THE UNCONSCIOUS MIND:
DO JUNG AND LEVI-STRAUSS AGREE?

The works of Carl Jung and Claude Lévi-Strauss are cosmic in scope and universal in appeal, addressing facets of human existence ranging from religion and myth to neurosis and psychosis. Underlying both theoretical frameworks is an unconscious generator which conditions human consciousness. Recently, attempts have been made to demonstrate the affinities between these two great thinkers (see Prattis 1978:20ff.), attempts which this paper will show to be, for the most part, quite spurious. To this end, an investigation will be undertaken to examine to what extent Jung and Lévi-Strauss concur or diverge in their viewpoints concerning the nature of the unconscious, by exploring the key concepts which they employ in articulating their respective paradigms. Reference will be made primarily, though not exclusively, to their understanding of myth, and in particular to the ubiquitous folklore figures of the trickster and culture hero. As a concluding statement, an assessment of the efficacy of their respective models and a proposal for a synthetic form amalgamating the viewpoints of the two will be made.

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1. Jung: The Psyche and Its Archetypes

Jung's psychology concerns itself with the working of the psyche and with the development of a model to explain its dynamics. This leads him to discuss the nature of the psychic forces which energize the world of human consciousness and its underlying unconscious components. The terms psyche and psychic in this model designate operations of the mind which take place on both a conscious and an unconscious level (C.W. VIII: 352-3), leading Jung to postulate a two-tier system in which the psychic forces active in the unconscious (which he separates into personal and collective components) compensate and consequently influence consciousness (C.W. IX, 1: 281). The conscious aspect of the mind, for Jung, is designated as the ego and is capable of perceiving events in the external environment as well as unconscious internal activity which has become conscious. Included here would be one's personal memories along with everything else that is readily available to consciousness. The ego is made up of images recorded by the senses 'that transmit stimuli from within and without, and...of an immense accumulation of past processes' (C.W. VIII: 323). It is

...the complex factor to which all conscious contents are related. It forms, as it were, the centre of the field of consciousness; and, in so far as this comprises the empirical personality the ego is the subject of all personal acts of consciousness (C.W. IX, 2: 3).

The unconscious in Jung's model, as noted, is divided into two parts. The first of these is the personal unconscious in which the contents from the personal past unavailable to the ego are stored:

...the (personal) unconscious is the receptacle of all lost memories and of all contents that are still too weak to become conscious. These contents are products of an unconscious associative activity which also gives rise to dreams. Besides these we must include all more or less intentional repressions of painful thoughts and feelings (C.W. VIII: 133).

At a deeper level stands the collective unconscious in which the earliest and most archaic vestiges of man's psychic development exist; here are contained the 'archetypes' (ibid.: 138). These are primeval forms or motifs which have evolved through the centuries and now reside in man's unconscious.

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1 References to Jung's works are taken from his Collected Works (hereafter C.W., followed by the volume and page numbers; see Jung 1978 in References).
The energy which drives Jung's psychic system is referred to as 'libidinal' and arises out of a primal source that is biologically based - i.e., derived from the instincts - but never unrelated to spirit; thus the archetypes embody both an instinctual and spiritual component (ibid.:212).

Within the psyche, energy flows between poles of opposites, the basic opposites being those of consciousness and the unconscious. Notably, should too great a quantity of libidinal energy become concentrated at one of the poles of opposites, creating a situation of psychic disequilibrium, the principle of 'enantiodromia' forcibly causes the energy surrounding the over-energized pole to switch over to its opposite (C.W.VI:426).

Therefore, in order to allow for the smooth operation of the psychic system, the degree of tension between the poles of opposites must be regulated.

If the ego is forced to regress, i.e. to retreat to the unconscious, Jung claims that a compensatory activity has been set in motion in response to the undue tension in the psyche (C.W.VIII:39). Regression indicates that some aspect of the psyche's contents is in disequilibrium, causing a curtailing in the normal flow of energy. If for some reason the flow of libidinal energy is impeded or in any way restricted at the conscious level (e.g. through repression), then it will move to meet and alleviate the restriction. At this time the unconscious will produce symbols indicating that there is a disruption in the system.

Symbols, in Jung's model, are derived from libidinal energy and present conflicting positions in the psyche with a third component which mediates the conflict through a higher synthesis, incorporating yet transcending the positions in conflict. 'The raw material shaped by thesis and antithesis, and in the shaping of which the opposites are united, is the living symbol' (C.W.VI:479-80).

In Jung's psychology the manufacture of symbols for the purpose of assuaging the conflict of opposites is known as the 'transcendent function'. In regressing to the unconscious the system has found a symbol that will re-establish the harmony between consciousness and the unconscious through the mediation of opposites. The transcendent function arises from the union 'of conscious and unconscious contents' and manifests itself as a 'quality of conjoined opposites' (C.W.VIII:90). If the symbols are ignored by consciousness, then neurotic and psychotic symptoms result (ibid.:288). For this reason Jung's psychology addresses itself to the maintenance of a steady state within the system, where consciousness and the unconscious continually and actively adapt and respond to one another.

The instinctual and spiritual components of libidinal energy, when brought out of the unconscious, act as the core material for man's symbols (C.W.VI: 238-9). After a period of gestation, these emerge from the unconscious through, for example, dreams and myths, and function to relate the ego back to the unconscious (C.W.VIII:336). In returning to the unconscious the ego is
directed to the archetypes, the primal forms or motifs which in­
habit the collective unconscious (C.W.IX,1:42).

For Jung, the archetype is not directly perceivable in terms of a specific content, but only as a form, which is considered to be a priori. The archetype

...is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience. The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, nothing but a facultas praeformandi, a possibility of representation that is given a priori. The representations themselves are not inherited only the forms... (ibid:79).

It is in mythical motifs that the content of archetypes becomes manifest, and because these arise out of a collective source Jung notes that they will be cross-culturally similar:

...in so far as the myth is nothing but a projection from the unconscious and not a conscious invention at all, it is quite understandable that we should everywhere come upon the same myth motifs, and that myths actually represent typical psychic phenomena (C.W.VIII:38).

Two archetypes present in myth are those of the trickster and the hero; these will be examined in this paper.

a) Jung's Conception of the Trickster

Jung's analysis of the trickster developed out of his academic exchange with the anthropologist Paul Radin. In the mid-1950s, Radin requested Jung to formulate a psychological theory to account for the presence of the trickster within the mythology of the Winnebago Indians, a group which Radin had been investigating for some time. Jung's analysis originally appeared as part of Radin's Der göttliche Sohne, first published in 1954 and translated as The Trickster in 1956.

In fitting the trickster into the framework of his overall theoretical perspectives, Jung addressed himself specifically to Radin's ethnographic data. However, inasmuch as many of the trickster myths recorded by Radin are found not only within Algonkian mythology but also in other, especially European (as pointed out by Jung) mythology, Jung's understanding of the trickster goes beyond the Winnebago and addresses itself to the trickster within all mythologies.

The trickster, for Jung, represents man's 'collective shadow', that is, some person or group of persons viewed as transgressing the societal norms outlining acceptable modes of behaviour. The collective shadow figure defines the normative structure of a group of persons by embodying the antithesis of these norms within itself. Accordingly, the collective shadow is
the epitome of all the inferior traits of character in individuals'.

In the trickster stories of the North American Indians the collective shadow figure is preserved, claims Jung, 'in its pristine mythological form' (Radin 1956: 202). Here he embodies humanity's earliest stages of conscious development. With the attainment of higher levels of consciousness, however, this figure was looked upon as an entity set apart from the culture bearing man, and gradually he developed into an object of scorn and contempt, insofar as he came to represent an inferior and earlier stage in the development of consciousness (C.W.IX:262-3).

At one and the same time, the trickster is the archetype of the emerging ego - that is, the prototype of the first man - and also the last remnant of an archaic past. The ability of this figure to continue to attract our conscious attention points to his existence as an archetype within the collective unconscious (ibid.: 264-5). Here he acts as a magnet, drawing towards himself the free-flowing libido which energizes Jung's model of the psyche.

The paradox involved in this analysis, however, is that although the trickster attracts consciousness because of his archetypal basis, at the same time he elicits resistance and rejection because of his shadow qualities (ibid.: 268). To be reminded of his past is embarrassing to the acculturated man. Yet by mythicizing the foolish escapades of the trickster, who is the embodiment of the shadow in each and every individual and in society as a whole, the embarrassment of being identified with this blundering proto-man is deflected away from the individual and society and onto the archetypal motif. But the negative aspects of the trickster still require assimilation, or the possibility of their being projected may arise (ibid.:267).

What is important to note is that the role of the trickster as a culture hero, as found in many Indian mythologies, is not directly addressed by Jung's analysis. This is primarily because of the fact that the mythological material which Radin sent to Jung for analysis was all of a trickster variety, that is, it dealt with an abundantly 'foolish' personality. Furthermore, the culture-hero cycle of the Winnebago Indians concerns itself with a being known as the Great Hare, whose mythical cycle is clearly distinguished from that of the trickster - a situation notably not present in all North American Indian mythologies (Radin 1956: 131).

b) The Trickster-Hero in Jung's Psychology

In discussing the archetypal hero and his psychological significance for mythology, Jung points out that animal figures in myths symbolize man's instinctual nature. Thus mythologies depicting the slaying of an animal by the hero would represent the transformation of the hero's instinctuality from that which controls his ego into that which is made subservient to it. However, at
the same time as the animal sacrifice symbolizes the hero's renunciation of instinct, it also represents the emergence of his ego consciousness. Having gained this through separation from the unconscious, the hero must again enter into the matrix from which his consciousness has emerged in order to be reborn, this process representing the normal and healthy flow of energy within the psyche which, for Jung, is reciprocal between consciousness and the unconscious.

Apart from the fact that the trickster is the archetype of the collective shadow, he also represents the emerging ego consciousness of man. As a reminder of man's humble origins, the trickster is established as the first human being, a newly conscious being who, because of his incompetence, assumes the role of the 'fool' in mythology. This is due to the incomplete development of his consciousness. Similarly, the archetypal hero also portrays a stage in the development of human consciousness, becoming only fully conscious with the sacrifice of his instinctuality. The question remains, however, what becomes of these sacrificed instincts? Jung locates these in the unconscious, where they form part of man's shadow, his inferior personality. The quest of the hero becomes, then, to integrate his instinctuality - i.e., his shadow - into consciousness, a development which represents the individuation process and culminates in the realization of the self, the total personality.

In his works Jung has referred to the shadow as the 'inferior personality', which he further relates to man's instinctual nature, 'the lowest levels of which are indistinguishable from the instinctuality of an animal' (C.W.IX, 2:233-4). As observed, the trickster, in Jung's analysis, is above all else a creature of instinct, or 'a psyche that has hardly left the animal level', re-embodying the shadow characteristics of all men. In contrast, though, to the trickster, the hero is the representation of the self, the whole man.

The hero himself appears as a being of more than human stature. He is distinguished from the very beginning by his god-like characteristics...he is psychologically an archetype of the self...(C.W.V:391-2).

 Whereas the hero sacrifices his instinctuality in attempting to free himself from the unconscious, the trickster affirms it. While the hero relegates his instinctuality to the unconscious - as symbolized by the animal sacrifice - the trickster re-embodies it. The trickster is mankind's collective shadow, a primitive instinctual being constituting his inferior traits of character.

Within mythology, the archetypal hero has been ascribed positive qualities, while the trickster has become an object of scorn and ridicule. Inasmuch as this is the case, the separation of trickster and culture hero within the mythology (as in Radin's example of the Winnebago) can be explained in terms of Jung's theoretical framework. The hero, as a model for the self, is the goal towards which consciousness strives, while the trickster, as
Jung and Lévi-Strauss

a representation of mankind's collective shadow, elicits negative feelings because of his inferior qualities. Consequently, the trickster is shunned by consciousness, while the hero, as the archetype of the self, is praised and emulated. As a result, trickster and hero become divided in the conscious attitudes of men, the one being accepted while the other is rejected.

Yet there is a contradiction involved in this attitude, namely that the self, as an archetype of the collective unconscious, calls for the necessary integration of the shadow. Because the self symbolizes the total personality, it cannot exclude the shadow from its constitution, as Jung himself affirms when saying that 'the self is a combination of opposites. Without a shadow even the self is not real' (C.W.X:107-8, n.66).

Significantly, in many North American Indian mythologies trickster and hero function as one. From the vantage point of Jung's psychology, therefore, they can be said to achieve a fuller appreciation of the nature of the archetype - the self - by integrating its darker aspects. Following Jung's model of the psyche, it can be observed that as psychic energy moves from the unconscious to consciousness, the trickster emerges, reminding man of his repressed instinctuality; while conversely, as the psychic energy moves from consciousness to the unconscious, cultural renewal is brought about, and the trickster takes on the role of the archetypal hero, whose task it is to enter into the unconscious and emerge from it renewed and revitalized by its energies.

Jung notes at several points in his works that all archetypes are ambivalent, this being true of the shadow as well, which incorporates the rejected side of both personal and collective consciousness. But precisely because it represents this rejected side, it also represents the possibility of both personal and collective renewal through its integration. As a consequence, symbols of the shadow can be envisioned as both foolish and respected, as in the case of the trickster. As a representative of this rejected side, the trickster can become the bearer of the 'new' when he takes on the role of the saviour or culture hero in mythology.

Given this two-way flow of energy between consciousness and the unconscious, the manifestly instinctual nature of the trickster is not seen as a contradiction of his heroic qualities but, as a true representative of the self, he brings the shadow into harmony with the totality of his personality, integrating both positive (heroic) and negative (foolish) qualities into one mythological personage (cf. von Franz 1972:63).

In summary, Jung's model of the psyche and the role of the trickster-hero therein can be represented as in Figure 1:
The basic opposites of consciousness and the unconscious are mediated by the archetypes. Each of these, as Jung notes, 'spontaneously develops favourable and unfavourable, light and dark, good and bad effects (C.W.IX, 2:267). Thus within themselves they contain an inherent polarity which, when incompletely mediated, seeks symbols to provide the missing third. The trickster-hero is illustrative of this reciprocal flow of energies. Failed mediation of the polar opposites results in a projection of shadow qualities, leading, in this instance, to both individual and cultural neurosis.

The basic concepts discussed above find parallels within the structuralist's paradigm as articulated by Lévi-Strauss.

2. Lévi-Strauss: Binaries and Mediation

For Jung, the opposites of consciousness and the unconscious, along with the ambivalent nature of the archetypes and their subsequent reconciliation through symbolic forms, is central to the articulation of his model. Similarly, for Lévi-Strauss, opposites and their attempted reconciliation through mediation provide the crux for his theoretical framework.

According to Lévi-Strauss, through the senses - taste, touch, sight, smell, and sound - man apprehends the world around him and transforms his perceptions into coded messages processed via the agency of the mind; these messages function in terms of binary oppositions, which through mediation and correlation with other relations of opposition present a logical structure manifest -
although not always apparent - in social life. Lévi-Strauss refers to the procedure by which these coded relations of opposition are deduced and elucidated as structural anthropology or, simply, structuralism.

Crucial to any understanding of Lévi-Strauss is his conceptualization of the mind, which is the unconscious generator of all social activity. Because the mind operates in a logical fashion, social formations will be structured according to its dictates, leading him to posit 'an internal logic which directs the unconscious workings of the human mind even in those of its creations which have long been considered the most arbitrary' (1969:220). Entailed in this conceptualization is both a conscious and an unconscious component. Consciously the mind apprehends phenomenal reality via the senses, while unconsciously it acts as the structuring principle for these perceptions: 'As the organ of a specific function, the unconscious mind merely imposes structural laws upon inarticulated elements which originate elsewhere' (C. N. VII:30).

The structures produced by the mind are manifest in various cultural forms such as kinship systems, myths, and totemic classifications. It is this structuring mental activity which 'unifies form and content, and therefore contributes to the emerging of an ordered social interaction' (Rossi 1974:98). Because this order is structured, posits Lévi-Strauss, it can be examined and understood by social science. Thus between mind and reality there is no priority, but rather a reciprocal exchange in which reality provides mind with the raw material upon which it operates (ibid.:99).

The perception of this exchange is problematic, however, in that its structure is not always deducible from phenomenal reality. For Lévi-Strauss 'true reality is never the most obvious of realities', for it is usually hidden from view; yet it is nevertheless recoverable at the level of an underlying unconscious structure (ibid.:64). Lévi-Strauss is thus led to rebuke the contention of the phenomenologists who posit a 'continuity between experience and reality' (ibid.:65). At the same time, though, he does not reject this type of understanding, claiming that it is 'not so much a real proof but rather a guarantee that the structural analysis of the unconscious categories has left nothing aside' (ibid.:94); in other words, that the exchange between structure and reality is working in both directions.

Lévi-Strauss's quest, simply stated, is one for human universals. 'Verbal categories provide the mechanism through which (formal) universal structural characteristics of the human brain are transformed into universal structural characteristics of human culture' (Leach 1970:38). It is through these categories that man communicates not only overtly, but covertly as well, revealing a deep level at which messages are transmitted, socially manifest, and structurally articulated; this formulation provides the basis for Lévi-Strauss's understanding of totemism, kinship systems and, most importantly, myth.
In apprehending the differences in his physical environment, man—particularly primitive man in Lévi-Strauss's study of totemism—differentiates himself culturally from his fellows and nature by opposing the latter to culture (society) and the former to his group affiliation. Thus 'opposition, instead of being an obstacle to integration, serves rather to produce it' by providing a system of classification through differentiation (Lévi-Strauss 1962:89). Consequently, just as a leopard and an eagle are perceived as distinct from culture—distinguishing man from nature—so too a man of the leopard clan is different from one of the eagle clan—distinguishing classes within culture. These differentiations between nature and culture, clan and non-clan, unite, through relations of opposition, man and nature and man and man. In this way, totemic classifications integrate the individual into a coherent system which situates him culturally and naturally as a distinct entity, existing within nature and yet standing apart from it, and present within culture as a member of a group, and yet distinct from the whole—the logic of the system being, as Lévi-Strauss contends, to provide a means of symbolic communication, 'stating how the games of communication should be played on both a natural and cultural level' (Lévi-Strauss 1973:387).

In a similar manner, elementary kinship systems unite diverse groups through relations of opposition via the exchange of women. In this instance the pattern of exchange points to the logic of the system, whether of a 'restricted' or a 'generalized' nature (Harris 1968:499-501). Kinship rules provide 'the blueprint of a mechanism which extracts women out of their consanguineous families to redistribute them in domestic groups, which in turn become new consanguineous families...' (Lévi-Strauss 1963a: 369).

Myth, notably, is also a form of communication within the structuralist's paradigm, although one quite different and structurally much more complex than either totemism or kinship systems, for in myth the mind is left...

...to commune with itself and no longer has to come to terms with objects, it is in a sense reduced to imitating itself as an object; and that since the laws governing its operations are not fundamentally different from those it exhibits in other functions, it shows itself to be of the nature of a thing among things (Lévi-Strauss 1969b:10).

In his works on myth, Lévi-Strauss illustrates a deep structure built upon different empirical levels—such as social organization and economy—which have been apprehended by the senses and codified in such a way as to address the paradoxes and contradictions within nature and society. Common to all of these is an underlying structure through which the various codes and their transformations and permutations transmit messages addressing the myth's contradictions. These oppositions, paradoxes and contradictions are mediated, appropriately enough, by
'mediators' who, in a sense, 'punctuate' the sequences of the myth (Prattis 1978:12). Their appearance signals that the contradiction being addressed has been defined in the form of an opposing relation and a resolution sought. Failure to solve the paradox causes the message being transmitted to switch over onto another code and level, and again to seek resolution through mediation (ibid.:10).

As a result, myths address themselves to the logical inconsistencies within nature and society, making statements about norms and values, and further, enter into a discussion - at a meta-linguistic level - of the unresolvable dilemmas of human existence: life and death and man's place in nature (Campbell 1974:22).

a) The Structural Study of Myth

Two trends are evident in Lévi-Strauss's writings on the structural study of myth: the first of these delineates a methodology for the derivation of a myth's basic units, along with their permutations, transformations, and mediation within a corpus selected for study; the second, more eclectic procedure selects material, seemingly at random, from culturally diverse and geographically remote areas. These two procedures, it should be noted, are not antithetical, and certainly the latter is justified within the structuralist's frame of reference. However, for the purpose of articulating how a myth should be analysed, Lévi-Strauss's initial statement - and in my mind his most lucid - provides the clearest guidelines for the purposes of exposition; this is contained in his 1955 essay 'The Structural Study of Myth' (1963b).

Given the fact that studies of myth have, for the most part, been inconclusive at best, Lévi-Strauss ventures that further research should be directed towards unearthing some universal common denominator. This leads him to postulate that myth, as with his analyses of totemic systems of classification and kin designations, is a form of communication which is comprehensible not at the surface level, but at the level of an underlying structure. The question becomes, then, how is this structure to be apprehended? Conveniently, as Lévi-Strauss notes, myth is language and therefore, to a certain extent, governed by its rules - but not entirely.

2 The latter procedure is best exemplified in Lévi-Strauss's Mythologiques I-IV. As Edmund Leach describes it (1970:61), 'this grand survey of the mythology of the Americas, which has so far mentioned 528 different stories in some 1300 pages, is increasingly tending to degenerate into a latter-day Golden Bough'.
Though Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology borrows extensively from structural linguistics, he is careful to point out that 'language in myth exhibits specific properties'. Following De Saussure, Lévi-Strauss notes that language is made up of two components: langue, the structural properties of a language; and parole, the statistical frequency with which these occur. Myth, in this schema, is a composite of the two, and yet is distinct: it is 'an absolute entity on a third level'.

Because of this, the properties of myth exhibit 'more complex features than those which are to be found in any other kind of linguistic expression'. Allowing for this, two hypotheses are generated, namely: (1) myth is made up of constituent units; (2) even though they are like the constituent units of language (phonemes, morphemes, sememes), the units which make up the language of myth are of a 'higher and more complex order'. Lévi-Strauss refers to these as 'gross constituent units' or 'mythemes'.

The derivation of mythemes takes place at the sentence level. Here, each myth is analysed with a view towards breaking its story-line into a series of short, concise statements which are methodically transcribed onto index cards numbered in sequence and corresponding to the unfolding of the story. This, in Lévi-Strauss's terms, is the diachronic level, and should show that a certain function is 'at a given time linked to a given subject. Or, to put it otherwise, each gross constituent unit will consist of a relation'.

Yet, because of the non-reversible nature of time in the diachronic dimension, a synchronic plane or atemporal dimension is necessary. On the synchronic level, time stands still, as it were, becoming altogether ahistorical. Yet what gives myth an operational value is that the specific pattern described is timeless; 'it explains the present and the past as well as the future'. Thus both the diachronic and synchronic dimensions must be considered when analyzing a particular myth or set of myths. Accordingly, claims Lévi-Strauss,

The true constituent units of a myth are not the isolated relations but bundles of such relations, and it is only as bundles that these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning (p.211).

The relations among the mythemes or 'bundles of relations' lead us to the underlying structure, and hence to the meaning of the myth.

Lévi-Strauss notes that myths are only imperfectly transmitted in individual accounts, often leaving their reliability in doubt. Yet the structuralist's method does away with this problem of searching for the 'true' or 'original' version by subsuming it within its theoretical framework, where a myth consists of 'all its variants'. Or, as Leach puts it,
Lévi-Strauss' postulate is that a corpus of mythology constitutes an 'orchestra score'.... The collectivity of the senior members of the society, through its religious institutions, is unconsciously transmitting to the junior members a basic message which is manifest in the 'score' as a whole rather than any particular myth (1970:60).

Following this line of argument, to discover the structure of the myth, Lévi-Strauss's method requires us to lay out our index cards in a two-dimensional grid-work, with the horizontal plane corresponding to the diachronic level of the myth and the vertical to the synchronic. Now the myth can be viewed in two dimensions, and if other versions are added to the corpus, allowing us a more comprehensive view, a third dimension is added whereby the accumulated mythemes can be read diachronically, synchronically, and from front to back. Then, by examining the relations between binary pairs of opposites among the mythemes, the grammar or structure of the myth is made apparent. This structure will be coded, i.e., it will refer to various spheres of social life, such as economy, political order, kinship, etc., and articulate, through relations of opposition, the myth's central contradiction.

The oppositions within myths, and their relations, function dialectically in this schema, and are mediated within each code by a third term which possesses characteristics of both contradictions and acts so as to reconcile their differences; failing to do so, it too becomes one of a pair of opposites, which in turn must be mediated. Thus a series of opposites, each seeking mediation is generated - Lévi-Strauss refers to these formations as 'triads'. In this way the myth structures itself, growing 'spiral-wise until the intellectual impulse which has produced it is exhausted. Its growth is a continuous process, whereas its structure remains discontinuous'. The purpose of myth, for Lévi-Strauss, is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming contradictions.

Briefly stated, then, through an analysis of coded bundles of relations in the myths (i.e., the mythemes), their correlation through opposition, and subsequent attempt at mediation, the structure of the myth, and hence its meaning, is deduced. Mediators, as noted, are crucial to the exposition of this meaning. The mediators which will be of particular significance in the discussion to follow are those of the trickster and his logical counterpart, the hero.

b) Trickster and Hero in Lévi-Strauss's Structuralism

For Lévi-Strauss, tricksters and heroes act as mediators by attempting to resolve the contradictions posed within myths. Thus the trickster, for example, acts as a mediator 'because his mediating function occupies a position halfway between two polar terms, (therefore) he must retain something of that duality -
namely an ambiguous and equivocal character'.

The trickster, however, is only one of several mediators in myth, among whom are included the twins, the messiah, bisexual beings, and sibling pairs. Each of these achieves only a limited success in reconciling the opposites within myth. For example, the trickster, by juxtaposing contradictories, attempts to resolve them. But mere juxtaposition, notes Lévi-Strauss, is not sufficient for mediation, and consequently the myth switches over onto another level, articulating its contradiction in terms of a different code, and again seeks resolution via another mediator (1976:166).

The function of mediator, however, is not solely to point to a logical contradiction but also, in some cases, to exhaust 'all the possible solutions to the problem of bridging the gap between two and one' (1963b). In this way, their appearance signals that a resolution is being sought within the domain of a particular code, and resultant upon the success of the mediation - as signalled by the presence of trickster, hero, and so on - a new code may or may not be entered into; thus the mediator defines the nature of subsequent codes in which mediation is sought.

Similarly, the hero appears when a contradiction posed in terms of a particular code has been defined. In the structuralist's framework, trickster and hero can be viewed as two aspects of the same personality, as evidenced by those mythologies where the two are combined.

Not only can we account for the ambiguous character of the trickster, but we can also understand another property of mythical figures the world over, namely, that the same god is endowed with contradictory attributes - for instance, he may be good and bad at the same time (ibid.: 227).

For this reason, trickster-like qualities of cunning and foolishness can be associated with a mythological being, as also can heroic attributes. For Lévi-Strauss, these contradictory traits are a function of the type and degree of mediation sought, and issue from the unconscious mind.

Thus trickster and hero appear as particular instances of attempted mediation of binary oppositions. Notably, in contrast to Jung's model, trickster and hero do not represent flows of energy, but rather build upon the notion of logic - particularly combinatorial logic - inherent in the mind, which operates by structuring oppositions, their relations, and mediation into consciously manifest forms such as those of myth.

In what follows, some points of conjunction between the theoretical perspectives of Jung and Lévi-Strauss will be discussed, and a critical assessment of their respective positions will be made.
3. Jung and Lévi-Strauss: A Comparison

a) Mind and Psyche

As noted, the ego in Jung's model of the psyche is synonymous with consciousness. Consciousness, though, is only one aspect of the psyche's domain, for it also includes the unconscious, both personal and collective. Mind, in Lévi-Strauss' frame of reference, has a slightly different meaning. Here, similar to Jung, both conscious and unconscious components are entailed; but the concept of mind, unlike Jung's psyche, ultimately - as Lévi-Strauss observes - derives its origin from the physiological brain (1963b:226-7). Jung too couches his explanations in biological terms, noting that the archetypes arising out of the unconscious are held collectively by all men. These develop from primordial images (also referred to as 'engrams') which denote behaviour patterns developed through evolutionary history and which have become embedded in the unconscious.

The unconscious, considered as the historical background of the human psyche, contains in concentrated form the entire succession of engrams (imprints) which from time immemorable have determined the psychic structure as it now exists (C.W.VI:169; cf. ibid.:240).

These, as Jung goes on to say, occur as the result of 'the differentiation of instinct' which occurs, in his words, as 'a biological necessity'(ibid.:239).

Instinct within Jung's evolutionary perspective represents every psychic phenomenon 'that does not arise from voluntary causation but from dynamic impulsion' (ibid.:451). Yet impulses, emotions, and other affective dimensions of social life are, for the most part, effectively discounted in Lévi-Strauss's theoretical framework:

...impulses and emotions explain nothing: they are always results, either of the power of the body or the impotence of the mind. In both cases they are consequences, never causes. The latter can be sought only in the organism, which is the exclusive concern of biology, or in the intellect (Lévi-Strauss 1962:71; cf. 1963c:203).

Furthermore, it is significant that, for Jung, the mind assumes a subordinate position relative to the psyche. 'It is no use thinking we can ever get beyond the psyche by means of the mind, even though the mind asserts that it is not dependent on the psyche' (C.W.IX 1:269). Although Lévi-Strauss does not discuss the concept of the psyche in his works, it is nonetheless quite evident that the mind - in its capacity as an analytic
agency - is primary in his formulation. 3

b) Archetypes and Binary Oppositions

Binary oppositions, their mediation, transformation and permutation, issue from the unconscious. These enter consciousness, and in interacting with the sense perceptions of social actors, logically structure features of both society and culture. Archetypes similarly spring from an unconscious source and affect consciousness. The manifestation of archetypes occurs in instances of myth, ritual, and religious experience. Notably, the number of archetypes in the repertoire of the unconscious is theoretically innumerable (C.W.VIII:135; cf. Lévi-Strauss 1969b: 64). Though this point is not dealt with at length in Jung's works, he does note that the perception of the archetypes has been obscured by the extraordinary differentiation of our thinking, (C.W.VIII:135). As a result, with the evolution of consciousness, many archetypal forms have become unavailable to consciousness. Potentially, therefore, it is suggested that their number may well exceed our knowledge of them. (This issue has been of special interest among the neo-Jungians - see Hillman 1963, 1975.) Contrariwise, in the structuralist's scheme of things oppositions, as unconscious formal properties, are limited to the concise schema of binaries, and their mediation, transformation and permutation. Inversely, on the conscious level a limitless number of oppositions occur, as in instances of myth, for example.

For Lévi-Strauss, the underlying structuring principles of the mind are understood as being formal, and not specifically related to contents - as in the instance of a particular binary opposition, such as nature-culture or life-death.

It is only forms and not contents which can be common. If there are common contents the reason must be sought either in the objective properties of particular nature or artificial entities or in diffusion and borrowing, in either case, that is, outside the mind (1966:65; cf. ibid.: 247n.).

Jung also claims that

...archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree.... The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal (C.W.IX, 1:79).

3 See here Rossi 1974: 20-2, and Jung, C.W.VIII: 435-6, on their relation to the philosopher Kant.
However, these unconscious 'forms' are, for Jung, on the one hand theoretically more numerous than those contained in the structuralist's model, and on the other derived in part from the instincts, which Lévi-Strauss has already discounted. Also, there is a qualitative difference between Jung's conception of 'form' and that of Lévi-Strauss. For Jung archetypes, as formal properties, represent general themes of motifs within the unconscious, while for Lévi-Strauss the formal aspect of the unconscious refers to certain abstract structuring principles within the mind, devoid of any thematic element.  

4 Jung C.W.XVI:124; see Lévi-Strauss 1963c: 186-205. Also, it should be noted that Jung's model does not deal with some of the issues subsumed under the structuralist's rubric, such as kinship and totemic classifications. Similarly, though, it can be said that Lévi-Strauss's schema does not do justice to some of the areas examined by analytical psychology, such as neurosis and psychosis; these are only peripherally addressed, if at all.

c) Logic and Rationality

Though the concept of logic - primarily combinatory logic - is central to Lévi-Strauss's thesis, Jung makes no reference to it in his works. He does, however, discuss the notion of rationality and the irrational at length. Rationality in his schema is

...that which accords with reason....reason (is) an attitude whose principle it is to conform thought, feeling, and action to objective values. Objective values are established by the everyday experience of external facts on the one hand, and of inner psychological facts on the other (C.W.VI: 459).

The irrational, however, is not something contrary to reason, but 'something beyond reason, therefore, not grounded on reason' (ibid.: 454). Consequently, archetypes, according to this definition, are irrational, and thus beyond the realm of reason.

Practical psychology stirs up many problems that are not susceptible to a rational solution, but can only be settled irrationally, in a way not in accord with the laws of reason (ibid.:455).

Logic describes the formal properties of reasoning, i.e., the chain of connecting premises upon which explanations are built. Rationality characterizes what can rightly be fitted in with these premises. Though the logic employed by Lévi-Strauss is eminently analytical, as opposed to deductive-inductive, it is grounded on the premise that the structures elicited by his
investigations build upon an ethnographic context—as in his case of citing the coyote among the Pueblo, who acts as a trickster by mediating between herbivorous animals and beasts of prey and between warfare and agriculture (1963b:224; cf. Harris 1968:200-1). It is on the basis of these indigenous categories of significance that an analytic structure is deduced. In this instance, hunting and warfare are important factors to the Pueblo's survival, leading to the consequent mediation of the life-death opposition. The analytic insight provided by structuralism is arrived at, therefore, on the basis of certain ethnographic givens, and to this extent it accords with the laws of reason (cf. Rossi 1974:51 n.9). Consequently, in citing logic as a foundation upon which his theoretical framework is constructed—overtly at the analytic level and inherent to the deductive—Lévi-Strauss permits only that which is rational to fit into his model, leaving the irrational as a residual category constituted by the world of nature. As a result, the irrational—such as the archetypes in Jung's model—is, by definition, relegated to a position of secondary importance. Lévi-Strauss has quite candidly remarked: 'Since I was a child I have been bothered by, let us call it the irrational, and I have been trying to find an order behind what is given to us as disorder' (1978:11).

Whereas consciousness for Jung is eminently rational, consciousness for Lévi-Strauss is primarily irrational, inasmuch as the world of nature, i.e., that which is perceived by the senses, is seen as disordered, and must first be operated upon by the logical structuring principles inherent to the mind in order to achieve a structure (Chevalier 1979:4-6). In the case of Jung, the irrational constantly threatens to impinge upon consciousness; this irrational element is located in the unconscious. For Lévi-Strauss, the unconscious is the domain of certain formal principles which serve to structure logically the events of consciousness.

With these considerations in mind, a vast abyss appears separating the two theorists, where what one claims as being legitimately knowable (Jung's archetypes) the other dismisses as being essentially epistemologically unsound.

d) The Nature of Consciousness

As noted, consciousness is synonymous with the ego in Jung's theoretical framework.

By consciousness I understand the relation of psychic contents to the ego insofar as this relation is perceived as such by the ego. Relations to the ego that are not perceived as such are unconscious (C.W.VI:421).

For Lévi-Strauss, consciousness includes the sense perceptions, emotions, sentiments, and normative models, while the structuring principles which operate on these belong to the
unconscious. These perceptions provide the raw material upon which the unconscious structuring principles of the mind operate. For Jung too, 'the contents of consciousness are to a large extent determined by the sense perceptions', as well as emotions, sentiments, and norms (C.W.VIII:342). Jung does, however, qualify his statement by saying that unconscious contents may also become conscious.

In Lévi-Strauss's theoretical framework, the consciously observed realm of social phenomena is viewed (though not analysed) phenomenologically, thus providing him with the basis for his ethnographic facts (Rossi 1974:94). For Jung, too, phenomena are similarly observed. However, for the latter this perception refers ultimately to the manifestation of the archetypes in consciousness, which Jung cites as an a posteriori proof for their existence (C.W.IX 2:1979). For Lévi-Strauss, that which is observed phenomenologically acts as the starting point for the analysis of the underlying structuring principles of the mind, thus providing the necessary a priori condition for a study of these unconscious processes.5

On the whole, the contentious issue between the two is not the nature of consciousness, but rather that of the unconscious and its relation to consciousness.

e) The Nature of Symbols

In Jung's psychology, symbols appear in consciousness as indicators of psychic disequilibrium. Jung is careful to point out, though, that the 'concept of a symbol...should be strictly distinguished from that of a sign. Symbolic and semiotic meanings are entirely different things' (C.W.VI:473). For a symbol cannot be something known, because it is alive 'only so long as it is pregnant with meaning' (ibid.:474). The symbol

...does not define or explain; it points beyond itself to a meaning that is darkly divined and yet still beyond our grasp, and cannot be adequately expressed in the familiar words of our language (C.W.VIII:336).

Conversely, for Lévi-Strauss symbols can be known, and inasmuch as this is the case, can be effective in creating 'formally homologous structures, built out of different materials at different levels of life' (1963c: 201). Unlike Jung's notion of the symbol (which is distinguished from the sign), Lévi-Strauss' theoretical framework is eminently semiotic (and conceptual) by Jung's definition, where symbolic systems represent not the unknown, but the known. Symbolism in this schema underlies all of culture, as that which permeates the social order and on the basis of which

5 Cf. Rossi 1974:83, on the verification of structuralist models.
Jung notes that symbols function within the psyche by supplying the missing 'third' which is required to reconcile the oppositional quality inherent to the archetypes. The notion of opposition here suggests Lévi-Strauss's binary oppositions and their attempts at mediation. Yet in view of what has previously been said, this surface similarity is just that. Archetypes, because of their instinctual basis, irrationality, and theoretically limitless number, and in spite of their apparent congruence with the notion of binaries and mediation, are different. The mediation of the polar extremes in the archetype is primarily one of renegotiated reciprocity between consciousness and the unconscious, and takes place only when the system is in disequilibrium. Conversely, in the structuralist's model, mediation is a constantly recurring process which puts the system of contradictory meanings into equilibrium - albeit a fragile one - by creating order from the apparent chaos.

f) The Teleological Dimension

One fact which is clear in Jung's psychology is that it is primarily teleological (in the historical sense), its goal being the movement towards individuation, the fullest possible realization of the psyche by the individual and society. At one end of the teleological continuum Jung posits an archaic past from which man has evolved into progressively higher states of consciousness (C.W.IX,1:255ff.). Libido lies at this extreme and spirit at the other. The inevitable movement of the species, claims Jung, is towards the spirit, and consequently closer to individuation (C.W.VIII: 159ff.). For Jung, 'the psychic process, like any other life process, is not just a causal sequence, but is also a process with a teleological orientation' (C.W.VII: 131).

Trickster and hero, for example, function in this theoretical framework by moderating the flow of psychic energy between the consciousness and the unconscious. They do this in such a way that the individual and society come to understand the dynamic interchange between what is affirmed by consciousness (the heroic qualities) and what is rejected (the trickster traits). As individuation is progressively realized, the rejected dimension becomes incorporated into consciousness (Messer 1980).

The teleological dimension is, for the most part, absent in the works of Lévi-Strauss. Granted, he does discuss how music is related to myth, and how it has - in his opinion - replaced myth in Western society, cautioning, however, that the

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6 Chevalier 1979:24; see Jung (C.W.IX, 2:33) on the notion of the concept.
Yet is this development a teleology in the historical sense? On the whole, the answer to this question is uncertain, particularly given Lévi-Strauss's viewpoint on science. Throughout his works, he emphasises that modern and mythical thought forms are alike governed by the structuring principles inherent to the mind (ibid.:45,54; see also Prattis 1978:15ff.). To this extent, the idea of a historical teleology in his theoretical framework appears incongruent with the formulation of his basic epistemic. However, it should be noted that he is ultimately forced to concede that scientific thought is superior to mythical thinking, for 'it not only presumes to be, but actually is closer to the truth...since science can reveal myth, but myth cannot explicate science' (Rossi 1974:303). Consequently, in spite of his affirmation that the kind of logic 'in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science', an evolution in the complexity and quality of thought forms is evident, leaving unresolved the issue of whether or not his model represents a historical teleology.7

Yet in saying that the human mind is the controlling agency in all social processes, Lévi-Strauss's structuralism does display characteristics of a functional teleology, inasmuch as myths and other social expressions which are products of the mind are functional to the maintenance of society (Chevalier 1979:24-7). These attempt to reconcile and maintain the fragile reality which the mind creates in overcoming the contradictions posed by the social structure and nature. Jung's historical teleology, in contrast, portrays a model of continual change in response to the evolution of individual and social psychic growth and development. This is distinguished from Lévi-Strauss's position in that it is dysfunctional to the maintenance of the system, which is moving inexorably towards higher levels of consciousness.

g) The Trickster-Hero Relationship

In Jung's interpretation of the relationship of trickster and hero, as libidinal energy flows from the unconscious into consciousness, the trickster, as the primordial image (archetype) of man's instinctual nature, becomes manifest. In functioning as a

7 Lévi-Strauss 1963b:230; cf.1978:13-14. On the issue of science, Jung contrasts 'modern scientific' thought with that of mythical thinking, viewing the former as more conscious than the latter, in the sense that primitive man's ego is largely caught up in the world of the unconscious, and to this extent regulated by the archetypes. Opposite to this view, for Lévi-Strauss man has always and everywhere thought equally well (see here Rossi 1974:302-3; Jung C.W.V: 21, 18).
culture hero, conversely, he directs these energies inwards, back to the unconscious where, as a hero, he does battle with the unconscious and returns with its life-giving energies to consciousness.

Lévi-Strauss's analysis singles out a compendium of mediators who appear in myths; among these are the trickster and the hero (1963b:226). Notably, in his analysis trickster and hero are only two of many mediators, and in and of themselves are no more important than others. This is significant because in Jung's model trickster and hero, inasmuch as they are related to the archetype of the self, are very important, and not, as in Lévi-Strauss's model, one among many instances of mediation.

By embodying the inferior personality of man, the trickster, inasmuch as he also functions as a hero, attains a fuller realization of the self. Consequently, the notions of trickster and hero, rather than referring to two apparently different personalities, represent different aspects of the same mythological being; this ultimately points to the reality of the self, which is both the goal of individuation and the aim of Jung's psychology (C.W.VI: 448-50).

It is significant here that the opposites which trickster and hero mediate in Jung's psychology are those of consciousness and the unconscious, while in Lévi-Strauss's analysis, these opposites can be represented by any one of a number of dichotomies, such as nature-culture, life-death, and hunting-agriculture. Thus while Jung's archetypes are theoretically infinite in number, his basic opposites - those of consciousness and the unconscious - are quite restricted. In contradistinction, Lévi-Strauss's model posits very elementary structuring principles - binaries and mediators - which address a vast number of oppositions.

4. Conclusions

In comparing the viewpoints of Jung and Lévi-Strauss it was noted that the latter, because of his failure to incorporate the emotional sphere into his argument, has perhaps neglected an essential issue in the formulation of a comprehensive social theory (cf. Chevalier 1979:47). In analysing symbol systems in his investigations of myth, Lévi-Strauss focuses primarily on the manifest level at which these occur, without exploring the impact which instincts and emotions have on the symbol's formation. Although Jung's procedure for interpreting symbolic systems is, in a sense, reductionistic, in that it views mythic articulations as elaborations of typical psychic processes, at the semiotic level it does delve into the significance behind the symbol's manifest content, analysing the unconscious mechanisms which participate in its creation (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1963b:208-9).

Given this apparent gulf separating these two thinkers and their respective theories, what possible common ground can be
found on which a more comprehensible semiotic model may be based? It is at this point in the discussion that the father of psychoanalysis emerges as an arbitrator - although surely, never a more unlikely one - in this dispute. But what exactly do Jung and Lévi-Strauss have in common with Freud? In his earlier works, Jung incorporates many of Freud's ideas in his theoretical formulation. Even in his later writings, he acknowledges his debt to Freud and the importance of his contribution to psychology, noting that 'the semiotic interpretation is (not) meaningless; it is not only a possible interpretation but also a very true one' *(C.W. VIII:46)*. Lévi-Strauss too acknowledges his debt to Freud, claiming that 'Freud has shown me all the possibilities that are open to a scientific investigation of human phenomena' *(Rossi 1974:17)*, and citing in particular Freud's discovery of the unconscious, which affirms that there is a meaning behind the apparent one *(ibid.:17-19)*.

Whereas in his later writings the symbol is made into something unknowable, in his earlier essays Jung focuses on the processes which Freud and the followers of the Psychoanalytic Society - of which Jung was at one time President - developed in the study of semiotics. I propose that it is at this juncture that some conjunction between depth psychology and structuralism may be found.

The central concepts of psychoanalytic theory issued from Freud's monumental work *The Interpretation of Dreams*, published in 1900 *(Freud 1953)*. This compendium of dreams taken from Freud's life illustrated the unconscious mechanisms operative during sleep, and demonstrated the importance of a hitherto unknown field of investigation. Although Freud and Jung differed on many aspects of their interpretation and description of the unconscious, on certain issues they are in agreement. The concepts which I believe are significant to a proposed amalgamation between the Jungian and structuralist schools of thought are those of repression, projection, and sublimation. 8 Here, some common ground may be found.

Repression, simply stated, refers to the process by which socially unacceptable desires are negated in consciousness, which does not, however, deny their reality. Rather, it merely entails their being relegated to some other sphere. For Freud and Jung, this other sphere is the unconscious (specifically the personal unconscious in Jung's model). Repression, in this schema, is a necessary consequence of living in society; it is 'a process that begins in early childhood under the moral influence of the environment and continues throughout life' *(C.W.VII:270)*. Yet in repressing these desires consciousness becomes susceptible to other processes, such as those of projection and sublimation, which compensate, through distortion of the repressed material, conscious life.

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8 For a comparison of the works of Freud and Jung, see Jung, *C.W.IV*. 

Sublimation is a process in which the instinctual desires repressed at the conscious level are converted into socially acceptable forms of behaviour. Thus in the development of civilization, the necessary renunciation of man's instincts precipitated their transformation into cultural activities which were functional to the maintenance of society; these resulted in culture and civilization (ibid.:50).

Projection, as already noted in Jung's discussion of the trickster, is an unconscious activity in which repressed desires or instincts which cannot be sublimated are dissociated from the ego and viewed in terms of other persons or things. In the case of the trickster, man's repressed instinctuality, which is a necessary part of the total psychic system, is projected onto an external figure. Sublimated instinctuality on the one hand leads to the development of culture, and on the other to the projection of shadow qualities. Projection, however, is not random, but object-seeking; in this way the object receiving the ego's projected content demonstrates characteristics associated with the source of the repression. As Jung notes:

...the carrier of the projection is not just any object but is always one that proves adequate to the nature of the content projected - that is to say, it must offer the content a 'hook' to hang on (C.W. XVI:291).

Viewed in terms of these concepts, some synthesis between the structural and depth psychological approaches to the study of semiotics may be postulated. Entailed in this amalgamation would be an incorporation of the emotive dimension articulating the interplay between social functions and unconscious processes. Lévi-Strauss's analysis of the trickster figure coyote among the Pueblo Indians will be employed to illustrate this amalgamation.

In proposing that the purpose of myth is to overcome a logical contradiction, Lévi-Strauss suggests that some type of latent cultural anxiety exists in mythic formulations, to the extent that contradictions are constitutive and yet disruptive to the maintenance of a socially constructed reality. Thus when he proposes that the human species orders cognitive input in a logical fashion, reference to an ethnographic context would permit a view of native schemes of reference in a 'symptomatic manner', by examining to what extent a particular myth is a function of tabooed or repressed areas within a cultural context. In this way the trickster figure coyote, as in the previous example, can be said to function not only in a purely grammatical sense, as a logical operator in a sequence of mythical units ('mythemes'), but also in a therapeutic fashion, addressing both the ambiguity within culture and the ambivalence as well. His function becomes then not only to resolve a logical contradiction - i.e. the life-death antithesis - but also to address a socially ambivalent issue, namely that of the necessity of doing away with those qualities rejected by society as dysfunctional to its maintenance. These ambivalent and ambiguous issues are divorced
from consciousness and resolved (to a degree) by the individual and society, by projecting them onto an external object.

The anxiety engendered by issues relating to life and death are referred to in terms of hunting and agriculture, herbivorous animals and beasts of prey. These are played out mythically through a process of progressive mediation of the opposites presented. The myth asserts that in order to survive, man (the Pueblos) must address these issues and also - if we follow Jung's interpretation of the trickster - project those culturally repressed traits which are adverse to survival onto an external object, who in this instance is selected (as Lévi-Strauss suggests) because of his ambiguous status in Pueblo animal taxonomy - i.e., as a carrion eater.

Going beyond this example, other elements in symbolic systems could be similarly analysed, not only from the viewpoint of their structural significance in a system of relations, but also in terms of the nature of the repressed content which they symbolically manifest. Naturally, this amalgamation of structuralism and analytical psychology is highly speculative, and subject to the criticisms which have already been levelled at both schools of interpretation; but at the same time it does suggest a way in which instincts and emotions can be fitted into the structuralist's schema. In proposing that the mind functions logically in structuring social reality, some conception of that which is illogical is presupposed. This notion, as noted, is dealt with in Jung's theoretical framework. However, Jung, because of his inherently evolutionary model, falls prey to the criticisms which have been levelled at such a position, primarily that of ethnocentrism (cf. C.W.VII:37). Lévi-Strauss, because of his emphasis on synchrony and his denunciation of historical teleology, avoids this charge.

In view of what has been said, a model which incorporates the parsimony of Lévi-Strauss's theoretical framework - with its underlying dialectic, certainly not antithetical to Jung's formulation - and the emotive dimension incorporated in Jung's semiotic analysis would provide a more comprehensive understanding of social phenomena, particularly myth (cf. Coward and Ellis 1977: 98-100). Whether or not such a schema is practicable is another issue, but certainly one worthy of further investigation.

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