How shall we approach Sapir in an introductory lecture? There is really no need nowadays for an introduction to this important anthropological linguist. The student has all the materials readily to hand, or so it would seem. There is first of all his original famous work, entitled *Language*, published in 1921 (referred to by his memorialists quite frequently as his *only* real book, as opposed to papers and monographs). Then there is that compendious work of piety, the *Selected Writings*, collected by David G. Mandelbaum (1949). Its 617 pages largely fill the gap between his 'real book' and his life's output - although even this volume does not contain the exhaustively complete works. Then there is the centenary volume, *Edward Sapir: Appraisals of his Life and Work*, edited by Konrad Koerner of the University of Ottawa and published recently (1984). This latter is what in English Departments would be called the 'Critical Heritage'. It contains nine obituaries and memorials, dated 1939-52, reviews, mostly early, of *Language* (1921) and of the monograph *Time Perspective in Aboriginal American Culture* (1915), several reviews of the *Selected Writings* (1949), and finally various re-reappraisals dated 1956-1980. One begins to expect the centennial volume to be reappraised in the centennial volume by some version of the Russelian paradox! We may add to all of this a small paperback of selections from the *Selected Writings* (Mandelbaum 1956), the early memorial volume edited by Spier and others in 1941, and many more. There is,

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1 Delivered in the series *General Linguistics* for the Sub-Faculty of Linguistics, Oxford University, May 1987.

2 All the papers of Sapir's mentioned below are to be found in this volume.
therefore (as I said), no special need for an introductory lecture. This man is the very stuff of Introductions, you may well think! One is best employed in a gathering like this in presenting a personal view (yet another one) which will bring out points which are not immediately apparent to the reader of the critical apparatus: the 'dogs which did not bark in the night', perhaps.

Let us begin with this fact. In 1971 I referred in writing to Saussure's rejection of the view of language as a mere labelling device. Soon afterwards, I received a letter from Professor C. Voegelin of Yale, asking, in all seriousness, whether Saussure was a misprint for Sapir. I must confess to having been slightly taken aback. I repeated my reference to the Cours (Saussure 1922: 34, une nomenclature), but I could not help being somewhat impressed that the Atlantic was wide enough then for Sapir to be more salient than Saussure on this point. My own view at the time was quite other. In Saussure's systematics the rejection of any 'nomenclature' view is quite basic to the development of his whole later argument (such as we have it). Even if Sapir had said it, it was to me then as if I had referred to Newton's falling apple and someone had seriously asked if this was a slip of the tongue or pen for William Tell!

The personal stature of Sapir in the United States and especially at Yale has, then, to be taken as an important fact. In Voegelin's sketch of 1952, in the centennial volume, he refers to his 'brightness' among the 'giants' of American anthropology ('with a brightness we associate with youth and poetry and innocence' - Voegelin, in Koerner 1984: 33). Kroeber, the great American anthropologist (1876-1960) and pupil of Boas, made an even more remarkable statement in 1959, within a year of his own death. Comparing Sapir directly with Boas, he said:

I have always felt that Boas was an extraordinary person for his dynamism, for the energy, intellectual and ethical, which he could and did develop, for the output of his work, his range of interests, and so on. But I asked myself when I was doing one of the obituaries on him whether he was by the ordinary understanding of the term a genius or not. And I came to the conclusion that while he was a great man, he lacked the quality of genius of the sort that Sapir did exemplify.

He added:

Edward Sapir, I should say, is the only man that I have known at all well, in my life, whom I should unreservedly class as a genius (in Koerner 1984: 131).

Sapir was an almost exact contemporary of the anthropologist Malinowski. Both were born in the same year (1884). Sapir died in 1939, Malinowski in 1942, both still at the height of their powers. Both were foreign-born incomers to the countries they made their own (the United States and England respectively).
Sapir was born in Lauenberg in Germany, Malinowski in Krakow, Austrian Poland. Sapir was, however, a very young immigrant (only 5 years old) compared with the 26-year-old Malinowski. In other respects their backgrounds were also different, and yet there is another, more intellectual, aspect of their biographies which they share, as we shall see in a moment. Sapir's family was Jewish and lived in New York, where his father was a synagogue cantor. These factors combined in his first choice of university (Columbia) and of academic subjects ('Germanics' and 'Semitics'). On his graduation in 1904 he had already moved beyond these towards the American Indian languages and his anthropological future. Nonetheless, his philological training was of the first importance in his theoretical development, while to the end of his life he continued to make important contributions to Semitic and Judeo-Germanic linguistics.

In pursuit of his new specialism, however, he joined the staff of the University of California in 1907–1908, where he worked on the language of the Yana Indians. Then at the University of Pennsylvania he studied the Paiute language. He received his Doctorate at his home university of Columbia in 1909.

In 1910 a totally new and formative period began, lasting until 1925. He went to Ottawa as Chief of a new Division of Anthropology of the Geological Survey of the Canadian National Museum. He married and had three children. During this time he studied many American Indian peoples and their languages, and he became well known for his contributions on the Nootka of Vancouver Island, the Athapaskan languages, and many more. By 1925, however, his wife had died, and he came back to the United States and to the University of Chicago. The memorialists speak of Sapir's intellectual frustration during this period. The milieu of the Survey was not a conventionally academic one, but the experiences and the intellectual problems were new. This sort of enforced retirement to think in action reminds one rather of a feature of the biographies of a number of outstanding innovators in various disciplines of the period.

A digression on this point may be in order here. Three scholars of the Modernist period (see Ardener 1985) share in their development the interesting feature that each, after an early partial success in conventional terms, spent some years in a practical milieu, during which their ideas and speculations were able to acquire a new kind of focus outside the purely academic mainstream. Freud, after the cocaine debacle, spent nearly a decade out of the public eye, before the publication of The Interpretation of Dreams. Einstein's years at the Zurich Patent Office are famous for the history of his work on relativity. Nearer in status and discipline to the subject of this lecture is (once again) Malinowski who, after embarking on what was essentially an extension of the Melanesian survey work of his teacher Seligman, stayed for a complex of reasons on the single island of Kiriwina in the Trobriands. There his experience led him to a series of academic innovations, which resulted in his virtual refoundation of the British School of Anthropology. There is something very similar in its atmosphere about Sapir's long period with the Canadian Geological Survey. It was indeed after eleven years with that body that the work appeared
which established his new reputation. If there are such parallels, however, certain differences in the results of this productive isolation for Sapir's branch of his discipline, compared with the obvious effects of the other thinkers on theirs, will require consideration later.

Preston, in a valuable discussion, says that during the Ottawa years Sapir experienced a clear change in direction, away from his 'Boasian' orientation. He says:

He was twenty-six years old and had recently received his PhD when he obtained, apparently to his surprise, an offer from the director of the Geological Survey, on Boas' recommendation. Evidently Boas got him the job as a research position from which Sapir could get to the task of collecting 'salvage' data on the Indians of Canada. Boas had by that time three other students located in museum research positions - Kroeber at Berkeley, Speck in Philadelphia, and Lowie at the American Museum in New York.... It has been speculated that Ottawa was also in part a kind of exile; Sapir was such an intensely brilliant colleague that Boas found comfort for himself in keeping Sapir at a distance. In any event, Ottawa did become an exile, a place where intellectual isolation and personal difficulties threw Sapir very much on his own personal resources. The result was a period of great productivity, followed by a period marked more by profound rethinking than by research activity (in Koerner 1984: 179).

A strange refraction of Sapir's analytical mind is revealed in a poem he wrote at the time. Perhaps the discomfort of his mentors was justified:

You sit before me as we talk
Calmly and unafraid.
Calmly and unafraid
I sink my net into your soul,
That flows before me like a limpid stream.

I draw forth many lovely things
That you had thought were hid;
I draw forth many ugly things
That you had thought were pure,
That you had never thought to hide. 3

His famous book Language (1921) was a product of this period, and it was recognised immediately as fresh in its approach, and written in an excellent style. The volume exemplifies a particular combination of the skills of Indo-European historical linguistics, and of a general European background, with an encyclopaedic control of Amerindian languages. The effect of this union of skills was

publicly to turn exotic languages into tools of general scholarship. Some of his later papers combine materials from Amerindian and Indo-European studies - and at their most technical, too, for example, his 1938 paper 'Glottalized Continuants in Navaho, Nootka and Kwakuitl (with a note on I.E.)'. Sapir wrote important papers on Tokharian (its relation to Tibetan, for instance) and Hittite (e.g. 1936). His appreciation of Hittite laryngeals was illumined by his awareness of Amerindian phonologies. From the time of *Language* onwards this particular 'world-wide' linguistic scholarship became a characteristic feature of American anthropological linguistics. We take it for granted (or did - for it has begun to wither a little of late). It is a feature of Bloomfield's great contribution (also called *Language*) of 1933. It is in Swadesh, Greenberg, Pike and many others. Yet Sapir was taken by them to be the model for them all.

The main explicit theoretical points that people remember from *Language* concern the notion of drift as the motor of linguistic change. Drift is the name that Sapir gave to a kind of pattern dynamic that drove languages of common genetic origin when separated to continue to change in parallel ways. This is a typical Sapir quasi-theory - 'quasi' because it is almost impossible to make precise. There are quantities of illustrative cases that can be cited, however. One might be the independent development in south-western Irish Gaelic and in north-western Scottish Gaelic of a diphthong before velar nasals and laterals (e.g. *ann/aUN/ 'in it'; *geall/g'auLI/ 'promise', where /W/ and /N/ are velarized phonemes). These changes occur, therefore, at the opposite and long-separated ends of the Gaelic realm (O'Rahilly 1972: 50-1, 122). Similar discussions have occurred, from time to time, in the context of the relationships between English at various early dates and Old Saxon, on the one hand, and Frisian on the other. For Sapir, however, the notion of drift developed (as later papers hint) from the problem of applying the historical methods derived from the analysis of texts of various dates to orally living material. He says somewhere (about establishing stages of a common language) that Common West Germanic cannot be 'reconstructed' with the phonemes /H/ and /h/ by utilizing the modern West Germanic languages alone, as those languages have 'lost' (that is, show no trace of) /h/ in combinations of that sort. Faced only with languages still living today, we should, therefore, be permitted by the rules to restore /r/, /l/ only. When West Germanic *was 'Common*', argues Sapir, all the Western Germanic languages must have had such forms: the common absence is a post-separation phenomenon. They all lost the missing phonemes later, by linguistic drift. Sapir developed this view because of a genuine problem in setting up fixed intermediate stages in reconstructing the earlier interrelationships of Amerindian languages, using standard historical linguistic methods. Restored stages cannot be regularly and consistently fixed to specific linguistic features. Nowadays this has a modern ring. A Celticist recently declared that when we refer to Common Celtic we may be referring to a period of several thousand years. To unpack the meaning of such non-Brugmannian heresies would need a full consideration of wherein
lies the historicity of 'historical reconstruction' (cf. Ardener 1971b), but for our immediate purposes it is sufficient to note that experience of Amerindian 'reconstruction', without historical documents, reflected upon in Ottawa, contributed to Sapir's own early insight.

Language is also marked by a concern for linguistic typology and for classifying previously inadequately analysed language groups. The Sapir reclassification of Amerindian languages was bold and has been subsequently built upon. Its methods certainly inspired Greenberg in his own reclassification of African languages in the 1950s (Greenberg 1955 and subsequent publications). That classification does not resemble the close-knit, densely documented classification of, for example, the Indo-European languages, backed by regular tables of sound changes. The classification of Niger-Kordofanian, in which the Bantu family found itself redefined as a greatly swollen subset, is much looser, more statistical - with a Heisenbergian element of uncertainty. Sapir had a very strong influence here.

All very good, but possibly not riveting for a non-specialist? In fact it is quite misleading to look in Sapir's writings merely for technicalities - he is deeply informative on these - or for an orderly theory. Nothing can be set up in the way of an organised exposition of a theory of language along the lines of, say, Jakobson or Saussure. Yet among his contemporaries it is clear that 'Sapirism' was a total cast of mind. We saw how Professor Voegelin couldn't (or didn't) accord certain priorities to Saussure over Sapir.

In this connection, Bloomfield's review of Sapir's Language, in 1922, a year after its publication, is also of interest:

Dr. Sapir in almost every instance favors those views which I, for one, believe to be in accord with our best knowledge of speech and of the ways of man.... As Dr. Sapir gives no bibliography, one cannot say how much of his agreement with scholars who have expressed similar views is a matter of independent approach. For instance...the author develops what he justly calls an 'important conception', - the 'inner' or 'ideal' phonetic system of a language: it is exactly the concept of distinctive features developed by the school of Sweet, Passy, and Daniel Jones....

(Bloomfield fails to mention the clear terminological echoes of the innere Sprachform of von Humboldt.)

The same concept was developed (independently, I think) by Franz Boas (Handbook of American Indian Languages...) and by de Saussure (Cours de Linguistique Générale [Paris 1916]). It is a question of no scientific moment, to be sure, but of some external interest, whether Dr. Sapir had at hand, for instance, this last book, which gives a theoretic foundation to the newer trend of linguistic study (Bloomfield 1922, in Koerner 1984: 47).
A question, we may think, of some 'scientific moment'. It is interesting that there were really two routes to the 'discovery' of the phoneme (to which Bloomfield was referring): through the vaguely German inner forms of language, and through precise phonetic analysis. Bloomfield lumps together both approaches, but there is no doubt that he himself belongs more with the latter and Sapir with the former. In my own view, however, the important point is that the day of the new synchronic systematics had dawned, and from now on the contribution of Sapir would appear intuitive and unorganized in comparison. The discourse of Sapir takes for granted a holistic view of language. It was an irony that the Chomskian purity squads, in their heyday years after his death, dubbed him *mentalistic*, and thus allowed him into the pantheon of the Cartesian predecessors of transformationalism, a movement with which surely Sapir would have had little sympathy. As a final word about *language* before we leave it, there is no doubt that it suffered from the appearance only a year later of the vastly successful second edition of Saussure (so often reprinted). As we have already mentioned, Bloomfield's own *Language* (surely the title must have been a deliberate if not a provocative echo?) appeared in 1933 and almost immediately ushered in the American phase of structuralism; which, because of its immense vogue, to some extent obscured Sapir, who would in six years be dead - on the very eve of that war which strengthened (through the famous military crash courses) the general awareness of the contribution of what for long was thought of as 'Bloomfieldian structuralism'. It is quite clear, of course, that that school - characterized as 'objectivist', 'anti-mentalist', and which proposed 'discovery procedures', based on the concept of an infinite corpus of observable data - certainly does not belong in the same theoretical world as Sapir's. Nevertheless, his work was not totally overwhelmed, as we have seen. The American school never lost its respect for his cast of mind.

Let us look at the nature of that cast of mind.

He had, first of all, a broad view of the idea of culture. He explicitly included in it 'higher culture', such as literature and poetry. As we have seen, he aspired to verse himself. Furthermore, he included mental phenomena (his so-called 'mentalism'), as is illustrated by papers such as 'Cultural Anthropology and Psychiatry' (1932), writing in terms that Evans-Pritchard (who recommended Sapir as reading) might in part have used:

The true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals and, on the subjective side, in the world of meanings which each one of these individuals may unconsciously abstract for himself from his participation in these interactions (in Mandelbaum 1949: 515).

In 1934, we have, as a development of this, his famous article on 'Symbolism' in the *Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences*, much
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leaned on by Victor Turner (1964: 30ff.; 1967). He distinguishes there between 'referential symbols' (including 'oral speech, writing, the telegraphic code', etc.), and 'condensation symbols' ('a highly condensed form of substitutive behaviour for direct expression, allowing for the ready release of emotional tension in conscious or unconscious form'). He notes, however, that language, although at one level referential, has deep condensation roots. This point was lost subsequently, when the rise of communication/information theory tended to overstress the aspect of language as a 'code'.

In an interesting article in *Psychiatry* in 1938, called 'Why Cultural Anthropology needs the Psychiatrist', he refers to being rather shocked when, reading J.O. Dorsey's *Omaha Sociology*, he would find an account of a cultural practice, followed by some such phrase as 'Two Crows [an Omaha informant] denies it' (the title now of a recent thorough treatment of the Omaha by Dr R.H. Barnes [1984]). It was, says Sapir, as though Dorsey had not squarely met the challenge of his source material and given the kind of data that we, as respectable anthropologists, could live on. It was as though he 'passed the buck' to the reader, expecting him by some miracle of cultural insight to segregate truth from error. We see now that Dorsey was ahead of his age.... The truth of the matter is that if we think long enough about Two Crows and his persistent denials, we shall have to admit that in some sense Two Crows is never wrong.... The fact that this rebel, Two Crows, can in turn bend others to his own view of fact or theory or to his own preference in action shows that his divergence from custom had, from the very beginning, the essential possibility of culturalized behaviour (in Mandelbaum 1949: 567, 572).

It is not surprising that the linguists did not see in this much more than 'mentalism' at this time. What we have here is a perception that wherever human beings are, total consistent systems cannot be. There would be four decades of structural and transformational theory to get through before the idea of language as a total system began to come under general attack. As for the anthropologists - among them the idea of consistency in social systems had almost as long a life.

Perhaps one of the great puzzles about Sapir is why he should have been remembered by most linguists and anthropologists today for something known as the 'Sapir-Whorf hypothesis'. I have often discussed this matter from Whorf's point of view (Ardener 1971a, 1982), and the question of attribution has considerable complexity. I have repeatedly argued that the hypothesis as commonly summarized (that language determines the view of reality) does not really square with Whorf's views, and that the extreme relativism implied was a product of his professional colleagues' interpretations and his own occasionally hasty phraseology in semi-popular writings. It is the more surprising that Sapir should have been made, as it were, to take the prior responsibility for what was to become a
rather controversial thesis. It seems likely that the 'Sapir-Whorf Hypothesis' received its public baptism from Harry Hoijer's contribution (of the same title) to a conference of 1953 in Chicago, which led to a major review of these ideas, published under his editorship as *Language and Culture*, in 1954. In that volume, Hockett ('The Whorfian Theses') and Fearing (the 'Conceptions of Benjamin Whorf') refer only to Whorf in their titles, and the rest, save Hoijer, refer only to Whorf in their papers. In the 'Discussions', which form half of the book, all save Hoijer refer to the 'Whorf hypothesis' or the like, and by the end so does he ('the Whorf hypothesis', p. 263). Hoijer's own 'Preface' confirms the matter (1954: ix) with its references to 'the Whorf hypothesis and its problems', and to 'what Whorf [not Sapir] actually said'. The Hoijer volume remains one of the best discussions of Whorf. At the time, it was widely perceived as a major attack on 'the hypothesis'. In fact, it is still required reading on the wider problems, which are still with us.

To return to Sapir's possible role in all this, there is, of course, a famous citation of Sapir by Whorf, as we shall see in a moment, and Whorf also refers respectfully to his studies with Sapir. However, Whorf describes important hypotheses on the subject that he developed before he met Sapir, which are very much his own and in his very recognisable mental style - particularly those linking the materiality of action with linguistic conceptualisation. It is as if, when Whorf's approach had its main post-war impact, which came after a posthumous publication (1952), it was important to some that Sapir's role should be given priority and his name provide a certain professional respectability to it. I am not aware that he himself ever declared anything so scientifically grand as a 'hypothesis'. The Whorf-like passage, quoted by Whorf, is from Sapir's paper, 'The Status of Linguistics as a Science', published in 1929, having begun life as a public address the year before:

Language is a guide 'to social reality'. Though language is not ordinarily thought of as of essential interest to the students of social science, it powerfully conditions all our thinking about social problems and processes. Human beings do not live in the objective world alone, nor alone in the world of social activity as ordinarily understood, but are very much at the mercy of the particular language which has become the medium of expression for their society. It is quite an illusion to imagine that one adjusts to reality essentially without the use of language and that language is merely an incidental means of solving specific problems of communication or reflection. The fact of the matter is that the 'real world' is to a large extent unconsciously built up on the language habits of the group. No two languages are ever sufficiently similar to be considered as representing the same social reality. The worlds in which different societies live are distinct worlds, not merely the same world with different labels attached (in Mandelbaum 1949: 162).
Some large claims are certainly made in this paragraph, which is, however, one among many in a somewhat discursive paper covering the relationships between language and human life. Furthermore, there is another passage (Whorf-like in a slightly different way) in an earlier paper of 1924, with which it is not entirely consistent:

It would be absurd to say that Kant's 'Critique of Pure Reason' could be rendered forthwith into the unfamiliar accents of Eskimo or Hottentot, and yet it would be absurd in but a secondary degree. What is really meant is that the culture of these primitive folk has not advanced to the point where it is of interest to them to form abstract conceptions of a philosophical order. But it is not absurd to say that there is nothing in the formal peculiarities of Hottentot or of Eskimo which would obscure the clarity or hide the depth of Kant's thought - indeed, it may be suspected that the highly synthetic and periodic structure of Eskimo would more easily bear the weight of Kant's terminology than his native German.

(Whorf might have written that last clause.)

Further, to move to a more positive vantage point, it is not absurd to say that both Hottentot and Eskimo possess all the formal apparatus that is required to serve as a matrix for the expression of Kant's thought. If these languages have not the requisite Kantian vocabulary, it is not the languages that are to be blamed but the Eskimo and the Hottentots themselves. The languages as such are quite hospitable to the addition of a philosophical load to their lexical stock-in-trade (in Mandelbaum 1949: 154).

Now all that may be true or false, but it is quite conventionally universalistic in tone. The subject is Whorfian but the conclusions are somewhat different. On the other hand, later in the same paper (ibid.: 157), he is quite aware that 'innocent linguistic categories may take on the formidable appearance of cosmic absolutes', and he speaks of language producing 'spurious entities'. On the whole, Sapir's lack of formal theorizing makes it difficult to see him as a caricature Sapir-Whorfian. Nevertheless, much that is sound in discussions of the relations between language, thought and reality is to be found in his writings.

How shall we evaluate Sapir? There is no doubt that his concern with what he kept seeing as Psychology of Culture diverted his energies in the later years. Unlike Malinowski, with whom he has points in common, he did not locate his insights in either a general theory of language or in a general theory of society. Sapir died in 1939. His widow has written: 'Edward died with the feeling that he had an important point to make that he hadn't managed to get across' (see Koerner 1984: 192). There was a failure of sorts. His perception of the links between life and language were taken too literally as a matter of linguistics alone. It is
not surprising, as we have said, that Sapir should have found his 'important point' eluding him, when it is realized that both anthropology and linguistics were at the height of their modernistic, scientizing obsessions. In addition, his best insights require a knowledge of historical linguistics which is rare in general anthropologists. The path into psychology was trodden not only by him, but (of course) by Benedict, Mead, Bateson, Nadel, Fortes and many others (including Audrey Richards). The then available psychologies were, however, either too individual, too positivistic, too culturally loaded, or too totalitarian in their claims (psychoanalysis managed to be all these at once!) for this to be other than a blind alley. It has taken most of the post-war period for anthropology itself to work through the Mind/Society/Language relationship - the seventeen years of this Journal (JASO) alone probably provide sufficient illustration of that!

The case of Sapir is a good illustration of the way that an apparently successful professional life can be lived with powerful intellectual winds against it. Even if we recognise certain intuitions of Sapir's that are now more subtle than we first thought, the appropriation of Sapir by the 'Sapir-Whorf' discussion makes it very difficult to put him forward as the ancestor of post-Whorfian discussions, especially when we note the largely ad hoc nature of many of Sapir's views. One thing is certain: both he and Whorf have suffered from misinterpretations of quite serious, though not identical kinds. Let us remember, however, that they, like Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, 'did make love to this appointment'. They accepted conventional ways out, oversimplified, went with the grain of their times, and perhaps they could not always even remember what they had originally wished to say. They would not be the first, nor the last, to fall into these traps! Sapir had, and still has, great exemplary value in this and other ways - especially for humanists. Without his memory, certainly American anthropological linguistics (and much anthropology of language in general) would not have so sturdily weathered (as it did) the mortal storm of Chomsky's transformational formalism that left so much else in ruins for a generation.

EDWIN ARDENER

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