic, and the Greeks too came late to the idea. The growth of the practice in the ancient world can to some extent be traced, and from the patterns of occurrence of such names and from certain details of their formation some notion may be deduced of what they conveyed to contemporaries - direct evidence for this being sadly deficient. Even if questions cannot be fully answered, they may at least be raised and complexities suggested that go beyond the apparently simple fact of a city being named after someone.

Places may, of course, get their name from a personal name not by any definite act of naming but rather from mere reference within a community: 'John's house' may be identified as such locally, though it may have been named and be known to the Post Office as 'The Laurels'. Thus in France, for instance, countless place-names in -(i)ac, -(e), -(y), etc. continue earlier forms in -(i)acum derived from family names and once indicating family estates. Such labels will not be considered here, attention being turned rather to those names that may be supposed to have been formally given to or adopted by a town or city.¹

¹ It is interesting to note that names derived from personal names seem not to have been given to natural features - mountains, rivers, etc. - by the Greeks and Romans. (Exceptions are the parts of the Alps that came to be distinguished as the Alpes Cottiae and
That importance might be attached by the Greeks to the naming of a city at its foundation is suggested by an episode in the *Birds* of Aristophanes: Pisthetaerus has persuaded the birds to join him in building a new city, and they ask him what is to be done; 'First,' he replies, 'give a grand and glorious name to the city, and after that make sacrifice to the gods' (809 ff.) - the name chosen in this instance is Νεφελοκοκκοκία 'Cloud-cuckoo city'. How names were chosen for real cities founded by Greeks in the early historical period is not known, but they are certainly not all grand and glorious. There is no shortage of examples, for from the eighth century BC onwards numerous colonies were founded on the shores of the Mediterranean and the Black Sea and were given names of various kinds: an original local name might be retained, or a name might be imported from the homeland, or a city might be named after a nearby river or some characteristic feature of the region (e.g. Σαλίνος 'abounding in celery'), or after a deity, as in the many instances of Ἀπόλλωνια, Ἡρακλεία, Ποσείδώνια (Risch 1965: 195ff.). In practice the names conform roughly to the pattern outlined by Plato, who, in discussing the establishment of an ideal city, treats the matter of the name only in an unconcerned aside (Laws 704a), supposing that the newly founded city will take its name from the conditions of settlement, from some locality, or from the name of a river or local deity. It will be noticed that the list of possibilities does not include the name of the founder, and this too is true to early Greek practice. This is the more remarkable for the fact that the name of the founder of a city would be known, remembered and revered, and he would be the object of a cult within the city after his death; but there are no clear examples (pace Malkin 1985) of early Greek city names derived from the names of founders.

In striking contrast, many older cities, whose origins were no longer known, do have eponymous 'founders' - assigned to them in retrospect: for instance, the heroes Καμίρως, Ιάλυας and Λίνδος correspond to the three main cities of ancient Rhodes (Pindar, Ol. 7.73 ff.), and Σίκους (Hesiod, fr. 224 M-W) is associated with the city of the same name that seems originally to have been so called Άλπεις Ηλιαίας, but these are very much sub-divisions of a mountain chain known as Άλπεις.) This may reflect a feeling that rivers, etc. would have names that needed only to be discovered, while a new city would naturally need a name to be given to it, but it also suggests a political rather than purely commemorative connotation for such names.

I have restricted the discussion in this paper to the Graeco-Roman world, but the phenomenon of eponymous foundations is of course to be encountered in other ancient societies: for some interesting examples from Iran see Klingenschmitt 1980.

2 In the *Birds*, Pisthetaerus thinks up the name and the birds agree to it, which may well mirror actual practice, with the colonists approving the choice of the founder; so Hagnon, sent out from Athens as the designated founder, named Amphipolis (Thucydides 4.102.3).
from the excellence of its cucumbers. These 'founders' are incorporated into the Greek mythological system - so Kamiros and his brothers are sons of Helios and Rhodes, Sikuon the son of Erecht heus - and the tradition of inventing them seems to be of some antiquity, since already in Homer the family tree of the royal house of Troy includes Ilos and Dardanos, with obvious reference to Ilion and Dardanie, alternative names of the city.

Given this relationship between city and mythical 'founder', it is perhaps not altogether surprising to find an instance of a city actually named for such a figure (Risch 1965: 200): Maroneia, was the name given to a city founded from Chios in the seventh century BC in the Ismarus region of Thrace, and it seems to derive from Maron, the name in Homer of a priest of Apollo, dwelling near Ismarus, who gave to Odysseus the wine with which he later made Polyphemus drunk (Od. 9.196); this Maron was subsequently, by natural association, identified as a son or grandson of Dionsus, and as a suitable local hero adopted by the colonists as their founder.

All of this indicates that a mythical hero was an acceptable eponym, but a living person was not; a founder might receive heroic honours after his death, but at the time of the foundation his status must still have been such as to preclude his name being given to the city. It may be supposed then that the change abruptly introduced by Philip II of Macedon in the mid-fourth century BC would have come as something of a shock to the Greek world. In 357 Philip founded Philippi: the name is startling for its association with a living person, and also puzzling in formation, being just the plural of the personal name - the exact significance intended can only be guessed at, perhaps 'Philip and his people'. There followed several cities with the name Philippou polis 'City of Philip', more readily understood but equally without precedent. City names containing the element polis 'city' seem only to have become well established in the preceding century, and those consisting of the syntagm genitive + polis are essentially to be found earlier only in Greek names given to Egyptian cities, so Heliou polis 'City of the sun', Krokodilôn polis 'City of crocodiles', etc. (Risch 1965: 200f.); but the use of a man's name in such a formation is something quite new. Yet no contemporary Greek comment has survived to enable us to judge how outlandish this may have seemed, and only speculation is possible as to why Philip should have felt it appropriate to impose his own name on his foundations in this way: certainly a monarch with wide dominions may allow himself a licence not readily granted within the confines of a city-state.3

Alexander followed the examples of his father with Aleksandrou polis in Thrace, but it was the foundation of Aleksandria in Egypt in 332/1 (the first of many cities of this name that Alexander was to establish throughout his empire) that introduced a new type of name, which was widely used over the next few centuries. The formation may be revealing, if Risch (1965: 201f.) is right in his explanation of its origin: he argues that the most likely model

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3 For discussion of this question see Malkin 1985.
for the name in -eia would be Khairóneia in Boeotia - the site of an important battle in 338 that secured the Macedonian domination of Greece and in which Alexander himself took part; Khairóneia had long been associated with an eponymous founder-hero Khairón, son of Apollo; the name ALEksandreia would thus be tantamount to a claim to heroic status, and it is doubtless no accident that it was at this time that Alexander visited the oracle at Ammon, where he was hailed as the son of Zeus.4

ALEksandreia set the pattern for the successor states, in which the cult of the ruler assumed increasing importance, and the names of Hellenistic monarchs served as the base for many a Kassandreia, Attaeleia, Seleukeia, Antiocheia, Lusimakheia, etc.; in due course cities also came to be named after the wives, mothers or daughters of rulers, giving Laodikeia, Burudikeia, Arsinoeia, etc.5 These names were conferred upon new cities and also upon older ones that were refounded - a process that no doubt involved some sort of reorganization and provided a convenient opportunity for a change of name. Names of this kind were frequently changed, as cities came under the sway of different rulers, which in itself indicates that the names retained significance in proclaiming the association of a city with a particular dynasty. That honour was at the same time bestowed upon the eponym was no doubt a consideration, especially in the case of members of the family, but this can only have been true to a limited extent when the names were so rarely specific - a Seleukeia, for instance, might have been named for any Seleukos. More specific are the formations from royal titles, so that an Epiphanéia, for example, may be assumed to be a foundation of Antiochus IV Epiphanes of Cilicia. A further example (though the formation is with a different suffix, for no obvious reason) is Eupatória, named for Mithridates Eupator of Pontus and still unfinished when that monarch was defeated in 63 BC by Pompey, who refounded the city as Magnopolis, and so ushered in a new era of city naming in the Greek world under Roman auspices.

Among the early Romans there seems to have been no tradition of naming towns for persons. Roman expansion within Italy was accompanied by the founding of a number of colonies, but for the foundations of the early republic existing local names were used or else

4 Risch points out that the ethnic corresponding to AlekSandreia is ALEksandréus 'a citizen of Alexandria', whereas normally a place-name in -eia would have a corresponding ethnic in -etôes or -eieu; there are a few -eia/-eiu combinations, e.g. Mantineia in Arcadia with ethnic Mantineus, where it is probable that the ethnic is in fact the base for the derived place-name, but there are in general very few old examples - the best being Khairóneia with Khairóneus.

5 Women's names could also be given to cities without alteration; this seems to have been particularly common in the case of Ptolemaic foundations - so Arsinoë, Berenikë.
abstract names of good omen, as Copia 'Plenty'. Even the instances of mythical eponymous founders to be encountered in Roman literature (Romulus for Rome being the most familiar) are likely to be the product of Greek influences. The names of persons could be attached to roads (e.g. via Flaminia) or buildings (e.g. pons Aemilius) or military camps (e.g. castra Claudia), and even to markets that became the nuclei of later towns (e.g. forum Aurelium), but these examples belong essentially within the sphere of reference labels as indications of the person responsible for construction; the naming of a town, and thereby its inhabitants, after an individual would be quite a different matter, and there is no evidence for the practice in early times.

In the second century BC, however, there are instances of towns in Spain being named after Roman commanders: Graccurris in the Ebro valley was founded in 178 by Ti. Sempronius Gracchus, and Brutobriga, known only from coins and of uncertain location, is probably to be associated with D. Iunius Brutus, who was campaigning in Spain in the years following 138. These names are formed in accordance with native rather than Roman patterns: -urris recurs as an element in Iberian place-names that cannot be further analysed because of the obscurity that still surrounds this language; -briga, on the other hand, is recognizable as a Celtic form, with an Indo-European etymology, which appears as the second element of a number of place-names in Spain and seems originally to have meant something like 'fortified height'.

These Celtic -briga names are compounds, of the same type as those found in Gaul and Britain with second elements such as -magus 'field' or -dunum 'fort'. The first elements of these names are not always clear, but there are examples with an adjective (e.g. Noviodunum 'New fort'), a noun (e.g. Blatomagus 'Field of flowers', Carrodunum 'Chariot fort'), or more rarely a divine name (e.g. Camulodunum 'Fort of Camulos'); there are no certain examples with a personal name as the first element, although there is some ambiguity in cases where an adjective is found which is also attested as a personal name, so that Cambodunum, for instance, may be either 'Crooked fort' or 'Fort of Cambos'. Yet it is hard to see how Brutobriga could have been formed without a Celtic or Latin model; might the fact that brutus existed as an adjective as well as a name have helped?

Both Brutobriga and Graccurris are built on the cognomina (Brutus and Gracchus) rather than the gentilicium (Iunius and Sempronius) of the Romans concerned. At this period a Roman would have a gentilicium, an inherited family name, and a praenomen (as here D(ectius) and T(iberius)) to distinguish him as an individual; he might but need not have a cognomen, which would have begun as a form of nickname for an individual but often became part of the family name, to be passed on through the generations. For official purposes, the praenomen and gentilicium made up a man's name, the cognomen having no recognized status - in early inscriptions, for instance, the names of consuls are given without mention of their

6 See Dottin 1920: 85 ff. for further examples.
cognomen, if they had one. Perhaps the fact, already signalled by the formations in -briga and -uris, that these towns were built for natives made the choice of this part of the founders' names more suitable - the foundations would thus have been personal rather than formally Roman and official. It is surely significant that when the same D. Junius Brutus founded a town for demobilized troops he followed the traditional Roman pattern and named it Valens 'Strength'.

A few years later, in 122 BC, Aquae Sextiae (Aix-en-Provence) was founded by C. Sextius Calvinus, probably as a garrison rather than a colony, and here the gentilicium is used, attached to Aquae 'waters' in a formation of a familiar Roman kind (cf. forum Aurelium, etc. above), with the important difference that this name may be assumed to have been definitely given to the town, so that the type has been extended in use from reference to naming. A further extension brought true colonies into the system: the first example would seem to be Mariana on Corsica, if it was indeed established by C. Marius in the early first century. Not much later, after 82 BC, a colony for veterans was established at Pompeii by L. Cornelius Sulla, and this he named Colonia Veneria Cornelia, after the goddess Venus and himself.7 The association of a person's name with a colony, a settlement officially established by the Roman state, is a new development, and is to be seen in the context of the disorders of the period, when armies were increasingly looking to their commanders to provide for them, and when personal loyalties so created might offer a basis of support for a military commander in any bid for power.

For Sulla's colony at Pompeii, Cornelia was essentially an additional title rather than the actual name. Such 'honorific' additions became more frequent, especially under Julius Caesar, so that several towns (of whatever status) had Julia as part of their title. (Julia was also bestowed as a title, beside Augusta, by Augustus and his immediate successors, and it is not always possible to know whom it commemorates.) That the practice was more widespread in the last years of the republic than surviving names might indicate, and that a significance beyond a mere historical record of foundation was attached to it, is suggested by examples of titles that have clearly been replaced or allowed to disappear. Lugudunum (Lyons), for instance, became a Roman colony in 43 BC as Copia Felix Munatia, bearing the name of L. Munatius Plancus, but in the next century it appears as Copia Claudia Augusta Lugdunum, with imperial titles substituted. Similarly Celsa in Spain, founded in 48/7 BC, issued coins as Colonia Victrix Iulia Lepida, apparently with reference both to Caesar and to M. Aemilius Lepidus, but under Augustus it is simply Colonia Victrix Iulia Celsa.

Augusta is found not only as an extra title but also as the principal name of towns; cf. Augusta Praetoria (Aosta), Augusta

7 There is a further question to consider in connection with the use either of the gentilicium as such in the feminine (so Cornelia) or an adjective derived from it (so Martoma), but I cannot discuss it here; see Meister 1916: 81ff.
Suessionum (Soissons), Caesaraugusta (Zaragoza), etc. Towns built for native peoples in the western provinces, however, provide further examples of Celtic compounds; cf. Caesarobriga, Iuliobriga, Augustobriga (all in Spain), Caesaromagus (near Chelmsford), Iuliamagus Andevaeorum (Angers), Augustodunum (Autun), etc. Thus a pattern was set for later emperors and later dynasties.8

Some interesting subtleties of usage have been observed (Galsterer-Kroll 1972: 50 ff.). It seems that in honorific titles the combination of gentiliciun and cognomen (e.g. Iulia Augusta, Ulpia Traiana, Aelia Hadriana) is typically reserved for colonies and municipia, that is communities of a status that gave certain rights of citizenship, whereas other towns might have one or the other but not both. Even then some distinctions may be made: under Hadrian, for instance, Aelia is reserved for colonies and municipia, while Trajan seems to have followed a geographical criterion, allowing Ulpia in the western provinces but in the east only for Heraclea Salbace, the home town of his doctor.

No doubt, as the last example suggests, these titles were conferred as a mark of favour, rather than certain English towns have been granted the status of Royal Borough, and as Bognor became Bognor Regis in 1929 after George V had stayed there for a period of convalescence. There is a record (Dio 54.23.7ff.) of Augustus in 15 BC allowing the title Augusta 'as a mark of honour' to Faphos on Cyprus. (It is interesting to note that this was done by a decree of the Senate. Dio contrasts this with the practice of his own day, some two centuries later, when he claims that towns just adopted what titles they pleased—which is hard to believe.)

Paphos seems to have been granted the title in connection with help afforded by the emperor after an earthquake. The system was thus of mutual benefit, as towns achieved a mark of distinction, while emperors built up loyanalties and advertised their munificence. So when Puteoli in Italy was raised to the rank of colony by Nero (Tacitus, Ann. 14.27), it took a title from his name at the same time; in this case the association was short-lived—a few years later the town is attested as Colonia Flavia Augusta, with Nero's name discarded in favour of the gentiliciun of Vespasian. As in the Hellenistic world, such replacement of names and titles is an indication that they were perceived as having a commemorative function. To this end Commodus, in 190 AD, renamed Rome with his own full name as Colonia Lucia Antoniniana Commodiana, which duly appeared on coins but is otherwise attested only in the accounts of historians, where it may be cited (SHA, Commodus 8.6) as a clear sign of his dementia: immortality through names can be dearly bought.

Nero too had sought to achieve lasting fame by the use of his name, converting the month of April, for instance, to mensis Neronius, and it is alleged (Suetonius, Nero 55) that he intended to change the name of Rome to Neropolis. That this should be a Greek formation may be ascribed to Nero's penchant for Greek culture,

8 A full collection of the evidence is provided by Galsterer-Kröll 1972.
but the choice of this type of name should also be seen in the context of developments in the Greek-speaking east, where Roman supremacy was accompanied by a shift in place-name formation.

It was noted above that Pompey renamed Mithridates' Eupatoria as Magnopolis. Pompey had taken the title Magnus 'the Great', and thus the city was named after him; he also founded or refounded several cities with the name Pompeiopolis.\(^9\) Not that all Pompey's foundations bore his name - he was responsible for Diospolis 'City of Zeus', Nikopolis 'City of Victory', and others - but he was clearly not averse to the idea. The local Greek tradition was no doubt the main factor, but it may also be noted that he had earlier served in Spain, where there were Roman examples to hand, and indeed it may be that he was the Pompeius after whom Pompaelo (Pamplona) was named - the name is an indigenous formation, probably equivalent to 'City of Pompey'.\(^10\)

From the Greek point of view, the novelty of Pompey's practice lies in the reversion to names containing polis. (It seems that these names in the Roman period were often formed as compounds rather than syntagms of the Philippou polis type, which has been blamed on Roman failure to appreciate the relationship between city name and ethnic, which would indeed regularly have been a compound, as Philippopolites 'citizen of Philippou polis'; be that as it may, it is the Latin form of such names that will be quoted hereafter.) City names in polis are attested throughout the Hellenistic period, but with accompanying adjectives or divine names, not the names of rulers, for which the -eia formation was used. It must be supposed that the adoption of -polis in preference to -eia was deliberate: presumably the dynastic associations of the -eia names and their aura of ruler-cult made the type unsuitable for a Roman general, however ambitious.\(^11\)

\(^9\) Pompey also founded a Megalopolis (Strabo 12.3.37), which might be interpreted as a Greek version of Magnopolis (megal- is 'great') - see Galsterer-Kröll 1972: 52, but could just reflect the size of the refounded and reorganized city, into which other towns were incorporated.

\(^10\) ... as it were Pompeiopolis', Strabo 3.4.10. On the name Pompaelo see Untermann 1976.

\(^11\) In 83 BC, L. Licinius Murena founded a city in Cappadocia, according to Memnon - FGrH 434F.26(1), and the name of this is given as Ekinia; Reinhach's emendation to Likineia is widely accepted (though perhaps one might have expected Likinieia), and this would be a direct imitation of the Hellenistic names. That Licinius Murena was capable of giving his name to a city is a probable conclusion from the appearance of Moureniot, citizens of an Asia Minor town that apparently bore the Roman's cognomen, in the first century AD (Habicht 1975: 74).
A handful of examples may be assigned to the next few decades. Tarsus adopted the name *Iulopolis* in 42 BC (Dio 47.26.2) out of regard for Caesar and his heir. In Rough Cilicia, given by Antony to Cleopatra, *Titopolis* and *Domitopolis* seem to have been named for M. Titius and L. Domitius Ahenobarbus, two supporters of Antony (Jones 1971: 208). These names were not replaced, but *Antonopolis* in Asia became innocuous *Tripolis*, presumably after the defeat of Antony and Cleopatra at Actium in 31 BC, though interestingly an official document a hundred years later still gives both names (Habicht 1975: 83 f.); there may well have been other cities named after Antony that were renamed without leaving any such traces.

From the time of Augustus such names become very common - *Iulipolis*, *Sebastopolis* (*Sebastos* is the Greek version of *Augustus*), *Claudiopolis*, *Flaviopolis*, *Traianopolis*, *Hadrianopolis*, etc., through to the most famous of all, *Constantinopolis*, and beyond into the Byzantine period. (There is even an isolated instance in the west: *Oranionopolis* - Grenoble - a fourth-century foundation.) This type effectively replaces *-eia*, but not quite without exception. *Kaisareia* (Latin *Caesarea*) occurs a number of times, but typically as the name of a foundation in honour of Augustus by some local monarch - as Herod in Palestine - and here the continuity with Hellenistic practice is evident: perhaps the emperor felt able to accept from others a distinction that he would be reluctant to claim for himself. Once the name became established it did to some extent spread: it is found, for instance, as the title of several cities in Asia in connection with benefits received from Tiberius after an earthquake in 17 AD (Galsterer-Kroll 1972: 49). There was also a *Sebasteia*, but its location is disputed and the circumstances that might justify its unusual name unknown; similarly unexplained is the single instance of *Hadrianeia*. *Neronia*, on the other hand, confirms the special status of the type, for this was the name given to the Armenian capital Artaxata in 66 AD by Tiridates when he had been installed on the throne by Nero. In these circumstances, Nero's proposal to call Rome *Neropolis* begins to look almost modest.

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12 Jones (1971: 439) points out that Titius and Domitius Ahenobarbus had defected to Octavian before Actium, so that there was no occasion for their names to be removed as a mark of disgrace.

13 Eumeneia in Asia seems to have acquired a title based on the name of Antony's wife, Fulvia, to judge from some coin legends (Galsterer-Kröl 1972: 131 no. 429).

14 The type enjoyed a certain vogue in Russia in the eighteenth century, as part of a general fashion for Greek names: see Schütz 1980: 117 f.
With a name like Neroneia it is particularly clear that a compliment is being paid to the emperor, but where a *-polis name is given to a city more directly under the emperor's control, or an imperial title is bestowed, it seems that honour is equally being conferred on the city and a special connection with the emperor recognized. This allows imperial propaganda and civic pride to go hand in hand: Tarsus by the 240s had accumulated an impressive array of honorifics - Hadriana, Commodiana, Severiana, Antoniniana, Maaritiana, Alexandriniana, Sordiana.15

The complimentary and commemorative function of such names is perhaps more overt when it is not the emperor himself whose name is used. Herod Antipas, for instance, refounded Betharamphtha as Livias in honour of Livia, the wife of Augustus, again very much in the Hellenistic tradition; similarly Plotinopolis in Thrace was named for the wife of Trajan. It is more remarkable to find one such instance in the west, where there was no long tradition to justify it, and furthermore involving a colony, all of which may account for the unsympathetic presentation of the facts by Tacitus (Ann. 12.27): in 50 AD, Agrippina, the wife of Claudius, as a demonstration of her power, secured the foundation of a colony bearing her name at her birth-place, Cologne - the Colonia Agrippina or Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippinensium.

A true memorial is found when a name commemorates a death. Selinus in Cilicia, where Trajan died in 117 AD, was renamed Traianopolis; Halala in Cappadocia was renamed Faustinopolis after the death there in 176 AD of Faustina, the wife of Marcus Aurelius; Antinopolis in Egypt preserved the name of Hadrian's lover, drowned in the Nile - or so it was given out - in 130 AD.

Disconcertingly different is the case of Hadrianotherae (literally perhaps 'Hadrian's hunt'), which is said to commemorate a successful hunt in which Hadrian killed a bear (SHA, Hadrian 20. 13): the bear's head that appears on local coins has been held to confirm the story (Jones 1971: 89). With this plunge into semi-legend it becomes clear how difficult it is fully to assess these names and to grasp what resonance they may have had for contemporaries, for any too grand a notion of imperial values carried and propagated by city names, with only emperors and their families eligible as eponyms, must falter before the sheer triviality of Hadrianotherae - and even if the story is doubted now, it is to be remembered that it found credence with the Romans.

The ancient world offers many puzzles that lack of evidence may render insoluble, but at least in the case of city names closer scrutiny can allow some progress. Attention to the form and distribution of names affords some clues to Greek and Roman attitudes, but above all suggests how complex the matter can be. It is never enough just to state that a city was named after someone.

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15 See Glässnerer-Kröll 1972: 56 and 136 no. 495.
REFERENCES


THE NAMING OF PLACES ON AFRICAN MAPS

The earliest maps of Africa, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, were full of names; but this gives a deceptive impression of what was 'known' about the continent's geography or people at that period. Adam Jones (1987) has plotted on a series of sketch-maps just how little African territory was actually described at first hand at different periods from 1400 on.\(^1\) However, the lack of first-hand reportage before the mid-nineteenth century did not deter the map-makers from filling up their images of the continent with a myriad of names, culled from every literary source, from classical times onward. Consider, for example, the crowded maps of Hondius, Homann, and Ortelius. As the eighteenth century gave way to the nineteenth, the basis on which cartographers accepted evidence for the authentic places and names of inner Africa changed, and blank spaces came to replace the luxuriant detail of the earlier versions.\(^2\) A concern for accuracy of placing and exactitude of naming came to dominate the making of African maps from the late nineteenth century and throughout the early colonial period of exploration, military appropriation and the securing of basic intelligence for administrative control. The blank spaces were steadily filled in. Given this new mapped-out pattern of fragments from spoken language, deliberately culled not from Western literature but from field investigations, a scholarly interest developed in the middle and late colonial periods, among both professionals and amateurs, in the meaning and explanation of names. This curiosity about the significance and origin of names took over

\(^1\) One may compare Plates 5 and 33 in Fage 1958.

\(^2\) Contrast Plates 17 and 37 in Tooley 1969.
from the practical fact-finding of the initial colonial period. Names on maps became the fodder for a different sort of intelligence.

Corresponding to these three periods we can distinguish three modes of onomastic interest in African maps: first, the textual-representational; second, the factual-investigatory; and third, the scholarly-speculative (a concern which has led among other things to the series of colloquia in which this essay was first delivered as a paper). Let me characterize and illustrate these three broad concerns (still with us in varying degrees).

1. The Early Onomastic Style, In Which Maps Were To Reflect Textual Images

This style could be said to have persisted from antiquity up to the early nineteenth century as a dominant mode, but it continues to the present in certain regions of the imaginative representation of Africa. In this tradition of enquiry, a range of names as such, embedded in literary texts, is already well known. But the problem is where to put them on the map. We know what we are looking for, but where is it? Examples abound: the capital of Prester John, the Mountains of the Moon, Meroe, Kush, Libya, Rubia, Monomotapa, and later, Timbuktu, Hausa etc. Names were collected from classical texts, from the Bible, and from medieval Arab travellers in particular. These names were used to decorate the sheet and to complement the artistic motifs; Swift's well-known lines remind us that 'Geographers, in Afric maps, / With savage fill their gaps, / And oe'r unhabitable downs / Place for want of towns.' Robin Hallett (1964) has recorded the efforts of the African Association in the late eighteenth century to find the West African city of 'Hausa', known only from rumour and second-hand report, to send a scientific observer there and decide where it should be reliably placed on the map. A very interesting illustration of these early attempts at systematic knowledge was the problem of 'Adofoodia', supposedly to the north of Dahomey. The traveller John Duncan in the early nineteenth century, who published a book in 1847, claimed to have been there; but doubts crept in later, and it is not at all clear whether he might not have made the whole thing up. The name was eventually omitted from French military maps; one explanation, as convincing as any, was that it may have represented a rude word in Yoruba (cf. Marion Johnson 1974).

2. The Onomastic Style of Professional Exploration, Military Appropriation and Early Colonial Administration

The map-maker here starts off not with a text, but with a blank sheet and a stout pair of boots. First, the place is found, and then the name is sought (rather than the other way around). Instead of asking, 'Where should this name be placed on my map?'
the investigator announces, 'Here's a place, now what is it called?' This onomastic enquiry is not in the interests of mere scholarly curiosity, but thinly cloaks the need to know in order to manage. Names were collected in their thousands from the late nineteenth century onwards from a wide variety of oral sources, mostly local and therefore assumed authentic. Where this kind of local authenticity could not be tapped, names were deliberately made up on the spot, and through being marked on the official map, given a political reality. For smaller places, anything would do: names of odd hills, bits of rivers, odd chiefs, partial scraps of language here and there, all were given a new permanence. For large and splendid places, the heroic motif dominated: names of soldiers and explorers, European patrons, royalty and noblemen back home, or officials of the exploration societies. These sources of names were sometimes mixed up - but attention was not upon the credentials of the source as such, as it had been in the earlier era. The overriding concern was to mark the political appropriation of the place. A certain amount of competition was evident between European powers. You have a place, name it and you have it taped, especially if on a map upon the basis of which a treaty may be signed.

Occasionally the names chosen in this style of naming were indeed from the ancient sources, but established anew with the authority of empirical discovery among the speakers of a native language. Here is the explorer Speke, drawing indirectly on Ptolemy as he begins to ascend mountains at the northern end of the Tanganyika Lake in January 1858:

This mountain mass I consider to be the TRUE MOUNTAINS OF THE MOON, regarding which so many erroneous speculations have been made. I infer this because they lie beyond Unyamwezi (country of the Moon), and must have been first mentioned to geographical enquirers by the Wanyamuezi (people of the Moon), who have from time out of mind visited the coast, and must have been the first who gave information of them (quoted in Richards and Place 1960: 131).

Most explorers' names for what they regarded as their own discoveries were, however, modern and European in their reference. Speke in 1862 writes as follows of his naming, in fact, 'christening', of the falls emerging from the newly-found great lake:

The expedition had now performed its functions. I saw that old father Nile without any doubt rises in the Victoria Nyanza, and, as I had foretold, that lake is the source of the holy river which cradled the first expounder of our religious belief... I now christened the 'stones' Ripon Falls, after the nobleman who presided over the Royal Geographical Society when my expedition was got up; and the arm of water from which the Nile flowed, Napoleon Channel, in token of respect for the French Geographical Society for the honour they had done me, just before leaving England, in presenting me with their gold medal for the discovery of the Victoria Nyanza (ibid.: 150).
Baker, meanwhile, had been approaching the great lakes from the north; he writes in similar vein of his major discovery in 1861:

The glory of our prize burst suddenly upon me! There, like a sea of quicksilver, lay far beneath the grand expanse of water... It is impossible to describe the triumph of that moment... As an imperishable memorial to one loved and mourned by our gracious Queen and deplored by every Englishman, I called this great lake 'the Albert N'yanza'. The Victoria and the Albert lakes are the two sources of the Nile (ibid.: 173).

Most of these names were not so imperishable, and have now been 'Africanized': for example, the summit of Kilimanjaro, once Kaiser Wilhelm Spitze, is now Uhuru Peal, and Lake Albert has been renamed Lake Mobutu Sese Seko. A few did not even stick at the time - for example, Teleki and Hohnel named some mountains 'General Matthews Chain' after their patron in Zanzibar; while their label 'Lake Rudolph' after His Royal and Imperial Highness the Prince of Austria (who had taken a gracious interest in their plans) did last to the 1960s, General Matthews scarcely made the official maps at all. The geologist J.W. Gregory had almost a free hand in naming the detailed topography of Mount Kenya and has given us a fascinating account:

As it is impossible to describe the mountain without names, some have had to be invented. I should not, of course, think of applying European terms to places for which native names are already in existence; but in a locality where there are no names, there can be no reasonable objection to proposing them (ibid.: 279).

He names Teleki Valley and Mount Hohnel after these explorers:

For the main valley on the south side of the mountain I propose the name of the Hobley Valley, as it is probably the one which the British East Africa Company's Expedition would have entered had it traversed the whole of the forest zone. The tarns upon the floor of this valley I beg to call after Mr W. Bird Thompson, the caravan leader of that expedition. When we come to the glaciers and the central peak the names are not so obvious... The principal glacier is on the south side of the mountain, and to it I gave the name of the Lewis Glacier, out of respect to the late Henry Carvell Lewis, whose brilliant researches have thrown so much light on glacial problems in England and America (ibid.: 280).

A less heroic, but no less imperialistic, mode of naming operated at a lower level in the early colonial period. I do not have space to detail the long lists of place-names given textual existence in the trek itineraries of officers of the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan for example, lists drawing on Arabic, English and African vernaculars indiscriminately, and sometimes mixing them (especially
where interpreters from one vernacular explain terms from several others. One or two examples must suffice: the Bertha-language *bela shangul* (meaning ' Rounded rock') becomes Bela Shangul, interpreted as 'sons of' (Arabic) 'the Shangalla' (Amharic for 'negroes in the wild'). The place-names Amwot el Kebr and Amwot el Sogheir, i.e. Great and Little Amwot, are composed of a Dinka-ized substantive (Amwot) and Arabic qualifiers; but the names are actually Nuer, Mwot Dit and Mwot Tot. The Nuer versions were used to replace the older ones on the official maps after a civil inspector was put in Lou Nuer country in 1917 and realised that the earlier versions were supplied by a Dinka-speaking guide who knew a little Arabic and was translating the adjectives for the benefit of the original military patrol. Occasionally jokes were made at the expense of the natives: in the Ingessana Hills, there are two main village foci. One is called Soda. The other one appears on the pre-War maps as Wisko, but more recently has been restored to its rightful name Bau. Ambiguities were rife; Doleib Hill in Shilluk country, where a mission was established, is as flat a stretch of clay plain as you could wish to find in the upper Nile. The *doleib* palms are there for all to see, but visitors wonder where is the hill. The term must surely be a wishful corruption of the Arabic *hilla*, a village or settlement.

3. The Late Colonial Armchair Onomastic Style

This style is perhaps our very own. Looking back over the wealth of names we find in texts, on maps, and in our own field diaries, we select a name and ask: 'What does this name mean?' What does it reveal, or perhaps conceal, about history, about languages, psychology, and anthropology? Given the wide provenance of names scattered in abundance over the maps of Africa by the post-First World War period, there were puzzles aplenty for the colonial scholar-gentleman. Names could be matched text with text by the more academic-minded of those in the Sudan Political Service, for example; and names could be matched between text and place, or even place and place, by those of practical curiosity on the spot. In this latter style, the map itself is taken to be a primary source (whether a twentieth-century military trek or an illuminated medieval version of Ptolemy).

Short articles began to appear in journals like *Sudan Notes and Records (SNR)*. H.C. Jackson wrote, for example, on the meaning of 'Omdurman' in his *Sudan Days and Ways* (1954: 84). An exchange of opinion took place on the meaning of 'Mongalla' in *SNR* in the late 1930s. An article on Suakin, also in *SNR*, devoted several paragraphs and various alternative lurid tales to a discussion of the meaning of its name, and this was followed by correspondence in 1938 and 1939. Shortage of space forbids me the pleasure of quoting from many of these period pieces. But I would like to close by referring to T.H.R. Owen's only partial-joking take-off of the onomastic game, in his letter to *SNR* on the name 'Wau' (1950). He suggests various types of plausible theory on the origin of this
rare: the Corruptive Theory (from a local Bongo word meaning 'market'); the Philological Theory ('the slave-raiders who permeated the South...hit upon the expedient of describing the principal centres by letters of the Arabic alphabet. All have now fallen into desuetude save two only - YEI and WAU'); and the Historical Theory. According to this, the Dinka agreed to attack an Ansar camp at night, and to use a distinctive battle cry in order to distinguish friend from foe - 'WOW, WOW, WOW!' The Botanical Theory (too involved to summarise here) is then followed by the Anthropological Theory, which treats of the Beja word wau meaning 'honey'; other evidence is adduced of traces of the Beja tongue in the Bahr-el-Ghazal, and the Hadendowa tradition of a southern origin; moreover if the Jur coiffure of ringlets were only turned upside down, it would resemble the Beja hairstyle:

From the above evidence the trained anthropologist will easily conclude that the Hadendowa and the Jur are of common origin and that the former, before their migration to the inhospitable Red Sea Hills, made Wau their headquarters for the honey-hunting which formed so important a feature of their livelihood.

At last Owen offers the Plain Theory: 'It is simply a Dinka name.'

To name a place, on a map, is to try and stamp some certainty on the world. But to look into naming too carefully undermines all sense of certainty.

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3 There are several different places called 'Wau' in the Shilluk, Jur and Dinka country today, and Douglas Johnson has told me that it does indeed seem to be an old Dinka usage. Although so well established it may not be capable of yielding a reliable 'meaning', it is common today to hear local explanations of the term. Dinka and Shilluk commonly say that 'Wau' is an expression of surprise (which might for example follow the killing of an important man), and the name 'Wau' commemorates a surprising event which once took place in that locality.
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Oxford University Press.
The term for 'word' among the Carib-speaking Trio of Surinam is kato, but in the present context the term eka, 'name' and 'news', is more appropriate. At one level these two terms are contrasted as the abstract to the concrete, but at another level they are both contrasted to eneto, as something heard against something seen; two forms of knowledge recognized by the Trio. The term for 'place' is pata. The term is most commonly used when referring to a human settlement, but it may also refer to the home of an animal or the location of inanimate objects or the haunt of supernatural beings. Thus an armadillo's hole is kapai pata, a garden site is wii pata, or literally 'manioc place', or wiripê pata, a spirit's abode. A human settlement may be called after a geographical feature, as in Kawsamalasamutu pata, literally 'bamboo sandy place'; or after the name of its founder, for example Eoyari pata, literally 'the man Eoyari's place'.

Within the human pata, or village, there is a cleared area, the anna, which is the place where communal meals, dancing and other public events take place; and the pakoro, one or several houses where much of the private family and everyday life takes place. The front of the house, which faces on to the anna, is basically a male space, and the rear of the house a female space. Round the village is the wiripêhtao, a crudely cleared strip of land where rubbish is dumped. Beyond is the forest, itu. The village/forest contrast is the fundamental distinction in a system of classification based on concentric dualism. In social terms this classification incorporates a series of contrasts of the type kin/affines, friends/enemies, etc.

Within the forest there are named sites such as other villages and geographical locations. These latter are rapids, hills, unusual rock formations, etc. However, by far the greatest number
of named sites are known after an event that occurred there. Some of these events, for example a raid, are important enough for the knowledge of it and where it occurred to be widely known; awareness of other incidents, for example where a hunter killed a certain animal, may have restricted dissemination. At the same time, this geography is being continually redrawn as past events fade faster or slower from memory and new events occur to recreate the configuration of space.

Directing someone to a point in the forest presents problems. There is a large range of postpositions and adverbs that indicate location, but otherwise the language is relatively poor in directional terms. For example, there are no absolute terms for left and right, so central to Western vocabularies of direction. The term for right or left is apētur depending on whether one is right- or left-handed. The other hand, whichever it is, is apēyano. The term refers to the arm by which one is picked up from the ground at birth and this is the incident which confers on one right or left handedness. There are separate terms for east and west (connected with the sun's rising and sinking), but there is only a single term for north and south. However, the compass directions are virtually never employed when giving directions. Perhaps the directional terms most used are upstream and downstream, but by far the most common way of giving directions is by reference to named sites, knowledge of which depends on experience and familiarity. Given these two qualities this can be highly accurate, and I have been with an Indian directed by another to an exact spot some miles away.

This dependence on experiential knowledge puts the outsider at a very grave disadvantage, and not only the non-Indian. Despite popular ideas, Indians do get lost in the forest, and when in unfamiliar terrain have as much difficulty in understanding directions as any outsider. This apparent vagueness is also found when dealing with distances. Distance is always expressed in time, but in the absence of any numerical system there is nothing definite about its measurement. Journeys of less than a day's duration are related to the course of the sun; for trips of more than a day by the number of sunsets, often counted out on the fingers in the form 'it sunsets; it sunsets; it sunsets; arrive'. However, there is nothing too precise about this since no two Indians travel at the same speed nor will the same Indian do the same journey in the same time on different occasions. There are many variables such as whether one is accompanied by one's family or whether one is distracted by opportunities to hunt.

Many of these features are common in one form or another throughout Lowland South America. For example, the layout of the Trio village with its internal classification of public and private space reaches its apotheosis in the circular and horseshoe-shaped villages of the Gê and Bororo in Central Brazil. The need to create a geography through history becomes that more urgent among those groups forced, perhaps more than once in a generation, to move into unknown country. What has not been discussed in this short account is how cosmology and myth stamp their mark on the
classification of space and how they create dimensions to a world in which we have no sense of direction.
In this article I discuss place-names and shop names. They are taken together here for contingent reasons: I gathered information on them in the same place and at the same time. The place-names - 'West End', 'West Hampstead' and 'Hampstead West' - have been applied, at different times, to the same location, i.e. present-day West Hampstead in London. The shop names are those to be found in 1988 in West Hampstead's main shopping street, West End Lane.

In discussing the names by which a particular part of London has been, is now, and perhaps one day will be known, I do not try to document fully the historical process by which this location has changed - and may again change - its name. Rather I try merely to indicate some of the variety of factors involved in the naming of one particular place. While the ultimate arbiters of what a place is to be called are presumably local and national governmental bodies, the process by which a name first comes to be used, becomes known and becomes established is more complex. I try here to indicate some elements of that process and its results, as well as some of the complexity of the present and recent situation.

As for shop names, I try below to reveal some 'rules' underlying shop-naming. In particular I suggest a correlation between types of goods sold and types of names.

West Hampstead can be summarily described as a middle-class commuter suburb in the northwest part of London, from the centre of
which it is a fifteen-minute train ride. West Hampstead is bordered to the east by wealthy and fashionable Hampstead, to the north by mixed-class and unfashionable Cricklewood, to the west by equally unfashionable Brondesbury, and to the south by working-class Kilburn, with its large Irish and Afro-Caribbean communities. West Hampstead is not a well-known part of London; it has no particular attraction for tourists or visitors, though it has many advantages as a residential area.

West End Lane and West End

Running through West Hampstead is West End Lane. Today this thoroughfare is in effect made up of three or four distinct parts. The central section runs southwards from West End Green to the junction with Quex Road and Abbey Road. The northern part of this section, from the Green to the underground station, is a busy shopping street, known as 'The Lane' to at least some older local residents. The other two sections run almost at right angles from the northern and southern ends of the central section. To the north-east is a short section leading to the Finchley Road, to the south-west is a winding, narrow lane leading to the A5 (Kilburn High Road).

When asked why West End Lane is so called and why it should take such a meandering route, local residents confessed to having little idea, having, not surprisingly, not thought about it much, if at all. Occasionally someone suggested the possibility of it having something to do with central London's famous 'West End' (i.e. Mayfair, Piccadilly etc.) - that the road led or used to lead to it, for instance, which is not in fact the case. A few people recalled that there are a North End and a South End in the neighbourhood and thought that West End Lane might have something to do with these. This is, in a sense, so.

The area around what is now the northern central section of West End Lane, and in particular the area around West End Green, was at one time the location of the hamlet of West End, recorded as being in existence at least as early as 1535. West End was so named for being at the western end of the manor and parish of Hampstead, just as North End was in the north and South End was in the south. West End Lane was so called as it was the lane running from

1 Those responsible for compiling information on Hampstead street names for the local history society found that 'surprisingly few residents seemed to know the story of their own houses and streets or were aware of the historical interests around them' (CHS 1975: 8). This might make one doubt what seems to be a general assumption that history should be drawn on for street-naming and similar activities. Those responsible for deciding such matters seem to think that the past, and historical names, are more 'real' than the present, and newly invented names, whereas for 'the people in the street' the historical associations are often irrelevant.
Hampstead village down the hill to West End and on through the hamlet to Kilburn to join the old Watling Street, thereby providing what was a longer, but apparently at times much quicker, alternative route for the inhabitants of Hampstead to get in and out of London.

Except in the name of West End Lane itself, the name 'West End' hardly survives in present-day usages. There is still a West End Green, which was at the centre of the old hamlet, and there is a West End electoral ward, the borders of which very roughly follow those of the old hamlet. There is also still the parish of West End, Hampstead, with its Emmanuel Parish Church just north of the Green. One might expect the name to survive, or to have been re-surrected, in the names of local businesses, such as the shops on West End Lane. There is a 'West End Green Bookshop', which stands opposite the Green, and the names of two other shops, 'That Shop on West End Lane' and 'West End Lane Supplies: D.I.Y. Centre', refer directly to the name of the street on which they stand. There are two more, 'West End News' and 'West End Stationers', whose names might be thought to refer to the old village. In fact, though, these names have nothing to do with that West End, rather their owners have drawn on their shops' locations on West End Lane to justify names which echo the sophistication of central London's West End.

The name 'West End' as such, then, has virtually disappeared. And why not? There is no requirement that historical names should be preserved. They are only if they serve some purpose. While one can imagine the name 'West End' being revived in an attempt to give a sense of a village community to the area, this does not yet seem to have been attempted. An idea of the possibilities to be found in exploring local historical associations can be gained from the brief introductory text of an advertising feature about the shops of West Hampstead published in a local newspaper a few years ago: 'A century ago, West End Lane was lined with ancient trees, with hayfields beyond. Such rural scenes are no more and the street has, instead, become a busy shopping centre.' Even the survival of 'West End Green' as a name may now be under threat. In its advertisement at the underground station a local hotel refers to its position as being by 'West End Lane Green'.

West Hampstead

The village of West End disappeared towards the end of the nineteenth century as the railways and suburban development came to this part of the northern outskirts of London. In 1871 West End station was opened, in 1879 West Hampstead underground station, and in 1888 West End Lane station. In 1870 there were some 700 inhabitants of West End, but by 1891 there were some 14,000 inhabitants of West Hampstead. For how long the name 'West End' survived in

2 From the Hampstead and Highgate Express, 20 September 1974, p.8.
any usage other than those already discussed above is not clear. By 1896 there was, it seems, a West Hampstead Town Hall. While historians of Hampstead and its environs frequently refer, improperly, to the area before its development as 'West Hampstead', they never, quite properly, refer to the area after development as 'West End'. It seems that virtually from the moment of its being built it was seen as wholly inappropriate to call the commuter suburb 'West End'. It is as if the transformation of the area was so great that a different name was required. One assumes that the railway boards in naming their stations, and the developers in wanting to attract buyers for their flats and houses, opted for 'West Hampstead' (and perhaps even thought the name up) as a more suitable and attractive name than 'West End'. The latter might have been thought potentially confusing for railway passengers and of less interest to property buyers than 'West Hampstead'. If the fashionable associations of 'West End' (as in central London) were considered, they were not paramount when it came to naming the new suburb.

Some of the associations of the name 'West Hampstead' over the years can be gained from a perusal of the accounts that those who have lived in the area have given of it. One of West Hampstead's most famous sons was the novelist Evelyn Waugh. Both he and his brother Alec were born there, and they and their father Arthur all published brief reminiscences of the place in their respective autobiographies.

Evelyn recounts that he was born in 1903 in a house 'in a cul-de-sac called Hillfield Road, near the Hampstead cricket ground, off the Finchley Road' (1983 [1964]: 22). As Davie, the editor of Waugh's diaries, points out, this description is 'mildly misleading'. Though Davie unequivocally locates the place of Evelyn's birth in 'Hillfield Road, Hampstead' - no qualifying 'West' here - he also points out how 'Hillfield Road is less sequestered than Waugh's phrasing implies, and nearer to the Hampstead Cemetery than to the cricket ground'. And he goes on: 'This part of west Hampstead, bordering Kilburn, was developed in the 1880s by a firm of speculative builders for the petite bourgeoisie who could not afford to live higher up the Hampstead slopes' (Davie 1976: 3). Davie makes clear that it was not Hampstead that Waugh was born in - though his use of the lower-case 'w' in 'west' is less accurate than it might be - but 'west Hampstead, bordering Kilburn'.

Evelyn's elder brother Alec seems to have been less concerned to establish Hampstead as his birthplace, and in his autobiography he straightforwardly refers to his birth in 'in West Hampstead' (note the use of the upper-case 'W'). Alec describes Hillfield Road as 'one of the least known streets in London ... I doubt if one London clubman in a hundred would have heard of it' (1967: 12). He recognizes that 'it was not socially a good address; it catered [in 1898] for middle-class families with incomes of £500 to £700 a year' (ibid.). His father, he says, wanted to live in Hampstead for its fresh air - he was asthmatic - and because some of his friends lived there. As 'he was the last person to place store on writing-paper', West Hampstead would apparently do for Arthur Waugh.

Indeed, and as his elder son describes, Arthur Waugh seems to
have been relatively unconcerned about his address. He and his wife started married life in a flat above a dairy near to the Finchley Road station, later moving to 'a small house in West Hampstead', where Alec and Evelyn were born (Arthur Waugh 1931: 281). Later, when this house became too small for their needs, they moved the short distance to North End—'the idea of coming into a village was a sheer delight to us, after twelve years in the thick of West Hampstead' (ibid.: 234–5). Of these addresses, Arthur Waugh writes of having lived in Hampstead all his married life. The dairy would in fact have been in St John's Hampstead (an area bordering Hampstead proper to the south, and separating Hampstead and South Hampstead) or West Hampstead, Hillfield Road certainly in West Hampstead, and though North End was originally a village to the north of Hampstead village, it soon became—at least as far as the Post Office was concerned—part of Golders Green.3 The story goes that to ensure a more fashionable postmark on his letters, Evelyn would walk up the hill to Hampstead to post them (CHS 1975: 31).

The relation of West Hampstead to Hampstead is clearly a problematical one. Reference to an extract from a classic anthropological text may help to explicate the problem. To help his readers grasp the point of his discussion of the Nuer word cting (roughly translatable as 'home'), Evans-Pritchard wrote in The Nuer (1940: 136):

> its precise significance varies with the situation in which it is spoken. If one meets an Englishman in Germany and asks him where his home is, he may reply that it is in England. If one meets the same man in London and asks him the same question he will tell one that his home is in Oxfordshire, whereas if one meets him in that county he will tell one the name of the town or village in which he lives. If questioned in his town or village he will mention the particular street, and if questioned in his street he will indicate his house.

On this model, therefore, one might expect a resident of Hillfield Road, West Hampstead, to respond to such questioning in London by saying that he or she lives in Hampstead, only specifying West Hampstead when so questioned in Hampstead. This is not, however, the case. A resident of Hillfield Road, or of any other street in West Hampstead, cannot in any circumstances and in all honesty say that he or she lives in Hampstead. It would be considered misleading or pretentious to give one's address as Hampstead when one lives in West Hampstead; at least, it would by anyone with local knowledge.

3 The variety of ways in which official and quasi-official bodies such as the Post Office and the Gas and Electricity Boards divide up the country for their own purposes results in a confusing plethora of names. For British Telecom, West Hampstead is part of an area they call 'West End'. I assume it is an area extending from central London's West End, centred on Mayfair and Piccadilly.
In reporting an interview with the novelist Doris Lessing, a contemporary literary resident of West Hampstead, Lorna Sage refers to 'unsmart West Hampstead' (Sage 1988). Sometimes one hears it described as 'the poor man's Hampstead' or as 'north Kilburn' or 'east Kilburn'. West Hampstead clearly is not, whatever some of its residents would like it to be, Hampstead; but nor is it Kilburn - nor Cricklewood nor Brondesbury. Indeed it is perhaps only in not being any of these other places that it finds its identity. Alec Waugh noted that at the turn of the century 'West Hampstead was a half-way house' between 'the affluence that lay a few miles to the west and south in Mayfair and Belgravia and the poverty and destitution that were to be found only a few yards away in Kilburn' (1962: 12). He claims not to have been aware of this as a child and introduces the comparison as deriving from the perspective of 'a modern sociologist'. A walk from one end of West End Lane to the other today would confirm the modern sociologist in such a view of West Hampstead as a half-way house between the affluence of Hampstead and the poverty of Kilburn.

That West Hampstead is not Hampstead does not, however, stop some of West Hampstead's traders taking Hampstead's name in vain. On West End Lane one can find a 'Hampstead Jewellers', a 'Hampstead Flatlets', a 'Hampstead Leather and Goods', the 'Hampstead Pine Company' and the 'Hampstead Boulevard Restaurant'. Of these businesses, only the last two are up-market, the first two being unarguably down-market. One would be most surprised to find a 'Brondesbury Bakers', 'Cricklewood Chemists' or 'Kilburn Kitchens' in West End Lane.

While West Hampstead is not a political entity, being larger than an electoral ward and smaller than a constituency or borough (though West End is still a parish), its 'official' existence is attested by a number of institutions. There are the railway stations, now all called 'West Hampstead' ('West Hampstead Underground Station', 'West Hampstead North London Link' and 'West Hampstead Thameslink'). There is a bus terminus and turnaround at West End Green; buses heading towards it show 'West Hampstead: West End Green' as their destination. There is a 'West Hampstead Library', a 'West Hampstead Branch Office' of the Post Office, and 'West Hampstead' branch offices of two of the major national banks. There are also a 'West Hampstead Community Centre' and a 'West Hampstead Housing Centre'. There are even directional road signs

4 It was in West Hampstead, incidentally, that Hannah Gavron found the bulk of the middle-class sample for her sociological study of The Captive Wife (1966).

5 West End was part of the manor and parish of Hampstead and later of the borough of Hampstead. West Hampstead was part of the borough of Hampstead, and with Hampstead became part of London in 1900. On 1 April 1965 Hampstead, including West Hampstead, became part of the London Borough of Camden. No resident of West Hampstead would say that they were a resident of Camden unless they were engaged in a discussion concerning local councils and rates.
to West Hampstead on the Finchley Road. Surprisingly, perhaps, only one of West End Lane's shops uses 'West Hampstead' in its name: 'Kays Fruits of West Hampstead'. It seems that when West End Lane's shopkeepers want to specify their geographical locations in the names of their shops, 'Hampstead' has more appeal than 'West Hampstead'.

Hampstead West

While it may now be difficult to discover the very first use of the name 'West Hampstead', there is no denying the speed and completeness with which it replaced 'West End'. The latter seems to have been inapplicable to the new world that was created in this part of London, and as nothing remained of the old village the name virtually disappeared. It is, however, possible now to record what seems to be the very first public usage of a potential new name for the same area. On the corner of West End Lane and Iverson Road, near to the West Hampstead (North London Link) station, a new block of shops and offices is being built (May 1988). Hoardings around the site announce the fact and describe it in big red letters as being in 'Hampstead West'. This unusual usage (apart from names of railway stations and electoral constituencies, I can think only of Haverfordwest as an example of such a construction of an English place-name) is presumably meant to sound more upmarket than 'West Hampstead'. Whether it actually does so (as opposed to sounding pretentious) and whether it will help the developers to sell the offices and shops I am not in a position to say. It is also too early to say whether this new usage will be adopted by other institutions and individuals. One might expect estate agents and other property developers to take it up; some already seem to use 'NW6' (West Hampstead's post code) in preference to 'West Hampstead' when advertising homes for sale in the area.

If other institutions do take up 'Hampstead West', 'West Hampstead' might well disappear as 'West End' did. But one suspects that this process would take somewhat longer, for while the area is changing as property prices increase and a more upwardly mobile population moves in, the changes cannot, in the foreseeable future at least, be as radical as those that saw West End physically, conceptually and nominally replaced by West Hampstead.

Shop Names in West End Lane

I know of no official rules governing the choosing, establishment and use of shop names. There seem to be no restrictions at all, 6

To add to the confusion, West Hampstead is the location of the Hampstead Cemetery and the Hampstead Synagogue. Whether these are situated outside Hampstead proper merely for reasons of space or for some more 'symbolic' reason I do not feel able to say at present.
Table 1: Slogan, Personal and Family Shop Names in West End Lane in 1933 and 1988

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1933</th>
<th>1988</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Slogan</td>
<td>35 (24.5%)</td>
<td>72 (61%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal</td>
<td>3 (2%)</td>
<td>14 (12%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Family</td>
<td>105 (73.5%)</td>
<td>31 (27%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>143</strong></td>
<td><strong>117</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

though one suspects that already established names cannot be used for shops in the same line of trade, and that obscene or blasphemous names cannot be used. Here I make a stab at revealing the existence of some unconscious 'structuralist' rules underlying the naming of shops on West Hampstead's West End Lane.

I have mentioned above, in passing, some of those shops on West End Lane which refer in their names to aspects of local geography such as 'West End Green Bookshop'. Other businesses make use of topography in their names: 'The Corner Shop' (a newsagent and confectioner's) stands on a corner; '303' (a record shop) is at number 303 West End Lane; and 'Inglewoods Chinese Restaurant' is in part of the buildings called Inglewood Mansions. Names which make use of geography or topography are examples of what I call, for want of a better term, 'slogan' names. They can be contrasted with those shop names which make use of the two other types of name identified here, i.e., family and personal names. Family names were the most common form in the past as the comparison between the numbers of such names in West End Lane in 1933 and 1988 in Table 1 shows. This relative increase in the number of slogan and personal names may reflect an increase in the use of both slogans and personal names in British life in general and of greater informality in many areas of social and economic life.

Today, slogan names can be drawn, it seems, from virtually any source, and shopkeepers' accounts of how they came to choose the names of their shops can be interesting, though as they tend to be personal and idiosyncratic I do not want to deal with them here. However, two possible patterns are worth mentioning. The three shops on West End Lane with self-referential names - 'The Save Money Shop', 'That Shop on West End Lane' and 'A Boring Old Hardware Shop' - all happen to be run by first- or second-generation central European immigrants. Two grocery-cum-general stores run by south Asian immigrants have names formed anagrammatically from the

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7 For a reminiscential account of the shops and shop names of West End Lane in the 1920s, see Lindsay 1978.
initial letters of the names of the family members who run the business (viz. 'Atlanta' and 'Marks'). Two others, 'Gems' and 'Alps', might, I suggest, have been named originally in the same way; even though they are now under new management, they have kept the same names. Whether these two patterns are widespread, and what significance they would have if they were, I cannot say.

Another pattern, on which I wish to concentrate here, emerges when one attempts to correlate the type of name, i.e. whether slogan, personal or family, with the type of business conducted by the shop, i.e. with the type of goods sold. If we concern ourselves for present purposes only with businesses selling foodstuffs, we find under 'personal' names the following: fruiterers ('Kays Fruits of West Hampstead', 'Naidoos'); take-away outlets ('Jason's Fish Bar'); restaurants and cafés ('Dominiques', 'Don Antonio's Trattoria', 'Jenny's Burger Bar' and 'Charlotte'); a patisserie ('Alexis' - a conscious adaptation from 'Alex's'); and a delicatessen ('Mo-IS'). Under 'family' names we find butchers ('Kingstons', 'John Stuart'); a fishmonger's ('Rowe'); and greengrocers ('Gerrards', 'Farrants'). Under slogan names we find take-away outlets ('Sizzles', 'Domino's Pizza', 'Perfect Pizza'); restaurants ('Bridge Café', 'Taste of India', 'Inglewoods' and 'Hampstead Boulevard'); grocers-cum-general stores ('Daily Needs Store', 'Gems', 'Buybest'); and a health-food store ('Peppercorns').

As is clear from an examination of these lists, only those businesses selling ready-to-eat food, whether cooked or raw, have personal names. Those businesses selling unprocessed, raw, inedible food have family names. Those businesses selling processed food which must be cooked to be edible have slogan names. Such a pattern may be represented à la Lévi-Strauss as in Figure 1. It is most remarkable that fruiterers and greengrocers fall so neatly into this pattern, for they sell in fact virtually, if not exactly, the same range of goods but, representing themselves as either one or the other (i.e. as sellers of raw but ready-to-eat fruit or as sellers of raw and inedible vegetables), only use a personal name for the shop if they are fruiterers.

It seems, therefore, as if family names are appropriate to businesses dealing with unprocessed natural products which must be culturally processed before being consumed (though it seems that family names can be used for other types of food business). Personal names are appropriate to businesses dealing with foods, whether in their natural or cultural state - unprocessed or processed - which are ready-to-eat, and cannot be used for other types of food businesses. Slogan names are appropriate to businesses selling culturally processed foodstuffs, whether ready-to-eat or not. They cannot, it seems, be used for businesses selling raw and unprocessed food; it is difficult to imagine a butcher's shop called 'Flesh and Blood' or 'The Chop Shop'.

The shops on West End Lane today provide only a minute sample.

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3 I leave aside here the problem of apostrophes in shop names and refer to the names of shops on West End Lane by the form of name they use (though not always consistently) themselves.
Figure 1: Diagrammatic Representation of Types of Shops and Types of Shop-Names

a) Type of Name

Formal \hspace{1cm} Informal

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Personal} \\
\text{Family}
\end{array} \hspace{1cm} \begin{array}{c}
\text{Slogan} \\
\text{Group}
\end{array} \]

b) Type of Food

Unprocessed \hspace{1cm} Processed

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Processed/Unprocessed (Edible)} \\
\text{Unprocessed (Inedible)}
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\text{Processed (Inedible)} \\
\text{Inedible}
\end{array} \]

c) Type of Shop

\[ \begin{array}{c}
\text{Fruiterers, Delicatessens, Restaurants} \\
\text{Butchers, Fishmongers, Greengrocers}
\end{array} \hspace{1cm} \begin{array}{c}
\text{Grocers, General Stores, Supermarkets}
\end{array} \]
of contemporary British shop-naming practice. That from the West End Lane data one can produce an intellectually diverting structur­alist model is pleasurable for the student of shop names. Whether it has any greater significance than this I cannot say. I shall, however, leave the reader to ponder the fact that the only other type of business on West End Lane which uses personal names in the names of shops deals with a most problematic and anthropologically rewarding human product. In 1933 there were 'Maison Paul' and 'Maison Gladys'. Now in 1988 there are 'Paul's' (the same Paul in fact) and 'Antonio's'. Why do hairdressing salons so often have personal names?

JEREMY COOTE

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Anthropologists have been better at noting the irrationality of the frontiers between African post-colonial states than analysing the nature of cultural change within them, but Baumann's excellent study of the four thousand speakers of Timiri is among the exceptions. His book illuminates an issue which worries many people including those directly affected, and those who study them; how a small category of people can retain cultural integrity while becoming citizens in a state moulded by persons with a very different culture?

There have been two common model answers to this question. That which derives from political economy tends to stress the relative powerlessness of most small-scale cultures, their lack of capital, and the tendency for them to enter the capitalist economy at the bottom. The exceptions, who organize to exclude outsiders - aggressive trading networks, or craft-monopolies, are interesting. But the political economists suggest that fragile cultures will be extinguished by the power of market forces, and there is, alas, plenty of supporting evidence.

The other common approach, deriving from Weber and the plural society theorists, tends to stress political domination and the state's command of the instruments of cultural control; the neo-marxist interest in ideology as coercion, from Gramscian 'hegemonic ideas' to Althusserian 'apparatuses', provides additional support. In this model too, small is vulnerable.

Baumann's account of the Miri invites us to think of a third possibility, a kind of bicultural, bilingual adaptation to the nation state. The Miri have, it is true, all converted to Islam, but although they would now be ashamed of some of their former customs, the religion seems to sit lightly and syncretically upon them. They learn Arabic in school, and this allows them to communicate and trade with other Sudanese, but they continue to speak Timiri among themselves, including the children of urban migrants, whose remittances do a good deal to make life in the Nuba mountains dignified, in terms of the desired modern consumption of tea, sugar, cloth, medicine, etc.

The Miri have sufficient fertile land to meet their needs, and this is clearly crucial to their continued well-being. They are not so near a major town that they run the risk of being swamped by the dominant urban culture, yet they are near enough to get what they want without hardship. Where some tribal groups in Northern Sudan have moved away from an increasingly arid environment, and others have lost land to large-scale irrigation and
mechanised agriculture schemes, the Miri have been relatively fortunate. Does Baumann's analysis have lessons for other, less well-placed groups? Interestingly, it does.

His revival of the term 'redintegration' is instructive. He means a reactive process 'that aim[s] at restoring and renewing a local community to its state of wholeness as its members it' (p. 3). Thus, for the Miri in the 1980s, 'being Miri' is not a matter of maintaining unchanged customs from the distant past, but of a selection from the flux that was the past, and an emphasis on language, ritual, and shared values which help them to keep a distinction between Miri and others; the idea of a moral community is crucial here.

My guess is that the idea behind redintegration will gain currency, and that the book will enjoy an influence which goes well beyond its ethno-}

The book is a model of conceptual clarity, of precision in thought and writing, and of organisational coherence. Each paragraph and each sub-heading lead us persuasively forward to a very carefully considered overview of the Miri-in-the-Sudan. Those who will quarrel with the book will have to attack its most central ideas, for once the argument starts rolling it is virtually unstoppable.

Baumann is careful to keep a good separation between different analytical perspectives, and makes a convincing case for his deployment of material on Miri song, and dance. This is the first major study of the group and it is to be hoped that Baumann will add to it. What provides permanence in the mobile society is the tent, but it is not clear whether this is the Permanent's doing...

The quality of the photographs does not match that of the writing, but it is not clear whether this is the printer's doing or the author's. The index is adequate.

PETER LOIZOS
the society is the activities undertaken during movement. The pre-
cise spatial orientation of the tent makes it a model of the social
and celestial cosmos. A woman acquires a tent upon marriage, and
her tent is a continuation of that of her mother, even to the point
of incorporating parts taken from her mother's tent. However, she
must pitch her tent in the camp of her husband's male relatives.
A man acquires status through his wife's tent, in which he is never
more than a guest. At periods in his life (youth, divorce, widower-
hood) he will not have access to a tent and will therefore be de-
prived of hearth, home and social position.

A crucial social bond is that between brother and sister,
which, however, begins to rupture upon the sister's marriage. A
brother leaves the tent of his birth and eventually, upon his own
marriage, enters a new tent. The exterior of their social space
is inhabited by malevolent spirits, souls of the dead. Most men
and women become such spirits on death, and a man will haunt the
tent in which he dies. The name-giving ritual draws a new-born
child from the realm of malevolent spirits. Aspects of the wedding
ceremony emphasize that when they enter the wedding tent, bride and
bridegroom enter the tent in which they will die. Tuareg men wear
veils because through their virility they are thought closer to the
spirits than are women. There is also an analogy between sperm,
spittle and the spoken word, each in its own way bringing to mind
the spirits. Nobles and commoners are men of few words, so that
the freedmen and the smiths are the bearers of Tuareg oral litera-
ture. Veils must be worn and properly adjusted when father-in-law
and son-in-law are in each other's presence; for they have in com-
mon that they will die in and haunt what is, symbolically at least,
the same tent, and they therefore represent to each other the
closeness of the evil spirits.

Casajus traces the intermingling of these and other themes as
he examines the relation between tents and camps, herding, warfare,
alternative kinship terminologies, preferential marriage with the
mother's brother's daughter, the ritual cycle, and finally the
veil. There are three appendices on the history of Tuareg tribes,
the origin of mat tents, myths of origin, and the division of
sacrificial meat. Thirty-six interesting and attractive photo-
graphs, as well as forty-one clear and informative figures, add
distinction to the book. A thirteen-page glossary helps the read-
er through an extensive list of native terms. The analytic style
and ethnographic quality reminds the reader of some of the other
volumes in Louis Dumont's Atelier d'anthropologie sociale, of
which this is the latest title. That context also increases the
comparative interest of this subtle but sound monograph.

R.H. BARNES
As indicated in its sub-title, 'Selected Readings', Japanese Culture and Behavior is a book filled with miscellaneous articles whose only common denominator is that they are concerned with Japan. The range of literature on Japan is nowadays huge; this book by no means covers all the topics one might include under the broad umbrella of 'culture' or 'behaviour', and this is of course both the strength and weakness of the present volume. As a general introduction to various themes in Japanese studies it does its job well, but the articles are so disparate that the book loses whatever focus its editors intended it to have. The specialist reader is apt to find bits and pieces of information that are illuminating, while the general reader will - as is often the case with books on Japan - be left with the impression of an utterly alien and incomprehensible society. This is certainly not the intention of the editors, who note in their introduction that 'any selected characteristic of the Japanese is not inherent in being Japanese but emerges only in comparison with other cultural groups' (p. xiii). Leaving aside the Americanism 'cultural groups', what Lebra and Lebra are saying is true. The enigmatic Japanese become much less so when compared with others, when they are stripped of the mystique of being Japanese; hence the current move against the ethnocentric literature on Japan known as *nihonjinron* (literally, 'theories on being Japanese').

In this revised edition the editors of Japanese Culture and Behavior try both to update the material and to tie it together with opening and closing commentaries on each of its four parts: 'Moral Values and Sentiments'; 'Interaction, Communication, and Grouping'; 'Development and Socialization'; and 'Cultural Stress, Psychotherapies and Resocialization'. Perhaps it is typical of American sociology and anthropology that having given us a title so loaded with meaning, the sections blithely continue this trend and give the readers even more loaded concepts: twenty-three articles could barely begin to scratch the surface of any one of these topics let alone all of them. Yet the persevering reader will find that, despite the formidable section titles, most of the articles are well worth reading.

Of special note are Asquith's short and succinct account of a monkey memorial service held by Japanese primatologists, Befu's ethnography of dinner entertainment, Lanham's article on ethics and moral precepts as taught in Japanese schools, Kawai's examination of violence in the home, Rohlen's account of a weekend of spiritual education, and Munakata's look at attitudes toward mental health care in Japan. What these articles have in common is that they
are excellent descriptions of events, attitudes or ideas with little theory to muddy the waters. Far more theoretical but still illuminating are Sasaki's article on nonmedical healing, Moeran's analysis of individual, group and seishin (spirit), and Suzuki's examination of language and behavior. All three manage to explore difficult territory without confusing the reader. The two articles by Takie Lebra do not quite achieve this, and although the comparative one on justice and moral investment is a bit more readable, like her article on self-reconstruction in religious psychotherapy it also suffers from a preponderance of theoretical jargon. Buried in both, however, is some excellent ethnography which makes them worth wading through. Finally, the Salamon, Brandt and Murase articles are useful introductions to various aspects of Japanese society not generally examined by ethnographers: male chauvinism and love; skiing; and religious meditation as a form of therapy.

Another nine of the articles are reprinted from the original 1974 edition, and of these nine it was clearly necessary to keep the Ishida article on Japan as a paradoxical culture of love and hate, as well as those by Befu on gift-giving and by Caudill and Plath on sleeping patterns in Japanese households. The last two are classics, referred to again and again in all the literature on Japan. Also interesting are Dol's article on amaë, the nebulous Japanese concept of indulgence towards children (immediately recognizable to any Spanish speaker as mimar), and Nakane's article on group formation. These two are also classics but have, with time, come to stand for all the worst aspects of nihonjinron arguments, since both stress the inalienable uniqueness of the Japanese. Another three papers, by De Vos, Pelzel, and Kasahara, are of interest while that by Caudill and Weinstein on maternal care in Japan is a frightening piece full of statistics. Is it possible that one can get valid results in a study which requires that the researchers never ask the people they are studying what they think but instead use a timetable, a stopwatch and so 800 observations in a five-hour span? Child care cannot be done as a time-and-motion study.

In contrast both to the failed attempt to organize so many diverse topics into one coherent book and to the Caudill and Weinstein article, Hendry's Becoming Japanese demonstrates how a careful study of one aspect of a society can successfully reveal the entire workings of that society. This is perhaps the best illustration of the key difference between American cultural anthropology and British social anthropology. Holding fast to the notion that culture can be subdivided and examined out of context to the social whole, the articles in Japanese Culture and Behavior do little to give the reader a good understanding of Japanese society. In contrast, Becoming Japanese begins with the premise that all of society is interconnected and this touches on all the concepts which the Lebra book tries so hard to elucidate. In examining the world of the pre-school child, Hendry must also delve into language, morals, socialization, development, communication, grouping and sentiments. If the book is flawed it is by an aspect of the study which the author herself notes, for she is exploring socialization within the context of social anthropology, 'an area of the subject
which has been neglected in recent years' (p. 6). Lack of comparative data, then, means that some basic questions the study raises cannot be answered. A good example of this problem is the practice of parents and children sleeping together: as part of Hendry's argument for the process of becoming Japanese it is important, but the practice is not unique to Japan. A reader with any experience of child-rearing will cry out at such points: 'but we (or the so-and-so) also do this; why is this seen as being Japanese?' Until more comparative studies on child socialization have been carried out, such questions cannot be answered in full.

That is not to say that Hendry's book raises queries and provides no answers. Rather, with its close examination not only of child-rearing practices but of the concepts surrounding children and child-rearing, as well as with her analysis of the specific words associated with children, Hendry's book reveals both the similarities and differences between the Japanese and other cultures. There is not enough space in a review to elaborate on the whole book but a brief example should suffice to give an idea of the excellence of Becoming Japanese. In a lucid and concise style, Hendry examines the difficult Japanese concept of *shitsuke* or breeding, upbringing, training and discipline. Rather than surround it with mystique as Doi did for *amae* (passive love), Hendry considers the word in all its aspects and uses. She employs Japanese material as well as informants' data so that, at the very beginning of her book, the conceptual framework which is integral both linguistically and structurally to child-rearing in Japan is clearly understood. Thus the concept of *shitsuke* - which is ultimately one of 'making up' or 'straightening' - is unravelled so that its relationship to all of Japanese society from rice-planting to kimonos becomes apparent.

That so short a monograph could be full of such essential detail is the hallmark of a good ethnography. Throughout the book Hendry repeats this process of examining each area of child-rearing with impeccable clarity, so that at the book's end one feels that one has really learned something about the Japanese. There can be no better recommendation for a book than that.

D.P. MARTINEZ


This 'analysis of the ethnographic literature' may be recommended for a variety of reasons, not least of which is the quality of the
concise analysis. Graham addresses some of the central problems that have developed from contradictions in the ethnographic literature on Iban shamanism. These include establishing 'the range and nature of the powers attributed to the Iban shaman...the significance of the transformed shaman, and [the position of] shamanism within the coherence-structures of traditional Iban culture'. A close reading of texts of ritual language reveals the field of salient associations and the source of the shaman's power in the socio-economic order of Iban life. As such, the analysis illuminates interesting categories of Iban thought concerning the role of the shaman, the nature of illness, and the 'order of things'.

Graham demonstrates the inadequacy of general theories of shamanism such as those of Eliade and Lewis for the Iban case, and chooses to demonstrate the significance of Iban 'shamanic' ritual as specifically appropriate to the Iban dialectic of self: other which permeates Iban political, kinship, and religious spheres. The interpretations of transformed shaman (manang bati) have usually depended on some notion of innate transvestism, but Graham offers an additional interpretation whereby manang bati 'place themselves beyond the range of effective competition in the gender-dichotomized terms of the Iban prestige system', and thus they may be 'credited with powers of perception beyond the surface appearances of things and events as they are seen by Iban men and women'.

Graham, as Derek Freeman notes in the Introduction, has produced 'an invaluable contribution to Iban studies', but the book recommends itself to a wider audience than Indonesianists for its relevance to more general studies of shamanism. It is also worth noting that this work grew out of Graham's Master of Arts thesis at the Australian National University. One is left considering the potential to the discipline if more Masters theses provided such concise, erudite analysis of ethnographic literature.

TIM FERRIS


Theravada Buddhism as a religious system does not attempt to do more than teach a way to enlightenment. It has less involvement in life-cycle rituals and the legitimation of kin-groups than any other world religion. It provides extremely meagre resources for magical, apotropaic or healing rituals. Consequently it always
coexists with other religious systems with different origins. Theravada Buddhists consider these other systems lower than Buddhism. The people of northern Thailand recognize two other systems which they call 'Brahmanism' - referring to non-Buddhist ritual and knowledge deriving from India - and the religion of spirits. Should one interpret these as opposed and ranked aspects of one overall system or should one follow the Thais in seeing them as separate systems of diverse origin with no necessary connection one to the other?

Both approaches have their value. Depending on the questions the anthropologist is interested in, one or other may be appropriate. And the two books under review, numbers 1 and 2 in a new series devoted to the anthropology of Thailand, for the most part take opposite sides on this issue.

The two authors evidently knew each other well and it seems that Gehan Wijeyewardene, the author of Place and Emotion, edited Muang Metaphysics after the death of its author, Richard Davis, at the early age of 38. (We are not told why no name appears on the title page of Davis's book.) The books are attractively printed in Bangkok, but would have benefited from careful proofreading.

Muang Metaphysics focuses on non-Buddhist myth and ritual in a Muang (northern Thai) village. It includes discussion of Buddhism only where relevant and thus describes only part of the religious experience of the people it describes. Place and Emotion on the other hand appears rather as a collection of essays on a variety of topics, some very much to do with Buddhism, others to do with spirit mediums and other forms of 'folk religion'. Unlike Muang Metaphysics, it does not draw its data primarily from one village but from a wide range of localities. By its method, then, rather than by its argument, it attempts to break down the distinction made by Thais themselves, and by most scholars, between Buddhism and other forms of religion. Wijerewardene argues that Buddhism is essentially this-worldly in its orientation and that folk religion is often concerned, like Buddhism, with the accumulation of merit. He recognises nonetheless that 'it is...probably a mistake' 'to assemble these complementarities and dichotomies into a single coherent intellectualistic system' (p. 140).

Of the two books, Muang Metaphysics has the greater coherence and will probably be of more interest to non-specialists. Richard Davis clearly knew northern Thai society and its language very well. One should not be misled by the title into thinking that he deals with abstract concepts divorced from their ethnographic context. The book's valuable discussions of space, time and myth are firmly and unpretentiously grounded in the facts of Muang matri-liney, household organization and ritual. The ritual year, and the symbolism of its rites, are described in great detail.

Davis begins by castigating previous anthropological work on ritual in Thailand for having 'for the most part shown only a rudimentary knowledge of local Thai idiom, no knowledge at all of Pali or Sanskrit, and a virtual indifference to Thai written traditions'. Davis himself is keen to use textual evidence to attempt some conclusions about the provenance of the various parts of Muang culture.
Since the locals themselves divide up their culture according to the origins of its parts, he does not refrain from more scholarly historical speculation about it. What the locals call 'Brahmanism' includes elements due to Tantric Shaivism and probably also Mahayana Buddhism, as well as the Indian system of astrology. Some local spirit cults are believed to have been inherited from the aboriginal inhabitants of the area, the Mon-Khmer tribes, who were driven out and/or absorbed by the present Muang. At the same time the Muang preserve, inter alia, certain classes of spirits and beliefs about the auspiciousness of certain times from their own pre-Buddhist Tai heritage. Davis himself believes that the Muang are the only Tai people to preserve an ancient Tai practice of matri-lineality, the other Tais, found in Laos and Vietnam, having diverged from this under the influence of the Vietnamese. He recognizes, however, that this is a controversial conclusion.

In discussing the local system of astrology Davis proposes a distinction between primary civilizations and secondary civilizations. In the former the Great Tradition represents a universalization, in Marriott's terms, of what were originally local or tribal ideas. In the latter the Great Tradition is derived from abroad. In the present case it leads to two wholly different systems of astrology being carried on, the one at court centres, the other by local soothsayers. They appear to be related because the local system adopts Sanskritic terms for its own, quite different, concepts. 'The astrological terminology is there,' concludes Davis, 'without the astrology' (p. 94).

In his conclusion Davis eschews historical questions and advances a theory of myth and ritual. He argues that Muang ritual is structured by a series of hierarchical and asymmetric oppositions (male:female, senior:junior, north:south, high:low, head:feet, right:left, settlement:forest). These oppositions receive very different treatment in Muang myth and ritual:

The rituals express, affirm, and reinforce certain oppositions and important distinctions which the Muang feel are inherent in the nature of things, and these oppositions are presented without ambiguity. In the myths, on the other hand, the discrete categories so important to Muang thought tend to be confused and even obliterated (p. 291).

He then broadens the argument by suggesting that in most societies what Roger Callois has called paidia, 'the playful emphasis of spontaneity, uncontrolled fantasy, and carefree gaiety', is, as with the Muang, expressed in myth. There may be some societies with an impoverished mythology, such as the Bantu described by Gluckman, which express paidia in ritual itself; and there are others, such as the Abelam of New Guinea described by Forge, which express it through painting. But in general, Davis concludes that 'ritual is typically motivated, at least in part, by a concern for the preservation of conceptual order; and myth is universally playful'. And he continues:

The Muang themselves are not of a particularly reflective or philosophical temperament. Although they are Buddhists, they
are not given to pondering the ultimate nature of things. But in their myth and ritual there is an implicit metaphysic which states that while definitional patterns are necessary to human existence, in the last analysis these patterns are illusory (p. 299).

Whether or not this view of myth and ritual is fruitful on a global scale, it deserves consideration. For South Asia it is certainly very suggestive.

Wijeyewardene's *Place and Emotion in Northern Thai Ritual Behaviour* will, like *Muang Metaphysics*, be of great value for students of Thai ritual. It also contains much useful data on Thai Buddhism, for instance on the way in which monasteries define localities, or on the different definitions of Buddhism competing in Bangkok, and foreign anthropologists' understanding of them. Thus Wijeyewardene has much to say about the sociology of Buddhism which is of considerable sophistication. There is much data also on interaction with spirit mediums, with long quotations from tape-recorded consultations. Wijeyewardene also discusses the history and symbolism of the pillar of Indra found at the centre of Chiang Mai. This leads to some suggestive remarks on the way in which rulers try to integrate and dominate communal rituals of all types, whereas monks are bound to resist this or find their position undermined. He concludes the chapter with some equations which he rightly calls 'intriguing': female:[spirit-] possession: personalized power:: male: territorial authority: impersonal power:: monks: ascetic: sexual power (p. 151).

Characteristically, however, Wijeyewardene then moves on to present further data, without clarifying this conclusion. One is left with the impression of a jumble of anthropological *apergus* and fascinating, but sometimes half-digested, data. In spite of the billing of emotion in the title, the book does not attempt cross-cultural analysis in the manner of American psychological anthropology. Lacking a clear and dominant theme, the book will be useful only to Buddhologists and students of Southeast Asia.

DAVID GELLNER

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This is a collaborative volume in which there are two chapters about Spain, one about Japan, one about a 'non-violent' society (the Piaroa of Venezuela), one about Northern Ireland, one about football hooligan behaviour, and one which concerns the London Metropolitan Police. Each is written either by an expert in the field, or by an academic whose star appears to be rising or who has
already established a reputation for having something to say—respectively, John Corbin; Garry Marvin; Brian Moeran; Joanna Overing; Graham Macfarlane; David McKnight; Dunning, Murphy and Williams; and David Parkin; as such they command attention. And if this reviewer were not familiar with the work of David Riches, the editor of this collection, nor with that of Copet-Rougier on the Mkako of Cameroon and of Heald on the Gisu of Uganda, then he was pleased of having the chance of getting to know it.

There is no question that the papers published in *The Anthropology of Violence*, which are rewritten and extensively revised versions of the papers read in St Andrews, will be required reading for the students of the peoples aspects of whose lives are addressed. Furthermore, because 'violence' is an odd-job word (Parkin, p. 204), the consideration of the topic in widely different forms of life also involves the consideration of an equally wide range of related ideas, what these ideas are depending, naturally, on the place of 'violence' in the ideology of the form of life in question. As Corbin writes, 'each culture constructs and lives its own meanings, each experiences its own violence, and each must be investigated in its own terms' (p. 48).

This injunction, however, runs counter to the stance adopted by almost all the contributors to this volume, who do not limit themselves to one particular form of life, but employ comparative data and more abstract writings to elucidate their material. Perhaps the most extreme example is Parkin's use of African material, from the Giriama, one of the Mijikenda peoples of Kenya, to throw light on Anglo-Saxon understandings of violence.

Such comparativism strikes this reviewer as wholly legitimate, and as a relief from the rather narrow regionalism which characterises some comparative approaches. The real question, though, is, perhaps, in what terms are such comparisons most profitably conducted? If it is the case (as it clearly is) that 'activities which strike members of one society as violent (and which are judged accordingly) may be conceptualized and evaluated quite differently by members of another society', as Marvin writes (p. 134), then clearly English 'violence' is unlikely to be a useful tool for comparative analysis, as Paul Heelas has already pointed out (cf. Riches, p. 2).

Various ways of dealing with this question are adopted by the essays in *The Anthropology of Violence*, and their success is best gauged by the reader. One way, which in one form is advocated by Riches (pp. 4-7), is to define 'violence' artificially, by reference to a characteristic which is common to all forms of violence (he argues), i.e. monothetically. Riches thus defines violence by reference to what he calls a 'core purpose', 'tactical pre-emption, i.e. securing practical advantage over one's opponents in the short term through forestalling their activities' (p. 5).

Riches's 'core purpose' runs hand-in-hand with his declared focus on the 'strategy' and the 'meaning' of a performer's violence, which in turn, of course, means that violence is taken to be rational and in a sense orderly.

Now, in his study of 'Violence in Rural Northern Ireland ...', Macfarlane asks: 'How do people square their views of violence in which 'killings and bombings within the home community tend to be
blamed on outsiders' (p. 192) with the reality of it?' (p. 198).

This attitude to meaning, i.e. that somehow the contributors have access to a meaning of what they study, which is other people's meanings, which is more real than the meanings upon which, in concert with Riches, they partially focus, detracts somewhat from the attractiveness of this book, for the attitude is inconsonant with the achievements of the social sciences in accounting for social phenomena.

The Anthropology of Violence leaves this reviewer a little dissatisfied too: although it manages obliquely to satisfy its main aims - 'to grasp what underlies the striking capacity of violence as a social and cultural resource: why is violence so readily chosen to satisfy social goals? Why are images of violence so culturally prominent, even in "peaceful" societies?' (Riches, p. viii) - the terms in which ultimately it does so, mostly power and politics very broadly defined, seem not to meet the demands of the case.

The attitude referred to, and sleights-of-hand in argumentation - in Parkin's essay, for instance, a young man, possibly a teenager, whose eyes burn with what could be anger, frustration, hatred, desperation or hopelessness (p. 206), later becomes a confused-looking teenage boy (p. 209), and then a desperate teenager (p. 219) - tend to lessen the compellingness of this volume. This effect is exacerbated a little also by Moeran's reliance, in a fascinating analysis of the relationship between Japanese conceptions of beauty, violence, sex, and death, and their connections with time, on the works of Mishima Yukio. Mishima, Moeran writes (p. 109), 'is, in fact, one of Japan's more interesting modern writers in that he acted out in real life what he frequently alluded to in his faction and essays', namely, among much else, he disembowelled himself publicly (the samurai's seppuku). Yet every Japanese person with whom I have discussed Mishima appears to think that he was quite mad (ki-chigai), and wholly unrepresentative, therefore, of the Japanese, and his works equally unrepresentative of Japanese thought. So I am uneasy: if one only knew more about the other places and topics discussed by the other contributors, one is led to ponder, what else might make one stop and think? This unease is not alleviated by the Glossary, it should be added, in which 'technical terms in the text' (Riches, p. ix) are listed and explicated. In this list, words such as 'Azande', 'Durkheimean', 'epiphenomenon', 'Nuer' and 'Weberian' appear (pp. 224-226), while 'incest' is glossed as 'sexual relations between kin (normally close kin) among whom sexual relations are disallowed', and 'kinship (kin)' as 'relation between people built up from links between parents and children, and siblings' (p. 225) which, it will be agreed, is not terribly reassuring.

Still, The Anthropology of Violence is instructive and thought-provoking and can be well recommended to JASO readers. This reviewer can hardly say, though, that it was as enjoyable a book to read as he had hoped.

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER

'Race' is a racist construct, an interested way of stating and creating political and economic difference in pseudo-biological terms. 'Race' is a word in language, and racism is literally expressed in an insidious variety of verbal and narrative forms. This is not a question of mere linguistics: racism has ugly consequences in the real world. All the more reason then for this collection of essays discussing the ways forms of difference are made and maintained in racist terms in the language we use.

Gates has gathered here a remarkable number (twenty) of (mostly) distinguished academics to contribute thoughtful, combative essays on different aspects of his central theme. Many papers gain edge because their authors are intellectuals from communities marginal to male WASP culture (black, female, Palestinian, Indian, etc.), while the white males included in this edition are all politically sensitive to the issue at hand. It is a pleasurable change to read works by dons who do not forget universities are functioning parts of the social world which foots their bill.

A sample list from the book includes: Anthony Appiah demonstrating that there is no biological basis whatever to 'race'; Edward Said uncovering the undemocratic core of the Israeli state; Abdul Jan Mohamed revealing how a political economy of Manichean allegory functions to generate racial difference in colonialist literature; Mary Louise Pratt - as sophisticated as ever - emphasizing the multiplicity of ways of codifying the Other, the variety of (seemingly) fixed positions and the variety of (seemingly) given sets of differences that they posit. She stresses the need to consider ideology not only in terms of reductive simplification but also in terms of the proliferation of meanings. Sander Gilman relates the perceived identity between the European prostitute and the Hottentot female by unravelling the threads connecting late nineteenth-century notions of female sexuality in art, medicine, and literature.

In an endpiece commenting on the other essays Todorov complains that buzzwords overused oversimplify. Indeed most of the contributors, trained in English literature, delight in using a composite vocabulary derived from Derrida, Foucault, literary theory, and narratology. 'Discourse', 'textualized', 'seen/scene', 'site/sight', 'capitalist mode of production', 'imperialist', 'narration', 'Bahktinian', are key terms to be found throughout this text. Skillfully used, this intellectual dialect advertised the intelligence of its author and pleases an educated reader. It also excludes non-academics from understanding highly informative articles on important issues. This edition may have radical tone but its edge is blunted, for its contributors' use of such terms restricts its possible market to already converted liberals living on campus. And some contributors waste their passion in unnecessarily political pieces criticizing others included in the book. Derrida's shrill reply to two doctoral students' commentary on a
short article by him is an unlikeable example of academic overkill of enthusiastic fledglings by an intellectual eagle who is already flying high. These otherwise politically concerned authors may want to change the world, but how can they do it if they burn time scoring points off one another? This is all a great pity because this stimulating collection of mostly well-written provocative articles deserves a wide readership. Anthropologists will profit from it.

JEREMY MACCLANCY


This is intended not as a text book, but as 'a somewhat philosophically oriented glance at anthropology by an anthropologist'. Essentially, it offers an account of just what is distinctive about anthropological thought and of how anthropology differs from other professions - academic or otherwise - with which it might superficially be compared. In plan it is quite straightforward, consisting of three chapters entitled 'Substance', 'Method' and 'Significance'. The first sees culture as 'the dominant concept in anthropology' on both sides of the Atlantic, including Britain, which is declared to be mainly concerned with 'the social context of culture'. The word 'culture' can be defined in many different ways, of course, but it is here that Peacock most clearly betrays his own allegiance and bias. Nonetheless, holism and meaning are also given their due.

The second chapter predictably highlights fieldwork as 'the distinctive method of anthropology' even though other professions could also be said to indulge in it. Accordingly, Peacock spends several pages emphasizing the long-term, total-immersion, 'pure' quality of anthropological fieldwork, free from the ulterior motives of the missionary or spy, from the deceit of the latter, from the superficiality of the journalist etc. Nor are the post-fieldwork methods of interpretation and comparison neglected.

The final chapter is largely concerned with anthropology's applicability in a complex and conflictual world, concluding finally that it has more to offer than just helping with the implementation of family planning: 'the contribution of anthropology is to broaden the framework of discussion' on the broader issues facing the world, making use of its cross-cultural competence to eliminate any particular cultural bias in their discussion and solution. Of course, this depends on finding enough people willing to listen. Peacock's tightrope-walking merely highlights the difficulty of avoiding both the ivory tower and the worldly corruption of
professional ideals that is especially acute for anthropologists.

Peacock draws on his own fieldwork area of Java on occasion, and on his sabbatical year in Oxford in the early 1980s, the University being presented as a typical (anthropological) academic community. It cannot be said that he has got all the details right, however (e.g. the Pitt Rivers Museum is autonomous from, not just a section of, the University Museum), and the nature-culture explanation of the distribution of science and humanities teaching in the University is distinctly forced; surely the science departments are on the periphery simply because they arrived later, not because they are closer to nature.

Frequently anecdotal, sometimes aphoristic, occasionally trite in its choice of the familiar for examples, this is nonetheless a very adequate defence of what anthropology is and does and what makes its practitioners tick. Outsiders frequently complain at anthropologists' apparent inability or unwillingness to explain these things — this is a book they should read. Unfortunately, though, such books have a habit of going out of date quite quickly, for they are less concerned to advance new ideas than to explain current ones to a wide audience. So what will this effort look like a generation or so hence?

ROBERT PARKIN

AKBAR S. AHMED, Toward Islamic Anthropology: Definition, Dogma, and Directions [Islamization of Knowledge Series, no. 2], Ann Arbor: New Era Publications 1986. 68pp., Bibliography.

This work falls into two parts: the major section (55 pages) is devoted to the development of anthropology, its scope, methods and the social problems it deals with; the remaining 13 pages define Islamic anthropology, its scope, principles and directions.

Ahmed maintains that the early development of anthropology was closely related to colonial expansion and that this, together with orientalists' prejudices, is reflected in the works of some contemporary Western anthropologists. Colonial policy in British India and French North Africa tried to divide tribal peoples in the hope that separate administrative entities would eventually create ideological divisions within the population. Thus some contemporary anthropologists promote provincial divisions as 'the pre-Islamic font of national existence' (p. 8) and stress the idea that certain nomads are bad Muslims, while others are good (p. 27).

According to Ahmed, some orientalists considered the age of the Prophet as an age of 'violence and barbarism' in contrast to the 'gentleness and peace' of contemporary Western society. Ahmed sees this dichotomy reflected in the works of some contemporary anthropologists who describe some Muslim groups as 'deceitful,
hollow, and suspicious', Muslim life as 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short', or claim that a 'particular Muslim society resembles the Mafia' (pp. 54-5).

Ahmed suggests the establishment of Islamic anthropology to counteract these prejudices. It is to be based on the sociological principles of Islam, mainly the universalistic concept of *ummah*, relating village/tribal society to the larger historical and ideological frame of Islam. The *ummah* includes a multitude of Muslim societies within the framework of universal Islam (p. 58). The teachings of the Prophet recommend also that *ummah* transcends lineage and race. The rules which organize social relations (marriage, inheritance) are laid down explicitly by Islam. Ahmed states the Islamic view that man's mission is to reconcile society with the instructions of God (p. 57). Life is a struggle to improve the moral quality of one's existence (*jihad al-nafs*). However, he does not relate this to any specific anthropological questions.

Ahmed recommends that Muslim societies should be studied in chronological sequence corresponding with broad periods in Muslim history, namely tribal society in early Islam, the Ottoman period, Islam under Western Imperialism, and re-emergent Islam as in the creation of Pakistan, and the Islamic revolution in Iran. He also recommends the writing of text books and monographs in the various languages of the Muslim peoples, cooperation between the anthropologists of the various regions of the Muslim world, comparative studies of the major categories of peasants, tribes and cities, and the creation of a core of Islamic anthropological literature based on the works of Ibn-Khaldun, al-Biruni, Ibn-Battuta and al-Mas'udi (I would add the works of Arab geographers like al-Bakri and Ibn-Hawqal, and Ibn-Meskawayh who wrote on the manners of the Arabs and Persians).

Ahmed's brief outline of Islamic anthropology is unclear. He does not state the specific questions such an anthropology would ask. He does not detail the rules, the theoretical implications and the relation of the chronological study of Muslim societies to the existing body of historical and social data. He does not explain what contribution this study would make towards the improvement of the methods of present studies. Ahmed argues that the world-view of Muslim anthropologists should be the universality of Islam (pp. 56-9) and the Muslim ideal that society and individuals are motivated by the desire to perform the will of God. However, he does not elucidate how this would create an Islamic anthropology. It is a general anthropological rule that an anthropologist working in any community should bear in mind the ideals of the community and the religion of its people, but this is not in itself a Christian, Jewish or Hindu anthropology.

In my opinion, what is important is to try to find out how Islamic ideals and world-views are articulated in social contexts and in popular imagination; in order to do so the anthropologist, whether Muslim or Western, should be well versed in Islamic literature, culture, history and the language of the people concerned. Muslim anthropologists who are not educated in these subjects write bad anthropology.

Islamic values and ideals permeate Muslim society and affect
most of its social aspects. The quality of some Western works may be affected by bias or ignorance of Islamic literature, Middle Eastern history and culture. The latter weakness is also common to some Muslim anthropologists. Ahmed's suggestion of the establishment of efficient educational institutions in the Muslim world may be one way to remedy this problem.

NADIA ABU-ZAHRA


This book consists of a collection of Annual Lectures, covering the period 1972-83, instituted by the Minority Rights Group. The distinguished collection of politicians and academics, which includes Dr Conor Cruise O'Brien, Professor Sir Edmund Leach, the Rt. Hon. Shirley Williams and Professor Ralph Dahrendorf, were given the task of developing a 'coherent philosophy for dealing with minority problems in the abstract' (p. 6). As Roland Oliver indicates in his introduction, only Professor Sir Edmund Leach used the occasion to 'pour scorn on his hosts' by questioning the underlying philosophy of MRG. Leach declared that there is no such thing as a moral absolute, every human culture having its own system of values. The values propounded by MRG should therefore be recognised, he argues, as a form of moral imperialism. One wonders how far those suffering discrimination would go along with Leach's stance on the relativity of moral values? The style of Leach's contribution is provocative and his message ultimately unconvincing.

Other contributions cover a wide spectrum, reflecting the varied content of MRG reports. The term 'minorities' itself is something of a misnomer, the concern being with what is considered unjust discrimination wherever it occurs. The problems of refugees, human rights abuses, the undemocratic rule of minorities, the effect of prejudice, the limits of integration and the tension between intervention and sovereignty are all given an airing. An appendix lists the first 62 MRG reports, together with details of how to obtain them. I found the volume informative and thought-provoking and the values expounded altogether more universal than Leach would allow.

FIONA BOWIE
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Fieldwork as a topic is receiving more attention today than at any time in the history of anthropology. As Baumann comments below, a surprising amount of the writing on this subject is by authors who have no first-hand experience of participant observation research. However, many anthropologists undertake fieldwork on several occasions, and one would think that it is these that make the most reliable and interesting commentators on its qualities, problems and procedures. Doing fieldwork for a second time (or, as Banks points out, a 3rd, 4th, 5th or nth time) helps the researcher recognise which aspects of fieldwork 'experience' are essential to fieldwork itself, which are due to the circumstances of any particular piece of research (including the nature of the society or people studied), and which may be due to the personality and peculiar characteristics of the researcher himself or herself.

It is clear from MacClancy's account that today's researchers find very similar problems in trying to conduct fieldwork in what are apparently very different parts of the world. They may also, like Barnes, find that second fieldwork can only be conducted piecemeal, in short bursts on a variety of trips and projects. Such themes are discussed in the articles that follow, as are, amongst many others, film as ethnography (Banks), the constraints of academic life and bureaucratic difficulties (Barnes), the problems of local politics (MacClancy), and the simultaneities that affect urban research 'at home' (Baumann). In discussing such areas of concern in relation to more than one fieldwork experience, the authors are able to be more reflective, perhaps more objective, than is often the case.

'Second fieldwork' (or 'comparative fieldwork' as it might be called) is, like many concerns of anthropology, not as new a topic as it might seem. For example, Evans-Pritchard briefly compared
his Nuer and Azande field research in the pages of this Journal several years ago (see 'Reminiscences and Reflections on Fieldwork', *JASO*, Vol. IV, no. 1, Hilary 1973, pp. 1-12), voicing the widely held view 'that it is desirable that a student should make a study of more than one society' (p. 2). Of course he did not mean that making second studies would lead to better reflections on fieldwork, but that second fieldwork would make students better anthropologists. While not every student can have the opportunity to do field research twice (or even once), it must surely remain a desired aim. We hope that the articles that follow will reinforce the recognition of its value to the individual anthropologist and the discipline as a whole.

We should welcome further contributions and correspondence on the theme of second fieldwork, and related topics, for publication in future issues.
If it is true that anthropologists are prone to theorise in binary modes what their informants temper with the subtleties of everyday relativism, then second fieldwork can claim the status of a professional cure. None of the oppositions in the title of this essay has escaped unscathed from the gentle gnawings of doubt and common sense that second fieldwork has exposed me to. Ploughing a second field can go far in making one allergic, if not immune, to the glib binarisms paraded in textbooks, agonistic seminars, and much 'methodological' verbiage. What has struck me as new in my second fieldwork is the simultaneity of phases, influences, and roles that in my first were neatly separated. Some of these aspects of simultaneity are due to working in an urban field, some to working 'at home', and others to both.

My first fieldwork consisted of three periods, of altogether eighteen months, spent in the Nuba Mountains of the Sudan. The

Editors' Note: Dr Baumann carried out his first fieldwork in the Nuba Mountains in the Sudan in the late 1970s. The major product of this research has been a book (Baumann 1987). Presently Dr Baumann is carrying out his 'second fieldwork' in West London.

1 Very few well-known anthropologists appear to have shunned it, although second ethnographies are rarer than second fieldwork.

2 In my case, the phrase applies with qualifications. My second fieldwork concerns predominantly people of South Asian, Caribbean and Irish backgrounds who, unlike myself (born in Germany), are called 'immigrants'.
latter two periods were spent almost entirely in resident fieldwork in a farming village of some 500 people and in its neighbouring settlements. My second fieldwork has, so far, extended over two years spent in a 'town' of some 60,000 people in outer West London, and made use of evenings, weekends, academic vacations, and other time unoccupied by teaching anthropology to undergraduates. After sixteen months of part-time and some ten months of full-time research, the latter helped by two undergraduate student assistants, I have embarked on the first year of continuous full-time research, made possible by a research grant from the Leverhulme Trust. At such a stage, comparisons must be preliminary. To compare the two 'fieldworks' across the binarisms of the title, and across the unweighable variables of being older, in a different decade, and a new place, I shall follow the example of my most articulate informants and start at the beginning, tracing distinctions chronologically.

One's arrival in the field is gradual and staggered in time when doing rural research overseas. Officials and academic colleagues are left behind in the capital as one makes one's way to the provincial centre of the research area; provincial officials and first contacts such as school teachers and traders are again left behind as one leaves, or is taken, 'up-country' to the village, the camp, or other small place where, metaphorically at least, one is to pitch one's tent and begin to live. It is from face to face that local people, powerful, influential, but often competent only locally, decide to tolerate or accept, to help or hinder one's research. It may take patience and must rely on patronage; but all interaction is face to face, direct, and often faster than one's command of local faces and names can keep pace with. Having steered one's way from an international airport to a far-off village by gradual transitions, even initial disappointments can be borne with confidence and overcome within an entirely local, small arena, the dynamics of which are often easy to grasp. One knows one has arrived, at least.

My sincere thanks are due to Mr Bryn Williams and Mr Richard Hundleby who spent the summer of 1987 on their own fieldwork projects. Their original conclusions, as well as questions about fieldwork, have taught me much of ethnographic and reflexive value. I gratefully acknowledge the support of the Chairman and Trustees of the Leverhulme Trust in funding my research on 'Cross-Community Peer Orientations in a London Multi-Ethnic Youth Culture'. Without it, even this article could not have been written in time. In doing village fieldwork overseas, I found it useful to recognize individuals by their shoes, and necessary even after I had been granted legitimacy as a researcher.
If gradual approach and pointed arrival are the hallmarks of village fieldwork, urban research can indeed appear as its binary opposite. In my own experience, 'arrival' in an urban field is a very slow process indeed. Instead of entering into a small local group through face-to-face interaction, the unknown fieldworker stoops to visiting cards and telephone appointments to break through the constraints of privacy and anonymity, and more often than not depends on the help of officials, functionaries, public figures, or indeed busybodies or eccentrics, to cross thresholds and build networks. Not surprisingly, much 'urban anthropology' has taken the form of 'network' analysis, reflecting the research process itself, or of studies of smaller-scale, well-bounded groups that are highly integrated and afford more face-to-face interaction. The urban researcher who has decided to do fieldwork, not along, but across the boundaries of sub-sets, organized groups or distinctive face-to-face 'communities' may have to wait longer until he or she is sure of having arrived. In such a case, it can take up to a year - and might well be done part-time - until different branches of one's own networks have sprouted or grown together, often seemingly of their own accord.

Having 'arrived', the urban fieldworker is likely to find further differences from his or her rural colleague, which result from the simultaneity of phases which gradual journeys up-country help to separate. While they are more likely to make themselves felt at home, they are by no means impossible also in urban research overseas. A first glimpse of the simultaneity characteristic of much urban research emerges from the continued presence of 'gatekeepers': the officials who control access to key public institutions, such as community centres, youth centres, schools, hospitals, law courts; the volunteers who ward off intruders from clubs and groups, crèches and play-schemes, classes and functions; the bureaucrats weary of the responsibility for helping a researcher who might turn out 'foul' - none of these are left behind in the capital or provincial centre. In urban fieldwork, they remain in one's city, town, borough, ward, to look over one's shoulder, and over their own. It is remarkable how much of the best 'urban anthropology' has been done through religious congregations and networks - unique among urban institutions in the welcome their 'gatekeepers' extend to newcomers and the trust they often place in the researcher's responsibility and admissibility. Most secular 'gatekeepers' insist on more elaborate evidence to unlock the doors they guard, and some are given to jealousy of rival 'gatekeepers' who may have unlocked other doors for the same anthropologist.

A further facet of simultaneity may emerge either because of the urban setting of research, or because research is done at home rather than abroad. It is the simultaneity of fieldwork and 'bookwork'. To the researcher going overseas, and especially the one bound 'up country', library research is 'preparation'; it is finished, so far as possible, before one leaves, and certainly well before one arrives in the field. Working in Sudanese villages, I was content for months on end with consulting only excerpts from the sparse ethnographic literature and a cherished copy of Notes
and Queries on Anthropology (5th edition, BAAS 1929). Urban fieldwork affords the researcher access to libraries and archives that will interfere with, deviate or help field research. Fieldwork at home is certain to expose the ethnographer's attention to relevant or seductive commentary in the media; to helpful or partial comment from academic colleagues; and to an avalanche of usually quantitative data superior to one's fieldnotes and their anecdotal style, yet inferior and perhaps detrimental to them through their lack of experiential content, their loadedness with distant assumptions, and their tempting quotability.

The simultaneity of fieldwork and bookwork takes on starker contours when the fieldworker remains involved, during fieldwork itself, with other academic pursuits and colleagues. This situation, virtually unknown to the single fieldworker in overseas villages, may occur when working in rural parts of one's own country or in urban parts of another. In urban fieldwork at home, such as I have pursued, this simultaneity of being an academic while being a fieldworker can make itself felt in two distinct ways. The first concerns perceptions among and of one's informants, the second, one's colleagues' reactions.

Informants, who in most anthropologists' fieldwork are not themselves academics, can often make little of the researcher who, on the one hand, carries the hallmark or stigma of Higher Education, and on the other is seen to mingle in the sleeves-up, rough-and-tumble pursuits that form as much a part of fieldwork as the well-appointed, professionally tidy interview. Neighbours and 'gate-keepers' in West London asked baffled questions when one day I received respectable academic colleagues, the next day sat in a pub with three well-known local ne'er-do-wells, and on the third had dinner with a local solicitor. The class status of academics is ambiguous enough as it is; and such antics, indispensable as they are in urban fieldwork, can lead to confusion among those who observe the observer. Such instances are by no means a daily occurrence; yet they deserve mention as one of the sharper edges of the issues of class or status in fieldwork. In an overseas village, the Western anthropologist is such an exotic being as to render local comparisons of status and class irrelevant or even incommensurate. In urban fieldwork or in fieldwork at home, by contrast, the researcher's perceived class and status are of immediate influence.

I have heard it said by a number of colleagues working in cities that the urban field does not really allow for the methods of participant observation. Among the reasons given, one can expect to hear generalities about the privacy, anonymity, and variety in city life that render social relations diffuse and often single-stranded. Yet if urban fieldwork is possible at all, these factors cannot, in the end, have proved insurmountable. What, in my experience so far, remains insurmountable is the mere fact that perceptions of class and status will matter, in positive or negative ways, where the fieldworker is not an exotic outsider. In such a situation, he or she cannot hope to be exempted from the distinctions of class or status that informants consider binding; researchers desperate for deklassement may temper their accent,
manners, dress or other class markers. Such strategies are likely, however, to find neither the respect, nor the credence, of most perceptive informants. They will be recognised as insincere and deceitful, as well as pathetically incomplete; for which field-worker can change his body language, daily routines, material culture, or contacts outside the field to the point of 'fitting in'; and which informant would waste an hour to explain to the fake 'mate' what any real mate takes for granted? The only strategy I have found in dealing with class expectations and their constraints consists in finding local activities suitable to them, such as teaching evening classes or organizing recreational activities, and generally making available such skills as might make one useful, while at the same time insisting that one may stray from the 'median model' to the eccentricities of both the academic and the local resident with a weak spot for low company and odd pursuits.

The simultaneity of being an academic while being in the field can make itself felt also in the reactions of colleagues, as in one's own reactions to their concerns. This fact is especially pronounced when the fieldworker teaches at a university while in the field, as has been my experience for the past two years. While academic colleagues within anthropology have shown a heartwarming understanding of the tensions sometimes involved and excelled in giving support and advice, participation in other academic activities can throw into stark relief some of the particularities of anthropological fieldwork.

Social scientists working on contract research are baffled, and at times disgusted, at what appears as the 'leisurely' time frame of anthropological research and the refusal, typical of many of us, to define 'issues' before, and even while, research is proceeding. These fears are not helped by the cult of 'the research project' that British universities and academics have developed in response to 1980s ideologies of 'market place', 'performance indicators', and 'research paying its own way'. Beside the Golden Calf of the neat 'research project', custom-built to standard expectations and streamlined to promise quick results in no time at all, anthropological fieldwork looks decidedly untidy and vaguely ominous. Worse than that, it can be thought entirely illegitimate by committed social researchers from other disciplines who suspect that behind the fieldworker's open brief is a 'liberal' or 'culinary' attitude that steers clear of pre-defined 'issues'. It can be useful in such circumstances to face openly and record clearly reactions to fieldwork itself, and to take seriously the understandable, if sometimes insufficiently reflexive fear of a

I am most grateful to Professor Adam Kuper for his institutional support at the Department of Human Sciences, Brunel University, and have thrived on his keen personal encouragement. Dr Godfrey Lienhardt has followed my research with the insight, and helped it with the the genuinely reflexive knowledge, that he granted even my first ethnography. Professor John Blacking, who made me an anthropologist, has been as true an inspiration for my second fieldwork as he was for my first.
once colonial discipline thought to harbour 'liberals' bent on 'exoticising' others in order to serve the powers that be. What reprieve from such distrust anthropologists can claim might best be gained by doing creditable ethnography on the precepts cultivated in Trobriand and Azande villages: to live locally, to let oneself in for it, and to publish responsibly.

On the whole, academic influences in the course of second fieldwork can be extremely beneficial, not least when they are of an interdisciplinary range. Unlike the now classic exemplar of first fieldwork, the doctoral candidate supervised by one senior anthropologist and encouraged perhaps by a few postgraduate friends, the practitioner of second fieldwork is more likely to enjoy more freedom in the selection of academic influence. These are more copious when working in cities, and often more accessible when working in one's own country. Two of these in particular may deserve stress. The particularities of anthropological fieldwork and of ethnography have, over the past decade, been discussed and studied both by sociologists and by anthropologists; and it is a direct result of the simultaneity of fieldwork and 'bookwork' in a city of one's own country or language that these debates intermingle with the pursuit of fieldwork in situ.

Practitioners of neighbouring disciplines - among them, for instance, those sociologists of science who have taken further Kuhn's notion of 'normal science'7 - have begun to validate the 'genre' of ethnography and to subject to their own deliberations the claims and promises of fieldwork. Few of the relevant debates distinguish between living fieldwork and writing an ethnography; yet they have already done much to develop and spread more sophisticated notions of 'reflexivity' as pertain to anthropological research.8 As this is not the place for theoretical disquisitions, I shall limit my commentary to the concerns of doing fieldwork. To leave a heated discussion among and with 'informants' for an interdisciplinary round-table on 'methodological issues', there to be questioned by colleagues about the effects of 'observer interference' in anthropological fieldwork, is a challenge of simultaneity that it may take days of further field or book work to overcome. Given the precepts of 'fieldwork diaries' and the age-old striving for reflexivity in one's ethnographic knowledge, the demands of cultivating 'the field' may well conflict with the demands of 'doing fieldwork' in an academically legitimated way. Such experiences have given me all the more sympathy with those who face first fieldwork at a time when 'ethnography' itself is styled into a problematique by a few 'postmodernist' students of Geertz. While the discourses of ethnography deserve to be analysed by each practitioner who wishes to serve the 'genre',9 even a common-sense

7 See Kuhn 1962; cf. the sociological ethnography of Latour and Woolgar 1979.
9 Useful examples in lucid rather than obfuscatory English can be
understanding of reflexivity would tell one that 'ethnographic authority'\textsuperscript{10} is an ass and 'ethnographic responsibility' a Pegasus. Second fieldwork, perhaps irrespective of dichotomies between rural and urban, at home or abroad, is likely to clarify the distinction. At my present stage of research, it appears to me to reflect the differences between taking trouble in fieldwork, and viewing it as a troublesome preliminary to fast publication. The painstaking and reciprocally invigorating pursuit of long-term fieldwork is easily threatened by 'performance indicators' urging us to 'publish or perish', which will prevent second fieldwork being done by colleagues unable to resist the higher speed and, oddly, greater prestige of theoretical pronouncements about fieldwork and ethnography.

The simultaneity of such academic influences and fieldwork practice is, of course, not confined to second fieldwork, but goes with research in the 1980s and is heightened when working in cities where the relevant debates are accessible. The added variable of doing one's second fieldwork may matter in that one is freer to select among intellectual influences and has past personal experience of the links and breaches between living fieldwork and writing ethnography. At the present stage of my second fieldwork, academic analyses of the discourses of ethnography and explorations of the notion of reflexivity have had tangible effects. I now consider documents and interpretations of the research process and the traditional reflexive 'fieldworker's diary' as an integral part of 'the data'. I am astonished, however, at the volume of academic debate that is generated without the authors having experienced second fieldwork (and sometimes even first), without data generated in and out of fieldwork to supplement the data generated through interpretation of printed results, and without any documentation of the effectiveness or otherwise of theoretical disquisitions on one's daily interaction with 'informants'.

The simultaneity of working at a university and living in the field has taught me a more committed respect for fieldwork than my first experience of it could justify. While some factory inspectors misplaced in universities may find it wasteful and dispensable, and post-Geertzians may find it problematic, colleagues from other disciplines have come to view it as promising, necessary, and deserving of reflexive theorization.

The other aspects of simultaneity already mentioned, and perhaps the mere fact of doing fieldwork for a second time, have made me more weary of binarisms within our discipline. This may be a

\textsuperscript{10} The phrase is used thematically/theatrically in Clifford 1983.
result, and would be a vindication, of doing second fieldwork generally. For it is likely that commonplaces and formulae will appear glib as one re-enters the cycle from fieldwork through academic conventions to their joint result, ethnography. I no longer believe that villages overseas afford fieldwork, while cities at home offer only research. Much depends, for instance, on the time-span of urbanisation among one's urban informants, as on their perceived class or status, and the urban, suburban or indeed village-like forms of settlement and interaction to be found in all cities. The opposition between fieldwork overseas or at home can be spurious unless one specifies the researcher's relationship to the chosen place. It is hard to say whether an urban-born South Indian anthropologist is more 'at home' in a North Indian village or among South Indians in a British city. Even the categories the question takes for granted beg questions; answers, whatever theoretically validated categories they may be predicated on, will require fieldwork, in this case among anthropologists. Such fieldwork might suggest differentiating between two types of anthropological fieldworker: one who has done fieldwork in a strange place to him or her and makes it familiar, and another who started in a familiar place and makes it strange: both may span the entire range from urban to rural and from home to abroad.

GERD BAUMANN

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Second fieldwork is erotic dream to first fieldwork's nightmare. The ethnographer is older, more confident. She knows what to ask, how to ask it, and who to approach. Her ideas are clearer and her questions more precise. She knows when to keep quiet, when to let her fieldwork friends go on and apparently on, and when to interrupt. She has a shorter period in the field than the first time round, but that doesn't matter because she is so much more organized, her work is so much more efficient. There is very little of the anguish, self-recrimination, periodic depression, violent pendulum swings of mood, or general trauma that characterized the first trip away from her institutional home. She doesn't need to be over-earnestly self-reflexive and isn't paralyzed by doubt or left dumb by worry over the political nature or ethical aspects of her work. She has answered those questions to her own satisfaction before, and now simply gets on with the job.

All this is the received knowledge, the conventional wisdom. None of it applies to me. I do not boastfully claim to be unconventional. I simply question the hardening dogma that second fieldwork is, by its very nature, easier and more fruitful. Since 'fieldwork' is rapidly becoming an acceptable subject of study bolstered by a mainly tedious and narcissistic literature, I wish

Editors' Note: Dr MacClancy's first fieldwork was carried out in Vanuatu (New Hebrides) from 1978 to 1982. This resulted in a doctoral thesis (MacClancy 1983), a book (MacClancy 1980) and a number of articles (see, for example, MacClancy 1988a). His 'second fieldwork' has been in Navarre in Spain from 1984 to 1988. He is currently writing up this research; a number of articles are in press and a book is in preparation (see also MacClancy 1988b).
to query certain beliefs before they achieve mythical status, or
decome hasty charters for action misguiding future anthropologists.
Like any ethnographer, I illustrate my points with ethnography.
Only this time the subject on centre stage is me.

My aim is not public self-flagellation, a literary performance
by a masochistic author only intended for himself and the odd in-
tellectual voyeur. Instead I wish to tell a cautionary tale, to
introduce a note of doubt in an otherwise increasingly confident
discourse. Before generalizations about fieldwork become command-
ments written on stone, I wish to cry caution peregrinus!

Pulled by a South Pacific dream and attracted by tales of Malinow-
ski, I chose Melanesia. It seemed a suitable site for my anthropo-
logical apprenticeship, for if fieldwork was meant to be a testing,
profound encounter with the Other, then, I was told, you could not
get a more extreme Other than in Melanesia. Such was the word in
the corridors of the Oxford Institute of Social Anthropology.
Fieldwork was a meeting with oneself as much as with others, and
that self-confrontation could be played all the harder on the other
side of the globe. The distance was tempting, I liked the chal-
lenge, and I wanted the knowledge. The New Hebrides, found on both
the extreme left- and the extreme right-hand sides of the Mercator
projection of the world, seemed suitably eccentric for my purposes.

An eager but ignorant twenty-five year old, I flew into a
colonial archipelago whose blacks were fighting to get the whites
off their backs. The struggle for independence had started eight
years before, in 1970, and had divided the islands village by vil-
lage into opposed factions. The islanders, controlled by a system
of joint neglect called an Anglo-French Condominium, opted for or
were bribed into accepting the support of either colonial power.
The English, thinking of their purse strings, wanted independence
soon. The French, thinking of their nuclear testing site in
Tahiti and regarding the Pacific as the strategic area of future
decades, had a rather slower schedule.

I chose to work with the Big Nambas of northern Malakula is-
land because no one had worked with them. No one had worked with
them because they did not want to be studied. The big-man who did
finally accept me turned out to be only one of the claimants to the
chieftaincy of his village. My arrival precipitated a major row,
then a fight, and finally a court case which ended with thirteen
men going to jail for three months each and me wondering where to
go next.

The Small Nambas (nambas = penis-wraper) were too expensive.
My grant could not cover the fees they demanded. I visited the
Middle Nambas, but their chief said they had to be careful, as a
white man was now going around saying he wanted to live in a vil-
lage and then getting all the men locked up. I wrote to an
Australian anthropologist asking about certain rituals on an island
where she had worked. In her speedy reply she made rude noises
about the idea of someone wanting to work in 'her' area. I wished
to avoid such ethnographic imperialists and so, following others' advice, I contacted the big-men of a village on a different island. But they wanted to make up their minds before I even went there. I was told to wait. Six days later they radioed that they could not come to an agreement and thus the answer was no. I then visited the headquarters of Nagriamel, a cargo-cultish co-operative movement promoting resettlement of alienated land. But the rumours grew stronger that its half-caste leader, Jimmy Moses Tubo Stevens, was colluding with extreme right-wing American businessmen bent on realizing their own millenarian dreams. It seemed best to stay away.

I will not continue with the details of this picaresque tale. Nine months later my girlfriend introduced me to her old friends, the family of a once big-man living in Sulfa Bay, the headquarters of the John Frum movement. This anthropologically famous cargo cult had recently become a quasi-Francophile political party. But her friends seemed prepared to take me, the village was large and interesting, and the island (Tanna) still had a flourishing ritual life. I could now do fieldwork in the classical manner. I decided to stay.

It seems clear to me now that the shock of being the precipitated cause of thirteen men going to jail still affected me. The sense of guilt for their plight, plus the repeated, subsequent refusals and setbacks, compounded by my increasing awareness of the worsening political situation made me very wary in my first attempts to make friends and do fieldwork in Sulfa Bay. I was bluntly told to keep out of 'politics' and not to discuss the business of Sulfa Bay if I should decide to visit other villages. Though the big-men of the village were friendly and liked to see me getting drunk on kava, they refused to chat about political matters with me. Everything I learnt I found out through subterfuge: discreetly asking my close friends in snatched moments what was happening, eavesdropping, or reporting what I had heard about Sulfa Bay in other villages and asking whether it was true. Those who spoke to me were the isolated, the lonely, the embittered, or simply those who lived next door and whose actions they knew I could observe. The various members of the family which had taken me in kept me more informed than anybody, but they were indebted to my girlfriend. Almost all my work seemed to be done in a sideways, glancing fashion. I could approach very little head on.

Two months before independence the Francophilic minority rebelled against the Anglophone majority party that formed the government. Sulfa Bay became the headquarters of the Tannese rebels, and I had to get out. After independence and the squashing of the rebellion, I tried repeatedly to return to Tanna but was not allowed to. Despite the suggestions made by my supervisor in his letters, I now had no wish to start to do fieldwork on yet another island. Instead, having suffered the political situation for the last two years, I decided to study it. I changed the focus of my research from ritual systems and cosmology to Melanesian nationalism and its cultural symbolism.

The causes of the rebellion forced me (and many others) to consider the nature of democracy, while the reality of colonialism...
was something I could never avoid. Getting dirty in a black village was not going to mask the fact that I was white and therefore privileged. The locals' stark division of all whites as either staunchly pro-French or staunchly pro-British (leaving no space for diffident dissidents) also made me, the British-born son of an Irish father and a Maltese orphan, question my own nationality. I had always carried a British passport but had never before considered that I had a nationality that I might have to defend. I doubted whether I wanted to defend it.

My problems did not go away. Certain politicians would not talk with me. Some whites were too worried to tell me anything. The security department of the police refused to lend me their transcripts of rebel radio broadcasts. When I finally gained access to a boxful of declassified ex-French Residency documents, the curator of the national museum and the director of the local branch of the University of the South Pacific complained in person to the Prime Minister, arguing that my support of the majority party was in doubt. Though I was now trying to gather material on my new topic, I remained fundamentally unsure how it might cohere.

Several months later I was told to leave the country within three weeks. I gained an audience with the Home Secretary. He began by saying he could not revoke his decision to expel me. I replied that certain jealous whites were trying to get me deported. My visa was extended for another three months. In a bid to bypass my enemies' manoeuvres and stay in the country so I could finish my research, I became the owner of a local soap-making concern and so applied for a businessman's visa. My application was turned down and I had to leave the islands, three years and five months after my arrival.

My doctorate done, I looked for a different area, a new challenge. Friends derided European anthropology, saying they had not read anything which struck them as intellectually illuminating. I disagreed with their prognosis and liked the idea of a strong contrast.

Melanesia is not a literary culture, Europe is: anthropologists of the area compete against novelists as fellow students of social life and so are forced to do finer-grained fieldwork if they wish their cultural characterizations to be ethnographically credible. Literate natives can all too easily crab what they consider to be caricatures. They do not want to be remembered in print as unsophisticated handlers of crudely defined concepts. In these settings the Other is not radically different, and field-workers, by studying and living with people so culturally similar to themselves, come to a more detailed understanding of their own social selves. The careful consideration of this narrow cultural gap is a test both for the individual and for the discipline. For if anthropology has little to report about our own societies, then what can it say?

I was told Basque, Catalan, and Galician nationalisms were
already well studied, while the Andalusian variety 'isn't really nationalism', but that the semi-Basque province of Navarre nursed a regionalism worthy of study. I spent nine months in the bars of Pamplona's Old Quarter, gained a research fellowship for what I had learnt there, and went to live in 'Ull Alto', a small, aesthetically pleasing village with friendly people, excellent cuisine, and a wine that deserved prolonged investigation.

In Ull Alto, division is masked by avoidance and silence. Basque patriots and Navarran regionalists tend to go to different bars and not to talk to one another. It is during the week-long annual fiestas that political difference, stimulated by drink, tiredness, and sustained physical proximity, can lead to fights. I timidly asked a few questions about politics, but people seemed not to hear me and talked of other things.

My lack of confidence about buttonholing others and querying them about their lives was not just a product of the acute political situation. If the villagers were not radically different, then I needed time to see in what subtle ways we were not the same. I wanted to learn, I had to listen, I had to watch. I assumed as bland a personality as possible, at times perhaps overly so. Adopting an unassertive character in a culture framed by maahismo, the male fieldworker was feminized. No wonder some thought I was bisexual: I was not fulfilling the local role outlined for men, at least not at the beginning.

Despite my insistence, people did not want me to work in the fields. I was never too sure why not - they did not want a pen-pusher breaking the earth? They knew I would be slow? They wanted to be alone? My landlord only called me out when many hands were needed to store the hay, bring in the grapes, harvest the olives, or kill his pig. I gave a few English lessons, chatted in the shops, drank in all the bars (five of them excluding the one in the brothel), ate at my age-groups's Saturday dinners, and cradled my hangover while I dutifully attended Mass the next day. I was being quietly assessed and could not yet ask people to confide in me. It was my landlords who provided the exit (I have heard similar from other ethnographers of rural Europe). Sonless, they inquired into my life and, day by day, revealed theirs to me.

Warmed by the salary and length of my fellowship, I did not have to force friendship but slowly came to know others as they began to understand me. I deliberately delayed intensive interviewing for some time, preferring to learn from my landlords and to drop pregnant questions informally in bars. Then I concentrated on village officials (councillors, ex-mayors, the priest etc.), constantly supplementing their comments with long talks with my now increasing circle of acquaintances. I lived in the village for twenty-one consecutive months. Simply remaining there (though I might be in Pamplona many days), being seen, seeing others, seemed to confirm my commitment. Returning to the village after brief trips to the UK showed I was not staying out of inertia but wanted to come back and even knew the road home.

To avoid the consequences of division, I never stated my own politics. If explicitly asked, I said I was 'on the Left', but skirted further precision. Villagers seemed to accept that; they
appeared pleased that a middle-class academic from a prestigious university they had heard of had come to live with them, valued their knowledge, and took them seriously. For, as some middle-aged and elderly people will bitterly recount, they are the exploited and ignored. From tales of back-breaking work and Civil War grievances to present problems of chronic unemployment and miserable pensions, they will justifiably complain. On reflection, I was almost relieved when someone finally intimated that I, funded by the British Government, was a spy. My accuser clearly thought I was learning a lot about the village.

Teetering on the political fence became an even harder game to play when I started to interview politicians outside the village. In Ulí Alto I would not advertise the fact that I had just spent the afternoon with a pair of ageing fascists, or with an ideologue of Herri Batasuna, the radical coalition seen as the political wing of the terrorists. I kept very quiet that my girlfriend worked with the police. I was ultimately pleased that she did not want to visit the village much.

People asked what I was going to do with what I was writing. They wanted to know if I had already published anything, and to see it if I had. I used to explain the nature of my research as honestly and as fully as I could. I made no promises about how I would portray their home town. They seemed satisfied that I will return with the manuscript of my proposed book to read to them the relevant sections and to hear their comments. In this way they will have some counter to the power of the author. We both gain here: I produce a finer ethnography, and they are not confined within hard covers as unsubtle actors crassly playing out their roles. But I do not look forward, for instance, to telling a physically large man of confirmed opinions who has held public office that many of his neighbours think him dictatorial.

Events in Melanesia had made me ponder the nature of democracy. This time, I was forced to consider seriously the political theories of non-democratic government and of bloody revolutionary terrorism. Also, I could not study local debates without simultaneously questioning the nature of nationhood and nationality. Some Basque patriots received me politely, though I said I was British, then gesticulated joyfully when I said I was Irish: 'Why didn't you say so before? That's something to be proud of!' 'But we have the same struggle!'

I wondered how much of the difference I was perceiving was due to class, not ethnicity. I found I compared life in the village with that in my father's native County Clare, and contrasted it with Oxford manners and the London I know. In all these matters concerning difference (political, national, and social) I did not come to satisfying conclusions, just temporary solutions, a steady flux that makes me read my field notes like an evolving autobiography. My sense of sameness with the villagers expanded and contracted over time. For, of course, recognition of others' difference is matched by one's own definition of self and, for some academics, that definition can become extremely restrictive.
In Sulfa Bay I was gravely uncertain about how to learn what was going on politically in the village. Back in the capital I suffered corrosive worry whether my new thesis topic, about which I knew nothing theoretically, would prove successful. Similarly, in Navarre I was very diffident in my initial dealings with the people of Ulí Alto so as not to smother their distinctiveness with my own personality. And the political situation in both villages meant I had to use cunning and guile in order to learn anything. At the same time, the very difference of the two communities with respect to 'my' London and Oxford forced me in both cases and in different ways to reflect upon my own position. In sum, despite the great cultural difference between Melanesia and the Mediterranean, uncertainty, self-doubt, and the gravity of politics framed my time in both places.

The villagers' main grumble about me was that I was too formal ('formal, punctual, serious'). They wanted me more emotionally involved, sentimentally anchored in the pueblo. What I needed, they said, was a steady girlfriend, one from Ulí Alto. While I would have been very happy to have gone out with any one of a number of women in the village, I could also imagine the unlikeable consequences of breaking up with her and, thus also, with her family. But dedicated fieldworkers are meant to observe and to participate, to prostitute themselves for experience and revel in the process. The anthropologist is a whore, and a poorly paid one at that.

A senior academic advised me to go into the field alone. 'You learn the language quicker,' he said, 'if you're not talking English every night with a girlfriend who's gone with you.' The Pamplonan women with whom I did finally go out taught me much about local ways, both formally and informally, intentionally and unintentionally, just as the English expatriate with whom I lived in the South Pacific told me about aspects of the local scene and its history that I would otherwise never have learnt. Anthropologists often make much about their 'chief informants' or 'co-authors', but rarely mention their local lovers. (A neglected topic within 'fieldwork' studies?) For when fieldworkers become authors they make mileage out of their own emotions and use their feelings to add to their ethnographies. By laying their heart on the line they gain a sentimental education which can be turned to 'good' academic use. They don't just exploit others, but also themselves.

JEREMY MACCLANCY

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ETHNOGRAPHY AS A CAREER:
SECOND THOUGHTS ON SECOND FIELDWORK IN INDONESIA

Whether or not I have ever learned to write with economy, I have
conducted my study of a second society quickly, as Evans-Pritchard
said anthropologists having a second try would: 'A second study
usually takes a shorter time because the anthropologist has learnt
from his previous experience to conduct research quickly and to
write with economy' (Evans-Pritchard 1951: 76). The research has
been quick, however, only in terms of the number of days, weeks and
months spent doing it, and speed in this case has little or no­
thing to do with experience. The actual period that has elapsed
since I first set foot in Lamalera, Lembata, is now more than nine­
ten years. Over those years I have accumulated somewhat more than
ten months of effective research time, a total which is now pushing
up towards the aggregated year upon which The Nuer is based.
The fieldwork has been opportunistic at best, and the methods

Editors' Note: Dr Barnes's first fieldwork was with the Kédang,
at the eastern end of the island of Lembata (Lomblen) in eastern
Indonesia. He and his wife lived in the village of Léuwayang from
October 1969 until June 1971. This research provided the basis for
a D.Phil. thesis (Barnes, R.H. 1972), subsequently published as a
book (Barnes, R.H. 1974a), and several articles and notes. The
'second fieldwork' he discusses here consists in a number of short
visits, on different projects, to the village of Lamalera at the
western end of the same island. This research has resulted in a
number of publications (see, for example, Barnes, R.H. 1974b, 1980,
1984, 1985, 1986), as well as, most recently, The Whale Hunters of
Lamalera, a film in Granada Television's 'Disappearing World'
series, first shown on British television in July 1988.
of opportunistic fieldwork have little in common with the ideal of a leisurely, if intense, two years of D.Phil. field study broken by a few months in a university department, which Evans-Pritchard (ibid.) said was the Oxford standard. It does have more in common with the twelve to sixteen months of frantic immersion, delayed, interrupted and harassed by host government agencies, Economic and Social Research Council irrationalities, illness and accident, which is the reality for at least some of our students at present. Still the similarity is small. The one thing that can be said for it is that it does not permit the synchronic, slice-of-life account that results from the conventional approach. People age, attitudes alter, and misfortunes come and go. The nature of misfortune also changes, plus progress arrives over and over again, bringing with it varied and unpredictable effects.

In 1970 I visited the village for a week during the prescribed break from doctoral studies in Kédang which brought me no farther from friends and subject matter than Flores. Villagers cheerfully invited me to accompany them on a whale hunt and praised the luck I brought when we actually caught one (the only time I have had either that experience or that effect). The brief article (Barnes, R.H. 1974b) deriving from the visit has been plagiarized shamelessly at least twice and has contributed in a small way to the increasing flood of tourists making their way to the village. In the academic year 1977-8, two distinguished academics employed in Australia visited Oxford after having within twelve months led shiploads of elderly foreigners to Lamalera's shore, thus giving value to the insincere assurances I had provided the director of tourism in Larantuka, Flores, in June 1987, that I would indeed seize any opportunity to send hordes his way.

I had intended to make Lamalera my real second study. After completing work on Kédang (Barnes, R.H. 1972, 1974a), I wished to produce an equally thorough account of this neighbouring but rather different group. This project should have started a series of investigations into the Lamaholot cultural area, for which I had initially prepared myself by compiling a handbook from published sources in my B. Lit. thesis (Barnes, R.H. 1968) and by drawing together from available grammars and wordlists a preliminary, unpublished dictionary. The Lamaholot programme began to mutate from the moment I decided to go one linguistic group farther east, to the almost entirely unknown Kédang, for my first field research. D.Phil. completed, my first task was to find employment and begin to repay my backlog of educational debts. In time, I ended up in Edinburgh, where sabbatical leave was available every twelve years, but unpaid leave could be obtained whenever one's department would agree to it. In 1975, I cobbled together some funds and, with the indulgence of Brian Moser, set out to gain a few weeks in the village in the hopes of putting together further research and, eventually, a film for his 'Disappearing World' series. I got no farther than Oxford, where I learned that my visa request had been
rejected because of the outbreak of war on Timor, in the same province as Lembata.

Thus things stood until December 1977 when I received a call from Norway asking me to advise about a possible World Wildlife Fund project to investigate the conservation implications of the hunting of porpoise and whale in Lamalera. They were planning to send a marine biologist and an anthropologist. I managed to get myself attached as the anthropologist, and in 1979 from July through September Durant Hembree, the marine biologist, Saddon Silalahi, a fisheries expert, and I looked into various aspects of the subsistence economy. Of course, I took every opportunity to expand my own investigations as far as I could. Three months, however, remained three months.

While we were there a new underwater volcano, Ili Hobai, erupted on July 17, while Ili Werung, on the Lerek Peninsula just a few miles east of us, fell into the sea causing a tsunami. The village of Wai Teba was completely erased by the wave, while other villages suffered damage from the landslide. Initial figures put the loss of life at over 100 souls and the number who disappeared (and were never found) at nearly 500. One man from a hamlet adjacent to Lamalera lost his wife, four daughters and four other close relatives, all of whom had gone to trade in the market at Wai Teba. Damage was concentrated on the east side of the Lerek Peninsula, so that Lamalera to the west was protected; but the tsunami did reach far enough along the western side of the peninsula to strike Labala, where it destroyed a few houses and killed six persons. All available transportation (in this case only small passenger boats used for local trade) was commandeered for relief work, so that our communications to the outer world were broken off for two weeks. During that period, basing itself on uninformed speculation coming from the World Wildlife Fund office in Bogor, Java, the Jakarta newspaper *Sinar Harapan* reported the deaths of my two colleagues, my wife and two small children and myself. Relatives made frantic efforts to contact us, though we knew nothing of what was happening until the first boat in eventually brought a *Sinar Harapan* journalist to confirm that report and a telegram from the American Embassy asking us to telephone news of our fate. Today, we would be able to use the village's new short-wave radio, but in 1979 we would have had to travel some hundreds of miles to reach a telephone.

By 1982 I had accumulated enough sabbatical entitlement at Oxford to allow me to take one term off and had also, on a second try, been awarded a Social Science Research Council grant which permitted me to take a team including Dr Gregorius Heraf, a linguist at the University of Indonesia, and my wife Ruth, as a textile expert, to Lamalera for six months. Dr Heraf was both a native of the village and the author of a modern linguistic study of the grammar of the version of Lamaholot spoken there (Heraf 1978). We arrived in July and remained through December. This time I was able to make good progress on a general ethnography, with the main focus on the economy. The subsistence side of the economy was an important interest, but the circumstances of village life required that much time be given to major transformations
which the village has been subjected to in religion, education and occupation.

For decades, Lamalera has been a stopping point for the occasional adventurer who made it to this fairly remote part of Indonesia. By the 1970s, however, it began to attract more conventional tourists, and in the 1980s tourism has become a regular feature of life. In 1982 my work was interrupted when a boatload of thirty-three scantily clad but mostly middle-aged or elderly Italian tourists arrived unannounced and declared that they were going to stay a few days. They were accompanied by a Balinese guide who spoke Indonesian and English, but no Italian. There was also an Austrian couple with whom we could communicate in German, but they also spoke no Italian. The Italians spoke no Indonesian, English or German. There proved to be no way, therefore, to make them understand that the villagers wanted the women to cover up. Fortunately, after clambering around the rocky and fairly inaccessible village for a while and sunning themselves on the boulders to one side of the beach which shelter the latrine, they decided that they had seen what there was to see and made an early departure. A few weeks later five Italian men and a young woman parked a luxury yacht in front of the beach for several days. They posed no real problems except that they had picked up open-sided Balinese sarongs, and the men insisted on exposing themselves full-frontally to the beach and the houses behind when they adjusted their clothing. Anyone who wanted to know could ascertain that they wore no underwear. My friends were rather upset at European lack of decorum, and indeed I still have to listen to their wonderment, when the topic comes up, that people, namely Europeans, who are so rich can dress like savages. My only comeback has been that like the villagers, the Italians are Catholics, and therefore the people of Lamalera are responsible for their behaviour, not me. My position admittedly is weak, and my argument has not been generally accepted.

The village has had a resident Catholic missionary continually since 1920. The men who have held this office have not only been concerned with converting people to Christianity, but also have provided health care, education, training in crafts, material support in building brick houses, and many other services. They have also consciously attempted to alter the culture to replace pagan practices and beliefs with Catholic orthodoxy. Of course, the several generations of priests and nuns who have come from the village participate in the debates on doctrine and practice which go on within the international community of Catholicism. They also to varying degrees concern themselves with issues about the extent to which local culture should be defended from enforced changes. On a daily basis, few people spend much time thinking about whether their activities are traditional or modern, but such issues do come to the fore from time to time, especially when they become concerned with the fate of their subsistence fishery. Over the years
Father Arnoldus Dupont has increasingly changed the religious topography of the village. In 1987, he conducted a ceremony to the east of the main village site in a new grotto of European design, which for once did not overlay a location of pre-Christian religious importance. It is often very difficult to recognize quickly whether what you see is the new in older guise or the old in modern dress. Pseudo-traditions abound, and the anthropologist has to work hard to see that he does not invent them himself and fill up his reports with them. The villagers are so Christian that the anthropologist can easily appear to himself and others as being interested in merely antiquarian matters when trying to find out what remains of pre-Christian culture. But there are moments when things begin to happen which have nothing at all to do with Catholic belief.

In 1982, I witnessed the most spectacularly pagan ceremony I have ever seen. It took place on a hill overlooking the outsize reinforced concrete church of West German design which the village built with West German financial assistance in the late 1970s. Government clerks, school teachers and other educated persons organized the ceremony and paid for it. The whole thing was recorded on their tape recorders, but not photographed, because it was conducted at night by impersonated evil spirits who had to be kept out of the light. Everyone who took part, including the evil spirits and the director of proceedings, was Catholic, though not all of them were necessarily currently in good standing.

Father Dupont has taken over the annual ceremony at the beach which opens the whaling season in May. Although he urges the villagers to make the ceremony as traditional as possible, the tradition is largely his own concoction and the purpose is radically changed. Leadership has passed into his hands from the lord of the land, who formerly was responsible. In 1987, he was unhappy with the quality of cooperation he received. Unknown to him, the lord of the land later went down to the beach with his assistants early one morning and redid the ceremony in order to get it right. Like the other Catholic missionaries I have known, Father Dupont has been unfailingly courteous and helpful, even though I have been one of many outsiders who have imposed on his hospitality and added to his burdens. On three of my four visits, he has gone out of his way to help arrange housing. I realized, however, that I was not fully aware of how matters stood, when once in 1979 I innocently told him of a set of attitudes and prohibitions I had inadvertently stumbled across which were full of succulently anthropological interest. To my complete surprise, in his sermon on the next Sunday, he referred to these beliefs and told the flock that they should get rid of them. Since then I have attempted to be cautious, if honest, in discussing my findings with him.

I first went to Lamalera in the aftermath of the Sukarno period, when the national economy was flat on its back, but on the verge of reinvigoration by the military government. This was a period of
unusual success for the subsistence economy, combined with very reduced opportunities outside the village. Since then, the equation has changed completely. Whaling has been in continuous and now deep decline, while young men and women have left the village for modern employment in sufficient numbers to affect seriously the demographic balance, and to disrupt the labour pool for the boats. Where once I might have written an account of a vigorous and exotic way of life, today the task has almost become one of survival anthropology. The fact that talented people leave the village, while the unsuccessful remain, is known and deplored. It is bound also to have subtle effects on the anthropologist's job. Persons who go elsewhere do not necessarily sever their ties, but the best people who continue to take an interest in village affairs provide leadership from afar. They are no longer shaping and taking charge of local events on a daily basis, and it is at least possible that the withdrawal of talent is as disruptive as any other influence. A very visible sign that this is so is the number of disused boats lying in the sheds along the beach. In 1969 there were 29 boats that went to sea every day. I regard it a near miracle that 15 went to sea in 1987 and that some boats are still being rebuilt.

The result of four brief visits over eighteen years is bound to emphasise change at the expense of stability, but not necessarily exclusively so. You also see some things staying the same, despite good reason to expect otherwise. If the diachronic aspect of the study comes out more strongly, holism does not completely disappear. Things are interconnected in history, just as much as they are in functionalism and structuralism. In 1982 we were called in to help a friend's very ill son at a point when it was too late to get any medicine into him. The death was not only extremely distressing as well as unnecessary, it was also a commonplace sign that improvements in well-being are not only desired, but also can only come about through the introduction of modern facilities. Health care requires better communications and also electricity. These factors, if they are introduced, bring with them further transforming effects. The pace of change increases, and the anthropologist has to run harder to keep up.

The death, however, also had connections with a surprisingly diverse set of past events and present conditions. Among them are why the boat Léla Sapang cannot now be rebuilt, why members of the clan Léfo Tukan cannot marry persons in the clan Léla Ona, and the reason why the first European missionary went insane. Also linked are the death of a school teacher some hundreds of miles away in Ende, Flores, and the reason why a descendant of the village is now a medical doctor in West Germany. All of these circumstances are explained by historical events, some of them unique and trivial, but they rest on facts of social structure and beliefs about collective responsibility and liability for guilt shared between the ancestors and the living that anthropologists regard as routine topics for description.
Among the advantages of working with a team is the range of expert skills and knowledge that become available. In this respect I was fortunate to have worked with the marine biologist Durant Hembree and to have had available Gorys Keraf's excellent investigation of the local language. The most substantial result of the trips so far has been my wife's D.Phil. thesis on weaving and on the women's contribution to the economy (Barnes, Ruth 1984). Whether or not it proves that there are topics women can study that men cannot, there is no doubting that she did it with greater skill than I could have done. Furthermore, she did it when my time was fully taken up with other demands; so if she had not done it, it would have not been done at all. Her thesis has become a book (Barnes, Ruth 1988), well ahead of much of my own writing. On the other hand, none of us has really had the time necessary to carry out our projects with the thoroughness we would have wished. Because I speak the national language, and everyone in the village is to some extent bilingual, I have been able to get the job required done in the limited time available through that medium. Nevertheless, I have never been able to concentrate on learning the local language, as I did when in Kédang, and an awful lot of everyday conversation has gone on around me without my understanding it or picking up whatever clues it may have contained. Even if it were otherwise possible, I will never, on the basis of my present knowledge, be able to produce the kind of account that I have done for Kédang.

In comparison to some other universities, Oxford has generous provision for sabbatical leave, but it has never recognized the special needs of field-based subjects such as anthropology. Evans-Pritchard's ideal of two years of nearly continuous intensive research has therefore always been beyond the reach of the academic staff of the Institute of Social Anthropology. At the most, a teaching anthropologist could string together fifteen months of uninterrupted fieldwork, but that assumes that faculty boards, grant-giving agencies and the departments of foreign governments that issue research permission and visas can be made to operate according to the same deadlines. Then there are personal considerations and family obligations that must be thought of. Because we do not get to the field as often or for as long as we would like, the Institute's reputation for empirical research depends all the more on the work done by generations of students working for research degrees. They have built up a reputation which is vital for the survival of anthropology at Oxford, and which unfortunately we continually have to defend from bureaucratic rationalizers and the enemies of academic independence.

If I had my choice of career when I completed my work in Kédang, I would have chosen to be a permanent ethnographer. Few people ever manage anything close to such a life; those who do must be of the hardest and most determined type. For the rest of us, at least those of us who are lucky, the alternative is an academic career. In my case, academic employment was definitely a means to an end and certainly not an end in itself. It has inevitably become, however, a means which has overtaken the original end.

Only two professional ethnographers preceded me into the Lamaholot area. The first was Ernst Vatter, who went there in 1928
to 1929. Because his wife, who travelled with him, is Jewish, Vatter was forced out of his job at the ethnographic museum in Frankfurt and eventually had to flee to Chile, where he died in exile. The second was the American Raymond Kennedy. In 1950, after finishing his work on Flores, he returned to Java on his way home. Travelling to Jakarta, he was shot and killed while driving his jeep through the mountains near Bandung. In April 1987 Durant Hembree died while on vacation in Mauritius after completing a long and arduous stint on a Japanese research ship in the Antarctic. He never had the comforts of a permanent job or a permanent income. Though he hoped eventually to have such security, he had to make do with a series of short-term research postings, often doubtless more rigorous than anything I have put up with while doing ethnography. Among the sadder sides of fieldwork are the deaths of so many people, young and old, whom the anthropologist has known and cared for. Within a few weeks of our arriving in Lamalera in 1982, almost every house adjacent to our own suffered a death. People who were young and vigorous when we got to know them in 1970 have since died.

Although female tourists are now occasionally taken out in the boats, local women never go along when they are used for fishing. In November 1982, two boatloads of villagers in the Kopo Paker and the Demo Sapang sailed a short way down the coast to a place called Nubi to split planks for rebuilding the Soge Tēnā, in which I had frequently gone to sea. Both boats were heavily loaded with food, palm wine, bamboo water-containers, women, children, and men. Felling and splitting the trees was hard and awkward work, and my own hands eventually became too blistered and bloody to continue. Nevertheless, the atmosphere was cheerful and festive. We were fed four times during the day. In the evening, after the day's work was completed, we rowed back. Everyone, old and young, male and female, took part. Since there were many more in each boat than the normal crew of fourteen, some people sat on the outriggers to row, much like eighteenth-century prints of Moluccan kora-kora. The supplies of palm wine had been refreshed at Nubi from local tappers, and boys climbed around the boats passing drink to the rowers. The return soon became a race between the Kopo Paker and the Demo Sapang and a splashing battle between their crews whenever the boats came close enough together. The women showed themselves better boatmen than I had expected; and though the distance was not great, everyone displayed greater stamina than I could muster after a hard day's work. Everyone, of course, enjoyed the race, and for me it bought a sense of timelessness, an event and atmosphere which had repeated itself in one form or another on countless occasions since the ancestors fled here from a sunken island to the east. To me the trip suggested the very voyage their ancestors made to the west when disaster struck their homeland at Lepan Batan.

Lamalera celebrated '100 Years of Religion' in 1986, and the village filled up with dignitaries, relatives, and anthropologists
working on nearby Flores. A year later Bapa Jo (Bertholemeus Jo Bataona) complained to me that during the celebrations the place was so packed that you could hardly move. There were so many people, most of them strangers, that it was not like his village anymore.

In June 1987 I arrived with a crew from Granada Television. Granada had decided to revive the old 'Disappearing World' project. Even though I did not have the extensive knowledge of culture and language that their anthropological advisers normally command, I was better prepared than I had been in 1975. We had extremely good luck, in the sense that so many different things happened in the brief three weeks the film crew was in the village, but of course rarely did what happen perfectly fit the producer's aims. He got put out with my reaction when he told me to ask harpooners whether they ever get bored with hunting whales and whether they ever feel sorry for the whale. I too was surprised when he said that he had in mind that the film would be a sort of Indonesian Moby Dick. However, Brian Moser recently recalled that he too thought that the original project would be another Moby Dick. At least there has been continuity of misapprehensions. I did ask the questions, and Petrus Hidang had the imagination to give us some usable answers. But then he had been dealing with me for years, and in any case he has had plenty of training in coping with foreigners.

R.H. BARNES

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There seem to be two schools of thought about second fieldwork. The first is that because one has done it before, everything will flow much more easily the second time around. The second is that because one has done it all before, one is less diligent the second time around. There are also two kinds of second fieldwork, each with two subdivisions (this being an article about twos). The first is second fieldwork conducted in the same place and with some of the same people, but some years after the original study (Scarlett Epstein's *South India: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow* [1973] is a good example of this). The second is fieldwork conducted in a different location (such as Geertz's shift from Indonesia to Morocco). For both, there is a subdivision, with the second fieldwork either being concerned with the same issues as the first (as with the Epstein book), or involving a complete shift in focus (as with, say, Martin Southwold's shift in interest from kingship in Buganda to his study of Buddhism in Sri Lanka).

There is another possible difference between first and second fieldwork: methodology. A change in methodology will inevitably dictate a change in the style of fieldwork; furthermore, the change may be imposed upon the anthropologist. For example, several anthropologists revisit the area of their first fieldwork to conduct a commissioned study, usually on behalf or together with some

*Editors' Note:* Dr Banks has carried out fieldwork amongst Jains in Britain and India. Since his doctoral research, which has resulted in a number of papers (see, for example, Banks 1984; in press), he has turned his attention to the field of visual anthropology, one result of which has been the film discussed in this article as an example of 'second fieldwork'.
development agency. Where their previous work may have been a de-
tailed study of semiotics, entailing a lot of sitting around, chat-
ting, and generally getting into the flow of things, the new field-
work may consist of crawling around fields with a measuring tape
and interrogating people about crop yields.

I mention all these possible variations (and there are presum-
ably others) in order to contextualize in some way my own exper-
iences. First of all, however, it should be pointed out that many
of the contrasts I have highlighted are merely those that might lie
between any periods of fieldwork - first and second, third and
fourth, second and twenty-second. It seems to me that the crucial
aspect of second fieldwork is not so much its 'secondness' as the
fact that it is contrasted with one's first fieldwork, that crucial
crucible of anthropological testing.¹

Even trying to distinguish first from subsequent fieldwork may
be difficult. My first fieldwork - on lay Jain organisations - had
actually been conducted in two countries with two (almost) entirely
separate groups of informants.² I started first in the English
city of Leicester and spent about eight months there before moving
to the city of Jamnagar in Gujarat State, India. Did my work in
Jamnagar therefore count as second fieldwork? Certainly it was
easier: I had a rough grasp of the language; I knew vaguely what it
was I was looking for; and I had letters of introduction from the
Jains in Leicester, so making contacts was not a problem (as it
often is in urban fieldwork). If I am honest, I think my work in
Jamnagar was also sloppier. India was new and exciting, whereas
Leicester had been rather dull and I had concentrated on my work
more. Furthermore, while my study in Leicester had been confined,
for the most part, to a single Jain organisation, in Jamnagar I was
surrounded by them. And in every neighbouring town and village
there were still more. The very abundance of data meant that I
alternated between panic at the thought that I could never cope
with it all, and a rather cavalier attitude that I only needed a
few standard facts about a representative sample of them. Thus,
if I were to consider my Leicester and Jamnagar experiences as
first and second fieldwork, then the second time it did flow more
easily but I do not think I did it as well.

¹ This seems particularly so in Britain where fieldwork is usually
first encountered as a make-or-break, death-or-glory right of pas-
sage on the way to a doctorate. Anthropologists in other countries
often seem to treat it far more lightly, shuttling in and out of
'the field' several times in the course of a year (to the veiled
contempt of their British counterparts).

² Although there are groups of Jains in South India, the Jains
today have their strongest presence in the states of Gujarat and
Rajasthan. They are a strongly urban group and are often connected
with trade and business in some way. In the late nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries many Jains migrated from Gujarat to East
Africa, and from there to Britain in the 1960s and '70s.
For a number of reasons, however, I do not think the Leicester experience by itself counts as first fieldwork. For one thing, I do not think eight months is really long enough to make it more than a taste (I subsequently visited Leicester a number of times, and indeed continue to do so). More importantly, I had no more than a few days' gap between Leicester and Jamnagar, and so had no time to reflect on the first before starting the second. Most importantly of all, both periods of fieldwork were conducted within the same research frame (gathering data for my doctoral dissertation). Although anthropologists often state in the introductions to their books that they spent a period of (say) eighteen months 'in the field', it often transpires (in conversation) that sometimes as much as half that period was spent in a state or regional capital - obtaining permission, consulting archives, learning the language, searching for the actual village to study. While I spent two out of my nine months in India similarly engaged in the state capital, there is a sense in which my Leicester fieldwork was a preparation for my Indian fieldwork.

Perhaps a better comparison lies between my first Indian fieldwork and a piece of work I conducted last year, also in the city of Jamnagar. I have in fact visited Jamnagar every year for a period of six to ten weeks between my original work (in 1983) and my most recent work. On the whole these visits have been social, in that I have been in India for some other purpose and have gone to Jamnagar to see friends. Until last year, any work I did as an anthropologist was simply tidying up loose ends from the original study and maintaining my contacts.

In 1987, however, I had the chance to make a documentary film with an anthropological bias on more or less any subject I chose, provided it was within my competence as an anthropologist. I ended up back in Jamnagar and made a film that is a portrait of one of my friends (one who hardly ever acted as an informant) and in which Jainism is mentioned only in passing. Thus my second fieldwork, following the categories outlined at the beginning of this article, was conducted in the same place, with some of the same people, on a completely different topic (if the film I made is 'about' anything in the conventional set of anthropological interests, it concerns marriage and boundary crossing), and with a completely different methodological basis. Given these differences, it is obvious that I cannot make a direct comparison between first and second fieldwork such that I can analyse the quality of secondness (or, as I pointed out above, not-firstness). Many of the differences between the two experiences I would attribute to methodology and I am thus unable to compare like with like. Nonetheless, the fact that I chose a different methodology is an indication that I approached this second piece of work differently.

3 From October 1986 to October 1987 I held an RAI/Leverhulme Film Fellowship at the National Film and Television School.
But would it not be fair to say that I had the opportunity to make a film and simply went to a place I knew well? If that were the case, then it is not so much that I chose to pursue a second period of fieldwork employing a different methodology as that I was presented with a ready-made opportunity which I simply accepted. The answer is, not really. I had already made a couple of short films and therefore, when presented with the opportunity, knew that I wanted to pursue a different kind of ethnography on film. Furthermore, there is a strong feeling amongst makers of ethnographic films that one should only shoot a film after conducting a significant period of research in the area first, so Jamnagar was a choice, but so was Leicester. Finally, until about a fortnight before flying to India I was actually going to make a completely different film. I withdrew from that (it was to have been a film about Jain initiation) when I realised that the methodology was, for my purposes, unsuited to the task.

My reasoning was that film, when its strengths and weaknesses are understood, is as useful a methodological tool for anthropological analysis as any of the other tools (open-ended questionnaires, participant observation etc.). To reach this argument I have to demonstrate that I chose to use film in this way for a period of second fieldwork, or at least, that I recognised this potential while I conducted the fieldwork. The assumption I wish to counter is that one simply shoots a film and that this should not count as 'serious' fieldwork. Some anthropologists are scornful of ethnographic film, often expressing the sentiment that 'anyone can point a camera'. Of course this is true, just as anyone can be a participant observer. It is to be hoped, however, that an anthropologist would point a camera with more care and forethought than just anybody, just as an anthropologist would observe and participate with more care and forethought. In the context of this particular article I also want to show that a certain tension exists in second fieldwork when a different methodology is applied. On the one hand, if the work is conducted in the same place and/or with the same people, there is a desire to use the new methodology to reach similar conclusions to those reached the first time around. On the other, there is a desire to let the new methodology lead the way, suggesting new channels of investigation. Thus, having already decided that I wished to use film as an anthropologist in a general sense, I was ready to return to Jamnagar to use film to explore a ritual I had already observed and documented in the standard way (through tape recordings, note-taking, pre- and post-event interviews etc.) twice before.

The reasons why I discarded the Jain initiation film are many and complex, and some of them stemmed from factors beyond my control. However, the more I thought about it, the more uneasy I felt. Simultaneously, the more I discussed my back-up project with friends and colleagues, the more certain I was of its strengths. My unease with the first project stemmed partly from the fact that I could not guarantee knowing any of the participants personally (I would just have to take whichever initiation occurred in the area while I was there), and partly from the fact that a film of such a complex event would demand either a very specialised audience
or a large amount of dense verbal explanation. Although I think that films with a heavy commentary are often useful, for example in classroom teaching, I find they rarely succeed as films, the reason being that the capacity of film to communicate visually and through authentic verbal narrative is suppressed and rendered subordinate to a mediating voice which interprets the events of the film to the audience. Such films are basically lectures with illustrative slides.

The implication of the above is that certain subjects do not make 'good' films. Far from it. Simply, the circumstances surrounding the making of the Jain initiation film were such that I would have been steered into making the kind of film I did not want to make. In other circumstances - for example, had I been living in Gujarat for some months prior to filming and found a suitable ceremony with articulate actors - a film on this topic would be more likely to live up to my expectations. More generally, in the period between my doctoral research and preparing for the film, I had increasingly begun to question the generalizations that characterize much traditional British anthropology. In planning the Jain initiation film I had unconsciously started from the standpoint that the one instance of initiation shown in the film could stand as a type, specifically of Jain initiation and more generally of Indian religious initiation. It would thus be a representative of the class or set 'initiation'. As I pressed on with the planning I realised the limitations of such an approach: I was going to subordinate the traumatic experience of a life-changing event to membership of an abstract, academic category. From my past experience I knew that the indigenous logic was actually the converse: after feeling some profound dis-ease with everyday life, or after some traumatic event (the death of a loved one, for example), the individual casts around for a solution, of which initiation as a Jain monk or nun is only one of several alternatives (the others being anything from suicide to marriage).

Thus, rather than 'initiation' being a set of which the events in this film would be a member, the set as perceived by the actors would be that of 'solutions to problems' of which initiation would be a member. Of course, if I was lucky I might find an initiate who could explain that they chose initiation as a solution to a moral or spiritual problem rather than to demonstrate a social process, but I still felt there was a danger of an audience seeing only the latter meaning. In England, the only solution to this dilemma that came to me was to film an initiation that did not happen, since only this would jar the audience out of whatever preconceptions they might be bringing to the film. (There is, by now, a small but significant body of non-event documentary films, of which the most famous is probably Michael Rubbo's Waiting for Fidel [1974, in which he fails to meet Castro.) Of course, the chances of finding such a (non-) occurrence were even less than those of finding an actual initiation.

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4 No one should doubt that Jain initiation is traumatic, since it involves renouncing all family ties, possessions etc., and thereafter living a life of self-discipline and deliberate discomfort.
I have digressed for too long in describing the film I did not make to the exclusion of the one I did. In itself, however, this reveals the (fairly obvious) fact that once one has conducted fieldwork it is much easier to predict the nature and course of subsequent fieldwork.

The back-up film was one that I had had in mind for a year. In 1986 I went to Jamnagar to conduct preliminary research for the Jain initiation film. A Jain friend of mine, Raju, kept me company while I visited people at home, interviewed Jain monks and nuns, and called in at temple offices. In between trips Raju took me to his home and arranged meetings with friends of his I had met on previous visits. When I was conducting my first fieldwork I had always felt a slightly guilty pleasure about being with this group of people (actually, several groups, with Raju as the common member): pleasure because I enjoyed their company, guilt because it meant time away from the Jains, my objects of study (some of these friends were in fact Jains but we rarely talked about Jainism).

The idea for the film came to me in a narrow street in the Muslim quarter of Jamnagar. Raju and I had just left a Muslim house where we had taken tea with a group of women friends, and I was discussing with him the unusual nature of his many friendships - with Muslim women, postmen, wealthy traders, bicycle mend- ers and tea-stall boys and, of course, with a foreigner. It was the time I had spent with Raju and his friends that I remembered most fondly from fieldwork, and it was memories from these experiences that I would most often use when telling non-anthropologists about India. I also found myself drawing on these memories when trying to counter stereotypes and illusions: about caste, the position of women, Islam, poverty and so on. What more natural, then, than to conduct fieldwork, in this case using film, that drew on friendship, personal experience, a sense of place and belonging? Moreover, these seemed to be qualities which were ideally suited to the medium of film. Film can show, in a way words never can, a person's familiarity with a street, a doorway, a room; the laughing glances exchanged between friends, the teasing banter, the gestures of hands - these things cannot be described, only demonstrated.

Paul Hockings has recently claimed (1988) that film has an essentially phenomenological character as opposed to the deductive and empiricist character of conventional anthropological analysis. I would dispute this as a general statement on the grounds that certain shooting and editing techniques can subvert this character, but I would agree that the 'observational' style of documentary shooting and cutting is most likely to preserve the phenomenological character. Meaning is seen to arise from the casual and unscripted interaction between people and between people and objects. Nancy Munn has also recently demonstrated, through the linked concept of 'experientiality', that casual and formal interactions are located by actors (and thus for analysts) in a grid of space and, more importantly, time. These seem to be obvious truisms, but it

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5 Munn outlined her argument in a seminar paper entitled 'Kula
is crucial to realise that events take place not as representatives or examples of abstract categories ('marriage payments', 'dispute settlement'), but as contingent phenomena where the status of the person with whom one interacts, one's previous contact with them, one's predictions of future contacts and a whole constellation of related factors may singly or together be far more important than the label which is attached (by analyst or actor) to the interaction.

In my first fieldwork, framed as it was within the context of a doctoral dissertation and preceded by theoretical courses in anthropology, I was looking for labels and categories. Indeed, I would get a mild thrill of pleasure when I found myself observing rules of purity and pollution, or finding a mother's brother helping a sister's son. I think if I had made the Jain initiation film, especially if it had been with strangers, I would still have been looking for categories and labels. Instead, by making the film about Raju and his friends (in which, as a friend of Raju's, I was involved as a player as well as a documenter), I knew that everything I saw and heard had no simple explanation, that because I had my own experiences and knew many of theirs any attempt to generalize or to single out a statement or event as 'typical' or representative would have to be endlessly qualified.

At one point in the film, for example, Raju explains that he had wished to marry a Muslim woman but that family pressure had prevented it. Fine, an example of India's well-known rigidity (the 'caste system' being the archetype): different religious groups rarely interact and certainly never intermarry. But the event is more complex and is not time-bound. Raju, for example, goes on to explain that he and this woman still meet, that they both feel tied to each other and would help each other in times of trouble. He shows us gifts she has given him (rings, a watch) and points out that some of them have (popular) Islamic significance. Elsewhere in the film we see him in interactions with members of his family which are intended to demonstrate (from an editorial point of view) that the family is not authoritarian and repressive. We also see him with another Muslim woman, not his ex-fiancée but one who, in a sense, stands for her. All these events or phenomena (described weakly in words, as here, but demonstrated in the film) reveal that the marriage would merely have been one strand in a complex web of relationships between Raju and his family, between Raju and his ex-fiancée, between Muslims and non-Muslims, and so on, which stretch across apparent boundaries of time, space, gender, religion, kinship. To try and capture such data in writing needs great skill and an intensity of description that only the truly devoted could bear. Film, on the other hand, is a medium almost ideally suited for such ethnographic reportage. I would not claim that film

produces better ethnography, merely that it produces a different ethnography. 6

But film has its limitations too, one of which is reflected in the title of this article. The medium of film (fiction as well as documentary) has its own conventions, some of which relate to length. Conventions may, of course, be broken, but they need to be understood. With regard to this film, I was faced with budgetary constraints which meant that I could not really afford to go beyond forty minutes in total length (each of those minutes costing approximately £250). So the problem was, how to fit an entire fieldwork experience into forty minutes?

The question brings up another difference between first and second fieldwork. In my first fieldwork I had the luxury of time and the handicap of inexperience. So little was known about the Jains (and nothing at all about the Jains in England) that while I gained a frisson of excitement at stepping into virgin territory, it was extremely difficult to know exactly what I should study. In the end, in common with many other graduate students, I blundered around for my allotted time and then constructed a thesis out of what I had. I exaggerate, of course; I did work to plans (constantly changing) and set myself goals and objectives (rarely achieved), and I know in general that I was trying to fit the Jain organisation I had studied in Leicester into some kind of typology of Indian Jain organisations. But I had no clear sense of the way in which the data I collected (from interviews, conversation, eavesdropping, documents, inscriptions, observation) related either to each other or to the written synthesis I produced.

In contrast, film stock is expensive, delicate, cumbersome and limited. Most importantly, although the image, once recorded, can be altered in numerous subtle and not so subtle ways, it stands in some sort of iconic relationship to its source (its relationship to the viewer is far more complex and subject to change). Thus, in shooting the film, I had to be constantly aware of what was being recorded, what had gone before and what might possibly follow, in order to achieve the objective of forty coherent minutes. I also had to consider simultaneously the internal narrative of the film and the wider context within which the film was located (the budgetary constraints, the fact that someone else needed the equipment after I had finished with it, the fact that I had to fulfil a contract). Neither of these factors, the internal and external narratives of field research, had really bothered me during my first Indian fieldwork.

The internal and external narratives of fieldwork each have two perspectives: the view of the fieldworker and the view of those he

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6 Hockings (1988) would claim that this kind of ethnography would, or should, bring about a change in anthropological theory. This is a claim I support (Banks 1988), and hope to argue for in greater detail in the future.
Forty-Minute Fieldwork

or she works with. Most writing on fieldwork seems to consider only the fieldworker's perspective and is usually concerned only with the internal narrative (that is, how the work is done and how it hangs together). Of course, in certain types of fieldwork - for example, surveys undertaken for a development organisation - the external narrative (why the work is done and what will happen as a result of it) and the view of the informants are intimately linked, which presumably explains why these aspects are ignored together.

With regard to my first fieldwork, I looked on it as something akin to detective work; the internal narrative was that of the detective story. I took as my model not Agatha Christie's Durkheimian world - a bounded and tidy social universe disrupted by inevitable violence (Christie makes frequent allusions to the 'presence' of evil and the fact that some individuals are inherently evil) and restored again after a period of catharsis - but the complex experiential world of Ross MacDonald, one of the genre noir writers along with Chandler, Hammet and others. In MacDonald's world, the 'crime' itself is rarely unproblematical, the past casts a constant shadow over the present (young people are often trying to break out into the future but must know the past before they can do so), characters often unknowingly hold vital information which, when revealed, brings the responsibility of more autonomy in their lives, and the detective merely pulls the pieces together in a way that is rarely pleasing to anyone. Often the detective is used (and abused) by the other characters.

In order to be as objective as possible I tried never to be seen to be working during my first fieldwork. With each individual or group I tried to pretend that my presence at that moment was accidental and that I was 'off duty'. In this way, I felt, people would be off their guard and treat me as a friend or, at least, as a harmless interloper. Sometimes I even staged unnecessary interviews, pen and notebook at the ready, to gain an introduction to someone I wanted to meet. Casual meetings, where the real work was done, could then follow. Throughout, however, I was convinced that I was on the track of something (the solution to the puzzle) and that to reveal my quest would spoil my chances of attaining it.

Shooting the film four years later I found myself in a contrary situation. With a 16mm camera and 1/4" tape recorder, the difference between working and not-working is all too evident. Every time the cameraman lifted the camera to his eye or I placed the headphones over my ears, the subjects we intended to shoot were alerted to our intentions. Practitioners of observational cinema have numerous techniques to desensitize the subjects to the equipment, but none can be wholly successful. In this case, although we could familiarize the subjects with the equipment, the huge crowds we drew every time we attempted to film outside were a constant reminder of our activities. Thus, I embarked on a strategy of revealing as much as I possibly could about what I was doing and what I wanted to achieve. I also constantly questioned the subjects about their feelings and thoughts. In place of the detective approach of my first work, I was devising a strategy where, instead of the documenter embarking on a quest for some hidden object of desire, subject and documenter collaborate to create that object.
Thus the film that resulted is not a piece of pure observational cinema (because it contains interviews, monologues to camera and pieces of action that Raju himself instigated), but it is, I would say, an attempt at collaborative cinema.

Despite the differences between working and not-working in the two situations, there was a common problem: what, in the eyes of the subjects, was I actually doing? Anthropology in general is a difficult enough subject to explain and, paradoxically, the fine details seem even more inexplicable. Most anthropologists have a fund of (often humorous) travellers' tales about the natives' attempts to understand and explain what it is the anthropologist is doing. But the problem is a serious one and becomes more serious if one returns somewhere.

During my first fieldwork I was faced with the problem that there was a very obvious explanation for what I was doing: I was studying Jainism and would write a book that would describe the religion. The difficulty was, why had I come to Jamnagar, a backwater city of no obvious Jain significance? Surely I would have found my work easier at one of the major pilgrimage centres or in a big city such as Bombay. Eventually, most people decided that I had come to Jamnagar because of its links with Leicester and that I had known Jains there because it was my home. Of course, some of my informants understood that I was studying them, not their religious tradition, and that I had chosen Jamnagar because it was a backwater, where I would find ordinary people, not religious specialists or those whose awareness was heightened by pilgrimage. But when I tried to explain this to others, their eyes glazed over, much as my own did when I had to listen to long religious discourses instead of being able to ask questions about money, family history and the like.

Shooting the film, I was faced with a similar problem. Raju and his family and friends decided early on that I was making a film about 'ordinary' people. I was preparing a kind of catalogue of activities - getting up, going to work, having lunch, meeting friends - that I would use to show my students back in England what everyday life in India was like for what Raju called 'medium-class' people. But my decision to be open (together with the fact that I was working with a small group of people, many of them close friends) enabled me to circumvent the misunderstanding. For example, one day Raju took us to visit another friend at his shop where Raju wanted to use the telephone. I was using a highly directional microphone and, as we filmed the telephone call, I heard Raju say *sotto voce*, 'It's Raju speaking; listen, don't take any notice of what I'm going to say. They're making a film about my shop [Raju sells suitcases and tin trunks] and I'm pretending to give you an order.' Then, in a much louder voice he said, 'Hello, is that the Raj Tin Factory? I'd like to order six trunks...'

Afterwards, I challenged him with this. He was embarrassed and a little shocked, but explained that we needed the call to establish a reason for going to the factory the next day but that he needed no more stock. Still, we had to show how the business ran, didn't we?

I was touched by his forethought and concern but tried to
explain that we wanted to film things naturally, without contrivance. If I used the sequence at all, I said, I would include the 
*sotto voce* section. This Raju forbade, feeling it made him look foolish, but it was the start of a closer understanding. The real 
breakthrough came a few days later when he explained the circum-
stances of his engagement and the failure of his marriage plans.
Afterwards, as we descended from the roof where we had shot the 
scene, he said, 'I think I know now why you wanted me for this 
film; it's because I'm not ordinary, because I've done things other 
people haven't.' This was true; I explained to him that I thought 
by showing the unusual, people would understand more clearly what 
is usual and taken for granted. From then on, Raju behaved entire-
ly in character, exhibiting the quirky traits that endear him to 
his friends, such as arranging a surprise picnic and horse-cart 
ride for ourselves and a couple of other friends, an event which 
forms the final sequence of the film.

While informants like Raju may, during the course of fieldwork, 
come to understand the methodology and aims of field research, the 
use that is made of the data afterwards may be more obscure. My 
first fieldwork, like that of so many others, was directed towards 
gaining a doctoral degree. On one level, this was fairly compre-
hsensible to my informants, though they thought it was fairly useless. 
The mercantile ideology of Jains in western India is so strong that 
few could believe I had no ambitions to go into business, and 
several, seeing the opportunity I presented, offered to set up 
import-export schemes with me. On the whole, however, they were 
pleased with the perceived topic of my research, feeling that any 
attempt to communicate the principles of Jainism to a wider audience 
should be encouraged. They were less clear about why I should be 
the one to do this, but several people came up with explanations 
that involved a previous link in past lives. My return, to make 
the film, caused few problems, I think because many of my former 
informants saw it as a purely private project involving me, Raju 
and my cameraman, and unconnected with my research.

If nothing else, an increased collaboration with the subjects 
of field research should bring about a heightened sense of respons-
ibility on the part of the fieldworker. This is particularly so 
when one considers the wider context of the research, a context 
which includes knowledge of the end state desired. In my case, 
returning to make the film, I was contractually obliged to produce 
a forty-minute visual document. My personal obligation was to try 
and synthesise one man's life and a four-year friendship in a way 
that suited my aims as a filmmaker. Raju wanted to please me and 
to cooperate (sometimes in conflict with my own wishes, as with the 
telephone to the tin trunk manufacturers), but was at the same time 
conscious of his own responsibilities. For example, after he had 
told us about his ex-fiancée and we were packing up to leave, he 
called the camera back and asked to be able to say something more. 
He then asked for the name of the woman to be deleted so that she 
should not be embarrassed if the film were ever shown in Jamnagar 
as it will be). Raju realised, of course, that her name is still 
preserved on the original sound tape (and indeed that I knew the 
name all along), but he trusts me to do as he wished.
In summary then, for my 'second' fieldwork I chose a new methodology and rejected a plan for working on a topic related to my first fieldwork but involving strangers in favour of a new topic involving people well known to me. Even without a methodological shift I would have thought it likely that second fieldwork brings about a shift in attitudes on the part of the fieldworker, away from 'detached' observation and generalization and towards the personal and individualistic (see, for example, Southwell's very personal study of Sri Lankan Buddhism [1983]). Part of this shift may be due to the fact that one has greater confidence to experiment and less to prove - certainly no examination to pass. Paradoxically, however, I found (and I think many others have done so too) that although one may be more self-indulgent on second fieldwork, one is also more aware of the political and social context of one's work - what I earlier termed the external narrative. I found myself having to contend with a number of different demands - to be fair, honest but discrete in portraying Raju, to distil what I wanted to say into forty minutes, to explore and exploit the richness of film as an ethnographic medium. These had to conform with the internal narrative of the work, the actual events and day-to-day interaction.

Although he has not yet seen the final version of the film, Raju seems pleased with it. I sent him cassettes of earlier versions and consulted him frequently by letter during the editing. For me, one of the greatest benefits of working with film has been the access to my work that it has allowed my subjects. There are a couple of copies of my doctoral thesis in Jamnagar (in English, obviously), but I doubt if anyone has ever looked at them. I imagine they will gather dust, while the tape of the film wears out through use.

MARCUS BANKS

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7 As this article goes to press I have just returned from India where I showed the final version to Raju and obtained his comments. I hope to write about this in the near future.

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CULTURAL CRIMINOLOGY: THE WORK OF RENÉ GIRARD


René Girard is the most disquieting of contemporary cultural theorists. For twenty-five years he has been developing a hypothesis which aims not merely to reveal the structural dynamic of all societies, but to uncover the substance of all mythologies and recapture the moral vitality of the world's greatest literature. This venture has been undertaken with complete disdain for almost every critical presupposition of modern scholarship: it is explicitly didactic, unashamedly anachronistic, impenitently ethnocentric and conducted with an apocalyptic sense of its own finality. Although Girard stands aloof from current academic debates, he does not claim originality. His project attempts to give more systematic expression to ideas found in the Gospels and reflected in the works of Sophocles, Shakespeare, Cervantes and Dostoevsky. Yet this is not a literary endeavour: the only adjective that Girard believes to fit his hypothesis is 'scientific'. It is a science of peculiar potency: 'Men will finally be liberated by means of this knowledge, which will help them first to demystify the quasi-mythologies of
our own history and then, before long, to demolish all the myths of our universe' (Seapegoat, p. 108).

It is impossible to read Girard without feeling a sense of embarrassment. His ambitions are so grandiose and quixotic that it is disconcerting to be invited to share them. Even temporary sympa-thetic engagement is only begrudgingly given to an author whose claims are, on his own admission, 'scandalously out of proportion with the general temper of the times' and whose literary background constitutes 'the worst possible recommendation' for his research ('To Double Business Bound', p. 200). It is difficult to dispel the uncomfortable sensation that the Girardian project is liable to be a débâcle painful even to witness.

The tone of Girard's writing serves to undermine rather than enhance the reader's confidence. There is an endearing innocence about an author who can acknowledge that 'Freud's comments on Greek tragedy are undoubtedly the most profound of all modern pronouncements on the subject', when he has stated in the previous paragraph that his own approach 'incorporates all Freud's observations' and 'also takes into account those elements that escaped his... attention' (Violence and the Sacred, pp. 204-5). There is a repugnant childishness about an author whose ethnographic insights take the form of pronouncements such as: 'The African peoples close their eyes to nothing; in fact, they keep them wide open' (ibid., p. 105), or 'Western civilization... has enjoyed until this day a mysterious immunity from the most virulent forms of violence' (ibid., p. 33).

It is not as though Girard's writing is opaque or his meaning ambiguous. It is just unselfconscious to the point of self-exposure. For example, on the opening page of Violence and the Sacred he accuses Hubert and Mauss of circular reasoning and then demonstrates that his own logic is rather dubious by arguing that 'if sacrifice resembles criminal violence, we may say that there is, inversely, hardly any form of violence that cannot be described in terms of sacrifice' (p. 1). Arguments such as this are probably not intended to be purely deductive, yet the absence of empirical evidence suggests that Girard's conclusions are supposed to be self-evidently true. He spares himself the tedium of providing anything other than the most perfunctory scholarly apparatus. In his most substantial work - diffidently entitled Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World - there is less than one reference every three pages. Instead, Girard subjects himself to the scrutiny of two interlocutors. This procedure is perhaps meant to convey the impression that some kind of critically informed discussion is taking place. If so, it would be more convincing if the other participants restrained themselves from proclaiming their belief that Girard's theory allows mankind to see 'the alpha and omega of human culture' (Things Hidden, p. 63) and brought to the master's attention some of the possible objections to his hypothesis.

Also irritating is Girard's apparent unwillingness to modify, or even qualify, his statements in the light of subsequent research. His most recent books are just as dogmatic as the earlier ones. Girard and his interlocutors are convinced that men are 'ritually
eaten so that their power is absorbed' (ibid., p. 83). What do they make of the questions regarding this type of causal reasoning raised by Needham's article on *kìpu* (Needham 1976)? Have they since had doubts, following Arens, that cannibalism was as widespread as early ethnographers believed (Arens 1979)? We do not know, because Girard does not appear to have taken the opportunity to augment his anthropological reading between the book's first publication in France in 1978 and the revised English version of 1988. This is not entirely unexpected, for Girard's sources are neither numerous nor recent: Frazer, Evans-Pritchard and Lévi-Strauss are the only anthropological authors with whom he shows any familiarity. Even with them, Girard is apt to disregard unpalatable information. In *Violence and the Sacred*, he cites the sacrifice of cattle by the Nuer as evidence for his contention that 'all victims, even the animal ones, bear a certain resemblance to the object they replace' (p. 11). But while an ox may bear a certain resemblance to the man for whom Girard believes it to be a substitute, can the same be said of the cucumber that sometimes replaces the ox (Evans-Pritchard 1956: 42)?

Girard is accustomed to criticism of his work. His response to it is characteristic:

> There is always an outcry, especially in such a troubled time as ours, against powerful evidence, but such quibbling is not in the least important intellectually. To go even further, it is possible that the revolt against the type of evidence I have described may grow in strength and we may once more be faced with the legions of Nuremberg or their equivalent (*Scapegoat*, p. 96).

Anthropologists will presumably be amongst the recruits to the armies of obscurantism. According to Girard 'the sciences of man have been dogmatic and philosophical for so long that they have lost sight of what scientific knowledge is really about' ("To Double Business Bound", p. 214). Ethnologists in particular are guilty of 'minimizing, if not actually justifying', the enormities perpetrated by the societies they study (*Scapegoat*, p. 62).

Girard's reservations about the discipline make the indifference shown to his work by anthropologists less than surprising. Although *Violence and the Sacred* was first published in France in 1972, it has had little impact in Britain, even upon the discussion of topics with which it is centrally concerned. In *From Violence to Blessing*, Maurice Bloch notes that although *Violence and the Sacred* bears a 'superficial similarity' to some of his own work, its conclusions are, for some unspecified reason, 'unwarranted' (Bloch 1986: 198). The collections *The Anthropology of Violence* (Riches 1986) and *The Anthropology of Evil* (Parkin 1985) contain only incidental references to Girard. At present, the hypothesis that aims to demystify all mythologies features as no more than one of the host of unwanted references that any comprehensive literature search is liable to uncover. Will this situation change? Should it change?
The publication of almost all of Girard's work - some of it newly translated - by the Athlone Press provides an opportunity to re-assess the matter. *Violence and the Sacred* is now available in paperback. *Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World* covers much of the same ground as *Violence and the Sacred* but in the form of a dialogue with two psychiatrists. "To Double Business Bound": *Essays on Literature, Mimesis and Anthropology* and *Job the Victim of his People* are also now available, while *The Scapegoat* provides the best introduction to Girard's thought. In addition, there is a collection of essays, *Violence and Truth*, edited by Paul Dumouchel, in which Girard's followers apply his hypothesis to a variety of questions in theology, economic theory, history and literature.

Girard's argument is fundamentally the same in every book, and, indeed, on almost every page. His techniques of persuasion are unsophisticated: ceaseless repetition, earnest entreaty and hysterical denunciation are his rhetorical tools. But their effectiveness should not be underestimated, and the theory emerges as internally coherent, provocative and, if nothing else, original. Girard's hypothesis can be summarised as follows.

1) Social order is secured by difference. When socially differentiated, human beings suffer from a form of ontological insecurity that leads them to suspect that others may, by virtue of difference, enjoy some superior state of being. The practice of imitation is an attempt to deal with this insecurity. Imitation of another involves sharing the same desires. This results in a mimetic rivalry, because the satisfaction of a single desire is impossible for all who share it. Individuals may come to see others solely as obstacles to the realization of their desires. The outcome is uncontrollable violence in which all social differences are eradicated.

2) Because mimetic violence destroys difference, it can be stopped only by the reintroduction of difference. This is effected through the selection, often on the basis of some arbitrary distinguishing characteristic, of a scapegoat to whom all the difference-dissolving crimes of the mimetic crisis can be attributed. The scapegoat is separated from the rest of the community and killed with the active consent of all. By disposing of the scapegoat as the embodiment of undifferentiation and the obstacle of all desires, the participants in the mimetic crisis are unanimously reconciled to the differences that distinguish them one from another.

3) The scapegoat mechanism is the foundation of all societies. The scapegoat is perceived to be both the source of disorder and the means of reconciliation, and is thus considered sacred. Entities that are similarly undifferentiated, such as twins, are also treated as taboo. The founding murder is reenacted in the form of ritual sacrifice. Mythology disguises the arbitrary character of the process by investing the scapegoat with supernatural power and reaffirming its guilt. The collective murder of an innocent victim is thus presented as the salvific death of the divine being responsible for the original crisis. All human culture is thus an elaborate mystification of the crime that made it possible.

4) There are, however, a few works, most notably the Christian
gospels, that tell a different story. In these works the scapegoat is portrayed not as a supernatural being capable of causing chaos and effecting its resolution, but as the innocent and impotent victim of a social process. Because of the revelatory demystifying potential of this perspective, Western science has been able to free itself from supernatural explanations of physical and social events. As a result, modern Western society is remarkably free of persecution and is at least potentially able to perceive, for the first time in history, the arbitrary and murderous practices of other cultures for what they are.

When presented in skeletal outline, the radical nature of the theory is only partially apparent. Its capacity to undermine the most cherished perceptions is perhaps best exemplified by Girard's reading of the Oedipus story (in Violence and the Sacred, Scapegoat and Job). Everyone is familiar with the tale of the man who was fated to kill his father and marry his mother. According to Girard we have all been deceived: Oedipus is innocent; he did not kill his father or marry his mother.

This belated rehabilitation of Western civilization's most notorious criminal is based on the belief that the legend presents the scapegoat mechanism in a mythological, and thus distorted, light. The basic structure of events in Oedipus Rex, Girard argues is entirely consonant with the pattern of the mechanism: there is a crisis of social and natural order; a man, distinguished as an outsider with a limp, is held to be responsible for the disaster; his crime is the destruction of difference, for he is said to have united in himself the incompatible roles of husband and son; he is expelled from the city, and order is restored. What makes the account mythological is its acceptance of the reality of the Oedipal crimes. The unique achievement of Sophocles is, Girard suggests, that he allows the alternative view to surface in the hero's protestations of innocence.

Two objections present themselves. What is Girard's justification for re-opening the case when he has no new evidence? And is he not confusing myth with history by attempting this procedure at all? Girard's response to these questions is to offer a text that is structurally similar to the Oedipus story and to challenge the reader to retain a sceptical response (Scapegoat). The text is Guillaume de Machaut's Judgement of the King of Navarre, a long poem which opens with a description of a city afflicted by disaster. The cause of the suffering is revealed to be the wickedness of the Jews. The guilty men are made known to the population. They are massacred and peace and prosperity return. Any modern reader will discern in this story a record of the persecution of the Jews. To do this it is necessary to doubt the reality of only one element of the narrative - the claim that the Jews were poisoning the wells. Although the poem is a fiction, there is no doubt in the contemporary reader's mind that it reflects actual events of a particular historical kind. Why, Girard asks, should the Oedipus myth not be read in the same way?

It is a difficult question to answer. Both narratives include supernatural elements that are automatically disregarded by modern readers. Both attribute to individuals crimes that are, although
not impossible, improbable. Why should it be that in one case understanding should hinge on the assumption that the murder of the Jews is both historical and arbitrary, while in the other it is assumed that the expulsion of Oedipus is mythological and justifiable? Why should it be that the kernel of truth in Guillaume de Machaut's poem is taken to be its demonstration that society is prone to treat the Jews as scapegoats, while the central truth of the Oedipus legend is the reality of the murderous and incestuous desires of the human infant? It may now seem entirely obvious that this is the appropriate reading of the two texts. But, Girard argues, this is not the result of any fundamental dissimilarity in the texts themselves. It is because Western culture has discovered - albeit only recently and after horrific delay - the technique for decoding the mythology of its own persecutions, but is still incapable of discerning similar distortions in the myths of ancient and primitive cultures. Would not many pre-Holocaust Europeans have read Guillaume de Machaut and perceived some timeless truth about the malevolence of the Jews? Would not a contemporary Islamic fundamentalist be liable to do the same? What about a member of a society accustomed to witchcraft? How can we be so confident that we are able to decode the Oedipus myth when the techniques for dealing with the myths of our own culture are so newly acquired and so far from universally acknowledged?

The significance of Girard's hypothesis emerges only gradually. His suggestion is that awareness of the scapegoat mechanism should be extended to all texts and all cultural practices in which the process is not already perceived to be at work. His assumption is that the mechanism is the foundation of all social order and therefore ubiquitous. He admits that he may be wrong, but invites others to employ his techniques on every available myth, seeking, as a moral duty, to exonerate the innocent and reveal the centrality of crime to every social formation.

Before focusing on the innumerable difficulties raised by such a programme, it is worth remarking on the nature of its appeal. One of the potential attractions of the Girardian project is its moral seriousness. Underlying Girard's perception of contemporary academic life is his frustration with the way in which the humanities and social sciences appear to have made themselves irrelevant by disregarding the moral imperatives that originally informed them. He would like intellectual endeavour to be re-infused with a sense of moral purpose. This in itself is a laudable ambition. But as the supply of prophets of moral regeneration generally exceeds demand, Girard's theory must be assessed primarily on its intellectual merits. These are not insignificant, and are most clearly seen in relation to the work of three earlier thinkers: Nietzsche (to whose critique of Christianity Girard makes a spirited response), Freud and Lévi-Strauss. Girard's reworking of structuralist and Freudian themes is worth examining in more detail.

While Girard accepts that culture is formed by difference, he
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does not relegate the undifferentiated to the margins of his en-
quiry. His underlying question is: 'How is a society possible?'
Because he assumes that social systems are differential he is
forced to ask the supplementary question: 'How is difference possi-
ble?' His answer, perhaps inevitably, is that difference is made
possible through the exclusion of the undifferentiated. (The un-
differentiated is that which, although distinct, is defined by its
identity with something else - a twin, for example - or which im-
plicitly denies the reality of difference by combining or incorpor­
ating what is incommensurable.) His project is an attempt to re-
cover an awareness of what has been excluded by examining the means
of exclusion. In that respect, Girard is engaged in a deconstruct-
ive practice, applying to mythology the techniques that Derrida
used to such alarming effect on philosophical and literary texts.
The Girardian project is, therefore, like deconstruction, both a
continuation and repudiation of the structuralist concern with the
closed and differential nature of cultural systems.

Lévi-Strauss himself admits that 'a discrete system is pro-
duced by the destruction of certain elements or their removal from
the original whole' (Lévi-Strauss 1969: 53). But he makes no real
attempt to analyse the process of exclusion. Although he perceives
ritual as an attempt to return temporarily to the undifferentiated
immediacy of primordial chaos and as an escape from differentia-

ted order, he does not see much significance in the similarity between
the pre-differential and the anti-differential. Ritual is but 'a
bastardization of thought, brought about by the constraints of
life' (Lévi-Strauss 1981: 675). Girard, on the other hand, is able
to give an account of ritual which better reflects its fundamental
importance to the continuity of social groups. The infringement of
otherwise binding taboos re-enacts the breakdown of order in the
original mimetic crisis, and sacrifice commemorates the founding
murder. The recapitulation of the process serves to renew the dif­
ferentiated social order, not by temporary negation, but by restag­
ing the events that created it.

Lévi-Strauss is interested in binary opposition. Girard is
pre-occupied with triangular relationships. In this respect he is
closer to Freud, whose late work, especially *Totem and Taboo* (1919)
he finds sympathetic. Concerning the Oedipus complex, there is no
such agreement. Girard is, of course, of the opinion that Freud
misread the story by accepting the reality of the hero's crimes.
But there is also a fundamental discrepancy between the Freudian
and Girardian perceptions of the Oedipal triangles. For Freud, de-
sire for the mother is primary and the rivalry between father and
son is a consequence of shared desire that may be surmounted by
identification with the father. Girard argues that the son's de-
sire for the mother is itself the result of the son's imitation of
the father and that both desire and rivalry are mimetic (*Violence
and the Sacred*). The Freudian triangle, he points out, is itself
reliant upon imitation for its reproduction (*Things Hidden*).

Girard's theory has certain advantages for the comparative
study of inter-generational conflict, because it emphasizes that
desire is socially constructed. The identity of the rival and the
object of desire are not determined by biology and transmuted by
culture but derive from social practice alone. For this reason, Girard's paradigm is the more readily applicable to societies where familial arrangements differ from those envisaged by Freud. Girard's own example is the rivalry between nephew and uncle described by Malinowski in *The Father in Primitive Psychology* (1927). But the notion of mimesis could also be employed to explicate complex patterns of conflict in a patrilineal-society. The Tallensi, whose inter-generational disputes Fortes struggled to align with Freudian orthodoxy, might serve as an example (Fortes 1959).

Like Freudianism, Girard's theory can be applied to any and every subject. 'Hominization', incest, kingship, initiation and taboo are just some of the topics with which he deals. The universal applicability of the theory is, however, not necessarily an argument in its favour. It is simply a result of the theory's structure. Girard can take any binary relationship and postulate that it depends upon the exclusion of some third element. His theory is, in a sense, no more than a sociological version of the law of the excluded middle: 'a' and 'not-a' are distinct because of the exclusion of 'a and not-a'. Like Bochvar's three-valued logic (Rescher 1969), Girard's hypothesis suggests a system in which the third 'paradoxical' element would infect any compound of which it was a part with its own meaninglessness. Unlike the proponents of polyvalent logic, Girard assumes that such a system would be unworkable. At the core of Girard's project are two assumptions: first, that the principle of bivalence is not (as Lévi-Strauss imagined) an intrinsic feature of the human brain, and secondly, that the principle of bivalence holds in all human societies. Despite the fact that his entire project exploits the tension between these beliefs, Girard does not defend them individually, nor explain his decision to conjoin them.

Although the theory is of universal applicability, the range of evidence to which Girard applies it is narrower than he imagines. He only considers violence that is either competitive or exclusive in motivation. Conjunctive and inclusive forms of violence escape his attention. He has nothing to say about rape (his paradigm of mimetic violence is two men fighting over a woman; the possibility of violence towards the object of desire does not seem to occur to him) or other forms of coercion. At a societal level, he ignores wars of conquest and colonization. Intra-societal violence is his concern; inter-societal conflict, despite its ubiquity, is ignored. This omission is a serious blind spot. Inter-societal aggression is frequently justified by attributing to another society precisely the kind of anti-social practices that are imputed to a scapegoat (Arens 1979). Yet Girard takes such accusations to be evidence of the prevalence of cannibalism and human sacrifice. His ability to decode the mythology of intra-societal violence thus depends, at least in part, upon his uncritical acceptance of the mythology of inter-societal conflict.

Girard himself points to another inconsistency in his project. In an essay on Camus in *To Double Business Bound*, he re-opens the case of Mersault, the hero of *L’Etranger*. Mersault might be supposed an archetypal scapegoat - a man unjustly condemned to death on account of his anomalous behaviour at his mother's funeral. Yet
Girard sees him as a juvenile delinquent who receives his just deserts. Camus, he feels, presents his character from a 'warped perspective' in which the 'secretly provocative nature of the murder is never acknowledged and the reprisals of society are presented as unprovoked aggression' ("To Double Business Bound", p. 31). As a reading of the novel this has much to recommend it, but from a Girardian point of view it is problematic. It raises numerous questions to which Girard offers no answers: How are the guilty to be distinguished from the innocent? Are sacrificial victims always innocent, and if not, does it matter?

Girard's distaste for dealing with the difficulties raised by his own ideas should not obscure his exceptional readiness to engage with the work of earlier theorists. It is this which explains his considerable popularity in France - a country in which he has not been resident for forty years - where a survey conducted in 1981 found him to be the fourteenth most influential of contemporary intellectual figures (Lévi-Strauss came first, Dumézil thirty-fourth and Bourdieu thirty-sixth [Bourdieu 1988: 252]). For a generation whose intellectual development has taken place within perimeters staked out by Lévi-Strauss, Freud and Nietzsche, Girard's work must come as an extraordinary liberation. He has turned these boundaries inside out and used them to define a unified theory of his own. As an act of subversion, Girard's project is without parallel. He has created a mirror in which the cultural assumptions of the age appear grotesque and misbegotten. That this reflection may be a distortion is all too evident. What is really disconcerting is the extent to which the image is recognisable and familiar.

For English readers less absorbed in the milieu to which Girard is reacting, the impact of his work is bound to be muted. Even so, the sense of embarrassment experienced on encountering the Girardian project is not wholly inspired by its author's solecisms. Because it offers a complete theoretical perspective independent of conventional academic presuppositions, Girard's work provides a unique vantage point from which to review one's own assumptions. The embarrassment it induces is perhaps also that of self-consciousness.

MALCOLM BULL
REFERENCES


When, in the early 1980s, I first moved into 'Wanet', a small and isolated valley in the Yorkshire Dales National Park, I did not really know what to make of the conversations I kept hearing local people enjoying. For instance:

'These rioters in Liverpool are disgusting,' Doris announces in her farmhouse kitchen as daughter Sarah clears the dinner plates, 'and now it's London too! Why do they let them behave like that? They should lock them up with rats!'

Seated opposite, her mother-in-law Polly nods assent; and cousin Sid, standing smoking by the Aga, joins the consensus: 'Aye! Happen rats are too good for 'em.'

Doris warms to her task: They should gas them, and then take them in unconscious. They need their wilfulness birched and beaten out of them...why do they let hooligans do things like that to innocent policemen? You know, Gran, I've never seen sights like on TV last night. Kids just throwing stones and petrol-bombs...why not stop them? Shoot at their legs and maim them. Kids of Bill's age would soon do different if they saw their elders hobbling about a bit!'

Doris wags a knowing finger as her son Bill looks down into his dessert-dish, furiously spooning the last of his custard rather than meet her eye. 'Because there's no excuse

'Wanet' is a pseudonym. The results of this research are to appear in more extended form as a volume in Manchester University Press's 'Anthropological Studies of Britain' series. For encouraging the development of the present piece I am grateful to Marilyn Strathern. See also Rapport 1986.
for causing grief,' Doris continues, 'like tipping policemen's
cars over, or like smashing the windows of innocent shop-
keepers on the way.... You know Sid, I just can't understand
why the government is being so weak and soft. They go on
about an illness, and finding causes. Huh! There's no ill-
ness: these rioters just need their wilfulness braying out of
them!'

Sid wrings an imaginary neck as Doris pauses for breath.
Polly adds her blessing: 'And that's what it says in the Bible
too.'

'Right, Gran.' Sid emphatically stubs his fag-end out on
the sole of his workboot. 'A few machine-guns'd soon sort
them out! And you just get cheek from these kids and nowt
else. From fifteen or sixteen to... about thirty: they're all
just the same. Bread-grabbing buggers.'

My experience of settling into Wanet involved the understand-
ing of such habitual encounters between neighbours by the context-
ualization of their words. I came to realize that it is to miscon-
strue these words to remove them either from the context of the
regular conversations which Sid and Doris, for example, agree to
hold, or from the context of the individual views of the world
which they possess, and to which the words they use in conversation
efficiently allude.

Traditionally, inhabitants of Wanet were mostly pastoral hill-
farmers, stocking small acreages high on steep fells, or else arti-
isans - blacksmiths, joiners, butchers. But increasingly, farms
have had to expand for economic survival. Thus land is sold, house
prices rise and cottages are renovated for 'offcomers' (those who
come off aways) who want holiday or retirement homes or to escape
the cities and start a new life.

More peripatetic offcomers swamp Wanet's 500 residents in the
summer tourist season. Therefore, Wanet's 'settled village harmony'
and 'outstanding natural beauty' are given the careful protection
of the National Park Committee and its wardens: building and plan-
ning regulations are stringent.

The travelogues proclaim that in the 'still tranquility' of
Wanet's salubrious air, larks can still be heard as in the days of
the Norsemen. Doris' brother-in-law, Arthur, regaling an audience
of offcomer walkers and cavers in The Eagle pub of an evening, ex-
plains that in fact the Norse heritage is the imbuing of Wanet loc-
als with a Viking spirit: industry, self-reliance and 'helping
themselves to be helped' in a harsh climate. Arthur is ambivalent
about offcomers. He meets a lot, working as a factory-hand in a
town over the hills; and it would be nice if more of these newcom-
ers who were good at badminton could help pull the Wanet team out
of the Third Division. But when the British Army cadets come
tramping through and the local girls start fawning over them like
tarts, then Arthur puts on his Guinness tee-shirt. It reads
'Genuine Irish'. It will be different, he knows, when there is a Wanet Liberation Army posting sentries on the fell tops, keeping all these 'Herdwicks' over in the Lake District. Who really needs flocks of shaggy tourists anyway?

Back on her farm, Doris and her husband are members of the Wanet Commerce Corporation. Like the Dale's publicans, artists and guest-house owners, they realise their business survival now depends on campers and caravanners, not just livestock. But then Doris also misses the past; when all these offcomers, long-haired 'Arabs', layabouts, 'Hebrews', desert-rats, were wandering elsewhere, pestering someone else.

Sid agrees. He calls offcomers 'trailing bastards'. Refusing to stay home, they come here and stick their oars in where they do not belong. They drink 'gnats' piss' lager in The Eagle, and then vomit in Wanet gardens. They leave farm gates open, while they strip naked in the fields. Or else they move in, form committees, cadge grants, and then get their building plans passed by the Park. Meanwhile, Park wardens act to locals like 'little Hitlers'. They are all liars, creating the problems they pretend to solve. And one nosey offcomer just brings in ten more, to steal locals' homes and jobs. But one day, Sid knows, they will all fall over their wallets and break their necks. Or the blind effeminate weaklings will succumb to the sodden fells. And the remainder can be done away with, so no more secrets leave the dale for outsiders to laugh at and capitalise on: offcomers are due to die.

Sid did not like me when I arrived, as anthropologist, in Wanet Town, the Dale's nucleated settlement of about 150 people, and others did not have a lot to say to me. I was anomalous, and I did not realise at first how words were properties of individuals, and used in habitual talking relationships with neighbours - less examples of a standard English idiom, which I had naively assumed we might all share, then counters in regular exchanges.

Shortly after my arrival, playing darts in The Eagle, I noticed Doris and husband Fred, and Sid and wife Cathy walk in for a nightcap and a game of dominoes. They had come from an evening at The Mitre, another pub a few miles away, at the head of the Dale. Before its present owner changed it, The Mitre was called The Hayrake, and Doris and friends were still in the habit of referring to it as The 'Rake. So, being friendly, I wandered over and asked her how they enjoyed it down The 'Rake; and said that next time I might accompany them down The 'Rake. Doris mumbled the politenesses due a potential customer, while Sid and others glared. What sort of usurping urban pup would steal their words, pretending knowledge of the form of life surrounding the old (and for them continuing) Hayrake, while simultaneously broadcasting his ignorance of what lay up-dale from down-dale. It was 'up The 'Rake' at least!

I found myself having to listen to Sid and Doris conversing, then, for example, before being able to participate myself. Doing
so, interactions seemed matters of habitual symbolic form: Sid and Doris would converse in formulaic fashion, one regular phrase eliciting another. Moreover, each seemed to possess a personal store of these often idiosyncratic phrases which were amended, expanded, juggled for conversational fit, but were basically repeated at different times, like abstracted sections of longer loops of thoughts. These impressions were to solidify when Doris and Sid became my conversational partners.

Doris once had a rather upper-class, offcomer neighbour who spoke the language of local government and would write pleading her case for farm improvements. But when he died, her plans were dismissed peremptorily. My relationship with Doris began, then, as a neighbourly translator of National Park edicts and writer of requisite, duplicated hyperbole. Then I also offered free help on the farm and slowly became ensconced in their farmyard. That is, I learnt to shut up, not give silly opinions on herd management which would lead to 'barneys'; learnt to avoid Doris' favourite, trained sheepdog, not pet it as if it was a stupid, city dog; and learnt to muck out the shippon ('cattle-shed') whilst Doris was milking, not drive the tractor, disturb her cows or risk her knocking me down in a set-to.

Stringing together the phrases which Doris regularly used in our different conversations, I reached what I felt was something of an understanding of a world view only partially expressed, in attenuated form, at any one time. Doris found people fated to live lonely little lives in a dump of a world, controlled by a harsh market. At best, one may find pride through business independence. But England was a sick country, peopled by fickle gloaters over misfortune, who would steal, lie, even kill, to stop you bettering yourself. English cities were bedlams, full of poor stock and ruinous habits: the results of cross-breeding. The urban working-classes were disobedient, lazy and vulgar. They refused posh standards, would not work, merely sought easy, short-term gain, and rioted. Urban youths were pathetic: taking everything to excess, with no self-control.

Once, Doris found Wanet a haven. Through the hard, traditional way of life, you could work to prove yourself and gainsay all detractors. Farming is the hardest of jobs, and on her farm, work was the first priority. With her ambition she should have been a man, but through her industry, and her commandeering of a husband and then children to help, Doris had caused the little farm her father left her to expand. Her effort had been awful, but the farm became her sanctuary. Then the dirty, unskilled and quarrelsome city folk invaded, and the National Park was set up to keep everyone poor and dependent, and eventually all dressed alike, like in Russia.

It was in her family that Doris found her last refuge of happiness - where her children would copy her and Fred, and be made loyal and respectful, and everything would be shared. But if she had to live in those riotous cities, Doris could contemplate suicide. Cities must be improved so people would not want to leave and threaten her home and family. Doris always voted Tory, as her father taught her. For only their governments may do the right
thing by inculcating in the cities realistic, upper-class values of respect for the law and property, religion, manners and hard work.

Gradually then, Doris and I negotiated relations which we found reciprocal and apt: I would keep farm secrets and work; she would keep my dim wits a farm secret. I was almost family. This found expression in our sharing of regular forms of interaction. As we ate or farmed, there was an accompanying verbal formula, such as:

Doris: Nay, I'm really stored tonight... You know, Nigel, Sid's tongue is something else. He's really scornful. I hate that... You haven't said anything to him about our set-up here, have you?
Nigel: Not a word.
Doris: Well, don't, will you. And make sure.
Nigel: I don't say anything about the farm.
Doris: Well be careful of Sid, 'cause last night in the pub I was telling him you were deep, and had little to say, and said nowt about anything unless you were asked. And didn't think much at all about anything, and that's true isn't it?
Nigel: Well, yes... I keep quiet.
Doris: Right, but Sid said he just told you a whole load of lies, and then he could find out whatever he wanted to know from you. So you haven't told him owt, have you?
Nigel: Nope.
Doris: So just be careful. Fred can tell him anything he needs to know.
Nigel: Right.

Sid was a jack-of-all-trades, and a frequent visitor to the farm - but, Doris felt, no more trustworthy than anyone else. When Sid came to do some 'blocking' on the farm, I was assigned to assist. He warned me that I had better 'shape', if I was to keep up with him; that my hands would suffer at the rate at which he expected to be handed the rough concrete blocks; and that if I ever gave him cement with bits of gravel in it, he would soon kick me where it hurt. However, if I watched him quietly, in six months he could teach me so much that my brain would probably explode.

On the work site, I obediently attended to Sid's building supplies, while he repeatedly lectured me about the shortcomings of students, his family, sex, his feet, beer and Radio Two disc-jockeys. Over the weeks, we developed a routine, and I pieced together something of Sid's world view. Sid found the English way of life threatened. Traditionally, it meant a world where work and experience earned you wealth and respect: a world, supported by every true Englishman, of master craftsmen and apprentices. Jealous foreigners had always wanted to adulterate England, but now Sid
found conspiracy within: England was at the mercy of drug addicts and perverts, the lazy, spoilt and immoral. They were making Englishmen destructive, hostile and selfish. Even Sid's wife kept threatening to leave, and drove him to girl friends.

Children, Sid felt, should be silent pupils, grateful for any time adults afforded them. But with such poor role models, was it surprising that all today's kids wanted was 'aggro'? They were too cute by half in school, and then, like parasites, claimed any work afterwards was 'a hassle'. They preferred to boast fake experience with paper diplomas, or stay in expensive colleges forever. Even at home, Sid's children refused him respect, and argued black was white.

Sid felt that any animal that did not want to work was sick, and frankly, should be killed. Certainly he would not even spit on a 'punk' if he was on fire! In Wanet, at least, adults must start supporting each other: refuse to pay for grants through taxes, and wrest their home from offcomer insurrectionists. Come the civil war, true Englishmen would help the police crush all radicals, hooligans, students alike, and send the Blacks back to their barbarous African tribes.

Working with Sid, as with Doris, reciprocal talking relations were gradually reached which we found apt and legitimate. He taught me; I learnt I was in Wanet under his sufferance. For example, teaching me 'women', Sid would confide who he lusted after, and lusts he had satisfied. The following became a verbal formula often repeated, as we 'blocked' or drank in the pub afterwards:

Sid: You know, Nigel, I like proving people wrong. And proving them right if they're right. Like I'd do everything I could to prove you wrong, just like I would to prove you right... Recently, I proved someone wrong by making love to his wife when he was only about six feet away.

Nigel: What! Really? Was he watching?

Sid: No. But he claimed that there was no one for his wife but him, and she did too, so I was happy to prove them both wrong. Now, only three people know that, Nige: you, me, and his wife....

Nigel: Right.

Sid: But if four people get to know, I'll know where to come looking - right?

Nigel: I'll remember.

Sid: You do, lad. Fancy another drink?

Nigel: Sure!
Doris and with Sid. We had negotiated a similar reciprocation of repeated phrases; words rebounding off each other, appropriate and familiar.

Beyond the ellipsis of such oral discourse may exist various differences between speakers' larger world views, but at least superficially Doris and I, and Sid and I, met in mutual confidence about 'others'. Like the tirades I had heard from Doris and Sid concerning the strangeness of outside youth, I had learnt to converse about the vagaries of outside imbroglio, using such notions of the wider world as tokens of regular, internal conversational exchange. To criticise others' manners and mores appropriately was ever part of the currency of situational belonging.

NIGEL RAPPORT

REFERENCE

1. Malcolm CHAPMAN
A Social Anthropological Study of a Breton Village, with Celtic Comparisons. D.Phil.

This thesis is a social anthropological study of a fishing village, Plouhinec, in the south west of the department of Finistere, in north-western France. It is based upon two years of participant observation.

Chapter 1 introduces the commune of Plouhinec, with some demographic, occupational and political history, and modern consequences and developments of these. The fishing industry, and the place

Editors' Note: The research theses in social anthropology listed here are those for which higher degrees were awarded by the University of Oxford during the calendar year 1987. The text of each abstract is as supplied by the author in the copy of the thesis held in the University's Bodleian Library. Those wishing to consult a particular thesis should apply to the Bodleian or to the British Library Lending Division (BLLD), which should be able to supply microfilm copies or reprints on request. However, 'restricted' theses are not available for consultation until the date specified. Unfortunately we are not able to provide BLLD reference numbers for the theses listed here as they were not available at the time of going to press; the numbers should be available from the Bodleian later in the year.

We should like to thank Mrs S. Surman of the Bodleian Library for her help.
of tourism, are discussed.

Chapter 2 describes the experience of coastal fishing for crayfish (langouste), and oceanic fishing for tuna (thon blanc, or germon).

Chapter 3 discusses the relationship between men and women, and the local history of alcohol use. The association of the marine environment with excessive alcohol consumption is stressed. The division of labour, of space, or propriety and of comportment, according to sex, are related to occupation and alcohol consumption. Comparisons are drawn with other European areas.

Chapter 4 is the heart of the thesis, treating of the relationship between (and opposition between) two different occupational groups, the small farmers (paysans) and the fishermen (marins-pecheurs). The difference between these two groups is discussed as it is exemplified in settlement patterns, alcohol use, attitudes to giving and selling, family relationships, and the character and reputation of the two groups in question (as they see themselves, and as they see one another).

Chapter 5 discusses the question of pays, which are conceptual social and geographical units of 'belonging'; two contiguous pays, Cap-Sizun and the Pays Bigouden (on the frontier of which lies Plouhinec) are used as examples.

Chapter 6 discusses Breton/French bilingualism in Plouhinec, with treatment of the social and historical background to Breton use, the domestic context of bilingualism, and the problems that a language such as Breton presents to the learner and to the ethnographer.

2. C.I.P. DAVISON
Environments of Integration: Three Groups of Guarani Migrants in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. D.Phil.

Anthropological theories of ethnicity have often addressed the relationship between ethnic identity and culture. This thesis explores this area of interest with reference to the lives of three groups of Amerindian migrants in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Bolivia. The difference between ethnic integration, where a minority population retains a separate identity while participating fully in regional society, and assimilation, where a minority's participation in the wider society leads to its disappearance is explored.

The three groups of migrants, whose lives are described in the ethnographic core of the thesis, occupy three different socio-economic 'niches' within the regional society of Santa Cruz. One group live in a small village on the fringe of Santa Cruz city, an urban area containing about half a million inhabitants. This group hold a small land area and rely mainly on casual wage labour and self-employment in both the rural and urban sectors. The second
group hold a larger land area slightly further from the city, and produce sugar-cane and other crops for the urban market. The third group live in an ethnically mixed town which houses the employees of an important sugar refinery. This group are the families of full-time, waged factory workers.

The thesis examines and compares three areas of cultural life in the three groups: community leadership, language use and household composition. It is argued that the differences in behaviour and attitudes exhibited by the three groups are the results of the influence of the 'environments of integration' in which they live.

3. Tamara DRAGADZE

The Domestic Unit in a Rural Area of Soviet Georgia. D.Phil.

This is a case study of a regional enclave of traditional culture which has retained its character despite the impact of the ideology, economics and politics of the Soviet Union of which it is a part. To understand even partially how such a rural society persists in the face of a Soviet communist, modernizing regime's pressures, a description of the domestic unit is important. As an anthropological study, the thesis contributes to the more general field of Soviet studies through its approach. By focussing on a set of villagers and one of their most intimate concerns, domestic life, we may see how they perceive the Soviet system in which they live, and how they have responded to its impact. Through the examination of the relations between the structures of domestic units and their particular social and economic context, this work adds to the general study, in Social Anthropology, of institutions.

The Introduction locates the fieldwork village in Ratcha, a province in the Northwestern hills of Soviet Georgia. The study then recalls some of the most salient features of the Soviet regime and how they relate to and are interpreted by the villagers. The main body of the work describes and analyses the tasks and organization of domestic units, the system of kinship and marriage within which they are rooted, socialization and the life cycle. Attention is also given to traditional domestic ideas and the everyday manifestations of morality according to age, gender and kinship status. Relationships between domestic units and the village and wider society are also discussed.

An important theme in this work is to seek to understand aspects of continuity and change in domestic units in Soviet times. The last part of the thesis discusses the influences of industrialization and urbanization in the last century and up to 1921, then in the Soviet period. I also suggest that the particular way in which collectivization was experienced by the villagers did not represent a radical change potent enough to challenge their customary resistance to interference in their traditions.
The main thesis of this work is that villagers use traditional structures in response to the distinctive conditions of Soviet life. Particular State policies have reinforced the role of domestic units and it is to this paradox that the study has addressed itself.

4. Clare JOHNSON-KROJZL

The Social Institutions of Turkish Migrant Workers in West Berlin. D.Phil.

Based on fieldwork in West Berlin, the thesis describes Turkish migrant social institutions in the context of relations between the Berliner and Turkish communities. The international and local economic background to international Turkish migration and the historical development of industrial institutions in Berlin are presented as central to the analysis of these relations.

In section one, chapters one and two describe migrant institutions and industrial development in Berlin and the Turkish national and household economies respectively. Section two, the ethnography, contains five chapters. Chapter three describes the Turkish village household and the conditions in which rural-urban and international migration occur. Chapter four describes the demographic and occupational background of the Turkish community in West Berlin and the economic and institutional effects of migration on the Turkish household. Chapter six gives an account of Berliner-Turkish relations in the context of important concepts and institutional trends in the host society which affect migrant institutions. Chapter seven continues this account, focusing on the second generation. A conclusion summarizes the main characteristics of the Turkish community in West Berlin in relation to the latter's own institutions.

5. Linda KING

Roots of Identity: Language and Literacy in Mexico. D.Phil. ['Restricted' until 16th July 1992.]

The thesis focuses on the relation between language and literacy in Mexico. It analyses the cultural and linguistic conflict which followed the Conquest of the Americas. At different levels it attempts to expose the underlying relationship between language and power, writing and knowledge, language and identity.

The first section, comprising Chapter I, offers a short introduction to some theoretical approaches to the study of literacy. The problem of defining literacy is considered and the importance
The second section discusses the nature of the indigenous literary tradition in Mexico, from the early Mesoamerican writing systems through to contemporary forms of Indian literacy and their relation to a modern ethnic consciousness. The concern over the place of writing in both colonial and contemporary Mexico is placed in the context of a continuing polemic over the future of the country's Indian population and the cultural identity of the nation. Chapter II offers a general account of pre-Hispanic literacy with specific reference to the Mixtec, Mayan and Aztec cultures. Chapter III describes the survival of the Mayan and Nahuatl languages during the colonial period and their adaptation to new forms of linguistic communication. Chapter IV discusses the nature of contemporary indigenous literacy.

Section three explores the relation between language, literacy and education. Chapter V offers a general description of the linguistic situation of contemporary Mexico with regard to the classification and distribution of the indigenous languages, types of bilingualism and diglossia. Chapter VI is devoted to a discussion of the pattern of illiteracy and the main theoretical arguments which have been put forward to explain this pattern. Chapter VII evaluates some of the contemporary literacy programmes for Mexican Indians.

The fourth section of the thesis concentrates on an analysis of the discourse of the illiterate in Mexico and attempts to show how cultural and linguistic conflict is reproduced at the level of discourse. Chapter VIII considers indigenous representations of language and literacy among the Purepecha, Nahua, Maya, Mixe, Totonac and Zapotec peoples. The analysis covers the relation between language, ethnic identity and historical consciousness, the role of literacy in the Indian languages and the representation of education. In Chapter IX the expression of illiteracy in the mestizo world is discussed and contrasted with that of the indigenous perception. Illiteracy is considered from the point of view of a culture of silence, and in terms of differing forms of mutedness, whilst literacy is, on the other hand, examined in terms of its symbolic value.

The thesis concludes with a summary of the main findings of the research and points to possible areas where anthropologists might make important contributions to the understanding both of Mexican society and of the nature of literacy.

6. Sharon MACDONALD


Through a social anthropological study based upon participant-observation fieldwork in a Gaelic-speaking community, the means
by which people living in the Scottish Gàidhealtachd perceive themselves, the Gaelic language, and their place in the Scottish nation is examined. In this way, a detailed ethnographic analysis is placed within a broader historical and political framework of attitudes towards the Scottish Gàidhealtachd on the part of the wider society. The results of this analysis suggest that we cannot understand the Gàidhealtachd apart from this wider framework, and that people living within the Gàidhealtachd select and reconstruct elements from outsiders’ views about Scottish Gaelic culture in defining their own identities and social values.

The thesis is divided into three parts. Part one, 'Historical Framework: Language, Land and Religion', charts a history of attitudes towards Gaelic and their interrelationship with national and ethnic identities; and examines the important social changes of the nineteenth century which brought about the crofting and strict Presbyterianism characteristic of the north-western Highlands.

Part Two, 'Social Organisation and Identity in Staffin', shows how the history discussed in Part One informs contemporary life in the Highland community of Staffin, and analyses the concepts and practices through which identities are articulated. The interest here is in localized self-classifications as well as national and ethnic ones, and the study pays particular attention to 'community', crofting, kinship, politics and religion.

Part Three, 'Ethnography of Language and Identity', focusses on the decline in the number of Gaelic-speakers, the growth of Gaelic development policies, and the way that these have been experienced within the locality. It is argued that the place that Gaelic has in identity has changed over the last half-century, and that this can be seen in differences of attitude and language-use between the generations.

7. Lindi MDHLULI
Bunguni: The Zulu Constitution. D.Phil.

The development of cultural and demographic aspects of Zulu institutional identity is frequently placed in the nineteenth century. Colonial and ideological interpretations of all cultural and environmental factors relating to the proper perception of past and continuing components of the Zulu state are responsible for the misrepresentation. In addition to tracing the early developments in contacts from the period of Dutch immigration, those significant constituents of the Zulu state – primary institutional evolution, inherited philosophical traditions, the habitational universe, population, self-descriptive nomenclature and its derivation, constitutional organization – have all been explained and set in traditional conception and interpretation. Thus Zulu national identity and institutional heritage have been set forth as the true markers
of an autochthonous and ancient human civilization of the African continent. Together these bear witness of an indigenous constitution and culture.

European interpretative studies have further postulated the disappearance of traditional African states and institutions. It is the main conclusion of this study that Zulu state institutions are an abiding and immutable inheritance of the region. This is no less because of the assessment that the Zulu state is a creative body of people pledged to maintain their inherited traditions and institutional heritage as for the recognition of the expansive and accommodating nature of their past state tradition.

Zulu definitions of constitutions comprehend the entire spectrum of cultural and demographic facts. The fundamental basis of the population derivation of the constitution, institutional creation, and their organizational base are seen together to comprise traditional understanding of constitutions. These values are not separable from ideas relating to the nature and purpose of government - umbozo - and its institutional life. To this extent, the permanent values in government of those institutions are seen to derive from their time-honoured, ancient, efficacious and lasting recognition by their indigenous inheritors.

8. Burkhard SCHNEPEL

Five Approaches to the Theory of Divine Kingship and the Kingship of the Shilluk of the Southern Sudan. D.Phil.

My thesis is about the anthropological problem of divine kingship. In its two parts I discuss two distinct, though in various ways interrelated, sides or aspects of the problem in question.

In the more theoretically oriented first part I discuss five approaches to the theory of divine kingship, those of Frazer (Ch. I), Evans-Pritchard (Ch. II), Weber (Ch. III), Fortes (Ch. IV), and Hocart (Ch. V). I give representative accounts of the five authors' images or concepts of divine kingship and show how each approach investigates the problem from a unique perspective and illuminates aspects that are not, or not sufficiently, brought out by the other approaches. In order to critically discuss the various approaches and to assess their heuristic value for future anthropological research, I discuss questions concerning their methodological and theoretical tenets and examine how the authors' intellectual, social, political, and personal positions may have influenced their interpretations of the ethnographical data available to them.

In the more ethnographically oriented second part I examine five aspects of the kingship of the Shilluk of the Southern Sudan and thereby reconsider questions concerning the nature and scope of the power wielded by the Shilluk king or reth. I discuss in turn characteristic features of the Shilluk social and political
organization (Ch. VI); Shilluk royal ceremonies of death and installation (Ch. VII); the problem of the fictional continuity of the royal office despite the death of its incumbents by examining questions concerning regicide and royal shrines (Ch. VIII); and, finally, power struggles and the question of succession to the royal office, firstly from a predominantly sociological, and then from a predominantly historical, perspective (Chs. IX and X).

The validity of the reth's claim to legitimacy rests on the belief in his being elected and possessed by Nyikang, the Shilluk's mythical hero and first king. This association of an immortal and divine being with a succession of temporary kings, as well as the problem of regicide, have repeatedly attracted the interpretative efforts of anthropologists and have made the Shilluk kingship into the prime ethnographical example of divine kingship in the history of anthropological thought. My reconsideration of the rethship of the Shilluk is, therefore, necessarily connected with questions concerning the theory of divine kingship, and inevitably reflects back upon and is in turn part of this theory.

9. Mary Alexandra SPYROPOULOS


Parking boys are a distinctive group of Kenyan street-children, mainly of Kikuyu origin, whose emergence in Nairobi dates back to the late 1960s. The term 'parking boys' is a popular one which refers to a boy who, as part of his strategy for obtaining money in order to support himself, participates in the 'parking business'. This involves directing motorists into empty parking spaces and protecting cars for a fee or tip. The largest proportion of parking boys come from Mathare Valley, a notorious city slum. They are most often from poor, single-parent families headed by women who frequently cannot provide for their children's needs.

This thesis is based partly on my own fieldwork, carried out in brief periods between July 1985 and August 1986, and partly on other sources. It focusses on the following crucial aspects of the parking boy phenomenon: the general economic and demographic environment; mothers of parking boys; organization and survival on the streets; and sub-culture. It is argued that parking boys are a product of rapid social and economic change in twentieth-century Kenya. More specifically, they are a product of the way in which such change has culminated in the existence of a group of women, mainly, although not exclusively, of Kikuyu origin, who survive in slums such as Mathare Valley largely as prostitutes, beer-brewers and petty traders. In the light of comparative material from South Africa and Zaire, it is evident, however, that Nairobi's parking boys are not a peculiar case.

It is argued that making children the focus of this study has
anthropological, economic, social and political justifications. Finally, it is stressed that parking boys should be viewed, not as 'delinquents', but positively, as children with courage, initiative and independence trying to make the most of the circumstances in which they find themselves.

10. Charles STEWART
Demons and the Devil: Greek Representations of the Supernatural with Special Reference to Naxos. D.Phil.

This thesis considers a group of demonic figures known in Modern Greece as exotica. The presentation is divided into three parts. In Part One the island of Naxos, site of sixteen months' field research, is introduced and the values and customs of a particular village, Apeiranthos, are described. Conceptions of God and the saints are examined along with representations of the Devil and the exotica. At present, the exotica are accorded increasingly less validity as an explanation of illness and other misfortunes. Chapter Four studies this decline in relation to modernization and offers a sociological account of their disappearance.

Part Two considers the exotica in a pan-Hellenic perspective, adopting a synchronic approach. Doctrinal distinctions between the Devil and the proscribed exotica are explicated and shown to be vague, allowing for confusion of the two. The demons are further revealed to share certain characteristics with the saints and the Panagia; in opposing each other saints and demons often work through the same media and assume similar forms. The symbolism of the exotica as a category is then studied. Although these demons are separately named, their properties overlap to a considerable extent, and they are best understood when resolved into a common pool of symbols. The imagery of the demons is seen to express antithesis to basic social values.

Part Three examines a triad of rites: baptism, exorcism and spells. Baptism constitutes the archetypal instance of exorcism where initiates are cleansed of their impure state, which is conceived to involve contact with the demons, before being accepted into the Church. Exorcism, a rite of spiritual healing, alleviates both psychic and physical illness, by expelling malignant demons. The texts of these exorcisms contain detailed information on the operation of demons, including the parts of the body afflicted, as well as times and places of attack. In the final chapter, Naxiote spells for jaundice, erysipelas, sunstroke and the evil eye are presented and compared with similar spells from throughout Greece. Although considered as 'superstitions' by the Church, these spells depend on the power of the Christian sara and do not conflict with a Christian world view. A brief conclusion summarizes the findings and relates this study to anthropological work on religion in literate societies.
Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass is a vigorous, allegorical and ironical contribution to — some would say attack on — anthropological theory. The word 'irony' even appears in the index (10 loci), but this comes as no surprise when one considers the influence of the eighteenth-century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico on Herzfeld's thought. For Vico, irony was the characteristic mode of the fourth and final historical phase, the ricorso.

Herzfeld's version of the ricorso calls for anthropologists to review their practice and learn from the mistakes enshrined in earlier theories and research strategies, and even in the etymologies of words such as 'theory' (root sense of 'observation', i.e. what one would expect to be doing as part of fieldwork), ethnography ('writing the ethnos', i.e. something akin to what we now call theory) and empirical ('experiential', i.e. not as objective as we would like to think). In his estimation, anthropologists have dwelt too much on the differences between, on the one hand, themselves as members of European societies and, on the other hand, the peoples of other societies who comprise the main objects of enquiry. Never mind that most anthropologists would immediately reject this charge by pleading 'not a conscious motive', we are most of us already implicated by the very language — or should one say 'discourse' — in which we present our researches to each other. After all, anthropology is 'just another mode of expressing identity, which trivializes its own significance by ignoring this condition' (p. 185).

The remedy for anthropology's taxonomic predisposition, which pictures us as a particular 'sort' of people, and them as another 'sort', entails accepting that the people under study are also anthropologists, though admittedly not professionals, and that their theories about their own ethnic uniqueness are no less privileged than our own. We must situate ourselves in the same frame as our subjects. Paraphrasing Said's paraphrase of Vico, Herzfeld observes, 'scholars adopt a rhetoric of intellectual disinterestedness that itself serves political ends, but at the same time they tend to assume that the people they have studied lack a comparable measure of intellectual curiosity' (p. 189).

Proposed phases of social evolution representing us as civilized and them as savages have, it is true, given way to more guarded phrasings such as simple vs. complex, pre-literate vs. literate, cold vs. hot, all of which are still misdirected, if less offensively so. Herzfeld contends that even trusted tools of anthropological theory, such as Evans-Pritchard's segmentation,
have been employed to typologize otherness, when they could equally well be applied to Western societies. Consistent with the programme of the ricorsi, these formulations are not to be ignored, but rather to be dealt with as 'instructive mistakes'.

Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass forms a part of the critical or reflexive anthropology movement, yet Herzfeld casts his net wider than the contributors to the recent collection Writing Culture (1986), most of whom criticize individual authors. Nor is it as exclusively theoretical as Johannes Fabian's Time and the Other (1983), although the two books agree on a great many points. Interwoven with his historical critique of anthropology is an exposition of Greek ethnography which the author sees as a looking-glass for the discipline as a whole.

Anthropology arose during a period when much of Europe was transformed by romantic nationalist movements. This transformation posed questions of participation in both national and European identities that had never been encountered before. Greece, which finally achieved independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1833, served at once as a lynchpin of European identity and as a whipping-boy for the various nation states. Greece ideally continued the classical tradition common to all European countries, but for those who travelled there it was hopelessly backward and oriental, 'a sad relic of departed worth' in Byron's words. The relation of European countries to Greece amounted to a searching speculation on European cultural identity which proceeded as much by revulsion and exclusion as by recognition and inclusion. The project of comparative anthropology arose shortly after, if not during, this period, and it too mediated on the same questions, although with more exotic 'savages' as a foil to 'civilized' European sensibilities.

The results of this dimension of Herzfeld's study show how Greek culture has internalized its insecurities about participation in European identity. In certain private or community-internal contexts, the people recognize and even value their romiossini, that flawed, possibly oriental aspect of their culture. Romiossini is about self-knowledge; its gleaming opposite, Hellenism, is about self-presentation. In the company of outsiders, especially Europeans, the same people will make an effort to speak a purer form of Greek and to exhibit qualities which assert an affinity with Europe as well as with illustrious ancient forbears. Herzfeld labels this predicament 'disemia', which he defines as 'not a static cultural condition, nor yet a simple listing of alternative codes, but a pragmatic contest between radically different ways of understanding social life' (p. 133).

The ethnography of Greece thus reveals certain tensions inherent in the discipline of anthropology itself. In both cases a rigid statism - and the word 'state' as Herzfeld demonstrates, exercising his Vichian flair for etymology, comports the idea of 'static' - is applied to extirpate, or at least gloss over, local variations. This holds equally for typologizing anthropological theories which reify otherness, as well as for nationalist programmes which promulgate a homogeneous culture. The detailed discussion of this issue, accompanied by rich historical and ethnographic evidence, offers a new perspective on the vexed question of
structure/praxis or rule/strategy raised by Bourdieu, Giddens and others. These antinomies govern the action of anthropologists, not just anthropological subjects.

Referring to Herzfeld, a Greek colleague once remarked to me: 'He has so many ideas; they are even pouring out from his trouser-legs'. In Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass, Herzfeld indeed pursues a great many trains of thought, making this a demanding, wide-ranging work which ultimately rewards the diligent reader. It will no doubt be a source of critical perspectives on anthropology for many years to come. Besides attacking the discipline's taxonomizing tendencies, Anthropology Through the Looking-Glass makes an incisive contribution to the ethnography of Greece and ushers in a new phase in the anthropological study of Europe, which may no longer be viewed, as it has been in the past, as too unexotic for interest. On the contrary, the study of Europe reveals clearly, as would a mirror, our own exoticism.

CHARLES STEWART


George Stocking's series on the history of anthropology continues to maintain the exemplary combination of scholarship and lucidity established in the first three volumes. Each volume provides a challenge to our narrow understanding of our disciplinary past, and with that challenge there normally comes some salutary reminder of half-forgotten precursors of today's avant-garde. This volume provides considerable food for thought for anyone involved in linking anthropology with literary theory and poetics, for those interested in applied anthropology, for those concerned with the political implications of ethnographic enquiry, and for arguments about multiculturalism and anti-racism. It also reminds us of an enduring enigma in British anthropology - the hostility to psychology and psychoanalysis - which continues to puzzle newcomers to the discipline.

As the editor explains in a footnote to his brief introduction, this volume was originally planned as a collection on 'anthropology between the wars' and only gained its eventual theme in the later stages of editing. The title itself is taken from a poem by Auden (who also crops up in a bit-part in Jeremy MacClancy's entertaining chapter on John Layard), which also serves to remind the reader of two sub-themes which run through the volume. As well as studies of American 'culture and personality' work in the inter-war years, the volume also examines dominant
anthropological personalities - Mead, Bateson, Sapir, Herskovits and Kardiner, as well as Auden's triumvirate - and their relationship to their culture: the Polish avant-garde of Malinowski's youth, the Greenwich Village bohemianism of Benedict, and Herskovits' association with the leading figures of the Harlem Renaissance.

The first two contributions are the most obviously relevant to the concerns of British anthropology. Stocking's own piece concentrates on Malinowski's brief involvement with psychoanalysis; as context, he provides a characteristically rich discussion of the early intellectual influence of Ernst Mach, a Freudian reading of Malinowski's fieldwork experience as revealed in his diary, and an account of his ill-fated attempt at ethnographic revision of the Oedipus complex. This is immediately followed by MacClancy's chapter on John Layard, who is probably best remembered for his huge Jungian monograph *Stone Men of Malekula*, published in 1942 but based on fieldwork from 1914 to 1915. Layard's eccentric progress on the fringes of British anthropology makes for amusing reading, but it is this very eccentricity - 'loony Layard' as he was immortalized by Auden - which weakens MacClancy's attempts to read some wider significance into his tale.

Bateson apart - in a nutshell, the story of his life - the rest of the book is American in emphasis. William Manson contributes a chapter on Abram Kardiner which is perhaps a little too close to its subject to interest the outsider. Walter Jackson's chapter on Melville Herskovits and his changing position on Afro-American culture is an excellent study which sets off all manner of resonances for the contemporary study of race, ethnicity and pluralism. There follow two chapters which, in different ways, try to pin down the important contribution of Edward Sapir to the study of culture, despite a relative paucity of major published statements. Richard Handler's route in is by way of a comparison of Sapir's poetry with that of Ruth Benedict; Regna Darnell provides a more conventional history based on the fragments of conference remarks, book outlines, uncompleted research proposals and funding applications. Both studies demonstrate Sapir's scrupulous intelligence and the continuing relevance of his critique of anthropological reifications of culture. And, while Handler's reading of the poetry never quite meshes with his broader intellectual theme, it is refreshing to read something on the relations of anthropology with literature not written in fashionably obtuse critspeak.

Finally, there come two chapters featuring the odd couple of Bateson and Mead. Virginia Yans-McLaughlin charts the sometimes bizarre contribution of culture-and-personality theory to the war effort - Bateson's analysis of Hitler-Chamberlain interactions, thoughtfully forwarded to Eleanor Roosevelt by Mead, is a useful warning to those who would celebrate his tremendous intelligence and creativity without remembering his equal capacity for unworldliness. The last essay, by James Boon, is a characteristically camp and self-conscious piece on inter-war Bali.

Behind these later chapters looms the presence of Boas. The inter-war years were, as well as the years of culture and personality, also the years of the onslaught on scientific racism by Boas.
and his students. There was no obvious British counterpart to this heroic episode, and we can perhaps discern a reason in the differing attitudes of Mead and Bateson to the usefulness of academic interventions in public affairs, attitudes which reflect the very different relationships between universities and the wider culture in Britain and the United States. Both were to the professorial manner born - Mead's father was an economist and her mother a sociologist, Bateson's father a famous geneticist - but where Mead's background predisposed her to a life of causes and interventions, Bateson's fitted him more for the role of detached and ironic commentator. Mead's uninhibited attitude to extrapolation - to put it kindly - at once earned her a central public role in American culture and consigned her to the outer darkness in British anthropology. How much, I wonder, of the continuing distrust of words like 'culture' or 'psychology' in British anthropology stems from a residual unspoken determination not to be confused with Margaret Mead or any of her works?

JONATHAN SPENCER


This book is a delight, a refreshing change from tedious exegesis of obscure passages in Mythologiques or Totemism. For Pace does not dissect depressingly well-known texts, but examines the more speculative, non-technical passages in Lévi-Strauss's writings and interviews. Through careful reading, he extricates the personal and political views of this otherwise highly private individual, emphasising Lévi-Strauss's inspired championing of cultural relativism and his strong opposition to the seemingly inexorable spread of a deadening mass culture.

Pace sites Lévi-Strauss in his social and intellectual contexts: he demonstrates the jerky evolution of his thought and reveals his magisterial ability to manipulate the media and academic institutions for his own opportunistic ends. Pace brings out well the rhetorical construction of Tristes Tropiques and the interested nature of his attack on Sartre.

Pace is also good on the sociological reasons for Lévi-Strauss's popularity, on his rather wet fielding of Marxist criticism as he moved further to the Right, and on the important, unresolved contradictions between his public and more academic images. In the 1950s and '60s, Lévi-Strauss could have influenced public opinion powerfully by expounding his informed views on the necessary harmony between nature and culture. But he chose not to, instead teasing his public with grand statements, then retreating into his academic niche. The image this book suggests is one of a
brilliant anarchist scared to discover the profundity of his own
soul, and so unprepared to state openly what he is.

It makes a good read and Pace tells his tale well. Admirably
clear, though not always very profound, this book will entertain
already educated anthropologists, instruct new students on vaca-
tion, and help the ignorant learn what structuralism was all about.

JEREMY MacCLANCY

PIN-HSIUNG LIU, *Foundations of Kinship Mathematics* [Academic Sinica
Monograph Series A, no. 28], Nankang: Institute of Ethnology 1986.
xvii, 268pp., Appendices, Bibliography, Indexes, Figures, Tables.
No price given.

This unusual work displays the results of twenty years' thought on
how to apply to kinship terminologies the conceptual rigour of
mathematics. Some twenty-six terminologies are analysed in greater
or lesser detail, starting with English, but the fundamental aim is
less the elucidation of particular sets of terms than the provision
of 'a general introduction to the classification and cataloguing of
kinship systems'.

The author is based in Taiwan (the book celebrates the
thirtieth anniversary of the Institute of Ethnology there), and
perhaps this geographical fact has helped him to avoid the polemic-
al tone characteristic of much work on kinship. In any case, he
scarcely comments on the history of mathematical approaches to it;
the brief section on componential analysis is neither dismissive
nor markedly enthusiastic. Morgan alone is treated as an excep-
tion, apparently on the grounds that 'all students of kinship eventu-
ally acquire a kind of filial piety towards Morgan'. But nowhere
does the author strive for bibliographic completeness, and a single
version of each terminology is treated as adequate. The focus is
firmly on the mode of analysis.

The writing is, however, by no means inaccessible to the non-
mathematician (in which category the present reviewer emphatically
belongs). Though using different language, Liu recognizes, as one
must (pace Kroeber), the distinction between fundamental prin-
ciples which differentiate types of terminology (such as cognatic,
prescriptive or generational) and the (by comparison) far less im-
portant classificatory principles which divide up the semantic do-
mains within such types and which give rise to subtypes. For in-
stance, it is basic whether or not siblings are equated with
cousins, much less significant structurally whether siblings are
subdivided by relative age or sex, by absolute sex of ego or alter,
or by a combination of these. For analysing the types a new alge-
braic notation is introduced which is particularly convenient for
handling reciprocals. One tends loosely to think of F and S as
reciprocals, but of course they are not: for female ego the reciprocal of F is D and that of S is M. Instead of F, M, S, D, Liu therefore uses X, Y, X, Y, where X can be read, if one wants to, as 'fatherling', i.e. child of a man. Thus BC is written JX (where J represents sibling), and its reciprocal FB is XJ. Liu also uses a particularly clear and standardised geometrical mode of displaying the types, and a handy three-dimensional model for the partitioning of siblings. Perhaps the hardest topic he treats is the contrast, stated in group-theoretical language, between non-prescriptive, non-section prescriptive, and section systems (respectively monoids, infinite groups and finite groups). Incidentally, computers are never mentioned.

There is an undeniable elegance in the approach. As the author remarks, 'who among us does not derive pleasure from seeing Wintu second cousins described by a simple Omaha equivalence rule?' Moreover, in the more obscure cases from Australia and the Pacific the clarity of presentation will surely prove useful to many. A new and persuasive solution is offered to the long-standing challenge posed by the Yolngu (formerly known as Murngin), and we are gently shown why Korn's interpretation of Bateson's Iatmul data cannot be right. Liu notes, helpfully, that prescriptiveness is indicated at least as well by cognate-cognate equations such as M=FMBD as by cognate-affine ones such as W=MBD.

On the other hand a mathematical approach has severe limitations. It obviously works best with terminologies showing internal logical consistency. More than 1000 terminologies are said to have been described, and presumably the author has selected for analysis ones which need minimal listing of irregularities. Moreover, he himself implies that his approach would have difficulties with Chinese, and one would like to see how it handled, for instance, San (Bushman) terminologies. He talks of the 'ultimate practical goal of cataloguing all kinship systems', but is this really practical? However semantically ordered they may sometimes be, terminologies are only sets of words abstracted from the lexicon, and they are no less subject than other words to the rather slow and more or less conscious processes of lexical change. Since particular language families often show a diversity of terminological types, radical typological change is possible, and at a certain point in such a change a terminology will straddle a typological divide. Presumably mathematical analysis can be adapted to handle this, but the problem is not systematically addressed. The sporadic remarks on evolutionary change are in fact not always cogent. For instance it is unnecessary to assume that in and around Australia 'personal kin terms' have been assimilated to a seasonal structure. I have elsewhere proposed the opposite: the congruence between sociocentric and egocentric structures was the original situation from which terminologies in most areas have moved away (see my 'Tetradic Theory: An Approach to Kinship' in JASO, Vol. XVII, no. 2, pp. 87-109).

One welcomes the occasional oddity. What is Gwen Raverat's Period Piece doing in the bibliography? Is not the subheading 'An entertaining passage from Morgan' itself more entertaining than Morgan's expression of surprise at Omaha equations? Seriously,
even if one thinks that mathematics has less to offer us than dia-
chronic linguistics, it does cast a fresh and instructive light on
the problems Morgan set us so long ago.

N.J. ALLEN

PEGGY GOLDE (ed.), *Women in the Field: Anthropological Experiences*
(2nd edn.), Berkeley etc.: University of California Press 1986
[1970]. x, 388pp., Bibliographies, £10.95.

When this collection was first planned in 1965, the editor and con-
tributors were prescient in identifying the separate but related
issues of gender and reflexivity in fieldwork. The first edition
came out in 1970, justifiably gaining acclaim as a minor 'classic'
about women, by women, in its particular genre - autobiographical
accounts by anthropologists of experiences in the field. This
went out of print. Now the second edition makes its welcome ap-
pearance, with two more essays added to the original twelve and an
updated bibliography. It provides more than the editor acknow-
ledges: an invaluable archaeology of knowledge revealing various
strata of disciplinary frameworks, epistemological assumptions,
research strategies and professional attitudes projected by
American (women) anthropologists from the inter-war period to the
present.

Although the original essays were written in the late 1960s,
some describe fieldwork undertaken at much earlier dates - as, for
example, the indomitable Margaret Mead on her work in the Pacific
islands from 1925 to 1927. With the new essays, the time period
extends to 1983, spanning nearly six decades. Much of the earlier
research derived its focus from 'culture and personality'. Several
studies examine the problem of social change in terms of the uneasy
shift from traditional to modern.

What is missing from this second edition, unfortunately, is
any editorial recognition of the changing ideas within anthro-
pology, and in particular the growth of feminist theory, which relate
so centrally to anthropologists' perceptions of themselves and
their work as ethnographers. In her new Preface, Peggy Golde
writes: 'There was no need to update the introduction, since it was
based on common themes found in the original essays and has with-
stood the test of time.' But this abrupt closure ignores the
flourishing body of feminist analysis in anthropology, with its
links to all the new directions in the 1980s loosely subsumed under
the term 'post-modern', and thus fails to place the original essays
in historical context. The final chapter by an anthropologist of a
younger generation, Rena Lederman on Papua New Guinea, shows an
epistemological leap in its author's awareness and analysis of
gender.
'What it means to be a woman in the field' provides the central theme of this collection, although contributors give greater or less attention to their femaleness. Not surprisingly, the generalizations reveal few new insights. The main attraction of this volume comes from its wide range of ethnographic experience and incisive observations. Well before 'reflexivity' became salient in the anthropology lexicon, Jean Briggs narrates the growing tensions between herself (her cultural background and work agenda) and the Eskimo view of her as a disobedient and undutiful 'daughter' within the circle of the family iglu. Caught up in the Rwanda revolution in 1959 to 1960, Helen Codere discovered how the existing ethnography had taken the perspective of the minority ruling group; she tells how she drove herself to get data from all segments of this divided society, including life histories of women and men, young and old, rulers and lowly. Niara Sudarkasa foreshadows the later concentration on the 'anthropology of women' with her description of fieldwork among Yoruba women in Nigeria in 1961.

Reflecting on the book's title, Helen Codere remarks on how foolish the title 'Men in the Field' would sound. Ernestine Friedl, in her perceptive analysis of work in a Greek village in 1955, considers such a companion volume to be necessary. Both are right, one noting the asymmetry of 'women' as a marked category, the other pointing out the danger of setting 'women' off as a separate unit when the issue is that of gender relations. Again, other contributors argue against considering 'women in the field' as an undifferentiated category when the differences are critical - young or middle aged, black or white; single, married (with or without spouse), divorced, widowed, childless, pregnant, or with children in the field.

These essays, then, show the multiple facets of fieldwork from the perspectives of three generations of American anthropologists. They also reveal strands in the transition from the neutral scientific observer to the gendered participant, from anthropology as 'the study of man' to 'the anthropology of gender'.

HELEN CALLAWAY


In this collection of essays some of the late Peter Lienhardt's colleagues and former students have come together to record their debt and gratitude to a man affectionately remembered both for his profound intellectual influence upon them and for his conviviality and friendship. The result is a volume which, by focusing on the
diversity of the Muslim world, successfully reflects some of the
diversity of Peter Lienhardt's own interests, and addresses many
of the issues about which he himself wrote so astutely. Thus,
for example, Lienhardt's concern with the influence of Islam on
other traditions, with literacy and education, and with the impact
of urbanisation are among the many different themes woven through
these essays.

 Appropriately, these themes are first touched on in the vol­
ume by Lienhardt himself in an autobiographical extract from a
work upon which he had been engaged until shortly before his death,
and in which he humourously and perceptively outlines his first
encounter with the inhabitants of Kuwait in the early 1950s. In
addition to whatever anthropological merits it might have, the
accessibility, wit and insight of this piece testify to Lienhardt's
wider talents and must surely earn it a place alongside some of
today's best travel writings. The essays which follow, while per­
haps stylistically more conservative, are no less interesting, and
the range of topics and countries covered ensures that there should
be something here for everyone. Thus the papers range from
analyses of the consequences of literacy and its relationship to
religion in Iran and Egypt (Street, Gilsenan) to a discussion of
the role of religion in Sudanese politics (Al-Shahi), and from an
account of saintly praise hymns in Ethiopia (Baxter) to elucida­
tion of Iranian concepts of time and space (Singer) and Egyptian
concepts of work (Ghosh). The legacy of the Arabs and of Islam on
the local cultures to which they gradually spread is examined in
three essays which focus on the development of towns on the East
African coast (Middleton), on Islamic reinterpretations of origin
myths in Senegal (Dilley), and on the influence of Islam on
aesthetics in Indonesia (Hitcchock), accounts which are usefully
balanced by a description of the part played by Islam, particularly
by Ramadan, in the definition of identity in the religion's Arabian
homeland (Yamani).

 Taken individually, these essays are of a consistently high
standard, and several of them advance arguments of interest to a
more general readership as well as to scholars of Muslim society.
Thus guided by Hoggart, Brian Street convincingly sets out the
limitations of Goody's analysis of literacy and suggests some
interesting possibilities for combining the anthropological and
literary critical traditions, while Amitav Ghosh shows the insights
to be generated when the system of production in agrarian societies
is viewed in terms of 'the totality of relations which properly
constitute a system of labour' (p. 116), and not just in terms of
technology and technique, which is how, he claims, they are more
usually viewed. Other essays also stand out for their clarity, for
example, Roy Dilley's economical and well-integrated analysis of
the relationship between Tukulor origin myths and social structure.

 However, taken together, the essays do not develop any par­
ticular theme or argument, and without such a common thematic focus
the whole unfortunately remains no more than the sum of its parts.
The 'diversity' of the Muslim community once presented is left to
speak for itself, and there is no attempt to develop a coherent
approach to this diversity, or even to assess the work of those who
have grappled with the issue. While one of anthropology's main contributions to the study of Islam has been to illustrate the specificity of Islamic belief and practice in its local context, something which most of the essays in this book do well, the anthropology of Islam will surely have to move beyond this if it is not simply to stack case study upon case study. By limiting itself to the latter, however, this book is likely to be of substantial value only to those with an interest in the subjects of particular essays.

HASTINGS DONNAN

ANTHONY P. COHEN, Whalsay: Symbol, Segment and Boundary in a Shetland Island Community [Anthropological Studies of Britain], Manchester: Manchester University Press 1987. ix, 216pp., Appendices, References, Index, Illustrations, Figures, Maps. £29.95.

In editing the two collections Belonging, Identity and Social Organisation in British Rural Cultures (1982) and Symbolising Boundaries: Identity and Diversity in British Cultures (1986), Anthony P. Cohen has established himself as the leading coordinator of the social anthropology of the British Isles. For those of us with an interest in this growing field, Cohen's own ethnography has been eagerly awaited.

As he writes himself, it has been a long time in coming. He began his field research in the Shetland island of Whalsay fifteen years ago, and since then has made regular return visits. During this time, he tells us, the prospect of writing an ethnography of Whalsay has become increasingly daunting; informants became friends, his circle of acquaintances decreased, and generalisations gave way to a powerful sense of the individuality and idiosyncrasy of Whalsay folk. Greater knowledge yielded greater uncertainty. Rather than abandon the task altogether, however, Cohen has chosen to make this experience part of his thesis. The appearance of social conformity, he contends, is a veneer which Whalsay people subscribe to in their relations with the outside world. However, this 'apparent orthodoxy is only superficial' (p. 201); below it lies a richer, more complex discourse which elaborates detailed 'levels of individuation' (ibid.). Whalsay people themselves choose to 'protect' this more intricate discourse by keeping it hidden from the outside world. The ethnographic task is to reveal something of this hidden reality of Whalsay lives, though in doing so the ethnographer commits a kind of 'betrayal of trust' (p. 206).

Social anthropology, according to Cohen, typically deals in generalisations rather than the versatility within communities. He likens this to a concern with the form of a symbol as opposed to interest in its content. A single form may stand for many and
various things. In his account of Whalsay, he attempts to redress this imbalance. To some extent, of course, the argument that anthropology ignores variability is itself an over-generalization. Also, it is not only anthropologists who use generalizations: the 'ethos of "being Whalsa"' is a collective character ideal which Whalsay folk subscribe to, as Cohen shows well. Within this generalised community 'boundary', however, are what Cohen calls 'segmentary boundaries', in particular those of kinship, neighbourhood and fishing crew, and it is through these that individuality is articulated. This is not, perhaps, an altogether novel position in anthropology, though it should be emphasized that Cohen is not claiming, in the manner of classical anthropology, that segmentary principles are inherent in society, but that segmentation is a means by which people allocate sense to their world.

Cohen does not present his study of Whalsay in the form of the traditional ethnography. Instead, he explains that 'The structure of this book resembles the formulation of an anthropologist's perspective in the society he or she studies, moving from naive observation, through increasing contextualization, to the endlessly ramifying connections among ethnographic data' (p. 20). And continues: 'Thus my ambitious claim is that in the progression from chapter two to chapter five, the reader is moved from the outsider's naivety to an interpretation which more closely approximates to that of Whalsay people themselves' (ibid.). This does not mean, however, that in the early chapters the reader is presented with all sorts of misguided and odd-ball theories such as a naive initiate to Whalsay society might make. In some ways this is rather a shame, for over the years Anthony Cohen has altered his views considerably, as he mentions in passing, and has had some local response to his published and unpublished works. Little of this enters the text, however, though it undoubtedly constitutes an interesting dimension of long-term fieldwork amongst people who have access to any work which the ethnographer publishes. Instead the ethnography moves, in not quite such a clear progression as implied in the above quotation, between detailed 'sketches' of Whalsay life, which always contain particular characters (e.g. 'Magnie' or 'J.J.', rather than 'an entrepreneur' or 'a fisherman', or even 'entrepreneurs' or 'fishermen'); analysis grounded in Whalsay concepts (e.g. Wir folk and Yon folk); and more abstract analysis (using, for example, concepts such as 'community coherence' and 'segmentary affiliation'). The events sketched by Cohen include the more obvious public and ritual occasions, such as funerals and sprees, as well as more apparently mundane affairs, such as a dispute over a water-main or a conversation between fishermen. The sketches are carefully detailed and often contain a good deal of dialogue, rendered in a form of Shetland dialect, which gives the reader a direct feel for the subject of the ethnography.

Whalsay, like many other areas of the British Isles, has experienced significant changes in its communications with the outside world during the last century, and particularly over the last twenty years. Large-scale commercial fishing has made Whalsay folk much wealthier than they were in the past, and the island is not
short of the material comforts of modern living. However, despite their new prosperity, Whalsay folk pursue, with increased avidity, certain activities - crofting, peat-cutting and fishing with small boats - which make little economic sense. These often entail the expenditure of a considerable amount of time and labour, and this must be understood, argues Cohen, as a demonstration of commitment to the traditional island way of life in the face of the perceived threat from da Sooth ('the South'). This process of vigorously maintaining and reconstructing a sense of self, termed 'cultural accounting' (p. 18ff.) by Cohen, is characteristic of communities which believe their continuity to be at risk. Whalsay helps to establish this as a major theme within the social anthropology of the British Isles.

In the final chapter of the book, Cohen confronts anthropology's current post-modernist Angst. He affirms the subjective nature of his ethnography: 'It is ... such stuff as I have been able to gather and to render intelligible to myself ... it is a version, my version ... But it may well not be very reliable at all' (p. 204). However, he has other niggling convictions: 'This is not to say that I believe there is a strong likelihood that the judgements I have advanced here may be demonstrably false. Quite the contrary; I am convinced of their validity' (ibid.). Cohen's equivocal stance here is evident in the ethnography too in that, although he states that his account of Whalsay is only one possible version of reality, he does not present the reader with versions he has encountered which contradict his own (such as the unfavourable response of Whalsay folk to some of his arguments about crofting). Also, it is only in this final chapter that the reader is given some account of how he carried out his fieldwork and how he was received by Whalsay folk.

The book ends, somewhat strangely, on a different and seemingly unintentional post-modernist theme, that of 'performativity'. With the end of grand meta-theories, it has been argued, the legitimisation of knowledge lies in performance, and specifically in the 'use-value' of particular ideas for the social system in which they were formulated (see, for example, Jean-Francois Lyotard's *The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge* [1984]). Cohen concludes his ethnography of Whalsay, then, with an illustration of the use of his segmentary approach to analysing the allocation of resources within the National Health Service.

This is an ambitious ethnography and contains a wealth of ideas about Whalsay and about anthropology in general. For this reader, some of the theoretical sections were over-long and detracted from the progression of the ethnography. In the end, I was somewhat disappointed that 'the longest sustained and most detailed anthropological study ever undertaken in a British community' (cover 'blurb') was not even more ambitious in making use of the potentialities of such long-term fieldwork. However, Whalsay will undoubtedly become an important text in the social and cultural anthropology of the British Isles and in discussions of identity in general.

SHARON MACDONALD
The South Asian population in Great Britain is approximately 1.3 million, and about one-third of these are Hindus. They have migrated over the last thirty years for various reasons, and have settled both in consolidated and dispersed fashions. The great majority (70%) of British Hindus have their origins in Gujarat, while Punjabis (15%) and people from other regions of India comprise the balance. Perhaps 10% of the Gujaratis and Punjabis arrived via East Africa, after decades of settlement there. The caste make-up of British Hindus is diverse, with large numbers of Rangarhias and Jats among the Punjabis, and Mochis, Patels and Lohanas among the Gujaratis. Kinship and social networks in Britain are of critical importance to Hindus, as are sectarian and organizational affiliations. Ethnic 'boundary markers' - internal and external - have waxed and waned through the years among British Hindus, witnessing at different times the fusion and fission of community identity. Caste identification has, in many cases, remained strong, while the caste *system* has attenuated. Ritual forms and religious practices have been modified, while the positions of temples and priests have changed considerably. In brief, Hindus and Hinduism in Great Britain present a fascinating set of phenomena concerning general issues of migration and ethnicity, as well as material pertinent to research on Indian society and culture.

*Hinduism in Great Britain* is the first collection of studies exclusively devoted to the subject. Along with Richard Burghart's Introduction and Conclusion, the volume presents eleven articles covering a wide range of topics. While many of the articles contribute significantly to our understanding of the transplantation of long-standing traditions, some, because of journalistic style or threadbare analysis, cause the volume to be substantially uneven.

Burghart's Introduction handsomely presents us with the conceptual problems faced by orthodox Hindus, given the dilemma of leaving the auspicious universe (India) to venture into impure space; he also neatly summarizes the history of Indian migration to Britain as well as key points drawn from the assembled articles. David Bowen then outlines consecutive phases in the development of Hindu organizations in Bradford, phases which accompanied demographic shifts in the years since immigration in the 1950s. Maureen Michaelson and Merryle MacDonald follow with articles describing important aspects of domestic Hinduism, which in Britain continues to be the primary domain of Hindu religious culture. Michaelson's piece focusses on the family practices of Lohanas, while MacDonald's - the most detailed ethnography in the volume - examines the pragmatic religious practices of Gujarati women. In a study of the Swaminarayan movement, Rohit Barot demonstrates how pre-migration patterns of intra-sect conflict are reproduced in this country, forming a basis for cleavage among Leva Kumbi Patels (and testing Dumont's ideas on the relation between sects and...
Following these four interesting and informative articles, four articles are presented (two by Sean Carey and two by Donald Taylor) which give the volume a rather hollow centre. The first piece by Carey is an impressionistic essay on the International Society for Krishna Consciousness (ISKCON, or Hare Krishna movement). The only merit of this piece is to tell us that some Indians in Britain now like to go, on occasion, to ISKCON temples, but no conclusive appraisals are offered. Taylor's description of an obscure ashram in Wales, run by a lone guru and a few sporadic devotees, is of dubious value to the volume. His examination of the Sai Baba movement, however, is of somewhat greater worth. While entrenched in a Weberian framework (the routinization of charisma into legal-rational institutions), Taylor's second article uncritically describes the gradual, world-wide development of a movement devoted to an individual whom some regard as a living incarnation of God. Carey's second contribution is an over-long discussion of initiation into the Ramakrishna Mission, a piece which includes much trivial material and dwells on activities in Calcutta far more than in Britain.

The volume returns to form with Kim Knott's portrayal of a temple where Gujarati and Punjabi have negotiated and 'retradtionalized' their once regionally elaborated rites, in order to practice common modes of worship. Werner Menski leads us clearly through a maze of legal concepts in describing facets of Hindu accommodation to British norms concerning marriage rites, and Robert Jackson explains how and why Hinduism has been variously depicted in religious education curricula over the years. Burghart concludes the volume by reminding us that 'changing Hinduism by redefining it is as old as Hinduism itself' (p. 255); yet he also suggests Hinduism has, in Britain, become an 'ethnic religion' in that it represents a 'ritual basis of collective identity' (p. 234), exemplified by reduced forms of worship and standardized practices which have been consequent on transplantation. Finally, Helen Kanitkar's bibliography (of over 600 items, complete with subject classifications) is an eclectic but highly useful addition.

A number of issues are absent from this collection (such as the persistence of a purity-pollution complex, the role of priests, and comparative implications), but this is due more to the relative youth of the subject than to research shortcomings. Hinduism in Great Britain is a welcome volume which provides many significant insights into a far-ranging and fruitful field of study.

STEVE VERTOVEC

Here is a book which really should, as its flyleaf suggests, 'be of value not only to anthropologists and professionals in all areas of international health, but also to scholars and planners dealing with many aspects of development in the Third World'. Anthropologists have been talking for many years about the need to take central bureaucratic cultures into consideration in the analysis of development policy and planning. Justice takes up this challenge. In the space of 154 pages (plus appendices), we are given an eagle's eye-view of the Nepalese health system, starting with the international and Nepalese health bureaucracies in Kathmandu. We then swoop down to examine health service delivery in rural areas, ascending again to look at how information from these areas is fed back into the bureaucracies, ending with a more philosophical consideration of the role of socio-cultural information (and therefore anthropologists) in the health planning process. Interspersed with this are case studies, two of which are shorter versions of articles previously published in Social Science and Medicine, on planning for community participation, the peon as invisible worker in the Nepalese health system, and the way socio-cultural information could make the newly created post of assistant nurse-midwife more appropriate to local conditions and needs.

That she can achieve so much in such a short space is a tribute to Justice's trenchant prose. Some of the conclusions she draws may appear as common sense to the practising anthropologist, but they should provide insights to the larger audience which the book intends to reach. Obviously, in covering such a large area of ground, some over-simplification may occur. The subject of medical pluralism, which could have made a book in itself, is confined to a few pages, and other current concerns in the development-anthropology literature, such as the role of consultants in aid projects, are similarly foreshortened. We learn far more about the 'structure' of the health bureaucracies than their 'culture', despite Justice's brave endeavours and undoubted insights in this area. Experts on particular parts of the ground she covers may quibble with the way their work is presented, but few can dismiss the general tenor of her account.

The picture Justice paints of health development in Nepal as she saw it in 1978-9 is generally bleak. The goals, structure, patterns of operation and interaction of the twin bureaucracies of the Nepalese government and the international donor agencies have been the determining factors in the operation of basic allopathic health care facilities. Donor agency policies change frequently and are often promoted without sufficient regard to the economic, political and socio-cultural reality of Nepal. The bureaucratic 'culture' of the Nepalese government is misunderstood by expatriates and is equally removed from the rural scene. New health
initiatives reach the village level, having passed through two major cultural boundaries. Health posts are poorly supported from the centre, and rely on the personality and competence of occasional exceptional individuals for their effectiveness. Grass-roots information which could be expected to play a valuable part in improving this situation has to pass upwards through the same cultural screens, facing 'the structural imperatives of all administrative organizations, which may prevent relevant information from being used, even when it is available, or in fact, even when it is common knowledge to planners and administrators' (p. 134). Much of Justice's account is quite properly written in the past tense to emphasize the rapid change in the system being observed, but, in spite of some hopeful signs, she remains ultimately pessimistic about the effective utilization of anthropological knowledge 'as long as the structure and culture of the health bureaucracies remain unchanged' (p. 154). It would be good to have similar books written by scholars researching other areas of development concern, such as the environment, agriculture or refugees, to see the extent to which Justice is describing a general problem.

More conservative anthropologists may question the nature of 'fieldwork' which took in the headquarters of international aid agencies in New York, Washington, Ottawa, Geneva and New Delhi in May and June 1978, Nepalese government and aid agency officials in Kathmandu from June to September, and twenty-four health posts and offices in ten districts across the entire country during the next twelve months. Assuming there is a useful role for anthropologists in development settings (and not, as a question in the 1984 Oxford Social Anthropology M.Phil. examination put it, somewhat prejudgmentally: 'Every time social anthropologists have become interested in "applied anthropology", their interest has been short-lived. If this is true, why is it?'), such misgivings must be addressed. There can be no doubt that the more time which can be spent in data-collection, the fuller the eventual account can be. However, in the high-flying world of development planning, 'meeting deadlines is very important', and despite the fact that even with all deadlines met it can take an international agency three years to get a new project 'operational', 'planners tend to see the gathering of anthropological data as too time-consuming' (p. 135). In fact, the literature in development anthropology, particularly that concerned with 'rapid rural appraisal', has been concerned with enhancing the 'cost-effectiveness' or quality of short-term anthropological fieldwork for several years now. Short time-scales and wider geographical domains (to take in the region, the nation or even the 'international community') are vital if anthropologists are going to be able 'to take a more comprehensive approach that planners would find helpful' (p. 136). Unfortunately, these needs have generally been treated with disdain in academic circles.

Health officials also clearly had misgivings about the object of Justice's fieldwork: 'In addition to joking questions about why I did not carry a big stick as Margaret did, I was most frequently asked what "my group" was. When I replied, "the Department of Health", or "health planners", the conversation usually stopped, since this answer definitely did not meet the expectation that
anthropologists study a particular ethnic or caste group or village' (p. 136). One wonders what they will make of the finished product. This book can be seen as a damning indictment of health bureaucracy in Nepal and may only serve to further preconceived notions about anthropologists that many health professionals already hold. Insofar as the book is a contribution to the anthropology of development, rather than to anthropology in development, this is almost inevitable. Justice writes that the anthropologist's main contribution to the planning process is the acquisition of information from the grass-roots level. One cannot blame her for the broader perspective of her own work, which has gained her an assistant professorship at one of the best medical anthropology departments in the United States. However, it will not necessarily have won her or her profession so many friends in Kathmandu.

Justice is critical of a WHO Country Health Profile on Nepal which 'was published in English and distributed very selectively to donor agencies and government officials, but not at the district level' (p. 71). One hopes that she will persuade her publishers that they should soon produce both paperback and Nepali versions of her book so that it can receive the widespread consideration it deserves.

ANDREW RUSSELL


In this book, based on twenty-two months fieldwork in central Java, particularly in the areas of Klaten, Solo and Jogja, the sights, sounds, and smells of the performance of Javanese shadow plays are blended with concerns about potency, status and speech. In a most illuminating and readable narrative, Ward Keeler endeavours to catalogue the Javanese shadow theatre's appeal in a host of different registers, attempting to show just how closely 'artistic' metaphor and actuality are intertwined: in a process of resemblance and repetition, the world of the shadows, in its ambiguity and insubstantiality, is but an extension of the world of everyday encounter.

His central thesis is that 'an art form constitutes a relationship, or really, a series of relationships, that can be compared with other (i.e. social and political) relations' (p. 17). What makes such a comparison possible is the author's contention that 'both social life and aesthetics develop out of deeply held assumptions about the world, and that neither one need be seen as cause or effect of the other' (p. 18). In defining the premise of his
argument in these terms, he sees it as his responsibility 'to dis­
cern what those underlying assumptions might be, and how they shape
both social life and aesthetic activity' (ibid.).

In the first chapter, the author locates the Javanese 'self'
in the interplay of rules of speech and rules of practice, stress­
ing its relational character. In this context, concern with power,
status and personal sovereignty is what informs and constitutes the
irreducibility of personal action. Power, status and personal sov­
eereignty are said to be derived from the amount of potency (batin)
a person possesses. Thus Javanese selves partake both in the world
of everyday encounter and the world of mystical forces.

However, the logic of everyday encounter, a logic of selfish
desires and interests, is strongly opposed to the logic of mystical
encounter, a logic of subtlety and sensitivity, imperceptible
forces and energies. Paradoxically, then, it seems that the more
'selfless' a self becomes the greater the potency it attains.
Thus involvement in the everyday world of desire is antithetical to
the enhancement of the potent self; it introduces, however, the
possibility of tensions and contradictory impulses. The reality of
social involvement and the ideal of non-involvement (best expressed
in the ethic of asceticism) oppose each other as the two poles of
human existence, which have to be balanced in the interests of
potency, status and personal authority.

Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are devoted to a discussion of several
kinds of relationships: between husband and wife, father and son,
village headman and villagers, the spiritually powerful and their
supplicants. Once again the same concerns with power, status and
personal authority allow the author to establish a community of
meanings that centre upon the search for potency, both reflecting
and determining the efficacy of personal action.

Chapters 5, 6 and 7 examine the relationships that are
occasioned by a performance of shadow theatre: the interaction that
takes place among sponsors, performers, guests and other spectators.
Again the same concerns, interests and tensions come to the surface.
The potent figure of the puppeteer resembles and repeats the fig­
ures of the father and the headman, implying the archetypal rela­
tionship between the more and the less potent. Thus the perform­
ance provides an indigenously generated representation of Javanese
life, while at the same time constituting a part of it.

In the last two chapters, Ward Keeler turns his attention to
the more abstract notion of 'interaction', which is implicit in
the relationships he has already discussed, and to indigenous ex­
egesis of such interaction, thereby attempting to offer a brief
comparison between Javanese and Western models.

Interpretation for the Javanese is rooted in a person's re­
serve of potency. It is a defensive technique - in interpreting
signs a person attempts to control their significance. The degree
to which he is successful in doing so indicates and determines how
potent he is. Keeler's most interesting conclusion is that inter­
pretation for the Javanese comes before experience, indeed it is
meant to control and 'resist' experience. In contrast, in the
Western scheme 'experience, interpretation and action are supposed
to proceed always in that order' (p. 259).
The author's whole argument - interesting as it is - necessarily depends on three hypotheses. It is supposed that between all the relationships he explicates it must be possible to establish a system of homogeneous relations, each of them expressing one and the same central core. It is also supposed that all the differences (or at any rate most of them) in Javanese society can be reduced to a single world view. Lastly, it is also assumed that the recurrence of a specific set of similarities reflects a specific type of interaction in a variety of rather dissimilar contexts.

To admit the relational character of every identity, as Keeler does, is to treat all relations as not having a necessary character, which he does not. If potency is the underlying principle which makes intelligible the aesthetic and social practices he describes, then it follows that all relations have the same character and all identities are always the same. The specificity of the various practices is dissolved - they are but momentary realizations of a more immanent logic, which is always already there.

A further problem involves his insistence on the appropriation of signs and degrees of selfhood. The appropriation of signs through interpretation and the appropriation of selves through interaction are treated as analogous instances in the quest for personal efficacy. Thus there seems to exist a motive, a constitutive principle of selfhood, which can be fixed outside both interpretation and interaction, and consequently outside the practices within which Keeler attempts to locate it.

Whatever the case may be, this is an important and challenging book. The author's readiness to re-examine most of his own assumptions, as well as his sensitivity to the ethnographic context, offer a more sensitive and less dogmatic understanding. It also presents a challenge to those anthropologists who continue to work comfortably with an 'unproblematic notion of the self, whether as performer or spectator'.

DIMITRI TSINTJILONIS
After the first event of the year, which was a welcoming drinks party, the newly arrived temporary lecturer Marcus Banks was appointed President of the Society, supported by Tim Ferris who continued as Secretary. Michaelmas Term's speakers had all been invited by Mr Ferris and proved to be entertainingly varied in their approach and subject matter. At the 802nd meeting Zachary Kingdon, from the Rock Art Research Unit at Witwatersrand University, presented a paper on 'Shamanic Art in Southern Africa' which provoked much interest. He was followed in the 803rd meeting by Kathleen McDermott, from the Centre for the Study of Social Policy, Swansea, who spoke on her research within British prisons. The minutes of the meeting note that the exchange of questions and comments afterwards was 'slightly sombre', which seems appropriate.

The final session of the term was addressed by David Napier, late of Oxford and now at Middlebury College, Vermont. Dr Napier spoke on Bernini's Piazza Oblique in Rome, and suggested ways in which the design of the piazza could be seen as a cosmological diagram.

The meetings for the following two terms were arranged by Dr Banks; Susan Erb replaced Tim Ferris as Secretary. At the first meeting of Hilary Term, John Baily from AFRAS, Sussex, presented a film he had made on an RAI Film Fellowship, Amir: An Afghan Refugee Musician's Life in Peshawar, Pakistan, and then further entertained the audience by performing some Afghan songs on the rubab. He was followed a fortnight later by Jonathan Benthall, Director of the RAI, who described the origins of the popular anthropology journal, Anthropology Today, and discussed more generally the issue of popularising anthropology. The 807th meeting was addressed by Mike Hutt from the Indian languages department at SOAS who spoke on the cultural interpretation of modern Nepali poetry and provided some very beautiful examples in translation. The final meeting of the term was addressed by Jeremy MacClancy, of the Oxford Institute, who described the historical background to his researches on political identity in Spain.

The three meetings held in Trinity Term were equally varied. The first was addressed by Felicia Hughes Freeland, from the National Film and Television School (also an RAI Film Fellow). She spoke under the title 'How to Understand a Javanese Dance Tradition', and was prevailed upon at the end of her talk to give a short demonstration. The 810th meeting featured Chris Pinney from the Centre of South East Asian Studies, Cambridge, who continued the visual theme.
by discussing colonial photography under the title 'Nature and Culture in the Early Photography of Other Peoples'. His talk aroused some critical questions, but this resulted in an interesting and productive debate. A fortnight later, a former Oxford student, Malcolm Chapman, gave the final paper of the year, turning his attention to the cultural identity of the north-west of England, particularly that of the 'forgotten' Cumbrian coast.

Attendances at the year's meetings were generally satisfactory, and it can be said that Oxford anthropology was enriched as a result of the year's activities.

MARCUS BANKS
President, 1987-8

FUNDING ANTHROPOLOGICAL RESEARCH

At a time when it is increasingly difficult to obtain research funds, the publication of a directory of potential funding bodies is most welcome. It will, at the very least, give students hope that they might be able to get money from somewhere.

The editors of the directory have compiled a list of 704 'program profiles' of sponsored research programmes in the United States, and give information on each programme under the headings: Program Description, Eligibility/Limitations, Fiscal Information, Application Information, Deadline(s), and Subject Term(s). A detailed subject index, a sponsor type index, a listing of sponsoring organizations and a bibliography of printed source materials and online databases follow.

The perhaps uniquely diverse nature of anthropological research - as humanity, science, social science - makes the search for funding a particularly difficult task. The editors of this directory are to be thanked for producing such a comprehensive guide to sources of potential funding in the USA. Its price is prohibitive for the individual student, so it is to be hoped that university departments and libraries will make it available to their members and draw their attention to it. And perhaps someone or other will soon initiate the compilation of a similar directory for the United Kingdom or, perhaps more usefully, Europe.

JEREMY COOTE

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