Obituary Notice
Peter Arnold Lienhardt

RON MESSER
The Unconscious Mind: Do Jung and Lévi-Strauss Agree?

M.-F. CAMMAERT
Cultural and Shifting Identity: Berber Immigrants from Nador (N.E. Morocco) in Brussels

Byways in Oxford Anthropology
On Top of the World: A New Exhibition at the Pitt Rivers Museum, Oxford. By ELIZABETH EDWARDS and LINDA CHEETHAM, with illustrations by HELEN BOND

Review Article
R.J. PARKIN
History and Kinship: Two Recent Books

Review Article
KENNETH KIRKWOOD
Race and Ethnic Relations

Book Reviews

Other Notes and Notices

Letters to the Editors

Publications Received

Notes on Contributors
CONTENTS (continued)

Book Reviews

CLAUDE LÉVI-STRAUSS, The View from Afar. Reviewed by P.G. Rivière 63-64


MICHAEL HITCHCOCK, Indonesian Textile Techniques. Reviewed by Ruth Barnes 67-68

S.A. NISSLER, Motifs of Life in Toba Batak Texts and Textiles. Reviewed by Ruth Barnes 69-70

Research in African Literatures (Special Issue on African Oral Narrative) and JEROME ROTHERNBERG, Technicians of the Sacred. Reviewed by Jeremy Coote 71-73

CAROL RUBENSTEIN, The Honey Tree Song: Poems and Chants of the Sarawak Dyaks. Reviewed by R.H. Barnes 73

POGER TRIGG, Understanding Social Science: A Philosophical Introduction to the Social Sciences. Reviewed by Aldo Martin 74-75

HARALD O. SKAR, The Warm Valley People: Duality and Land Reform among the Quechua Indians of Highland Peru. Reviewed by Ann E. Fink 75-77

Other Notes and Notices

JOY HENDRY - Japan Anthropology Workshop 78-79

PAUL E. MINNIS, Social Adaptation to Food Stress (R.H.B.) 79

Letters to the Editors (McLeod and Mack; Reply by Coote) 80-82

Publications Received 83

Notes on Contributors inside back cover

Copyright © JASO 1985. All rights reserved.
ISSN UK 0044-8370

ii
OBITUARY NOTICE

PETER ARNOLD LIENHARDT

12 March 1928 - 17 March 1986

It is with great sorrow that we record the death of Peter Lienhardt on 17 March 1986, following a period of illness. Peter first joined the Institute of Social Anthropology in Oxford as a student in 1952 and had taught there since 1960. During these years he was a valued teacher, colleague and friend to many who will hold his memory dear.

Born in 1928, Peter Lienhardt attended Batley Grammar School (1938-45) and from there was awarded an Open Scholarship to Downing College, Cambridge, where he read English and then Oriental Languages (Arabic and Persian). After his military service with the RAF (spent mainly in a department of the Foreign Office, 1950-52), he joined the Institute in Oxford, completing a B.Litt. thesis on 'The Northern Arabs' in 1953. With the support of a Treasury Senior Studentship in Foreign Languages and Cultures (1953-57), he carried out fieldwork in the Trucial Coast, Kuwait and Bahrain, completing his D.Phil. in 1957 on 'The Shaikhdoms of Eastern Arabia'. The opportunity of a Research Fellowship at the East African Institute for Social Research at Makerere, Uganda, enabled him to carry out further field research among the Islamic communities of the Swahili coast, a part of the world for which he retained a special affection. Back in Oxford, Peter held a Research Fellowship at St Antony's College from 1960 to 1962. Following the Hayter proposals for the expansion of area studies in Oxford, the post of Faculty Lecturership in Middle Eastern Sociology was created to be held at the Institute, and Peter Lienhardt was appointed to this new position in 1962. He held it in conjunction with a Fellowship at St Antony's from 1962 to 1970, and a College Lecturership from 1970 onwards. In 1965-66 he took advantage of a year's sabbatical leave to undertake further field research, in the Iranian city of Isfahan.

Peter played an active role in the Oxford University Anthropological Society and indeed was its President at the time of his death, having been elected to that position for the second time in Michaelmas 1985.

Accepting for himself only the very highest standards in writing and publication, Peter published relatively little, but each of his contributions has a special originality and fastidious
quality which we shall now treasure the more. It is a major loss to our subject that it was not given to Peter to bring to fruition his major work on the Gulf states. Our personal loss is, however, greater, and it will be widely shared. With friends in Oxford and those now dispersed, we join to offer Godfrey Lienhardt our deepest condolences.

W.R.J.
24 March 1986

A Memorial Fund is to be established in Peter Lienhardt's name, to be attached to the Oxford Institute and to foster research in social anthropology. Further details will be published in a future issue of JASO.
The unconscious mind: Do Jung and Levi-Strauss agree?

The works of Carl Jung and Claude Lévi-Strauss are cosmic in scope and universal in appeal, addressing facets of human existence ranging from religion and myth to neurosis and psychosis. Underlying both theoretical frameworks is an unconscious generator which conditions human consciousness. Recently, attempts have been made to demonstrate the affinities between these two great thinkers (see Prattis 1978:20ff.), attempts which this paper will show to be, for the most part, quite spurious. To this end, an investigation will be undertaken to examine to what extent Jung and Lévi-Strauss concur or diverge in their viewpoints concerning the nature of the unconscious, by exploring the key concepts which they employ in articulating their respective paradigms. Reference will be made primarily, though not exclusively, to their understanding of myth, and in particular to the ubiquitous folklore figures of the trickster and culture hero. As a concluding statement, an assessment of the efficacy of their respective models and a proposal for a synthetic form amalgamating the viewpoints of the two will be made.

Certain sections of this paper have previously appeared in Studies in Religion/Sciences Religienses (Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfred Laurier University Press, summer 1982). I would like to thank Professor Jacques Chevalier of Carleton University, Ottawa, for his help in the preparation of this paper.
1. Jung: The Psyche and Its Archetypes

Jung's psychology concerns itself with the working of the psyche and with the development of a model to explain its dynamics. This leads him to discuss the nature of the psychic forces which energize the world of human consciousness and its underlying unconscious components. The terms psyche and psychic in this model designate operations of the mind which take place on both a conscious and an unconscious level (C.W. VIII: 352-3), leading Jung to postulate a two-tier system in which the psychic forces active in the unconscious (which he separates into personal and collective components) compensate and consequently influence consciousness (C.W. IX, 1: 281). The conscious aspect of the mind, for Jung, is designated as the ego and is capable of perceiving events in the external environment as well as unconscious internal activity which has become conscious. Included here would be one's personal memories along with everything else that is readily available to consciousness. The ego is made up of images recorded by the senses 'that transmit stimuli from within and without, and...of an immense accumulation of past processes' (C.W.VIII: 323). It is

...the complex factor to which all conscious contents are related. It forms, as it were, the centre of the field of consciousness; and, in so far as this comprises the empirical personality the ego is the subject of all personal acts of consciousness (C.W.IX, 2: 3).

The unconscious in Jung's model, as noted, is divided into two parts. The first of these is the personal unconscious in which the contents from the personal past unavailable to the ego are stored:

...the (personal) unconscious is the receptacle of all lost memories and of all contents that are still too weak to become conscious. These contents are products of an unconscious associative activity which also gives rise to dreams. Besides these we must include all more or less intentional repressions of painful thoughts and feelings (C.W.VIII: 133).

At a deeper level stands the collective unconscious in which the earliest and most archaic vestiges of man's psychic development exist; here are contained the 'archetypes' (ibid.:138). These are primeval forms or motifs which have evolved through the centuries and now reside in man's unconscious.

---

1 References to Jung's works are taken from his Collected Works (hereafter C.W., followed by the volume and page numbers; see Jung 1978 in References).
The energy which drives Jung's psychic system is referred to as 'libidinal' and arises out of a primal source that is biologically based - i.e., derived from the instincts - but never unrelated to spirit; thus the archetypes embody both an instinctual and spiritual component (ibid.:212).

Within the psyche, energy flows between poles of opposites, the basic opposites being those of consciousness and the unconscious. Notably, should too great a quantity of libidinal energy become concentrated at one of the poles of opposites, creating a situation of psychic disequilibrium, the principle of 'enantiodromia' forcibly causes the energy surrounding the over-energized pole to switch over to its opposite (C.W.VI:426). Therefore, in order to allow for the smooth operation of the psychic system, the degree of tension between the poles of opposites must be regulated.

If the ego is forced to regress, i.e. to retreat to the unconscious, Jung claims that a compensatory activity has been set in motion in response to the undue tension in the psyche (C.W.VIII:39). Regression indicates that some aspect of the psyche's contents is in disequilibrium, causing a curtailment in the normal flow of energy. If for some reason the flow of libidinal energy is impeded or in any way restricted at the conscious level (e.g. through repression), then it will move to meet and alleviate the restriction. At this time the unconscious will produce symbols indicating that there is a disruption in the system.

Symbols, in Jung's model, are derived from libidinal energy and present conflicting positions in the psyche with a third component which mediates the conflict through a higher synthesis, incorporating yet transcending the positions in conflict. 'The raw material shaped by thesis and antithesis, and in the shaping of which the opposites are united, is the living symbol' (C.W.VI:479-80).

In Jung's psychology the manufacture of symbols for the purpose of assuaging the conflict of opposites is known as the 'transcendent function'. In regressing to the unconscious the system has found a symbol that will re-establish the harmony between consciousness and the unconscious through the mediation of opposites. The transcendent function arises from the union 'of conscious and unconscious contents' and manifests itself as a 'quality of conjoined opposites' (C.W.VIII:90). If the symbols are ignored by consciousness, then neurotic and psychotic symptoms result (ibid.:288). For this reason Jung's psychology addresses itself to the maintenance of a steady state within the system, where consciousness and the unconscious continually and actively adapt and respond to one another.

The instinctual and spiritual components of libidinal energy, when brought out of the unconscious, act as the core material for man's symbols (C.W.VI: 238-9). After a period of gestation, these emerge from the unconscious through, for example, dreams and myths, and function to relate the ego back to the unconscious (C.W.VIII:336). In returning to the unconscious the ego is
directed to the archetypes, the primal forms or motifs which inhabit the collective unconscious (C.W.IX,1:42).

For Jung, the archetype is not directly perceptible in terms of a specific content, but only as a form, which is considered to be a priori. The archetype

...is determined as to its content only when it has become conscious and is therefore filled out with the material of conscious experience. The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal, nothing but a facultas praeformandi, a possibility of representation that is given a priori. The representations themselves are not inherited only the forms...(ibid:79).

It is in mythical motifs that the content of archetypes becomes manifest, and because these arise out of a collective source Jung notes that they will be cross-culturally similar:

...in so far as the myth is nothing but a projection from the unconscious and not a conscious invention at all, it is quite understandable that we should everywhere come upon the same myth motifs, and that myths actually represent typical psychic phenomena (C.W.VIII:38).

Two archetypes present in myth are those of the trickster and the hero; these will be examined in this paper.

a) Jung's Conception of the Trickster

Jung's analysis of the trickster developed out of his academic exchange with the anthropologist Paul Radin. In the mid-1950s, Radin requested Jung to formulate a psychological theory to account for the presence of the trickster within the mythology of the Winnebago Indians, a group which Radin had been investigating for some time. Jung's analysis originally appeared as part of Radin's Der göttliche Soehm, first published in 1954 and translated as The Trickster in 1956.

In fitting the trickster into the framework of his overall theoretical perspectives, Jung addressed himself specifically to Radin's ethnographic data. However, inasmuch as many of the trickster myths recorded by Radin are found not only within Algonkian mythology but also in other, especially European (as pointed out by Jung) mythology, Jung's understanding of the trickster goes beyond the Winnebago and addresses itself to the trickster within all mythologies.

The trickster, for Jung, represents man's 'collective shadow', that is, some person or group of persons viewed as transgressing the societal norms outlining acceptable modes of behaviour. The collective shadow figure defines the normative structure of a group of persons by embodying the antithesis of these norms within itself. Accordingly, the collective shadow is
In the trickster stories of the North American Indians the collective shadow figure is preserved, claims Jung, 'in its pristine mythological form' (Radin 1956: 202). Here he embodies humanity's earliest stages of conscious development. With the attainment of higher levels of consciousness, however, this figure was looked upon as an entity set apart from the culture bearing man, and gradually he developed into an object of scorn and contempt, insofar as he came to represent an inferior and earlier stage in the development of consciousness (C.W.IX:262-3).

At one and the same time, the trickster is the archetype of the emerging ego - that is, the prototype of the first man - and also the last remnant of an archaic past. The ability of this figure to continue to attract our conscious attention points to his existence as an archetype within the collective unconscious (ibid.: 264-5). Here he acts as a magnet, drawing towards himself the free-flowing libido which energizes Jung's model of the psyche.

The paradox involved in this analysis, however, is that although the trickster attracts consciousness because of his archetypal basis, at the same time he elicits resistance and rejection because of his shadow qualities (ibid.: 268). To be reminded of his past is embarrassing to the acculturated man. Yet by mythicizing the foolish escapades of the trickster, who is the embodiment of the shadow in each and every individual and in society as a whole, the embarrassment of being identified with this blundering proto-man is deflected away from the individual and society and onto the archetypal motif. But the negative aspects of the trickster still require assimilation, or the possibility of their being projected may arise (ibid.:267).

What is important to note is that the role of the trickster as a culture hero, as found in many Indian mythologies, is not directly addressed by Jung's analysis. This is primarily because of the fact that the mythological material which Radin sent to Jung for analysis was all of a trickster variety, that is, it dealt with an abundantly 'foolish' personality. Furthermore, the culture-hero cycle of the Winnebago Indians concerns itself with a being known as the Great Hare, whose mythical cycle is clearly distinguished from that of the trickster - a situation notably not present in all North American Indian mythologies (Radin 1956: 131).

b) The Trickster-Hero in Jung's Psychology

In discussing the archetypal hero and his psychological significance for mythology, Jung points out that animal figures in myths symbolize man's instinctual nature. Thus mythologies depicting the slaying of an animal by the hero would represent the transformation of the hero's instinctuality from that which controls his ego into that which is made subservient to it. However, at
the same time as the animal sacrifice symbolizes the hero's renunciation of instinct, it also represents the emergence of his ego consciousness. Having gained this through separation from the unconscious, the hero must again enter into the matrix from which his consciousness has emerged in order to be reborn, this process representing the normal and healthy flow of energy within the psyche which, for Jung, is reciprocal between consciousness and the unconscious.

Apart from the fact that the trickster is the archetype of the collective shadow, he also represents the emerging ego consciousness of man. As a reminder of man's humble origins, the trickster is established as the first human being, a newly conscious being who, because of his incompetence, assumes the role of the 'fool' in mythology. This is due to the incomplete development of his consciousness. Similarly, the archetypal hero also portrays a stage in the development of human consciousness, becoming only fully conscious with the sacrifice of his instinctuality. The question remains, however, what becomes of these sacrificed instincts? Jung locates these in the unconscious, where they form part of man's shadow, his inferior personality. The quest of the hero becomes, then, to integrate his instinctuality - i.e., his shadow - into consciousness, a development which represents the individuation process and culminates in the realization of the self, the total personality.

In his works Jung has referred to the shadow as the 'inferior personality', which he further relates to man's instinctual nature, 'the lowest levels of which are indistinguishable from the instinctuality of an animal' (C. W. IX, 2:233-4). As observed, the trickster, in Jung's analysis, is above all else a creature of instinct, or 'a psyche that has hardly left the animal level', re-embodying the shadow characteristics of all men. In contrast, though, to the trickster, the hero is the representation of the self, the whole man.

The hero himself appears as a being of more than human stature. He is distinguished from the very beginning by his god-like characteristics...he is psychologically an archetype of the self...(C.W.V:391-2).

Whereas the hero sacrifices his instinctuality in attempting to free himself from the unconscious, the trickster affirms it. While the hero relegates his instinctuality to the unconscious - as symbolized by the animal sacrifice - the trickster re-embodies it. The trickster is mankind's collective shadow, a primitive instinctual being constituting his inferior traits of character.

Within mythology, the archetypal hero has been ascribed positive qualities, while the trickster has become an object of scorn and ridicule. Inasmuch as this is the case, the separation of trickster and culture hero within the mythology (as in Radin's example of the Winnebago) can be explained in terms of Jung's theoretical framework. The hero, as a model for the self, is the goal towards which consciousness strives, while the trickster, as
a representation of mankind's collective shadow, elicits negative feelings because of his inferior qualities. Consequently, the trickster is shunned by consciousness, while the hero, as the archetype of the self, is praised and emulated. As a result, trickster and hero become divided in the conscious attitudes of men, the one being accepted while the other is rejected.

Yet there is a contradiction involved in this attitude, namely that the self, as an archetype of the collective unconscious, calls for the necessary integration of the shadow. Because the self symbolizes the total personality, it cannot exclude the shadow from its constitution, as Jung himself affirms when saying that 'the self is a combination of opposites. Without a shadow even the self is not real' (C.W.X:107-8, n.66).

Significantly, in many North American Indian mythologies trickster and hero function as one. From the vantage point of Jung's psychology, therefore, they can be said to achieve a fuller appreciation of the nature of the archetype - the self - by integrating its darker aspects. Following Jung's model of the psyche, it can be observed that as psychic energy moves from the unconscious to consciousness, the trickster emerges, reminding man of his repressed instinctuality; while conversely, as the psychic energy moves from consciousness to the unconscious, cultural renewal is brought about, and the trickster takes on the role of the archetypal hero, whose task it is to enter into the unconscious and emerge from it renewed and revitalized by its energies.

Jung notes at several points in his works that all archetypes are ambivalent, this being true of the shadow as well, which incorporates the rejected side of both personal and collective consciousness. But precisely because it represents this rejected side, it also represents the possibility of both personal and collective renewal through its integration. As a consequence, symbols of the shadow can be envisioned as both foolish and respected, as in the case of the trickster. As a representative of this rejected side, the trickster can become the bearer of the 'new' when he takes on the role of the saviour or culture hero in mythology.

Given this two-way flow of energy between consciousness and the unconscious, the manifestly instinctual nature of the trickster is not seen as a contradiction of his heroic qualities but, as a true representative of the self, he brings the shadow into harmony with the totality of his personality, integrating both positive (heroic) and negative (foolish) qualities into one mythological personage (cf. von Franz 1972:63).

In summary, Jung's model of the psyche and the role of the trickster-hero therein can be represented as in Figure 1:
Here, the basic opposites of consciousness and the unconscious are mediated by the archetypes. Each of these, as Jung notes, 'spontaneously develops favourable and unfavourable, light and dark, good and bad effects (C.W.IX, 2:267). Thus within themselves they contain an inherent polarity which, when incompletely mediated, seeks symbols to provide the missing third. The trickster-hero is illustrative of this reciprocal flow of energies. Failed mediation of the polar opposites results in a projection of shadow qualities, leading, in this instance, to both individual and cultural neurosis.

The basic concepts discussed above find parallels within the structuralist's paradigm as articulated by Lévi-Strauss.

2. Lévi-Strauss: Binaries and Mediation

For Jung, the opposites of consciousness and the unconscious, along with the ambivalent nature of the archetypes and their subsequent reconciliation through symbolic forms, is central to the articulation of his model. Similarly, for Lévi-Strauss, opposites and their attempted reconciliation through mediation provide the crux for his theoretical framework.

According to Lévi-Strauss, through the senses - taste, touch, sight, smell, and sound - man apprehends the world around him and transforms his perceptions into coded messages processed via the agency of the mind; these messages function in terms of binary oppositions, which through mediation and correlation with other relations of opposition present a logical structure manifest -
although not always apparent - in social life. Lévi-Strauss refers to the procedure by which these coded relations of opposition are deduced and elucidated as structural anthropology or, simply, structuralism.

Crucial to any understanding of Lévi-Strauss is his conceptualization of the mind, which is the unconscious generator of all social activity. Because the mind operates in a logical fashion, social formations will be structured according to its dictates, leading him to posit 'an internal logic which directs the unconscious workings of the human mind even in those of its creations which have long been considered the most arbitrary' (1969:220). Entailed in this conceptualization is both a conscious and an unconscious component. Consciously the mind apprehends phenomenal reality via the senses, while unconsciously it acts as the structuring principle for these perceptions: 'As the organ of a specific function, the unconscious mind merely imposes structural laws upon inarticulated elements which originate elsewhere' (C.W.VI:30).

The structures produced by the mind are manifest in various cultural forms such as kinship systems, myths, and totemic classifications. It is this structuring mental activity which 'unifies form and content, and therefore contributes to the emerging of an ordered social interaction' (Rossi 1974:98). Because this order is structured, posits Lévi-Strauss, it can be examined and understood by social science. Thus between mind and reality there is no priority, but rather a reciprocal exchange in which reality provides mind with the raw material upon which it operates (ibid.:99).

The perception of this exchange is problematic, however, in that its structure is not always deducible from phenomenal reality. For Lévi-Strauss 'true reality is never the most obvious of realities', for it is usually hidden from view; yet it is nevertheless recoverable at the level of an underlying unconscious structure (ibid.:64). Lévi-Strauss is thus led to rebuke the contention of the phenomenologists who posit a 'continuity between experience and reality' (ibid.:65). At the same time, though, he does not reject this type of understanding, claiming that it is 'not so much a real proof but rather a guarantee that the structural analysis of the unconscious categories has left nothing aside' (ibid.:94); in other words, that the exchange between structure and reality is working in both directions.

Lévi-Strauss's quest, simply stated, is one for human universals. Verbal categories provide the mechanism through which (formal) universal structural characteristics of the human brain are transformed into universal structural characteristics of human culture' (Leach 1970:38). It is through these categories that man communicates not only overtly, but covertly as well, revealing a deep level at which messages are transmitted, socially manifest, and structurally articulated; this formulation provides the basis for Lévi-Strauss's understanding of totemism, kinship systems and, most importantly, myth.
In apprehending the differences in his physical environment, man – particularly primitive man in Lévi-Strauss's study of totemism – differentiates himself culturally from his fellows and nature by opposing the latter to culture (society) and the former to his group affiliation. Thus 'opposition, instead of being an obstacle to integration, serves rather to produce it' by providing a system of classification through differentiation (Lévi-Strauss 1962:89). Consequently, just as a leopard and an eagle are perceived as distinct from culture – distinguishing man from nature – so too a man of the leopard clan is different from one of the eagle clan – distinguishing classes within culture. These differentiations between nature and culture, clan and non-clan, unite, through relations of opposition, man and nature and man and man. In this way, totemic classifications integrate the individual into a coherent system which situates him culturally and naturally as a distinct entity, existing within nature and yet standing apart from it, and present within culture as a member of a group, and yet distinct from the whole – the logic of the system being, as Lévi-Strauss contends, to provide a means of symbolic communication, 'stating how the games of communication should be played on both a natural and cultural level' (Lévi-Strauss 1973:387).

In a similar manner, elementary kinship systems unite diverse groups through relations of opposition via the exchange of women. In this instance the pattern of exchange points to the logic of the system, whether of a 'restricted' or a 'generalized' nature (Harris 1968:499-501). Kinship rules provide 'the blueprint of a mechanism which extracts women out of their consanguineous families to redistribute them in domestic groups, which in turn become new consanguineous families...' (Lévi-Strauss 1963a:309).

Myth, notably, is also a form of communication within the structuralist's paradigm, although one quite different and structurally much more complex than either totemism or kinship systems, for in myth the mind is left

...to commune with itself and no longer has to come to terms with objects, it is in a sense reduced to imitating itself as an object; and that since the laws governing its operations are not fundamentally different from those it exhibits in other functions, it shows itself to be of the nature of a thing among things (Lévi-Strauss 1969b:10).

In his works on myth, Lévi-Strauss illustrates a deep structure built upon different empirical levels – such as social organization and economy – which have been apprehended by the senses and codified in such a way as to address the paradoxes and contradictions within nature and society. Common to all of these is an underlying structure through which the various codes and their transformations and permutations transmit messages addressing the myth's contradictions. These oppositions, paradoxes and contradictions are mediated, appropriately enough, by
'mediators' who, in a sense, 'punctuate' the sequences of the myth (Prattis 1978:12). Their appearance signals that the contradiction being addressed has been defined in the form of an opposing relation and a resolution sought. Failure to solve the paradox causes the message being transmitted to switch over onto another code and level, and again to seek resolution through mediation (ibid.:10).

As a result, myths address themselves to the logical inconsistencies within nature and society, making statements about norms and values, and further, enter into a discussion — at a meta-linguistic level — of the unresolvable dilemmas of human existence: life and death and man's place in nature (Campbell 1974:22).

a) The Structural Study of Myth

Two trends are evident in Lévi-Strauss's writings on the structural study of myth: the first of these delineates a methodology for the derivation of a myth's basic units, along with their permutations, transformations, and mediation within a corpus selected for study; the second, more eclectic procedure selects material, seemingly at random, from culturally diverse and geographically remote areas. These two procedures, it should be noted, are not antithetical, and certainly the latter is justified within the structuralist's frame of reference. However, for the purpose of articulating how a myth should be analysed, Lévi-Strauss's initial statement — and in my mind his most lucid — provides the clearest guidelines for the purposes of exposition; this is contained in his 1955 essay 'The Structural Study of Myth' (1963b).

Given the fact that studies of myth have, for the most part, been inconclusive at best, Lévi-Strauss ventures that further research should be directed towards unearthing some universal common denominator. This leads him to postulate that myth, as with his analyses of totemic systems of classification and kin designations, is a form of communication which is comprehensible not at the surface level, but at the level of an underlying structure. The question becomes, then, how is this structure to be apprehended? Conveniently, as Lévi-Strauss notes, myth is language and therefore, to a certain extent, governed by its rules — but not entirely.

2 The latter procedure is best exemplified in Lévi-Strauss's Mythologiques I-IV. As Edmund Leach describes it (1970:61), 'this grand survey of the mythology of the Americas, which has so far mentioned 528 different stories in some 1300 pages, is increasingly tending to degenerate into a latter-day Golden Bough'.

Jung and Lévi-Strauss 11
Though Lévi-Strauss' structural anthropology borrows extensively from structural linguistics, he is careful to point out that 'language in myth exhibits specific properties'. Following De Saussure, Lévi-Strauss notes that language is made up of two components: langue, the structural properties of a language; and parole, the statistical frequency with which these occur. Myth, in this schema, is a composite of the two, and yet is distinct; it is 'an absolute entity on a third level'.

Because of this, the properties of myth exhibit 'more complex features than those which are to be found in any other kind of linguistic expression'. Allowing for this, two hypotheses are generated, namely: (1) myth is made up of constituent units; (2) even though they are like the constituent units of language (phonemes, morphemes, sememes), the units which make up the language of myth are of a 'higher and more complex order'. Lévi-Strauss refers to these as 'gross constituent units' or 'mythemes'.

The derivation of mythemes takes place at the sentence level. Here, each myth is analysed with a view towards breaking its story-line into a series of short, concise statements which are methodically transcribed onto index cards numbered in sequence and corresponding to the unfolding of the story. This, in Lévi-Strauss's terms, is the diachronic level, and should show that a certain function is 'at a given time linked to a given subject. Or, to put it otherwise, each gross constituent unit will consist of a relation'.

Yet, because of the non-reversible nature of time in the diachronic dimension, a synchronic plane or atemporal dimension is necessary. On the synchronic level, time stands still, as it were, becoming altogether ahistorical. Yet what gives myth an operational value is that the specific pattern described is timeless; 'it explains the present and the past as well as the future'. Thus both the diachronic and synchronic dimensions must be considered when analysing a particular myth or set of myths. Accordingly, claims Lévi-Strauss,

"The true constituent units of a myth are not the isolated relations but bundles of such relations, and it is only as bundles that these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning (p.211)."

The relations among the mythemes or 'bundles of relations' lead us to the underlying structure, and hence to the meaning of the myth.

Lévi-Strauss notes that myths are only imperfectly transmitted in individual accounts, often leaving their reliability in doubt. Yet the structuralist's method does away with this problem of searching for the 'true' or 'original' version by subsuming it within its theoretical framework, where a myth consists of 'all its variants'. Or, as Leach puts it,
Levi-Strauss' postulate is that a corpus of mythology constitutes an 'orchestra score'... The collectivity of the senior members of the society, through its religious institutions, is unconsciously transmitting to the junior members a basic message which is manifest in the 'score' as a whole rather than any particular myth (1970:60).

Following this line of argument, to discover the structure of the myth, Levi-Strauss's method requires us to lay out our index cards in a two-dimensional grid-work, with the horizontal plane corresponding to the diachronic level of the myth and the vertical to the synchronic. Now the myth can be viewed in two dimensions, and if other versions are added to the corpus, allowing us a more comprehensive view, a third dimension is added whereby the accumulated mythemes can be read diachronically, synchronically, and from front to back. Then, by examining the relations between binary pairs of opposites among the mythemes, the grammar or structure of the myth is made apparent. This structure will be coded, i.e., it will refer to various spheres of social life, such as economy, political order, kinship, etc., and articulate, through relations of opposition, the myth's central contradiction.

The oppositions within myths, and their relations, function dialectically in this schema, and are mediated within each code by a third term which possesses characteristics of both contradictories and acts so as to reconcile their differences; failing to do so, it too becomes one of a pair of opposites, which in turn must be mediated. Thus a series of opposites, each seeking mediation is generated - Levi-Strauss refers to these formations as 'triads'. In this way the myth structures itself, growing 'spiral-wise until the intellectual impulse which has produced it is exhausted. Its growth is a continuous process, whereas its structure remains discontinuous'. The purpose of myth, for Levi-Strauss, is to provide a logical model capable of overcoming contradictions.

Briefly stated, then, through an analysis of coded bundles of relations in the myths (i.e., the mythemes), their correlation through opposition, and subsequent attempt at mediation, the structure of the myth, and hence its meaning, is deduced. Mediators, as noted, are crucial to the exposition of this meaning. The mediators which will be of particular significance in the discussion to follow are those of the trickster and his logical counterpart, the hero.

b) Trickster and Hero in Levi-Strauss's Structuralism

For Levi-Strauss, tricksters and heroes act as mediators by attempting to resolve the contradictions posed within myths. Thus the trickster, for example, acts as a mediator 'because his mediating function occupies a position halfway between two polar terms, (therefore) he must retain something of that duality -
naming an ambiguous and equivocal character'.

The trickster, however, is only one of several mediators in
myth, among whom are included the twins, the messiah, bisexual
beings, and sibling pairs. Each of these achieves only a limited
success in reconciling the opposites within myth. For example,
the trickster, by juxtaposing contradictories, attempts to
resolve them. But mere juxtaposition, notes Lévi-Strauss, is not
sufficient for mediation, and consequently the myth switches
over onto another level, articulating its contradiction in terms
of a different code, and again seeks resolution via another
mediator (1976:166).

The function of mediator, however, is not solely to point to
a logical contradiction but also, in some cases, to exhaust 'all
the possible solutions to the problem of bridging the gap between
two and one' (1963b). In this way, their appearance signals
that a resolution is being sought within the domain of a particu­
lar code, and resultant upon the success of the mediation - as
signalled by the presence of trickster, hero, and so on - a new
code may or may not be entered into; thus the mediator defines
the nature of subsequent codes in which mediation is sought.

Similarly, the hero appears when a contradiction posed in
terms of a particular code has been defined. In the structur­
alist's framework, trickster and hero can be viewed as two aspects
of the same personality, as evidenced by those mythologies where
the two are combined.

Not only can we account for the ambiguous character of the
trickster, but we can also understand another property of
mythical figures the world over, namely, that the same
god is endowed with contradictory attributes - for instance,
he may be good and bad at the same time (ibid.: 227).

For this reason, trickster-like qualities of cunning and
foolishness can be associated with a mythological being, as also
can heroic attributes. For Lévi-Strauss, these contradictory
traits are a function of the type and degree of mediation sought,
and issue from the unconscious mind.

Thus trickster and hero appear as particular instances of
attempted mediation of binary oppositions. Notably, in contrast
to Jung's model, trickster and hero do not represent flows of
energy, but rather build upon the notion of logic - particularly
combinatory logic - inherent in the mind, which operates by
structuring oppositions, their relations, and mediation into
consciously manifest forms such as those of myth.

In what follows, some points of conjunction between the
theoretical perspectives of Jung and Lévi-Strauss will be
discussed, and a critical assessment of their respective posi­
tions will be made.
3. **Jung and Lévi-Strauss: A Comparison**

**a) Mind and Psyche**

As noted, the ego in Jung's model of the psyche is synonymous with consciousness. Consciousness, though, is only one aspect of the psyche's domain, for it also includes the unconscious, both personal and collective. Mind, in Lévi-Strauss' frame of reference, has a slightly different meaning. Here, similar to Jung, both conscious and unconscious components are entailed; but the concept of mind, unlike Jung's psyche, ultimately - as Lévi-Strauss observes - derives its origin from the physiological brain (1963b:226-7). Jung too couches his explanations in biological terms, noting that the archetypes arising out of the unconscious are held collectively by all men. These develop from primordial images (also referred to as 'engrams') which denote behaviour patterns developed through evolutionary history and which have become embedded in the unconscious.

The unconscious, considered as the historical background of the human psyche, contains in concentrated form the entire succession of engrams (imprints) which from time immemorable have determined the psychic structure as it now exists (*C.W.*VI:169; cf. *ibid.*:240).

These, as Jung goes on to say, occur as the result of 'the differentiation of instinct' which occurs, in his words, as 'a biological necessity' (*ibid.*:239).

Instinct within Jung's evolutionary perspective represents every psychic phenomenon 'that does not arise from voluntary causation but from dynamic impulsion' (*ibid.*:451). Yet impulses, emotions, and other affective dimensions of social life are, for the most part, effectively discounted in Lévi-Strauss's theoretical framework:

...impulses and emotions explain nothing; they are always results, either of the power of the body or the impotence of the mind. In both cases they are consequences, never causes. The latter can be sought only in the organism, which is the exclusive concern of biology, or in the intellect (Lévi-Strauss 1962:71; cf. 1963c:203).

Furthermore, it is significant that, for Jung, the mind assumes a subordinate position relative to the psyche. 'It is no use thinking we can ever get beyond the psyche by means of the mind, even though the mind asserts that it is not dependent on the psyche' (*C.W.*IX 1:269). Although Lévi-Strauss does not discuss the concept of the psyche in his works, it is nonetheless quite evident that the mind - in its capacity as an analytic
agency - is primary in his formulation.3

b) Archetypes and Binary Oppositions

Binary oppositions, their mediation, transformation and permutation, issue from the unconscious. These enter consciousness, and in interacting with the sense perceptions of social actors, logically structure features of both society and culture. Archetypes similarly spring from an unconscious source and affect consciousness. The manifestation of archetypes occurs in instances of myth, ritual, and religious experience. Notably, the number of archetypes in the repertoire of the unconscious is theoretically innumerable (C.W.VIII:135; cf. Lévi-Strauss 1969b: 64). Though this point is not dealt with at length in Jung's works, he does note that the perception of the archetypes has 'been obscured by the extraordinary differentiation of our thinking,' (C.W.VIII:135). As a result, with the evolution of consciousness, many archetypal forms have become unavailable to consciousness. Potentially, therefore, it is suggested that their number may well exceed our knowledge of them. (This issue has been of special interest among the neo-Jungians - see Hillman 1963, 1975.) Contrariwise, in the structuralist's scheme of things oppositions, as unconscious formal properties, are limited to the concise schema of binaries, and their mediation, transformation and permutation. Inversely, on the conscious level a limitless number of oppositions occur, as in instances of myth, for example.

For Lévi-Strauss, the underlying structuring principles of the mind are understood as being formal, and not specifically related to contents - as in the instance of a particular binary opposition, such as nature-culture or life-death.

It is only forms and not contents which can be common. If there are common contents the reason must be sought either in the objective properties of particular nature or artificial entities or in diffusion and borrowing, in either case, that is, outside the mind (1966:65; cf. ibid.: 247n.).

Jung also claims that

...archetypes are not determined as regards their content, but only as regards their form and then only to a very limited degree.... The archetype in itself is empty and purely formal (C.W.IX, 1:79).

3 See here Rossi 1974: 20-2, and Jung, C.W.VIII: 435-6, on their relation to the philosopher Kant.
However, these unconscious 'forms' are, for Jung, on the one hand theoretically more numerous than those contained in the structuralist's model, and on the other derived in part from the instincts, which Lévi-Strauss has already discounted. Also, there is a qualitative difference between Jung's conception of 'form' and that of Lévi-Strauss. For Jung archetypes, as formal properties, represent general themes of motifs within the unconscious, while for Lévi-Strauss the formal aspect of the unconscious refers to certain abstract structuring principles within the mind, devoid of any thematic element.4

c) Logic and Rationality

Though the concept of logic - primarily combinatory logic - is central to Lévi-Strauss's thesis, Jung makes no reference to it in his works. He does, however, discuss the notion of rationality and the irrational at length. Rationality in his schema is... that which accords with reason... reason (is) an attitude whose principle it is to conform thought, feeling, and action to objective values. Objective values are established by the everyday experience of external facts on the one hand, and of inner psychological facts on the other (C.W.VI:459).

The irrational, however, is not something contrary to reason, but 'something beyond reason, therefore, not grounded on reason' (ibid.: 454). Consequently, archetypes, according to this definition, are irrational, and thus beyond the realm of reason.

Practical psychology stirs up many problems that are not susceptible to a rational solution, but can only be settled irrationally, in a way not in accord with the laws of reason (ibid.:455).

Logic describes the formal properties of reasoning, i.e., the chain of connecting premises upon which explanations are built. Rationality characterizes what can rightly be fitted in with these premises. Though the logic employed by Lévi-Strauss is eminently analytical, as opposed to deductive-inductive, it is grounded on the premise that the structures elicited by his

4 Jung C.W.XVI:124; see Lévi-Strauss 1963c: 186-205. Also, it should be noted that Jung's model does not deal with some of the issues subsumed under the structuralist's rubric, such as kinship and totemic classifications. Similarly, though, it can be said that Lévi-Strauss's schema does not do justice to some of the areas examined by analytical psychology, such as neurosis and psychosis; these are only peripherally addressed, if at all.
investigations build upon an ethnographic context - as in his case of citing the coyote among the Pueblo, who acts as a trickster by mediating between herbivorous animals and beasts of prey and between warfare and agriculture (1963b:224; cf. Harris 1968:200-1). It is on the basis of these indigenous categories of significance that an analytic structure is deduced. In this instance, hunting and warfare are important factors to the Pueblo's survival, leading to the consequent mediation of the life-death opposition. The analytic insight provided by structuralism is arrived at, therefore, on the basis of certain ethnographic givens, and to this extent it accords with the laws of reason (cf. Rossi 1974:51 n.9). Consequently, in citing logic as a foundation upon which his theoretical framework is constructed - overtly at the analytic level and inherent to the deductive - Lévi-Strauss permits only that which is rational to fit into his model, leaving the irrational as a residual category constituted by the world of nature. As a result, the irrational - such as the archetypes in Jung's model - is, by definition, relegated to a position of secondary importance. Lévi-Strauss has quite candidly remarked: 'Since I was a child I have been bothered by, let us call it the irrational, and I have been trying to find an order behind what is given to us as disorder' (1978:11).

Whereas consciousness for Jung is eminently rational, consciousness for Lévi-Strauss is primarily irrational, inasmuch as the world of nature, i.e., that which is perceived by the senses, is seen as disordered, and must first be operated upon by the logical structuring principles inherent to the mind in order to achieve a structure (Chevalier 1979:4-6). In the case of Jung, the irrational constantly threatens to impinge upon consciousness; this irrational element is located in the unconscious. For Lévi-Strauss, the unconscious is the domain of certain formal principles which serve to structure logically the events of consciousness.

With these considerations in mind, a vast abyss appears separating the two theorists, where what one claims as being legitimately knowable (Jung's archetypes) the other dismisses as being essentially epistemologically unsound.

d) The Nature of Consciousness

As noted, consciousness is synonymous with the ego in Jung's theoretical framework.

By consciousness I understand the relation of psychic contents to the ego insofar as this relation is perceived as such by the ego. Relations to the ego that are not perceived as such are unconscious (C.W.VI:421).

For Lévi-Strauss, consciousness includes the sense perceptions, emotions, sentiments, and normative models, while the structuring principles which operate on these belong to the
unconscious. These perceptions provide the raw material upon which the unconscious structuring principles of the mind operate. For Jung too, 'the contents of consciousness are to a large extent determined by the sense perceptions', as well as emotions, sentiments, and norms (C.W.VIII:342). Jung does, however, qualify his statement by saying that unconscious contents may also become conscious.

In Lévi-Strauss's theoretical framework, the consciously observed realm of social phenomena is viewed (though not analysed) phenomenologically, thus providing him with the basis for his ethnographic facts (Rossi 1974:94). For Jung, too, phenomena are similarly observed. However, for the latter this perception refers ultimately to the manifestation of the archetypes in consciousness, which Jung cites as an a posteriori proof for their existence (C.W.IX 2:1979). For Lévi-Strauss, that which is observed phenomenologically acts as the starting point for the analysis of the underlying structuring principles of the mind, thus providing the necessary a priori condition for a study of these unconscious processes.

On the whole, the contentious issue between the two is not the nature of consciousness, but rather that of the unconscious and its relation to consciousness.

e) The Nature of Symbols

In Jung's psychology, symbols appear in consciousness as indicators of psychic disequilibrium. Jung is careful to point out, though, that the 'concept of a symbol...should be strictly distinguished from that of a sign. Symbolic and semiotic meanings are entirely different things' (C.W.VI:473). For a symbol cannot be something known, because it is alive 'only so long as it is pregnant with meaning' (ibid.:474). The symbol

...does not define or explain; it points beyond itself to a meaning that is darkly divined and yet still beyond our grasp, and cannot be adequately expressed in the familiar words of our language (C.W.VIII:336).

Conversely, for Lévi-Strauss symbols can be known, and inasmuch as this is the case, can be effective in creating 'formally homologous structures, built out of different materials at different levels of life' (1963c: 201). Unlike Jung's notion of the symbol (which is distinguished from the sign), Lévi-Strauss' theoretical framework is eminently semiotic (and conceptual) by Jung's definition, where symbolic systems represent not the unknown, but the known. Symbolism in this schema underlies all of culture, as that which permeates the social order and on the basis of which

5 Cf. Rossi 1974:83, on the verification of structuralist models.
Jung notes that symbols function within the psyche by supplying the missing 'third' which is required to reconcile the oppositional quality inherent to the archetypes. The notion of opposition here suggests Lévi-Strauss's binary oppositions and their attempts at mediation. Yet in view of what has previously been said, this surface similarity is just that. Archetypes, because of their instinctual basis, irrationality, and theoretically limitless number, and in spite of their apparent congruence with the notion of binaries and mediation, are different. The mediation of the polar extremes in the archetype is primarily one of renegotiated reciprocity between consciousness and the unconscious, and takes place only when the system is in disequilibrium. Conversely, in the structuralist's model, mediation is a constantly recurring process which puts the system of contradictory meanings into equilibrium - albeit a fragile one - by creating order from the apparent chaos.

f) The Teleological Dimension

One fact which is clear in Jung's psychology is that it is primarily teleological (in the historical sense), its goal being the movement towards individuation, the fullest possible realization of the psyche by the individual and society. At one end of the teleological continuum Jung posits an archaic past from which man has evolved into progressively higher states of consciousness (C.W.IX, 1:255ff.). Libido lies at this extreme and spirit at the other. The inevitable movement of the species, claims Jung, is towards the spirit, and consequently closer to individuation (C.W.VIII: 159ff.). For Jung, 'the psychic process, like any other life process, is not just a causal sequence, but is also a process with a teleological orientation' (C.W.VII: 131).

Trickster and hero, for example, function in this theoretical framework by moderating the flow of psychic energy between the consciousness and the unconscious. They do this in such a way that the individual and society come to understand the dynamic interchange between what is affirmed by consciousness (the heroic qualities) and what is rejected (the trickster traits). As individuation is progressively realized, the rejected dimension becomes incorporated into consciousness (Messer 1980).

The teleological dimension is, for the most part, absent in the works of Lévi-Strauss. Granted, he does discuss how music is related to myth, and how it has - in his opinion - replaced myth in Western society, cautioning, however, that the

---

6 Chevalier 1979:24; see Jung (C.W.IX, 2:33) on the notion of the concept.
music that took over the traditional function of mythology is not any kind of music, but music as it appeared in western civilization in the early seventeenth century (1978:46).

Yet is this development a teleology in the historical sense? On the whole, the answer to this question is uncertain, particularly given Lévi-Strauss's viewpoint on science. Throughout his works, he emphasises that modern and mythical thought forms are alike governed by the structuring principles inherent to the mind (ibid.:45,54; see also Prattis 1978:15ff.). To this extent, the idea of a historical teleology in his theoretical framework appears incongruent with the formulation of his basic epistemic. However, it should be noted that he is ultimately forced to concede that scientific thought is superior to mythical thinking, for 'it not only presumes to be, but actually is closer to the truth...since science can reveal myth, but myth cannot explicate science' (Rossi 1974:303). Consequently, in spite of his affirmation that the kind of logic 'in mythical thought is as rigorous as that of modern science', an evolution in the complexity and quality of thought forms is evident, leaving unresolved the issue of whether or not his model represents a historical teleology.7

Yet in saying that the human mind is the controlling agency in all social processes, Lévi-Strauss's structuralism does display characteristics of a functional teleology, inasmuch as myths and other social expressions which are products of the mind are functional to the maintenance of society (Chevalier 1979:24-7). These attempt to reconcile and maintain the fragile reality which the mind creates in overcoming the contradictions posed by the social structure and nature. Jung's historical teleology, in contrast, portrays a model of continual change in response to the evolution of individual and social psychic growth and development. This is distinguished from Lévi-Strauss's position in that it is dysfunctional to the maintenance of the system, which is moving inexorably towards higher levels of consciousness.

g) The Trickster-Hero Relationship

In Jung's interpretation of the relationship of trickster and hero, as libidinal energy flows from the unconscious into consciousness, the trickster, as the primordial image (archetype) of man's instinctual nature, becomes manifest. In functioning as a

---

7 Lévi-Strauss 1963b:230; cf.1978:13-14. On the issue of science, Jung contrasts 'modern scientific' thought with that of mythical thinking, viewing the former as more conscious than the latter, in the sense that primitive man's ego is largely caught up in the world of the unconscious, and to this extent regulated by the archetypes. Opposite to this view, for Lévi-Strauss man has always and everywhere thought equally well (see here Rossi 1974:302-3; Jung C.W.V: 21, 18).
culture hero, conversely, he directs these energies inwards, back to the unconscious where, as a hero, he does battle with the unconscious and returns with its life-giving energies to consciousness.

Lévi-Strauss's analysis singles out a compendium of mediators who appear in myths; among these are the trickster and the hero (1963b:226). Notably, in his analysis trickster and hero are only two of many mediators, and in and of themselves are no more important than others. This is significant because in Jung's model trickster and hero, inasmuch as they are related to the archetype of the self, are very important, and not, as in Lévi-Strauss's model, one among many instances of mediation.

By embodying the inferior personality of man, the trickster, inasmuch as he also functions as a hero, attains a fuller realization of the self. Consequently, the notions of trickster and hero, rather than referring to two apparently different personalities, represent different aspects of the same mythological being; this ultimately points to the reality of the self, which is both the goal of individuation and the aim of Jung's psychology (C.W.VI: 448-50).

It is significant here that the opposites which trickster and hero mediate in Jung's psychology are those of consciousness and the unconscious, while in Lévi-Strauss's analysis, these opposites can be represented by any one of a number of dichotomies, such as nature-culture, life-death, and hunting-agriculture. Thus while Jung's archetypes are theoretically infinite in number, his basic opposites - those of consciousness and the unconscious - are quite restricted. In contradistinction, Lévi-Strauss's model posits very elementary structuring principles - binaries and mediators - which address a vast number of oppositions.

4. Conclusions

In comparing the viewpoints of Jung and Lévi-Strauss it was noted that the latter, because of his failure to incorporate the emotional sphere into his argument, has perhaps neglected an essential issue in the formulation of a comprehensive social theory (cf. Chevalier 1979:47). In analysing symbol systems in his investigations of myth, Lévi-Strauss focuses primarily on the manifest level at which these occur, without exploring the impact which instincts and emotions have on the symbol's formation. Although Jung's procedure for interpreting symbolic systems is, in a sense, reductionistic, in that it views mythic articulations as elaborations of typical psychic processes, at the semiotic level it does delve into the significance behind the symbol's manifest content, analysing the unconscious mechanisms which participate in its creation (cf. Lévi-Strauss 1963b:208-9).

Given this apparent gulf separating these two thinkers and their respective theories, what possible common ground can be
found on which a more comprehensible semiotic model may be based? It is at this point in the discussion that the father of psychoanalysis emerges as an arbitrator - although surely, never a more unlikely one - in this dispute. But what exactly do Jung and Lévi-Strauss have in common with Freud?

In his earlier works, Jung incorporates many of Freud's ideas in his theoretical formulation. Even in his later writings, he acknowledges his debt to Freud and the importance of his contribution to psychology, noting that 'the semiotic interpretation is (not) meaningless; it is not only a possible interpretation but also a very true one' (C.W. VIII:46). Lévi-Strauss too acknowledges his debt to Freud, claiming that 'Freud has shown me all the possibilities that are open to a scientific investigation of human phenomena' (Rossi 1974:17), and citing in particular Freud's discovery of the unconscious, which affirms that there is a meaning behind the apparent one (ibid.:17-19).

Whereas in his later writings the symbol is made into something unknowable, in his earlier essays Jung focuses on the processes which Freud and the followers of the Psychoanalytic Society - of which Jung was at one time President - developed in the study of semiotics. I propose that it is at this juncture that some conjunction between depth psychology and structuralism may be found.

The central concepts of psychoanalytic theory issued from Freud's monumental work The Interpretation of Dreams, published in 1900 (Freud 1953). This compendium of dreams taken from Freud's life illustrated the unconscious mechanisms operative during sleep, and demonstrated the importance of a hitherto unknown field of investigation. Although Freud and Jung differed on many aspects of their interpretation and description of the unconscious, on certain issues they are in agreement. The concepts which I believe are significant to a proposed amalgamation between the Jungian and structuralist schools of thought are those of repression, projection, and sublimation. 8 Here, some common ground may be found.

Repression, simply stated, refers to the process by which socially unacceptable desires are negated in consciousness, which does not, however, deny their reality. Rather, it merely entails their being relegated to some other sphere. For Freud and Jung, this other sphere is the unconscious (specifically the personal unconscious in Jung's model). Repression, in this schema, is a necessary consequence of living in society; it is 'a process that begins in early childhood under the moral influence of the environment and continues throughout life' (C.W.VII:270). Yet in repressing these desires consciousness becomes susceptible to other processes, such as those of projection and sublimation, which compensate, through distortion of the repressed material, conscious life.

8 For a comparison of the works of Freud and Jung, see Jung, C.W.IV.
Sublimation is a process in which the instinctual desires repressed at the conscious level are converted into socially acceptable forms of behaviour. Thus in the development of civilization, the necessary renunciation of man's instincts precipitated their transformation into cultural activities which were functional to the maintenance of society; these resulted in culture and civilization (ibid.:50).

Projection, as already noted in Jung's discussion of the trickster, is an unconscious activity in which repressed desires or instincts which cannot be sublimated are dissociated from the ego and viewed in terms of other persons or things. In the case of the trickster, man's repressed instinctuality, which is a necessary part of the total psychic system, is projected onto an external figure. Sublimated instinctuality on the one hand leads to the development of culture, and on the other to the projection of shadow qualities. Projection, however, is not random, but object-seeking; in this way the object receiving the ego's projected content demonstrates characteristics associated with the source of the repression. As Jung notes:

...the carrier of the projection is not just any object but is always one that proves adequate to the nature of the content projected - that is to say, it must offer the content a 'hook' to hang on (C.W.XVI:291).

Viewed in terms of these concepts, some synthesis between the structural and depth psychological approaches to the study of semiotics may be postulated. Entailed in this amalgamation would be an incorporation of the emotive dimension articulating the interplay between social functions and unconscious processes. Lévi-Strauss's analysis of the trickster figure coyote among the Pueblo Indians will be employed to illustrate this amalgamation.

In proposing that the purpose of myth is to overcome a logical contradiction, Lévi-Strauss suggests that some type of latent cultural anxiety exists in mythic formulations, to the extent that contradictions are constitutive and yet disruptive to the maintenance of a socially constructed reality. Thus when he proposes that the human species orders cognitive input in a logical fashion, reference to an ethnographic context would permit a view of native schemes of reference in a 'symptomatic manner', by examining to what extent a particular myth is a function of tabooed or repressed areas within a cultural context. In this way the trickster figure coyote, as in the previous example, can be said to function not only in a purely grammatical sense, as a logical operator in a sequence of mythical units ('mythemes'), but also in a therapeutic fashion, addressing both the ambiguity within culture and the ambivalence as well. His function becomes then not only to resolve a logical contradiction - i.e. the life-death antithesis - but also to address a socially ambivalent issue, namely that of the necessity of doing away with those qualities rejected by society as dysfunctional to its maintenance. These ambivalent and ambiguous issues are divorced
from consciousness and resolved (to a degree) by the individual
and society, by projecting them onto an external object.

The anxiety engendered by issues relating to life and death
are referred to in terms of hunting and agriculture, herbivorous
animals and beasts of prey. These are played out mythically
through a process of progressive mediation of the opposites
presented. The myth asserts that in order to survive, man (the
Pueblos) must address these issues and also - if we follow Jung's
interpretation of the trickster - project those culturally
repressed traits which are adverse to survival onto an external
object, who in this instance is selected (as Lévi-Strauss
suggests) because of his ambiguous status in Pueblo animal tax-
onomy - i.e., as a carrion eater.

Going beyond this example, other elements in symbolic
systems could be similarly analysed, not only from the viewpoint
of their structural significance in a system of relations, but
also in terms of the nature of the repressed content which they
symbolically manifest. Naturally, this amalgamation of struct-
uralism and analytical psychology is highly speculative, and
subject to the criticisms which have already been levelled at
both schools of interpretation; but at the same time it does
suggest a way in which instincts and emotions can be fitted into
the structuralist's schema. In proposing that the mind functions
logically in structuring social reality, some conception of that
which is illogical is presupposed. This notion, as noted, is
dealt with in Jung's theoretical framework. However, Jung,
because of his inherently evolutionary model, falls prey to the
criticisms which have been levelled at such a position, primarily
that of ethnocentrism (cf. C.W.VIII:37). Lévi-Strauss, because
of his emphasis on synchrony and his denunciation of historical
teleology, avoids this charge.

In view of what has been said, a model which incorporates
the parsimony of Lévi-Strauss's theoretical framework - with its
underlying dialectic, certainly not antithetical to Jung's for-
mulation - and the emotive dimension incorporated in Jung's
semiotic analysis would provide a more comprehensive understand-
ing of social phenomena, particularly myth (cf. Coward and Ellis
1977: 98-100). Whether or not such a schema is practicable is
another issue, but certainly one worthy of further investigation.
REFERENCES


CHEVALIER, Jacques 1979. 'Base and Superstructure: The French Connection', Carleton University (departmental working paper).


... 1963c. 'The Effectiveness of Symbols', in Lévi-Strauss 1963a.


... 1978. Myth and Meaning, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.


CULTURAL AND SHIFTING IDENTITY:
BERBER IMMIGRANTS FROM NADOR (N.E. MOROCCO) IN BRUSSELS

**Introduction**

One way of gaining insight into the way immigrants reorganise their lives in Belgium is to take their countries of origin as a starting point. Therefore, in order to understand the world of Moroccan Berber immigrants, I pursued research through an interplay of contacts in the north-eastern Berber region of Nador (60 families) and in Belgium (30 families). Most immigrants from the Nador region of Morocco settle down in Brussels, usually after an initial period in the French-speaking part of the country.

A significant feature of this research and its analysis is its predominantly female character. This is largely determined by the situation in which I, as a female research worker, found myself. Because I was a woman, I was, to a certain extent, 'restricted'. Most of the Berber women living in Belgium, and especially those living in Brussels, were only able to speak Berber and so, at first, I talked chiefly to men and, where possible, to the young. However, as my knowledge of Berber improved, there was an obvious shift in the attitude towards me by the local people. I was increasingly given to understand (albeit indirectly) that I had to stay with the women, adapt

---

1 My field research in Morocco was carried out over a period of about six years, involving three visits to Morocco, each of about three or four months.

The author wishes to thank Johanna Crowell and Pat Holden for their help in editing this paper.
my clothes, etc. It was no longer accepted that I should leave the village by myself to visit other families, and the fact that the taxi that was to take me to visit a certain family did not arrive one day was taken as an indication of this.

After some time, I was given a sort of intermediary position, and it gradually became accepted that I could go and visit other informants by myself, but even then my freedom of movement was to some extent limited. It was always evident from the conversations that I 'belonged with the women'. I was, therefore, accepted, but, at the same time, 'restricted' to the world of women.

These practical limitations and restrictions gave me an insight into the seclusion of Berber women. Nevertheless, within this female world there is a degree of openness among the members. Basically, the boundary between the world of the men and that of the women is actualized by reciprocal transgressions spatially and temporally defined. The limitation of women is, therefore, constantly defined by reference to the men. It is essential to keep this complementarity in mind, even though this study is seen from a female perspective.

The complementarity of both sexes also expresses itself in the self-definition of the Berber immigrants.

Differentiation in the Adaptation of the Cultural Background

It is soon apparent, when meeting Moroccan immigrants in Belgium, that they do not represent a homogenous 'group'. In the first place, a distinction exists between the people who speak Arabic and those who speak Berber. Moreover, in the unwritten Berber language there are considerable differences in the three dialects that are spoken respectively in North Morocco (Rif region), Central Morocco (Mid-Atlas) and South Morocco (Souss). A female immigrant from the Nador region will, in the first place, automatically look for contacts with women from her own region, and in this case linguistic considerations are, of course, important. However, as I shall show later, practical circumstances make it impossible for the woman to limit her relationships to this one group.

In addition to distinctions between Berber- and Arabic-speaking persons, there are also differences in behaviour between the successive age-groups in the Berber community in Brussels. The cultural background and the practical situation of migration

---

2 Starting from a basic vocabulary of two hundred words, Hart came to the conclusion that there is a deviation of 53% between the Berber dialect of the north and that of the south (1976:339). Moreover, within each dialect a number of variants occur, often from one village to another.
can differ greatly, as is shown in the cases of a Berber mother, an adolescent, a child born in Belgium, and a newly married woman.

a) The Married Berber Woman with Children

In Brussels, a married Berber woman with children, the central focus of this study, is involved in a specific form of 'adaptation'. In Brussels, the woman usually finds herself in a new and very limited world - the few rooms of her apartment. However, after some time has passed (and this varies from woman to woman) she extends the limits of her living space and begins to make contacts which will form the basis of a women's network. If several Moroccan, or even Berber, families live in the same building, this development is often speeded up. Very often a Berber immigrant also makes contacts with non-Moroccan neighbours, and the attitude of the latter can be a determining factor in the establishment of the relationship. The important thing about the new relationship, of whatever kind, is that it allows the woman to cross the boundary between her dwelling-place and the surrounding world.

When the woman takes her child to school, she has to take a second step into this world, which in the traditional view is perceived as a man's world. The image of Europe held by Moroccans is basically a negative one in which the 'liberty' of European women is seen as a loosening of morals. This provides a further dimension for the entry of the Berber woman into the outside world in Brussels compared with that of Morocco, where the crossing of the boundary involves entering only into the spatial domain of men.

On entering the outside world, it becomes possible for the woman to meet other women - Berber women, Arabic-speaking women and/or non-Moroccan women - at the school gate or on the way to school. A woman's network develops from these contacts, and the initial isolation of the female Berber immigrant is broken. This does not mean, however, that the 'limited' nature of the women's world has been affected. As in Morocco, the network has a great

3 The town as opposed to the countryside, in which the small village develops into one group of women in the absence of the men (all the villagers belong to it), offers the opportunity for the development of a women's network that can be spread out all over the city of Nador. The 'given' fact of the village group contrasts with the 'choice-aspect' that can play a part in composing a network. The practical circumstances in Brussels force the woman, as it were, to choose her friends. In the beginning, the contact of the Berber migrant with other women is often more important than a choice based on the personality of the new acquaintances.
'openness' among its members, but the network is not absorbed into the cultural world surrounding it. It is, indeed, striking to see how the outside world is viewed and discussed from a relative distance.

Each female immigrant takes over a number of elements of her new surroundings and integrates these into her own meaning system. This does not preclude the maintenance of most aspects of the traditional cultural world (although perhaps in a slightly altered form). Sahlins (1981) has noted how a cultural system can be both reproduced and transformed at the same time. The continuity of their system does not prevent the new circumstances - in this case living in the 'strange' Belgian surroundings - from facilitating transformations. Within these adaptations, two levels can be distinguished.

The first level could be described as the reinterpretation of material elements from their own cultural system. Let us take sweet food as an example. In Berber symbolism, sweetness has a positive connotation connected with interpersonal relationships. Strongly sugared tea or coffee traditionally offered to visitors can, therefore, be seen as equivalent to the different sweets found in Belgian cooking, such as tarts, cakes, wafers, etc. Even though these elements differ from those of the Berbers in form and colour, they may be integrated into the traditional meaning system. They remain recognizable signs for the members of the old cultural community (van Zoest 1978: 117-23). For immigrants, 'recognizing' their own cultural signs is particularly important. In this way, the extent to which they continue to adhere to their traditional culture is externalized. (We shall see later that the other age-groups do not necessarily behave in the same way.)

Another example of selective adaptation can be seen when a baby is born, an event that is reinforced by a ritual ceremony. In Brussels, as in Morocco, sugar loaves (a positive symbol) and baby-suits are given as presents. The opposition of the colours pink and blue, often used by the Belgians, can be found in the city of Nador as well (perhaps because of Spanish influence). These colours, therefore, can be taken over in Brussels. In the Berber countryside, however, other colours are frequently used as well. This is the symbolic expression of the fact that at birth, the fundamental opposition of the sexes is not yet of great significance. That is why the clothes of babies in Brussels can vary in colour, rather than being either pink or blue.

A new element, however, and one we have only seen introduced

---

4 The dissertation on which this article is based discusses the 'internal openness' of the woman's network in more detail (Cammaert 1983: 305-22).

5 The Rif region was colonized by Spain till 1956. The city of Melilla, about 13 km from Nador, still forms a Spanish enclave in Morocco.
in a few cases, is that of giving sugar-beans to members of the mother's family and friends. Whereas traditionally, the sweets are given to the mother and the baby, in the new environment the visitor receives them from the mother. Although the symbolic meaning of sweetness is expressed more clearly when it is directed towards mother and child (so that it may fulfil its function), the fundamental meaning of this usage is a positive one. Thus the giving attitude of the mother could be compared with that of some married couples in Morocco who offer a small present to their guests a few days after the wedding. Thus the stream of the positive seems to flow symbolically in two different directions, strengthened together with the mutual ties among the individuals involved. So a 'new' element - giving sugar-beans - is adapted to their field of meaning and becomes acceptable.

In addition to the partial adaptation and alteration of certain elements, other changes are also introduced into the world of the Berber woman. For instance, the giving of sugar-beans stresses the giving position of the mother, whereas traditionally, she finds herself in a receiving position. Another example is the traditional washing of the linen in the village river, which is replaced by washing machines, thus eliminating female working groups and reducing the time invested.

There are, therefore, certain shifts taking place in the traditional system. It is, however, essential to keep in mind not only adaptation to the surrounding culture [which is the immigration phenomenon mentioned by writers such as Yinger (1981), Gabriel and Ben Tovim (1979), and others], but also the creative aspect inherent in the adaptation of the cultural elements that have been taken over. In this taking-over, the female Berber immigrant concentrates clearly on her own closed world. In this way, she experiences the development of a number of usages and activities which, to some extent, follow naturally from pre-immigration customs and practices, but which also - in Eisenstadt's words\(^6\) - result from the dynamic interaction between their own cultural patterns and those of the guest country.

The second level of adaptation in immigration is connected with the Berber boundary system.\(^7\) I have already mentioned the

\(^6\) Quoted by Charsley 1974: 355.

\(^7\) Elsewhere (Cammaert in press) I specifically consider the relationship between husband and wife in the traditional Berber community and in the migrant situation. Cf. Cammaert 1983, especially chapters III, VI.5 and VII.3.
ways in which the fundamental separation of the sexes structures the Berber community, and how the 'new' character of the environment of Brussels sharply affects this. The boundary of the apartment in Brussels is given a completely different meaning by the isolation of the female immigrant - different, that is, from the meaning of the boundary of her Moroccan home. What is generally considered, in Morocco, to be the threshold for daily transgressions (going to the river, to the well, to other women) takes on the meaning of a boundary between isolation and communication in Brussels. The traditional boundary between the home and the outside world, therefore, is questioned.

The husband can participate in this questioning to a greater or lesser extent. Being a man, he is responsible for his wife; he represents his family to the outside world. His wife's behaviour can affect his honour in either a positive or a negative sense. In view of the previously mentioned negative image of the Western world he will, at first, most likely be against this crossing of the boundary. Sometimes he himself defies certain sexual boundaries by, for example, being home during the day-time (even though during that time the house, traditionally speaking, is an exclusively female space). Furthermore, life in a nuclear family (as opposed to the traditional way of life within the family at large) more often brings the spouses in direct contact with each other which, in course of time, can make the intersexual boundary less absolute.

Therefore, in different circumstances, the conceptual boundary system is challenged by practical circumstances and by what is functional. Also in this matter, we therefore notice shifts and adaptations on the part of the Berber woman. Both levels of adaptation - the material one and the structural one - mutually affect each other. The taking-in of new material elements can affect the husband-wife relationship in a direct or indirect way. Through the course of time, shifts can also become visible in the way these elements are adapted (or selected). The married Berber woman takes her own traditional cultural world as a starting point for the shifts and adaptations she acquires as an immigrant, although she remains, in essence, within the relatively closed women's world. In examining younger age categories, some differences may be noticed.

b) The Adolescent Girl

The fourteen adolescent girls (from about 13 to 17 years old) encountered in Brussels were all born in Morocco, and for a decade they had received a traditional education in their home country, where they were being prepared to live as married women within a closed circle of women. They also know most of the members of their family that were left behind in Morocco. That is why Berber traditions also play an important role in the life of these girls. The majority help out with the housework after school, submit to the authority of their parents, and avoid moving in the women's network of their mothers. They often wish
to return to their own country after they have finished their studies and, in many cases, they accept the traditional preparation for their marriage (staying at home, the possible breaking-off of their studies, not knowing or even meeting their future partner, etc.). A few girls, who returned to their country when they married, managed to reintegrate relatively quickly into the traditional world at home. The female adolescent does not seem to cause a disruption to either the culture in the home country or to the 'adapted' system as established by her mother in Brussels. When a female adolescent is in doubt about choosing which way to act, she will, in most cases, eventually let herself (consciously or not) be led by her mother. In this case, the degree of adaptation this woman has established can play a considerable part with regard to the direction in which she will lead her own daughter.

But in a number of ways a shift may be noticed – a shift away from the world of the mother and towards the surrounding culture. This is most obvious with regard to clothing, as well as to such things as modern music, slimming, etc. In such material elements it becomes clear that, for many girls, the boundary of what is is permitted has moved or changed. The contact with the outside world - often more frequent and direct than in the case of the mother - causes a number of outwardly visible elements of the surrounding culture to be adapted without the negative connotations given to it by the traditional Berber community. Regular encounters with non-Moroccans, for example, result in the opinion that wearing short skirts is not necessarily linked with the loosening of morals, or that being slim is not necessarily looked upon as a result of bad luck or physical pains. This change of attitude does not always happen consciously, and it is not altogether common among adolescents.

Changes which are less visible and less general than these can also be noticed in a number of fundamental Berber values. One example concerns the rahya. This Berber term conveys the idea of respect for the parents, for the elder generation, for the family, as well as that of 'positive' shame, which plays an important part in relations between men and women. Under the influence of the new circumstances of immigration, adolescents add negative connotations to this notion, for example, being ashamed of an unemployed father (hence, sometimes a decline of their respect towards him), or being ashamed of their own nakedness in female company.

On the other hand, in some cases, a growing self-affirmation can be noticed, emphasising the individual as opposed to the prevailing importance of the family group in their home world - in other words, an incipient shift from a 'we-culture' towards an 'I-culture' (Eppink 1981: 45-59). This is expressed, for instance, in the value attached to going to work and to interpersonal friendships. Nevertheless, this shift in adolescent attitudes is still slight and may not be generalized.

In most cases, we observed that adolescents build upon the adaptations their mothers have established, but this does not
prevent them from quickly shifting the boundaries by questioning the system more frequently.

c) The Children

The situation is completely different for Berber girls who emigrated to Belgium when they were still babies, or for those who were born in Belgium. For them, education starts, as it were, in Brussels. There is no question of a concrete Berber background in their case. It is, however, possible for the relationship between mother and child itself to develop in a relatively closed Berber surrounding - albeit with the adaptations established by the mother - during the first years of the child's life. Nevertheless, the child goes to school rather early.

From that moment onwards a gap begins to emerge between the Berber mother and her younger children. School affairs, like other aspects of the surrounding culture, are also alien to the mother to some extent. She perceives going to school in terms of authority versus obedience. The father looks upon education and schooling in the same way, and he holds the mother - who has to do without the traditional help of the women's group - responsible when the child does not meet these requirements.

Consequently, the child finds herself in two very distinct settings. The girl's behaviour will sometimes differ according to the setting she is in: a Berber girl, quiet and docile at school, will frequently behave rebelliously at home. Very often, this rebelliousness is the expression of a 'negative' feeling of shame with regard to her parents and/or the traditional Berber structures. In view of the part played by the school (and hence that played by Western culture), the girl often compares the position and behaviour of her parents with that of the Belgians, thereby being unable to discern the meaning of the discrepancy between the situation of the immigrants and that of the indigenous. This 'negative' feeling of shame for many Berber customs (e.g. the traditional clothing of the mother, some of the eating habits, religious celebrations) emerges more frequently with children than with adolescents. It shows that the norms that a little girl has internalized differ considerably from the Berber ones, and often have a Western character.

One can, therefore, understand that many girls (though not all) will detach themselves more and more from the world of their mother, as well as from the home world. Returning to Morocco forever is out of the question for practically all of them, although they are willing to go there on holiday. Many girls can exclude their mother by means of the language. As several of the Berber mothers only have a slight knowledge of French, their

---

8 I have met about thirty-five such girls in the course of my research in Brussels.
children can call them names in their presence – respect is thus again violated. The distance between the world of the mother and that of the children grows wider; for example, lies or distortions of the facts often cannot be checked.

Nevertheless, these children do not aim at breaking their relationship with their mother, nor with their home. It is apparent that, for children, the zone of contact with the surrounding culture is much wider than is the case for adolescents, and this has its consequences in their wishes.9

A striking characteristic that has already become visible with some of the adolescents is the increasing trend toward the 'I-culture'. Time and again the importance of interpersonal contact, of interpersonal (even intersexual) friendships or relationships has been emphasised. A second important line of development concerns the desire for a more explicit way of communicating, as opposed to the traditionally implicit code of communication of imitating and accepting (cf. also Eppink loc. cit.).

However, the shifts taking place in the world of the children reach much further than those of the mothers and adolescents, hence the sometimes numerous conflict situations within the family. An important factor which seems to be missing here is the presence of a mediating figure between these two diverging worlds. A 'link' could bridge the distance between the world of the children and that of the mother in Belgium, in the same way that elderly women in Morocco can move about relatively unhindered in both the men's and women's worlds.

d) The Newly Married Woman

I met a dozen young women who emigrated immediately after their marriage or who got married in the course of my research. Their position lies somewhere between the categories of women already discussed, and their conduct demonstrates characteristics deriving from each of these categories.

The most striking characteristic in the behaviour of these women concerns their relationship with their husbands. Most of these newly-weds choose the nuclear family. In this way, the young woman leaves the immediate influence of her mother, and of the latter's vision of the new world they live in. The influence of the Western environment may play a part in this choice (choice as opposed to the given immigration situation of the Berber mothers). (Some of the young women have studied and/or worked before getting married.) This development may also follow naturally from the growing demands of young people in the

9 It may be noted in passing that the question of how they are regarded by Belgians is rarely posed. Obviously, on the level of the world of Berber children no decisive problems have occurred so far.
city of Nador (hence the large number of conflicts there).

The growing emphasis on individual 'feelings' is remarkable. Whereas traditionally speaking a marriage is a matter of two groups of families, nowadays there is more and more talk of relationships built on 'love' (IhuB). Here too, both the direct influences of the Western surroundings and the changes in the world of the Nador youth may play a defining role. Compared to the world at home, the interpersonal (and intersexual) building-up of relations in the category of newly married immigrants is in every respect in a more advanced stage. Time and again a widening of the zone of contact between man and woman is striven for (cf. mutual transgressions of the boundary).

Apart from the specific relationship with their husbands, these women also build up a world of their own. Repeatedly I heard that young women were looking for jobs. Here the stress is often on talking to and getting into contact with other women, rather than on the nature of the work itself. Therefore, the building-up of a women's network of people of the same age, although not necessarily Berber (the language is a problem), is what is sought. But when this build-up does not seem possible, they join a network of elderly women.

Even though the behaviour of a young woman is sometimes judged in negative terms by the elderly, there is no question of disruption within the family group, either in Belgium or in the home country. Family ties are underlined in different ways - in conversation and in behaviour. However, a number of contrasts between these young women and the older surroundings come to light. Frequently, the newly-weds will stress these contrasts, and so their behaviour assumes a more conscious nature than that of the children. As was the case with the children there are, however, tendencies towards a more explicit way of communication, towards independence and individualism. The importance of individualism in the eyes of these young women is made explicit in their wish for birth control in order to leave space for the individual upbringing of each child (this does not, however, interfere with the emphasis on obedience versus authority).

The flexibility with which young women are able to return to the traditional pattern whenever this is required by the company they are in is remarkable. (The conversations with young women or with elderly Berber women may be very different.) This is what especially separates these women from the children, who experience adaptation problems in a traditional Berber environment.

None of the age categories that have been discussed aim at breaking with the world at home. Each category, however, organizes its own world in a very specific way. Whereas the adolescents we have met strongly lean towards their mother's line of adaptation, the newly-weds and the children pursue a more individualistic development. While the children are being led in this development by the Western environment (i.e. school) right from the start, the newly-weds gain a new dimension to their lives, consciously or unconsciously.
Naturally, the personality of each of the persons involved plays a part in the nature of these changes. The boundaries between the categories that have been discussed cannot be drawn strictly. For instance, in the course of my research I came to know three adolescent girls who later got married. It was evident that the transition to marriage did not cause an immediate reversal in the behaviour of these women.

In addition to leaving the parental home and the 'adapted' world of the mother, relations with the husband also affect changes in the behaviour of a newly married woman. This does not mean, however, that marriage must be looked upon as an essential factor in the transition towards a more conscious adaptation of their own world. In these changes, time plays a part that may not be under-estimated. Prolonging the duration of study, delaying the age of marriage, etc. - changes that have gradually become prevalent - may also lend a more personal and conscious character to the adaptation of the adolescent's life.

The striking differentiation between the age categories mentioned does not prevent all these individuals from calling themselves 'Moroccan' or 'Berber'.

**Ethnic Self-Definition**

First of all, one notices a distinction in ethnic self-definition, according to the environment in which the speaker finds him-or herself.

At first, a Berber woman or girl will define herself as Moroccan; it is only when she knows that the listener is informed about the distinction between Berber and other Arabic speakers that she will present herself as a Berber. Moreover, in the company of Moroccans or Berbers she will specify that she is a Riffian, a distinction that can be narrowed even more, for example, on the basis of dialectical variants. As Evans-Pritchard remarks, in this way one can be at the same time a member and a non-member of a specific category or group (1940: 137).10 In the case of a Berber woman belonging to the Moroccan nation - which comes to the fore when Morocco is placed against other countries (such as in the context of immigration) - the

---

10 In this context, the term *category* indicates a number of individuals who possess one or more 'ethnic features' in common. However, there is no question of a feeling of togetherness as a basis for a meaningful social interaction. In a *group*, on the contrary, there is a meaningful interaction among the members, based on one or more common features. These features can be obtained from the linguistic, the religious, the physical, etc. domain. They can be innate as well as taught, imposed, invented, etc. Cf. McKay & Lewins 1978; Schermerhorn 1970.
accent of her membership is diverted when Berber and Arabic
speakers are confronted, etc.

In order to stress this latter opposition, special light
is thrown upon a number of diacritic cultural characteristics in
Morocco concerning clothing, means of expression and rituals.
By means of these, different ethnic categories and/or groups
come into being. A few observable signs - material elements
and/or basic values - are extracted from the whole of the
culture in question and are attributed to a number of persons
through which these are separated from their environment (Barth
1969: 14). Consequently, culture is manipulated in order to
create certain boundaries and social contrasts. As Barth
emphasises, these cultural characteristics do not always
originate from a historiographically verifiable past: one does
not deal with objectively perceptible differences, but with a
variable, subjective ascription. The individual is classed in
terms of his relation towards the others (ibid.: 11-17). This
ascription, as a feature of the ethnic group or category,
distinguishes the given facts of a culture. A culture changes
and evolves - the diacritical features or cultural 'traits' can
be changed or adapted - but the principle of dichotomisation
between members and non-members continues to exist (ibid.: 14).
In Morocco, this boundary is kept very much alive. A few women
were surprised to hear that the Souss (South Morocco) had an
organization of the house similar to that of the Rif, since the
differences were so often emphasised.

Before independence (1956), an organized ethnic group
living in the Rif, under the leadership of Abdelarim, was very
active against Spanish colonialism. Such a group is not merely
to be considered as a pressure group (see Glazer and Moynihan
1975); rather we should accept, as De Vos does, that in an ethnic
group, an instrumental, purposeful dimension can be distinguished
from an expressive, psycho-social one. Not only is the required
status within the ethnic group to be considered, but also
affective factors, such as origin and self-identification (1975:
5-41). Both dimensions can sometimes be far from functional,
but on other occasions - during a war against the colonial
power, for example - they can be given a more wide-ranging
definition.

Immigration, too, can revive identity (Burges 1978: 275-
80), although not always to the same extent. In the case of the
Berbers we noticed how a female immigrant in Brussels has built
up a women's network, the members of which may have come from
different regions of Morocco, or may even be non-Moroccan. These
networks structure the internal world of the women to a certain
extent, but they hardly affect their public world. In their
composition we notice an application of Barth's definition:
'...boundaries persist despite a flow of personnel across them'
(1969: 9).

We looked, as much as possible, at women from the same
region of Morocco, i.e. the Rif. In this case, other women were
often badgered because of their 'being different', and
especially because of language differences. The repeated emphasising of these differences appear to support the ethnic boundary, even though there is some mutual contact. It is, however, mainly the expressive, psycho-social dimension that is externalized by emphasising differences. To an outsider, this distinction is hardly noticeable. The absence of organization or mutual interaction makes the term 'ethnic category' preferable to ethnic groups in this case.

It is possible that women belonging to the same ethnic category will, on occasions, 'work together', that is, cut themselves off or distance themselves from the others. This seclusion, in a way, can be compared with what Gulick describes as 'the ethos of insecurity', where everybody is distrusted outside a close circle of relatives (1976: 148). This distrust of outsiders, which is partially expressed by the strongly walled houses of the Middle East (as well as Morocco), becomes even more apparent in a strange environment. According to Gulick, in migrating from the countryside to the towns in the Middle East, kinship ties make the essential 'adaptation' possible and in this way buffers are created between the migrants and the town (ibid.: 146). In the foreign environment of Brussels, where non-Berbers predominate the different nationalities and/or ethnic groups live next to each other. Berber immigrants also express their 'insecurity'. It is only within a limited circle that anything may be said, and where any 'openness' exists. However, we would not necessarily confine this circle to relatives only, but rather stress its ethnic character.

The re-interpretation of the objects from the new environment within their own frame of reference, as described above, does not affect the preservation of ethnic boundaries. The newly introduced elements are not considered as culturally diacritical; in other words, the taking-over of Western cultural features is not considered as breaking through the ethnic boundary. The creative adaptation of new cultural features realizes the further existence of ethnic ties beyond the spatial boundaries. However, in adapting to her new way of living, it may be that the Berber woman remains within the traditional cultural system: the Western, outside world continues to lie beyond.

Immigration itself also causes another boundary - an invisible one - to arise between immigrants and non-immigrants. Those who stay at home are not usually informed of the living conditions that really occur in Brussels; immigrants are invariably seen as living wealthy and prestigious lives. This aspect of the relationship, however, does not violate the boundary that 'demarcates', as it were, the ethnic category of the Rifians. The fact that most Berber women do not exclude returning to Morocco in the future indicates that they consider themselves as part of this ethnic category. The altered status they hope to reach by that time - an image of material wealth - does not detract from the fact that they have ties in their home
country. They are admitted into a category which distinguishes itself from 'the others'. Considering oneself as belonging to the same ethnic category or group does not accord with Harris's thesis that 'the material conditions of socio-cultural life' are the first priority (1969: 4). Despite different material conditions, ethnic demarcation – in other words, a number of cultural diacritics – still continues. The continuing evolution of culture – and consequently also that of the diacritics – does not prevent the principle of dichotomization – in this case, between Berbers (Riffians) and non-Berbers – from remaining in existence.

Although the world of immigrant Berber young people does not always coincide with that of their parents, they still refer to themselves as Moroccans or Berbers. The intensified interpersonal contact – both with Berbers and non-Berbers – gives a different content to the ethnic identity of the young people. Also, a distinction has to be made here between the age categories mentioned. Adolescents who move mainly within their mother's network show a pattern similar to that of Berber women in the matter of realizing their ethnic identity. Ties with the home country are maintained; some girls get married in Morocco and then stay on living there. Berber immigrants and non-immigrants are usually perceived as belonging to one great ethnic category.

However, the fact that one reacts against the traditional way of living and looks for more interpersonal contact with the non-Berber surroundings (as some adolescents and newly married women do) does not imply that one wants to relinquish one's own ethnic identity. It may appear that the adapted cultural elements are not always viewed in the same way by the elder generation. The conflicts that arise between both generations follow directly from the different ways of re-organising the framework of the world they are living in (the young people, for instance, wear short clothes outside the house and they want friendly contacts with the other sex, etc.). In this way, from a traditional viewpoint diacritic elements are affected (e.g. the enclosure of the female body, the separation of the sexes) and thus, to a certain extent, blur or endanger the dichotomy between Berbers and the West. According to the elder generation, the ethnic identity of the Riffians is affected. The young, however, call themselves Riffians too – Berbers, as opposed to those speaking Arabic – and do not consider elements adapted from the West as being diacritically relevant. For in wishing to expand the medial zone or zone of contact between both cultural groups, the elements mentioned above fall within this zone. This does not exclude the fact that there are also some differences which these young people will occasionally emphasise. They frequently bring forward a number of Berber values – such as the religious dimension of life, firm family ties surpassing the boundaries, the role of the grandmother, etc. – when comparing the Berber way of life with the Western one. All the adolescents and young women we spoke to had spent
ten to fifteen years (or more) in Morocco. This explains why they acquired most of the diacritic elements used for their identification with their home country. The ethnic category they belong to connects immigrants with the stay-at-homes, in the same way as it did with the elder generation. Very often, when they are in their home country they will conceal or hide the conflict-generating aspects of the new world they live in (at least if they are conscious of them).

The children, however, to a large extent miss the cultural dimensions of the Riffian home country. In an immigrant situation, the cohesion of the Berber world can be passed on to the children only in a reinterpreted and impoverished form, because of the absence of numerous important aspects. Holidays spent in the home country are too short and often too far removed from the child’s representation of reality to fill these gaps. It can be seen immediately that the immigrant child therefore has fewer diacritic cultural elements from the Berber world at his or her disposal with which to define him or herself ethnically. Opposing this is Western school education, in which quite a lot of diacritical features are offered. Here too, the Berber child largely misses the coherence provided by Western cultural patterns.

There are various consequences of this. The frequent contact with non-Berber children has enlarged the medial zone between both cultural worlds. A Berber girl wants pocket money, exactly like the Belgians; she wants to eat chips, as the Belgians do; she wants to play in the street with the Belgians; she wants to play after school instead of attending Koran lessons. On the other hand, a Berber girl usually speaks Berber; she goes on holiday to Morocco; she observes how her mother and other Berber women or adolescents behave; she hears them talking about other Berbers, about Morocco; she listens to the many stories her mother tells her, etc. In so far as she talks about this to non-Berbers a number of these elements, varying from person to person, become partially diacritical. Moreover, a number of these diacritics are emphasised more than once by the school environment, especially in the form of phenotypical and objectively perceptible differences.

These differences procure for the Berber girl the ethnic label of being a 'Moroccan' because, for the most part, outsiders do not know the internal ethnic divisions in Morocco. As Roosens remarks, it is therefore "...possible that from repeated and continual affirmation by the surrounding setting new ethnic entities and identities will grow with a partly new content" (1982: 111). Like many adolescents, several young Berber girls are ill-informed of the substantial meaning of ethnic divisions within Berber culture. Added to this is the fact that that they spend a considerable, if not the greater part of their time in an environment where these boundaries are not known (the school, the street, etc.). That is why these immigrant girls seem to accept the ethnic label 'Moroccan'. However, the content of being Moroccan varies greatly for these
young immigrants. Elements from different cultures can be found in it: Berber, as well as Spanish, Greek, Belgian, etc. This variation is connected with the strongly enlarged medial zone between Berbers and non-Berbers. At the same time, the shift from the ethnic label 'Berber' to 'Moroccan' contains an enlargement. In this way, the ethnic identity of Berber children slides away from that of the other age categories towards the non-Berber world.

Conclusions

Berber immigrants obviously do not form a homogeneous group. Already, within the female part of their community, differences in behaviour can be noticed that distinguish the age categories of the Berber mother from the newly married woman, the adolescent girl and the child. Both the background of the individuals involved and the actual situation in which they find themselves give the newly built-up world they live in a different content for each of the mentioned categories. The Berber mother only carries through a limited number of transformations in reproducing the traditional culture system (in which she is largely followed by her adolescent daughter). However, these transformations assume a more profound and conscious nature for the newly-weds and for some adolescents. The influence of the West, and that of the recent demands of youth in Nador, do not prevent a further building-up on a Berber basis. In view of the fact that Berber culture is offered to the children in a very atrophied form, it is very difficult to speak of a similar cultural reproduction. Because of the permanent influence of the Western school environment, the distance between the world of the mother and that of the child continues to grow. In view of the absence of any kind of medial figure, this gap has not so far been bridged.

However substantial the differences between the age categories, one can still discern the dichotomy of 'we' versus 'the others'. The content given to their own ethnic group or category may vary (its name can even shift from 'Berber' to 'Moroccan'), but each female immigrant considers herself as clearly distinct from 'the others' that surround her. Continuity with the past differs for successive age categories. The historical background of the home country, which remains a vivid reality for the mother (e.g. fighting against Spanish colonialism), is generally equally as 'strange' for a Berber child as for a Belgian. This does not prevent the child from realizing in his or her ethnic self-definition - consciously or not - ties with the Berber world.

Various possibilities for development now lie open. The so-called 'passing' (De Vos 1975: 26-30) or disappearance in the indigenous group, in view of the phenotypical differences and the attitude of the Belgians who continue to maintain the cultural
differences that fix the boundary, seems to be the least probable hypothesis. It is more probable that a sub-system will be developed that will differ, to a greater or lesser extent, from the new system of the elder generation. Through this sub-system new cultural elements may be introduced, both from the environment and from the traditional culture; or else new elements may be created which, perhaps later, will be said to be authentic (cf. what has happened to the Hurons in Canada, Roosens 1979: 40-4; 1980: 179-94). The exact course of events is hard to predict. As Barth puts it, '...one cannot predict from first principles which features will be emphasized and made organizationally relevant by the actors' (1969: 14). A further question arises concerning the reaction of the elder generation to such a sub-system.

In the event of conflict with the autochthons, however, the distinct 'new' systems should grow closer to each other, despite the possibly numerous differences. It is not impossible that in such an event, the enlarged ethnic boundaries of a Berber - or perhaps Moroccan - 'immigrant system' will be regarded as the only authentic one, which would naturally not be without consequence as far as relations with the 'stay-at-homes' is concerned.

M.-F. CAMMAERT

REFERENCES

... in press. 'Het in vraag stellen van een systeem: "begrenzingen" van de gehuwde Berbervrouw in Nador (N.O.Marokko) en te Brussel ["Questioning a System: "Limitations" of Married Berber Women in Nador (N.E. Morocco) and in Brussels"].

M.-F. CAMMAERT

REFERENCES

... in press. 'Het in vraag stellen van een systeem: "begrenzingen" van de gehuwde Berbervrouw in Nador (N.O.Marokko) en te Brussel ["Questioning a System: "Limitations" of Married Berber Women in Nador (N.E. Morocco) and in Brussels"]].


VAN ZOEST, A. 1978. Semiotiek. Over tekens, hoe ze werken en wat we ermee doen [Semiotics. About signs, how they work and what we do with them], Baarn: Ambo.

'A what exhibition?' people exclaim, evidently unwilling to believe their ears. 'Oh, a hat exhibition', they repeat in amazement, and as the polite smiles slip from their faces we watch the thought balloons emerge from behind their anxious eyes.

A hat exhibition? At the Pitt Rivers Museum? A mere fashion show at one of the oldest and most renowned ethnographic museums in the world? Surely something so frivolous is not 'in keeping' or 'relevant', not suitably serious or scholarly?

This reaction is precisely why an exhibition of hats and headgear is relevant in an ethnographic museum, for it betrays an attitude to headgear: that in late twentieth-century Britain hats are associated with pleasure and frivolity, weddings and the races. (And what of all those other hats - warm woolly balaclavas, waterproof hats, safety helmets?) In fact, at all times, in all parts of the world, hats have been loaded with meaning; they are therefore worthy of serious consideration.

The aim of the Pitt Rivers Museum exhibition 'On Top of the World' - a title which admittedly betrays a certain joie de vivre - is to look at headgear around the world, its different uses, its aesthetic appeal and the significance attached to it. In such an exhibition, General Pitt Rivers' belief in the value of comparative display comes into its own, even though the primary theme is not, as he would have wished, evolution. Broadly speaking, people wear hats for largely the same reasons, and the exhibition shows a fascinating array of different solutions to common problems. Thus it has been divided up, loosely, according to function. There are hats for war, for special occasions, hats to denote status, be it social, political or religious, everyday hats and of course those where function is paramount, giving protection from the sun, wind, rain, or even one's taboo relatives. And, as a concession to twentieth-century Western attitudes, there is even a small fashion section, with all that fashion implies! Of course, it soon becomes apparent that one hat can have many functions. For example, the
Northwest Coast chief's head-dress denotes status but is only worn on special occasions, and the Mongolian Yellow Lama's hat indicates not only his religious occupation but his social and scholarly status. The Welsh 'chimney hat', although worn every day, has political implications, for it was strongly linked with the folklore revival movement and the upsurge in nationalist feeling in the nineteenth century. With some headgear, aesthetic considerations are uppermost: for example, Lisu girls in Burma decorate their standard black turbans with brightly coloured strings on special occasions - the list could go on almost endlessly.

The exhibition includes a number of British, and even Oxfordshire items, for we do not subscribe to the ethnocentric view that equates 'ethnographic' with 'exotic'. British hats are, more often than not, fulfilling the same functions and conveying similar messages as hats in any other culture. Hence the exhibition includes a policeman's helmet (protection, authority and status) and a nineteenth-century bridesmaid's hat (status on a ceremonial occasion) which have as much anthropological value as, for instance, the Chinese mandarin's hat or the Haida twisted spruce root hat displayed nearby.

We felt it would not have been ethnographically relevant to categorize the hats according to material or technique of manufacture: nevertheless, there is ample opportunity for the visitor to examine these aspects of the specimens. The exhibition includes hats made of textile, fur, wood, grass, metal, leaves, fish skin, basketry and feathers. The decorative techniques employed, such as fine embroidery from China and the Sudan, beadwork from Nigeria and Sarawak, intricate canework from Assam, and painted palmleaf from Borneo, point not only to the technical attention lavished on hats, but also towards aesthetic preferences. The form and decoration of hats also indicate changes and influences brought about by trade, conquest or colonization introducing new materials and techniques. For example, the Azande man's brimmed hat is an amalgam of traditional forms and the influences of both neighbouring groups and Europeans; the Andean knitted cap represents a technique introduced with the Spanish Conquest; and European forms have been assimilated into an oba's regalia in Nigeria. Exotic and traded materials often confer status on a hat and its wearer, for example, the trade mirrors incorporated into the Samoan human hair head-dress, tuinga lauula, in the nineteenth century.

Working on such an exhibition has had its problems. To start with, how does one define a hat? When does a hat become a mask, and vice versa? Is it a question of structure or function? And so on. Inevitably, some arbitrary distinctions have to be made for purely practical reasons. One might imagine the research for such an exhibition to be a fairly straightforward exercise, but in fact it has proved particularly difficult. Where a given object or photograph has come to the Museum with full and reliable documentation there has been little problem. Sadly, this is not always the case, and some material has no more documentation than, for example, 'Hat, Burma, collected 1893'. Is it traditional or imported? Worn by men or women? When? Has it any special significance? Sometimes a similar object held in the collection will
throw some light on the problem, but it is surprisingly difficult to answer such questions. The written records of anthropologists and travellers are peculiarly unforthcoming on the subject. Although they might give a fairly detailed description of clothing and ornament, the last sentence will read 'Both men and women usually wear hats' - what hats? Given the importance of heads and their coverings, both practically and symbolically, in many cultures, this is indeed a curious omission from the record.

Arguably it is wrong to isolate hats and headgear from their related clothing, and there is an attempt to draw attention to this aspect by the use of over 70 photographs showing hats and headgear in context. However, by concentrating on one specific aspect of dress, it has been possible to bring together a much wider range of material (almost 100 items) which does, in the manner in which it is presented, form a coherent whole.

Having worked on this exhibition, we are unlikely ever to feel quite the same about hats. Any hatted individual crossing our path in future will be fair game for scrutiny and analysis. Why is he wearing that? Does it keep his ears warm? Does it keep the sun off? Is he bald? Is he expecting someone to hit him on the head? Does it show his position in society? Should I make way for him? Is he going somewhere special, or does he always wear it? Possibly he just thinks it suits him. Or her.

The result of our labours is, we hope, illuminating, visually exciting and, dare we say it, just a little bit of fun. There is definitely more to hats than meets the eye.

ON TOP OF THE WORLD can be seen at the Pitt Rivers Museum, Oxford, throughout 1986.

ELIZABETH EDWARDS
and LINDA CHEETHAM
(Illustrations by HELEN BOND)
WALES
Black plush 'chimney hat'

CANADA - QUEEN CHARLOTTE ISLANDS - HAIDA INDIANS
Head-dress worn for the Klaskin ceremony

EAST MONGOLIA - NEAR CHAO YANG
Hat of a Buddhist monk of the Yellow Hat Sect

ENGLAND
Bridesmaid's hat of pink tulle

WALES
Bridesmaid's hat of pink tulle

NORTH AMERICA - NORTH WEST COAST - HAIDA INDIANS
Hat of twisted spruce root

CHINA - MANCHURIA - MUKDEN
Hat of third-class mandarin

BOLIVIA - AIMARA INDIANS
Knitted woollen cap of the high Andes
HISTORY AND KINSHIP: TWO RECENT BOOKS


Evans-Pritchard regarded social anthropology as being closer to certain kinds of history than to the natural sciences\(^1\) and thus distanced himself firmly from the anti-historicism of the functionalists. Indeed, the lecture in which this then iconoclastic view was expressed also recorded the increasing acceptability of history to post-functionalist British anthropologists in particular, though it certainly did not precipitate it, for as Evans-Pritchard himself made clear, the trend was already under way. But there was still a long way to go before there would be a true meeting of minds from the two disciplines; despite sharing the overall aim of evaluating the nature of human society, their differing methods and the particular themes on which they focused their attention still served to keep them apart.

These two recent books are, on the face of it, admirably suited to assess how far that situation has improved in the quarter of a century since Evans-Pritchard delivered his lecture. Both deal with themes in the history of European kinship, and in that sense they unite the two areas that have traditionally been at the heart of these respective disciplines. The first is an imaginative attempt to fuse the two scholarly traditions in a way that, on the whole, Evans-Pritchard would probably have approved; the second, however, leaves the impression that we are left with the same old log-jam. Let us examine them in a little more detail.

\(^1\) 'Anthropology and History', in his *Essays in Social Anthropology*, London: Faber and Faber, 1962 p. 46.
Goody's book examines the influence of the Christian Church on the ideas and practices of kinship in European history. His thesis essentially is that from the early Middle Ages on, the Church was instrumental in weakening the hold of local kin groups over their members and in encouraging individual control, especially over the disposal of property. This was to the Church's advantage, since as a consequence much of this property was left to it, and this in turn enabled it to grow in strength and influence by supporting its monastic, pastoral and charitable activities. In order to achieve this, the use of wills and other written legal devices such as bookland were encouraged, and prohibitions were imposed upon marriages with close kin, as well as on adoption, concubirage and divorce. The effect of the latter group of prohibitions was to rule out virtually entirely any means whereby those left childless by a first marriage could obtain an heir; and this, together with fear for the fate of a person's soul and supported by written documents, allowed the Church to become the heir of many properties in the face of kin group opposition. Finally, the kin group was weakened still further by the extra limitations imposed by the redefinition of the degrees of kinship in the eleventh century. As a result, 'one could no longer marry anyone from whom one could have formerly inherited, i.e. kinsfolk' (p.136).

Goody admits that such policies were not necessarily designed just to bring property into the Church, but that in some cases supported its authority generally, or had doctrinal advantages: 'The rejection of adoption attacked the worship of the ancestors, since the provision of an heir and the provision of a worshipper were inextricably woven together' (p. 42). But often the Church was acting not only against custom and Roman legal tradition but against scriptural authority also. For example, the Gospels enjoined poverty: but the eventual recruitment of the wealthy into the Church forced a redefinition of scriptural authority on it, which in its turn was to provoke sectarian reaction such as that of the Cathars.

This is a novel thesis, and much of it relies on assertion rather than evidence. At the start, Goody relies more heavily on minimising the contrasts between the Arab lands and Europe than some might feel wise, choosing the side of those who support the view that close marriages and bilateral inheritance alongside basically patrilineal descent occurred uniformly throughout these areas until late antiquity. While not wholly rejecting the opposite view, the distinctions he finds are not areal ones, but those between urban and rural situations right around the Mediterranean and in Northern Europe. Also, the attribution of true descent groups to many parts of pre-Christian Europe cannot be at all certain: Goody himself mentions vassalage as well as descent as a possible mode of recruitment into Scottish clans (p. 216). Finally, he has little to say about the Orthodox areas of Europe, despite the fact that, being under the control of a Church independent of Roman authority, they might have provided instructive contrasts with which to test his theories.

Nonetheless, there are a number of points in their favour. The reforms detailed above are pretty well attested, and the
Church's concern for its property can also be invoked to explain its ban on the marriage of all clergy (not just the higher clergy) from the fourth century onwards, a reform which put a brake on the tendency to divert such property to the children of the clergy generally. There is also the eventual restoration of parental authority over marriage in much of Protestant Europe as part of the general reaction against the Catholic Church from the sixteenth century onwards. Finally, even in the Middle Ages, at the height of the Church's influence, there were reactions to its policy— not only from the Cathars and other poverty-advocating sects, but also from secular governments alarmed at the Church's acquisition of property (on which their own power equally depended); and popular evasion and such strategies as wife-sales as a way round the ban on divorce constituted other reactions, less explicit and combative in character, but nonetheless real.

What of the implications of the book for other theories and scholarly debates? One German scholar has already invoked Goody's thesis in support of his search for evidence of prescription in German and English kin terms—in particular, the discussion of changes in European kin terms, in which Goody sets out to show that the present-day pattern of $P \neq PG$ has evolved from one in which $P \neq PssG \neq PosG$ (Appendix 3). Secondly, there is further support for Dumont's examination of the connection between Christianity and the rise of individualism in the West. Thirdly, the tendency towards close marriages which Goody claims for pre-Christian Europe contradicts, like that in the Arab lands, Levi-Strauss's doctrine of the universal importance of the principle of exchange as the foundation of marriage alliance and, by extension, of human society generally (p. 43).

Finally, it is clear that, despite the fact that the increasing secularisation of recent centuries has greatly diminished the Church's control over kinship and property, the momentum of change has been maintained and even increased. There has been no overall return to what Goody claims were the close marriages of times before that control was imposed—quite the reverse, with a marked if often exaggerated trend away from marriage and the raising of families in many parts of Europe and North America, the increased social acceptability of unmarried motherhood, less social pressure to get and stay married, and the imaginable but as yet unclear impact of recent medical advances concerning human reproduction. Contrary to this, one could certainly argue that divorce has received increased legal approbation, though a recent paper shows the supposed prior difficulty of divorce in England to have been exaggerated, at least for the period since the start of the eighteenth century. Nonetheless, Goody's book might still provide

2 Georg Pfeffer, 'Symmetrische Präskription in germanischen Verwantschaftsterminologien', Sociologus, Vol. XXXV no.1, 1985, pp. 53-73; a similar paper on English kin terms by the same author is to appear shortly in L'Homme (personal communication).

further ammunition for those trying to remove the Church's remaining control over divorce in countries such as Ireland and Italy. Moreover, despite secularisation, our modern conceptions of incest still tend to correspond to the Church's precepts, at least as far as the law is concerned; and if these really were innovatory in themselves, then recent suggestions and occasional instances of allowing marriages between close cousins, half-siblings, in-laws, etc., in Britain, Scandinavia, the United States, etc., would seem less radical and could derive an additional argument from this book. Whether it will be invoked in this way only time will tell, but it is certainly one of those rare anthropological works that should appeal to a wider, non-specialist readership.

From Goody, an anthropologist looking at a problem located in history, we turn to Plakans, a historian approaching ordinary historical sources with a view to anthropological results. His book is in fact an exhaustive methodology intended to introduce two later substantive volumes, one on the kinship of the Russian Baltic provinces in the late eighteenth to early nineteenth centuries, the other on the kinship of the Schwalm district of Hesse in West Germany in the earlier part of the mid-nineteenth century. Most of it is concerned to discuss the possibility of using the sorts of data familiar to social historians - censuses, wills, marriage documents, etc., both singly and in combination - for the task of reconstructing historical kinship systems.

One immediately obvious limitation of his discussion is that he concentrates much more on descent than on marriage. Even on the former, many will feel that his reliance on functionalist notions - especially Radcliffe-Brown, Nadel, and Fortes - and on the Banton-Nadel role model in his discussion of what constitutes 'significant' kinship are outmoded, not to mention his confident assertion that 'most of the systematic correlations of various social traits have shown societies to have a considerable degree of correspondence between such traits as terminology, rules of residence, rules of descent and forms of marriage' (p.116). But at least the problem of deciding what was emphasised at a popular level out of the welter of kindred and other kin ties and descent lines traceable in the documents is realised and faced, and Plakans is clearly aware of the drawbacks of relying just on genealogies to establish indigenous conceptions of kinship (pp. 74-5). Indeed, the difficulty of obtaining information as to the ideational component of kinship from such material is seen as their major drawback, possibly irresolvable: not even the codes of the legislators give a dependable guide as to the ideas of the people for whom they were legislating, and only by inference as to their actual practice; and unlike the field anthropologist, the historian cannot simply go and ask further questions about his data from the nearest suitable informant. But this does not exhaust the problems presented by this sort of evidence. Since the historian is stuck with evidence which provides only a limited set of perspectives, he may be restricted as to the sort of substantive conclusions he can arrive

at: e.g. household lists may give good information about co-residence, but little about the wider genealogical links of those involved.

There is also the converse problem, although it is one that can be corrected by the researcher's vigilance, namely that he may wrongly come to regard the data as useful at one level of analysis only - e.g. concentrating on lineage links to the unnecessary exclusion of those of smaller family units (pp. 192-3). Correcting this may, however, mean going many times over the same body of data, which is likely to be enormous in the first place. Indeed, it is the sheer volume of data involved that makes such endeavours so daunting. And although one would have thought the computer ready-made for such work, Plakans rejects this (p. 243), putting his faith instead in network analysis (pp. 131-2, chapter 10), a method suitable for behaviour rather than ideas. The field anthropologist is not faced with these problems, since not only can he circumvent them by asking further questions, but he also finds it easier to move sideways into new perspectives in relation to the data that interests him. The social historian's sources are only likely to be increased by obtaining more of the same, in a sort of arithmetical progression, again useful for judging behaviour, but which no amount of computing or network analysis or inferential cogitation can turn into conceptions of ideal or actual kinship. Statistics and ideologies form essentially contrasting bodies of data: they can be juxtaposed in a complementary fashion but ultimately they apply to different levels of analysis.

Plakans suggests in his final chapter that historians have done more than anthropologists to bridge the gap between the two disciplines. On the face of it he is right. The functionalists, of course, rejected history, not as bad in itself, but as irrecoverable in most cases in any form of use to anthropologists, this being one of their fundamental objections to the evolutionist and diffusionist schools they sought to replace. And long after the rest of their intellectual inheritance has been discarded, the general suspicion, not to say hostility, that commonly greets anything today smacking of evolutionism remains as their legacy. Even most structuralists regard history as a purely contingent matter, useful in that it may have a bearing on, for example, the study of tradition and its place in contemporary societies, or simply on the way things have come to be as they are, but not in explaining why they should remain of value at the present day.

Plakans clearly regards method rather than concepts as the basic problem. Anthropologists may find data in history of confirmatory value to their own work, and the list is long of those who have incorporated the great literary civilisations of the past in large-scale comparative work on the basis of historical research (e.g. Frazer, Hocart, Eliade, most of the Année Sociologique school). But although increasingly prepared to examine the past of whichever people they are studying, anthropologists treat this as just another source of data, not as an end in itself, and they invariably prefer to leave the nuts and bolts of historical reconstruction to historians, preferring where at all possible to concentrate on what they can ask informants directly about.
versely, historians generally find their data too limited and piecemeal to provide a true anthropological picture, even though they may sometimes find inspiration in anthropological concepts; the latter are almost invariably treated uncritically and in order to provide confirmatory support, whereas anthropologists cite their colleagues' work at least as often to modify or contradict it as to confirm or approve it, and thus are more likely to carry the subject forward. The circumspection, even diffidence, of historians inhibits them when faced with anthropological ideas, and as a result their work tends to remain social history rather than anthropology. Contrary to what Plakans suggests, therefore, it would seem that anthropologists have done at least as much, perhaps more, to bridge this gap, despite a certain tendency to reduce history to the status of merely one more source of data to be set alongside their own fieldwork and their colleagues' ethnography.

Yet in fact the contrast between the two disciplines is not confined to methodology or the nature of their respective sources; it is also a matter of perspective. While there have been many historians of ideas, history has tended to concentrate on the narration and analysis of events or the description and analysis of social trends - in a word, on behaviour. Conversely, while aspects of behaviour have always been of interest to anthropologists - indeed some schools, like the transactionalists, are almost obsessed by it - it is indigenous ideologies that they have increasingly made the object of their attention. Secondly, whereas historians emphasise, even dramatize change, anthropologists (except, perhaps, those specifically interested in social change) tend to see continuity of tradition through and despite such changes. Finally, while the overall aim of understanding human nature may be shared (and not only by these two disciplines, of course), the end product is very different. History has not managed to create much in the way of an identifiable body of theory beyond grand designs in the manner of Toynbee or Spengler, some speculations as to the inevitability of history, 'interpretations' such as those of Macaulay or Pieter Geyl, and a general interest in the mechanism of cause and effect - with individual works fairly compartmentalised and discontinuous, one from another. The scope for comparison seems to be quite limited, unlike that in anthropology, which as a result has always generated as much theory as fact, despite a continuous process of revision which has left little intact from generation to generation (perhaps this simply means that historians are more honest). Indeed, it is the command of theory that brings influence in anthropology: only a very few have achieved positions of eminence on the basis of fieldwork alone, despite the great emphasis placed on its importance.

Thus unlike philosophy or linguistics or (in previous eras) the natural sciences, history has not been able to contribute much in the way of conceptual tools or models to anthropology, and its impact seems to have been restricted to that of providing some raw data, often incomplete, and of helping to preserve (not unaided) a diachronic awareness among anthropologists. As a result, the latter have long been used to treading different paths, while at the
same time freely exploiting historical material where appropriate. Goody's book, though bound to be controversial, shows just what can be achieved by an anthropologist using purely historical data to cast light upon an area of research central to anthropology rather than to history. It will be interesting to see whether Plakans' future projects are as successful, given the sources he intends to use and the very different methodological and academic tradition in which he is accustomed to work.

R.J. PARKIN
Many of the palpable errors and serious omissions in this well-intentioned but extravagantly assertive compilation might have been avoided if Ellis Cashmore had sought the comments and advice of a few more colleagues. As it is, the claims that this so-called Dictionary captures 'the full complexity' and covers 'all the established areas of race and ethnic relations' are very misleading, as are those which assert that 'crucial concepts', 'influential theories', 'significant research projects', 'important historical figures' - 'all are dealt with'. The intended readership of 'practitioners, academics, journalists and anyone seriously interested in race and ethnic relations' must be warned that this volume falls very far short of what one normally expects from a publication designated a 'Dictionary'. Accuracy, precision, indication of a cautious regard for evidence, detached scholarship, comprehensiveness, universality, appropriate comparative examples, historical depth, contextual significance, thoroughness and care in the selection of bibliographical references are some of the criteria which dictionaries are reasonably expected to satisfy. There are entries of interest and value in this assemblage, but too many important weaknesses undermine the whole ambitious project. Reliability and adequate, if not total, completeness are essential requirements for references in a dictionary. Users, not least serious students, tend to rely on dictionary entries which, if inaccurate, lead to the perpetuation of avoidable errors in a whole series of subsequent studies - theses, essays, monographs and the like. Sub-titles are also important: they often make plain the content. Thus, in the entry on 'Pluralism', readers are told that *Netherlands India* by J.S. Furnivall 'first published in 1947...is a very early account of plural societies'. Apart from the extraordinary view of 'very early', the information is inaccurate, misleading and incomplete. Furnivall's *Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy* was first published in 1939. His *Colonial Policy and Practice: A Comparative Study of Burma and Netherlands India* was published in 1948. The works are complement-
ary, both deal with plural societies, both are essential; the second, comparative, study published a decade after the first naturally contains the fruit of subsequent study and reflection on the structure and dynamics of plural societies in Southeast Asia as well as in other regions of the world. It is unfortunate that the 1948 study is not mentioned and that Furnivall's own vivid words are not quoted instead of the editor's gloss. Nothing could be more effective than these sentences:

In Burma, as in Java, probably the first thing that strikes the visitor is the medley of peoples - European, Chinese, Indian and native. It is in the strictest sense a medley, for they mix, but do not combine. Each group holds its own religion, its own culture and language, its own ideas and ways. As individuals they meet, but only in the market-place, in buying and selling. There is a plural society, with different sections of the community living side by side, but separately, within the same political unit.

Again, in the references to J. Ashley Montagu there is nowhere mention of his Man's Most Dangerous Myth: The Fallacy of Race, first published in 1942, a key text in race and ethnic relations. It was in this book that Ashley Montagu drew on the seminal writings of three outstanding British scholars and scientists, Julian Huxley, A.C. Haddon and A.M. Carr-Saunders who, in 1935, in response to the challenge of Nazi 'racial science', published We Europeans: A Survey of Racial Problems. This work rejected the Herrenvolkism of Hitler and his associates and in its concluding paragraph declared that 'Racialism is a myth, and a dangerous myth at that'.

But it also drew on a deep and rich historical background, including ancient Greece, in its analysis of key terms, and unhesitatingly advocated the general adoption of the term ethnic (including ethnos, ethnea etc.), a recommendation subsequently endorsed by Ashley Montagu in his Appendix A entitled "Ethnic Group" and "Race". Other biological anthropologists and scientists have added their views to the debate on terminology, not least Professor Geoffrey Ainsworth Harrison in his lecture 'The Race Concept in Human Biology', printed in Biosocial Aspects of Race, which was published in 1969 as a supplement to the Journal of Biosocial Science.

Readers and purchasers of a dictionary are entitled to expect that they will be guided to such important sources, fundamental to the whole subject. But there are other extraordinary omissions and inadequacies, indicative of a strange lack of awareness, of a cultural blindness, indeed of ethnocentrism. The sketchy note headed 'Native Peoples' is wholly inadequate and it is significant in this context that while there is an entry 'Labour', there is not one on 'Land', despite a reference to Maoris and New Zealand under 'Native Peoples'. Professor Hugh Kawharu, for example, has published major studies which have made abundantly plain the fundamental significance of land to the Maori peoples, and he has closely analysed their conceptions of land tenure. On Malaysia and Fiji, other
studies have brought out the primary importance of land to 'native' Malays and Fijians including urgent contemporary issues of political and 'race' relations. In both South and North America, the land factor remains of great significance, as it does throughout Africa, in virtually all states and in every zone of the continent. Within Ethiopia, Uganda, the Sudan and elsewhere, there are urgent, unresolved land and ethnic issues. South Africa's land apportionment naturally demands and rightly receives emphasis, but it is an extreme example and even here the treatment is inadequate. Land, labour and political representation have long been acknowledged to be of central significance in 'plural societies', 'multi-racial states', 'polyethnic states'. Each of these topics - land, labour and political representation - requires more significant attention than is given here, and it is deplorable that African, Amerindian, Asian and Pacific scholars and scholarship are not represented when 'non-Western' perceptions and perspectives are fundamental to their proper understanding. The Sioux political scientist Dr Siyakunin Ogle Lute (Dr Frances Svensson), Dr Walter Kunijwok Owado-Ayoker (Shilluk-Sudan), Nana Agyemang Badu (Akan-Ghana) and other students of government and politics, writing from within their understanding of their own traditional institutions, have made contributions which must be incorporated into any universal science of politics, and inter-ethnic political relations.

Africa receives an entry, but not Asia, Europe or any other continent or sub-continent as such. Differential treatment of this kind is unfortunate, misleading, restrictive and warping. The Africa entry itself is very limited, with virtually no reminder of the philosophic, religious, artistic and other heritages of the peoples of Africa, nor of pre-European encounters or relationships between them, which represent vital constituent elements of Africa's cultures and which influence Africans' views of others. In a review of Michael Banton's Race Relations (1967), Julian Pitt-Rivers strongly criticised the book's over-emphasis on Africa and African/non-African relations and forcefully made the point that such relationships did not comprise the whole field of 'race relations'. Pitt-Rivers has illuminated the point with his own writings on ideas such as 'race' and 'caste' in Latin American contexts, as other scholars have done with Arabian, Central Asian, South Asian, Southeast Asian and Pacific examples. Before and since 1967 there have been important studies of the peoples of Europe and their inter-relations which should be incorporated in any Dictionary of Race and Ethnic Relations if understanding is to be deepened.

Arbitrary exclusions and a lack of a sense of historical continuity, perhaps even an impatience with the past, seem to account for weaknesses and omissions in the consideration of subjects such as 'Minorities'. It is extraordinary in a so-called Dictionary produced in Europe to find scarcely any reference to the several valuable studies of the ethnic minorities of Central and Eastern Europe which so preoccupied leading scholars and statesmen between the two world wars, and after 1945, and which are still very relevant. The analyses of several leading British scholars seem to have been forgotten in the subsequent arbitrary delineation of the field of race and ethnic relations by many Western sociologists,
even though Emerich K. Francis, very conscious of the highly significant Austro-Hungarian background, has incorporated Central and Eastern Europe into his major study of Interethic Relations: An Essay in Sociological Theory (1976). Under an entry entitled 'Conquest' in the Dictionary, Pierre van den Berghe does at least cite this book, but that is all. The clear, balanced publications of Ben Whitaker's Minority Rights Group on the definition of 'minority' and on the rights and problems of minorities throughout the world also merit attention.

The entries on the British Isles, the United Kingdom, the United States of America, South Africa, seemingly the main areas of focus, are themselves very inadequate. It is extraordinary to find under 'Irish in the U.K.' no mention of Northern Ireland, an integral part of the United Kingdom. Nor is there discussion of events in and after 1969 and the several valuable studies of inter-group relations there. Under 'Scarman Report', one might have expected a reference to Lord Scarman's report, Violence and Civil Disturbances in Northern Ireland in 1969 (Cmd 566 of 1972).

Carelessness and insensitivity should not characterise any book on race and ethnic relations, let alone a dictionary. 'The U.K.' Britain and Great Britain are not synonymous and scholars must keep in mind the susceptibilities of all population groups, as well as the history, especially the sensitive constitutional history, and the contemporary political relationships of all the peoples involved - those in the Republic of Ireland as well as those in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. The Welsh and the Scots also deserve consideration, before and since 1707, to cite but one important date. The partition of the British Isles is a fact of the utmost significance to students of ethnic relations, as are all manifestations of Welsh and Scottish nationalism. Lord Scarman's work in Northern Ireland was deemed to have prepared him for his investigations in Great Britain in 1981 when he was appointed to report on the Brixton disorders in London (Cmd 8427 of 1981). 'Riots: U.K. 1981', 'Riots: U.S.A. 1965-67', 'Riots: U.S.A. (Miami) 1980', are entries in the Dictionary which reflect a highly selective and excessively narrow approach. Riots, disturbances and rebellions have been and continue to be very significant events in race and ethnic relations, and there is immense value in being made aware of the deeper historical background - for example, the Liverpool and Glasgow riots of 1919, the Detroit riots of 1919, and the numerous significant riots and rebellions in overseas territories of the Empire and Commonwealth, and in South Africa, before and since 1948.

The selection of 'religious' items is strange. 'Nation of Islam, in the U.S.A.', 'Pentecostalism', 'People's Temple' are given a place, the last-mentioned despite a comment that the mass suicide of the People's Temple adherents in Guyana in 1978 is unique in the modern world. But the main faiths, their precepts in race and ethnic relations and their practices are not included. Buddhism, Hinduism, Islam, Judaism and Christianity, together with other faiths, and at least an indication of their denominational diversity, require understanding, even in the most secular or professedly atheistic states. The principles of state philosophies
such as Marxism-Leninism in their relation to ethnic and racial questions should also be stated, as should evidence of actual policy and practice.

Despite the assurance about important historical figures being dealt with, the reader must again be prepared for strange anomalies and extraordinary, even offensive, omissions. There is nowhere a heading 'King, Martin Luther, Junior', but if one searches the index, one can find aspects of his life and thought, i.e. under 'Gandhi, Mohandas Karamchand (1869-1948)', 'Black Power', 'Civil Rights Movement'. 'Nkrumah, Kwame' and 'Kenyatta, Jomo' are given their alphabetical places, but not Senghor, Leopold Sédar, nor Nyerere, Julius, nor Kaunda, Kenneth, still less Luthuli, Albert, Nobel Laureate or Biko, Stephen. DuBois, W.E.B., should surely appear with 'Garvey, Marcus', who does receive his entry. Washington, Booker T., and Bunche, Ralph, should have their places. If 'Mosley, Oswald (1896-1980)' and 'Powell, Enoch (1912- )' appear, one would hope that Huxley, Julian, Scott, Michael Guthrie (Revd.) and Jenkins, Roy, might do so also, to name but a few other important figures, dead and living, in Britain. Mandela, Nelson and Mugabe, Robert, are other African leaders who certainly deserve an adequate note under their own names, as do Nomlana, Eduardo, and Mboya, Tom.

Robert Mugabe is inaccurately described at the end of 'Zimbabwe (Rhodesia)' as 'the first president under majority rule elections', an unfortunate error since he, as prime minister, deliberately though vainly, invited Joshua Nkomo to become the first president in an attempt to reconcile ethnic and regional differences. Such cavalier disregard for accuracy over important details is most regrettable, and errors of this kind are likely to be perpetuated by readers. The opening sentence, which could have easily been corrected by changing 'ranks' to 'ranked', is less likely to mislead-'this country ranks with South Africa' - but it is another mark of the carelessness which recurs, for example, in the article on 'Apartheid', not least in the misspelling of key words and names.

To conclude, one must confess real puzzlement as to the criteria which governed the choice of topics - why 'Creole' is included, but not 'Language' in general, or other examples of particular languages which have special importance in inter-ethnic situations; why 'Blues' and 'Reggae' appear, but not 'Music' in general, nor particular musics deeply significant to other populations in Britain and elsewhere. Several of the articles have some real interest and one does appreciate the motives, especially the enthusiastic desire to spread enlightenment. But this Dictionary is not only disappointing, it is seriously defective and can be dangerous. The author was wise to secure specialist contributions from a few colleagues, but it is not clear how fully they were involved in the overall planning and composition and in the scrutiny of the actual texts. Meticulous checking and cross-checking are essential. Many errors and omissions could have been corrected even by very hasty cross-checking. But for a worthy dictionary in an established subject of great and growing signifi-
cance one must start with a team of scholars and scientists, bringing the contributions of all appropriate disciplines - archaeological anthropology, biological anthropology, social anthropology, ethnology, economics, social geography, urban geography, history, linguistics, musicology, political science, religious studies, philosophy, psychology, social psychology - to name but some which have central relevance. I fear that this book in its present form may do a serious disservice to the subject of 'race relations' - that is, of ethnic, cultural and race relations - for several reasons which I have tried to indicate. My chief regret is that it is so very limited in its scope and focus - cultural, historical, territorial - and that it fails to reflect the rich, total universe which must be incorporated into the subject if it is to advance as it must.

Virtually all 'social studies' or 'social sciences' are blighted because they remain so profoundly ethnocentric. The conceptualization and analysis of inter-ethnic relations are difficult, and the basic intellectual tasks have scarcely begun. 'Pre-Linnaen' is a not inaccurate description of the present stage of scientific and scholarly development. The idea of a dictionary is praiseworthy, but the planning and execution must be more thorough.

If it were not for the fact that the author in his Preface describes this collection of articles as an introduction to anthropology, one might wonder whether the publisher might not be guilty under the Trades Description Act. The blurb assures the unsuspecting reader that the author 'has...been careful to assume little previous knowledge of structuralism or ethnology so that he has provided what is, to a large extent, an introduction to these subjects'. It is anyhow difficult enough to explain what anthropology is about, but it would be intriguing to know just what impression of the subject an unprepared reader of this potpourri might end up with. He might well react with some perplexity to an argument over whether certain Northwest Coast Indian myths refer to horse clams or some other sort of clam.

The book, as the author recognises, have been entitled Structural Anthropology III, since it bears much in common with the earlier volumes. It is composed of 23 chapters, most of which belong to the past ten years, and with two exceptions they have all appeared in print before, although some are modified or amended versions. The oldest piece, that on 'The Family', is taken from a 1956 textbook and is sadly dated, its presence barely excused by the claim that its inclusion results from the 'desire for thoroughness' and popular request. Of the other pieces, the standard rationale for collections - the advantage of gathering together scattered and hard-to-find writings - has justification, since included are pieces that first appeared in the programme of the 1975 Bayreuth Festival and in the catalogue to an exhibition of Anita Albus's paintings held in Frankfurt in 1980. Whether this is justification enough for the appearance of this collection is another matter, and there is certainly nothing in it of the calibre to be found in the two earlier volumes.

On the other hand, the range of subjects covered is considerable and will certainly give the newcomer the impression that everything is grist to the structural anthropologist's mill. Some chapters are concerned with grand themes, such as the innate and acquired characteristics of human nature; other with topics closer to the usual nitty-gritty of anthropological dispute, such as the Wikmukan atom of kinship; others, such as that taken from the Frankfurt catalogue mentioned above, could have been written by someone without any knowledge of either anthropology or structuralism; and in yet others, such as 'Reflections on Liberty' (shades
of Durkheim's division of labour linger here), anthropology makes a rather forced appearance.

Some papers may be difficult for readers to follow because they consist of responses to the criticisms of other writers. For example, 'Structuralism and Ecology' (Chapter 7) is a talk given at Barnard College to which Marvin Harris responded, 'Structuralism and Empiricism' (Chapter 8) being Lévi-Strauss's reply. Despite what the latter may claim, I doubt whether anyone will be able to follow the argument without being familiar with Harris's paper. Lévi-Strauss welcomes Harris's criticisms because they 'place the problem on its real terrain - that of facts and our ability to deal with them', unlike most critics, who 'resort to often abstract prejudicial objections as a basis for the a priori rejection of structuralism'. This is rather surprising, for whereas such criticisms exist, Lévi-Strauss has just as frequently been accused of rather cavalier treatment of the ethnography and has rarely found it necessary to reply. Perhaps Harris's tone, of which Lévi-Strauss complains, touched a raw spot.

The translators have done a competent job, but there is one place at which things go wrong. This is on the essay on twinship, much of which involves a discussion of hares and harelips. The relevant ethnography is mainly from North America, where the local species of hare is popularly referred to as a rabbit (Jack rabbit and Snowshoe Rabbit). In the French version, both the terms hare and rabbit occur, but the translators have failed to follow the French exactly, so that a rabbit turns into a hare in the middle of a single story. This confusion is further compounded by the fact that the footnote in the original that explains the use of the word 'rabbit' in North America has inexplicably been left out of the English text.

This, however, may not be the translators' fault, because lurking in the pages of the book is an unidentified character, an editor. True, he mainly reveals himself by the insertion of banal footnotes (rather than the excision of useful ones), but he has also avoided undertaking more serious editorial tasks. For example, the Preface was quite clearly prepared for the French edition and needs some modification for the English version. The discussion of Chapter 7 on p. xii leaves us uncertain about whether what is included is a reprint of the original text or a translation of the French version. This point is not cleared up in the Acknowledgements, where further, similar uncertainties occur.

Certainly, many of the pieces included in this volume are hard to find, yet unless one is a committed collector of Lévi-Straussian it is difficult to see how it could be placed high on the shopping list.

P.G. RIVIERE

This book, edited by Renée Hirschon, who has also written a lucid introduction, consists of nine papers which deal with contemporary social situations in East Africa (Patricia Caplan), China (Elizabeth Croll), North India (Ursula Sharma), Portugal (João de Pina-Cabral), Turkey (June Starr), South Africa (Sandra Burman), southern Ghana (Sallie Westwood), New Guinea (Marilyn Strathern) and northern Ghana (Ann Whitehead). The papers were originally a series of lectures organised for the Oxford Women's Studies Committee.

The extent to which any collection of papers based on different ethnographic situations can represent a theoretical step forward depends not so much on whether these situations are strictly comparable as on careful editing, such as ensuring a complementarity of subject matters. In this sense, the implications of these papers are cumulative, and the volume as a whole represents a theoretical challenge to certain common-sense assumptions which have been employed by anthropologists in dealing with the notions of property, women, and the relationship between them.

Lévi-Strauss's theory of marriage, taken to mean that passive female 'objects' are transacted between active male 'subjects', has been hotly contested by feminist scholarship. In a partial rehabilitation-cum-subversion of his idea, Ann Whitehead and Marilyn Strathern take British anthropologists to task for their ethnocentric use of concepts derived from Western jurisprudence and capitalist economy. For Ann Whitehead, the notion of an 'individual subject' is anomalous in 'pre-state, non-class' societies, where action is always embedded in a collective context, and gender is given by the availability to certain people of certain spheres of action within a kinship hierarchy. Rather than talk in terms of 'subjects' and 'objects' or a relationship between 'persons' and 'things', she suggests analysis in terms of 'relative capacity to act', which, she concludes, is always more circumscribed for women than for men. Women's subordinate kinship status inhibits their capacity to recruit labour and therefore to activate resources, for example.

Marilyn Strathern doubts whether the Cartesian subject-object contrast has any validity in many societies. Like Whitehead, she points out that in the West Highlands of New Guinea, women and men form part of kinship units which transact women and wealth, both considered to be 'on the skin' and therefore detachable aspects of the giver.

Nevertheless, Strathern insists that gifts transferred in this way from one group to another create relationship only in so far as they continue to form part of the identity of the givers. Indeed, in the Southern Highlands they are considered to be 'of the skin' itself. Thus there can be no Cartesian separation of the functions of giver and gifts, no subject-object relationship between men and women or indeed men and valuables. Strathern compares
the Western and Eastern Highlands with respect to the variable
capacity of women to transact on their own account, concluding
that their status as subjects in this sphere is part of the way
gender relationships are variously constituted.

Although we might accept that a 'subject-object' form of an-
alysis is perilous, when what is required is an understanding of
the symbolic relationship between the genders, there is no escap-
ing the fact that the transacting entity is thought of as male.
Yet even in situations where gender relationships are such as to
define unmediated action as male, real women do act. (See my dis-
cussion of the role of women in arranging marriages in *Women and
Property in Morocco*, Cambridge 1974). In some situations, such as
those Mediterranean societies where women are bearers of group
honour, unmediated initiatives may incur punishment by male kin.
Even their murderers may act with impunity, since they have merely
eliminated 'their own' (women), who are non-subjects in juridical
terms. This is an extreme case, but if the book has a defect, it
is that it gives pre-eminence to normative (gender) relationships
and little space to the tensions which may arise because of the
discrepancy between gender definitions and social action at dif-
ferent stages in the life cycle, and the changes which these dis-
crepancies may produce in the long term.

On the other hand, several of the writers (Burman, Starr,
Whitehead) emphasise the role of jurisprudence in creating new
'actors'. Particularly interesting is the account by Starr of the
way in which Muslim women in the Bodrum region of Turkey have suc-
cessfully used the modern law courts to defend their rights to
land and honour, as accruing directly to women, and not only to
their male guardians. It is unlikely that we can attribute this
success to personal tenacity and do away with the concept of 'em-
bedded' action. Starr mentions the emphasis Bodrum women give to
warm and collaborative relationships among themselves, and there
is other evidence in the volume that women's action is positively
defined in symbolic terms, where there is a recognised mutuality
of interest among them. One instance are the GÃ, described by
Westwood, where women associate for trade and invest in houses, or
again, the *wok meri* business associations described by Lorraine
Sexton and cited by Marilyn Strathern. However, those societies
characterised by hostile relationships between women of different
kin groups and generations (e.g. the alienation of a bride's dowry
in favour of her husband's mother in north India [Sharma]; or the
tendency in Cape Town for a woman's female peers and seniors to
accept her forcible abduction [Burman]) appear to be those in which
women's capacity to act is most restricted, and the symbolic attri-
butes of femaleness most negative.

Residential arrangements are crucial in determining women's
relation to resources. Two excellent papers, by Croll and Sharma,
describe the constraints which co-residence with in-laws or parents
imposes on women's activities. In another paper, Pina-Cabral
points out a contrast in social power in northern Portugal between
those women who inherit house and land and are able to marry and
bear legitimate children, enjoying the support of the community of
*vezinhos*, and those women who do not and whose houselessness lays
them open to material and sexual exploitation.

Finally, Pat Caplan describes for Mafia Island how both women and men are able to set up house near the kinsman or kinswoman of their choice within the framework of a cognatic kinship system. The ease with which a divorced or widowed woman can build a new house and change her residential alignment is not unrelated to the autonomy with which she manages her resources (admittedly more limited than a man's). The Tanzanian government's campaign to encourage people to build permanent housing has, paradoxically, of creating male-headed households in which a woman's capacity to act is considerably reduced.

The volume reminds us that resources are inert unless they can be deployed in social relationships, and that those qualities which define a transactor - honour, employment, jural capacity, residential choice - may themselves be a form of property. Previous discussions of the relation between women and property have focused on different forms of marriage payments and inheritance. Yet as Ursula Sharma points out in her fine paper on dowry in north India, the direction of marriage payments does not necessarily indicate women's greater or lesser control over resources. On the contrary, several papers (Burman, Croll) note changes from bridewealth to dowry and vice versa without concomitant changes in gender relationships. Sharma concludes:

The coexistence of two quite different forms of marriage payment in the same society, not accompanied by radical differences in kinship structure, cultural evaluation of women, etc., presents a nice challenge to the possibility of sociological generalisation. (p. 67)

This, perhaps, in a nutshell, is the contribution of this volume to anthropological theory - a proposal to view women's relation to property not merely as an 'economic dimension of kinship', but rather as part of the social organisation of relations between people, such that some have more power to act than others.

VANESSA MAHER


Indonesian Textile Techniques is a slim volume, intended to be sold as an information booklet in museums and to be read by people of all ages and from widely different backgrounds. Designed to be an introduction, a first glimpse of the variety of textiles found in Indonesia, it is very readable and, on the whole, informative.
It makes the point rather well that though steeped in local customs and closely linked to ceremonies and rituals which probably have an ancient history, Indonesian textile traditions have never been a static art form and have continuously changed and adapted to particular needs.

Some criticism must be raised, though. The book contains several avoidable errors. For example, Kalimantan is said to differ 'greatly from the other major islands because of its lack of substantial mountains'. Any map contradicts this claim. Speaking of materials, Hitchcock says that cotton 'has always been the predominant textile material'. Linguistic evidence separates the use of the loom and the use of cotton, the latter coming from India at some time between the second and eighth centuries A.D. On the other hand, the word 'weaving' associated with the 'loom' is Proto-Austronesian. The time depth generally accepted is 5000 years, leaving many centuries for weaving with other materials. An alternative fibre might have been Musa textilis. Speaking of the trade in patola cloths from Gujurat, Hitchcock says that this type of textile 'was traded throughout the archipelago in the nineteenth century'. In fact, the trade is considerably older: the first Portuguese travellers in Southeast Asia noted the demand for patola in the sixteenth century, in particular in the Moluccas. The Dutch established a monopoly on the patola trade in the seventeenth century.

General publications on Indonesian textiles usually dwell on the symbolic significance that cloths have in the archipelago. They typically talk about this significance in such a generalized and unspecific manner that the results are mystic to the point of banality. This approach is blissfully absent here. At times, though, I think Hitchcock could suggest another, less concrete, interpretation. The association of weaving with noise-making which he reports from Bima deserves at least a footnote about the consistent and widespread use of clappers or bells (idiophones) at times of transition. Similiarly, the text opts for a superficial interpretation when it says that cloths which show rows of people holding hands illustrate the fact that 'family relationships and friends...are important to many islanders'. The standard interpretation is that they represent 'linked ancestor figures'.

Nevertheless, the book serves its purpose well. It is especially to be welcomed that the techniques of textile decoration found in the islands are discussed extensively, and the description of looms is easy to follow - a difficult task for anyone to achieve.

RUTH BARNES

*Motifs of Life* claims to be the first attempt to interpret the textiles produced by Toba Batak women in a 'complete' sense, i.e. in their social meaning. It does, in that respect, present an example of a most welcome development in Indonesian studies. During the last decade, a growing number of scholars working in the Indonesian field have turned their attention to the investigation of textiles in their cultural setting, a trend which has gone hand in hand with an increasing appreciation among the general public of the cloths of maritime Southeast Asia.

Niessen, however, tries to bring an altogether different focus to textiles. She starts from the premises of the Dutch Field of Anthropological Study (FAS), which for Indonesia claims a 'Unity in Diversity' (both the Indonesian official motto and the title of a book recently discussed in *JASO* [Vol. XVI, no. 2, pp. 87-110] by R.H. Barnes). She intends her work to be an 'experiment constructed around the hypothesis that a comparative textile program could profit from the application of the FAS'. Yet the book is not a comparative study.

Instead, she discusses fundamental themes of society in the Toba Batak context: kinship, fertility, time, and space. These notions are approached from two perspectives. First, there is a verbal approach, in which two myths, 'The Origin of Humans' and 'The Origin of the Earth', are presented. Both are given in the original Batak and in translation. Secondly, there are the textiles, in particular traditional types which are significant as gifts at certain times of transition in the lives of all Toba Batak.

Niessen has used the myths as an introduction for her analysis. I assume this is done because they develop two particular themes. In the first myth, 'The Origin of Humans', social order is expressed by the males in society. The second myth, 'The Origin of the Earth', gives the female a dominant role: the earth is created by a woman. The link between both myths is the disobedience of two sisters, who do not wish marry the husband chosen for them. One kills herself, the other moves to another world, the future earthly realm. Both, in effect, create by removing themselves from their original state. The older sister, after her death, turns into the sugar palm, the younger sister manages to harness chaos and bring order into the world of humans.

The mythical role of creator, given to a female, is then continuously referred to throughout the book and compared to the weaving done exclusively by women. As two points of reference in interpreting Toba society, these are successful images. Unfortunately, the interpretation which follows is not always so convincing. The chapter called 'Kinship Motif' attempts a discussion of descent, exchange, and alliance: should it not then include the
analysis of a comprehensive kinship terminology? The terminology
given can barely be called a beginning. A major aspect of
Niessen's argument in this section is the question of matrilineal
descent, but the evidence given for the 'surviving matrilineal
traces' seems extremely flimsy. Inheritance of textiles and looms
from mother to daughter are the 'proof' offered. Textiles are
passed from mother to daughter in many parts of the world; in In-
donesia I can report it from several, though not all, parts of the
Lamaholot region to the east of Flores. But these practices are
doubtful evidence of matrilineal descent. As concerns the inherit-
tance of the loom: what would a son do with these tools, which he
has never learned and never will learn to use, because they are
for women's work? And finally on this point, Niessen does not at
all mention the inheritance of knowledge, which is at least as im-
portant as that of material goods. Most commonly in Indonesia
(reported from all societies, as far as I know), a girl learns
how to weave and what to weave from her mother. It is in these
cases, where potentially certain patterns or textile types are
passed on from one generation to the next, that one could conceiv-
ably find a specific 'female' knowledge which is independent of
the patrilineal aspects of a society. R. Maxwell has posed this
question for the textiles of East Flores, and J.J. Fox has found
elaborate evidence for it on Savu. Yet Niessen does not refer to
the issue at all.

A very important aspect of Toba Batak weaving is discussed in
terms of fertility and concepts of time, that is, the linking of
the continuous, circular warp thread of the cloth to the passing
of time. Niessen should have directed the reader to similar exam-
inations of time concepts in other Indonesian ethnographies. The
magically most important cloths in Toba Batak society frequently
have an uncut warp, and again the author does not give enough in-
dication that the cutting of cloth or the retaining of the circular
shape may be critical issues in other Indonesian societies, issues
that have been discussed elsewhere.

Finally, certain of the cloths are considered in terms of
spatial orientation. The description closes with a most interest-
ing definition of the ragidup, given to the author by a Toba Batak.
This should have introduced the entire discussion and been used as
a guide throughout. Instead, it stands rather separate from
Niessen's own interpretation. Should the statements and categories
given by the people we write about not be in the forefront? Here
they have become obscured by the ethnographer.

Sadly lacking is information on Toba categories of cloth, a
gap which is difficult to comprehend. I also think that the gift
of cloth, which is so important, must be seen in conjunction with
the piseg gift, the offering which is considered male. The two
must complement each other and should be discussed together. The
question of cloth and 'femaleness' could furthermore be discussed
in terms of a change in condition, of which textile production is
obvious evidence. It changes from raw cotton to thread, from white
thread to the coloured fabric. Characteristically, it is women
only who can manipulate the transformation.

RUTH BARNES
Research in African Literatures is a quarterly journal published by the University of Texas Press. It is an official journal of the African Literature Association and the African Literatures Division of the Modern Language Association. This special issue, under the guest editorship of Veronika Görög-Karady, features seven articles by six members and associated members of the research team known as 'Langage et Culture en Afrique de l'Ouest' and listed by CNRS as l'Equipe de Recherche Associée 246, 'Recherches Linguistiques et Littéraires au Soudan et au Sahel Occidentaux'. Görög-Karady, the head of the oral literature section of the equipe, provides an introduction to the Special Issue and a discussion of Genesis stories collected from a Vili (Congolese) student. Geneviève Calame-Griaule, Christiane Seydou and Dominique Casajus present translated and edited versions of articles which have previously appeared in French journals. Calame-Griaule discusses a Dogon tale, Seydou presents a comparative analysis of four versions of a Fulani tale, and Casajus analyses two Tuareg tales. There is also an analysis of three versions of a Voute tale by Jean-Louis Siran. All these contributors make use of comparative materials as well as linguistic and socio-cultural information and are more or less inspired by structuralist and psychoanalytical approaches. That the articles is the product of a research team is clear.

To the uninitiated the analyses are sometimes esoteric and may seem far removed from the original texts (and a fortiori from the original performances); we are given accounts of the tales but almost no texts at all. The final article makes this more understandable, however, for this is an account, by Brunhilde Biebuyck, of 'The many faces of the French research team, Langage et Culture en Afrique de l'Ouest'. This article and its accompanying bibliography make it clear that the articles contained in this Special Issue are the theoretical and sometimes speculative end-products of time-consuming and conscientious research. As Biebuyck explains, the structural, psychoanalytical, ethnological and linguistic analyses are the fifth stage in a process which begins with the collection of texts in the original language, followed by situating the tales in their cultural context, comparing different versions and situating these in cross-cultural contexts. There has also been much work carried out in documentation and bibliography.

Though we may object to particular analyses in these essays, we can but admire the equipe's continuing interdisciplinary research and their success in making their work known outside France. This last point is brought home by the fact that among the reviews in this Special Issue is one of a previous product of the equipe's

Jerome Rothenburg's Technicians of the Sacred is altogether a different kettle of fish. The book under review is a revised and expanded edition of the original edition of 1968. Poems from oral traditions of all continents are presented in ten sections: Origins & Namings, Visions & Spels (sic), Death & Defeat, The Book of Events (I), The Book of Events (II), Africa, America, Asia, Europe & The Ancient Near East, and Oceania. These sections are more or less arbitrary and other classifications would, Rothenberg recognises, do just as well or better. Some poetry from written traditions slips in, for example, the 'Poor Tom' scene from King Lear (III, iv).

The poems, or extracts as some of them are, are first presented without comment and take up most of the book. At the back of the book are commentaries on each of the poems with information concerning source and context and comparative material from modern Western poetry - mostly French (Breton, Apollinaire) and American (mostly obscure to this reviewer). This comparative material is chosen, as it seems to echo the primitive-archaic material.

Rothenberg himself is a poet and the book grew out of poetry readings given in New York cafes in the 1960s. Rothenberg saw similarities between 'primitive' rituals and the 'happenings' and 'events' which were then being presented. The key words in understanding Rothenberg's enterprise would seem to be such as instinct, intuition and imagination. There was then the idea, as Rothenberg puts it, that what Blake called 'our antediluvian energies' would lead to a transformation of intelligence.... It was to this new imagination that the work was dedicated - as a resource book of possibilities that were often new for us but that had already been realized somewhere in the world. (pp. xvii-xviii)

As an enterprise, Technicians of the Sacred tells us more about the poetry scene in America in the 1960s than it does about any of the other poetic traditions of which it makes use. For modern American poetry it was perhaps a time and place comparable to Paris in the early years of this century, when Picasso et al. 'discovered' African and Oceanic art. But one doubts it. Since 1968, the interest in and knowledge of oral poéties amongst academics and everyone else has grown enormously, and Rothenberg has added material to all his sections. His Pre-face reviews the developments that have occurred and includes a number of warnings to potential readers about their likely misconceptions: that simple cultures produce simple poetry, that oral poetry does not change, that the producers of these poetries are not reflexive about the poetic enterprise, and so on. It is, therefore, an informed book and Rothenberg's ideas are sound, though the presentation is sometimes rather pretentious, especially the irritating use of '&' rather
than 'and' throughout.

Finally, the poetry is wonderful and, due to Rothenberg's own bias, 'strong' rather than 'pretty'. It is a beautifully produced book and the Commentaries are informative and thought-provoking. If the thoughts so provoked are not always scholarly, they are frequently more enjoyable.

JEREMY COOTE


Carol Rubenstein, an American poet, spent the period from November 1971 to December 1974 in Sarawak collecting the material for this book from among no less than seven Dayak groups. She was assisted by staff of the Sarawak Museum and local interpreters and transcribers. The chosen task was formidable, involving archaic song language and colloquial versions of each of the Dayak languages as well as Malay and English. She acquired a small working vocabulary of each language for daily use, but hardly mastery. Translations began word-for-word and moved on to phrases, sentences and stanzas. The author was keen to be shown items of physical culture and landscape involved in the chants, songs, prayers and poems and to have allusions, double senses and verbal tricks explained to her. She describes the circumstances straightforwardly and acknowledges the difficulties and probable limitations. The book contains a great mass of such poetry divided into nine sections with names like 'Courtship, Marriage, and the Pangs of Love', 'Childbirth and Cradle Songs' and 'Headhunting'. Each section opens with a scene-setting vignette, followed by the English-language translations. These are designed for oral presentation and no doubt are best heard in readings by the author. The vernacular texts having been omitted, there is no direct way to judge the accuracy of the translations. Presumably the author has found or will find a means to make the originals available to scholars. What the reader takes from this book will depend on his purposes. Common humanity speaks from the texts, as does the sense of cultural distance and diversity. The reader who wishes to appreciate the richness of reference to local usages will have to work hard and go well beyond the book.

R.H. BARNES

Roger Trigg introduces the reader to the basic theoretical problems with which social sciences have to deal and does this, as the subtitle indicates, from a philosophical point of view. What is the nature of science? What is the nature of society? These and other questions are examined in an admirably clear and thorough manner. Trigg's fundamental contention is that social science 'must start from a properly articulated philosophical base if it is to be successful' (p. 205).

First, philosophical reflection about the nature of reality is of central importance for social science. In the empiricist view, reality has an objective nature: reality exists independently of what people think it to be. Therefore, it forms the empirical common ground on which theories can be tested as to their truth-value. Consequently, 'truth' is seen as *adaequatio rei intellectus*: a proposition is true if and when it adequately reflects reality, if and when it perfectly corresponds with reality. These views are challenged by sociologists of knowledge such as David Bloor and philosophers of science such as Thomas Kuhn: they claim that there is no reality beyond concepts. What is real is merely what people think and believe to be real: it follows that there are as many 'realities' as there are different groups of people with different notions of reality. According to Trigg, if Bloor and Kuhn are right the intellectual endeavours of social scientists become totally pointless: this is because he assumes that the empiricist views on reality and truth are the *conditio sine qua non* of all science. If different conceptual schemes produce fundamentally different worlds, reality stops being the common and independent point of reference and the correspondence theory of truth becomes nonsensical. Therefore, social scientists must oppose the radical demise of empiricism: ontologically speaking, social scientists cannot be but 'realists', since, for Trigg, it is the very condition of possibility of science in general, and social science in particular. Those who are convinced that science can function properly without the necessity of adopting the empiricist point of view will obviously disagree with Trigg, but then the problem is precisely what they mean when they claim that what they have to say is 'true'.

What does all this mean for the social anthropologist? According to Trigg, it means that he has no other choice than to reject cultural relativism:

Without holding to a realist conception of the world, and without a substantive belief in human nature, it becomes miraculous that the members of one culture should understand those of another. Indeed, no possible basis for understanding has been left, and the only conclusion is that we must be doomed to mutual
If, ultimately, people belonging to different cultures do not speak about the same world, there is no room left for meaningful communication: they are, and cannot but remain, complete strangers to one another.

Secondly, philosophical arguments about the specific nature of society are also of prime importance for social science—indeed, social scientists investigate not only 'reality' but, more specifically, 'social' reality. Consequently, they must adopt those methods which are best suited for obtaining knowledge about the social world. Which methods those are should, according to Trigg, depend on the conception the social scientist has of the nature of society. For Trigg, this is not only a methodological imperative but also proof of a scientific—in the true sense of the word—approach. Thus whether a social scientist should copy the methods used in the natural sciences should be determined by whether he thinks people can be studied in the same way things are, or not. Trigg advocates that they cannot, since human society exists in the realm of consciousness, meaning and intention and, consequently, other methods than the ones used in the natural sciences are needed in the social sciences.

In sum, Trigg quite convincingly argues that the philosophy of the social sciences 'cannot be an optional activity for those reluctant to get on with the 'real' empirical work. It is the indispensable starting point for all social science.' Indeed, those who do not think much of the value of philosophical reflection for social scientists will find it hard to sustain their claim after reading this book.

ALDO MARTIN


This is a study of the impact of the 1969 Peruvian Agrarian Reform on a Quechua-speaking Indian community (called Matapuquio) located in the Apurimac region of the Peruvian Highlands. Before the reform, Matapuquio provided labour for the nearby village haciendas that produced sugar-cane alcohol and various types of fruit and dairy produce for the regional market. Under the Agrarian Reform Legislation, the haciendas were appropriated and brought together to form a single-production co-operative whose membership included many households from Matapuquio as well as former hacienda workers.
Harald Skar's monograph combines analysis of the social consequences of this state-initiated and planned change with a systematic treatment of cultural categories and oral patterns of social organisation, and demonstrates very skilfully the social and practical relevance of applying an anthropological perspective to problems of social change and development. His ethnographic data, which is primarily focused on the concept of ayllu and its ramifications for the social organisation of the Matapuqio, is presented in the context of a comprehensive historical, economic and ecological account of the area. He gives a frank description of the methodological problems encountered in a situation where identification with one of the two moieties in the community could have precluded access to the other.

His meticulous observation of the ayllu - a communal work group formerly described as either a corporate kin group or a group with defined territorial boundaries, neither of which seemed satisfactory in view of the ethnographic evidence - leads him to conclude that the ayllu is an extremely flexible grouping of individuals normally brought together for the purpose and for a limited period. Skar points out that although in Matapuqio such a group will frequently consist of a core of kinsmen, it does not exclude other sets of relationships, some ayllus being organised through a set of compadrango, affinal and/or friendship ties. The ayllu is also a relative notion, since its size and social composition will vary from situation to situation. It also has the idea of a structural opposition built into it, in the sense that the group is generally defined in relation to other similar or competing groups. Hence many ayllus function as factions and are constructed around 'big men' as leaders: according to Skar, their quintessence is the idea of 'those I can rely on'. In this part of his discussion he begins with an analysis of binary classification within the context of the ecology and economics of an Andean village, but he concludes by showing how this system is partially transformed under the impact of a particular process of agrarian reform. In short, he depicts the change from a segmented but relatively undifferentiated village social order (that formed by the two moieties) to one becoming differentiated economically and politically. Skar points out, however, that group structures in the Andes are inherently flexible and unstable, because of the nature of the bilateral kinship system.

In placing his ethnographic description and structural analysis of the ayllu within a historical as well as an economic and ecological framework, Skar provides a very graphic account of a process of adaptation and change and is able to point to the limitations of central government planning in the face of local, culturally specific modes of social organisation. He shows a deep understanding of the complex ways in which local and natural structures impinge on one another. Because this study is grounded on the systematic analysis of one strategically chosen case, documenting structural continuity and change at the local community level, Skar is able to expose many misconceptions about highland society and the nature of agrarian problems which underlie the Peruvian model of agrarian reform. He does not claim that the dynamics of change experienced
by the people of Matapuquio will necessarily be applicable to other communities in other regions, but he calls for studies of a similar nature to supplement and enhance his own.

Another important dimension of this work is that it aims to combine a structural with an actor-oriented approach, so as to isolate the incentives and constraints giving rise to particular social forms. This orientation is especially useful in the analysis of changing patterns of interpersonal relations at household and intra-moiety level, and it enables Skar to resolve the problem of the ayllu concept in Andean societies. However, the female reader is acutely aware that this is necessarily a male-actor orientation and is led to question how a female perspective would enhance this complex and otherwise comprehensive account. Skar's wife, herself a social anthropologist, accompanied him during his fieldwork, so perhaps in due course we can expect a companion volume of the way the structural dualism of Matapuquio society affects the organisational patterns of the lives of the women.* This does not detract from Harald Skar's achievement, but it underlines the problems faced by all anthropologists working in any society who set themselves the goal of achieving a totally comprehensive view of it.

ANN E. FINK

The Japan Anthropology Workshop (JAWS), which was founded in Oxford in 1984, held its second meeting at the Fourth International Studies Conference on Japan, which took place in Paris on 23-26 September, 1985. Members of JAWS were represented in most of the eight sections, but the majority of papers were presented in a section entitled 'Sociology, Education and Cultural Anthropology'. There was a special session devoted to the theme of 'Communication', chosen at our last meeting, but our members also contributed to sessions on 'Women in Japan', 'Children and Youth in Japanese Society', and 'Medicine and Society in Japan', as well as to the general sessions on a variety of subjects ranging from the problems of doing research, through the mythology of Nihonjinron (Japanese theories about what makes them unique), to the moulding of the past to justify the present social order in a relatively new Tokyo community. There were also JAWS contributions in the Linguistics Section on the Culture of Kanji and some comparisons between Sakhalin and Hokkaido Ainu, in the Economics and Economic History section on 'Pre-Modern Whaling in Northern Kyushu', and in the History, Politics and International Relations Section on 'The Debate over Japanese Capitalism'. We were also represented in the sections on literature, religion and philosophy, and the new section on theatre, music and the arts.

At a business meeting held in the Centre de Recherches sur le Japon Contemporain, we agreed to hold our next conference in Jerusalem in the spring of 1987. In view of the number of North American anthropologists who have joined JAWS, the possibility was also discussed of setting up a similar group, based in North America, which could meet at local gatherings of anthropologists.

The Paris papers will eventually be published, but there is no news as yet about format or publisher. Many of the papers from the initial conference, held in Oxford, have appeared in a book entitled *Interpreting Japanese Society: Anthropological Approaches* (JASO Occasional Paper, no.5), edited by Joy Hendry and Jonathan Webber, available from JASO, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 5PE, England, price £9.75, including postage.

Prospective members of JAWS may write to Dr R.J. Hendry, Department of Social Studies, Oxford Polytechnic, Headington, Oxford OX3 0BP. Please mark the envelope 'JAWS'. The current membership
fee is £3.00 per 18-month inter-conference period. Scholars interested in forming a North American counterpart to JAWS or in contributing to a North American newsletter of research in Japanese anthropology should write to Dr Theodore C. Bestor, Department of Anthropology, 452 Schermerhorn Hall, Columbia University, New York, NY 10027.

JOY HENDRY


This work attempts an interpretation of archaeological data in order to link hypothetical 'food stress' to possible demographic changes in the Rio Mimbres region of southwestern New Mexico from ca. A.D. 600 to 1249. Minnis frames questions by reference to modern ethnographic studies of responses to hunger among the Fringa Enga of New Guinea, the Gwembe Tonga of South Africa, and the Tikopia. Puebloan ruins are found in areas lacking modern pueblos. Studies of tree-ring variations and alluvial deposits documented substantial prehistoric environmental variation. From these circumstances archaeologists have inferred a tie between environmental and population changes. The author attempts to push this assumption further by means of an elaborated model combining topography, climate, hydrology, soils, vegetation, and fauna with archaeological information on subsistence, residence and exchange. Minnis discusses the limitations on his information and model, but only an archaeologist could assess his methodology and his many, sometimes unevideced assumptions. Ecologically minded anthropologists may find interest in his second chapter and conclusions.

R.H.B.
Dear JASO,

In his notice of our book Ethnic Sculpture (JASO, Vol. XVI, no. 3, pp. 247-8), your reviewer raises what he takes to be errors of fact in our presentation of Nilotic attitudes to cattle. We would like to respond briefly to these remarks. Your reviewer also compliments us on a view which unfortunately we do not hold and did not express in the book. Since an important point has thereby been missed, this too might be corrected.

Firstly, then, cattle. This subject, we should explain - since your reviewer does not mention why it should be discussed in the first place in a book on sculpture - is raised only to bring into focus how shaky are some of the foundations of the notion of 'sculpture' when considered cross-culturally. 'As the subjects of pride and boasting, of lengthy and detailed discussion of form and colour conducted in a specialised vocabulary and as the models of aesthetic ideals (and, up to a point, of moral ones too) they (cattle) engage and even surpass most of the criteria conventionally applied in the West to sculpture' (p. 10). In little more than half a page, we sought to outline and amplify on a range of attitudes and behaviours which permit this conclusion especially amongst Nilotic populations. Our point was therefore a general one and an aside from the main discussion, and we felt at liberty to list instances and examples without being specific as to tribal sources.

We have not, however, invented the ethnography for all that. Your reviewer's observations, as indeed some of ours, clearly derive from the well-known literature dealing with the Sudanese Nuer and Dinka. We have also based ourselves, however, in field data and published material on Nilotic peoples elsewhere, in southeastern Sudan, for instance, especially on the Toposa, Jiye and those transhumant groups of Turkana and Nyangatom who cross the border from neighbouring Kenya and Ethiopia. There is also available published material on the Longarim (otherwise known as the Boys, or better the Larim) who though not Nilotic in a technical, linguistic sense have nonetheless been extensively influenced by Nilotic cultures and notably in relation to cattle (see, for instance, the information in A. Kronenberg, 'Longarim Favourite Beasts', Kush, 1961). This (p. 261) is indeed the source of our note, rejected as inaccurate, that the death of a favourite animal may be a cause for suicide. Here too is to be found a discussion of the extension of the range of favoured animals, found elsewhere as well, from oxen alone to bulls (which may be decorated in various ways) and indeed even to cattle. In generalising about Nilotic practice in this area, there is arguably good reason to follow Kronenberg and adopt a neutral term to refer to the favoured animal rather than exclusively the neutered term, oxen.
Turning to your reviewer's comments on matters more central to the book, he says: 'The lack of figurative sculpture in non-Western art is posed as a problem: and then rejected, quite properly, as an ethnocentric question' (p. 247). This is frankly puzzling. Leaving to one side field photographs and illustrations of tools or technical processes, all but two of our illustrations are in a direct and accessible way figurative - we have indeed made a point of the fact (p. 40) that, whilst what is actually represented in a sculpture may often be problematical, figuration rather than more purely abstract form is the normal vehicle for such representation. We can only suppose that what your reviewer was thinking of was our discussion of the lack of traditions of portraiture in a conventional Western sense. Yet, in that case, whilst we do indeed reject the notion that representing particular persons in art must inevitably involve attempts to produce their physical likenesses we do nonetheless note traditions in which visual reference to acts, mannerism, or the office a person holds, is sufficient to personalise sculptural representation. In the end it seems sad that a book intended to introduce and discuss ideas about non-Western sculpture, rather than yet another unchallenging catalogue, should be reviewed in so bland a manner.

MALCOLM McLEOD and JOHN MACK
Museum of Mankind, London

Dear JASO,

I must apologise to McLeod and Mack for my carelessness in using the term 'figurative' when referring to portrait sculpture. As for cattle, however, I still maintain that their account of Nilotic attitudes is misleading. Indeed, the reason why their account is misleading is now clear: they have based it, in part, on material concerning a non-Nilotic people. Kronenberg's article no doubt gives an accurate picture of attitudes to cattle amongst the 10,000 or so Longarim, but McLeod and Mack are hardly justified in making generalisations, on the basis of Kronenberg's account, about attitudes to cattle amongst the Nilotics, who just in the Southern Sudan can be numbered in millions. As for adopting the neutral term 'beast', Kronenberg adopted 'the awkward term "favourite beast"' (Kush 1961, p. 258) because the Longarim, unlike the Nilotics, have both favourite oxen and favourite bulls - and even favourite cows. But I do not see why being aware of these Longarim customs means that we should use the neutral term when discussing the favourite ox among the Nilotics, for the Longarim are not Nilotic and, even if there are exceptions, it is still the case that the vast majority of Nilotics adopt oxen as favourite beasts. McLeod and Mack do not use the neutral term in their
discussion, referring instead to bulls; that it is generally speaking oxen is in itself surely an interesting fact, relevant to aesthetics and morals.

Having been accused of being bland, perhaps I might also add that although I do have criticisms of the book, I do think that *Ethnic Sculpture* is a very good introduction to contemporary ideas about non-Western sculpture and that it is worth any interested student's £4.95.

JEREMY COOTE
Wolfson College, Oxford


CARRITHEERS, Michael, Steven COLLINS and Steven LUNES (eds.), The Category of the Person: Anthropology, Philosophy, History, Cambridge etc.: Cambridge University Press 1985. ix, 300 pp., Index. £27.50/£19.95.


EDWARDS, Viv, Language in a Black Community, Cleveldon: Multilingual Matters 1985 [241. xii, 135 pp., Appendices, Index, Bibliography, Tables, Figures. £15.90/£7.95.


N.J. ALLEN
Tetradic Theory: An Approach to Kinship 87-109

SPECIAL SECTION ON POLISH ANTHROPOLOGY
1. GRAŻYNA KUBICA
All Souls' Day in Polish Culture: Sacred or Secular? 110-125

2. Commentary
IESZK DZIĘGIEL
Post-War Polish Anthropologists in the Developing Countries: Contributions to Peasant Field Studies 126-134

3. JADWIGA PSTRUSIŃSKA
Magati: Some Notes on an Unknown Language of Northern Afghanistan 135-139

4. GRAŻYNA KUBICA
Bronisław Malinowski's Years in Poland 140-154

5. Review Article
KRYSZTOF CECH
The Malinowski Centenary Conference: Cracow 1984 155-158

Book Reviews 159-177

Other Notes and Notices 177-180

Peter Arnold Lienhardt 1928-1986: Some Appreciations 181-185
Peter Arnold Lienhardt Memorial Appeal 186

Publications Received 187-188

Notes on Contributors inside back cover
CONTENTS (continued)

Book Reviews


JUDITH LYNNE HANNA, The Performer-Audience Connection: Emotion to Metaphor in Dance and Society. Reviewed by Sally Murphy .. .. .. .. .. .. 163-165

MARSHALL SAHLINS, Islands of History. Reviewed by Jeremy MacClancy .. .. .. .. .. .. 165-167


VALERIO VALERI, Kingship and Sacrifice: Ritual and Society in Ancient Hawaii. Reviewed by Burkhard Schnepel .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 169-170

LOUIS GOLOMB, An Anthropology of Curing in Multiethnic Thailand. Reviewed by Linda Hitchcox .. .. .. 171-173


ROBERT L. WINZELER, Ethnic Relations in Kelantan: A Study of the Chinese and Thai as Ethnic Minorities in a Malay State. Reviewed by R.H. Barnes .. .. .. 175

Banking on Disaster: Indonesia's Transmigration Programme (The Ecologist, Vol. XVI, nos. 2/3, Special Issue). Reviewed By R.H. Barnes.. .. .. .. .. .. 176-177

Other Notes and Notices

Strangers Abroad: A Correction .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 177
Short Book Notices .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 178-180

Peter Arnold Lienhardt 1928-1986: Some Appreciations .. 181-185
Peter Arnold Lienhardt Memorial Appeal .. .. .. 186

Publications Received .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .. 187-188

Notes on Contributors .. .. .. .. .. .. inside back cover

Copyright © JASO 1986. All rights reserved.
ISSN UK 0044-8370

vi
TETRADIC THEORY: AN APPROACH TO KINSHIP

1. **Kinship**

1.1. Social anthropology is the collective attempt to come to terms with the diversity of the societies the world has seen.

1.2. One aspect of this diversity is the variety of ways in which societies have elaborated on the biological imperatives to mate and reproduce. The study of kinship is the study of what societies make of the relations between the sexes and generations.

1.3. From these relations a society not only makes a kinship system; it makes itself. To merit the name of a society a group must endure, normally by the continuing production of new generations to replace old. Nothing that a society might produce could be more fundamental to it; and the mode of production imposed by biology involves both sexes. Thus kinship is necessarily fundamental among social phenomena.

1.3.1. The production of its new members constitutes a society. In contrast, the production or provision of a food supply, which is also a biological imperative and variously elaborated, is merely a condition for social continuity; it is not what we mean by the continuity.
2. What sorts of kinship phenomena are basic to the theory?

2.1. Societies handle the relations between the sexes and generations in two ways which are logically different: egocentric (relativistic, local, individual) and sociocentric (absolute, global, holistic). The egocentric system pertains to the relatives of an individual, ego, the sociocentric to the structure of society as a whole.

2.2. Occasionally 'kinship' is used in the narrow sense of 'consanguinity as opposed to affinity'. Ordinary usage associates it most closely with the egocentric system. But any general theory of kinship must handle sociocentric phenomena as well as egocentric. (If a society consists of three endogamous hereditary strata, the relations between the sexes and generations are implicated ipso facto.)

2.3. From the whole range of kinship phenomena conceived in this way, the theory abstracts the most 'formal', those that provide the framework for the rest.

2.3.1. Sociocentrically, the focus is on social structure or social morphology, and we shall narrow these expressions so as to exclude, especially, considerations of territory. Egocentrically, the focus is on the constitution of the domain of relatives, i.e. on its range and structure, and particularly on kinship terminologies, understood in the narrowest sense.

2.3.2. These formal aspects of kinship are interrelated, offer the greatest scope for rigorous abstract treatment, and have historically been at the centre of the field. If a satisfactory general theory of kinship is possible they would be part of it, and no doubt part of its core. Their relationship to other aspects is scarcely touched on.

3. Conceptual steps to the notion of tetradic society

3.1. Although the theory grew out of analyses of Tibeto-Burman kinship terminologies and clan organisation, and has been developed by working back and forth between facts and abstractions, it is best presented by separating the empirical and theoretical, and concentrating on the latter.

3.2. The conceptual starting-point is the totality par excellence - society, endogamous and enduring. At this point
nothing more is specified than that sexual relations stop at the bounds of society, that all new members result from these relations, and that membership of the society is co-extensive with the domain of ego's relatives.

3.3. The simplest step towards reality is to split the totality into two endo-mating child-exchanging sociocentric levels ('generation moieties'). The rules are now that sexual relations are confined to one's own level, and that membership is to the level of the grandparents.

3.3.1. The most obvious alternative to 3.3 is to split the totality into patri- or matri-moieties. However, this would be to introduce not only a bifurcation but also a sexual asymmetry.

3.4. The next, and final, step is a second bifurcation: each sociocentric level is split into exogamous sections in such a way that people who are brother and sister to each other belong in the same section. The marriage rule is now 'own level, other section'; but for the recruitment rule there exist two possibilities.

3.4.1. Consider the four grandparents. Symmetry demands that each section contain one male and one female. FF and FM are married, so must belong in different sections. That leaves FF and MM, i.e. PssP, in one section, PosP in the other. Ego could be recruited to either.

3.4.2. In the former case the line of same-sex ascendants or descendants oscillates between two sections, while in the latter it cycles round all four. For convenience we shall focus on the oscillatory model. Cf. Figure 1.

3.4.3. (We shall ignore some other comparable quadripartite models, for instance, those locating the interlevel division at marriage rather than at birth, and those that make the four components endogamous rather than exogamous.)

3.5. All such models (whose properties remain to be defined) will be called 'tetradic'. The label is used both specifically, as in speaking of 'the focal tetradic model', and generically, to speak of 'tetradic society' (as one might speak of 'feudal society'). Tetradic society is the fundamental concept in the present theory, which is therefore named after it.
Figure 1. Conceptual steps leading to the focal tetradic model

Unstructured endogamy (3.2.)

Sociocentric levels (even = ego's) (3.3.)

Four sections, recruitment undefined (3.4.)

Focal (= oscillatory) model (3.4.1.)

Legend

\(<=>\) represents marriage or alliance relations

\(\uparrow\)\(\uparrow\)\(\uparrow\) represent child-exchange relations

ms, ws male ego's, female ego's

ss, os same-sex, opposite-sex

E spouse
4. Some properties of the model

4.1. The focal tetradic model prescribes marriage within a section which includes cross cousins and excludes primary relatives; marriage of a male with his M, Z or D is thus precluded.

4.1.2. If it is stipulated that sexual relations take place only between spouses or potential spouses, the model precludes incest in the sense of sexual intercourse between primary relatives.

4.2. This gives the tetradic model a realistic quality absent from the models of 3.2.-3.3.1. — so much so that if a primate society conformed to the model, one would be confident that the society was a human one. That is why 3.4. talked of 'marriage' rather than 'mating'.

4.3. The society posited in 3.2. cannot be split into two enduring groups in such a way as automatically to preclude incest in the specified sense. A four-element structure is the simplest that can do this.

4.4. Tetradic models are such elementary logical constructs that anthropologists would have had to invent them even if neither section systems nor cross-cousin marriage had ever been reported.

4.5. Given a total population of a few hundred, there is no reason of a demographic nature to prevent the rules being adhered to perfectly. (To be sure, real societies seldom obey their rules perfectly; there is nothing to stop the model builder imagining rules to deal with deviants.)

4.6. Though exceedingly simple compared to attested societies, tetradic models are sufficiently complex to raise worthwhile conceptual problems. Their theoretical significance derives from their position at a threshold along the scale leading from almost vacuous logical simplicity towards unmanageable complication.

4.7. Their properties derive from human biology, notably from the existence of the two sexes and their necessary cooperation in reproduction (not from any a priori interest that may attach to the number four).
5. **Tetradic terminologies**

5.1.1. A tetradic society could obey its own marriage and recruitment rules without possessing verbal language (for instance, if section members were distinguished absolutely by body-painting). *A fortiori*, it could function without a kinship terminology.

5.1.2. However, a kinship analyst could not claim to have fully understood it (or to have translated it so as to render it readily understandable to others) without envisaging it egocentrically.

5.1.3. Moreover, the members of a tetradic society could distinguish the sections and follow their rules using *solely* an egocentric, relativistic nomenclature (i.e. kinship terms), in the absence of any absolute nomenclature.

5.2. *The simplest kinship terminology making the necessary distinctions has four terms.* Each ego classifies relatives into four categories, each category corresponding to one section. Egos in two different sections using the same term are, of course, referring to relatives located (absolutely) in different sections.

5.3. The otherwise similar four-term terminology presented in *JASO* 1982\(^1\) was unnecessarily indigestible in that it pressed relativism to the limit: the term ego applied to relatives in the odd level was *doubly* relativistic, i.e. relative to the sex as well as to the section of ego.

5.3.1. The focal tetradic society presented here can be characterised from an egocentric point of view as *singly* relativistic. To take account of 5.4.3, one could complete the characterisation by stating that, from both egocentric and sociocentric points of view, the society is not only oscillatory but also 'single-stage' (in that the individual's life-cycle is not bisected at marriage), and 'BZ-merging' (as opposed to 'HW-merging').

5.4. The categorisation of any kin-type, however remote, can be readily calculated with the aid of Figure 2, supplemented by 'the principle of same-sex sibling equivalence'. This states that, whether as alters or as link relatives, ssG are to be treated as indiscriminable. (If the conventions are not obvious, check that NZSDWSZHMZBM is classified with Z.)

---

\(^{1}\) N.J. Allen, 'A Dance of Relatives', *JASO*, Vol. XII, no.2, pp. 139-46.
Ego by convention is located in the lower left quadrant. Relatives are categorised with siblings (G), father, mother or spouse, according to their quadrant. The arrows show the direction of the passage of time. Thus to reach ego's FF, one follows the line from F backwards in time round the outside of the diagram and down to the triangle which already represents a male ego and his ssG. (The diagram can just as well be drawn with circles replacing triangles and vice versa, in which case the labels M and F must be reversed. The diagram would then show a female bias rather than a male one, but the structure, the set of relationships represented by the diagram, would be unchanged.)

5.5. The sociocentric structuring of society and the egocentric categorisation of relatives here pattern the same universe using the same dividing lines.

5.6. A tetradic society is defined as a quadripartite society which handles the relations between the sexes and generations in such a way that the egocentric and sociocentric systems are co-extensive and isomorphic.

6. Corollaries and refinements
6.1. Sociocentrically, the splitting of the endogamous levels (3.4.) affects both levels identically, but egocentrically it does not. The even level is split into ego's own section, which includes parallel cousins, and the section in which the closest cognates are cross cousins;
so the split can aptly be called parallel versus cross. As for the odd level, ego is in a sense closer to the section of his or her children, which is also that of his or her ssP, than to the other section; but male ego is closer to one section, female to the other. Thus odd-level relatives can be qualified as parallel or cross only at the cost of neglecting one sex of ego.

6.2. As presented so far, tetradic models are wholly symmetrical as between the two sexes. The term 'descent' is usually, and properly, associated with unilineality, and will always imply it below. Thus the term cannot be applied to tetradic models unless an asymmetry is explicitly introduced.

6.2.1. In its place, the more general and versatile term 'recruitment' is used to refer to the maintenance of continuity (especially sociocentric) across the generations. One can speak either of a section recruiting certain of the grandchildren of its members, or of new members of society being recruited to the section of certain grandparents — looking 'downwards' to the future or 'upwards' to the past respectively.

6.2.2. Where necessary, one can distinguish the sociocentric relation of 'alliance' holding between sections and the egocentric relation of 'marriage' holding between relatives.

6.3. Out of the rules that constitute a tetradic model, one can theoretically abstract rules of *marriage* bearing on the relations between the sexes and rules of *recruitment* bearing on the relations between the generations; but the separation is artificial, since each type of rule presupposes the operation of the other. The rules constituting a tetradic society form a single complex, within which marriage and recruitment are of equal significance.

6.4. The model prescribes marriage into the section which includes cross cousins, but it does not prescribe cross-cousin marriage, even bilateral. Male ego can marry DD or even, if he wishes, MM.

6.5. Similarly, the model cannot be imagined as consisting of genealogical levels stacked one above another. Suppose one possesses the complete genealogical records of a properly functioning tetradic society. If one takes a particular genealogical level, say +2, and works outwards from a lineal relative of ego, say FF, confining oneself to intra-generational or 'horizontal' genealogical links (G, E, PGs, CE), one will eventually reach ego, and FFFF, but never FFF or F. The model does not recognize the distinction between genealogical levels as
such; it recognises the distinction between even-level relatives and odd-level ones.

6.5.1. Rather than levels stacked in a pile, one can imagine a double helix. The two strands represent the two socio-centric levels and spiral round an axis representing time. The time taken to complete a single circuit of the axis is two generations.

7. What is the use of tetradic models?

7.1. They can help in refining analytical concepts (as in 6).

7.2. As will be the main theme of the rest of the paper, the models can serve as the starting point for generating models of more complex kinship systems. *Tetradic theory is the theory that attested kinship systems should be set in relation to tetradic models.*

7.2.1. The relation between a tetradic model and an attested kinship system has two components: typological (conveniently thought of as horizontal), and ontological, holding between different 'levels' of abstraction or concreteness. Cf. Figure 3.

7.2.2. To conceptualize the ontological relation in isolation, imagine a society attempting to realise a tetradic model. It would have to fill out or enrich its formal rules with other rules bearing on residence, divorce, plural marriage, matrimonial choice, forms of address, etc. Given the description of such a society, an analyst could reverse the process of enrichment and abstract the underlying model.

7.2.3. A tetradic model could, of course, be filled out in a variety of ways. The resulting realisations would all have something in common, and from descriptions of them the analyst could abstract what they shared. He might equally well call this the *model* underlying all the realisations, or the *type* of which the realisations were tokens. 'Model' usually implies more precise specification than 'type', but the distinction will not be important here.

7.2.4. Types or models generated from tetradic models bear to their realisations the same ontological relation as tetradic models bear to theirs. The ontological relation seems less problematic than the typological, and
Figure 3. Relations between components of tetradic theory

The theory recommends formulating the relation $\leftarrow \rightarrow$. $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ = reversible analytical operations of abstraction/enrichment. $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ = reversible analytical operations of typological transformation (which might be drawn $\leftarrow \rightarrow$ to indicate the divergence of the egocentric and sociocentric - 8.5.). On the strong interpretation of the theory, $\cdot \rightarrow \rightarrow$ represents essentially one-way historical processes.

7.3. Tetradic theory can be interpreted in a weak fashion or a strong one. The weak holds merely that it is analytically valuable to look at real kinship systems as if they derived from tetradic models, but remains agnostic on whether they did so. **The strong interpretation holds that attested kinship systems derive historically from ones of tetradic type.**

7.3.1. The weak interpretation could be held alone, but the strong interpretation implies the weak.

7.4. The strong interpretation, which is much the more interesting, might serve to guide research on the relation between prehuman and human society.

7.5. The theory offers a firm base from which to explore the
jungle of the specialist literature on kinship. Such an exploration would not only contribute to the historiography of social anthropology, but would also consolidate the theory itself and provide a (much needed) expression of its indebtedness to its predecessors.

7.6. In principle, the theory might guide reflection on kinship phenomena other than the strictly formal (e.g. prescribed sentiments\(^2\)), and on non-kinship phenomena relatable to kinship ones.

7.6.1. For instance, in so far as society is an aspect of the cosmos, and in so far as religion is an attempt to apprehend what gives continuity to the cosmos, the theory could have a bearing on religion. (Supernaturals are commonly associated with components of social structure, or with the functions performed by such components.\(^3\))

7.7. If the theory is taken seriously, it must have a bearing on general theoretical positions within anthropology. For instance, as regards structuralism, one thing it suggests is that the binary oppositions favoured by that approach may sometimes be fragments of or derivative from more complex four-element structures.

7.8. However, applications 7.4. - 7.7. lie outside the scope of this paper.

8. How can the focal tetradic model be used to generate other models (7.2.)?

8.1. The model is subjected to stepwise transformations, each of which can be regarded as instantaneous and complete (in contrast, of course, to historical transformations - 15.2.1.).

8.2. The number of transformations theoretically conceivable is indefinite - a powerful enough magic wand can change anything into anything else. The transformations likely to prove instructive will be as follows: (i) they will produce more or less familiar models, i.e. idealisations approximating to attested kinship systems; (ii) they will be reasonably simple in themselves, from a logical

\(^2\) Cf. ibid., p. 140.

\(^3\) Cf. ibid., p. 145.
point of view; (iii) they will be such as could be realised by reasonably plausible historical processes.

8.3. In formulating transformations, it is unnecessary to specify every detail. It is sufficient to generate types (7.2.2-3.).

8.4. The majority of the more familiar types can be generated by a single series of transformations, each acting on the result of its predecessor. (This finding results from trial and error, rather than from any a priori leaning towards unilineal evolutionary theory.)

8.5. Tetradic society is characterised by the perfect overlap and isomorphism of the egocentric and sociocentric systems, but the perfect fit disappears as soon as one leaves tetradic models, and the further one moves away from them, the more the two branches draw apart. They are best followed separately in the first instance.

9. Egocentric branch: properties of the focal tetradic terminology

9.1. The terminology covers the whole of society, and not only its members within living memory, but all members, from the indefinite past to the indefinite future; its range is truly total. This makes the society 'closed', in a strong sense.

9.2. Each term covers a homogeneous category. The genealogical distance separating ego from an alter is irrelevant, and to stipulate that a category centred on a focal specification would be to detract from its perfect congruence with a component of social structure, and hence to change the character of the terminology as a whole.

9.3. The 'formal' semantic structure of a terminology consists in the discriminations and equations that it makes. In a model terminology these will fall into clear-cut types. The focal terminology makes three types of discrimination, one structurally insignificant type of equation, and three important types of equation.

9.4. The three types of discrimination separate relatives belonging to (i) different sociocentric levels, (ii) different even-level sections, (iii) different odd-level sections (cf. 6.1.). One may refer to the 'vertical' and the two 'horizontal' discriminations.
9.5. Step 5.2. equated male and female members of a section; but nothing fundamental changes if we introduce the discrimination of sexes (a suffix marking one sex would suffice).

9.6. The three important types of equation are as follows:

9.6.1. Alternate generation equations (like $Z = FFZ$) equate kin-types belonging within a single section but removed from each other by two generations. (It is convenient to include under the heading equations such as $FF = SS$ where the number of generations separating two kin-types is a multiple of two.)

9.6.2. Prescriptive equations (like $MBD = W$) equate cognatic and affinal kin-types represented by a single symbol in a genealogical diagram showing prescribed cross-cousin marriage. (Figure 2 can be counted as such a diagram, in spite of 6.4. It is convenient here to include $MBC = FZC$ under prescriptive equations although it equates cognatic kin-types.)

9.6.3. Classificatory equations (like $F = FB$, $S = msBS$) equate kin-types by using the principle of same-sex sibling equivalence (5.4.).

10. Egocentric branch: the three major recognised types

10.1 Tetradic terminologies, which have not been attested empirically or recognised theoretically, can be called type 1. Types II - IV are generated by replacing the three major types of equation by three new types of discrimination.

10.2.1. Type II are the conventional prescriptive terminologies; they make prescriptive equations (9.6.2.), but the diagrams they are related to lack the 'vertical cycles' shown by the lines with arrows passing round the outside of Figure 2. (In practice, the conventional diagrams usually show a 'stack' of five genealogical levels.)

10.2.2. Type II is generated from type I by eliminating the alternate generation equations. Since adjacent genealogical levels are already discriminated, to discriminate alternate ones is to distribute relatives into a stack of genealogical levels (cf. 6.5.). This has radical effects, both 'horizontal' and 'vertical'.

10.2.3. The prescribed category is no longer sociocentric as
well as egocentric. It is no longer an enduring component of society with a constant inflow of new members. Unlike a sociocentric level, a genealogical level eventually dies out. If marriages were strictly confined to a genealogical level, instances would necessarily arise when the last-born member of a genealogical level could not find a spouse. If one takes account of demography (not merely of genealogical diagrams), the only societies which can obey perfectly a rule prescribing marriage with an egocentric category of relatives are those in which the category is also sociocentric. Tetradic societies are workable (4.5.) in a sense that non-tetradic societies with positive marriage rules are not. The latter must sometimes 'fudge' their marriage rules.

10.2.4. The temporal range of the terminology is restricted. It could only continue to cover the indefinite past and future (9.1.) by inventing indefinite numbers of new terms for the 'unfolded' remoter levels. Being excluded from the field of the terminology, distant ancestors are no longer relatives of ego in the same sense as members of close genealogical levels. (Perhaps the relation might rather be felt as religious.)

10.3. Type III terminologies are classificatory but non-prescriptive. They are generated from type II by eliminating the prescriptive equations, i.e. by systematically discriminating cognates and affines.

10.3.1. Although theoretically it may not be absolutely necessary, we may reasonably stipulate that the range of the terminology is no longer co-extensive with society (understood more or less synchronically). This creates an implicit category of contemporary members of society who are not relatives. (One supposes that ego might feel towards them a sense of 'ethnic' identification or solidarity.)

10.4. Type IV terminologies are non-classificatory, i.e. descriptive. They are generated from type III by eliminating the classificatory equations, i.e. by systematically discriminating those previously equated on the basis of the ssG equivalence principle. Type IV terminologies are necessarily limited to covering a range of kin-types removed from ego by only a relatively small number of genealogical steps.

10.4.1. (If such a terminology is used by a society having endogamous sub-divisions, the effect of the limitation is to create for ego an implicit category of potential-but-not-actual relatives, towards whom he might feel yet a third type of identification, based perhaps on common life-style or economic expectations.)
11. **Egocentric branch: elaborations**

11.1. The majority of generally recognised terminological types can be related to types II - IV. The main exception is the generational ('Hawaiian') type, which in addition to using the principle of $ssG$ equivalence treats $osG$ as equivalent when they are link relatives.

11.2. Types I - IV can be refined to give constructs having any desired degree of specificity. We consider only one sub-division per type.

11.2.1. Closely related to tetradic terminologies are terminologies which retain the egocentric-sociocentric isomorphism but divide the universe into a *multiple* of four categories (this assumes that males and females within a category are not discriminated). For instance, eight categories can be arranged two-by-two in four sociocentric levels, or four apiece in two levels as with the Aranda.

11.2.2. Type II can be divided into symmetrical and asymmetrical, as is conventional.

11.2.3. Type III may show 'skewing', i.e. it may override the vertical tetradic discrimination by making the Crow-Omaha equation of cross cousins on the one side with $+1$ cognates, on the other side with $-1$; or it may not.

11.2.4. Type IV may wholly lack equations; or it may make 'counter-tetradic' equations, like $FBS = FZS$ or $FB = MB$, which override the horizontal tetradic discriminations (even-level and odd-level respectively) - as in English.

11.3. A type I terminology takes account neither of genealogical distance (9.2.) nor of genealogical level (as distinct from sociocentric level). In a type IV terminology genealogical concepts are fundamental, and sometimes a one-to-one relationship exists between kinship terms and genealogical formulae. The importance given to genealogy by types II and III is intermediate, and they can be envisaged, as it were, from either side.

11.3.1. If the analyst's conceptual starting-point is type IV, ego is envisaged as surrounded by concentric circles of relatives, primary, secondary and tertiary, at increasing degrees of genealogical distance. Classificatory equations then appear as the result of kinship terms *extending* their meanings outwards from the closest, focal meaning, and prescriptive equations appear as the result of eliminating the terms rendered redundant by superimposing cognates and affines. In so far as one is interested merely in translation between European
kinship categories and exotic ones, this approach is not necessarily valueless.

11.3.2. However, tetradic theory naturally recommends starting conceptually with type I, and envisaging the other types as resulting from contraction. The general trend is from focus on the totality towards focus on the individual ego.

11.3.3. The model-builder can leave unspecified the extent to which categories in the intermediate types II and III may be conceived of by ego as polarised (between the genealogically closest kin type and remoter types), rather than as homogeneous.

12. Sociocentric branch: generalities

12.1. For our model-building purposes, social structure can be defined as mode of division of a whole endogamous society on the basis of kinship.

12.2. A minority of societies lack a social structure in this sense, and to generate corresponding models one must include in the theory a transformation deleting non-egocentric internal dividing lines.

12.3. Whereas there is not much incentive to generate models in which two kinship terminologies co-exist, there is no objection to models in which a plurality of social structures co-exist, either subsuming or cross-cutting each other.

12.4. As with the egocentric branch (8.2-4.), the types or models an analyst is most likely to want can be generated in essentials with a reasonable degree of economy and historical plausibility by starting from tetradic models.

13. Sociocentric branch: major transformations

13.1. In tetradic society one sociocentric dividing line separates parents en bloc from their children, while the other splits up spouses, including an ego’s parents.
(Following 9.4, one would have to call the P/C divide 'vertical'; but although it pertains to a 'vertical' relationship, the line is most naturally pictured horizontally.)

13.1.1. By eliminating first the P/C divide, then the E/E divide as well, one distinguishes three major types of social structure. In terms of recruitment, child-exchanging structures locate children in the component of neither parent, while descent-based ones locate them in that of one parent; structures based on endogamous groups recruit bilaterally and locate children in the component of both parents. In terms of alliance, the three types (i) put E, F, M and ego into equally separate components, (ii) keep E and ego in separate components while putting ego in the natal component of one parent (E may or may not be in the natal component of the other), (iii) put all four in the same component.

13.2. To move from exogamous tetradic sections to exogamous descent groups, one must merge the children's section with the section of one or other parent. The following seem the most obvious transformational paths.

13.2.1. If one odd- and one even-level section are merged, the result is descent moieties (patri- or matri-).

13.2.2. By moving to an eight-element Aranda-type model (11.2.1) before merging sections (or 'sub-sections') of adjacent levels, one can generate a four-clan model with symmetrical exchange.

13.2.3. If, before the merging, one moves to an eight-element model with asymmetrical exchange between sub-sections, one can generate a four-clan model with asymmetrical exchange.

13.2.4. In both four-clan models the clans are arranged in exogamous pairs. One can therefore recognize two levels of organization or segmentation: binary into moieties, quadripartite into clans.

13.3. All these sociocultural models possess a quality of rigidity resulting from (i) a fixed number of exogamous components (at most eight), (ii) a fixed number of levels of organization (at most three), (iii) fixed alliance relations (symmetrical or not) between components. To generate models applying to a wider range of descent-based societies, one must eliminate the rigidity.

13.4. A plausible way to do this is to increase the number of components. If the society remains reproductively
bounded, the new units must be formed by segmenting pre-existing ones. By segmenting and resegmenting, one can generate models with an indefinite number of units arranged in an indefinite number of levels of segmentation.

13.4.1. Wherever a unit is segmented, the model builder can stipulate the fate of the original unsegmented component. The latter may be eliminated from the model so that the resultant units are no more closely interrelated than any other pair of units of the same level of segmentation; or it may be retained as a component of the model on the superordinate level of segmentation. If it is retained it may remain exogamous; or the new segments may be defined as the maximal exogamous units.

13.4.2. Further flexibility can be introduced by eliminating fixed alliance relations. The model-builder again enjoys considerable freedom to stipulate how and at what point this shall come about.

13.4.3. These operations generate socio-structural models in which the relations between generations are handled by the rule of unilinear descent and the relations between sexes by rules of descent-group exogamy. The descent groups may or may not show more than one level of segmentation. The rules of exogamy may apply to the descent groups of more than one of ego's grandparents (Crow-Omaha models), or only to ego's own descent group.

13.5. The final major step is to segregate descent groups into endogamous sets. Once this 'endo-recruiting' component is constituted, the descent groups may be deleted.

13.5.1. Theoretically, each endogamous component might be equally valued, but the models will come closer to empirical societies if the components are ranked. (Empirically, higher rank might be represented by greater honour, power, wealth, purity, etc., but formal models must abstract from such particular values. The highest ranking element would be the one closest to representing the whole.)

13.5.2. All the social structures considered so far have consisted of components which are sharply bounded, in the sense that every member of society belongs unambiguously in one component or another. Such structures can be called segmentary. (Where there is any risk of confusion, one must distinguish this concept from the narrower notion of segmentation on a multiplicity of levels, as in 13.4.)
To generate a model of a class-based society, one must replace sharp boundaries by statistical ones. In the limit, even the notion of statistically separable strata can be replaced by a continuum of ranked positions with a statistical tendency for members of a nuclear family to cluster around a point on the continuum. This would no longer be a social structure in the sense of 12.1.

Relations between the egocentric and the sociocentric

Corresponding more or less to the types set up independently for the two branches, one may distinguish the following situations: (i) perfect isomorphism; (ii) approximate isomorphism; (iii) egocentric domain covers at least one component of social structure but not all of them; (iv) egocentric domain is included within one component.

In the perfectly isomorphic tetradic models, the systematic equation of alternate genealogical levels correlates with socio-structural components which endure by recruiting grandchildren, not children; and the lateral symmetry of the terminology corresponds to the symmetry between the sexes, in particular to the lack of lineality.

The conventional genealogical diagrams which underlie prescriptive terminologies (10.2.1.) can also represent social structures consisting of descent groups in enduring alliance relationships. For the sake of clarity the two interpretations of the diagrams should be distinguished, but the very possibility of ambiguity expresses the approximate isomorphism which characterises kinship systems based on conventional (= non-tetradic) elementary structures.

('Elementary structures', in whatever forms they may be realised, are best understood as being the abstract relations expressed in genealogical diagrams representing cross-cousin marriage [cf. 9.6.2.]. Tetradic structures, as exemplified in Figure 2, are more elementary than conventional elementary structures and can be termed the only truly elementary structures.)

With the loss of prescriptive equations and of the corresponding alliance relations, the scope for egocentric-sociocentric isomorphism decreases, but Crow-Omaha models attempt, as it were, to salvage what they can. The terminology covers the descent groups not only of
ego but also (at whatever level of segmentation) of some of his non-lineal cognates (13.4.3.), reflecting the lineality of these groups in its vertical equations (11.2.3.).

14.4.1. Other type III terminologies can retain a degree of isomorphism by making some egocentric category boundaries coincide with group boundaries - for instance, by limiting 'classificatory father' to covering +1 males within the patriclan. To stipulate this would in effect be to preclude application of the principle of ssG equivalence to both sexes to the same extent.

14.5. The elimination of classificatory equations and of descent groups are parallel operations. With this step, one eliminates the possibility of the egocentric and sociocentric systems sharing internal dividing lines, and there is nothing left of the original isomorphism.

14.5.1. If any link remains between the two systems, it relates to the bilaterality seen in the sociocentric recruitment rule. This bilaterality can perhaps be recognised within the terminology in the elimination of the limited sexual asymmetry introduced in 14.4.1.; and also, where they occur, in equations such as FE = MB which treat the parents as indiscriminable.

15. In conclusion

15.1. This paper has offered an approach; within its framework there is indefinite scope for elaboration. In principle, one could readily build into the models other formal kinship phenomena such as relative-age discriminations, double descent, hypergamy and age sets (not to mention matters like territory and property which are often related to kinship).

15.1.1. How would such elaborated models fit into Figure 3? The abstract level there does not consist simply of a single sequence of types for each branch, for we have already suggested a choice of paths leading from four sections to four clans (13.2.) and, at least by implication (11.1.), one or more side branches leading to Hawaiian terminologies. Thus one possibility would be to locate additional phenomena in models situated on the same conceptual level or plane as the others.

15.1.2. Alternatively, one might envisage levels of abstraction intermediate between the two shown in Figure 3. On these
would be located types and models more 'filled out',
closer to concrete realities, than those considered so far.

15.2. This paper has concentrated on the lower horizontal
arrow in Figure 3 at the expense of the vertical and the
upper horizontal arrows. The former represent two
things: (i) statically, the gap between a model and
its realisation (for instance, between an elementary
structure (14.3.1.) and a society in which cross-cousin
marriage is present in some sense, perhaps merely as a
preference); (ii) dynamically, the gap between analytical
transformations and historical processes. (Henceforth,
we can ignore the weak interpretation of tetradic theory,
which declines the challenge of history and simply ab-
stains from comment on ii.)

15.2.1. Whereas the transformations take place instantaneously
and completely on the conscious decision of an analyst
manipulating models in a vacuum, the gradual, incomplete,
overlapping historical processes take place under local
impulsions unclear to those involved, in societies which
interact, which may be polylingual, which migrate and
invade each other. Nonetheless, the transformations can
serve as models of historical processes; and the step
leading from tetradic to non-tetradic structures is in-
tended to be as real as the concept of the Neolithic
Revolution.

15.3. Thus the central problem for the strong interpretation
lies in the upper horizontal arrow in Figure 3. Before
attempting to justify the arrow empirically, one would
have to be clear about its significance.

15.3.1. Tetradic theory is in certain senses evolutionary, but
evolutionism is by no means a single package (such as
might reasonably be rejected en bloc).

15.3.2. In particular, if tetradic theory can be described as
'unilineal' at all, it is so only in a very qualified
sense. Although the theory proposes a single starting-
point, a sort of Big Bang for human society, it is not
committed to forecasting an end-point. It is happy to
recognise side-branches and multiple rightward paths.
It does not exclude either leap-frogging or leftward
regression; indeed it expects both of these to occur,
as a result of influences between societies. Above all,
it does not suppose that real societies can be fitted
into clear-cut stages or ranked unambiguously along a
single scale of distance from tetradic models.

15.3.3. The fundamental reason for this (in addition to the
parallel paths and side-branches) is that the unilineal
stages one can stipulate on the level of types and models do not survive on the empirical level. In real societies, formal aspects of the kinship system will occasionally conform quite well to a single type, but generally they will present a mixture of features related to several types. Supposing one were determined to set up a single scale of distance from tetradic models, procedures would have to be devised for balancing progressiveness in one respect with conservatism in another; but such procedures could not escape being arbitrary. There is no possibility of a meaningful quantitative left-right scale.

15.3.4. Admittedly, one can sometimes make more or less intuitive estimates of the relative global position of real societies along such a hypothetical scale. The kinship system of the nineteenth-century Kariera stands closer to tetradic models than does the system of the modern West. But the purpose of the theory is not to facilitate such 'league-table' judgements, which have little point, but to understand kinship systems within a world-historical perspective.

15.3.5. This orientation can be contrasted with certain brands of a priori anti-evolutionism, for instance, the view which is sometimes expressed that societies 'choose' their kinship systems from the range of logical possibilities. This is unrealistic and misleading. The most that societies do is adapt the systems they inherit, and their options are far from unlimited.

15.4. The central claim of tetradic theory is that (in so far as changes can be conceived in such left-right terms) endogenous historical change has always led away from tetradic society. For instance, the theory proposes that since the emergence of tetradic society, some time in prehistory, equations of the three main types (9.6.) have regularly been broken down but have never been invented; apparent exceptions will be due to complex socio-linguistic interactions (e.g. sub-strata).

15.4.1. The theory also suggests that, in so far as it is meaningful to speak of typological transitions in the context of historical systems, they are likely to occur in a certain order. For instance, a terminology which at a given time conforms to type II is unlikely to go on to eliminate all its classificatory equations while retaining all its prescriptive ones.

15.5 These claims and suggestions must, of course, be tested empirically. The relevant materials are dispersed and in need of careful evaluation, but their volume is considerable. The methods of history and of ethnohistory
(studies of tribes documented over longish periods) must be supplemented by comparative methods, both those based on language families and those of the lexical evolutionists. Evolutionary theories are sometimes dismissed as speculative and untestable, but the second charge at least does not apply here.

15.5.1. Particular attention should be given to empirical cases which appear to show leftward changes.

15.5.2. Some other possible lines of exploration, which might add weight to the theory, were suggested in 7.4-7.

15.6. However, before a theory can be justified, tested or used, it has to be stated.

N.J. ALLEN

---

The question of death and attitudes to the dead form a subject of considerable significance in the study of Polish culture. Perhaps it represents a particular sensitivity to the continuity of tradition that moves Poles to visit the graves of relatives or pay homage to national heroes on a day at the beginning of November, called All Souls' Day (dnię zaduszny).

My direct reason for taking up the subject of All Souls' Day, however, was a desire to understand why Polish Lutherans, who form the subject of my present research and who until quite recently did not - for doctrinal reasons - light candles over the graves of the dead on that day, now do so increasingly. Until a few years ago, in places where there was both a Protestant and a Catholic cemetery, it was still possible to distinguish them easily on this day, because the former was completely unilluminated.

In this paper I analyse this custom, its symbolism and the variety of meanings attributed to it. The paper is in two parts: an ethnographic description of the custom, and an analysis of the problem.

This paper was presented at the International Conference on 'The Role of Ritual in the System of Culture', Zakopane, October 1985; and at Edwin Ardener's seminar on 'History, Ethnicity and Identity' at St John's College, Oxford, on 5th May 1986. I would like to dedicate this paper to Edwin Ardener and to thank all those who have helped me through the different stages of preparing this paper.
We can read about the genesis of this festival in the *Church Encyclopaedia*, from the beginning of this century:

...in the monastic orders the custom arose of devoting one day of the year to services for those of their members who had died. Later, they were extended for the benefit of the souls of all those suffering in Purgatory, and the day falling on the morrow of the ceremony of All Saints was reserved for this purpose (Nowodworski 1913: 482).

On All Souls' Day graves almost everywhere are decorated and, in the evenings, lighted candles are placed on them, signifying a supplicatory prayer for those unfortunate souls in Purgatory, that Christ might shine His eternal light upon them and the *locus refrigeri*, *lucus et pacis* might be open to them (ibid.: 252).

The actual genesis of this festival, however, reaches even further back, as is shown by another passage:

The Church rose idolatry and superstition, though the nation was bound strongly to them, but tolerated older customs in so far as they were not dangerous to the Faith, in accordance with the instructions of Pope Gregory the Great...to endow pagan ceremonies with a Christian meaning (Chełmicki 1913: 252).

Thus the Church introduced All Souls' Day in place of a similar pagan festival. The date coincided with the Celtic division of the year into a 'dark' half (from 1st November to 1st May) and a 'light' half (Rees and Rees 1978: 83-94):

We note that the Winter is the 'dark' half, like the annual night, and that the year begins with the Winter, just as the Celtic day begins on the previous dusk. The old markers were the feast of the Calends of Winter (*Samhainn*) which was fixed historically to 1st November, and the Calends of Summer (*Bealtainn*) ascribed to the 1st May. At the mid-points of the main seasons were feasts on 1st August *Lúnasaíl* (Lammas) and on 1st-2nd February *Fette Bride*, Candlemas (the Old Irish *Imbolc*) (Ardener 1975:3).

On the other hand, the year among pagan Slavs was probably divided up by festivals linked with the solstices: the winter solstice, the midsummer festival, the Vernal festival in spring and the autumn harvest festival. The Church must have taken this into account when spreading Christianity among the pagan Slavs. Among the missionaries, there were two schools of thought: there were those who tried to encourage festivals that could be accepted by pagan culture; 'ceremonies', on the other hand, 'promoted by the opposition never took root in the richer folk tradition, even when
they were as stubbornly advocated as the *Commemoratorio fidelium defunctorum*, or November All Souls' Day, introduced in 988 by Odilon of Cluny (Stomma 1981: 63). Stomma seems to be saying here that All Souls' Day was introduced into Poland by the Church and that it had no pagan history, but ethnographic data seems to dispute this by indicating an undoubtedly pagan setting for this festival. Furthermore, in the rites of the principal festivals connected with the solstices many elements have remained, testifying to the fact that on these ceremonial occasions the dead were not forgotten. It seems that the introduction by the Church of a special festival to honour the dead caused the pagan elements concerning the cult of the dead and appearing in all solstice festivals to be shifted and fused with their Christian equivalents.

However, let us attempt to extract these elements of pagan culture. This process is a logical reconstruction rather than an exact presentation of the data. There was probably a conviction that the souls of the dead live a life of their own, but that the living should offer them care and attention. The dead, who maintain contact with the world of the living, may cause them harm if neglected: '...from the ancestral group seems to have come part of the host of benevolent demons, demonstrating their goodwill to people permanently or occasionally. They increased the livestock on the farm and helped in spinning and rearing horses, plaiting their manes' (Gieysztor 1982: 220).

The Church opposed the cult of the dead not only for theological reasons, but also for sociological ones. The dead are rather a family matter, while the Church wanted to create broader communities under its own auspices.

...we must remember that the Christian Church had risen to prominence largely because its central ritual practices and its increasingly centralized organization and financial administration presented the pagan world with an ideal community that had claimed to modify, to redirect, and even to delimit the bonds of the kin. The Church was an artificial kin group. Its members were expected to project onto the new community a fair measure of the sense of solidarity, loyalty and obligations that had previously been directed to the family itself. Nowhere was this made more plain than in the care of the dead (Brown 1981: 31).

The Church achieved its sociological goal while theological victory was still rather doubtful. Older customs concerning the dead in fact fused with the Church festival as regards both external behaviour and the folk understanding of the meaning of these customs.

Modern ethnographic research presents the following picture of All Souls' Day in the nineteenth century. It was universally believed that on the eve of that day the souls of the dead came down to earth and made their way to their former homes and, at midnight, to the church, where a dead priest held mass. Thus cemeteries were put in order and candles lit over the graves, which were decorated with flowers and artificial garlands. Food and
money were distributed to beggars. The women dressed in black. A solemn and ceremonial atmosphere prevailed. In certain homes lights and stoves were kept burning all night. Food was left on the table, doors were left open all night, and the occupants of the house went to bed early so as not to disturb the souls as they arrived (Frankowska and Paprocka 1981: 147). It was believed that souls could be released from Purgatory by a specified number of masses - to which end candles were lit and indulgences bought - and that, during prayers said in church by the priest for the souls of the dead (often mentioning them by name), the dead were themselves present and revenged themselves if they were forgotten. For these prayers, the priests were offered gifts or a certain sum of money (Zawistowicz 1933).

Certain relics of customs relating to the dead have survived in the rites of the principal Church holidays. For example, Christmas Eve dinner is held in a solemn atmosphere. The custom of setting one extra place at the table is still observed, but the meaning attributed to it has altered. Originally, it was assigned for the souls of the dead, but later various explanations were offered, for example, in expectation of the Holy Family or of lost travellers. In the past the remains of the meal were left, doors opened, and lights left on all night. Until the eighteenth century, Maundy Thursday was regarded as a day of the dead (Kubiak and Kubiak 1981: 39); in some regions special sorts of bread were given to children or carried to cemeteries, and bonfires were built in fields and orchards (Frankowska and Paprocka 1981: 132-3).

We can distinguish, then, three strata, among which only the third is empirically verifiable: 1) pagan rituals and beliefs, the ethnographic nature of which we can only speculate about; 2) the doctrine and cult of Christianity, which has never existed in a pure form; and 3) the beliefs and practices of folk religion, which are the mixture of the two. This interdependence was neatly formulated by Stefan Czarnowski in his description of the culture of Polish country folk:

Religion, once accepted, tends to shape the social environment according to the pattern it carries with it. And since this environment is not passive material, but a living and thus active community with an irresistible tendency to express itself as fully as possible in every field, it leaves its own stamp on the religion. It introduces into the religion elements of belief and ritual that are foreign to it and combines its practice with social values that have nothing in common with it. It transforms religion to its own advantage, in its own image and likeness (Czarnowski 1956: 89).

An example of this may be the lighting of candles and the mass for the dead understood as a magic sacrifice. Only the performance of the rites causes the desired effect of releasing one's soul from Purgatory.
To return to the reasons why I became interested in the problem of All Souls' Day, I shall now present the situation in the Polish Lutheran context. For theological reasons, anything intended to help souls in Purgatory was frowned upon, such as masses for the dead, indulgences, gifts to the Church, or the lighting of candles. A contemporary cleric, fearing the possibility of syncretism, warned his faithful:

Let us not, then, make something like a contributory mass to the dead; let us light over the graves of our deceased the light of the Gospel of the redemption and the resurrection, for other lights will go out; let us not change and let us treat prayer as an act by which we should like to attain heaven for ourselves and others (Janik 1973: 350).

In the Lutheran Church, remembrance of the dead is currently practised either on the last Sunday of the Church year or on November 1st; posthumous remembrance of particular persons or whole families and contributory prayers is also performed.

It is difficult to say whether ordinary parishioners perceived the matter from the theological point of view. I believe that the clergyman needed to write in the way he did because of the false interpretation by his parishioners of the practices described above. Whether this was a direct loan from Catholic doctrine, or a reference to more distant residues, is today difficult to say. I suppose that it arose rather from a folk theology and from people perceiving certain obligations due to the dead, i.e. a more favourable memory of them (I shall develop this idea later).

As for the custom of lighting candles on graves and decorating them with flowers on All Souls' Day, the Lutherans saw this as a Catholic practice; November 1st was not seen as a Lutheran festival. They tried to take care of graves all the year round and, if lighted candles could be seen in Lutheran cemeteries, they had probably been lit by Catholic members of the families of deceased Lutherans. This was the situation until several years ago.

Returning to my main subject, All Souls' Day is at present celebrated throughout Poland on the eve of that day, i.e. on November 1st — in other words, All Saints' Day, which is a public holiday. From the small survey I conducted among university students in Kraków (Cracow), it appears that this is a family festival to which relatives often come from considerable distances. A few days beforehand, someone from the family tidies up the graves of the relatives and plants flowers on them. On November 1st, everyone usually goes to Mass in church or at the cemetery, to which flowers and candles are also taken. Later the whole family has a meal together. Cemeteries are also visited at dusk in order to pray in tranquillity over the graves of one's relatives, and to light candles and generally marvel at the evening's atmosphere. Some people also light candles on the neglected graves of people quite unknown to them.
Such information was also gathered by another student on customs associated with All Souls' Day, although here there is a difference: in Warsaw (where she studied the problem) people also visit the graves of soldiers (mainly those who took part in the uprising of 1944) (Komorowska 1984: 143-65). Similarly, in Kraków the graves of those who died in the two World Wars are visited, although my informants did not mention this (perhaps because most of them spend the day outside the city).

An outsider may, a few days beforehand, see numbers of women carrying chrysanthemums in flower-pots. Special candles are bought, for use only on this occasion; they look like small glasses containing stearin and wicks and can burn even when it is windy. Stalls offering these candles and flowers for sale, as well as small wreaths of everlasting flowers, spring up all over the city, especially in the neighbourhood of cemeteries - which then come to resemble market places, especially with the bustle of graves being tidied up (as houses are tidied before Christmas or Easter).

On the day itself it is not easy to reach the cemeteries, for everyone, dressed in Sunday best, is doing likewise. Trams and buses are packed with people, and the roads leading to the cemeteries are packed with cars. The spectacle at dusk is remarkable. The graves are inundated with flowers, mainly white chrysanthemums, shining in the light of the candles. One can make people out in the darkness walking slowly along the cemetery paths or standing round the graves in thoughtful mood. One can hear only the shuffle of hundreds of shoes on the gravel and, from time to time, hushed conversations. The air is filled with the overwhelming smell of lighted candles and withered autumn leaves. All this is so moving that people come there not merely to visit their relatives' graves, but also to partake of this solemn but not sorrowful atmosphere. During the night, the glow from thousands of lighted candles rises over some parts of the city. This is also true on a smaller scale of less populous towns and villages. On the same day the trains are crowded with people travelling to visit the graves of relatives in other places. It is a festival perhaps equal in importance to Christmas or Easter.

So much for the external form of the ritual. As for my informants' interpretations of the lighting of candles, the worldly view prevails that it is a symbol of memory and respect for the dead and of the impermanence of life. Here is an example of one of the more poetic replies: 'The candle -fire -for me is a symbol of memory. It seems to me that in lighting it, I remember the person over whose grave I do so'. The traditional nature of the custom is also emphasised: 'The candles may be rather like the Christmas tree'; 'the lighting of candles on this day is above all a custom which I have known intimately since I was a child'; etc. A religious meaning is also stressed fairly frequently, i.e. the symbol of Christ: 'the candle symbolises a kind of light which is Christ, whom man meets when he dies', and, more often, is a symbol of eternity, eternal life, Divine light. Informants expressed a religious meaning only after receiving a question specifically concerning this, and even then not all of them did so. No connection was made, however, between burning candles and an action to help
souls in Purgatory; this aim is expressed in the mass: 'the saying of a mass for the dead shortens their suffering in Purgatory or affords them relief and brings them closer to redemption'.

At present, then, the ritual of All Souls' Day has a rather temporal significance: to emphasise the remembrance of one's deceased. The religious meaning attributed to the burning of candles is now of a general, undefined nature. The purely religious, confessional aspect of this day is now mainly represented by the mass.

One must remember that there is also the official mass media which, to some extent, influence people's perception of the world. State propaganda has made the festival principally a national one, dedicated to the memory of those who 'laid down their lives in the struggle for the freedom of the fatherland', and a family one, dedicated to the memories of one's relatives. On television, a thoughtful atmosphere prevails with serious music and pictures of cemeteries with burning candles. On the same day, scouts hold vigils over the graves of soldiers and at sites of Nazi executions. Nothing, of course, is said about the implied religious meanings, and the everlasting fire seen burning under memorials to Soviet soldiers is certainly not understood by either the broadcasters or their audience as being intended to liberate them from the sufferings of Purgatory.

But it is not only on November 1st that Poles commemorate their dead: customarily they look after the graves of their deceased relatives also before the major festivals of Christmas, when they are decorated with fir spruce branches, and Easter, when they are decorated with flowers or catkins. This custom also applies to the more official ceremonies celebrated by both the state and the opposition - as, for example, the celebration of Labour Day in 1985. The official celebrations in Warsaw were preceded by the laying of flowers at monuments to 'activist workers', by which is meant such people as the early leaders of the Polish Workers' Party. On May 1st the workers themselves, after a service in Nowa Huta for working people, intended to visit the place where two of their colleagues had died, victims of martial law. The procession was, of course, broken up, and only a few people reached their destination.

Poles also celebrate the anniversaries of their relatives' deaths. A special mass is ordered 'for the soul of the deceased' and, if he or she was an important or popular person, information about the mass is published in the Catholic press by the family. Commemorative anniversaries are often used as an opportunity for political demonstrations. The authorities celebrate the anniversaries of their heroes' deaths, and sometimes they take the initiative in the remembrance of certain events, in order to make them 'official', as it were, and turn them to their advantage. An example of this may be seen in the situation which occurred in Gdańsk in December 1984, when there was an official laying of wreaths by local authorities at the monument to the shipyard workers who were assassinated in 1970. A later demonstration, which included Wałęsa and other members of the underground Solidarity movement who had gathered for the same purpose, was broken up by force. Wałęsa, realizing that he would not be able to lay the wreath at the monument, threw it at the feet of the riot police.
Several underground activists were arrested on the (absurd) charge of 'hooliganism'.

Thus in contemporary Poland, not only is November 1st devoted to the dead, but also other occasions. Poles remember the dead, then, at particularly solemn moments, just as their pagan ancestors did.

II

Now for an analysis of the ritual dealt with above. It will not be theoretically homogeneous, but rather a preliminary attempt to investigate the problem using various analytical tools and techniques.

Let us start with the reasons for the existence of such rituals. Summarizing the ideas of students of the problem we may offer the following. In the religious systems of traditional cultures there occurs a blending of two categories of time: a transformation of linear time into cyclical, by which social order triumphs over the fortuitousness of death, or, speaking even more generally, culture triumphs over the biology (Eliade 1959; Leach 1961; Bloch and Parry 1982). This is precisely the source of those rituals that divide the continuity of time into cyclically returning periods. One of these ceremonies is All Souls' Day.

Another reason for the ritual is its dealing with death and the dead. Ritual, as Goodenough says, 'can be seen as developing around situations and involving objects that are associated directly and symbolically with matters about which people are in emotional conflict' (1974: 171).

The ritual in question carries the hallmark of sacrifice. Hubert and Mauss (1981) point out that it involves the destruction of a victim for the purpose of maintaining or restoring the proper relationship of man to the sacred order. Similarly, Leach stresses that the role of sacrifice is to enable man to construct a bridge to the other world, to the power of the gods - the source of health, life, fertility, political influence, wealth, etc. This power can thus become attainable for any otherwise helpless individual (1976: 83).

The cult of the dead in the religion of the pagan Slavs, and also after Christianisation, was connected with an agrarian cult. This is a rather universal phenomenon. Eliade has pointed out that agriculture meets the world of the dead on two planes. The first is solidarity with the earth: the dead are like weeds dug into the earth. On the other hand, agriculture is, above all, a technique of fertility, i.e. life propagated by reproduction, and the dead are specially connected with the mystery of renewal and eternal fertility (1959: 301). Like Bolivian Indians (Harris 1982), pagan Slavs tried to gain the favour of the souls of the dead, who were invited to feasts and given food and warmth. These actions established a covenant, a bond between the living and the dead. The food was left neither 'to feed souls', as was often claimed in
earlier Polish ethnographies (Zawistowicz 1933; Frankowska and Paprocka 1981), nor to prove that since 'food remained untouched, therefore the dead remain dead', as was perversely pointed out in a more recent ethnography (Stomma 1986: 3). The ritual was a sacrifice which was not a matter of eating, but rather one of offering.

Feeding beggars was a similar practice. Beggars are a marginal group to some extent beyond society, and more a part of the next world than of this one. On the principle of reciprocity, beggars had in their turn to pray for the souls of their benefactors. They thus provided a natural link between the temporal life and the eternal. The custom of feeding beggars was common up until the Second World War, when it disappeared along with the social category of beggars. At present it appears only on the occasion of the more important Church festivals.

In the course of history the character of this sacrifice has been changing. Originally it was the souls of dead ancestors to whom sacrifices were offered, and later it was God. Now it is a ritual obligation rather than a proper sacrifice as such. This evolution stems from a shift in the stress on the material value of the sacrifice (food) to its more symbolic meaning and the solemnity of the offerer. Nowadays, it is a candle that is given. This is a good offering because, being burnt, it goes to the other world. But it does not occur only in this context. It is a frequent element in other rituals - for instance, in almost every Catholic church ceremony. Candles blessed on Candlemas Day were lit during thunderstorms and were supposed to protect the household from lightning. Blessed candles were also used to assist a dying person's soul to ascend to heaven. One can conclude that people give offerings to the souls of the dead, invite them to feasts, or pray for them, but as soon as 'their time passes', people need to get rid of them as soon as possible. The candle is supposed to make this transition easier. As to the secular use of candles, their instrumental function prevails (e.g. to provide light during power cuts). They are also sometimes used to stress the ceremonial atmosphere of a meal.

The dominating symbol in the ritual described above seems to be fire (candles, fireplaces, bonfires). It is one of those symbols which, because of its very nature, has always been of fundamental significance in folk culture. This arises, inter alia, from the fact that, in van der Leeuw's words:

> Fire belongs only half to Nature, and the other moiety to culture. Of course primitive thought did not make this distinction, yet it is fully aware that fire is man's property: even if it did come down from heaven, still it was kindled and nourished by man' (1938: 60).

The meaning of this symbol does not depend only on its own nature, but also on how it is understood. According to Erich Neumann, fire is 'something "red", "hot", "burning"', which means that it is understood emotionally: 'fire is experienced with the aid of images which derive from the interior world of the psyche and are projec-
ted upon the external world, rather than that experiences of the 
external world are superimposed on the inner' (1971: 294). One may 
argue that the influence of the permanence of the symbol of fire 
in folk culture may be based on this.

The fire which I am considering is the good fire, the light:

...when once the association of light with goodness and 
darkness with evil had become established, it was carried 
out in ideas of the fate awaiting men after death. Good 
souls enter a world of light and wicked souls a world of 
darkness.

These words of Edwyn Bevan (1962: 111) lead us back to the ritual 
of All Souls' Day. This symbolism, accompanied by other denota-
tions (godhead, wisdom, truth and goodness), is evident in the 
ritual.

Besides the symbol of fire, flowers also appear in the All 
Souls' Day ceremony. Their role is to lend the proceedings a more 
festive character, to stress the reverence of the offerer. In con-
temporary Polish culture flowers are very often used. They are 
given during visits to people on their name days to indicate that 
it is not an ordinary but rather a festive occasion, and they may 
also express sympathy. They often emphasise respect (for example, 
flowers given to a doctor to whom one is grateful at the end of an 
illness); or they function as a bribe to a woman clerk, on whom 
one is depending to arrange some matter for the donor. Laid at the 
monument of a national hero, they are an expression of homage.
When they are laid on graves during funerals or on All Souls' Day 
they underline the festive or unusual character of the occasion, 
express reverence for the dead, and symbolize an association with 
them.

There could, however, be another interpretation. Let me 
attempt a structural analysis. For Lévi-Strauss, the opposition 
between life and death is of primary importance. As with other 
oppositions, it cannot be overcome, but myths attempt to resolve 
it. 'Mythical thought', he writes, 'always progresses from the 
awareness of oppositions toward their resolution' (1963: 224). In 
primitive cultures, myth and rite constitute a certain whole, and 
are, as it were, two aspects of that culture: the theoretical and 
the practical (Mieletinski 1981: 52).

In the ritual under discussion, one can distinguish at least 
three important elements: food, fire and flowers. According to 
Danforth, food mediates the opposition between life and death in 
two ways. It is the metaphor of the human body as food. 'If the 
body is eaten by the earth, then it nourishes the earth and gives 
life to the world of nature' (1982: 104). The second is that food 
is believed to cross the boundary between the world of the living 
and the world of the dead, to pass from this world on over into 
the world where the souls of the dead dwell. These souls are 
thought to have the same needs as living human beings, yet they 
are unable to satisfy them without help' (ibid.: 104-5). Food is 
given to them directly or indirectly (through beggars or children).
Flowers, on the other hand, like all plants, weaken the opposition between life and death because they can be reborn each year. Flowers thus provide a metaphor of human life as plant life and therefore constitute an attempt to deny that human death is final (Leach 1961: 133).

Fire, light, symbolizing participation in the divine world and life everlasting (in heaven or in people's memory), can also deny man's death, which is now able to appear as a transitory stage, and not as the definite end of man's life. Fire is the transmitter between the world of the living and that of the dead.

These three symbols possess the same property: their role is to ease the discrepancy between life and death. They are used simultaneously, but in the course of history their role has been changed. Now it is rather the symbol of fire which conveys the message.

Let us pass on to the sociological part of the interpretation. 'In all societies', write Huntington and Metcalf, 'regardless of whether their customs call for festive or restrained behaviour, the issue of death throws into relief the most important cultural values by which people live their lives and evaluate their experiences' (1979: 2).

We honour the memory and the graves of those who were particularly important to us and who represented values particularly dear to us - indeed, who personified them. In paying homage to them, we acknowledge that we have the same beliefs as they had, and demonstrate the will to realise and defend the values they represented. And although our ancestors were surely no models of virtue, our memory sacralizes them. On a broader level, this concerns national heroes. That pantheon, however, is not assigned for ever. Heroes are historically changeable; nowadays, heroes are those figures who fought for independence and, more importantly, attained it, such as Field Marshal Józef Piłsudski. There are always many flowers on his grave in the crypt of Wawel Castle in Kraków.

People feel obliged to honour the memory of their ancestors. Historically speaking, this obligation has been realised in various ways. The principle of such ritual, however, has remained the same: as Turner put it, emotion was realised in ritual, which confirmed it as the norm, and the introduction of the ritual itself reinforced the norm (1970: 28-9). However, Radcliffe-Brown asserted that it is the ritual itself that determines the presence and intensity of the feeling expressed (1964: 324). I think that in the ritual in question there are two types of motivation; the first is connected with the acknowledgement of certain values as described above, while the second consists in social pressure only. However, the emotional result of performing the ritual is similar: strengthening or evoking the feeling of solidarity with the ancestors, continuity of tradition, or drawing attention to eternal matters.

Furthermore, the playing-out of the ritual itself integrates the group and allows it to distinguish its own members from outsiders. All Souls' Day fulfils this function by acknowledging the identity of the group and giving it a sacred character. However,
what has undergone change in the course of history is the nature of the group itself. Initially (i.e. before and for some time after the introduction of Christianity) we were dealing with a tribe; later, with a religious community, which was usually the local community made up of family groups; while at present, following urbanisation, it is the family and the nation. The sociological literature confirms the importance of these groups (at least as far as the two latter periods are concerned). The last period is of particular interest. Research into social consciousness by Stefan Nowak in the 1970s suggests that the Polish nation seems to be the sum of atomised families with nothing in between (Nowak 1979). The reasons for this should be sought as usual in the sphere of politics. All medium-range structures at present functioning in Poland are inauthentic, for they are created by the authorities. All attempts so far to create spontaneous groups or associations have been in vain; the only one to survive has been the underground Solidarity. On the surface, on the other hand, the groups which have resisted the destructive effects of the system are the family and the nation. The family is a group which can to a large extent resist the pressures of totalitarianism and the negative effect of the permanent economic crisis. The nation, on the other hand, is for historical reasons of fundamental importance to Poles and is linked with a sense of cultural identity. Thus the ritual described emphasises lasting and important social units, which are as it were realised over the graves of their dead, and the processes in which society participates. It also marks out lasting divisions and distinguishes its own members from outsiders. In this case, it principally concerns the division between the 'authorities' versus 'society at large', a division which became particularly important after 1980.

Connected with this is the problem of the two patriotisms: official patriotism, which chiefly concerns the last forty years of communist rule, and the spontaneous or traditional patriotism, expressing the cultural continuity of the Polish nation, despite attempts by the authorities to interrupt it (see Mach 1985). It must be added, however, that traditional Polish patriotism was formed during the period when Poland was partitioned: a strong identification with an idealized 'Poland' as a cultural unit became at that time the only source of national identity. This patriotism was, in fact, then the only indicator of the existence of a Polish nation. Being oppressed by a foreign power, Poles clearly distinguished the nation from the state. Thus the traditional patriotism is not chauvinistic, because it emerged from the need for ideological defence rather than attack, for example to sacrifice a great deal for the homeland (though all too often this has been limited to grumbles about the 'poor country' without anything positive being done). Patriotism of this kind thus has not necessarily meant a sense of solidarity with other compatriots, but rather a sense of solidarity with the idealized image of the country (symbolized by national heroes and those periods when Poland was a powerful and independent state). The communist state has tried to turn this Polish patriotism to its own advantage, but it has only partially succeeded. Poles have recognized that this
state, however 'Polish' it may be, does not express the Polish nation's aspirations, and that it has no intention of continuing traditional Polish culture, in which a sense of independence is deeply rooted.

One can learn much about these matters from a study of rituals and the symbols used in them, because they will in any case reflect, according to Turner, the key to an understanding of the social structure and the social process (1969: 1-43).

Let me conclude with the problem which was presented at the beginning of this article. Why did Protestants begin observing the ritual of the lighting of candles? It was the secularisation of this custom in an organisational sense, as well as the attribution to it of a very general religious meaning, which caused Lutherans to cease seeing it as a threat to their identity as a denomination different from Catholicism. Furthermore, failing to practise this custom would now be understood as an offence to the memory of the dead. From this change in Lutherans' behaviour, it may therefore be concluded that there has come about a change in the meaning attributed to the ritual.

The problem of secularisation (or rather, 'de-denominationalisation') itself remains behind, however. I believe that the two phenomena have overlapped. First, there has taken place a spontaneous generalisation and erosion of the religious significance of the lighting of candles, as this specific symbolism was no longer necessary. The pagan meaning of this ritual, or method of understanding it, no longer constitutes a threat to the Church. The Church meaning constructed to replace it, i.e. the 'supplicatory prayer for the wretched souls in Purgatory, that Christ shine His eternal light upon them', seems today to be rather naive. For this reason it has been replaced with a more universal meaning. Whether this process was spontaneous or guided is difficult to say; certainly Church teaching has ceased to be concerned with the question. It has, as it were, become so obvious that it requires no specific justification; like the Christmas tree at Christmas, as one informant put it, 'it has to be, and that is all'. But this secularisation does not mean desacralisation, for now it is people's memory and concern which sacralizes the whole sphere in which the ritual is performed.

On the other hand, there is a deliberate propaganda campaign on the part of the state media which, like the Church a thousand years ago, seek to accommodate old customs and apply a meaning to them which is convenient for the media as acceptable to society. In this case, it consists of drawing attention to the remembrance due to the dead. The occurrence of such phenomena we know from other contexts: the acceptance of the substance without identification with the transmitter. The worldly meaning has penetrated through to people's consciousness, dislodging the need for a religious justification. It was perhaps stronger, more general and unifying, and so is included in the ritual of all Poles, regardless of their denomination or lack of it. This ritual, moreover, is of some significance in the development of a sense of national identity, of the national ethos and the struggle for liberty.
And it often happens that it turns against the intentions of the propagandists, as people more often go 'to the graves of the Home Army [the resistance movement of the Polish government-in-exile during the Second World War], of those who were murdered near Katyn [where several thousand Polish officers were assassinated by Soviet secret police in 1940]...[or] those who took part in the 1830 and 1863 uprisings' (Komorowska 1984: 155), as one Warsaw informant put it, than to memorials to soldiers of the Red Army. Propaganda has always been interested in the graves of 'liberators' and of those who 'fell preserving the rule of the people' (e.g. Polish soldiers fighting together with the Red Army). It may be said that Polish society visits its own graves, and the authorities their own. This duality is even more dramatic when the authorities try to make society's graves 'official', as shown earlier. That example clearly indicates the basis of official ritual - the one meaning it carries is the legitimisation of authority. This meaning, at least since 1980, is recognised as such by society, which is why there is a desire to give even supremely official occasions, such as Labour Day (May 1st), the stamp of spontaneity. That is why, since then, Solidarity demonstrations and parades have been organised in many towns and cities, aided by the Church, which celebrates the worker St Joseph's Day on the same day.

Hence the phenomenon of adjustment is not at present a one-sided process. On the part of the authorities there is the 'officialisation' of traditional holidays and rituals. I may mention here two more examples: Whitsun has been made into the Festival of the United People's Party and May 3rd into that of the Democratic Party, both allies of the PZPR (the Polish United Workers' Party). On the other hand, society has made 'spontaneous' the festival of Labour Day, till now exclusively official. Nevertheless, in the social consciousness there does exist a clear division: Christmas, Easter, Corpus Christi and All Saints' Day (together with All Souls' Day) are family and Church festivals, while Labour Day and July 22nd, the anniversary of Poland's restoration of 'independence' after the Second World War, are official festivals. Two other festivals should also be mentioned here: May 3rd, the anniversary of the signing of the Polish Constitution in 1791, and November 11th, the anniversary of the rise of the Polish state in 1918. In the period between the wars these were state festivals; at present they are celebrated as opposition festivals, together with August 31st, the anniversary of the rise of Solidarity.

In conclusion, let it be said that the changes which have taken place in the understanding of the ritual described and interpreted above can be considered in three different aspects: 1) religious - in the sense of Catholic, denominational; 2) religious - in the sense of generalized Christian; 3) religious - in the sense of sacred by the force of people's memory and the performance of ritual. One may argue that the third aspect is not religious at
all, but that is only a question of definition.

The meaning attributed to the ritual in question changes from 1) to 3). This process may be called secularisation, but there is still much room for the sacred. The ritual may not be regarded as a religious one, but at the same time it is not entirely secular either.

There are still some questions which remain unanswered. Is contemporary man reconciled to the inevitability of death, or has he removed this problem from his consciousness? Have people ceased to be aware of the discrepancy between the loss of their own worth and the fact that they are mortal, or do they continue to believe in the immortality of their souls? It is difficult to give unambiguous answers to these questions, but the ritual I have attempted to present in this article allows me to count on the remembrance of my living relatives on at least this one day of the year.

GRAŻYNA KUBICA

REFERENCES


KOMOROWSKA, J. 1984. Święteczne zwyczaje domowe w wielkim mieście [Domestic Festive Customs in the Big City], Warszawa.


NOWAK, S. 1979. 'Przemiany świadomości społecznej społeczeństwa polskiego' [Changes in the Social Consciousness of Polish Society], Studia Socjologiczne, no.4.

NOWODWORSKI, M. (ed.) 1913. Encyklopedia kościelna [Encyclopaedia of the Church], Vols. 27 and 32, Płock.


... 1986. 'Ludwik XVII i upiory'[Louis XVII and demons], unpublished ms.


ZAWISTOWICZ, K. 1933. 'Obrzędy zaduszne' [The Customs of All Souls' Day], Wiedza i Życie, Vol. VIII, no.10.
Rural communities in developing countries have been a focus of attention for anthropological research centres for many years. However, that interest arose first of all in countries engaged in some form of direct aid in agriculture and modernization in rural areas of the Third World. Poland's participation in this kind of international help has been modest and rather occasional, and as a result, Polish scholars have not had very strong motivations for engaging deeply in such studies. Nevertheless, there has been some Polish research on such topics in the post-war period.

Professor Andrzej Waligórski, the forerunner of modern Polish research on the peasantry of the Third World, tried to define the subject of such studies. By the term 'post-colonial peasantry' he meant communities living in rural areas, involved in agriculture, using simple tools and family manpower, and treating farming or animal husbandry as their way of life. They differed from primitive, isolated, tribal communities because of their intensive cultural contact with the rest of the world and their engagement, even though modest, in the market economy by selling their surplus. I will not discuss the accuracy of this definition here, save to say that all in all it covered not only the settled farmers, but also pastoral nomads and semi-nomads.

During the inter-war period, no field studies on overseas rural communities were carried out by Polish anthropologists, although during the Second World War a Polish exile, the late Lucjan Turkowski, studied traditional farming technology among Palestinian Arabs in the Judean Hills, publishing a paper on this topic in England during the same period. The real starting point for such research by Polish ethnographers and anthropologists was the intensive field studies carried out among the Luo of western Kenya by Waligórski between 1946 and 1948. Waligórski, once a
student of Bronisław Malinowski, spent the war in Britain, and after getting an English grant for his research he went to Kenya, where he focused his attention on cultural change among the Luo and their response to fifty years of British colonial policy. Having defined the scope of his study so carefully and precisely, he refrained from any attempt to present the whole traditional culture of the Luo tribe. In 1948 he returned to Poland, though even twenty years later he had still published only a part of his field data.³ (The rest was prepared and edited by Leszek Dzięgiel at the request of the author.) In 1974, Waligorski's premature death following a serious illness prevented the further studies he had planned on the peasantry of tropical East Africa. His studies were under-estimated and ignored by other Polish scholars, and they sank into oblivion despite the fact that they had been a real innovation in Polish anthropology because of their method and subject.

Nevertheless, in the late 1950s Polish anthropology gradually gained momentum and began to show more interest in non-European cultures. This was the close of the epoch characterised solely by field studies of isolated, small tribal communities, and post-colonial peasant masses became an important focus of Western anthropologists' interest. All the same, during the post-war period Polish scholars carried out several field studies devoted either to such primitive tribal groups or to problems far removed from traditional peasant economy and everyday life. Here might be mentioned Anna Kowalska's work among Shipibo Indians in the Peruvian Montana in 1948,⁴ Janusz Kamocki's research among the Kubu of the Sumatra forests in the 1970s,⁵ and Henryk Zimon's studies on the historical sense of some Tanzanian tribes, carried out in the 1960s and published outside Poland by the Anthropos Institute.

The idea of research on the rural populations of the developing countries gained in popularity among Polish anthropologists in the 1960s and especially the 1970s, the most fruitful period of our field studies. Since the late 1960s, much research has been carried out in Mongolia by Polish scholars from Warsaw University and the Warsaw Ethnological Centre of the Polish Academy of Sciences. The Poles and their Mongolian colleagues worked under the direction of Professor Witold Dynowski, most attention being paid to the processes of modernisation among nomad and semi-nomad pastoralists and to those traits of their traditional culture which survived in the changing economic and social milieu. (It was only in the 1950s that Mongolian society became the object of mass collectivization.) The most comprehensive study published by a member of the Polish team was the book written by Sławoj Szynkiewicz in 1981 on the contemporary Mongolian family.⁶ Up until now, Mongolia has been the location of the most regular and comprehensive field studies on rural populations. Other research projects have been less methodical, and the subject of study has sometimes been a matter of chance.

Afghanistan was also visited by Polish scholars rather frequently up to the end of the 1970s, although their studies have not been limited to the rural population alone. Articles by Tadeusz Martynowicz on the traditional Afghan family and wedding ceremo-
ies, Jadwiga Pstrusińska on the Paštunvali tribal code and traditional healing practices, Bohdan Bielkiewicz on traditional customs of inheritance and Leszek Dzięgiel on traditional diet and nutrition systems concerned a traditionally minded urban population as well as rural communities. And Dzięgiel's paper on contemporary Kabul dealt with the sociocultural phenomena of the Afghan capital. On the other hand, Krzysztof Wolski stuck to rural areas and their problems, presenting some features of traditional agriculture in Afghanistan and the culture of nomads from the Afghan-Pakistan border involved in bazaar commerce. To this same category belongs the articles written by Dzięgiel on village architecture and problems of hygiene among the villagers.

Almost all these scholars visiting Afghanistan were from universities and museums in Cracow. In 1976, however, a Polish ethnological expedition from Poznan University, led by Professor Zbigniew Jasiewicz, also visited the country. The expedition's main interest was in the rural communities of Hazarajat and northern Afghanistan. Their actual field studies took three months and covered four villages, and they found a group of Haydariyan quite unknown to Western anthropologists. Among the positive results of the expedition was a book by Marek Gawęcki on the Afghan village under culture change, published in 1983 and the first anthropological monograph on Afghanistan written by a Pole. Other problems of Afghan rural communities in the second half of the 1970s were discussed in articles written by other members of the Poznan team, dealing with traditional craftsmen, village house-builders, folk medicine, magic, and so on. Here, we should also mention the book published by Zbigniew Jasiewicz on Soviet Uzbekistan and its traditional, rural features of culture, and field research on the traditional farming of Pakistani Baluchistan carried out by Krzysztof Wolski in the 1970s.

Kurdish villages in northern Iraq were studies by Leszek Dzięgiel in 1977, 1978 and 1980 as a member of a team of agroeconomic experts from the Institute of Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture and Forestry of the Cracow University of Agriculture. The team worked under the direction of Lucjan Wollen in the three Iraqi provinces of Dohuk, Arbil and Sulaimania on contract to the Iraqi Ministry of Agricultural Irrigation. The venture was, therefore, more of a utilitarian than an academic character, though while performing his duties as a member of the team Dzięgiel collected data on the economy, everyday life and modernization of Kurdish villages resulting from oil prosperity and the government's policy of opening up Kurdistan. In 1981 he published a book on this modernization, the first scholarly report on the sociocultural consequences of the oil boom in modern Kurdistan. However, the difficulties of the situation in which the team had to work, as well as the fact that Dzięgiel was the only anthropologist in it, made it impossible for him to broaden the scope of his research, and some cultural problems had to be left practically untouched.

Another Polish anthropologist, Marek Tracz, did research in Egypt during his stay at the University of Cairo in 1975. He gave much consideration to the cultural and economic evolution of the Egyptian peasantry during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.
under the impact of a long-term though rather ill-calculated government policy of modernization, studying especially simple technology and its transformations. The results of Tracz's studies in Egypt, together with observations made by Dzięgieł in Libya during a trip around major Libyan irrigation projects in Tripolitania, the Fezzan oases and Cyrenaica in 1981, were published by the two authors in a separate study.18

In this same period (the mid 1970s) Adam Rybinski of the Warsaw University Institute for the Study of Developing Countries stayed in Algeria, where he was involved in research on Saharan nomads, Tuaregs and Arab Beduins, especially their acculturation and the problems of their children's education.19 In a more comprehensive study, he concentrated on the social structure of one branch of the Tuaregs. Among Polish scholars interested in the problems of the Sahara and the Sahel should be mentioned Florian Plit, also from Warsaw University. In 1981 he published a book, based on his dissertation, on the ecology of pastoral animal husbandry in the Sahel, in which, though a geographer, he tried to insert some anthropological considerations.20 Plit travelled to Algeria, but his study is a comprehensive and up-to-date compilation or textbook rather than the results of his field research.

Mention should also be made of the field research done in northern Egypt by Professor Zajączkowski, of the Centre for Non-European Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences. Zajączkowski took part in the West German expedition to Egypt in 1984, which was interested in some newly settled rural areas in that country. The same Polish scholar spent some time in Uganda in the 1960s, but his studies from that period concern more general problems, of African mentality, philosophy and culture.

The field studies on peasant communities of Black Africa which had been initiated by Professor Waligórski were also being continued in the early 1980s. One quite interesting piece of research has been carried out by Ryszard Vorbrich, a young anthropologist of Poznan University, among the Daba tribe of northern Cameroon. His attention was focused on the traditional economy of the inhabitants of a rather remote mountain region and the ecological aspects of this type of human activity. This economy developed under the impact of the Muslim Fulani invasions of the nineteenth century, which one hundred years later has proved rather disastrous to the natural environment and the whole local traditional culture. The cultural and ecological phenomena described and analysed by Vorbrich in Cameroon could be relevant also to several other regions in contemporary tropical West and Central Africa. Another African field study has been carried out by Henryk Zimon mentioned above, who between 1984 and 1985 studied the animistic funeral and agricultural rites of the Konkombo tribe of northeastern Ghana. Zimon is Professor of the History and Ethnology of Religion at the Catholic University of Lublin.

During the post-war period, the Americas were also a subject of interest for the Poznan Ethnological Centre of the Polish Academy of Sciences, which formed a research unit quite separate from the local university, directed by Professor Maria Frankowska. In the 1970s the Andean countries, especially Peru, were the scene of
anthropological activity by some Polish scholars and undergraduate students, the culture of Indian mountain peasants being one of the most important topics of their studies. Unfortunately, up till now only a small part of this data has been published.

Indeed, a considerable amount of the data collected on all these field trips has yet to be published or even analysed by the anthropologists concerned. Waligórski's book on the Luo tribe, originally printed in a small edition, has been out of print for many years. Two books and a number of papers were the sole result of the long field trip to Mongolia. Some of the data collected in northern Iraq and Afghanistan has appeared, but we are still awaiting the publication of most of the material on Baluchistan, Egypt, Algeria and the Cameroons. Some field data has been analysed in theses, but unfortunately, these are still locked up in universities or the archives of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and as a result they have lost their immediate interest. Another problem is the dissemination of Polish anthropological research abroad. Almost all the published results are in Polish, though they are generally provided with an English summary of one or two pages, sometimes with a brief summary in French or Russian. However, Waligórski's book, an exemplary field study, was printed without any foreign-language summary at all.

It should also be mentioned that Polish ethnographers interested in non-European studies form quite a small community of a dozen or so scholars dispersed among several academic centres and museums. An even smaller group are those concerned with the peasantry of the developing countries, and they are altogether too few to establish a nationwide forum for scientific discussion. Also, up to now we have had only very poor and unsatisfying contacts with our colleagues among foreign ethnographers. As Poland's participation in international aid programmes is rather modest, there is practically no demand in the country for sociocultural studies on rural problems in the developing countries. There are few Polish contracts with developing countries concerning our scientific and technical consulting services in agriculture, and even rarer are contracts requiring the participation of an anthropologist or sociologist in studying the local sociocultural milieu. In 1974, the team of the Institute of Tropical and Subtropical Agriculture and Forestry working on the El Useta project in Libya used the services of a sociologist, Henryk Konarski, though only on a small scale. A greater interest in the human factor was discernible during the rather preliminary field studies conducted by the agroeconomic team in northern Iraq mentioned above, where the anthropologist was more or less allowed to do his job. But generally, our academic centres and museums have almost no means of sending their scholars abroad regularly to make field studies. For a Polish scholar to get a grant enabling him to visit a non-European country and do field research is today most frequently the result of chance rather than planning. No wonder that Polish studies on Third World peasants are commonly marked by contingency and academicism. There is neither the skill nor the will to discuss the results of an anthropological field study with scholars representing the other branches of social
science nor natural science nor technology. As a consequence, many of these studies are too descriptive and inconclusive, since the researcher's knowledge of Third World realities has been based only on his personal experience in the developing country which was the object of his fieldwork. His interesting and even valuable field experience remains for him merely a body of information isolated from the broader context. He cannot obtain any greater sociocultural perspectives, since the most up-to-date foreign publications on any particular topic are generally unavailable, simply because of the lack of foreign currency. And for the same reason, it is not possible for anthropologists to visit other developing countries of the same region of the world to get a broader anthropological background.

Some scholars are still influenced by an old, romantic vision of a traditional Golden Age, a tribal way of life destroyed ruthlessly by alien modernization and culture change. The analysis of contemporary cultures, the aspirations and motivations of the local population, and the elaboration of alternative proposals for sociocultural development are all problems which are rather remote for some ethnographers and anthropologists in Poland. Such things belong to the world of the practical, and are rather remote in their turn from university lecture rooms and libraries. In fact, nobody expected our anthropologists to do such things or to solve such problems, since according to at least one popular opinion, an ethnographer should be involved and interested only in, let us say, folk dance, exotic objects of art, or museum artefacts.

Today, we have in Poland the scientific potential to carry out studies on the peasantry of the developing countries, and we also have some field experience. On the other hand, Polish scholars are quite conscious of their contemporary and rather difficult situation. In the hope that, in the future, our country will be able to establish closer cooperation with developing countries and become more interested in their rural problems, our ethnographic and anthropological community will try to continue its work and even to stimulate interest in the Third World among students and university staff, despite these handicaps. It is especially important to foster lines of research concerning contemporary rural populations and the problems of mass culture emerging from rapid urbanisation in the Third World. These decisive forces and phenomena should not be omitted or neglected if we want to be conversant with the current problems of these countries. For the sake of stimulating new ideas, as well as improving our theoretical approach and methods, we must be given opportunities to meet and discuss our problems. The discussions should by no means be limited exclusively to anthropologists, but ought to involve scholars from other disciplines. More than anything else, however, we need greater access to the developing countries to study their actual situations and improve our tools of research, greater access to foreign scientific literature, and contact with our colleagues at the seminars, meetings and conferences they organise.

LESZEK DZIEGIEL
REFERENCES


In the summer of 1976, the Department of Ethnology of Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan, Poland, organised an ethnological expedition to Afghanistan.1 In the course of fieldwork conducted in northern Afghanistan in the vicinity of Kaisar (Fariab province), the expedition came across an unknown and so far undescribed group which differed from the surrounding population in many ways. The men's main occupation was blacksmithing and they were also circumcisers for the region; they were endogamous and had distinct physical features; and they lived in a separate village and used a distinct language.

The ethnonym of this group is Haydari (plural Haydarii). They number several hundred individuals and inhabit their own village of Haydarikhona and a part of a nearby village named Chor Tagou, though a few individual Haydari families have broken away from the community and live in Qaisar and other towns. They have very little land and occupy the lowest position in the local hierarchy. The keen awareness the Haydari have of their separate nature results from the particular nature of their existence and the attitudes of their neighbours, who treat them as a socially inferior group.

The Haydaris' nearest neighbours are the Qipchaqs, who consider themselves to be Uzbeks but at the same time are aware of...
their separate ethnic origin. In the same area are villages inhabited by the Char Aymqs. In the settlements near the bazaar in Qaisar live the families of merchants, craftsmen, clerks and other newcomers, who came there because of its development as a centre of trade and administration - Pashtuns, Turkmen, Uzbeks, Hazara and Tadzhiks. For many centuries the Haydaris have been linked mainly with the Qipchaqs - as servants living on their land - but their journeys to the bazaars in Qaisar and elsewhere have enabled them to make contact with other ethnic groups too. The Qipchaqs consider the Haydaris to be originally Baluchis from south-eastern Iran who brought blacksmithing with them and who settled on lands already occupied by the Qipchaqs. They also point to the dark skin of the Haydaris and say that twenty or thirty years ago they looked 'very black and ugly', but that nowadays they look less unattractive than before. Other views expressed by Qipchaq informants are that the Haydaris belonged to the Char Aymaq group or that they were Tadzhiks. Haydaris would rather see themselves as a Qipchaq clan and stated that they had arrived from somewhere in the direction of China, that they had lived on this territory before the Qipchaqs, and that they were told to learn blacksmithing.²

Haydaris refer to their separate and carefully guarded secret language as zaboni magati, 'human language' (zabon, 'language'; magat, 'man, human being', magati, 'of man, human'). I propose to adopt this name and use the term Magati. In contacts with outsiders they speak Persian (in its local Dari version), a language long known to the Qipchaqs, but they also know Uzbek. During a collective interview in Haydarikhona village, informants said that some thousands of people used a language similar to Magati in Kabul and Herat.³ Qipchaqs stated that the language was neither Iranian or Turkic but somewhat similar to Urdu; they seemed to regard it as rather unpleasant on the ear.

While conducting their research on the Haydari group, members of the Poznan Expedition collected a small sample of linguistic data. It is not much to go on; but for the sake of the record I produce the entirety of what was brought back from the field, exactly as received (and transcribed, moreover, according to the rules of Polish orthography):


³ Some informants I interviewed in Afghanistan in 1978 maintained that Magati speakers were also to be found in Mazar-i-Sharif.
1.

magata miaz (biaz?)
see man
magata miazem (biazem?)
see that man
katagi
mature man
mikim (bikim?)
go
duka
bread
gurak
house, room
danamosa
horse
buduku (budyky?)
girl, daughter
kalpuk
dog
ahumssooh
sheep
kolin
carpet
hoisk
hammer
sandok
chest
ambur
storeroom
dam
blacksmith's bellows
lou
iron
ochangari
smithery
kategi
father
apa
mother
donom (danam?)
woman, wife
nadachszut
man
kucza
road
borgh
orchard
lauza
water melon
jiryk
money
gadar
donkey
kaltoly
sickle
hurdik
wheat
gadarek
barley
dutki
tobacco

dutki

2.

Man magateem
I am a man
Man bosor mikiném
I am going to the bazaar
Tu bosor mikini
you are going to the bazaar
U bosor mikina
he is going to the bazaar
Mo bosor mikinam
we are going to the bazaar
Sumo bosor mikinid
you are going to the bazaar
Onho bosor mikinam
they are going to the bazaar
Man bosor bikimidom
I went to the bazaar
Tu magata miyazi
you see a man
In magata biyaz
look at that man
Man dina šakuš pušbuldam
yesterday I bought a hammer
Čakuš mušbulom
I am buying a hammer
Indžo butomm
I am sitting here

4 Material gathered by Professor Zbigniew Jasiewicz from children aged 8 to 12 years; ch=[kh], sz=[sh], ż=[zh], ż=[w], j=[y].
I was given this data by Professor Zbigniew Jasiewicz, head of the Poznan Expedition, with a request to identify the language it belonged to. After an initial examination, it was clear to me that the grammatical system was very similar to that of a Persian dialect, whereas the vocabulary seemed to be of mixed origin (from the Indian Peninsula, from dialects of Asiatic Gypsies, Turkic languages, Persian, Arabic and others). Further investigation led me to the conclusion that it is a hitherto unknown argot or secret language. Such languages have a very special social function, namely to protect the interests of the group. The term 'argot' is often confused with 'jargon' (incidentally the two terms come from the same source), but unlike the usage attaching to 'jargon', 'argot' does not have a pejorative meaning. Until now, information has existed on only one argot from Afghanistan, namely Zargar; others have never been collected.

It seems that Magati is very similar to the argot or secret language Chistonegi, which is used by members of the Chistoni group, weavers of sieves living scattered over the territory of the Tadzhik and Uzbek Soviet Socialist Republics. Analogies between Magati and Chistonegi in morphology and vocabulary are beyond doubt. For example:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chistonegi</th>
<th>Magati</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>mekimam</td>
<td>mikimim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bakim</td>
<td>bikim</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dawawak</td>
<td>danam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gadar</td>
<td>gadar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>gulak</td>
<td>gurak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>kalpuk</td>
<td>kalpuk</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As well as Persian words (e.g. zabon, duka, ambur, kueza, chumszoch, borgan, oohangari, kolin), the Magati terms listed contain borrowings from Turkic (e.g. kategi, jiryk, kahtroty), as well as vocabulary from the Indian Peninsula (e.g. gadar, gurak, al, lou). However, it cannot be definitely established which language this latter group of words comes from, since many Middle and Modern Indic languages have similar forms. For example, there is a striking similarity between many Magati words and some found in the dialects of Asiatic Gypsies (e.g. gadar, lou, magati, gurak). Words of Indian origin in Magati belong, most probably, to the oldest vocabulary items and were taken from the former ancestral homeland situated in the Indian Peninsula. One may regard the words of Persian and Turkic origin as more recent, since they were adopted during the group's wanderings and after settlement on their new territories. In addition, words of Arabic origin (e.g. kalpuk and haydari) have found their way into this language. Several items of the vocabulary (e.g. hoisk, nadasmsut) are similar to words used by a medieval Central Asiatic guild group called Sasyans, as is borne out by the book Kitab-e-Sarsiyan, written in 1344.

5 Material gathered by Andrzej Ananicz, again following Polish orthography, except for c as [tsh], S as [sh], Ž as [zh], and a.
The physical features of the Haydari group, who clearly differ from other groups because of their darker hair and complexion, and the Indic, possibly Gypsy elements of their vocabulary, may suggest a Gypsy origin. Yet on the basis of such scanty linguistic material it is impossible to establish the exact place in the Indian Peninsula which they once inhabited. It is possible that the ethnonym Mugat, once used by the Central Asiatic Gypsies and a name the Haydaris would have had to abandon on accepting Islam and which can still be traced in the name of their language, magati, is somehow connected with Magadha, the north Indian state and province which still existed in the tenth century, and with the Middle Indian language, Magadhi.

Further research on Magati would obviously require the collection of much more extensive material, which can be undertaken only in the Haydari community, and this is at present completely ruled out by the current political situation in Afghanistan. We do not even know whether this group still exists. There may be a chance of finding some representatives among the Afghan refugees and in Pakistan or Iran, since it is known that the number of non-Pashtun refugees has recently started to increase, and many have been coming to Pakistan from the north of Afghanistan.6

JADWIGA PSTRUSIAŃSKA

---

6 This is a subject I have discussed elsewhere, e.g. 'Ethnicity among Afghan Refugees', Paper presented at a seminar in the Refugee Studies Programme, held at Queen Elizabeth House, Oxford, in March 1986.
This article concerns the least-known period of Bronisław Malinowski's life. Evaluations of his work often fail to take into consideration the significance of his Polish origin and cultural background in the shaping of his personality and creativity. Therefore I would like to demonstrate those elements which were important in this process: the domestic intellectual atmosphere, his studies at the Jagiellonian University, the influence on him of various men of knowledge, and his personal friendships.

Thus my aim is to show the figure of Malinowski as a young scientist and as a man, covering the period from 1884 to 1914. This is the period in Malinowski's life when he was strongly connected with Poland, even after he left for Western Europe and Aus-

This paper was first presented at the International Conference commemorating Bronislaw Malinowski's centenary, Cracow, in October 1984.

Two other articles about Malinowski's life have been published in JASO recently. The first, 'Malinowski: Edgar, Duke of Nevermore' by Krystyna Cech (Vol. XII no.3, pp. 177-83), is mainly about his friendship with S.I. Witkiewicz. The second, 'Bronislaw Malinowski: The Influence of Various Women on his Life and Works' (Vol. XV no.1, pp. 189-203), covers the period of his life that he spent in Cracow and the role of his mother. The aim of the present paper is to describe Malinowski's years in Poland as fully as possible in the light of all the available sources; it was previously published in Polish in Grażyna Kubica and Jamusz Mucha (eds.), Między Domami Świata - Bronisław Malinowski, Warszawa and Kraków: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowa 1985 (reviewed on pp. 155-8 of the present issue of JASO) - this is the first English translation.
tralia. It ends, symbolically, with the rift between Malinowski and Witkiewicz and the outbreak of the First World War.

Bronisław Malinowski was born in Cracow, the son of Józefa Łącka and Lucjan Malinowski.

Lucjan Malinowski (1839-1898) came from the landed gentry of the Lublin area. His father worked as a civil servant after losing his estate. Lucjan finished his studies at Warsaw Main School in the Historical-Philological Faculty. Later he spent some years as a scholarship holder in different academic centres, such as St Petersburg, Cracow and Leipzig, where he obtained a Ph.D. in 1872 for a thesis entitled 'Beiträge zur slavischen Dialektologie'. This was the starting point for dialect studies in Poland, and it gave Malinowski the title of 'founder of Polish dialectology'.

In the period 1872-7 he worked as a teacher in one of Warsaw's secondary schools. Later he was appointed to the Chair of Slavonic Philology at the Jagiellonian University in Cracow, which thus 'gained in Malinowski the first real linguist, who used modern linguistic methods, a professor devoting himself equally to didactic and scientific work'. Immense was the range and scale of his teaching duties, his scientific and organisational enterprises, his editorial work, and other kinds of endeavour.

However, his activities went further than his official duties: social life was also important.

At that time the professors of the Jagiellonian University formed a quite exclusive clan into which it was not easy to gain entry. Not only was a high level of scientific achievement required of a candidate, but also a high moral standard, appropriate social prominence, sociability, the proper care of children, and a sense of patriotism were all brought into consideration. These requirements were important because the intention was to create an elite which could influence young people. The professors' wives played a prominent role in this clan, often meeting together, and they made a great university aristocracy which passed judgements about professors and candidates. Woe betide any who became notorious!

Members of university society met each other in drawing rooms at fixed times and carried on conversations about university affairs, intellectual problems, and so on. This also concerned the Malinowskis.

Professor Lucjan Malinowski lived with his wife and their only son in a flat in the academic hostel which he was in charge of. 'Hard work in the different fields in which he was involved was the cause of the early ruin of his organism and heart disease'. He died in 1898, when Bronisław was fourteen, after which his son's education fell upon his widow.

Mrs Józefa Malinowska came from the landed gentry, but she did not possess any estate. She was a very intelligent person and probably received her education at a boarding school. Her upbrin-
ging and intellect made her the best person to guide her son's education.

Young Bronisław attended a good secondary school in Cracow and also learned to play the violin. Mrs Malinowska devoted herself entirely to her son's upbringing. She talked about him with her friends and made a display of his intellect and talent. She was obviously very proud of him.

After his father's death, Bronisław was badly afflicted with eye disease which, according to the doctor, was hereditary, and Bronisław was threatened with blindness. He had to stay in a dark room during the initial stages of his recovery and was advised to travel to tropical countries. It was probably scrofula caused by an infection of tuberculosis, which was widespread in Cracow at that time and which caused allergies, chronic conjunctivitis and other diseases.6

Although Bronisław had to stop his education at school, his mother did not despair. Instead, she herself learnt all that was needed - Latin, mathematics, etc. - and then taught her son in the darkness of his room. Bronisław was a gifted student and managed to learn despite such conditions. Mrs Malinowska took care not only of her son, but also of his colleagues from school who were living alone in Cracow. For instance, Professor Jerzy Litwiniszyn still remembers his father Józef's memories about Mrs Malinowska, who became his substitute mother. She was apparently a considerable influence on young Józef, choosing the books she thought he ought to read and advising him in everyday problems. He believed that she was a person of deep personal sophistication and culture.

In 1899, when Bronisław had recovered sufficiently, Mrs Malinowska packed his rucksack - which must have been a small sensation, as people used to travel with trunks in those days. They left for Africa and stayed there about six months. Bronisław's health improved, but the treatment had to be prolonged, so they made a second trip to Africa and also visited the Canary Islands in 1900, after Bronisław's graduation. However, there were some financial problems, for Mrs Malinowska received only a widow's pension from the University. She may also have been responsible for the hostel dormitory after her husband's death.

As we can see, Mrs Malinowska played a dominant role in her son's life and, without her concern and perseverance, he would not have been able to finish secondary school, let alone university. In fact, he passed his school examinations with honours in 1902.

Young Bronisław was brought up in the atmosphere of the modernistic Young Poland movement both in Cracow and Zakopane (the famous health resort in the Tatras) in the company of people who later became famous Polish artists, writers, poets and philosophers. In Karol Estreicher's biography of the logician and painter Leon Chwistek we find this description of young Malinowski and his relationships with his friends Chwistek and Stanisław Ignacy Witkiewicz:

Bronisław Malinowski, weak in health, was the son of the prematurely deceased Lucjan Malinowski... Bronisław was a
diligent boy, not gifted with imagination but learning well. He didn’t reveal his thoughts, was vigilant in order to act decisively later, and avoided responsibility. Frequent conflicts arose. All three read each other their plays and poems and wrote imaginary scientific treatises.

The literary imagination of the boys was stimulated, excited by and mixed with the eroticism of the Young Poland movement, which was then at its zenith. Dreams about success, power and fame were mixed with dreams about love, apprehended naively as a sensual madness.

S.I. Witkiewicz (known as 'Witkacy') was Malinowski’s closest friend. He later became one of the major figures in Polish modern painting, literature and theatre. They lived together in Cracow in Bronisław’s flat and spent their holidays at Zakopane, where Witkacy’s mother possessed a boarding house and Mrs Malinowska rented a cottage. The relationship between the two friends was very important, and they both seem to have valued it highly. Witkacy discussed it with his father, the painter and writer Stanisław Witkiewicz, who commented:

In one of your letters you wrote to tell me something about Bronio. Strictly speaking, I know him very superficially. I know the external form of his intellect, which is evident in many ways. He gives the impression of a man whose thought and words are independent of his emotions, his inner ego, and of external influences.

Witkacy also tackled the matter of their friendship in his juvenile autobiographical novel entitled The 822 Downfalls of Bungo or the Demonic Woman written between 1909 and 1910 when he was 25 and the record of Witkacy’s love for the famous ‘demonic’ actress. It is also a social and historical commentary, describing the life of Cracovian bohemians and their young admirers. Among the main characters of the novel we can recognise Witkacy himself, Chwistek and Malinowski (as the Prince of Nevermore).

Here are some fragments describing the latter:

His cold, green, reptilian eyes, looking through the glasses of a seventeen-diopter pince-nez, represent a disturbing contrast with the childlike smile of immense, red, beautifully formed lips.

The prince was sitting on a sofa, lolling about with an elusive nonchalance, which representatives of high society tried to imitate in vain. Even in this posture, he didn’t lose the appearance of self-assurance and the left the impression of a resting tiger. (p.117)

His face, full of terrible will, expressed a longing for the fulfilment of all the vital appetites, which his health, impaired for thirty-six generations, prevented. (p.75)
Witkacy's novel also pictures the juvenile distractions of his characters and presents their different attitudes towards the meaning of life, and their self-definition and seeking of an identity.

What was Malinowski's viewpoint on these matters? He considered that we could and should consciously form the world with the force of our will and energy, somehow creating life within ourselves and discovering within ourselves the source of power and strength. This was to enable him to reach the desired 'unity in variety' - a goal unattainable to others. This state did not result from Malinowski's innate predisposition but from his intense quest for self-improvement, to which the following memories of Kazimiera Źuławska bear witness:

It was a feature of the frail Malinowski that he developed his strength and efficiency and overriding willpower which he achieved by climbing dangerous rocks and chimneys alone and practising almost like a yoga. Therefore, when Malinowski was in his assigned working time, there was no force which could distract him from it.

Witkacy, in his novel, also pointed out the creative force which Malinowski achieved by controlling his feelings and striving for self-improvement. Finally, the book should be seen as an attempt to debate important philosophical questions on the nature of the human being - for example, on the dilemma between Malinowski and Witkacy representing the polemic generally between the scientist and the artist; the first always saw the human being in his social context, while the second tended towards individualism. The role and meaning of art in a man's life was another issue. According to Witkacy, art was completely separate from life; according to Malinowski, it was the means of achieving vital power.

I shall now turn to a discussion of Malinowski's scientific interests. The process of shaping these was far from simple; a lot of factors seem to have influenced his scientific profile, the most important of which was his academic training at the Jagiellonian University. This university, though then under Austrian domination, was a Polish university, exerting its influence on all Polish territories. Its professors and students came from all parts of divided Poland. During this period the University was composed of four faculties, theology, law, medicine and philosophy. It was in the philosophy faculty that the study of social and natural sciences was undertaken.

Malinowski started his studies at the Faculty of Philosophy and chose sciences as his main subject, but he gradually devoted more and more time to the arts. Professors of considerable calibre were lecturing at the University at the time. Stefan Pawlicki (positivist and theologian) had a particular influence on Malinowski's scientific profile, with his seminars on the history of philosophy. His lectures served to propagate new ideas and covered a wide range in contemporary philosophical and scientific thought. From Pawlicki, Malinowski obtained not only a broad historical
knowledge, but also a sense of discovering truth. He was not only a teacher but a personal friend and patron; Malinowski wrote to him in 1906: 'With great impatience I am looking forward to the moment when you, Father, return to us for good and when I can satiate my philosophical doubts and perplexities at the source'. Malinowski's scientific interests centred mainly on studies in positivism, as demonstrated in his Ph.D. thesis entitled 'O zasadzie ekonomii myślenia' (On the Principle of the Economy of Thinking'), which was a criticism of Avenarius and Mach.

Thus Malinowski's philosophical background was formed in Cracow, especially under the influence of Pawlicki, but also his father's friends, Professors L. Dargun and S. Estreicher (both lawyers) and K. Potkański, the historian. These intellectuals shared an interest in ethnology and sociology, which tended to benefit their legal and historical research. It is also necessary to mention W. Matlakowski (physician and ethnographer), M. Zdziechowski (Slavist and philosopher) and the linguists J.M. Rozwadowski and K. Nitsch (the latter was Lucjan Malinowski's assistant and tutor to the young Bronisław). On reading the biographies of these outstanding men, one gains the impression that Malinowski not only continued to be influenced by them, but also that as a man he was very similar to them. Years later, Malinowski wrote about these influences:

The array of men of knowledge, writers and artists, remains before my eyes. I will mention here only those with whom I had the opportunity to come into personal contact and draw these really great cultural values which they represent.... From the perspective of today I can see how really good was the Polish culture which is focused on this small segment of national life.

However, his study of Frazer's The Golden Bough in the period 1904-5 became the turning point of Malinowski's scientific interest. Twenty years later, he acknowledged this in a lecture in honour of Frazer. He said that the book encouraged him to study anthropology and proved to him that this branch of knowledge was worthy of serious commitment. Nevertheless, this change in his interests did not come about completely one-sidedly: what also needs to be taken into account is the personal influence of teachers and professors among whom such subjects were very popular (somebody would have recommended the book to Malinowski), together with the situation in which Malinowski grew up. The situation I am referring to was the confluence between the subjugation of the nation on the one hand and the social position of Malinowski himself on the other, which enabled him to observe various social classes and strata, from the landed gentry and aristocracy, through artistic bohemians and intelligentsia, to exotic highlanders. All these factors together may well have led him towards a sociological and anthropological approach, the theoretical form of which he found in the work of Frazer.

To return to the biographical account, Malinowski completed his Ph.D. thesis in 1906, soon after finishing his study. Pawlicki was
his supervisor, and he and Professor Straszewski examined it and awarded it a distinction. Malinowski's final examinations in philosophy and physics were also highly regarded. However, the promotion was postponed until 1908, and because of his bad health, in the meantime he stayed with his mother in the Canary Islands.

After his return to Cracow in October 1908 he was promoted to the degree of Doctor of Philosophy sub auspiciis Imperatoris, a great honour and bestowed with due ceremony. The main auditorium in the Collegium Novum was packed with people from Cracow, but entrance was by invitation only. The representative of the Governor-General came first in the procession, followed by the president of the University and the professors in their gowns. There was music from the academic orchestra and the choir sang 'Gaude Mater Polonia'. Malinowski stood very close to his mother, and after the degree ceremony and consignment of a ring, the new doctor turned to his mother and kissed her hands and cheeks. 'It was really his mother's work', said Mrs Krzyżanowska, who had witnessed the occasion.

At the same time, Malinowski was involved in a complicated love affair. We can find information about it in the following memories of an acquaintance of Malinowski:

After some visits by a young philosopher, I realised that the real point of his helping me in my work was a young and beautiful musician's wife, whom he had met in my flat.... Fortunately the beautiful lady had to leave for Warsaw and the philosopher went to Leipzig for further study.

From then on Malinowski's relationships with Cracow began to relax, and he - as Juliusz Źuławski wrote - 'appeared like a bird and flew like a bird somewhere far away'.

Following other gifted graduates of the Jagiellonian University Malinowski went abroad to study further. He first went to Leipzig, staying there for only three semesters listening to the lectures of W. Wundt (philosopher and psychologist) and K. Bücher (economist) and coming into contact with Felix Krüger (Wundt's pupil and a representative of Gestalt psychology). Malinowski dealt mainly with psychology but he did not abandon science. He obtained a Habilitation scholarship from the Jagiellonian University for 1910 to 1914 which enabled him to go to England for further study. This he had been hoping to do in Leipzig and he had written about it to Pawlicki: 'I am very keen on going to England for at least a year, for there, it seems to me, culture has reached the highest standard'.

After a short visit to Cracow, also in 1910, Malinowski went to London and began a new period of his life in connection with the London School of Economics and Political Science. At first (till 1912) he was a postgraduate student working under the auspices of Professor E.A. Westermarck; later he himself became a lecturer in special subjects and about problems in the sociology of religion and social psychology (1913-14).

It took Malinowski some time to adjust to life in England and to the English people. He often felt lonely and wrote a lot of letters to his friends to alleviate his melancholy. For instance:
Today I am suffering from a fit of deep nostalgia, which I never knew before but which now occurs frequently. Finally I have escaped from London and for a few days I have been resting at the seaside. I am completely alone here and especially on account of the great stiffness of the Englishmen I feel lonely, and rather abandoned. In the autumn I will perhaps be in the country. I long to be in the mountains of Zakopane. It is the only place where I feel really well. 

He still maintained good relations with Witkacy and in 1911 invited him to London:

So do come right away or let me know immediately when you are coming. At present I am not busy and science is not in the way; as to 'women': this would not be a problem, anyway there is no one, unfortunately! Come in a week or two.

Witkacy accepted the invitation and spent two weeks in London accompanied by Mrs Malinowska and their friend, the poet Tadeusz Nalepiński.

In February 1912 Malinowski returned home to Cracow and stayed there for the whole year, until March 1913. He also spent much of his time with Witkacy in Zakopane. Even the woman who appeared in the lives of the two friends was unable to ruin their fraternal relationship. She had been involved with Witkacy but after Malinowski's arrival she transferred her attentions to him. In a letter to Witkacy she complained that 'Bronio is a part of you', which might indicate Malinowski's great influence over his friend, which became evident when she had got to know them both. The complicated situation did not last long because Bronio's interest proved temporary, and the former good relations between the two friends were restored. As he had done some years earlier, Stanisław Witkiewicz gave advice to his son:

Your relationships with people are of great concern to me. For instance, what you say about Bronio. Are you convinced that he is your only essential friend, and what you do you think of his soul? He was becoming completely egotistical. His anti-social theories were both narrow as an apprehension of life and expressed the narrowness of his own feelings.

Witkacy himself had observed some features in his friend's personality which troubled him, in spite of his constant respect and friendship. He wrote:

Bronio, so deep in crucial things, sometimes does something so disgusting and shows something so abhorrent that it shocks me.... There are little things in him which confuse me, and because I am subject to his demands, I respond on his terms, which poisons the relationship between us.
This was certainly a result of their very high demands on themselves and their strivings for self-improvement. Malinowski thoroughly analysed his own behaviour and motives in order to find his weak points and fight against them. That might suggest a cynicism taken to the extremes of his dignity, although sometimes such dissection and introspection can certainly be constructive for artists and scientists.27

Whilst living in England, Malinowski maintained good relations with the Academy of Sciences in Cracow, and he gave two lectures there while visiting the country.28 These lectures were based on earlier studies. He also wrote a paper which was a criticism of Frazer's Totemism and Exogamy. It was printed in three parts in Lud (Folk) between 1911 and 1913.29 Malinowski wrote to Kazimierz Nitsch about his scientific plans:

My mother would be very keen on my earliest possible Habilitation in Cracow. Now I have the Polish manuscript ready entitled 'Primitive Religion and Social Differentiation',...an expansion of the third part of my paper for Lud. I am mostly happy with it and regard it as fit for publication and I want to translate it into English later on.30

But Malinowski never obtained the Habilitation degree from the Jagiellonian University, due to his expedition to Australia, and he never translated his book. (It was published in Polish in 1915 by the Academy of Sciences.)

However, Malinowski's first book had been published earlier, in 1913. It was entitled The Family among the Australian Aborigines, a monograph based on such sources as reports and descriptions. In it he criticised the theory of the lack of the institution of the family among Aborigines. The book gained acceptance in scientific circles and Malinowski wrote to Professor Rozwadowski:

I enclose the review of my book, which appeared in the most competent English journal Atheneum. It is written by Professor Marett from Oxford.... The review is so good that I thought the fellow can't have had the book in his hands. But yesterday I was in Oxford and he showed me the book all marked - that means he read it.31

Years later, Malinowski referred to this work in the preface of a book by one of his pupils, Felix Gross:

I have also been associated with our ancient Jagiellonian University of Cracow. I also, like Dr Gross, have been inspired in my work by the teachings and personal interests of Professor Stanisław Estreicher. I have also started to study primitive societies in the library, and was only later able to go out into the field.32

This happened in 1914. The expedition was preceded by lengthy preparations. But his sense of humour did not leave Malinowski,
and he wrote to Kazimiera Żuławska: 'I have not married till now, but in New Guinea I will marry a Papuan for sure - it is cheaper than male service and divorces are easy. Anyway, women wash clothes better'.

In June 1914 Malinowski set out on his expedition to Australia with the British Association for the Advancement of Science, which was to hold its congress in Melbourne. He was accompanied by his friend Witkacy, who was the photographer and draughtsman on the expedition. But the real reason for Witkacy's inclusion was quite different - Malinowski decided to take him on the expedition in order to help him after the suicide of his fiancée.

The friends had left on their great journey in June 1914 from London, and by July they reached Fremantle harbour in Australia, together with several congress participants. The friends spent some weeks taking part in the congress, listening to lectures, attending official banquets, sightseeing and travelling in the regions inhabited by Aborigines. On August 25th Malinowski gave a lecture at the University of Sydney entitled 'A Fundamental Problem of Religious Sociology'.

On September 1st the friends drifted apart. The outbreak of the war was the main reason. Witkacy decided to leave and wrote about it to his parents: 'Today in Albany we received the tragic news about the war. If it is true I will leave Fremantle immediately on the first steamer. It is the only way I can be useful and achieve something'. His decision might have been aggravated by the deterioration of their friendship, since Witkacy wrote: 'Bronio is becoming more and more strange to me' (p.79). Also, the journey had not fulfilled Witkacy's hopes: 'I had forced on this journey at all costs, but I travelled with the thought of death all the time' (p. 83). At last the final quarrel occurred, and the friendship collapsed.

As he left Australia, Witkacy wrote to his former friend: 'I want you very much to change yourself before life teaches you different things in a more cruel way than it has so far. For some things I owe a deep gratitude to you'. And a few weeks later he wrote:

Nevertheless, I have remorse that you stayed there alone. But your behaviour towards me wasn't encouraging. I am writing to your old soul. I don't feel I have Malinowski as a friend and I must say that I don't long for him at all. When I was with you I longed for Bronio, and now I think about the good old days, when we used to discuss much of what we assumed to be essential, and did little. It was you who taught me to look at everything, including oneself, with cynicism. Think about it for a while. The comfortable position of having complete lack of faith in any gentle impulses added to your cold smile and this conviction that there is always meanness at the core. It is all too easy to see life in this way. Flowers can grow on mud, and one may look at them without putting one's nose into the mud. Excuse what I write. Don't think that I hate you.... I am writing to Bronio about Malinowski and about he who used to be Staš but hasn't become anyone else. (pp. 102-4)
Malinowski wrote about the rift in his Australian diary:

September 1st began a new epoch in my life: an expedition all on my own to the tropics. The Staś problem torments me. In fact his conduct towards me was impossible. There was nothing wrong with what I said in Lodge's presence; he was wrong to correct me. His complaints are unjustified, and the way he expresses himself precludes any possibility of reconciliation. Finis amicitiae. Zakopane without Staś! Nietzsche breaking with Wagner. I respect his art, admire his intelligence and worship his individuality, but I cannot stand his character.

Even after quoting these fragments of notes and letters, it is very difficult to tell what finally about the rift. The analogy with Nietzsche and Wagner, however, does suggest one possible interpretation (though of course it might be nothing more than a surface analogy illustrating the dissension of the two friends). Nietzsche charged Wagner with nationalism, with stress on the values of only one nation, with decadence in art and life, with an attitude deprived of stable standards and with too easy an assessment of values - all of which brought about his setting too much store on certain things. Witkacy fell victim to patriotic euphoria and eagerness to take part in a war which detracted from matters important for his friend. Other circumstances also need to be considered. Malinowski planned his expedition to last for two years, but at the outbreak of the war he had not even started his research; in that situation returning would have meant a catastrophe for his enterprise. Secondly, he was an Austrian citizen and therefore an enemy of Great Britain, and he could not leave Australia; he might have considered a change of citizenship in such a situation as treason. Thirdly, Malinowski's weak health prevented him from taking part in the war. All this split the friends deeply. Witkacy was not closely connected with the expedition and was only there to help his friend; he was a Russian citizen; his health was good enough for active military service. He clung to this possibility with the determination of a man deprived of the sense of life: 'It is a time when we ought to put off personal matters, renounce suicidal thoughts which are nonsense to what is going on, and to do something at last with one's life, with the remnants of strength which remain', he wrote to his parents. Phrases like 'looking at Australian plants, when there are such awful events out there, is without any sense' (pp. 79-80) would inevitably have given hurt to Malinowski, for whom perhaps not merely looking at plants but scientific work as a whole was of great concern. These differences intensified the distance which had started to emerge between them earlier. The time when their personalities correlated had passed by. They became great individuals, perhaps too great to stand each other. Bronio and Staś could be in the clouds together, but when they became Malinowski and Witkacy they differed too much. The coolness of a scientist could not exist with the emotional commitment of an artist. This
coolness separated Malinowski from Witkacy as well as from Poland; it was indispensable for science, but weakened all traditional emotional bonds.

To sum up, let me recall briefly those essential elements of Malinowski's personality that owe their origins to Poland and his formative years in Cracow. We find mainly a positivist philosophical background, an interest in ethnology, and a striving for self-improvement accompanied by an unusual sensitivity. We can find evidence of these factors in Malinowski's *A Diary in the Strict Sense of the Term* - a record of the author's intrinsic state of mind, his moods, physical condition, impressions and thoughts. All this was written in a rather emotional manner, reminiscent of his bohemian days in Cracow.

Grażyna Kubic

NOTES

1 'Pobóg' was his coat of arms.
3 Ibid., p. 349.
4 W. Truszkowski, 'Jak Bronisław Malinowski został ocalony dla nauki' [How Bronisław Malinowski has been Saved for Science], Paper containing Mrs Krzyżanowska's memories given in the Academy of Sciences in Cracow in 1984.
5 Taszycki op. cit., p. 350.
6 Cf. Truszkowski op. cit.
9 S.I. Witkiewicz, *622 upadki Bungo czyli demoniczna kobieta* [The 622 Downfalls of Bungo or the Demonic Woman], Warszawa 1978, p. 64.

Malinowski's student album contains information about the subjects he chose. In 1902-3 the lectures he attended were on: introduction to geometry (by Żorawski), introduction to mathematical analysis (by Zaremba), experimental physics (by Witowski), inorganic chemistry (by Olszewski); work in the physics laboratory (by Witkowski) and the chemistry laboratory (by Olszewski). In the second semester he also took part in a mathematical seminar (by Zaremba) and attended two semestral lectures on philosophy during the period of the Renaissance and the history of philosophy (by Pawlicki).

During the year 1903-4 Malinowski attended mathematical lectures on integral calculus and the theory of analytic function, and the mathematical seminar (all by Zaremba). He also attended lectures on projective geometry (by Russjan) and differential geometry, and the mathematics seminar of Żorawski. In physics, he attended lectures on the theory of heat (by Witowski) and theoretical mechanics (by Natanson). The humanities lectures he followed were: an outline of pedagogy and an explanation of the cultivation of volition and character (by Kulczyński), and psychology (by Pawlicki).

In 1904-5, there was an evident change in Malinowski's interests. He still attended lectures on integral calculus and the theory of analytic functions, as well as the mathematical seminar (by Zaremba), lectures on electricity and magnetism and the physics laboratory (by Witowski), on elasticity and the theory of electrons (by Natanson). However, he devoted much time to studies of philosophy and psychology. In first semester he attended lectures on the application of psychology to pedagogy (by Kulczyński), ethics (by Straszewski), the psychology of affections (by Heinrich), and a philosophy seminar (by Pawlicki). In that year he also attended lectures on philology - Polish lyrics from Mickiewicz (by Windakiewicz) and a Slavonic seminar (by Łoś) - but he did not continue his studies in this direction. During the second semester he attended lectures on an introduction to philosophy (by Straszewski), logics and dialectics, and the philosophy of Frederick Nietzsche (by Pawlicki), the application of psychology to pedagogy (by kulczyński), and two philosophical seminars (by Pawlicki and Straszewski).

In the last year of his studies (1905-6) Malinowski noted for the first time in his student book the lectures on philosophy. He attended lectures on psychology and ethics (by Straszewski), social politics, Aristotle’s philosophy, metaphysics and the history of modern socialism (by Pawlicki). During the whole year he took part in two philosophical seminars (by Pawlicki and Straszewski). Malinowski also recorded a mathematical lecture on differential equations.
and a mathematical seminar (by Zarembo), the year-long lecture series on electromagnetic waves, the theory of light and the physics laboratory (by Witowski), a lecture on the theory of electricity and one on the dynamics of electrons (by Natanson).

12 Letter of 1 November 1906 (in the Jagiellonian Library).

13 This dissertation was published for the first time in the first volume of the present complete edition of Dzieła [Works] by Bronisław Malinowski.


17 W. Truszkowski op. cit.

18 Cf. 'Listy Stanisława Ignacego Witkiewicza do Heleny Czerwiowskiej' [Letters of S.I. Witkiewicz to H. Czerwiowska], in Twórczość 1971, no.9, p. 49.


21 Letter of 12 August 1911 in Listy, p. 46.


24 Quoted from Listy, p. 25.


26 Listy, pp. 32-3.

27 For instance, Malinowski applied the method of introspection in his Wierzenia pierwotne i formy ustroju społecznego [Primitive Religion and Social Differentiation] (Dzieła, Vol. 1) in order to analyse the origin of religion.
The English version of the first of them, entitled 'Tribal Male Association of the Australian Aborigines', appeared in the *Bulletin International des Sciences de Cracovie* in 1913.


Letter of 30 June 1913 (in the Archives of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow).

Letter of 18 August 1913 (in the Library of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Cracow).


Witkiewicz, *Listy*, p. 79.

Ibid., p. 95.


Ibid, p. 34; note from 2 November 1914.

This book contains the speeches and papers delivered at the Malinowski Centenary Conference held in Cracow in September 1984 under the auspices of the Jagiellonian University, where Malinowski once studied. It was one of four conferences held that year to mark the occasion, the others being in London in April, New Haven in October, and Florence in November. For several reasons, the Cracow conference may have been the most significant. Effectively for the first time, Polish academia publicly embraced Malinowski as a long-lost national hero. It also marked the first real entry of Polish anthropologists into the international academic arena. Considering the political situation in Poland, it is not surprising that they had to wait for such an event of international importance and then use Malinowski as a national symbol in order to establish an academic dialogue with the West. Subsequent contact between Oxford and Cracow anthropologists has been particularly constructive, especially since the establishment of the 'Polish Hospitality Scheme', which has made it possible for Polish anthropologists - as well as other scholars from Poland - to visit Oxford University on a short-term basis. In September 1985 the Jagiellonian University hosted another international conference, on the subject of 'Ritual: Sacred and Secular'; a forthcoming conference, to be held in January 1987, is to be on 'Identity'.

The following papers were delivered at the conference: 'Malinowski in the History of Social Anthropology', by Raymond Firth (who was awarded an honorary doctorate by the Jagiellonian University); 'From Malinowski to Merton: A Case Study in the Transmission of Ideas', by Piotr Sztompka; 'Malinowski and the Development of Polish Sociology', by Jerzy Szacki; 'Bronislaw Malinowski's Polish Youth' by Grażyna Kubica; 'Bronislaw Malinowski's Idea of Culture', by Andrzej Paluch; 'Krakow Philosophy at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century and the Development of Malinowski's Sci-
entific Ideas', by Andrzej Flis; 'Polish Modernism and Malinowski's Personality', by Jan Jerschina; and 'Malinowski and the Problems of Contemporary Civilization', by Janusz Mucha.

From this list it is possible to deduce that the emphasis at the conference was on Malinowski's Polish social and domestic background and the formative philosophical, literary and artistic influences on his work and ideas. The connecting thread running through the papers seems to be an apology for not having wholeheartedly embraced Malinowski sooner - which in itself provides a statement about the political situation in Poland which made it impossible previously.

Kubica's paper (an English translation of which is reprinted in this issue of JASO) adds more fully to the biographical material now available about Malinowski's upbringing and early student career in Poland. She identifies four main influences which significantly shaped his personality: the domestic intellectual atmosphere, his studies at the Jagiellonian University, the influence of some men of knowledge, and his personal friendships.

Flis points to three main characteristics of philosophy at the turn of the century which must have had an impact on Malinowski's philosophical research when he was a doctoral student: a concern with historical research in Greek philosophy combined with modern contemporary European and Polish philosophy; the development of epistemology and the philosophy of science; and an interest in the belief systems of the Far East. The three teachers who exerted most influence on his ideas were Maurycy Straszewski, Stefan Pawlicki and Wladyslaw Heinrich, all followers of positivism and empirio-criticism. However, it was the work of Ernest Mach in particular which had a profound influence on Malinowski's theory of culture.

Jerschina, while not contradicting Flis, considers the influence of Polish modernism on Malinowski, his personality and ideas. He concludes that of the two intellectual trends prevailing in Poland at the turn of the century, positivism and modernism, it was in fact the latter which exercised the greater influence. Whereas positivism gave Malinowski reasons to take an anti-Hegelian stance, it was modernism and its romantic heritage which had most effect on his understanding of the historical process. Modernism's characteristic concern with the origin of culture, details of folk and national culture, and its expression in art and aesthetics all had their influence on Malinowski's ethnographic work. Similarly, biologism, the emphasis on man's dependence on nature, as well as self-analysis with respect to sex and eroticism, are all evident concerns of Malinowski, as witnessed in his fieldwork diaries. Elements of the modernist emphasis on individualism are also easily observable in his diaries. Understood without an appreciation of modernism's concern with objectifying feeling with respect to creating an understanding of life and a sense of being, they appear as evidence of egotism and exhibitionism. The cult of introspection and self-analysis should be seen more as a means towards creating an uninhibited state of being and as generating unconstrained expression. Other characteristics of modernism - an interest in religion, secret knowledge and magic
as well as humanism, democratism and patriotism - all found their mark in Malinowski's work.

Szacki addresses himself to the question of why Malinowski did not make an impact on Polish sociology even though his work was known in Poland (The Sexual Life of Savages and Crime and Custom in Savage Society had been translated in 1938 and 1939 respectively.) There are a number of reasons why this was so. Polish sociologists of the inter-war period were interested above all in the development of the nation state and the relation to it and participation in it by peasants. Thus, unlike Malinowski, they were interested in peasants rather than 'primitives', in the process of social disintegration and reorganisation rather than in static cultures and their functions, in the newness and separateness of society rather than in its similarities to other societies. Malinowski's The Dynamics of Culture Change (1946) did, it is true, address these problems, and his Freedom and Civilization (1947) did bring him closer to Polish sociologists, but they were published too late to have any impact. During the Stalinist era, after the Second World War, there was no sociology in Poland. After 1956 it was dominated by Marxism and American empirical sociology, and there is a big gap between Malinowski and Merton and Parsons. The work of Florian Znaniecki (The Polish Peasant in Europe and America, written with W.I. Thomas) had a much more receptive audience and a far greater impact in Poland than any of Malinowski's work.

Sztompka considers the gap between Malinowski's functionalism, now refuted by generations of social scientists, and the structural-functionalist school of sociology developed by Robert K. Merton. In a similar vein, Paluch addresses himself to the concept of culture developed by Malinowski. While it had great relevance to the development of anthropological theory as well as being the basic component of Malinowski's still appreciated empirical work, it has lost its theoretical impact on the social sciences, much as his theory of functionalism has. Mucha analyses Malinowski's ideas concerning applied anthropology, the problems of war and totalitarianism, and the perspectives of a new civilization of peace and freedom - a subject close to the heart of every Pole.

Mention should also be made of Raymond Firth's paper, in which he presents an intellectual portrait of Malinowski, evaluating his ethnographic fieldwork and anthropological theories as well as presenting the main issues discussed by his pupils and subsequent generations of social anthropologists.

Also of interest in the book is the appendix by Tomasz Grabowski entitled 'Students of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University in Relation to Social Anthropology', in which the status and form of the teaching of social anthropology in Poland are discussed. We learn that prior to the 1970s, social anthropology was taught within the institutional framework of sociological and ethnographic studies. In the 1970s, a separate department for social anthropology was opened within the Institute of Sociology at the Jagiellonian University. Social anthropology is now a compulsory course for third-year sociology students. Certain guidelines have been drawn for future social anthropological re-
search and consideration. They include the need for a familiarisation with the vocabulary and all the branch subjects of social anthropology; the formation of theories of culture outside sociology; the study of preliterate societies and the establishment of the value of social anthropology in the study of modern societies; and the placing of Malinowski firmly in his proper position in the development of social anthropology, 'knowing that apart from astronomy, there is no other discipline which owes so much to a Polish scholar'. A current project of the University is the study of a community of Jews in Cracow: its traditional life, cultural forms, religious rituals and level of assimilation in Polish culture.

It can only be regretted that this book was published in Polish, thus resulting in a restricted readership (all the more so since the papers at the conference were all delivered in English - perhaps an English edition is forthcoming?). Mention should also be made of another book published in Poland last year which in part fulfills the last of the guidelines mentioned above, namely Anthropologia Spoleczna Bronisława Malinowskiego [The Anthropology of Bronislaw Malinowski], edited by Mariol Flis and Andrzej Paluch (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe 1985). It is a collection of articles by Polish sociologists and anthropologists divided into two parts: 'The Genesis and Meaning of B. Malinowski's Anthropology' and 'Major Problems of B. Malinowski's Anthropology'.

KRYSTYNA CECH
Within a year, Brian Moeran has published two very different books about a rural valley in the south of Japan. The first is what he describes as the 'anthropological knitting' of his doctoral thesis, a fascinating account of the effects of the 'folk boom' of the wider industrialized world on people who continue to produce the crafts of their forebears. The second is an equally fascinating account of the effect of the life of the rural valley on the anthropologist from the wider industrialized world.

Lost Innocence opens with an apology to both anthropologists and potters that each will have to 'wade through' information that is likely to be of greater interest to the others, but the ethnography of the potting community concerned here is set in a well-tried and clearly stated anthropological framework relating social organisation to ecological constraints. Moeran also brings a global perspective to this small community of Japanese potters by using their case to formulate a general hypothesis about the development of folk art in any highly urbanised and rapidly industrializing society.

It should perhaps be said at once that the community was not selected at random. It had been visited in 1931 by the founder of a Japanese folk-craft movement, who had happened to find, fifty kilometres away, a teapot which accorded with his ideal of beauty and was made in the village. Twenty-three years later, the English potter Bernard Leach spent a period of twenty days in the village — by then rather well known — studying various techniques of decoration. A chance meeting, another twenty years later, between the author and Leach inspired the fieldwork on which this book is based, and Moeran has chosen the time of Leach's visit as a base line from which to examine changes in social organisation, which he relates to the folk craft movement.

The subsequent analysis is built around the paradox that the folk-craft movement has itself been responsible for breaking up the social and moral order which it saw as an essential basis for the
production of the crafts it valued. The Japanese case is presented in the context of folk art in Europe and elsewhere, and the characteristics which define it are similar. The craftsmen should be using natural materials and traditional methods to create functional objects. They should also work cooperatively, without regard for individual fame or financial gain.

Moeran's community has now been visited by hundreds of thousands of tourists, the potters have become comfortably well-off, and individuals among them have won prizes and national and international renown. They have refrained from introducing much in the way of modern technology, for they too understand the reasons why their crafts are valued, and they try to present a cooperative image to the outside world. Moeran's thesis, however, is that the environmental changes and improved economic conditions which have come with the 'boom' in folk craft, as well as other changes in Japanese society, have led to the breakdown of community solidarity and the emergence of individualism. These changes are seen by the leaders of the movement to have given rise to a deterioration in the quality of the pottery.

Moeran briefly describes family and community relations of Japanese rural villages more generally, and relates the specific case of the Onta potting community to the ecological constraints of the valley and its resources. He first presents a projected account of the community at the time it was visited by Bernard Leach, and then proceeds to describe the process of change which has taken place since that time. He notes that the earlier account is an idealised one which presents the 'good old days' for both the potters and the folk-craft movement, but he also expresses his belief that the model he presents is 'by and large, a fair reflection of community life' (p.122).

This is an important assumption, because the potters still describe themselves as cooperative, as 'doing everything together'; but Moeran is able to show, from his own experience during fieldwork, that they do not. Moreover, he can relate disputes which have arisen among the potters, and between the potters and the non-potters of the community, to changes which have arisen because of the demands of the outside world for their wares. In particular, for example, a cooperative kiln which ensured that everybody worked at the same pace has been supplemented by several private kilns, so that some families have been able to grow richer than others. Nevertheless, Moeran goes on to describe how there is considerable resistance and disapproval in the community at large to these signs of individual and household differences and also, for example, to the pressure from the wider world for individual potters to sign their names to their work. He suggests that residents turn nostalgically to the concept of 'tradition' in an attempt to maintain the social order which is in fact breaking down.

However, despite Moeran's stated aim of showing that community solidarity is giving way to individualism, he seems to fall short of demonstrating that this is the case. There have certainly been changes which may be compared with those experienced by potters and other craftsmen elsewhere, but there is no very clear evidence that individual interests are being allowed to prevail ultimately over
those of the community. Nor is there any evidence that there were not disputes, differences and resentments among individuals and households in the 'good old days' just as there are now. Another small weakness, in my view, is the way specific aspects of the ecology of this community are used to explain features of social organisation which are commonly found in the area. If more comparison were made with changes in other Japanese communities over the same period, I suspect that the potting community would be found to be little different, despite being singled out for so much special attention.

As it turns out, this is quite appropriate, for after a final chapter comparing the aesthetic values of the artists, buyers and folk-craft leaders, Moeran finally comes to the conclusion that the aesthetic ideals of the folk-craft movement are 'no more and no less than prescriptions for the organization of Japanese society' (p.217). Just as the Onta potters make use of the idea of tradition to protect their community from many of the outside influences upsetting their social organisation, so the Japanese as a whole have gone back to their traditional arts in order to preserve a national identity in the face of cultural innovations from the West.

In view of the initial paradox that the folk movement is destroying the very community system it sets out to preserve, the question is implicitly raised of how long and how far this and indeed any national identity will survive. Moeran is rather pessimistic, but his pessimism is perhaps based more on intuition than on the evidence presented here. In a few paragraphs, it is impossible to do justice to the whole argument, which also concerns itself with the wider question of what art is, and whether it is defined in the same way by different people associated with it. I can only suggest that the reader examine the evidence of this extraordinary Japanese case for him- or herself.

In contrast to the neat theoretical approach of Lost Innocence, the second of these books, Okubo Diary, is presented to the reader as something of a challenge to the author's perception of the subject he practises. In this, it falls neatly into the genre of self-analytical literature which is gathering on library shelves to accompany the more orthodox monographs for which social anthropology has become known. In the introduction, Moeran refers briefly to some of the other contributions to this species and the problems they raise about 'the dialogue between self and other' and the related idea of participant observation.

In Moeran's case, as the book eventually reveals, the problem is compounded considerably by the fact that he is more than a temporary participant observer. With a Japanese wife and two children born in Japan, he has committed himself on a long-term basis to a culture he ultimately finds impossible to accept. He also spends at least a portion of his time in the field, a country valley almost as alien to his previously urban family as to himself, determined to buy a house a few kilometres from the potting community and settle permanently in the area. This decision seems to have an interesting effect on the local inhabitants. To be sure,
the subsequent negotiations, which he describes in some detail, are most revealing of local customs and social mores, but they also bring out Moeran's own inability to conform to them completely.

Until that time, throughout the long first of three chapters, Moeran presents himself, almost in a tone of self-justification, as fitting in well with the local community. He makes clear that his use of Japanese is not a problem: indeed, the book opens with musings on the charm of the local dialect. He also uses reported speech to record long passages of discussion about local customs, political views and negotiations, where necessary providing extra information about non-verbalised cues. He furnishes the reader with considerable detail of his participation in the work of pott- ing, as well as many other local activities, more often than not accompanied by a good deal of hard drinking. This last interaction he sees as particularly important for getting through to the 'real feelings' people hide when sober.

Throughout the book, there is a wealth of ethnographic information, including detail about decision-making, gossip as a social sanction, the role of kin and neighbourly relations, the strength of women in supposedly male preserves, and specific events such as a funeral, a wedding, a fire, and the two major festivals of New Year: in the winter, and Obon, when the ancestors return in the summer. Much of the explanation is put into the mouths of (fictitiously) named informants, who also make comments on their ways in the light of wider knowledge of the world and their developing relationships with the author.

The second chapter pursues these relationships further and begins to dwell more on the author's difficulties and conflicts of interest and values, brought sharply into focus as the deal over his house and land falls through, but made particularly poignant in the third chapter when a swimming accident brings his son close to death. The reaction of the local authorities to this last event, often personalised through kin ties, tries the author's patience with local custom to its breaking point, and he eventually comes down on the side of his own principles. This decision is not taken lightly, however, and the book offers us a rare opportunity to share with one anthropologist the kinds of experience we must surely all have nightmares about.

However, the particular circumstances of Moeran's case must make it less than ideal for assessing the foundations of the subject, even if it throws into stark clarity the risks we take when we up-and-off to immerse ourselves in the lives of our chosen people. Instead, it perhaps raises questions about just how far we should become personally involved in the second world of which we become such an integral part.

In his introduction, Moeran also raises the perennial problem of how to translate from one culture to another. He reports a growing conviction that 'the only way to write sensitive interpretations of other cultures is to write in the style of the people we study'. He has thus chosen a Japanese literary style in which the 'essence of communication rests not so much in what is said as in what is left unsaid'. At the end of the introduction, he therefore
withdraws to leave his readers to create their own discourse with the people of the Oni valley, and indeed with himself. He suggests that the meaning of anthropology might be found in 'these creative interstices between the words'. Charming though the ensuing style may be, punctuated as it is with Japanese literary quotations, it would, I fear, make our subject totally redundant if we were able to understand the unsaid of Japanese literature without any further help. Still, perhaps that is the unsaid idea of the last sentence.

JOY HENDRY


The power of dance and movement to excite and provoke the emotions, to 'intensify heated sentiments', has long been recognised. Philosophers, choreographers and dancers, especially in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, have discussed the emotional significance of movement and the conveyance of feeling in all forms and styles of dance.

In this century, in the West, dance as an art form has been greatly influenced by the conscious use of feeling and emotion. Emotional states provide a stimulus or starting point for choreographers and performers. From another standpoint, many people, including anthropologists, philosophers and students of dance, study non-verbal communication or body language. The way human beings use their bodies to communicate with each other is an extensive, complex area of study, especially when considered from cultural and sociological perspectives.

Durkheim acknowledged that emotion is promoted by social interaction and that individual feelings ensure the presence of social processes. The ability of human beings to symbolise and convey emotion through body language means that dance and movement are used universally to communicate and accommodate human interaction. As Judith Hanna observes, 'actions occur on the basis of people constructing meanings in their engagement with each other'.

In her first book To Dance is Human: A Theory of Non-verbal Communication, Judith Hanna dealt with the ways in which people communicate ideas and feelings through dance in a vast range of contexts. To have read this first does, I think, help to appreciate the reasons for writing The Performer-Audience Connection and also enhances the understanding of its specialist area of study. Few people have investigated how emotion is conveyed during dance,
especially between the performer and the audience in the theatre. Most scholars would agree that it is impossible to identify satisfactorily how this transmission takes place. Certainly all people involved with dance are aware of the enormous problems encountered in the analysis of dance. This is particularly so when trying to elicit a meaning which can be translated satisfactorily into words. Such problems are intensified in the study of the dance of another culture. Interpretation may be difficult for 'natives' to express in words, and impossible for the outsider. Valid or even honest comment may be impossible to obtain with any kind of lucidity. Judith Hanna recognises these problems and was obviously ready to cope with them. However, she does express her own surprise when even the performers, in the same company and in the same dance, expressed differences in what they wished to convey to the audience. This is not to suggest that this discrepancy is unusual or wrong, but it helps to highlight the problems of researching and analysing any art form. The dance may even gain momentum through diverse opinions about interpretation.

Hanna's extensive experience in both anthropology and dance has influenced her methodology, conclusions and comments. It is difficult to think of anyone without such a background attempting a study of this kind. From a comparison of a number of dance forms, she highlights cultural variation in the way emotion is both transmitted to and perceived by an audience. The fieldwork revolved around eight dance programmes which were part of the Smithsonian Institute Division of Performing Arts Dance series. The performances included an American Tap trio, Indian classical dance, Tamiris spiritual, Japanese Kabuki, Kathakali Dance Drama, dances from the Philippines, and an 'avant garde' dance event. In each case, both choreographers and dancers were interviewed in an attempt to gain insight into the performers' intentions and how the dance accomplished the transmission of emotion. Members of the audience were asked to complete questionnaires. An appendix sets out clearly the details of how the survey was conducted and also deals with the many problems of such an undertaking. Hanna recognises that there are problems of reliability when asking people what they feel or perceive, when asking people to talk about the meaning of emotion. Many factors, such as the variation and diversity of the audiences, affect the findings of such a survey. Nature, culture and previous experience influence responses, and there are many dance languages. How the sexes are perceived and how the roles of different groups operate within a society may be issues familiar to the anthropologists, but they are unconscious factors affecting the audience response to dance. There are many conceptual and methodological problems which appear to be insurmountable.

It may seem that a survey in which the results depend on so many variables and uncertainties is of little value. However, by careful planning and by using a system which identifies six most frequently perceived emotions (previously determined) and six most frequently perceived clues to identify each emotion, the resultant questionnaires and responses do maintain a certain consistency and validity. As long as the limitations are recognised, they do not
invalidate the study, and with this view I support Hanna's stand. The strength of the book lies in her comments, discussion and conclusions, developed against the background of her anthropological and dance experience. The introductory chapter and historical survey of the topic provide an interesting and extremely formative background and theoretical base for the practical survey. The introduction, history and discussion of each form of dance, its performers and context is fascinating and informative, even apart from the survey dealing with the transmission of emotion. The summaries in each chapter and of the whole study add to the understanding of the cultural differences in human behaviour, psychological and functional as well as emotional. The final summary does include a number of points which may readily be recognised and seem rather obvious. However, such perceptions and realisations are rarely put into words or contemplated in any depth. Some issues are clarified, while the theoretical analysis provides information and points for discussion in areas of study both inside and outside dance. Although the main issue is the interaction of dancer and audience at the emotional level in the context of dance as an art form, it is possible to see the relevance to other events where dance and movement are involved.

The Performer-Audience Connection should therefore appeal to many people other than students of dance, since the book gives useful insights into an aspect of human communication which might help anthropologists in their analysis and interpretation of human behaviour in a much wider context than dance performance.

SALLY MURPHY


These 'islands of history' are five occasional papers - interrelated, though each is sufficient unto itself - fronted by a theoretical Introduction. Their common ground is Polynesian; their most common theme is the connexion between anthropology and history; the whole is typical Sahlins: erudite, polemical, witty, and with too many ideas to be surveyed adequately in a brief review.

He starts with a 'Supplement to the Voyage of Cook', where he claims that the 'loosely structured' societies of Papua New Guinea and those of the modern West and traditional Hawaii have defied anthropological explication. For they have what he calls 'performative' not 'prescriptive' structures. Instead of having clearly delimited groups and compelling rules which prescribe much behaviour, they make relationships out of practice. And in Hawaii they
fabricate them out of sexual practice, a literal "state of affairs" created by the very acts which signified it'. Dominant value, the persistent pursuit of sex, provides both personal pleasure and practical benefits - economic, political, spiritual. The collective result of these lustful individuals' actions is not a randomly constructed culture. The particular configurations based on the customary relations of men and women, chiefs and people, gods and mortals may alter, but the relations themselves tend not to change. They are the home of structure. Bolstered by the cultural constitution of erotic desire and by Hawaiian habitus, 'social system is...constructed out of passion, structure out of sentiment.'

In 'The Stranger-King', Sahlins explores Dumezil's suggestion that Indo-European and Polynesian philosophies of political sovereignty are structurally similar. By comparing Roman, Fijian and Hawaiian material, he shows that an unknown foreigner, one to be feared, both usurps power and is safely culturally absorbed - symbolically he dies and is reborn as a local god. The paper's main methodological point is an attack on the use of tables of binary oppositions and on the idea that core cultural categories are 'ambiguous', 'contradictory', or 'logically unstable'. He argues that these interested formulations reveal only a fraction of a culture's logic; they can too easily be falsified by alternate propositions taken from a different point of view - whether that of player or spectator. The richness and totality of such logics can only be displayed by a diachronic model of structure, one which manifests how categories are generated over time.

In the last chapter, 'Structure and History', Sahlins draws out the consequences of the fact that people act in a world which may resist their world view. Without assurance that empirical reality will behave as predicted, humans gamble their cultural schemes against the world. Life becomes permanent poker. The stakes are raised because people are interested performers, weighting categories differently according to their pragmatically conceived benefit. In this sense cultures become personal inventions, each individually inflected. In trying to solve disjunctions, grounded in historical situations, between world view and the world, cultural categories may be revalued, their interrelationships changed, and so structure transformed. Thus past and present are related to culture, and all three are tied to a specific moment in time and place. 'Real' and 'ideological', 'individual' and 'collective', 'infrastructure' and 'superstructure' collapse as bogus dichotomies. System and event, structure and history are inextricably interlinked. Neither half of each pairing can be ignored.

The chapter on Cook's fatal apotheosis, 'The Dying God', ethnographically illustrates several of Sahlins' contentions, while in the remaining paper, 'Other Times, Other Customs', he claims that different societies have different historicities. In those ordered by 'heroic history', the king has massive historical effect because the system of society inflates the importance of royal action.

Sahlins continues to entertain and provoke. Application of
his ideas to other contexts will test both anthropologists and the ideas themselves. For instance, it will be interesting to see whether the generative development of categories can be traced in other cultures or whether the diachronic model he proposes is but another interested contextualisation. Even if (as I suspect) this model proves to be an intellectual tour de force which cannot be replicated elsewhere by lesser minds, it is consoling that Sahlins refuses to be boring. His work remains exemplary.

JEREMY MacCLANCY


This work is an historical investigation of the impact European and later American market economies and politics have made over the last four hundred years on the economy and society of three Indian groups, the Choctaws, Pawnees and Navahos, whose homelands stretch from the south-west to the south-east of the United States. The productive activities of these groups over this period are seen as increasingly moving away from a subsistence ethos and towards the requirements of a thriving world market. Most of the facts presented by the author purport to support the observation that this historical adjustment has not, on the side of the Indians, been anything short of catastrophic. Exactly what he tries to substantiate in his usage of the term 'dependency' is the dramatic transformation of the Indians' more familiar, manageable, secure and spatially limited social environment to an 'appendage' of the world economy.

Demographic losses, effected either by the epidemic diseases brought by Europeans or by slavery, undermined the viability of Indian society. To avoid these dangers, the Indians had to move to a safer but at the same time more marginal natural environment. Such displacement deprived them of the natural resources they had hitherto exploited, hence the shift in Indian productive activities. The Indians' declining control over the old resources was accompanied by their increasing dependence on European goods, technology and markets. The use of European innovations and technology such as guns, horse-, pig- and cattle-raising and deer- and fur-hunting, combined with organisation and adherence to the exchange rationale, subjugated these basically subsistence economies to the dictates of the European markets. The injection of readily consumable European goods such as alcohol, clothes and food into Indian social reproduction ushered in new social relationships, and not merely because of the new tastes and demands they gave
rise to. These goods were exchanged for Indian political and military services or for products such as deer skins, buffalo hides and beaver pelts. Since Europeans made their technologically superior and socially desirable goods accessible to the Indians through their chiefs, who acted as the agents of exchange, these exchanges led to a tremendous increase in the political power and economic privilege of the latter. Therefore, European expansion strongly stimulated the development of class formation among the Indians.

Under the new conditions brought about by European expansion, the Indians had to seek efficient ways of countering the prevailing threats this expansion posed. It was therefore quite natural that in their efforts to recover their previous security, they turned to the same source that had removed it. 'Only guns could turn back the slavers.' In order to secure the supply of these items, the Indians had to respond positively to the demands made upon them to produce beaver pelts.

The uneven distribution of European goods both within and between Indian groups bestowed upon Indian society a new conflictual dimension. The increased productivity and efficiency of production, as well as the warfare they brought to the Indians, laid the basis for even deeper divisions between them. Among the Pawnees, families without horses 'had to either remain at home or else play a peripheral and less rewarding role in the hunt'. The newly developed conflict was similarly noticeable in relationships between the Pawnees and other Indian groups. They, 'strengthened by the acquisition of horses and guns, preyed upon more isolated peoples'. The unequal availability of these effective means of executing power, and of increased production, and its concomitant and equally distributed privileges among different sections of Indian society were deliberately pursued by the Europeans.

This work should be welcomed, mostly because the author attempts to link the Indians with the worldwide historical processes to which they, as well as non-Indians, belong. As he recognises, this is a promising alternative to the often practised but nonetheless restricted approach to human interactions, with its ecological niches or certain durable, if not permanent features of human cultures and societies. However, there are certain shortcomings in this historical study which distort its otherwise revealing character.

The author seems too preoccupied with abstract totalities to check their assumed uniformity with the concrete differentiation the historical facts display. One particularly important instance is the author's usage of the term 'nation' to describe the Indians throughout the period concerned. Another is his notion of dependency, his usage of this term often being ad hoc and tantalizing. He uses the world market as a master key in his study of the increasing domination of the Europeans over the Indians. This may explain why the analytical definition of 'economy', which would have required a much greater scrutiny of this historical process, remains unrecognised in this study.

MANUCHEHR SANADJIAN
Valeri's study can be recommended both to those interested in the ethnography of the Polynesian area and to those who are more interested in theoretical questions concerning the interpretation of ritual in general and of sacrifice in particular. Valeri himself describes his twofold aim as follows:

...the book has two complementary purposes: giving a coherent interpretation of Hawaiian religious ideas (the first one, to my knowledge) and working out a number of theoretical principles for the interpretation of ritual, especially in its interrelation with social practice. (p. x)

As far as the ethnography is concerned, the ritual practices and beliefs he investigates relate to the period before 1820; the main material of the book is therefore taken from literary sources of uneven quality and difficult to assess as to their reliability. Valeri's Introduction discusses the sources on Hawaiian religion: reports from travellers and missionaries, as well as accounts by educated Hawaiians of the nineteenth century who no longer practised the rites in question but who were able to enquire about them among their elders. The structure of the book is determined by the ethnographical problems discussed, while theoretical considerations, for example a most stimulating evaluation of various theories of sacrifice (pp. 62-9), are taken up at various points.

*Kingship and Sacrifice* is divided into three main parts. Part 1, 'Sacrifice and the Gods', offers a summarizing and systematizing analysis of Hawaiian religious notions and ideas and of the elements of sacrifice and, finally, it explicates fundamental Hawaiian notions governing the relations between human beings and divine powers. Part 2, 'Sacrifice and Hierarchy', investigates the hierarchy of Hawaiian deities and the resulting hierarchical implications of sacrifice, which stands at the centre of Hawaiian religion. The third and most ambitious part of the book is concerned with the 'highest' sacrifice, the one under the direction of the king. In this part especially, the reader will find stimulating ideas concerning both the relationship between political power and ritual functions and a phenomenon which anthropologists have been trying to interpret ever since Frazer first brought it to their attention in 1890: the sacrifice, symbolic or real, of the divine king.

As far as the theoretical approach, or rather approaches, employed by Valeri are concerned one welcomes a 'French' thinker (Valeri, presently teaching at Chicago University, is Italian, but he clearly represents the intellectual tradition of Lévi-Strauss and Dumont, both of whom were his teachers) taking up a subject...
which had already attracted the attention of Hubert and Mauss. Valeri attempts to make use of and combine various theories which hitherto have often been regarded as incompatible. With regard to sacrifice alone, Valeri attempts to combine, in his own interpretation of Hawaiian sacrificial ritual, Tylor's theory of sacrifice as a gift with Robertson Smith's theory of sacrifice as a communion, while including aspects of Hubert and Mauss's seminal study on sacrifice and making use of Loisy's and Hocart's views of sacrifice as an efficacious representation. The latter's views, which apparently were developed independently from each other and almost at the same time, find the particular approval of Valeri. In his more general concern with the interpretation of ritual, Valeri claims to be predominantly influenced by Hegel's Phenomenology, as well as by the writings of Feuerbach and Marx, and the influence of Nietzschean ideas is also evident. Valeri further acknowledges the influences of Durkheim and of Lévi-Strauss and Dumont. The author skilfully manages to make use of and reconcile these various schools of thought and to apply them to the Hawaiian data. Although an attempt to merge German and French styles of thought is welcome, Valeri sometimes appears to be over-ambitious, and one feels that less might have proved more fruitful. However, those readers who delight in encountering daring but stimulating intellectual ventures, even though these may occasionally transcend the boundaries of what the analysed material itself would allow, will undoubtedly find the book exciting. British readers, who normally (and justifiably) will put great emphasis on the sober presentation of facts rather than on grand ideas, may at first be very sceptical about the intellectual enterprise laid out by Valeri in the Preface, but they will be compensated by the rich ethnographic material offered and by its scholarly handling. Moreover, it is good to see that British social anthropological thought appears to represent the intellectual basis of Valeri's study. This is obvious throughout the book, as well as in Valeri dedicating his Conclusion to a critical and long overdue evaluation of Godfrey Lienhardt's interpretation of sacrificial ritual in Divinity and Experience.

There are several reasons which make Valeri's study of Hawaiian religion of the utmost interest, and it should find an approving readership among anthropologists working on all kinds of problems and in different ethnographical areas. The book has a comprehensive index, and an extensive bibliography which is worth consulting in its own right.

BURKHARD SCHNEPEL

The broad sweep implied by the title of this book is not reflected in its contents. Golomb's aims are specific and confined to a thorough and interesting investigation of social interaction between two minority groups, Malay Muslims and Thai Buddhists, within the domain of traditional healing. He states that Thai-Buddhist and Malay Muslim curing magic should not be seen as elements of separate sociocultural traditions with exclusive bounded cosmologies but rather as representations of 'a regionwide system of multiethnic strategies for harnessing supernatural power to solve interpersonal and health problems' (p.1).

Golomb sees Western medicine as an important variable for choosing strategies, one which complements traditional practices but does not transform them. Indeed, it may be a source of ethnic pride to reject modern methods. In chapter 1, Golomb shows how the Malays of Pattani resist the introduction of Thai public health services into their area as part of a broader sociocultural reaction to the Thai government's programme for assimilating the Malay minority. Modern medicine is identified with the Thai elite, while supernaturalistic curing ceremonies dramatise ethnic differences and so maintain group solidarity. Additionally, they may be successful where Western medicine is not, because the therapy is patient-centred and offers a pluralistic approach.

According to Golomb, rituals are also the media whereby outside cultural knowledge is introduced. Chapter 7 outlines several reasons why geographically or socially distant practitioners are preferred. Generally, distance is seen to enhance omnipotence. Likewise, ethnic minorities may come to specialise as magical, medical practitioners in traditional plural societies. In parts of central Thailand, the small Muslim majority is considered by the Buddhist-Thai majority to possess more powerful sorcery techniques. The aura of mystery which accompanies the use of a foreign language and techniques, Golomb suggests, is often sufficient to build reputations, particularly in the area of the more magical arts such as love potions and the like.

It comes as no surprise to anthropologists that patients may derive special hope from techniques that are out of the ordinary. Evans-Pritchard noted that all Zande magic tended to be ascribed to outside influences. Golomb takes us to this point with good descriptions of the process of interaction, but why the situation is perpetuated remains unclear. Are these the only terms within which a minority will allow association, or do social or political constraints dictate curing practice as the only viable economic outlet?

Likewise, Golomb writes at considerable length about the perseverence of traditional healing practices in terms of the satisfying functions they perform for cultural transmission and group solidarity, leading to the under-use of scientific medicine, with
its emphasis on treatment rather than explanations. Yet here and there we gain a hint that other factors are at work also. Golomb tells us that in more distant rural areas, where government health stations are poorly equipped, villagers continue to rely on local healers: 'As one travels further away from urban centres, one finds villagers increasingly dependent on supernaturalistic rather than naturalistic therapy' (p.163).

Similarly, Golomb carefully analyses the relationship between the Malay minority's beliefs and their reluctance to use local missionary hospital facilities. But he also mentions that local doctors ascribe the cause of the latter to poverty. While not wishing to under-emphasise the importance of religious beliefs as a critical factor, it might also be necessary to give other more practical considerations commensurate weight if we are to discover why modern facilities continue to be avoided.

Golomb's study appears to have been influenced mainly by the Parsonian tradition and in particular by the work of Clifford Geertz, to whom he makes frequent reference. Consequently there is a tendency to separate culture from social system and to show how people work out their explanations for society by a process of dramatisation of ritualistic incidents, which have the special function of re-orientating patients back to normal behaviour. Seeing culture as dramatized performance is a useful way in which its meaning and specialness may be emphasised, but it is more difficult to say how the framing-off of an event may help us understand the significance of the social whole.

Unfortunately, Golomb offers us little detail concerning methodology which might assist our understanding of the potential range of social variables. He states that he wished to focus first on social life in Muslim communities and then gradually extend his investigations outwards, pursuing interethnic activities into the surrounding Buddhist society. Accordingly, the first part of the book is organised into geographic areas where a description of the history and traditions of the people provides important background to the research. The main body of the material was gathered between March and December 1978 by means of 'hundreds of unstructured interviews'. Meetings with 97 traditional practitioners were established through the recommendations of numerous casual contacts. At each field site, several of the most knowledgeable and cooperative Muslim and Buddhist specialists were chosen for in-depth sessions. As an additional perspective, doctors and nurses at private clinics and hospitals were also interviewed. However, we are not told how any of these interviews was constructed nor how the relatively short field experience of ten months was divided between regions and groups. Such information, perhaps provided as an appendix, would have been a valuable addition to the book; without it, it is hard to see how future cross-cultural analysis may make accurate use of the research.

Golomb adopts a relativist stance when he states 'that Thai and Malay acceptance of magical-animistic explanations is probably as rational as the typical Western layman's acceptance of biochemistry or psychoanalytical theory' (p.110). Nevertheless, the following descriptions of how healers attract clients tend to offer
explanations which relate not so much to an intrinsic rationale but rather to how the gullibility of the clients may be manipulat-
ed if the 'curer-magician' fails in his task. Patients may be too embarrassed to admit that the cure has not worked, or blame their own inadequacies, or resign themselves to the futility of all human aid. Coupled with the fact that, according to Golomb, the healers employ many devices to make their products more sale-
able, the overall impression is of a rather discreditable enter-
prise. However, the fact cannot be ignored that such services do answer real and particular requirements and continue to flourish for those reasons. As Golomb points out elsewhere, regard for the patient as an individual is frequently lacking in Western medicine, with often damaging results. There is a need for the inclusion of carefully recorded case studies which might help to swing the em-
phasis from the point of view of the observer to that which is being observed.

Overall, Louis Golomb's study is probably more concerned with multiethnic relations than it is with the anthropology of curing. As such, it provides a useful introduction to a little explored but vital field of research. It is to be hoped that, in the in-
terests of improving ethnic relations, this book will stimulate further study to focus attention on the interface of contact bet-
ween groups.

LINDA HITCHCOX


In this detailed ethnographic study of childbirth practices and nutrition among rural Malay women, Carol Laderman demonstrates with admirable clarity how an investigation of food ideology and behaviour can provide the material from which an understanding of symbolic systems may be derived, her account being further enhanced by her description of the empirical realities of the economic and ecological environment in which this particular symbolic system is embedded.

The village and parish of Merchang, in which the study was conducted between 1974 and 1977, is located on the west coast of the Malay peninsula, in the most geographically and politically isolated state of Trengganu. Access was available to both Western medicine and Western-trained midwives as well as indigenous medi-
cal practitioners and traditional midwives. Laderman's observa-
tions of the differential use of these resources graphically de-
picts the flexibility of behaviour and the ability to manipulate ideology which the people of Merchang use in order to achieve
their valued ends. While such manipulation has been recognized and described by other anthropologists interested in ethnomedical matters, the concept of behavioural flexibility in the face of apparently strong ideology is not current in the discussion of food behaviour. It is in this area in particular that Laderman's observations and analyses constitute a unique contribution to a subject long neglected in the anthropological literature.

The failure to appreciate the extent to which people can and do manipulate their beliefs in relation to their eating practices can have practical consequences for health, agricultural and development projects and policies. The use and misuse of anthropological data to justify these policies places a particular responsibility on anthropologists to clarify the issues involved. In concentrating on the detailed study of women's nutritional practices in relation to childbirth, Laderman has collected a wealth of ethnographic evidence with which to challenge many of the misconceptions regarding indigenous Malay eating behaviour which are widely held by local health authorities and medical personnel, as well as by international agencies.

Although the focus of the study may appear to be narrow, Laderman's achievement lies in her success in integrating two quite different and apparently conflicting approaches: the ethnomedical, which as Laderman points out has been characterised by impressionistic data regarding health, and the biomedical which, while providing hard data, lacks the cultural base in which the data must be embedded to make it truly meaningful. In achieving this integration, Laderman has in fact investigated a much wider field than her topic might suggest.

In her account of childbirth and nutrition, she examines not only the post-partum diet, but also the normal diet in all its seasonal variations, the differences between the pregnant and the non-pregnant diet, and diet in relation to the ecological, economic and symbolic framework of the people of Merchang. Her discussion of the post-partum period is placed in the context of a description and analysis of the traditional medical system, the social, ritual and biological functions of pregnancy and childbirth within its particular cultural context, and the role and statuses of patients and practitioners.

The variety of methods which Laderman used to obtain her data presents a formidable achievement: traditional field-work observation, with meticulous attention to the systematic recording of data, as well as the detailed description and quantification of diets involving the taking of blood samples and analysis of foods in order to determine their nutritional value. Her technique for arriving at an understanding of the indigenous classification of foods is particularly impressive. *Wives and Midwives* is a milestone in the anthropological literature, a rare example of a successful attempt to bridge the divide between physical or biological anthropology and social anthropology, and a skilful demonstration of the integration of a variety of approaches to the understanding of human behaviour.

ANN E. FINK

The relationships among the diverse ethnic groups of Malaysia are an obvious and pressing subject for scholarship, and Winzeler has provided a usefully detailed picture of Malay, Chinese and Thai relationships and attitudes in the Pasir Mas area near the Thai border of the northwestern state of Kelantan. The author's scholarly puzzle is why there is relatively little hostility between ethnic groups here when compared to the West Coast. His varied analysis may be summed up in his comment that some of the 'common points of hostility between Malays and non-Malays are present but blunted, while others do not seem to be present to a significant extent'. He concedes, however, that it would be rash to conclude that this placid state of affairs will necessarily continue. This study is an offshoot from an earlier period of research directed at traditional Malay religion. Political events helped shift his interests as did a developing conviction that one ethnic section of the country cannot be understood apart from the others.

The book is built up from material collected over a series of six trips, some of them brief. Whereas Winzeler claims participant-observation familiarity with rural and urban Malay society and to a degree with urban Chinese communities, his information on the rural Chinese and on the Thai derives largely from survey methods. He discusses the methodological problems resulting from this blend. He obviously intends the book to find its slot on a shelf of works dealing with more general features of Malaysian culture and politics, for he has left cut information 'which is readily available', accounting for the pared-down appearance of the result. It includes chapters on two rural Chinese villages, rural and town-dwelling Chinese and Kelantan Thai communities, as well as a good deal of data about the relations and attitudes of these to the Malays and vice versa. It has few theoretical ambitions and says little about the debates concerning ethnicity. It is, however, a worthy empirical monograph and does add, somewhat reassuringly, to our knowledge of an issue which has caused violence in Malaysia in the past and has the potential to do so again.

R.H. BARNES

Two organisations - Survival International and Tapol: British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia - have joined forces in producing this special issue on the transmigration policies and practices of the Indonesian government. It includes an open letter to the current president and president-elect of the World Bank setting out charges against the programme and demanding that the World Bank cease funding it. In addition, there are three articles by Marcus Colchester concerning the World Bank's role, Indonesian policy towards tribal peoples, and the effects of transmigration on them, as well as articles by Mariel Otten, Charles Secrett and Carmel Budiardjo outlining failures of the programme, its impact on rain forests, and the way it is being used by the army in completing Indonesia's military conquest of East Timor and Irian Jaya, the latter also known as West Irian, West Papua and West New Guinea.

Transmigration continues a Dutch policy of attempting to alleviate the pressures of Java's population explosion by moving Javanese to sparsely inhabited areas in the 'outer islands', an unfortunate phrase of Dutch coinage which stands for Indonesia outside Java and Madura. The Dutch called this approach 'colonization', and its continuation by the Javanese, who control the army and the government as well as making up over sixty per cent of the nation's population, unfortunately makes apt the expression 'Javanese colonization', with its implication that the Javanese are the new colonial force in Indonesia. Indonesian scholars have acknowledged that *transmigrasi* has no effect on Java's population problem and that the numbers that leave Java in this way amount to no more than a drop in the bucket compared with Java's astounding growth. Indonesian scholars have also documented its many failures, so that the reader can be confident that the criticisms advanced in this collection are not the inventions of alarmist outsiders.

Among the charges the authors make are that transmigration leads to large-scale destruction of tropical forests and other environmental damage and causes the alienation and dispossession of the indigenous populations, amounting even to ethnocide. In Irian Jaya, where there are plans to move in 685,000 Javanese within the next five years, equivalent to over half the present indigenous population, the programme has become mixed up with attempts to suppress the local independence movement. It is being used in similar ways in East Timor also, an area where by no stretch of legal reasoning other than that based on brute conquest does Indonesia have any right to be or to settle its citizens. Since the Suharto administration has systematically suppressed grass-roots political life outside the cities, it cannot legitimately claim to protect the rights or respond to the desires of local populations. Reports that compensation payments for land taken for use by migrants never reach the owners of the land are more than believable. In fact, one question the authors do not broach is to what extent the
World Bank's development assistance can correctly be described as a massive system of political pay-offs. That transmigration is a failure in terms of its own objectives and damaging in its consequences is in no real doubt. By continuing with it (as well as with its two wars in Irian Jaya and East Timor), the government risks doing harm to the legitimacy of the Indonesian nation as it is presently conceived, a result that would be direr than considerations pertaining to the future of this or any other government. Given these circumstances, the request that the World Bank withdraw its support is entirely reasonable.

Since this issue of the Journal was published, it has enjoyed some attention in the international press. The Indonesian government quickly rejected its criticisms, and a spokesman gave assurances that Indonesia had imposed limits on cutting down rainforests and that the settlers and local inhabitants were living in harmony. Meanwhile, talks continue between the military chiefs of Papua New Guinea and Indonesia aimed at a peace treaty and the return of 10,000 refugees from Irian Jaya, while Libya has moved to establish links with the Free Papua Movement.

R.H. BARNES

OTHER NOTES AND NOTICES

STRANGERS ABROAD: A CORRECTION

Owing to unforeseen complications in the scheduling of the television documentary series Strangers Abroad (see Steven Seidenberg, 'In Our Fathers' Footsteps', JASO, Vol. XVI, no. 3, pp. 225-32), transmission has been delayed until Autumn 1986. The first episode of this series about the history of anthropology will now be transmitted on Channel 4 (UK) on Saturday, 18 October 1986. Readers in the New York area of the United States will be able to see two programmes from the series at the upcoming Margaret Mead Film Festival. Programme five, 'Coming of Age' (which is about Margaret Mead herself), has been selected to open the Festival, and Programme two, 'Shackles of Tradition' (which is about her teacher Franz Boas) will also be shown there.

S.S.
This collection of ten essays represents an important contribution to the anthropological study of peasant societies. Equally important, it represents a significant advance in the sometimes rocky but continuing marriage between anthropology and economics. Especially useful is the overview of Chayanovian theory and its relevance to anthropology, which forms the first four chapters of the book (two by the editor himself, plus important contributions by Nicola Tannenbaum, 'Chayanov and Economic Anthropology', and Michael Calavan, 'Prospects for a Probabilistic Reinterpretation of Chayanovian Theory'). The remaining six chapters (by Paul Joron on a French fishing community, Michael Dove on the Iban of Kalimantan, Ronald Herring on the Sri Lankan peasants, Jeffrey Jones on Bolivia, and two articles, by Shu-min Huang and James McGough, on China) use intensive case studies to test, tease and re-shape Chayanov's own theory. A useful and thought-provoking volume, invaluable for any anthropologist (of moderate numeracy) interested in the anthropology of peasant societies.

While the text of the volume is not to be faulted, the same cannot, unfortunately, be said about its production. Academic Press, like so many publishers of late, is now relying on 'instant book' publishing techniques, including the direct reproduction of typescripts. By by-passing expensive typesetting, publishers speed production and keep down the cost of the final product. When standards are simultaneously kept high and these savings passed to the consumer they are appreciated all round. However, when publishers fail to exercise proper supervision, results can be less than satisfactory. In this case I found the different typefaces used in different chapters detracted from the overall presentation of the book. More serious was its index, which does not represent the contents of the book adequately. These minor omissions detract from an otherwise excellent volume.

S.S.


The author sets out to show how important 'magic' was in ancient Egypt and claims that it has survived unchanged till the present
in Upper Egypt. 'Magic' is part of that Frazerian triad and is compared with religion and science. Thus it is both 'the essential energy which circulates in the world of the gods as well as that of men' and 'considered to be an exact science'. This ambiguity means that it is not clear whether there is an elite of magicians with professional secrets or whether it is an attitude shared by all. The first receives more emphasis, since the examples are all from papyri or inscriptions. It is not clear how this body was organised or what its connection with the state was. The problems of rationality and the social limits of belief are ignored. The lack of any sense of history means that changes in ideology are overlooked. The religious reforms of Akhnaten, for instance, go unmentioned. A chance meeting with a 'snake-charmer' one night in Luxor led the author to the conclusion that the same magic was being practised even now. It is difficult to take such an uncritical attitude seriously.

There is a place for anthropological studies of ancient Egypt, just as for similar studies of Greece and Rome. This book makes no attempt to fill this gap, merely presenting some new material to support outdated ideas.

N.F.


This book, by an economist and historian wife-and-husband, is 'intended to be of help to the nonspecialist who wants to know something about the Sudan' (p. 167). It achieves that aim and will certainly be of help to any reader who knows little about the Democratic Republic of the Sudan, the largest country in Africa. The stress is on internal political history, especially in terms of political groupings, but there are also chapters on the economy and international relations, as well as short sections on geography, language, religion, and so on. The history of the Sudan is told from early 'prehistoric' to the present day, with a Postscript to the Preface dealing briefly with the armed forces coup of 6th April 1985. The Volls' analyses of the Sudan's history and its present condition, while not particularly advancing our knowledge or understanding, are careful and sensible and will not mislead the non-specialist reader.

A central theme of the book, with which the authors try to understand the Sudan, is that of the sub-title: 'Unity and Diversity'. There is no denying that the Sudan exhibits great diversity - geographically, linguistically, culturally and in every
other way - nor that there have been, and still are, some elements of, and movements towards, unity. Among others, Mohamed Omer Beshir and Francis Mading Deng have, in various works, discussed the potential for Unity - in Diversity. This is a very complex matter and may confuse the non-specialist reader, but a discussion of it as a central theme in an attempt to specify what is special about the Sudan is welcome.

The reproduction of the map of the country is so poor as to make it virtually useless. This is surprising in an otherwise well-produced book.

J.C.


This novel was the third, and the first of full length, to be published in Somali. It originally appeared in 1974, two years after Somali became the official language of the state of Somalia, and the Latin script was chosen in preference to Arabic and 'Somali' script. It was published under the title Aqoodarwe waan u noqab jacooyl by the Somali Ministry of Culture and Higher Education and won widespread popularity.

The story is one of ill-starred love between the hero Cali Maxamed Xasan and the heroine Cawrala Barre, told against the background of the early twentieth-century Somali struggle against colonial rule. The characters are real historical figures and the story is based on, and includes, oral historical materials. In particular, great use is made of poetry, and the aesthetic appeal to the non-Somali reader says much for the work of the translator. The beauty of the novel is not even spoiled by the author's putting into his characters' mouths expressions of concern regarding the promotion of literacy, female emancipation and the eating of fish - three concerns of the author and other educated Somali, the last being very important in a country with a large fish supply but a prejudice among its population against eating them.

Andrzejewski's introduction, notes and appendixes provide information on the historical events and characters, on the geographical and cultural background to the story, and on alliteration, scansion and style in Somali poetry, and a bibliography is provided. The translation was commissioned by UNESCO and is one of the UNESCO Collection of Representative Works, Africa Series.

J.C.
Almost exactly forty years ago, Peter Lienhardt left his home in Dewsbury and went up to Cambridge to read English, a subject in which he achieved distinction.* While still an undergraduate, he transferred from English to the Oriental Studies Faculty, where he read Arabic and Persian. His training in Arabic became useful immediately after the completion of his degree, because his skill in it was put to use when he was required to translate documents and monitor broadcasts, as a nominal member of the RAF doing his national service. That service ended, like so many at the time who began in English at Cambridge he took up social anthropology here at the Oxford Institute. His fields of research interests were the Gulf Shaikhdoms, Arabs inhabiting the East Coast of Africa as far south as Zanzibar and Tanganyika and, also, Iran. One of the pleasures of knowing him was to spend a long evening with him discussing the peoples of these places and issues pertaining to their languages; for, although never one to flaunt his talents, he had a most subtle grasp of both Arabic and Persian. And if, at the end of the evening, a matter had to be left unresolved because some fact or other was missing, it was characteristic of his scholarly mind that he would burrow among the books until he found it. The discovery he would sometimes put into a gem of a letter, marked by its clarity and the ease with which it was written, and with a sprinkling of wit, none of which were contrivedly clever, but all of which came naturally to him.

Peter Lienhardt was well endowed with human kindness. The Institute of Social Anthropology here at Oxford has long had a just repute for the warmth of relations between its staff and its postgraduates. Even in the best of places, however, it is inevitable that one or two newcomers are left out on the periphery. During the past few years, more than one such person has voluntarily told me how they felt out of things until drawn in by him, asking them about their proposals for research, and treating their diffident comments for the merits in them, with a patience lacking in most of us, but which gave them real encouragement. This willingness to listen attentively he did not reserve for newcomers only, but was an attribute his more loquacious friends—myself among them—thoroughly relished, particularly the succinct comments he would inject into the conversation, to enliven it greatly.

* Funeral address delivered on Monday 24 March 1986, at Blackfriars, Oxford.
Consistent with these qualities went a gentleness - a gentleness which struck one as bordering on frailty at times. It was not that he was of limited experience: far from it. He had travelled widely and mixed with a very wide range of people of different cultures, different classes, and of different sorts. It was that he had no desire to bother with the big world around him, in the hope that it would not bother him either. Again, it would be wrong to suppose that he had lived an entirely sheltered life: here, and elsewhere, he had his trials and tribulations. He also knew what it felt like to suffer privation. Yet I never heard him complain about his lot. When afflicted by this and that, his tendency was to recoil and let it pass by. At the same time he was fiercely independent, and the more important of the views he held he hung on to tenaciously. What he felt to be congenial was a way of living which permitted him to browse as and when he felt inclined, to join in conversation - preferably with kindred spirits - frequently, and to unravel his thoughts on academic issues, particularly those relating to the Middle East, to fellow academics and younger people engaged in research. Much of what occupies the minds of others failed to capture his imagination. Here I have in mind matters of material gain, with regard to which he was truly innocent. In earlier years, for him a little amount left over meant the happiness of solvency, and a deficit of a similar amount meant the misery of retrenchment. Similarly with regard to academic preference, which did not engage his energies either: to compete against colleagues he thought distasteful, and the rewards, as he saw them, were very dubious, effectively alienating one from what he considered to be worthwhile in university life.

He did not proclaim his sentiments about these many matters. To get to know them meant getting to know him really well, for he was a private person, who exposed his inner thoughts to only a few close friends.

When, some five months ago, he was told he had little time to live, unlike most people, who would have been left stupefied, he resolved there and then to continue to live as normally as possible for as long as possible. This he was able to do until recently, proud that he could fend for himself, and get about unaided. Even to within a few days of re-entering hospital, although physically very weak, he still had the moral strength to lift the receiver to keep in touch with some of his friends.

He did not want us to mourn; he said as much. But I believe he would have been pleased to think that at least some of the things he cherished in life remained among us after he had left.

E.L. Peters
I first met Peter Lienhardt twenty-five years ago when I arrived at the Institute of Social Anthropology in Oxford. Peter was both my college tutor and university supervisor and, as often happened with Peter's students, the formal relationship quickly ripened into a personal friendship which survived until his untimely death.

Peter's anthropological work in the Trucial States, the East African coast and Iran gave him a thorough understanding of the way Arabs and Muslims think. In teaching students from Arab or Muslim countries in particular, he was always tactful, patient and genuinely interested. He recognised the difficulties encountered by these students in coming to terms with life in a very different society with a liberal and open educational system. He made considerable efforts to help them both tolerate and understand the diversity and complexity of human culture and to think for themselves. He showed infinite patience and a great sense of responsibility for these students. After a lengthy and interesting tutorial in which the student might have failed to grasp the points raised, he would nevertheless persist with his endeavour to make the student understand a new viewpoint. His tutorials were instructive and enriched with wit, anecdote and discussion about life in general. His breadth of knowledge and experience gave him a rare ability to draw on a wide range of parallels from anthropology, history and literature. Middle Eastern students, and others, were highly appreciative of his concern for them.

Peter's strength of character was evident in the way he coped with anthropological fieldwork in difficult circumstances with an affection and appreciation for many individuals in the Trucial States, East Africa and Iran. This was reciprocated, and Peter's loss will be felt widely.

Peter's understanding of the societies he studied was profound. On the many occasions he talked about these societies, I admired his intellectual ability and perception. I had the pleasure and privilege of reading some chapters of the book he was writing on the Shaikhdoms of the Trucial States which concerned the tribal structure, kinship organisation and political relationship between these Shaikhdoms. Peter witnessed the beginning of the impact of the discovery of oil on the traditional societies of the Trucial States, and he saw their subsequent transformation into modern states and the influence of Western contact on their economy and society. Despite this, he was of the opinion that the tribal shaikhs still had a role to play in their political structure. Here he was close to the centre of power, but equally he was at ease with ordinary people. Peter's excellent analysis reveals a deep understanding of the societies of the Trucial States.

Peter's grasp of languages was exceptional. He spoke Arabic, Swahili and Persian not only fluently but with elegance, and he had the ability to switch from one language to another with consummate ease. His subtle understanding of these languages gave him greater insight than that even of many native speakers and is evident also in his writing. The clarity of his thought and style of his ex-
pression make the reading of his writing a pleasure. His linguis-
tic ability and the quality of his writing are admirably demon-
strated in his book The Medicine Man: Swifa Ya Ngwamali (Hasani
this book, Peter's masterly command of the English and Swahili lan-
guages and his understanding of the society of the coast of East
Africa are evident; he shows perceptiveness, clarity and intellec-
tual vigour, and his scholarly attitude is reflected in his pre-
cision and meticulous handling of his material.

Peter had many admirable personal qualities. He had a wide
range of interests outside anthropology - in particular, literature,
music, art and history. His conversation was never dull, and he
enjoyed meeting people. Those in his company enjoyed his reper-
toire, his instructiveness and his wit. Despite the severity of
his illness and the gradual decline of his health, he remained in-
tellectually alert and sociable. It was typical of his attitude
that he did not want his friends to show gloom, sadness or emotion
over the consequences of his illness: rather, he wanted them to be
positive and cheerful. Even when he came to know the nature of
his illness, he accepted the inevitable consequence with courage
and rationality. Peter's courage and fortitude were also shown in
the remarkable way he coped with delicate situations in his field
research in the Trucial States and Iran. He made no secret of his
own convictions and was prepared to defend them in any company,
including the most powerful.

Peter's generosity, hospitality and kindness were well known
to his friends. He was always helpful and rendered help to his
students in a variety of ways. He was a sensitive and gentle per-
son entirely without malice. If he ever lost his temper this was
quickly forgotten and equally quickly forgiven. His friendships
were wide, deep and lasting, as was shown by the many who came
from far and wide to his funeral. His death on March 17 is a
deply felt loss and a great sadness to me. To his brother Godfrey
go our heartfelt sympathy, condolences and thoughts.

AHMED AL-SHAHI
PETER LIENHARDT AND THE OUAS

At the time of his death, Peter Lienhardt was President of the Oxford University Anthropological Society, having taken up the office in October 1985. It is therefore fitting that his long association with the Society should be recorded here.

Having arrived in Oxford in 1952, Peter Lienhardt presumably joined the Society after that date, though the incomplete records of the time do not record the actual date of his election. He is first mentioned at a Committee meeting of 9th November 1955, where it was agreed that 'Mr Peter Lienhardt might be invited to speak in the summer term'. In fact, he addressed the Society in the following Michaelmas Term at its 537th meeting on 7th November 1956. His title was 'Town Politics in Trucial Oman' and, in relation to the history of the Trucial shaikhdom of Dubai, he discussed the economic factors underlying political power and how the rivalries within the ruler's family and tribal section served to preserve the townspeople in their freedom 'by limiting both the autocratic power of the rulers and the potential oligarchic power of the ruling clans'.

The mid-to late 'seventies, some twenty years later, were a relatively inactive period for the Society, but when it began to have regular meetings again in Michaelmas 1979 it was Peter Lienhardt who first addressed it, giving an illustrated talk on 'Carpet Merchants and Carpet Designers in Iran'. The talk was based on his 1965-66 fieldwork in Isfahan, and in it he discussed carpet designs in relation to Islamic attitudes to the representation of animate things, showing how animate designs were 'metamorphised' into inanimate representations. Those who attended this meeting will remember the lively way in which he invoked the imagery of proverbs, songs and flower forms in the patterns of Persian weaving.

Peter Lienhardt was one of the foremost supporters of the Society: he regularly attended evening meetings and coffee mornings and was always generous with his support for social events such as the irregular end-of-term parties. He was therefore the obvious choice for President when the position became vacant in 1985.

After the first meeting of the year, he entered hospital for the first time. On returning to chair the third meeting of the term, he privately noted the irony of chairing a meeting which was to be addressed on 'The French Funeral as Triumph', an irony which amused him. Though already weak and unable to attend to all his duties as he would have wished, it is a testament to his sense of responsibility, and to his sociability, that he was able to chair that and the following meeting in his own inimitable style. It was a matter of great regret to him that he was not able to attend further meetings.

His death is a sad loss to the Society, as it is to his many colleagues, students and friends. We take this opportunity to offer our condolences to his brother Godfrey.

JEREMY COOTÉ
Former Secretary, OUAS
Further to the notice in the last issue of JASO concerning a Memorial Fund to be established in the name of Peter Lienhardt, details have now been finalised and are appended below. A leaflet giving additional information and the appropriate bankers' forms are also included with this issue of the Journal for those readers who wish to support the Fund.

The University of Oxford announces the establishment of the Peter Arnold Lienhardt Memorial Appeal, with the aim of creating a general endowment fund to be used for the support of research in social anthropology conducted in conjunction with the University's Institute of Social Anthropology.

The Institute is the largest centre for postgraduate training and research in this subject in Britain and it continues to attract a high proportion of overseas students. At the same time the Institute has faced the constraints which have made the funding of all postgraduate study and research so difficult over the last few years. Well-qualified students without private means, especially from overseas, have often found study at Oxford beyond their reach, and this continues to be the case.

The Fund will be administered by a Committee of the Faculty Board of Anthropology and Geography, and funds will normally be disbursed on an annual basis. Grants will be offered as appropriate to registered students or other young scholars engaged in research in social anthropology who wish to base themselves in Oxford. Applications for grants will be considered either for specific projects, or for general support, according to financial or other circumstances. The Committee will have discretion as to the spending or re-investment of the income from the Fund, which will be managed by the Oxford University Chest.

Potential donors might wish to note that a capital sum of £10,000 would make possible small grants to a total of £500 annually, and a sum of £80,000 would support one person per year exclusive of any fee obligations or travel money. However, a sum of £180,000 would be required to support a graduate student paying fees at the full overseas rate, and even more would be needed to cover travel or other research expenses.

The present appeal is administered by the Committee of Management of the Institute of Social Anthropology and is sponsored by the current Chairman (Dr Wendy James) and past Chairmen (Mr Edwin Ardener and Dr Peter Riviere). Enquiries may be addressed to Mrs Sutton, Administrative Secretary of the Institute, at 51 Banbury Road, Oxford OX2 6PE, England. Cheques in any denomination, payable to 'University of Oxford - Peter Lienhardt Memorial Appeal', should be sent to Mrs Sutton at the same address.
**PUBLICATIONS RECEIVED**


Critique of Anthropology, Vol. VI, no.2 (Summer 1985).


Ethnos, 1985, nos. 1-2 and 3-4.


LEVY-BRUHL, Leo Katranis Think (transl. by Lilian A. Claire, with an Introduction by C. Scott Littlejohn), Princeton and Galliford: Princeton University Press 1985 [1926]. lvi, 386pp., Index. £32.30/£7.15.


OLWIG, Karen Fog, Cultural Adaptation and Resistance on St John: Three Centuries of Afro-Caribbean Life, Gainesville, Fla.: Univ. of Florida Press 1985. xii, 192pp., References, Index, Plate, Maps, Tables, Figures. $15.00.


Social Sciences USSR Acad. Sci., no. 2 (1986).


TORKENCE, Robin, Production and Exchange of Stone Tools: Prehistoric Obsidian in the Aegean, Cambridge etc.: CUP 1986. xiii, 234pp., Index, References, Plates, Maps, Figures, Tables. £27.50.


ANNAN BRAMWELL
A Green Land Far Away: A Look at the Origins of the Green Movement.. .... 191-206

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER
A Balinese Form of Life in Western Lombok as a Totality 207-230

Commentary
NADIA ABU-ZAHRA
Fieldwork Remembered: Tunisia 1965 .... 231-244

ROY WILLIS
On Being One's Own Grandpa: The Contemporary Ancestor Revisited.. .... 245-253

Book Reviews ..... 255-275

Publications Received.. .... 276-279

Index to JASO Volume XVII, 1986 .... 280-282

Notes on Contributors.. .... inside back cover
CONTENTS (continued)

Book Reviews

RODNEY NEEDHAM, Against the Tranquility of Axioms
and Exemplars. Reviewed by Robert Parkin 255-258

GILBERT ROUGET, Music and Trance: A Theory of the Relations
Between Music and Possession. Reviewed by Martin Stokes 258-260

RICHARD FARDON (ed.), Power and Knowledge: Anthropological
Approaches. Reviewed by Jeremy MacClancy 260-262

GEORGE W. STOCKING Jr. (ed.), Observers Observed: Essays on
Ethnographic Fieldwork and History and Anthropology, Vol.1.
Reviewed by Steven Seidenberg 262-264

BRUCE M. KNAUFT, Good Company and Violence: Sorcery and Social
Action in a Lowland New Guinea Society.
Reviewed by R.H. Barnes 265-266

COLIN BAKER, Aspects of Bilingualism in Wales.
Reviewed by Fiona Bowie 266-267

VIV EDWARDS, Language in a Black Community.
Reviewed by Philip Harding 267-268

RICHARD A. KRAUSE, The Clay Sleeps: An Ethnoarchaeological
Study of Three African Potters. Reviewed by Peter Strong 268-270

ROBERT SNOWDEN and BARBARA CHRISTIAN (eds.), Patterns and
Perceptions of Menstruation: A World Health Organisation
International Study and JOYCELIEN MASSIAH, Women as Heads of
Households in the Caribbean: Family Structure and Feminine
Status. Reviewed by Ann E. Fink 270-273

JAMES M. TAGGART, Nahuat Myth and Social Structure.
Reviewed by Anthony Shelton 273-275

SERGE BOUZÉ, Réciprocité et hiérarchie: l'alliance chez les Ho
et les Santal de l'Inde. Reviewed by N.J. Allen 275

Publications Received 276-279

Index to JASC Volume XVII, 1986 280-282

Notes on Contributors inside back cover

Copyright © JASO 1986. All rights reserved.
ISSN UK 0044-8370

viii
A GREEN LAND FAR AWAY:
A LOOK AT THE ORIGINS
OF THE GREEN MOVEMENT

Introduction

In a previous paper on German self-identity and attitudes to Nature (JASO, Vol. XVI, no.1, pp. 1-18) I argued that one of its main strains was a dissatisfaction with the shifting political and territorial boundaries of the nation and a search for a more authentic, earth-bound identity. This search led to a politically radical 'ecologism' which pre-dated National Socialism, but which emerged as an underlying theme in the Third Reich, reappearing in Germany well after the Second World War in more obviously left-oriented groups.

In this paper I want to examine the origins and growth of the Green movement itself in England and Germany. While the insecurity of national identity in Germany was not exactly paralleled in England, the English experience nonetheless demonstrates a search for lost 'roots' after 1880. This crisis of identity fused with criticisms of orthodox liberal economists and mechanistic biologists to produce the ecologists and, later, the Greens.

This is a shortened version of a paper first given to my own seminar on Modern Conservatism at Trinity College, Oxford, in June 1985; it was subsequently delivered at a Social Anthropology seminar chaired by Edwin Ardener at St John's College, Oxford, on 28 October 1985, and at the seminar on Political Theory organised by John Gray and Bill Weinstein at Balliol College, Oxford, on 1 November 1985. Notes have been kept to the minimum necessary to identify actual quotations and the more obscure works I have cited.
'Greenism' is defined here as a movement incorporating 'ecologism'. The word 'ecology' is used in the normative sense, not in the biological, descriptive sense. Ecology is a science which considers energy flows within a closed system. The normative input is that severe or drastic change within that system, or indeed any change which can damage any species within it or that disturbs the system, is seen as bad, wrong. Thus ecological ideas have come to be associated with conservation within nature, whether it be of a single species, of the weather pattern produced by the Amazon forests, or the continuity of human existence.

Why is this subject important and why should it be of interest to anyone? Man's vision of his place in the world, the question of the objective existence of that world and his relation with it, is of fundamental importance. It affects the large questions concerning the source of historical change, the nature of man, the why and the how of man's history, and it is intimately bound up with the problem of causality, affecting, for example, the source of innovation and creation. The validity of science and the possibility of a social science all hinge on the stance taken towards man's place in nature.

Both conceptually and empirically, man has validated his beliefs by natural example since written records began. Ideas of the special nature of man seem to originate with the Judaeo-Christian tradition. But conclusions drawn from the observation that man is an animal can vary greatly, as can conclusions drawn from the claim to be different from animals. It is possible to assert that if man is part of the natural world, subject to the same laws as the animals, then he is, like them, entitled to compete to survive. Because he cannot hope to escape from his animal nature, he is justified in aggression. Others see man's role as that of a shepherd who nurtures the earth rather than despoiling it, precisely because he partakes of the earthly burden. However, if man is special, so malleable and adaptable in his nature that the laws of the natural world no longer apply to him, then he can be made over to any image. The model of improvement through social and environmental controls is generally a progressive and left-wing model. But there is a conservative variant which argues that it is precisely man's lack of a fixed genetic inheritance that makes stable institutions essential as a substitute. If man is born without, for example, the genetic template of the Church of England, continuity in social and family institutions becomes more important, not less: here, the argument is that if you strip man of his cultural heritage in the name of social change an irreparable loss will ensue. The cultural continuity of the group can only be safeguarded by preserving the acquired knowledge and (in the Hayekian variant) organically felt customs of man, as expressed through his institutions.

The ecological, cultural and political position known as Greenism involves substantial ethical and moral claims and proposes drastic and apocalyptic remedies. Today's Green parties have carved out political niches which receive 7-11% of national party votes in a wedge of nations stretching from Finland in the north to Austria in the south. They include West Germany, Denmark,
Switzerland and Belgium, all Germanic nations except for the latter. In Britain there has been substantial 'entryism', especially within the Liberals and middle-class Labour Party groups. The Conservative Party is now seeking a Green position, and the National Front went Green last year. Greens have to be moles in Britain because of our two-party system, but even so, some three million people in Britain alone are alleged to be members of environmental and other ecological groups. The Green tendency has aroused unease in some political quarters and has been dismissed in others. The power-oriented, pro-American conservative Right see Greenism as an irritating distraction from the proper business of politics, which is to help provide the United States with an efficient anti-Soviet striking capacity. The respectable hard left do not think the Greens have a future. Avner Offer, describing Richard Jefferies as 'the Tory transcendentalist writer' and seeing his ideas as 'a refuge from unpleasant realities', thinks they 'had a fatal flaw...like ecological ideas, they were not made to mobilise the masses'. A fatal flaw indeed, but the evidence seems to be that the masses are being mobilised nonetheless. When cultural criticisms are combined with mass political action, it is time to stop and look.

The political categorisation, the 'placing' of Greenism, is what I want to discuss here, and to do that one has, as it were, to find out whence it came. There is obviously a sense, a simple sense, in which Greenism is conservative: it aims to maintain a given stable ecological structure and system and, in the long term, prevent change. However, in its history ecologism has exhibited three dominant political strains. A left-wing egalitarianism with totalitarian overtones was the first. A second, religious, nationalist, high Tory version, strong in England, developed between the wars, while the third, a Nationalist Socialist version, was more radical, more negative, and more 'soft'. Although these groups do not represent a school or series of schools, they do present epistemological and morphological similarities. Forefathers are cited.

Today's Greens, though often gaining from single-issue, one-off problems (save the Danube, save the whale, re-cycle glass bottles), seem to present some common factors. They are internationalist, against nuclear arms and nuclear power stations, have a strong feminist representation (non-Greens being macho, exploitative, etc.), and


are egalitarian, pacifist and anti-capitalist. Is it possible to find a common ideology? I will return to this question after examining the Greens historically.

One problem with categorisation is that it is much harder to put people into boxes than at first appears. Just as the history of scientific thought concerns itself with the victors, so the history of political thought claims that the people who matter are those who are easily recognisable as forerunners or instigators of identifiable movements today. There is a recognised political evolutionary tree, with a main trunk and dead-end branches. If today's movement is respectable, then the forerunners have to be respectable too. If they are not, they are either written out of history, or rewritten. Since prewar political activists had a different conception of what was acceptable, it is easy to pick out respectable activists doing naughty things, in order to attack the canon of today. Marx was antisemitic. William Morris was a Nordic racialist. Beatrice Webb opposed overseas aid, except to the children of German or Austrian professors. This is fun. Historiographical dustbin-emptying is fun, and a hygienic and useful activity. But the unexpected categorisations that emerge from substituting a nature/anti-nature political axis for other currently accepted axes are meant here to offer a serious alternative. They are not for polemical ends.

**History**

Ecological ideas break down into two distinct kinds, which both deserve the name 'ecological' and which arose at the same time, the late 1860s. One I will call biological ecologism; the other is the discipline concerned with energy-flow economics. Biological ecologists include Ernst Haeckel, who coined the term 'Oceanology'; Willy Ostwald, the chemist, Nobel prize-winner and founder of the Monist League; Konrad Lorenz; R. Walther Darré, the Nazi Minister for Agriculture; Sir George Stapledon; Albert Howard; Lady Eve Balfour; Frederick Soddy, the nuclear physicist; Edward Goldsmith; and Frederick Georg Jünger.

Ecological economists include Podolinsky, Ostwald, Popper-Lynkeus, Ballod-Atlanticus, Liebig, Pfaundler, Sacher, Patrick Geddes, Soddy and Prigogine. Economic ecologism makes the claim, on an ethical basis, that it is concerned with non-renewable resources. Human energy is free and renewable; coal (later, oil) is not. The call to preserve scarce resources is today a very strong Green argument, and economists have begun to look at the problem of inter-generational allocation of resources (logically, this should be zero, but this is an unpopular conclusion). The question of non-renewable resources, with its apocalyptic impli-

---

cations of waste, loss, danger and famine, emerged when the implications of the theory of the dissipation of energy were understood. Before that, it was thought that as the earth was a closed system, no energy could leak out. This shift of vision paralleled the disappearance of Say’s Law as a serious economic concept. The writers who contributed to the discipline of energy economics, which has never quite made the textbooks, were all socialists, and egalitarian. They proposed drastic solutions, including re-structuring society into a system which controlled resource allocation and resource use and which would ensure that the burden of shortage was equally shared. The paradox of this plan was that consumption of energy was seen as a bad thing, but those who consumed less energy than others should be able to consume more. This movement should be distinguished from the Malthusian one, which assumed an arithmetical growth of food production, together with a geometric rate of increase in the population.

The first writer to discuss this problem was the Ukrainian socialist Podolinsky (1850-92), landowner, populist and doctor of medicine. In 1882 he wrote to Marx and Engels about his belief that inputs of energy units in agriculture could never be reclaimed in outputs (e.g. that the energy capital involved in digging a new allotment could never be reclaimed in the energy value of the food grown in it). Podolinsky hoped that Marx would realise that he had produced a scientifically based energy theory of value to replace the labour theory of value (the latter theory presented Marxists with the major theoretical problem of equating price with labour value). But Engels dismissed his argument as mere Ricardian physiocracies. Podolinsky was linked with Ukrainian populist nationalists, who formed themselves into communes. He also knew left-wing Ruthenians in Vienna, who idealised the Cossack tribal commune. As with today's Greens, he supported small-group nationalisms, such as those of the Catalans and Basques. He argued that 'the poverty of some human groups is the reverse side of the prosperity of other human groups', an argument which depended on a belief in finite resources.

Wilhelm Ostwald was an ecological economist, although because of his connection with Haeckel and his eugenic and communard ideals, he also belongs on the biological ecologist side. His book *The Energetic Imperative* ranked civilisations in terms of their efficiency in energy use. The most efficient would survive, according to the rules of natural selection. Ostwald's energetics received a hostile reception from Lenin, although he hailed Haeckel's work as a powerful weapon against capitalism. Ballod-Atlanticus (1864-1933) was inspired by both Marx's egalitarianism and Henry Ford's dynamism. He wrote a science fiction novel called *The Future State* which attacked capitalism and marginalist

---

4 I am indebted to Professor Juan Martinez-Alier, of the University of Barcelona, for permission to read the draft of his book *Ecologism and Economics: History of a Hidden Relationship*, and for the many discussions we had on this topic at an earlier stage of my research. He is not responsible for my interpretation of these issues.
economics. He compared the energy conversion rate of the steam engine and the human body and found in favour of the latter: 20% compared to 5%.

In 1912 appeared a book entitled *Die Allgemeine Nähpflichtung*, written by Joseph Popper-Lynkeus, a distant connection of Karl Popper. He emphasised the problem of exhausting natural resources and introduced detailed 'energy accounting'. His solution was to introduce peacetime conscription. Men would work for twelve years, women for seven, and everyone would receive a basic 'social wage'. Popper-Lynkeus's energy accounting was Eurocentric. He proposed solving Germany's shortages by importing energy equivalents such as beans and sugar from Latin America. In his scheme, human labour would be used for 'proper purposes', satisfying basic needs.

Frederick Soddy (1877-1956), Professor of Physics at Oxford, presents a more complex picture. Soddy fans like to put him in the box of left-wing egalitarians. Like many natural scientists, he became obsessed with the idea of organising human society more rationally and 'economically' in the Aristotelian sense. Most economic theories geared to problem-solving are leakage theories (Marx as well as Silvio Gesell), and Soddy was no exception. Long before the Depression he envisaged a disappearance of capital. He wrote a 'Cartesian' criticism of economics. He claimed that if capital was embodied energy, then it was subject to the laws of entropy. This meant that the idea of interest, especially compound interest, arising from capital, was a myth. Stored capital, in whatever form, wasted away. He called this a Cartesian argument, on the grounds that 'scientific' economics were irrational. He criticised Marx and Engels for not understanding energy limitations to growth.

Soddy was initially inspired by Ruskin. Later he became interested in Social Credit, although he disagreed with their compound-interest schemes. Because of its anti-capitalist bias his work on economics became a cult for biological ecologists, including the leader of the Kibbo Kift (later the Green Shirts), John Hargraves. He opposed nuclear bombs and wanted more research into nuclear power stations before they were built. Carrying the alternative nature of ecologists to extremes, Soddy was pro-Marx, anti-Soviet communism, anti the Russian atom bomb, anti-capitalist and anti-banking. The last position led him into antisemitic comments, but these were not programmatic. He thought that the white race would have to fight for its energy resources, because the notion that productive capacity could increase was a mirage.

These writers were described by Hayek as 'technocratic collectivists', and they did not see themselves as mystical, irrational or Utopian. They were united in their fear of the dissipation of energy and in their calculations of the carrying capacity of the earth. The attack on market economics followed from their belief that market methods of price formation did not take into account 'real' value, value based on energy. But although they

---

were rational socialists, the economic ecologists failed to get a hearing from their political leaders and even today are not legitimised in the works of John Goldthorpe, G.D.H. Cole, E.P. Thompson, and other guardians of the canon.

Late nineteenth-century biologists saw evolutionary theory as a science. But they attacked mechanistic thinking and called for a sensitive, organic, even holistic approach to the organisms they studied. Indeed, 'ecology' was defined by its founder, Haeckel, as 'the science of relations between organisms'. To men who thought in terms of millennia, who saw Beauty as coterminous with Nature, the immediate social and political implications of Darwinian theory could be ignored. However dark, unknowable and foreseeable Nature's ends, the method was still scientific. Nature ruled the earth. According to a metaphor which appears again and again, Nature was 'veiled' from man. If the veil could be rent aside, objective reality, the true truth, could be revealed. This idea had radical epistemological implications, because if the truth was achievable, then obviously nothing could be allowed to stand in the way of achieving it. Further, only change, flux itself, was permanent. The structure of tradition, holy lies, golden myths, and other means of maintaining social stability were seen by the radical late nineteenth-century biologists as obstacles to truth, those truths which could be learned from a didactic Nature. Thus the essential political message of biological ecologists was optimistic, as well as radical. If man could be brought into a 'correct' relationship with nature, all would be well. Nature would guide the path of progress.

Haeckel is probably the most significant figure in this movement. His own politics are typical. He became an influential populariser of science and scientific rationalism in Germany and in England, where his works were published by the Rationalist Press and distributed by working men's educational associations. He opposed duelling, corruption, reaction, Christianity and war. He thought that emotions were a myth, but that reason led to an appreciation of the beautiful - that beauty was an objective value, the essence of Nature. Originally a Protestant, he turned against Christianity because it placed animals and their feelings below people: he argued that people ranked equal but not superior to animals in the natural world. In his later writings he adopted an increasingly vitalist, neo-Lamarckian posture. From the position that the world was entirely matter he came to believe that it was entirely spirit, and in 1914 he published a work entitled *God-Nature*. Haeckel influenced the ecologists of the 1920s, especially in Britain, in two ways: first through his Goethean holism, his vision of the inter-relationship of all things, and the beauty of the world; and secondly but more importantly, through his argument that phylogeny recapitulates ontogeny. The implication of this theory was that evolution was recapitulated in each growing creature. Youth groups in the England and Germany of the 1920s concluded that one could alter and improve humanity through the correct environmental influences at the correct time of life: that the will came before determinist evolutionism. D.H. Lawrence was deeply influenced by Haeckel, by his atheism, humanism and worship of physical beauty.
The much-used phrase 'Social Darwinism' is an inadequate label for this line of reasoning, and it was, rather, neo-Lamarckianism that reached a peak in German biology in 1909, with the publication of Hans Driesch's *Philosophy of the Organism*, which argued that all was spirit, that the life force ruled evolution. It was economic ecologism rather than biological ecologism that wanted a 'correct' use of resources to help the human race survive. In terms of practical planning, the group did not have to be so widely drawn. In England, a lawyer and Hebrew scholar, Joseph Yahuda, argued that a planned ecosystem should be introduced in the British Empire. He called for a eugenic policy, although not sterilisation, and for the compulsory movement of population from one part of the dominions to another, in order to equalise resource use and improve efficiency. Although the author painstakingly (and correctly) differentiated his views from Germany's National Socialists, the belief in proper planning and the full and rational use of human energies and potential beings, and the desire to free misused abilities from worn-out, hidebound beliefs, are typically fascist.

The theory of the fascist state was attacked by some socio-biological Marxist writers of the 1930s for being primitive and for aiming at a static form, whereas Marxism, they claimed, understood the essential dynamism of biological processes. One left-wing biologist, on the other hand, Lancelot Hogben, who served in the International Brigade, thought that a state eugenic policy was essential in order to breed more workers because they possessed special genes for 'mutual help', but he opposed simple eugenics. This school of Marxist ecologists were pro-growth and pro-dynamism.

It has been argued that Marx himself was the first ecologist: that if you equate nature with the dialectic process, Marx was expressing a belief in the interconnection of man and the physical world that is ecological in spirit. This argument was popular in the class of post-'68, who equated capitalism with pollution. However, despite Marx's fondness for walks on Hampstead Heath, and Engels' love of hunting, the former's argument assumes the gradual abolition of the countryside, for both deterministic and normative reasons. He argued that rural life would decay and merge into urban life not only as the inevitable result of latifundian monopolisation and concomitant soil destruction, but as a desirable and progressive development, because of the alleged stupidity and bestiality of the peasant.


However, it is the conservative (loosely speaking) school of ecologists in Britain between the wars who represent the mainstream of true Greenness. Fascists and Marxists were not in power in Britain, but they were deeply concerned with power and how to achieve, use and maintain it, while the long-term apocalyptic visions of the true Green had no place for political structures and institutions. It is no accident that their representatives all came from a strata of the powerless: small landowners, small journalists, and non-mobile intellectuals who contracted the disease of independent thinking from their haphazard studies. They dropped out because they disliked the existing world: but they could not have worked within it in any case. Their inexperience about how nations work enabled them to have unfashionable ideas but prevented their implementation.

A key figure was Hugh Massingham, whose books on the English countryside, especially the Cotswolds, are still read. He was a believer in the theory of cultural diffusion, which he thought proved that man was an entirely 'pacific' being, and that Darwinism was wrong. He believed in the 'psychic unity of mankind' and wanted to decompose nations into small groups, especially Germany, whose unification he saw as unnatural. He saw culture, not race, as the main causal factor in society. As an early Guild Socialist he was to take up the cause of organic farming and of smallholders together with Jorian Jerks, Mosley's agricultural adviser, Lord Lymington, the Wyoming-born author of Famine in England, and Rolf Gardiner. This group saw environmental influences, not eugenics, as crucial: for example, infant feeding should be improved, so that 'a mother of C3 class, if undiseased herself, may ensure an Al baby'.

European rats were compared unfavourably by one writer with Indian rats which ate organic breadcrumbs: 'One feels that the [European] rat would sooner sit and work at a bench or at a desk than make his muscles glow with hard work upon the field'. Indian tribes in remote valleys were investigated to discover the causes of their superior health, teeth and longevity. Indian village compost-making was praised; the answer lay in the special virtues of recycling rotted waste, human and vegetable.

The paradox of the conservative ecologist position was that while materialism and hedonism were bad, the beauty and pleasure of rural life proved its virtues. This paradox was resolved through the Christian beliefs of the founders. It was man's duty to protect and conserve God's work. Like Massingham, C.S. Lewis criticised the teleological and manipulative scientific mind (see his attack on a disguised Olaf Stapleton in That Hideous Strength).

---


11 Wrench, op.cit., p. 52.
and the concept of unlimited growth. H.G. Wells was the typical
demonic figure for them; yet, as a typical economic ecologist,
Wells was a member of the Kibbo Kift Kin.12

This group was formed by John Hargraves, a Quaker, in the
early 1920s, after Hargraves read Rolf Gardiner's Guild Socialist
magazine Youth at Cambridge. The Kibbo Kift was formed to help
national regeneration through the countryside and it adopted
Haeckelian theories. At first, members wore an Anglo-Saxon cowl
and jerkin, topped with a Prussian army cloak, and their meetings
were called the 'Althing'. Kipling and Nietzsche were among their
inspirers, and their typically vitalist, anti-materialist slogan
was 'All is Energy'. Their elitist philosophy combined beliefs in
world unity, Social Credit and eugenics with, confusingly enough,
an apolitical but völkisch nationalism, which is supposed to have
influenced the German Youth Movement. The Kin included luminaries
like Julian Huxley, Havelock Ellis, Norman Angell and Patrick
Geddes, Professor of Botany and town planner. In the early 1930s
the Kibbo Kift became the Green Shirts and organised marches and
demonstrations by the unemployed.

The Kin was Germanophile, as were most middle-class, social
reformist movements between the wars. Two Kin members, Gardiner
and Lord Lymington, contributed to the Anglo-German Review in the
1930s (some of whose articles, such as 'The Scottish Origins of
National Socialism', drew annoyed rebuttals from the German con-
tributors). Both Northern European nationalists, and with a com-
mon interest in ruralisation, they started the New Pioneer in 1938.
It called for organic farming, back-to-the-land policies, and
peace with Germany. Both men turned their estates into organic
farming trusts. Gardiner afforested a desolate stretch of sandy
Dorset heath. Gardiner had taken a troupe of folk dancers to
Germany in 1921, and he wrote a Lawrencian account of the call of
the earth, the blood, and the electric excitement of communal dan-
sing. His aim was 'a new union of Celto-Germanic peoples from
the Adriatic to the Arctic, the Vistula to the Atlantic',13 Racial
frontiers were the 'real' ones: 'neither fascist blatancy nor Pol-
ish arrogance can obliterate them', he argued, in a veiled attack
on imperialist fascism of the Mosley/Mussolini variety. In 1928
he attacked 'slavery to any nonsensical racial theory, such as a
dogmatic belief in the Nordic race...', but gave a common Germanic

12 For the Kibbo Kift, see J.L. Finlay, 'John Hargrave, The Green
V, no.1 (January 1970), pp. 53-71, especially 54-5; and D. Prynn,
'The Woodcraft Folk and the Labour Movement, 1925-70', ibid., Vol.

13 H.R. Gardiner, 'A Common Destiny', in H.R. Gardiner and H. Roc-
holl (eds.), Britain and Germany, London: Williams and Norgate
1928, p. 127.
sympathy as a prerequisite for the international union he envisaged.14

The folk-dancing visits were reciprocated in the 1920s and continued after the Second World War, when Gardiner took a choir on a tour of Germany. He aimed to start a 'rural university' on his estate, which would include gymnastics, singing and Morris dancing, and he did run courses on rural husbandry. Gardiner criticised Mosley's British Union of Fascists for being lower middle class: national regeneration could only come from a combination of yeomen and aristocrats.

In 1940 Gardiner, Massingham and Lord Lymington established a group called Kinship in Husbandry, which wanted smallholdings, ecological protection and care for the earth. In the same year Lady Eve Balfour, author of The Living Soil, set up the Soil Association, which focused on one issue, organic farming. Correspondents and members had interests in wider aspects of rural reform and sometimes advocated Maoist agrarian communes, or the redistribution of land into very small plots, but the movement kept the argument on these issues to a minimum. In 1946, an attempt was made to form links with other countries, especially Germany, and German representatives, including an ex-Professor of Agriculture, later the Minister for Refugees in West Germany, attended a meeting to discuss possibilities. For reasons unknown to me nothing came of this meeting, and the German organic farming movement expanded and flourished as a separate organisation. The English conservative ecologists of the inter-war period continued with their programme of patriotic but moderate nationalism, an ethic of duty, service and care, nurture and tenderness for the earth, a Christian pantheism, and a paternalist social creed, focused also on the ideal of service.

The Steiner Connection

Organic farming movements in Germany, despite the persuasive nature of their public case, are rooted in the theocratic mysticism of Rudolf Steiner (originally an Austrian Catholic) and the Anthroposophists. In the 1920s Steiner gave a series of influential lectures on the importance of the Earth, which he saw as the living mother, or biomass. He asked a follower to establish a farm to experiment with his ideas.15 Steiner's constituency was the


15 Hellmut Bartsch, Erinnerungen eines Landwirts: mit Ergänzungen zu R. Steiners landwirtschaftlicher Impuls und seine Entfaltung 1924-5, Stuttgart: J.Ch. Meßlinger (no date; c.1948). A good and accessible work on Steiner is Geoffrey Ahearn's Sun at
professional middle class in Germany, Austria and Switzerland. These were the people who supported 'soft', social reformist ideas; indeed, Steiner's educational reforms, based on the so-called Waldorfshule, was originally aimed at helping the poor, the mentally handicapped and the hypersensitive child.

The values of the German Youth Movement - anti-urban, spiritualist, idealist - were inherently sympathetic to Anthroposophy. After the First World War many members of Wandervögel groups joined Steiner's movement. But, as quasi-anarchistic and apolitical as the Youth Movement, they had no political home, especially in the ferment of Weimar Germany. Conservative nationalists of the 1920s were not natural ecological sympathisers. Although often concerned for the same spiritual values, they subsumed such issues beneath their immediate concern for Germany's survival. The theoreticians of the neo-conservative movement looked for the sources of power, of action. Spengler argued that all man's constructs were artificial, essentially opposed to nature, while Ernst Jünger praised 'steel-like' warriors. However, the heirs of vitalist philosophy, including Heidegger and Friedrich Georg Jünger, saw technology and consumerism as parasitical and destructive, an interpretation especially dominant during the war. Jünger wrote that 'even the smallest technological labour-saving device consumes more energy than it produces', an analysis squarely in the tradition of the economic ecologists.

The most important ecologists belonged to the school led by the ethologist Konrad Lorenz. Although he was not incorporated into the rigid German or Austrian university system, there was a rapid and flexible feedback between his work and existing schools of biology. Lorenz's work followed the trail blazed by non-Germans, especially Whitman and Julian Huxley, but his chief emotional inspirer was Wilhelm Bölsche, author of Love Life in Nature and Haeckel's biographer. Vegetarianism, vitamins, and life-reform movements emerged not only from the open experimentalism of German free medicine, but from the holistic tradition of vitalist biology.

What continuity was there between this tradition and National Socialism, which earlier I described as containing a 'soft' strand of ecologism?

Some members of the National Socialist government became prominent supporters of ecological issues and organic farming. They have been described as 'the first radical environmentalists in control of a state'. A naturist hospital was named after Rudolf Hess (but re-named after his flight to England in 1941), while members of Hess's office, such as Antony Iudovici, argued for carefully planned, ecologically satisfactory land-use and planning. Fritz Todt and at least one of his members, landscape

Midnight (Wellingborough: Aquarian Press 1984), which discusses inter alia Steiner's attitude to evolution and relativism.

architect and motorway designer Alwin Seifert, were ecologists: Seifert took a more extreme position, opposing land drainage, reclamation schemes and monoculture. He was an active follower of Steiner. The Nazi government was the first to insist that tree planting should include broad-leaved deciduous trees as well as conifers (1935), while hedgerow and copse-protection ordinances were passed in the 1930s 'to protect the habitat of wildlife'. Tension between Germany and Italy intensified when Mussolini persisted in cutting down trees in the South Tyrol. German spies in Poland in 1937 saw an outbreak of pine-bud mite, which destroyed vast tracts of forest along the German-Polish border, as tantamount to an act of war. Anti-vivisection laws were passed. R. Walther Darré, Minister of Agriculture from 1933 to 1942, conducted a campaign for organic farming between 1940 and 1941, against the wishes of Goering and Bormann. He received comprehensive reports from the Gauleiters of various areas which showed that many peasants, as well as large farmers, were switching to organic farming techniques. Darré's staff circulated a letter from the chemical giant I.G. Farben, who were alleged to be plotting against organic farmers. One third of the top Nazi leadership supported Darré's campaign; another third declined to lend support only because of the link with anthroposophical ideas. Himmler established experimental organic farms, including one at Dachau which grew organic herbs for SS medicines. His staff sent him papers on Vitamin B shortages as a cause of matriarchal societies and genetic problems with potash establishment in plants. Lorenz himself was able to continue his scientific research after the Anschluss, and both American and Russian biologists came to work in research institutes under the Nazis.

Clearly there was major continuity under National Socialism of earlier German traditions in this area. That in itself would not be surprising, as continuity of this kind can be found in many academic areas, including history. But the existence of ecological ideologues among the Nazi leadership does show that National Socialism was perceived at the time as a system which had room for ecological ideas. Certainly it was (in theory, if not in practice) anti-transcendental, and it was also opposed to capitalism and the mechanism of the market. The old critique of the mercantilist ethic was given lip service by the Nazis, as was the ideal of duty and service for the collective good. The emphasis on long-term aims also fitted the ecological framework. But ecologists were perceived as hostile to Germany's interests by the technocrats in the leadership, especially Heydrich, who set the SD to harass organic farmers and fringe naturist groups such as the nudists. Monists, Druids and the Union of Anthroposophists were all closed down in 1935. This was a result of the conflict between theory and political power rather than the triumph of one ideology over another. The war meant the final decline of the early ecological sympathisers.

Darré himself tried to start a 'Soil Association' in 1953, after his release from prison. He feared that his connection would be seen as giving the Association a 'naziistische' taint, and the idea tailed off. His old English friends and sympathisers
contacted him again and sent him works on smallholdings and organic farming. He wrote several articles on these themes for local papers under a pseudonym, and he reviewed Eve Balfour's book *The Living Soil*. The ex-owner of the experimental organic farm visited by Darré and other ministers in the 1930s continued to write to him from East Germany. Today *Demeter*, the title of the magazine of the anthroposophist organic farmers, is the name of a chain of health-food stores, and the movement is growing, with branches in Canada and Australia.

In a post-war Britain dedicated to large-scale planning, it took a German emigre, Fritz Schumacher (*Small is Beautiful*), together with John Papworth (*Intermediate Technology*), to revive conservationist ideals. Their constituency was not the demoralised and powerless conservative of the era, but the young left, the proto-hippy, reacting against a perceived establishment-led bureaucratic vandalism and waste of human effort. Despite the continuation of the old organic-farming, self-sufficiency groups, publicity and politicisation focused on a more unstructured set of beliefs. Let us look at the Greens in that context.

Today’s Greens range from CND to the European New Right. They incorporate nomadic bands of witches, visiting Stonehenge to smear it with toad’s blood and following the astral plane, and politicised animal-rights groups. The matriarchal pagan witches worship at the same standing stone in Germany as Darré did, complaining that the Nazis were far too patriarchal. The New Right, grouped mostly in France, Italy and Belgium, base their Greenness on a cultural criticism. They are anti-technology, anti-American, anti-urban, anti-capitalist, and hostile to American nuclear missiles. There is a tendency to state a preference for Russia over America when pressed. They use socio-biological arguments to oppose democracy and are pan-European. Tolkien is one of their inspirers, though he would have been surprised at a hobbit movement which combined conservative moral, social and cultural values with an anti-conservative, revolutionary attitude.

What do the witches and the French professors have in common, if anything? Can one talk of a common Green ethic, and what is the connection with the past?

The first point to note is that the groups I have discussed, past and present, are all anti-capitalist, pacifist, opposed to the market economy and to the ideal of transcendence (man is subject to the laws of nature), and in favour of a long-term view.


18 Tolkien was inspired to create Gandalf by a German painting, *Der Berggeist* by Madalener, according to Humphrey Carpenter (*J.R.R. Tolkien: A Biography*, London: George Allen & Unwin 1977, p. 51).
They seek a return to tribal society and are communard and village-oriented. They oppose the nation state and have apocalyptic expectations of desertification, mass famine and anomie, together with the total pollution of air, soil and sea, to the point of endangering animal and plant as well as human survival. Today, all oppose nuclear power as well as nuclear weapons.

The moral values they have in common include the duty to nurture the earth and animals and care for future generations; quality, not quantity; distrust of large institutions; distrust of governmental institutions; pantheistic religious feeling; wholeness; the desire for a new culture, tribal or matriarchal; rejection of the old (not reactionary); opposition to what is perceived as the course of Western civilisation and to mercantilist, exploitative, materialist concepts; and the desire to conserve energy and other resources. If I point out at this stage that these values (apart from matriarchy) were all National Socialist ones, that does not mean I think today's ecologists are Nazis, only that many Nazis were ecologists. A science fiction novel published after the war by an ex-Nazi journalist paints a picture of a Green village utopia, and its rediscoverer points, quite rightly, I think, to the similarity between this and the radical Nazi desire for tribal stasis. The fact that ex-Nazis can infiltrate Greens in Germany does not prove that German Greens are Nazis - they do dissolve these fake Green cells when they find them - but it does show that there is sufficient similarity in style and belief for a masquerade to take place.

The political manifestations of Greenness today are various. Greens have already split into churches, some broad, some narrow. The most publicised are the anti-nuclear movements, and here the German Greens are virtually a single-issue party and have attracted a broad left support, especially from left of the Communist Party. Greenness has, in short, been latched on to by single-issue groups. These can only be detected by looking for consistency. Animal-rights groups are consistent, if fanatical. Vegetarians are inconsistent; they do not try to convert carnivores, or not yet. Greens opposed to nuclear power stations are inconsistent; this is the cheapest and cleanest known way of generating power. Many pseudo-Greens belong to the Third-World lobby; they do not just demand a cessation of trade and commodity circulation, which would be consistent, but wish the First World to continue subsidising and providing unstringed aid for these countries. Similarly, entryist Greens in the Labour Party, while opposed to industry and trade, desire more state subsidies. Like the Nazis, they prefer state committees to the operation of the market, but unlike the Nazis, they do not seem to have thought it through. One key element of Greenness which marks Greens off from rural craftsmen or smallholders is that they are bad at being Green. Cobbett's peasant could live off a five-acre holding; today's

Green communities cannot be self-sufficient on three hundred acres, even in areas where the Welsh peasants around them are doing it all the time.

In categorising Greenness, then, the same problem arises as with revolutionary conservatives in Weimar Germany, or radical right groups anywhere, exacerbated by the left-wing entryism that has taken place — intensely conservative moral values, but a non-conservative political stance. There is opposition not only to the written rules, but also to the unwritten ones, because society has taken a wrong way and is dishonest, inauthentic. There is a desire for a return to single objects produced by one man, relating to a single consumer: the relationship between the three is as important as the object itself. It would be possible to dismiss the common denominator as simply anti-democratic: nicely so where single issues (whales etc.) are involved, not so nice when they invade Oxford laboratories and smear Sir Denis Noble’s car with toad’s blood. But the commitment or lack of it to a pluralistic democracy seems to me to be the least interesting thing about the Greens: and in any case, they all have a legal, parliamentary move-ment (although in Britain, as stated earlier, it is unlikely to succeed because of our electoral system). But what does render them important is their broad-church quality, and here my long historical survey reappears. The strength of the Greens is that they fuse the energy calculations of the economic ecologists with the bundle of moral values involved in both conservative and national socialist ecological movements. They can thus range from left-wing egalitarianism to anti-humanist elitism. They can appeal to anarchist libertarians, who also value the proper use of resources and see governmental and bureaucratic mechanisms as wasteful and destructive of human energy. On the whole, though, Greens see human energy as free and expendable and therefore as essentially less important than non-human energy resources. This can lead to troubling recommendations, such as Popper-Lynkeus’ system of slavery mentioned above. The libertarian left have offered the concept of an infinitely self-adjusting feedback mechanism which can legitimate any system whatsoever: they insist that any viable energy system is, by definition, a viable ecosystem. This bit of entryism, though, strips the normativeness from ecologism and has been properly rejected by the Greens.

Here is a political movement fed by two streams: an apparently 'scientific' rational calculation of the 'best' way in which to run a society, backed by apocalyptic visions of no coal, or no oil; and a justified and powerful criticism of ugly, insensitive and wasteful societies, which has deeply influenced a deculturated generation inured to hardship of a sort through squats and drugs — proletarianised Greens whose roots have been lost by inadequate schooling and whose minds have been damaged by exposure to undis-ciplined music. This is a powerful and heady mixture, and it is not likely to go away.

ANNA BRAMWELL
I. Introduction

It has been maintained in a number of studies, some of which have already appeared in print, some of which are still in press or forthcoming, that the form of Balinese life in Pagutan, western Lombok, is a totality. It is now opportune (January 1986) to draw together the findings of these studies of various aspects of this form of life, studies which have come to demonstrate this contention conclusively.

Aspect in the present and earlier studies refers to what are more usually called 'elements' or 'areas' of social life. However, the data upon which this essay is based were collected during the course of about twenty-one months' field research in Pagutan, western Lombok. This work was funded by the Social Science Research Council of Great Britain and the Esmie Horniman Anthropological Scholarship Fund, to which bodies I am indebted for their support. Parts of this paper were read to Professor Telgo Yoshida's graduate class at Keio University; I am most grateful to Professor Yoshida for the opportunity thus given to me and for the helpful comments and advice which he has offered me, and for the lively response of his students. Unless otherwise specified, 'Balinese'in this study refers to the Balinese resident in Pagutan.

1 So as not to burden the text with references to studies which are in press or forthcoming, only published work is cited generally. Other essays are listed in the References, though all as forthcoming.
here these elements or areas are indigenously defined and derive from and are replications of Ida Sang Hyang Vidhi, the high god of the Balinese, as sunlight is to the sun, the goî (Bhatara) Surya. 2

We shall also refer to contexts. Aspects and contexts are not all the same. The latter have come in for much discussion of late, especially in the volume Contexts and Levels (Barnes et al. [eds.] 1985), but most of what has been said has not clarified the notion very much. Hobart (1985), indeed, demonstrates the impossibility of saying anything very definitive about the notion.

Dumont, according to Barnes (1985: 10), suggests that 'where empiricists are satisfied with identifying contexts, structuralists ought further to recognize levels': Dumont writes (1982: 225) that 'it is not enough...to speak of different "contexts" as distinguished by us, for they are foreseen, inscribed or implied in the ideology itself. We must speak of different "levels" hierarchized together with the corresponding entities' (emphasis added).

There is an unfortunate dogmatism here; and an idiosyncracy in the use of these terms, the meanings of which are anyway hard to pin down (cf., e.g., Allen 1985: 21), which makes their application in the analysis of social facts at least problematical.

If, further, 'Dumont's idea of hierarchical levels is an analytic construct' (Barnes 1985: 10) while levels are not 'abstract theoretical constructs invented by anthropologists' but 'social facts as Durkheim defines them and they assert themselves out of the ethnographic observation of specific societies' (Iteanu 1985: 91), it is a little hard to know how to proceed.

Notwithstanding Dumont's assertion, therefore, we shall have recourse to context in what follows. If that makes this study empiricist, so be it: the task is to try to make sense of a form of life, not to bother about what other people might term the attempt. In any case, what follows is also 'structuralist'.

Contexts refer to the following kinds of situation: two (or more) parties coming together to exchange goods and/or services for goods and/or services and/or cash; a temple festival (pindöclan); the joining of a male and a female in the rites of marriage (nganten); two senior priests meeting; ideological relations that obtain between the four estates (varna); 3 and such like.

---

2 This usage of 'aspect' is discussed at some length in Duff-Cooper forthcoming (e).

3 The four estates are Brahmana, Ksatrya, Vésia and Sudra. The first three are the trivangsa, or Dalem, 'insiders'; the Sudra are Jaha, 'outsiders'. Guermonprez suggests (1985: 62) that the Brahmana "constituent dans l'ensemble des trivangsa la classe la plus "intérieure", homologue à l'espace le plus sacralisé (jeroan) d'un sanctuaire, tandis que les Sudra sont rejetés dans l'extérieur homologue à l'espace profane entourant le mur d'enceinte d'un temple'. This suggestion is a limited version of the explana-
These contexts, and many others, are not simply distinguished by the anthropologist; they are isolated as such by Balinese people. These contexts naturally take place within the totality of villagers' way of life, and they are abstractions: some matters are not considered relevant to their constitution, although they are premised on the other contexts which constitute the various aspects of the Balinese forms of life.

The ways in which contexts and levels are comparable (if any) remain to be decided (cf. Barnes 1985: 10). Such decision will, of course, depend in the first place on what levels (and contexts) are taken to be.

So levels form no part of the enquiry which follows. Nor does 'hierarchy': if this term is defined fashionably as encompassment of the contrary or opposite (Dumont 1980: 239; cf. p. 242), then the Balinese form of life is not hierarchical (Duff-Cooper 1985c: 138). The notion of encompassing is anyway a metaphor based on a number of questionable assumptions, artfully sketched by Mark Hobart (1985: 49), which make it at least suspect as an analytical term.

Terms such as 'equal', 'unequal', '(social) inequality', do not appear as analytical terms either. These terms have meaning only by being defined by the social facts they are meant to elucidate, but it is these facts which such elucidation is supposed to move away from. Further, as MacClancy remarks (1985: 147), such terms may not (in my view, most probably do not) tell us more than is already apparent from the social facts under scrutiny.

The instruments we shall rely on to find a way through this form of life are: duality; juxtaposition and contingent; symmetry and asymmetry; alternation; reversal/inversion.

These basic concepts have proved useful both in the analysis of the Balinese form of life and of others. It should be emphasised that in the main they correspond with indigenous Balinese notions more or less directly and that they have been deduced from social facts considered in earlier studies, not imposed on them.

Duality is the Balinese god Rwa-Bhinéda. Duality is the division of a unity into two entities (e.g. Needham 1985: 138) which are juxtaposed or contingent. Juxtaposed means that these constituent parts, which may number more than two (see below), are close together or side by side in particular contexts; contingent means that such entities are in contact or tangential in such contexts. This unity in duality, represented archetypally by Ardhánáríśvara, the bisexual icon, and a representation of Vidhí, may be expanded by division into three, four, five, and numerically more complex forms up to eleven. Only Balinese notions of duration (see Howe 1981) and Balinese ideas of descent (see n.12) (e.g. Duff-Cooper 1984a; 1985f: 77-80) evince division into numbers greater than eleven.

When two or more entities are juxtaposed or contingent, the
relations that obtain between them may be either symmetrical or asymmetrical. By symmetrical is meant that the related entities are interchangeable or substitutable one for another (cf., e.g., Weyl 1952: 16-17).

Total or complete interchangeability is represented in Balinese collective representations by Ida Sang Hyang Sunya, the Void, where 'Void' means that none of the characteristics of the phenomenal world are present. Symmetry of less completeness, however, exists in other forms as social facts in everyday Balinese life. Such symmetry exists only when the ideological distance of the entities so related, relative to a centre of reference - such as a group of gods, temples, an origin-point (kawutan), or what have you - are almost identical according to certain indigenous criteria. Which centre of reference is taken as the bearing against which the relative standing of two or more entities is gauged depends upon the context.

In cases where ideologically and, generally, physically speaking one entity is significantly further from a centre of reference than another, it accords better with indigenous criteria of assessment to describe the relations that obtain between the entities in terms of asymmetry. Thus, whereas the relations that obtain between a Pedanda Siva and a Pedanda Boddha, both of the finest (Brahmana) estate, who are related as male is to female (Duff-Cooper 1984b: 18-19),4 symmetrical, the relations that obtain between a Pedanda and a king (Anak Agung in Pagutan), related as elder to younger, an analogue of the male/female dyad, are more appropriately described in terms of asymmetry. This fact derives from the king being of the Ksatrya estate, which is ideologically more distant from the high gods and other mystical centres than the Brahmana estate.

In the Balinese form of life, such asymmetrical relations are discernible to what have been termed four degrees. (In the example just given, the relations are to the first degree of asymmetry.) These forms of asymmetry are what might be called expansions of complete or perfect symmetry (cf. Weyl 1952: 13), represented, it will be recalled, by the Void. These relations are represented either horizontally or vertically. In such representations, when an even number of entities are related, the centre of reference is

---

4 This social fact translates into: Pedanda Siva is to Pedanda Boddha as male is to female (in some contexts). Tcherkezoff suggests that this analogy, and others of similar form, is 'meaningless' (1985: 62). This assertion is incorrect. The social fact means that the relations that obtain between a Pedanda Siva and a Pedanda Boddha are 'perfectly' similar to the relations that obtain between male and female in certain contexts. Of course, the full meaning of this statement (which was made to me, though in a less formal idiom, by my first host in Pagutan, Pedanda Gde Made Karang) is given by a holistic study of the form of life in question. For such studies of the Balinese form of life, see Howe 1980 for Bali and Duff-Cooper 1983a for Lombok.
putative; when an odd number of such entities are related, the relevant centre of reference is implicated explicitly as forming a constituent part of the unity in question.\(^5\)

When an entity is divided into two, the constituent entities may alternate; in Balinese 'there are words which are to some degree equivalent to "alternation"...' and which 'convey in common a complex of senses that includes most prominently the notions of change, substitution, series' (Needham 1983: 126), 'all of which are implicated by "alternation"' (Duff-Cooper forthcoming, a).

More complex modes of periodicity, numerically speaking, such as three, four, five, and nine, represent dynamically their concomitant forms of partition. These modes of periodicity may be considered as expansions of alternation, as partition into three, four, etc., are expansions of duality.

Different forms of division may be reversed or inverted. Since 'the notion of reversal and inversion does not denote a simple relation with a strict formal definition' (Needham 1983: 117), it must be said here that such reversals and inversions are generally enantiomorphic, that is, of the form \([a, b, c] \leftrightarrow [c, b, a]\). In this formula, \(a, b\) and \(c\) are entities which are related, either horizontally or vertically in particular contexts. These contexts are represented by the brackets.

The sign \(\leftrightarrow\) stands for transformation: it signifies that transformation may occur in either direction, as it were, depending on the viewpoint adopted. For instance, in the middle world, male (\(lanang/muan\)) - female (\(istri/luh\)) is the correct order; when speaking of the metaphysical world, female - male (\(pradhana purna\)) is correct. Similarly, where \([a, b, c]\) signifies the three syllables (\(tri aksara AN, UN, MAN\)) of Brahma, Visnu and Siva respectively, which constitute the mantra \(M\), this order signifies, for example, the order of the syllables as said by Brahmana and Ksatrya Pedanda; the reverse order is that of mantra used by a witch (\(leak\)). But which is the reverse of which depends on which is adopted as the correct order. Generally, this order is taken to be the former, but not of course if one is a Balinese witch. The notation should reflect such social facts.\(^7\)

The commas between the letters on each side of the formula (which may of course number more or less than three, according to the empirical case being represented) stand for relations which may be symmetrical or of one of the four degrees of asymmetry. In

---

\(^5\) I cannot say whether this finding is correlated with the odd series of numbers being to the even series as, for instance, life is to death.

\(^6\) See, for example, Duff-Cooper 1985b, n.4.

\(^7\) Only one example of reversal has been discerned in Balinese life which is not enantiomorphic. This reversal, though, appears to be simply a version of Needham's formula \(V\) (1983: 116).
general, where three entities are represented, the first comma represents asymmetrical relations to the first degree, the second comma such relations to the second degree, the first obtaining between $a$ or $c$ and $b + c$ or $a$, the second between $a$ or $c + b$ and $c$ or $a$ (Duff-Cooper in preparation, Table 6).

All or part of this set of basic concepts, and expansions of them, frame the aspects of Balinese life considered below. Before we proceed to this consideration, one question remains to be dealt with: how are these aspects concatenated? The relations which frame these aspects are social facts which, following Durkheim, we should treat as though they were things (cf., e.g., Needham 1983: 20). Now, of any two things it can be said that they are in some respects alike and in some respects dissimilar (cf. Hampshire 1959: 31). But only if the relations obtaining within two or more dyads are perfectly similar can it be said of the dyads in question that they are analogues of one another. It could, of course, be established that in some regard the relations we will be dealing with are similar, though whether they are 'perfectly' so depends on what this word is taken to mean. Even given that this meaning could be established beyond question, however, and the relations determined as perfectly similar, this would only be the case from one point of view. From a different point of view, it could be established also that they are not perfectly similar.

It is more profitable to adopt this latter course, so that it transpires that we are dealing not simply with a set of analogous relations, but with a set constituted of sets of analogues, the relations within the dyads constituting which are either symmetrical or of one of four degrees of asymmetry (see Duff-Cooper, op. cit.). The question then becomes (below, Section V) how these sets of analogous relations are systematized.

The aspects which are examined below, and the examination of them, are not of course exhaustive: both are logically impossible (Hampshire, op. cit.); and in any case, the circumstances of the field research during which the data examined in this study were collected were such, in common presumably with that of all field workers, as to make it impossible to deal with everything.

The aspects addressed move from the most extensive to the most particular and are divided, for convenience, into three parts: Section II, the Balinese nation, the realm, the desa (agglomeration of villages), the village (kekliangan), and local descent groups; Section III, matters concerning an empirical individual's conception, gestation, birth, childhood, adulthood and old age, death (burial and cremation) and rebirth, including 'economic' relations and subsistence activities; Section IV, aspects of an individual's 'private' life, such as sex, dreams, daydreams and fantasies, visions and entertainments; and finally Section V, which assesses previous sections and suggests some of their implications.

---

8 Pagutan is a lurah, on a par with desa, which it was before, but part of a different set of Indonesian governmental institutions (see, for example, Duff-Cooper 1983a: 52-68).
II. Nation, Realm, Village, Compound

a) The Balinese Nation (Bangsa)
Guermonprez suggests (1985: 60) that apart from the Bali Aga, generally taken to be the original inhabitants of Bali (see, for example, Covarrubias 1972: 17-26), all the Balinese have come to consider themselves as Wong Majapahit, 'People of Majapahit', although Belo suggested (1936: 12) that this appellation was appropriate only to the three senior estates (triwangsa). In Guermonprez's view, therefore, this fact distinguishes the Balinese from all other people: only the Balinese are descended from a centre (noyau) given divinity under the name of Bhatara Maospahit. Unfortunately, this view does not accord with two facts: that villagers in Pagutan never refer to themselves or to other Balinese of whatever estate as Wong Majapahit; and that villagers equate Hindu Indians - who, of course, do not derive from Majapahit - with the Balinese.

The Balinese people and Hindu Indians are distinguished from all other peoples by their closeness to the gods at the centre of Bali, Gunung Agung. This centre also includes Mount Rinjani on Lombok and Mount Semeru on Java (Duff-Cooper 1985a: 159 n.5). 'Closeness' here includes physical and ideological proximity.

The entire Balinese world is composed of aspects of the gods at the centre of the island (as just defined); all aspects of the world, including food, clothing, agricultural and other techniques, were also given to the Balinese by the gods (e.g. Soekawati 1926). The Balinese, that is, are distinguished from all others by their entire way of life (Duff-Cooper 1983b: 370). This way of life corresponds with one meaning of the Balinese notion dharma. In this sense, is different in different places (desa), at different times (kala), and for different classes of people (patm). The Balinese hold that one should live in accord with local, current conventions as they are applicable to one's standing.

9 Cederroth describes this phrase as 'a beautifully precise and limited analytical concept' (1985: 136). This weak attempt at sarcasm cannot disguise the fact that he could hardly be more wrong: the phrase is meant to be imprecise and open-ended to allow its full exploitation in coming to terms with other aspects of Balinese ideology and social practice. And, of course, we positively eschew the method which Cederroth trumpets, which (to paraphrase him) carefully selects components of different versions of "indigenous ideology" (why the inverted commas?) and then confronts them with 'relevant analytical concepts' (ibid.). This sausage-machine approach to social facts which are wrested from their contexts distorts the social facts being scrutinised and, like the methods of Tylor and Frazer, necessarily leads to failure.

10 For an important account of this notion, see Hobart (1984).
The relationship between the Balinese (and Hindu Indians) and all others is by this criterion of an infinite (the fourth) degree of asymmetry. Yet the class of other people (anak lén) is divided into a number of classes. Indonesians (anak java) are closest to the Balinese; combined, the Balinese and Indonesians are set against the Chinese and Japanese, classed together because, among other things, both, in villagers' view, are in their own ways brutal, and because their writing is taken to be the same; these classes, finally, are distinguished from Caucasians (turis or belanda) and 'black' people (anak selem or anak alas, people of the forests). These latter are as different from the Balinese as they consider possible. When this class of other peoples is divided in this way, the relations between the Balinese and the other classes are respectively of the first, the second, the third, and the fourth degrees of asymmetry.

The mystical head of the Balinese is the most senior Pedanda Siva. The jural head of the Balinese, once the Déva Agung of Klungkung, is now the Governor of the island-province. The relations that obtain between these two officials are asymmetrical to the first degree, and this when, as now, the Governor is Brahmana.

b) Realms (Kerajaan)
The Balinese world was traditionally divided into realms: eight on Bali and six on Lombok. A realm was also headed by a Brahmana Pedanda, whose duty (dharma) included dealing with the mystical, and a Ksatrya (or Vesia) king, whose duty was to deal with the jural: administration of the realm, war, and supporting Brahmana. Generally, the Brahmana was pre-eminent and was always ultimately so; in matters connected with the jural, however, the king was pre-eminent, as the Camat is today (see Duff-Cooper 1985d: 243-7). The relations that obtained between these officials were again, in either form, asymmetrical to the first degree.

A Balinese realm did not comprise a clearly defined territory nor a specific people over which the Pedanda and a king exercised authority. Rather, through 'highly unstable pyramids of authority' (Geertz and Geertz 1975: 24), lines or sub-lines of descent traced through the male line (but cf. Guermonprez 1985: 49 n.22) from particular origin points (see, for example, Duff-Cooper 1984a) were allied with a particular king. However, that there were those who exercised authority and those over whom authority was exercised is not in doubt. In this regard, also, a Balinese realm was dualistic.

c) Agglomeration of Villages (Désa or Lurah)
Realms were divided into sets of villages called désa. Pagutan is a lurah (see n.7). All désa and lurah contain three temples (kayangan tiga), which have been discussed at length elsewhere (Duff-Cooper 1985b). The relations which can be discerned as

11 Guermonprez writes (1985: 64) that the title Gousti (a Vesia appellation) was that of most of the nineteenth-century Balinese kings. This assertion contradicts Crawfurd's account (1820: 143), villagers' views, and the logic of the Balinese form of life.
obtaining among the three temples, which constitute a unity, are
dualistic and asymmetrical to the first degree. A desa
(lurah) is headed by the priest or priests (Pemangku) of one or
more of the three temples and by the village head. These instit­

tutions were thus dualistic in this regard, and the relations which
obtain between these officials are, again, asymmetrical to the
first degree.

d) A Village (Kekliangan)
A variable number of localized descent groups (seturunan or
keturunan) comprise all the members of a Balinese village. In
Baturujung, there are five. The members of these groups consti­
tute the people of (Batur) Ujung (Duff-Cooper 1985b, n.6). The
other part consists of these people's cremated forbears located
in the village temple (pamaksan).

The powers to which the farmer are subject within the village
(see Duff-Cooper 1983a, Maps 3-6) are divided between the Pemangku
of the village temple and the village council (banjar) to which,
all things being correct, all married men belong. The council is
headed by the Kliang, theoretically first among equals, but in
Baturujung very much the Head in practice. The former deals with
those aspects of village life connected with the mystical, the
latter with matters concerned with the jural. The relations that
obtain between the two are asymmetrical to the first degree.
The relations that obtain between the cremated (niskala) and
the living (sakala) members of the village, between the village
temple and the banjar, and between the village temple with the
banjar and the residential areas of the village are all asymmetri­
cal to the first degree (though the last is very tentative).

e) Compounds (Gria, Puri, Jero, Pakarangan)
A compound contains houses and a local descent group temple among
other physical structures (see Duff-Cooper 1985e, Figures). In the

12 Seturunan refers to descent through males only; keturunan refers to descent through males and/or females or both. Both words
derive from *turun, to descend, fall. People to whom a Balinese
considers himself or herself to be related he or she generally
terms semestan. Hobart suggests (1983: 7) that this word derives
from *se-metu-an, roughly "one exit" or "from one source" (here
presumably the mother, as metu is a synonym in High Balinese
for being born).'

13 In fact, a Balinese never dies (Duff-Cooper 1985f: 80-1). Niskala refers to living human beings who are essential, generally
invisible, and out of time, sakala to such beings who are
material, generally visible, and in time.

14 The names of Brahmana, Ksatrya, Vésia and Sudra compounds respectively. Villagers' compounds are addressed at some length in
Duff-Cooper 1985e.
farmer reside the material and generally visible members of the
descent group; the latter is the place (palinggikan) of the cre­
mated members of the descent group, who are generally essential
and invisible. The temple is contingent with the houses (and
other physical structures) in the compound, as the occupants of
the former are distinguished from the latter, to the first degree
of asymmetry.

This dualism may be expanded to include nine points of the
Balinese compass (nawa sanga) (see, for example, Covarrubias 1972:
296-7; Hobart 1978a, passim). In this case, the compound temple,
and not the central courtyard natah) of the compound, is the cen­
tre of the compound (Duff-Cooper 1985e: 48). The relations that
obtain between these two areas - the compound temple and the rest
of the compound - are asymmetrical to the first degree.

A house is composed of three elements which are analogues of
the elements of which seats of Surya (padmasana), a split oandi
(temple gateway), funeral biers, the courts of a temple, the three
areas compound-gardens-ricefields, and an individual's physical
body (sthula sarira) are composed.

These elements are related dualistically one to another as in
the examples given above, where a stands for a person's head, the
compound temple, the inside court of a temple such as the
pamaksan, the compound, the roof and rafters area of a house; and
where b and c stand for the next elements from a either horizon­
tally or vertically.

These elements are inverted by demons (bhuta-kala), to give
another example (see above), who go about upside-down and who in
their guise as aspects of the demonic aspect of Siva or Kala, are
inverted in the mantra used by witches (see, for example, Duff­
Cooper 1984c: 10-14).

The inheritance (warisan) of real and other property is
through the male line. These rules are complicated, but they are
basically as follows: a deceased man's property is left to his
wife and to his unmarried male and female children in equal shares,
with the proviso that illegitimate (astra) children, i.e. children
born to the parents outside the rites of marriage (ngantén), in­
herit in the ratio 1:4 with their legitimate siblings. On the
wife's death or the marriage of previously unmarried female chil­
dren of the deceased, the property is inherited in equal shares
by the other inheritors. If the deceased has no male children,
the wife and unmarried daughters inherit; this property then
passes to the deceased's closest male relative (if younger than
him) or relatives (if elder) and then to their children as these
relatives die. There are complications to these basic rules,
which may be manipulated, of course, to disinherit those who in
normal circumstances might expect to have inherited.

Yet these rules evince duality in two main ways: in the dis­
tinction between legitimate and illegitimate heirs; and between
male and female. It is noteworthy that among male heirs at least
- and distinguished as legitimate and as illegitimate - the rela­
tions which obtain between them relative to the deceased (as
aspect of their closest origin point or centre of reference) are
symmetrical, as they are in other aspects of their everyday lives.
III. Empirical Individuals (Jadma/Anak)

The material occupants of a compound may be either male, female or (male) transvestite (bancih or bantong).\footnote{Bantong is an Islamic Sasak word used by the Balinese to refer to what on Bali are generally called bancih.} A transvestite is finer than males of his own or of a lower estate, from this point of view, to the first degree of asymmetry, than females, to the second degree of asymmetry. Other matters, such as the transvestite being Brahmana and a related male Sudra, or a related female menstruating, even though of the same estate as the transvestite, may expand these relations to greater degrees of asymmetry. (This example demonstrates well the 'over-riding' importance which context plays in the Balinese form of life.)

Also, transvestites and males are set against females of the same estate in many contexts to the first asymmetrical degree, although this degree may also be expanded in such circumstances as those just mentioned.

The conception of an individual is dualistic and involves the semen of a male and the blood of a female. The union of these aspects of the female and male principles (pradhana and purusa respectively) creates life. In conception, the roles of female and male are symmetrical. When males are born, however, the male principle is seen to have been pre-eminent in conception; when females are born, the female was similarly pre-eminent. When a transvestite is born, as it were, the relations between the two were symmetrical. Such is also the case when twins of the opposite sex are born. Both transvestites and opposite-sex twins who marry are replications in the material world of Ardhanārīśvara, the bisexual representation of Viṣṇu, of the finest kind.

During gestation and birth, both parents are implicated: both are the objects of rites; the behaviour of each influences the character of the child; and the names which the child bears reflect each parent's social standing (see, for example, Duff-Cooper 1985f: 71-4). Of male and female, however, the former is ultimately pre-eminent, although the female may be pre-eminent in contexts to do with the domestic. The form of the relations obtaining between the two, however, depends on the estates and the relative ages of the two.

A person's character, although influenced by his or her parents' behaviour to one another and to others as just mentioned, is mostly determined by the configuration of the three qualities (tri guna) inside the person. These three qualities are correlated with the three bodies (tri sarīra) of which any empirical individual is composed. Both these qualities and bodies are analogues of the tri sakti (dharma, kama and artha). These qualities, bodies and sakti are correlated with the four estates, as shown below:
The four Balinese estates are related one to another dualistically (Duff-Cooper 1985a: 163). The constituents of an empirical individual, physically, sensationally, functionally, emotionally and intellectually, are thus all framed by dualism.

Further, the cycle from conception, gestation and birth to death and rebirth (see, for example, Hobart 1978a: 17, Figure 3), that is, from the material world to the essential world and back again, and so on, is in all but exceptional cases an alternating sequence. From another point of view (that of the substantive phases, childhood, youth, adulthood, old age, death), the sequence evinces periodicity of five; under the aspect youth, adulthood, old age - when, the Balinese say, a person walks on four legs, two legs and three legs respectively - the sequence evinces periodicity of three. Both three and five are highly significant numbers in Balinese ideology (see n.19).

The alternating sequence just mentioned is reflected in the terminology of relationship (see, for example, Duff-Cooper 1984a: 486). It is also enantiomorphic in two ways: about the five central generations (+2, +1, 0, -1, -2), and when an empirical individual is most associated with the material and visible, i.e. in the eighth and fourth ascending and descending generations and in ego's own generation (0).

The terminology can be used to deduce what Balinese notions of the family, for which there is no Balinese word, consist of. It appears to consist ideally of at least two parents and five children (Duff-Cooper 1985d: 233-5). Women are incorporated into their husbands' local descent groups after being taken in marriage. Relations of incorporation and alliance relations between a woman's husband's local descent group and the woman's natal descent group are related as male is to female. The less similar the female taken in marriage to the male by whom she is taken by reference to the male's origin points (parents, forbears in the compound temple, for instance), the greater the asymmetry in the rights and duties of the two descent groups in the context of the marriage.

The family that this couple and their children constitute consists, of course, of two generations. (The children of the couple may, of course, number more or fewer than the ideal five.) Both the relations that obtain between these two generations and between the empirical individuals of the two generations are...
dualistic, either symmetrically or asymmetrically to the first degree.

An empirical individual's social functions depend in the main on three things: the person's estate, sex, and relative age. Each of these ideas is dualistic. No matter to which estate an individual belongs, the descent group of which he or she is an aspect is related with other groups of people of greater or lesser extension.

These relations often take the form of exchanges of goods and/or services for goods and/or services and/or cash. Parsons remarks (1975: 142) that 'exchange means, first, duality' and the exchanges just referred to are indeed dualistic. The relations that obtain within the dyads constituted by the parties to the exchanges may be symmetrical or asymmetrical to one of the four degrees of asymmetry. Whichever is the case, the relations that obtain are correlated with the standing of the parties to the exchange in question relative to the centre of reference relevant to the context. This centre is either a seller's local descent group temple, in the case of an exchange of cash for goods and/or services, or the descent group of the pre-eminent party in an exchange of goods and/or services for goods and/or services. 'Pre-eminent' here is assessed by reference to the estates and/or relative ages of the parties.

Parsons also remarks (ibid.) that 'there is alternation in exchange first one actor gives and the other receives, then the other gives and the first receives.' This assertion holds in the Balinese case, however, only for such traditional relations as obtain between a Surya and his or her sisia (e.g. Duff-Cooper 1984a: 497). These relations are in principle unending, although for contingent reasons either party may decide to sever the relations. In exchanges for goods and/or services for cash, alternation is evinced only in the trivial way described.

Part of the duty of the fourth estate (Sudra) includes agriculture and animal husbandry. Rice-growing and other subsistence activities are dualistic in various ways. Many of the aspects of rice-growing, further, implicate symmetry and asymmetry as principles of order, while techniques such as hoeing and fertilizing evince alternation; and the rite nuasen (see, for example, Hobart 1978b: 69), in which the rice which is harvested first to make an effigy of Sri, the goddess of rice, is planted (see, for example, Hatt 1951), depends to a great extent upon the alternation of numbers of the odd and even series, which are contrasted as life is to death and in numerous other ways, for its significance.

The season which brings the rain which in large measure sustains the seedlings planted in the fields alternates with the dry season as sunrise alternates with the sunset. Further, the seasonal cycle is related to the social structure, with the rice harvest and the celebration of the Nuadhan festival being central events in the year.

---

16 For a fuller account of these activities, see Duff-Cooper 1983a: 95-170.
rotation of rice and secondary crops as practised by Balinese agriculturalists may be viewed, in line perhaps with indigenous ideas, either as an alternating sequence and/or as a series which repeats every five Balinese years of 210 days, i.e. as a periodicity of five.

Relations that obtain between the male and female employees of a holder of rights in ricefields are symmetrical, as are the relations that obtain between the holder of such rights and his (or very unusually her) male and female employees, although these latter relations may also be considered as asymmetrical (to the first degree), depending upon the viewpoint adopted (cf. Duff-Cooper 1983b), but only when payment is made in, say, unhusked rice (gabah) to teams (kelompok) of workers. When payment is made in cash for a person's labour, the closer the employee and the employer relative to the employer's descent group temple, the higher the employee's wages (see, for example, Hobart 1980: 148). Payment of wages is the reverse of what a buyer is expected to pay for goods and/or services by a seller. A buyer who is of the same local descent group as a seller can expect to be given goods and/or services in exchange for his request for them, the gift of an opportunity to the 'seller' to give with an open hand and a ready smile (darma alus dana goya). A non-Balinese, non-Hindu Indian buyer is expected to pay the highest price for the shoddiest goods of all buyers. By contrast, an employer pays an employee of his own descent group, say, 3x; one from another village, 2x; and a non-Balinese, non-Hindu Indian employee x minus as much as possible, i.e. as little as possible.

17 Rice (a), usually the new variety IR36, is grown in rotation with secondary crops (b) in a series: a, a, b, a, b, a, a, b, a, a, ...

18 A buyer who is of the same local descent group as a seller can expect to be given goods and/or services in exchange for his request for them, the gift of an opportunity to the 'seller' to give with an open hand and a ready smile (darma alus dana goya). A non-Balinese, non-Hindu Indian buyer is expected to pay the highest price for the shoddiest goods of all buyers. By contrast, an employer pays an employee of his own descent group, say, 3x; one from another village, 2x; and a non-Balinese, non-Hindu Indian employee x minus as much as possible, i.e. as little as possible.

19 They also implicate expansions of Vidhi as a dualistic unity: e.g. the trimurti and other triadic unities: the eatur (four) désa; the pana (five) déva; the navia (nine) sanga; and the Eka dasa (eleven) Rudra, the nine gods of the nawa sanga with nadir (ketebenan) and zenith (keluanan) (see text, supra). The colours red, black and white of the trimurti, at least, are expressed dy-
therefore draw into the rites the following dyads, which are fundamental to Balinese ideology: high/low, right/left, inside/outside, upstream/downstream, north/south, east/west, male/female, older/younger, and far more besides (see, for example, Duff-Cooper 1985d, tables).

In so far as these dyads and others with which they are associated are concerned, it is not claimed that they are all transitive, i.e. that upstream is male and downstream is female, for instance; nor is it claimed that the term on each side of each dyad is homologous with the other terms on each of the same sides of the dyads. The matter of transitivity is here an empirical question, though I find it hard to imagine how the question could be resolved beyond doubt; while the question of the homology of the terms depends on the relations that obtain within the dyads being 'perfectly similar' to one another. In the Balinese case, therefore, in some contexts the terms on each side of each dyad are homologous, in other contexts, they are not all homologous.

These dyads are also implicated in such social facts as the ringing of a Pedanda's prayer bell (genta) and the beads (ganitri) made from the seeds of the wild Canna (Canna Orientalis) which he or she sometimes wears, both of which evince alternation. When a Pedanda meditates during a rite being held by some of his sisita, these people probably wear their finest clothes; at other times they generally wear clothes which are older (see, for example, Duff-Cooper 1984c: 4-6). But the form of these clothes does not differ, whatever the occasion. The pattern of the sarongs which villagers wear, such as the perang rusak (see Geirnaert-Martin n.d.: 177, 194, Figure 3), evince alternation in two ways; and the checks of the white and black poleng, used to clothe statues and other objects such as the wooden bell (kulkul) during rites, also evince alternation. Of course, they are also dualistic.

The food (gibungan) which is served during rites and which people eat communally evinces duality in men and women eating at the same time but separately in contingent locations and through the eight people (seluar) who sit together round one table to eat being equated with eight points of the Balinese compass which are basically dualistic. Alternation is evinced in various ways, both in the arrangement of what is eaten and in the courses served (cf. Duff-Cooper 1985g: passim).

Eating and defecation are contrasted as right is to left and, by analogy, therefore, as male is to female in certain contexts.20

namically through being plaited. This operation suggests that the three, like other entities created by division of a unity, were always a unity, and that the unity also was always three (or whatever).

20 Barnes appears to suggest (1985: 15) that this deduction (i.e. as eating is to defecation as right is to left, and as right is to left as male is to female, therefore eating is to defecation as male is to female) is unjustified. Barnes, however, confuses
It is a question whether these two operations constitute an exhaustive universe of discourse. If they do, then presumably urination \((ngirisin)\) corresponds with right, defecation with left, and eating with the centre or middle (always set lightly higher than right and left in Balinese versions of partition into three) when combined with eating and defecation.\(^{21}\)

IV. An Empirical Individual's 'Private' Life

Balinese sexual life (see Duff-Cooper 1985h) is dualistic, implicating an enjoyed (the penetrated party) and an enjoyer (the penetrator). In sexual intercourse, and in other sexual activities, right is to left as high is to low. Moreover, the sequence of activities in intercourse alternates between one party doing something from the repertoire of activities generally practised by villagers to the other, and then vice versa. This series of actions should, in the best circumstances, begin when a male takes a female in marriage and come to an end only with the old age or with the death of one or both of the parties. When both are male, sexual exchanges may cease with the marriage of one or both of the parties, but the other exchanges which constitute the relationship braya (e.g. Duff-Cooper 1985h: 418) generally continue after the marriage of one or both of the parties.

Sexual relations are constrained by, at least, what is associated with what is higher and more to the right not being set lower than what is to the left. A person's dreams, equally, are not wholly untrammeled by the social, being limited, it seems from a consideration of twelve dreams, to the dreamer's waking experience. However, dreams evince the transpositions, transi-

formal argumentation (like this syllogism) with empirical enquiry: formally speaking, this conclusion (eating is to defecation as male is to female) follows from the premises. Formally speaking, it follows that, in some contexts, at least, eating, right and male, and defecation, left and female are homologues. As before, however, whether the terms on each side of the dyads are transitive (is eating male, for example?) is an empirical question. The question whether the terms on each side of the dyads are homologues empirically speaking depends on the relations that obtain within the dyads. If these are not all symmetrical or of the same degree of asymmetry, then the sets of terms cannot be homologous. However, since these relations vary with context, there can be no one answer to this (empirical) question.

\(^{21}\) Needham writes that the principles of the classification under his scrutiny - opposition, proportional analogy and homology - 'permit prediction' (1985: 141). The suggestion at this point in the present study is such a prediction, which of course requires confirmation or otherwise by empirical enquiry.
tions, and 'in general all manner of inconstancy and recalcitrance to constraint' which are characteristic of such activities (Needham 1978: 64; cf. 1985: 144). However, the factors which are discernible and meaningful in dreams (according to Balinese views), such as flight, fire, jewels, cloth and other garments, animals, shapes, plants, colours, and 'authority figures', such as police and army officers, are also so in the waking lives of the Balinese. These factors generally depend on their relations, which are usually dualistic, with other aspects of the Balinese world.

The daydreams and sexual fantasies to which the Balinese admit 'manipulate the asymmetries which are inherent in the relations which generally obtain between men and women' (Duff-Cooper forthcoming, h). Furthermore, inasmuch as these daydreams and fantasies depend on a number of dyads, such as knowledge/ignorance, country/town, communal/individual, constant/inconstant, diligent/lazy, cool/hot, male/female, they are (to this extent, at least) dualistic.

The visions (ipian) which a Balinese person may have are premised on the distinction good/evil (cf. Duff-Cooper forthcoming, a: n.8) and demonstrate again the various kinds of asymmetry that exist between the members of the four estates.

The main entertainments enjoyed by villagers - drama, shadow-theatre (wayang) to a far lesser extent, and cock-fighting - all include music of various kinds. They are also all forms of offering, the first two to the gods, the last to beings associated with what is low. It is not possible to go into the details of these activities here. Suffice it to note that Ramseyer remarks, what is clearly right, that Balinese 'folk-art and music as a part of it [including, of course, drama and shadow-theatre, though I dislike such terms as 'folk-' anything] is blended to a very high degree with all the forms of expression of existence; with magical practices and beliefs, religious, social, economic, or political art. It reflects life as an entirety....' He also remarks at the same place (1970: 12) that 'primitive art is so to say through and through conventional', these conventions, of course, depending on the collective representations of which it is a part.

As for cock-fighting, this activity is now illegal under Indonesian national law, but the Balinese may request permission to such fights as part of a temple festival, for instance. The cock-fight, and whether one wins or loses, is bound up with the performance of the festival: for example, my friend told me that when many young people win, they tend not to feel it necessary to dance during the festival at night, but if many lose, then the general feeling is that young men should dance. This is because winning is a gift (pina) from the gods: if many people win, then people are all right with the gods; if not, then they should make an effort to get into the gods' better books.

Over and above this, the cock-fighting area is termed ring jéro, 'inside', as opposed to the outside spectators' area. Only males attend such fights, female vendors of drinks, etc., keeping well behind the spectators. Choosing birds to fight one another and the direction from which they will fight involve cosmological
considerations, even though many of the people involved do not know them (nor should do so). These cosmological notions, like the conventions which guide the production of folk-art, including masks, are basically dualistic. As for Ramseyer’s allusion to ‘life as an entirety’, in the Balinese case this is Vidhi. In this sense, these activities include all the basic concepts mentioned in Section I. Empirically, dualism and expansions of it, reversal and inversion, and alternation are also discernible in these activities.22

Finally, villagers’ political affiliation (Duff-Cooper 1985d: 242) in rational politics is based on the distinction, which many villagers think runs through every aspect of life as they discriminate between the Balinese and Muslims, in particular, the Islamic Sasak of Lombok. In some regards this distinction, which is ‘flesh and blood’ (getih be) to villagers, is as asymmetrical as possible, although, as noted above, other peoples’ forms of life, when compared with that of the Balinese and the Sasak qua Indonesians, are even more distinct and the relations that obtain between the Balinese and these others therefore at least as asymmetrical as those which, in other contexts, obtain between the Balinese and Sasak.

V. Conclusion

Sections I-IV should, of course, be expanded into a monograph, a project which I hope to take up in the future. However, it should be reaffirmed (and this is open to confirmation by interested or sceptical readers consulting other essays about the Balinese listed in the References and by the test of logical coherence) that I have tried my utmost to make no assertion of fact or interpretation without it being based on prior ethnographical description and/or analysis of social facts. So far as I can be completely certain, only the comments about some of the points raised by other contributors to Contexts and Levels (Barnes et al. [eds.] 1985) are new.

The present study has not, of course, covered every aspect of the Balinese form of life (supra, Section I), but it has addressed most of the aspects which are of greatest importance to villagers.23 These aspects are all framed by principles of order from the set of concepts listed in Section I: duality as such or in one of its expanded forms and symmetry or a form of asymmetry.

---

22 I cannot say whether symmetry or one or more of the forms of asymmetry are evinced by these activities.

23 Two aspects not discussed are illness and curing and disease and healing. On the basis of the literature, however (e.g. Goris 1937), I very much think that these aspects of Balinese life would not be recalcitrant to the approach adopted to other aspects of it.
(but see n.22) are almost always discernible. Alternation or another mode of periodicity, however, is evinced only by a number of aspects, as is reversal or inversion. Thus the claim that the Balinese form of life is a totality, the various indigenously defined aspects of which are framed by common principles of order, is borne out. And clearly, the claim of Balinese metaphysics (sara-breaks-surya) that Ida Sang Hyang Vidhi, a dualistic unity, pervades the world in various forms (as lamps take many forms, but are still all lamps) is not untenable.

Whether a basic concept is or is not discernible does not depend on the representations considered collective or individual, so to say; nor does it depend on the aspect considered being what might be thought practical or symbolical, for this distinction has no place in Balinese ideology.24

After some consideration, it appears that the aspects which do not evince certain of the basic concepts have nothing insignificant in common, but are more profitably considered as constituting a polythetic class. We do not now ask what it is about these aspects which does not allow this or that form of a basic concept to be discerned, or alternatively why these aspects do not evince this or that (form of a) concept; instead, the problem becomes 'a retrospective attempt to work out the cognitive and imaginative operations' (Needham 1980: 61) by which the classification framed more or less sporadically by these basic concepts was constructed.

A starting point for this attempt is provided by an assessment of Witherspoon's intriguing hypothesis (1977: 5) that 'all cultures are constructed from and based on a metaphysical principle which is axiomatic, unexplainable, and unprovable'; and although Witherspoon does not assume that 'this metaphysical principle is the same for all cultures...', he does think 'that it may be the same for many cultures which appear on the surface to be quite different from each other'. Witherspoon suggests (ibid.) a scheme of development: a 'conceptual scheme' develops by the positing of an opposition to the starting premise - in the Balinese case, Vidhi - from which the conceptual scheme is then expanded 'into a more complex structure utilizing analogy, opposition, and synthesis as its tools of construction'. These are elusive and complex matters, of course, and cannot be considered further here; but their consideration would not obviously be unproductive for comparativism.

As regards the Balinese form of life in particular, much remains to be done. I have in mind two major tasks. The first is to construct a model of the Balinese form of life which would be at once faithful to indigenous ideas and comparable with the models constructed by chemists and physicists. If such authorities as Needham (1983: 161) and Barnes (1984: 201) think that such models could have advantages over more conventional ones,

---

24 More cautiously, perhaps, Hobart suggests (1979: 5) that 'exchanges in Bali...tend to have both technical and symbolic aspects'.
such an undertaking might also procure advances in understanding
the Balinese form of life.25

Now, the form such a model would take seems to be conical and
of three elements. If the cone were stood on its base, the ele­
ments would be one on top of the other, as in the house, seats of
Surya, the person's physical body, the Balinese Mahameru, and many
other triadic entities. This conical shape also represents the
puspe, literally 'flower', but in this case a conically shaped of­
fering made of white card or stiff paper with a yellow or gold
eight-pointed star fixed to the top. This star represents Vidhi as
Surya, the sun god. If the cone were (somehow) hinged about this
eight-pointed star, the cone, when turned to point outwards from
the hinge, either to right or left, would represent lateral triads
such as the three areas, compound-gardens-ricefields, or a
reclining human body.

In such a model, the star represents Vidhi as a dualistic
unity; the bottom of the element first from this star, partition
into three; the bottom of the second element, partition into five;
and the bottom of the cone, partition into nine. The centre of
these nine divisions would be the nadir, the centres of the par­
titions into five and three, 'collapsed' into one another, the
centre, and Vidhi as a dualistic unity at the star would be the
zenith, hence creating partition into eleven (Eka Vasa Rudra).
These three points (nadir, centre and zenith) would thus represent
the three aspects of Siva: Siva, Sada-Siva and Parama-Siva. In
this way, the teaching of Balinese metaphysics that Vidhi pervades
the world would be followed. A projection from the centre of the
star (the zenith or Parama-Siva) through the other centres men­
tioned divides the cone into two, representing the diarchy of
Balinese institutions as demonstrated in this and other studies.
The question then is, how to plot the sets of analogous relations
-symmetrical and of the four degrees of asymmetry - on this frame.
It may be that connections could be established between the top of
the cone and its bottom and the two intermediate divisions along
the lines suggested by James's drawings of axes he plotted around
'the holy precinct of Tjandidasa' (1973).

The second major task is to integrate Balinese notions of
duration, which are circular and linear (see Howe 1981), with the
relations which constitute this form of life. A starting point
for considering how to carry out such an operation may be provided
by the concept of change in the Great Treatise (Ta-chihian) which
from Han times has been appended to the Book of Changes (I Ching).

25 At the places cited, Needham writes that 'there is a categori­
cal closure in systems of this kind [i.e. asymmetric prescriptive
alliance] such that Bateson was led to propose a technique of cir­
cular diagrams; the terms and their connectives were to be "rolled
so as to form a cylinder around something hard..."'; Barnes writes
that 'a moving model of some kind, perhaps produced on a television
screen by a computer, could well have advantages in showing how an
Omaha descent group has found partners over a period of generations.'
In the Treatise, 'time [which is cyclical] is a receptacle, a container, or a room in which events happen or relations occur. As a principle of organization it gives coherence to all that occurs within it...' (Swanson, in Rosemont [ed.] 1984: 79). 26

These are complex matters, of course, but that it is possible to consider them at all derives from a holistic approach to the Balinese form of life. To conclude, though, it must be admitted that the approach which has been adopted has a number of drawbacks, which are spelt out in detail elsewhere (Duff-Cooper in preparation).

These problems involve such matters as the method of registration used in describing the relations formally; that the method cannot at present accommodate a number of oppositions such as front/back; and perhaps most seriously that the method requires methodological and other kinds of decision at places - though it is pointed out that so does any method, including pure description (if there is such a thing).

Yet the method renders social facts coherent and intelligible and generates questions which require answering. I am not sure what more one can ask of a study.

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER

REFERENCES


... 1985. 'Hierarchy Without Caste', in Barnes et al. (eds.) 1985.


26 This is because Chinese ideas connected with magic squares (e.g. Cammann 1961) in the form of the Writings from the Lo River (Lo shu) and the River Chart (Ho t'u) have proved useful in elucidating the meaning of the Balinese rite nuasén. A further point of interest is that Swanson also remarks upon 'the prephilosophical use of bipolar opposition and analogy that went back as far as the Shang dynasty oracle bones' (op. cit.: 70).


... 1984a. 'Principles in the Classification, the Marriages, and some Other Relations of a Community of Balinese on Lombok', Antropos, Vol. LXXIX, pp. 485-503.


... 1985a. 'Hierarchy, Purity, and Equality among a Community of Balinese on Lombok', in Barnes et al. (eds.) 1985.

... 1985b. 'Duality in Aspects of a Balinese form of Life on Lombok', Cosmos, Vol. I.


... 1985e. 'Analytical Notes about some Balinese Residences and Related Physical Structures in Western Lombok', Sociologus, Vol. XXXV, pp. 21-52.


... 1985g. 'Ethnographic Notes on Two Operations of the Body among a Community of Balinese on Lombok', JASO, Vol. XVI, no.2, pp. 121-42.

... 1985h. 'Notes about Some Balinese Ideas and Practices Connected with Sex from Western Lombok', Anthropos, Vol. LXXX, pp. 403-19.

... Forthcoming (a). 'Alternation and Other Modes of Periodicity from a Balinese Form of Life in Western Lombok', Southeast Asian Studies.

... Forthcoming (b). 'Balinese Kingship in Pagutan', Cosmos, Vol. II.
DUFF-COOPER, Andrew forthcoming (c). 'Twins and Transvestites: Two Aspects of the Totality of a Balinese Form of Life on Lombok', *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*.

... forthcoming (d). 'Incorporation and Alliance among a Community of Balinese on Lombok', *Zeitschrift für Ethnologie*.

... forthcoming (e). 'Aspects of the Aesthetics of Rice-growing in a Balinese Form of Life on Lombok', in J. Coote and A. Shelton (eds.), *Anthropology: Art and Aesthetics*.

... forthcoming (f). 'Aspects of the Symbolic Classification of a Balinese Form of Life on Lombok', *Sociologus*.

... forthcoming (g). 'A Balinese Magic Square of Three from Pagutan', *Cosmos*, Vol. III.

... in preparation. 'Contingence in a Balinese Form of Life on Lombok'.


... 1978b. 'Padi, Puns and the Attributon of Responsibility', in ibid.


... 1983. 'The Art of Measuring Mirages, or Is There Kinship in Bali?', Paper no. 11 given to the seminar on Cognatic Forms of Social Organisation in Southeast Asia, University of Amsterdam, January 1983.


... 1985. 'Texte est un con', in Barnes et al. (eds.) 1985.
... 1980. Reconnaissances, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
... 1983. Against the Tranquility of Axioms, Berkeley etc.: University of California Press.
... 1985. Exemplars, Berkeley etc.: University of California Press.
Introduction

Western anthropologists have frequently examined their fieldwork experiences in cultures other than their own, but little is known of the experience of non-Western anthropologists studying their own culture. One of the problems facing an Arabic-speaking anthropologist carrying out fieldwork in another Arab country is the changing relationships between the two governments. I encountered this as an Egyptian working in Tunisia between 1965 and 1966. The relationship between the two countries had been excellent, but just before I was due to start my work a conflict erupted and diplomatic relations were severed.

The main features of Middle Eastern societies, namely Islam and its cultural values, are common to both Egypt and Tunisia. The family is more important than the individual and parental approval of one's behaviour is essential in the two countries. Thus my father's encouragement and help were not only psychologically beneficial to me but also instrumental in the success of my fieldwork. He personally asked his Tunisian friends to look after me, and this conveyed parental approval of my travelling alone in Tunisia. They intervened on my behalf to overcome the government's suspicions of my travels in the Tunisian Sahel during this difficult time. It is exceptional for a young Muslim woman to travel alone (Saudi Arabia and Yemen do not allow a woman travelling alone) (1).

---

alone to enter the country) and their contacts and recommendations enabled me to be accepted into people's homes. Once I was settled in the village community of Sidi Ameur I was judged and gradually accepted according to people's judgement of my behaviour.

The criteria of this judgement were Middle Eastern, Islamic ones, according to which a young unmarried woman is expected to be a virgin and hence timid and easier to control. This enabled me to be assimilated by Tunisian families. Had I been married and had my husband with me, I would not have been able to live with a family; if I had been unaccompanied by my husband that would have aroused suspicion, because the sexual experience is believed to make women less timid, more susceptible to sexual temptation, and thus a menace to the moral order. The fact that I was an independent Muslim woman was neither easily understood nor readily accepted, as such a background and behaviour would have been in the case of a European woman.

I experienced the intricacies of all the above themes, particularly in the earlier period of my fieldwork. The following is a description of this experience as I lived it. I first had to get the required permission from both Egypt and Tunisia. My family name and my father's advice were a great help. In Tunis, traditional family values and my father's contacts enabled me to be accepted in the midst of Tunisian families, but in my travels in the Sahel the political disputes between Tunis and Cairo were not helpful to me. In Sidi Ameur I was initially able to establish relationships through friendships with children and their families, since maternal values and love of children are valued ideals. My integration into the community was gradual and depended on the judgement of my behaviour by both governmental authorities and the local people.

My choice of the Tunisian Sahel as the subject of my D.Phil. thesis was communicated to al-Sheikh al-Fadil ben Achour, the then Mufti of Tunisia, and al-Sheikh al-Shadheli Belqadi (Professor of Shari'a Law at Zaituna University in Tunis) by my father, the late al-Sheikh Muhammad Abu-Zahra (Professor of Shari'a Law at Cairo University) when they were in Cairo, some time before I travelled to Tunisia. This paper is a homage to my father and his Tunisian friends, particularly al-Sheikh Belqadi.

Reminiscences

It is twenty years since I carried out my fieldwork in Tunisia, but I vividly remember the overwhelming feeling of wonder that at last I was in Tunis and was approaching the final stages of my training as an anthropologist. After some travel in the Sahel, I settled in the village of Sidi Ameur. It is named after its founder, who is believed to be a saint. He is buried in his Zawiya (the lodge used by a religious order to propagate its teachings), which is surrounded by the houses of his descendants and is called the Zawiya quarter. The main road separates it from the Ramada quarter, whose inhabitants are not related to the Zawiya people.
All village ceremonies, namely the weekly hadra every Thursday evening (the singing of hymns in praise of the prophet and of Sidi Ameur), the annual fair of Sidi Ameur, and important parts of life cycle ceremonies all take place in the Zawiya building.

I met Salim the first or second evening of my stay in Sidi Ameur. I was living in the Zawiya building. Umm el-S'ad, the resident cleaner of the building, chaperoned me to the men's celebration of the circumcision ceremonies of two brothers. We sat in the corner of the courtyard close to the stage on which the dancers and singers were to perform. I was surrounded by children, and one of them, a child of about three, introduced himself as Salim. We became friends, and he visited me daily and invited me to his house where his mother, Lala Malika, cooked us many appetising meals of couscous and stew. We often went to the third storey of their house, called 'the high house' (el-'aleyy) because it is the highest building in the village, and from there we watched the outdoor life of the village. I never considered Salim to be my son, but when people talked to me about him they referred to him as 'Salim, your son'. When I was leaving Sidi Ameur, Lala Malika told me that unfortunately, since I was going abroad, she would not allow me to have Salim as my adopted son, but if I were to live in Sidi Ameur this would be all right.

It was fortunate that I had seen Salim's 'mother', for that fitted their pattern of adoption, whereby single women, whether divorcees, widows or unmarried, or couples without children, are allowed to adopt their relatives' or neighbours' children. Being a woman was an advantage, because men of similar status (except if they are married and their wives initiate the adoption) are not allowed to adopt children.

Since Salim had 'adopted' me, his extended family and home became accessible to me in an informal way. Their extended family ('arash) lived in el-'aleyy, opposite the Zawiya building. There were six families of brothers and paternal parallel cousins, and two elderly aunts, who had an apartment in this large house, the various sections of which were divided by corridors and front and back staircases. As I was introduced to everyone, enquiries about kinship and residence patterns were hardly noticed, and the material was gathered in an informal, unobtrusive way. I used to go with Salim to Lala Malika's kitchen on the third floor, where she received the women who helped her or who used to help her in the past. Thus I was able to learn about patron-client relationships without direct enquiry. The balcony of the kitchen overlooked the village and the main road connecting Sidi Ameur with the neighbouring villages. The people present would comment on the government's project for the making of new roads and how this led to the demolition of the houses of some Zawiya people, which was the subject of conflict between various factions in the village. Salim's father was the village headman, which gave me the opportunity to make

---

all the enquiries I needed from him, without having to make special arrangements.

In the autumn I moved into the house of Si Lamin, who lived in the Zawiya quarter. His son Munir and cousin Salem were also friendly towards me, and my friendship with these children promoted my relationship with their families. I was also in the midst of some very important Zawiya families, and this increased my participation in village life in a way that would not have been possible for a man. Because of the importance of the social offices of these people, I was in the best position to observe closely the political, administrative and ritual life of the village. Si Lamin was the director of the local branch of the Neo-Destour Party and of the Agricultural Services Co-operative. Opposite his house lived Muqaddim al-Hadra, who led the hadra singing, very close by was el-'aleyy, and opposite was the house of Si al-Hameshi, who was Sheikh el-Zawiya and administered Zawiya land.

I found it easy to make friends, and their company made my work enjoyable. I never ceased to be grateful that I was getting on with my fieldwork, learning a new Arabic dialect and moving as I wished between the local villages, Sousse (the capital of Sahel Province), Tunis and Hammamet. Wherever I went I was welcomed and offered help.

The Beginning

I passed my B.Litt. examination in the summer of 1964 and remained in Oxford until March 1965. The reason was that my passport did not include Tunisia as one of the countries I could visit. Travelling abroad under Nasser's regime was subject to government approval, and it proved difficult to obtain the necessary permission from the Egyptian authorities in London. I used this time to read the available literature on the Tunisian Sahel.

By March, I realised that I was wasting my time and decided to go to Cairo to get the necessary permission. Relations between Cairo and Tunis were excellent, and the Tunisian President, al-Habib Bourguiba was visiting Egypt, Jordan and the Lebanon. However, by the time I arrived in Cairo, on 22nd March, Bourguiba had given a speech in Jordan on the Arab-Israeli conflict recommending a rapprochement between the two. This angered Nasser, relations between Egypt and Tunisia deteriorated, and demonstrations against Tunisia took place in Cairo and vice versa in Tunis; relations were eventually severed. As a result, the educational authorities in Cairo rejected my fieldwork project in Tunisia. It was suggested that instead I should go either to Iraq or to Algeria. At this time Iraq, under the leadership of Abdul-Salam 'Aref, was contemp-

---

4 For more details on this theme, see Cecil Hourani, An Unfinished Odyssey: Lebanon and Beyond, London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1984, pp. 84-90.
lating union with Egypt, and Algeria, under the rule of Ben-Bella, had close relations with Egypt. My argument was that I could not choose on the basis of good or bad relations with other Arab countries, which were liable to change (as with Tunisia). Indeed, Abdul-Salam 'Aref was killed in an air crash in April 1966, and Ben Bella was ousted by Boumedienne in Algeria in June 1965.

My father suggested that I go to a particular official in the cultural section of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who could recommend the cultural value of my project to the authorities. I succeeded in getting the recommendation on the grounds that cultural relations between Arab countries were of prime importance, no matter what their political relationships, and that my study would enhance such cultural links. On the basis of this recommendation, I got Tunisia added to my passport as one of the countries I could visit. On May 23rd I received my Egyptian exit visa to go to Tunisia. On the same day the Tunisian Consul gave me the visa and wrote me a letter of recommendation confirming that I came from a well-known Cairene family and that my father was a well-known Muslim scholar.

This was an important introduction, because in the Middle East the family is more important than the individual, and in Tunisia a person without a family is by definition a thief if a man, and a prostitute if a woman. In this respect it was lucky that eminent Tunisians came to know about me and my project from my father in Cairo rather than through an introductory letter from him when I was in Tunisia. I suspect that such a letter would not have had the same effect as learning the facts personally from my father in Cairo. I later came to learn that Belqadi did not approve of my travelling alone in the Sahel and would only agree to it because it was my father's wish.

Rewarding Days in Tunis

On 30th May 1965 I flew to Tunis via Benghazi in Libya and went to Belqadi's house. He, together with his 'son' Rashid (Tunisians refer to the help employed to work for the family as 'son' or 'daughter'), met me at the top of the Bab Mnara steps. This was my first introduction to one form of Tunisian patron-client relationship. The house represented the ideal form of Tunisian traditional architecture and I later found that the architecture of village houses is a modest version of it. Its main feature is the separation between the 'home' and the external world. Its large wooden door leads to a small room (saqi'fa) which leads to a large courtyard, the surface of which, except for a mandarin tree planted in its centre, and its extensive walls all being covered with antique tiles. All the windows of the house opened on to the courtyard.

I was introduced to the family, and this was also an introduction to kinship terminology, the residence pattern and adoption. His wife was Lala al-Sayedah, whom Junayna, her niece and adopted daughter, and Mahbuba, their 'daughter', both addressed as nana, 'mother'. Belqadi shared his house with his younger brother Ibrahim. Belqadi, being the eldest, occupied the ground floor, while Ibrahim, together with his wife and two sons, Elias and al-Sadri, lived on the first floor.

Apart from a clerk in the Egyptian Embassy, I was the only Egyptian in Tunisia. The Embassy was closed and all in darkness, and even the clerk himself was wearing dark glasses. Since it was important to prevent any misunderstanding, the only other time I visited the Embassy was just before I left.

In the following couple of days Belqadi introduced me to the rest of his brothers and sisters. I was invited to their homes and shown round Tunis by them. Belqadi's sister-in-law gave me data on bridewealth and gift exchange between the bridal couple up to the birth of the first infant. Belqadi also kindly arranged some tutorials for me with Uthman al-Kaak, a Tunisian historian, on the architecture of the old city of Tunis and the history of the religious orders.

During this week in Tunis I encountered the effects of the breakdown of relations between Cairo and Tunis. Elias criticised the Egyptian President twice, but I had made up my mind not to involve myself in any political debates.

Cecil Hourani kindly introduced me to Monsieur J. Duvignaud and Mr Fradj Istambuli, both renowned sociologists. The former was working with a team of sociologists from the university of Tunis on social change at Chebika,6 in the south of Tunisia. Istambuli was also conducting research in Ksar-Hellal in the Sahel and was due to go there soon. He kindly agreed to show me round the Sahel. By the end of my first week in Tunisia, I had been introduced to several scholars, all in the Shari'a field of study at Zaituna University, which was the only university in Tunisia until the establishment of the University of Tunis after independence in 1956. Thus many of their students were teachers, imams of mosques or in administration. Their friendship and kindness not only facilitated my obtaining the various required permissions (as I shall show below), but it also strengthened me personally.

By then I was ready to go to the Sahel. Belqadi kindly gave me an introduction to Mr Bakr, a student of his and a native of Ksar-Hellal. Al-Fadil ben 'Achour gave me an introduction to Si Salem Farchiuo, the director of the girl's lycée in Monastir and the Imam of the mosque where President Bourguiba prays when he is in Monastir.

Of those few days in Tunis I wrote the following to Dr John Beattie on 2nd June:

---

I am staying with one of my father's friends. It is such a good introduction to Tunisian society. So far people have been very kind to me, and I am very happy here. I met Cecil Hourani yesterday. He is very helpful. He is going to introduce me to people in the Sahel area.

The Tunisian Arabic is different from the Egyptian dialect. I am picking up, however, a lot of material, and if things go in the same way in the Sahel as here in Tunis I think I will do good fieldwork. I am busy, there are people to meet and talk to, there are also many things to see in Tunis. It is a very pretty city. All houses and buildings are white with blue windows and doors. There are public baths in the streets, and I have been to one of the women's baths.

**Travels in the Sahel**

I left for the Sahel on June 5th. In Monastir I stayed at the Esplanade Hotel and visited the Sahel villages of Boudeur, Ben Nour and Bou-Hjar. During these travels I met a Western anthropologist who asked me to leave the Sahel. This was a very big problem for me, as I had already registered my thesis at Oxford University on the subject of 'Social Organisation in the Sahel of Tunisia'. I wrote to my supervisor, Professor E. Evans-Pritchard, my former supervisor, Dr John Beattie, and to my father, asking their advice. I continued, however, to travel in the Sahel while awaiting their replies, and I visited the ribat (fort) of Monastir and its museum, the market of Ksar-Hellal, Ksebeit el-Mediouni, and Moknine, the birthplace of Ahmed ben Saleh, the organiser of the nationwide co-operative movement. Moknine was therefore a great centre for co-operatives, ranging from olive presses and poultry farms to embroidery and shoe-making. I visited the headquarters of the Neo-Destour Party branch and met the director of the girls' elementary school, who, thinking that I might settle in Moknine, stated that it was a conservative place and that a 'girl's place is in the home!'

During these travels in the Sahel, men told me that it was not accepted that women should go to parties in hotels (which I never did) or unchaperoned to coffee-shops. They also asserted that Muslim women should not complete their education in Europe!

On 26th June Evans-Pritchard wrote to me as follows:

> You must make up your own mind. I have always refused to give advice to a fieldworker, because he knows the local conditions, and I don't. Just go ahead. I am sure you will find that you have made the right choice. Good luck.
Dr Beattie also wrote with the same advice and suggested trying to cooperate with the Western anthropologist. When this was communicated to my father the latter replied saying:

Since he resented your presence from the start, I don't consider that co-operation between you would be fruitful. Concentrate on your studies and don't change your project because he asked you to do so, particularly since your supervisor did not ask you to change. Two people may write on the same subject but perceive different things. As this anthropologist regards you as such a threat, I am sure you will do very well. Settle down in any Sahel community you choose and don't change except if scholarly considerations necessitate it. You can settle in Moknine, which combines the characteristics of town and village.

It was important for me to have the sanction of my supervisor, former supervisor and father to remain in the Sahel.

I continued to travel in the Sahel. I enquired in the villages about their economy, education, traditional crafts, genealogies, recent history and the changing role of the Zawiyas. Si Salem Farchiou gave me an introduction to one of the notables of Teboulba, who I visited several times, gathering data on the genealogy of some of its groups, its social stratification, economy and recent history. Accompanied by Mr Bakr, I went to Sahline with no introduction to anybody there. We sat in a coffee-house hoping to find somebody to talk to, but we failed to engage anybody in conversation. Mr Bakr then obtained some basic information on population, economy and schools from the waiter. Afterwards we went to Hammam-Sousse, where we visited a friend of Mr Bakr's. He gave us some basic data on the surrounding villages and attacked Nasser for the latter's attacks on the Tunisian President.

The visit to Sahline resulted in some trouble. With the benefit of hindsight I realise that what went wrong arose from the fact that I have had no introduction to anyone in Sahline and had sat with a man in a coffee-shop, which is for men only. In addition, there was the problem of the political tension between Egypt and Tunisia.

I continued to travel in the Sahel and was urged to visit its religious centre, Sidi Ameur, and settle there. I was given an introduction to Si Muhammad ben Wannas. On Wednesday, July 21st, the eve of the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution, I went alone to Sidi Ameur. En route I was stopped at Sahline and interrogated by the local police. I met Si Muhammad ben Wannas in el-'aleyy where he lived and I did not attract any attention, because people thought that I was asking him to write me a charm. He kindly invited me to come the following day to attend the weekly Thursday hadra. The following day was the anniversary of the Egyptian revolution and Nasser attacked Al-Habib Bourguiba in his speech. Unaware of all this, I took the bus, alone, to Sidi Ameur. I was conspicuous because of my strong Egyptian accent, and having not yet mastered the subtleties of Tunisian vocabulary...
I referred to Sidi Ameur as *dashra*, not *blad*, the former meaning an uninhabited place and hence an uncivilized one. Some passengers were angry, and my reappearance was reported to the local police in Sahline. I was unaware of this and went with Ben Wannas to attend the *hadra*. The Sahline police followed me, a member of the secret police came to the Zawiya and took Ben Wannas away with him, and I went back to Monastir.

I communicated to al-Fadil ben 'Achour what had happened in the Zawiya. He contacted the Governor of Sousse, who was a student of his at Zaituna University, gave me a letter of recommendation and asked me to go and see him the following day. I saw the Delegate of Sousse, who asked why I had chosen Sidi Ameur (*Zawiyas* and religious orders being frowned upon at that time by the government). He also considered that, given the bad relationship between Tunis and Cairo, it was natural that the Sahline police would suspect me. Also, Nasser's speech had, unknown to me, accused President Bourguiba of being a stooge of imperialism and Zionism.

Tunisians are so sensitive to anything said against their President, whom they love and consider as the father of the nation (*Abu el-Sha'b*). He read me extracts from Nasser's speech. Some of what he read said that Bourguiba followed the steps of Colonialism. The Delegate exclaimed how could this be said when Bourguiba came from the 'heart of the nation' (*samim el-Sha'b*)? He is not somebody imported from Europe.

The Delegate advised me to go and see the Delegate of Monastir where I was staying, so that he might arrange for me to see the Governor. Having settled and clarified my status and received the sanction of political authority, I had to face the problem of integration into the community of Sidi Ameur, which would depend on their judgement of my behaviour.

**Integration into the Community**

For the first couple of days I stayed with the Wannas family. Afterwards, a room in the Zawiya was prepared for me, which is where Zawiya visitors and government officials from outside Sidi Ameur stay. It was also considered better because it had been newly renovated, and unlike the rest of the village was free of scorpions. For the first couple of nights I slept either in the Qubba, where Sidi Ameur is buried, or in a room adjacent to it.

Of this period I quote the following from my diaries:

Yesterday after I came back from the circumcision ceremony, I found a great number of cockroaches and beetles in the room. They are called here *khanfus*. I moved to the Qubba,

---

7 *Al-Ahram*, 23 July 1965, p.5.
but there were khanfus there too. After I slept for a while, the bugs started attacking. I went outside and tried to sleep in the open air where Umm al-Sa'd slept, but she refused to allow me to do so. At last she came to sleep inside. Early in the morning she went out, and men came to visit the tomb of Sidi Ameur.

A visitor to the Zawiya came to talk to me yesterday. In spite of the fact that I refused his offer to bring jam for my breakfast, yet he went and brought some. I refused it because I do not want to encourage anyone. Today a young unmarried man (from Sidi Ameur) came uninvited to talk to me in my room. I was curt. He said that he would give me a history book for my studies (I told everyone that I was studying the folklore and history of Sidi Ameur). He then accompanied me to watch what was going on in the circumcision ceremony. On the way out, al-Munji, a middle-aged man, asked him our destination and instructed him to bring me back. When we came back, Si Wannas, who was there, remarked that I had stayed late the previous night at the circumcision ceremony. He urged me to concentrate on women's activities, saying that I can do my real job today at the tahniha (the dyeing of the hands and feet of the mother of the circumcised), and that there will be lots of customs observed by women, which should be the subject of my study.

The above shows a desire to control my behaviour in order to maintain their code of morality undisturbed. They also defined women's activities as the proper subject of my research.

By this time I had met the Governor of Sousse, who instructed people to treat me kindly. Governmental sanction meant that I was a guest. This enhanced my status, for a woman alone unaccompanied by any agnates does not command respect. When it is confirmed that none of her agnates will join her, she may be asked to sing or dance, both of which are equivalent to prostitution.

On August 30th Bourguiba formally opened the Zawiya, and the Delegates of the Province talked to me in front of the people, which greatly enhanced my status.

A Room of my Own

By now I had acquired government approval, and people saw enough of me to trust me to live in their houses. Thus I moved from the Zawiya to a house on the outskirts whose owners lived and worked in the north of Tunisia; in their absence their mother, Lala Jannat, looked after the house and the chickens she was raising in the garden. It was a newly built house in a modern design in that its windows, unlike those in traditional houses, opened on to the main road and garden (see the description above of Belqadi's house). It was accessible directly from the main entrance, which
led straight to the garden, from where a staircase led on to a balcony, in the middle of which was a door leading to the house. One of the rooms had two windows, one overlooking the balcony, the other the street. I settled in this room.

Salim, other children and teenagers from the Zawiya used to visit me. Their mothers invited me for meals in their homes but never came to visit me, because they do not visit the Ramada quarter. Ramada women did not visit me either, for they feared that somebody might suspect that they were receiving handouts from me.

On top of this isolation, I found little white insects in my books, papers and bed. They caused me skin rashes which were not cured by the olive oil prescribed by the women, who later diagnosed these insects as *be'bash* or chicken lice, which live in chicken feathers if their place is unclean.

One day I was summoned to the Zawiya, where I was told that two policemen in a black car were waiting for me. I was told that I was wanted at police headquarters in Sousse. Calmly, in front of the notables of the village, including Si Lamin, the Director of the local branch of the Party, I asked them to show me their papers and then went with them to Sousse, where it turned out that they were really after a Swiss woman. My behaviour in this incident was considered as a feat of courage in Sidi Ameur, particularly by Si Lamin. This was a positive step towards acquiring the people's respect.

In the autumn it became colder and people tended to stay indoors. One evening, I heard a light knock on the window overlooking the balcony. I persuaded myself that it was the wind, but the knocking became louder and more insistent. Clearly, someone was knocking at the window. On my calling the neighbours from the window overlooking the street, the intruder started his motor cycle and vanished in the direction of the Ramada quarter. In the morning I told the headman of the village what had happened. He contacted the Province headquarters, and Si Lamin, the director of the Party branch, offered me a room in his house.

A Room with a Family

It was a sign of the villagers' trust to accept me in the midst of their families. I taught Faisal, the eldest son, Arabic, and his younger brother, Munir, also became a friend. Lala Zumuruda, Si Lamin's sister, lived next door to him, and we became friends.

During this period, I made a survey of the village households. I adapted the questionnaire John Beattie had applied in Bunyoro to olive-growing and family life in Sidi Ameur. This enabled me to gather data on work, incomes, the ownership of olive trees and household composition.

---

I visited the households in the morning. I observed olive pressing in autumn and winter and visited the olive groves in the spring. I went to the Province headquarters in Sousse to read the records on Sidi Ameur. In order to prevent any misunderstanding, I went to the Party's headquarters in Sousse to enquire directly about the organization of the Party branch in Sidi Ameur and the details of the project for renewing the olive groves.

The evenings, which I would spend in the house of Lala Zumuruda, were the high point of each day. There I discussed my queries with her husband Si Husayn ben Salem. Lala Mamma, an elderly lady, was a regular visitor, who used to compose entertaining rhymes lamenting her fate and ridiculing those who caused her misfortune. I had all the warmth and affection a human being needs.

During the period of fieldwork (November to June) I participated in social life in my own way. I did not follow all the rules of etiquette: I visited everybody in both Zawiya and Ramada, whether invited or not. This is a deviation from the rule which prohibits mutual visits between Ramada and Zawiya women and enjoins that within each quarter no woman visits another unless there has been a prior invitation or unless she is reciprocating a previous visit paid by the host on a similar occasion. Also, I did not pay attention to their disputes with one another and by avoiding taking sides managed to remain friendly with all disputing parties. They also conceded more freedom to me than their women and said that they were 'making for me the value of a man' ('anshen lek qdar rajil').

I freely talked with all men older than myself. Those from my own age group I met only within the family context. Occasionally I went to Sousse with them, but also within the family context. I shared with Tunisians the same Islamic background and knew of the tradition of segregation between the sexes. I observed their rules and neither dated men nor had boyfriends. I never smoke or drank alcohol.

I left Sidi Ameur in June 1966. El-‘awyy was the last house I visited. I went through the corridors and up and down the staircases, sorry to be saying goodbye to everybody and to a most powerful experience in my life.

Tunisia 1984: Life Goes On

I went back to Tunisia in the summer of 1972. Some of my friends, both in Tunis and in Sidi Ameur, had died. In the latter I lived in Lala Zumuruda's house. In my memory, everything was more or less the same as before. The only difference was, the children had become young teenagers.

In 1984 I returned to Tunisia again, and it was as if I was visiting the country for the first time. I revisited the Belqadis but alas al-Shedheli had died. The survivors had rearranged themselves in the house. Si Ibrahim and his wife had moved to the ground floor and Elias, his eldest son, together with his wife and two sons, to the first floor, where his parents used to live. Elias named his younger son al-Shadheli Junayna, who is now married, lives in the north and has one daughter, whom she calls Nadia.

Tunisia has changed too. Tourism had increased, and people were ambivalent about it. Tunisia suffered also from periodic droughts and their problems, and there were riots when food prices were increased in January 1978 and January 1984.

Sidi Ameur, thanks to the villagers' thrift and remittances from its migrants, had prospered, to the point that I did not recognise it. New houses had been built and old ones renovated. I could not find Lala Zumuruda's house and had to ask for directions. When I knocked on her door, the only answer I got was a dog barking. I went to Si Lamin's house, where Dalinda, his eldest daughter, was now married and was carrying one of her babies. Si Husayn took me to his daughter's house. She is now married and lives in one of the apartments of el-'aleyy. Ameur, her brother, is now married and has a daughter called Zumuruda. Salim is 23 years old and lives in Tunis, working as a photographer for Tunisian television. Faisal is now a solicitor and Munir was preparing for his final examinations in physics at the University of Monastir, while Salim was doing his military service. Salim showed me all the new developments in the village and accompanied me on visits to all the friends I wanted to see.

I was especially satisfied that my 'children' were grown up and were doing so well, and I was deeply moved by their kindness towards me. I said goodbye to everyone and saw Lala Zumuruda, Ameur and his wife before I went to el-'aleyy to have lunch with Salem and his family. Just before I left, Ameur came carrying all the china and vases and ornaments he had in his room to give me as a farewell present, insisting that I should take at least some of them. Salim's elder brothers took me to the railway station in Sousse. Just before the train was to leave, Ameur reappeared, gasping for breath after having run a long distance, to say that he had come to give me some money in case I had need of anything. I assured him that I needed nothing but was so grateful that such kindness could exist towards me.

Salim and his brother contacted me in Tunis. On my last day I had lunch with the Belqadis. They talked with appreciation of my late father's works. Lala Lilia remembered how her brother used to tell them to look after me for the sake of my father. Si Ibrahim suggested that we make a prayer to him. They reminded me that I was welcome in their homes in both Tunis and al-Marsa. In the afternoon I went to Gmart to pay my respects to my father's friend, Dr al-Padil al Gamali. I left Tunis the following morning.

My life and experiences in Tunis, the Sahel and Sidi Ameur
and my friends in these places are more to me than anthropology and fieldwork - they are my youth and my happiest memories.
ON BEING ONE'S OWN GRANDPA:
THE CONTEMPORARY ANCESTOR REVISITED

'I have heard a Fijian elder narrate the doings of his ancestral lineage over several generations in the first person pronoun.'

The striking image of the Contemporary Ancestor, dear to the nineteenth-century evolutionist anthropology, deserves re-examination. For certain of our own intellectual ancestors appear to have inhabited a relativistic space-time continuum analogous to that familiar to present-day astrophysics: the further away your observations, the further back in a universal time-dimension. From a European perspective, the earliest social forms were to be found in Australia, among the Bushmen of South Africa, in the Amazon forests and in the South Seas. The Arunta appeared, to Durkheim and Frazer, much as those enigmatic objects called quasars, visible at the outermost limits of telescopic observation, appear to 1980s astronomy: as representing the very same processes that gave rise to our own galaxy. Viewed from an immense cultural distance, these were Contemporary Ancestors.

For nineteenth-century anthropological theory, then, both observers and observed were assumed to belong to a world governed by the same sociological laws, as yet undiscovered though these laws were. And, of course, it was the famous Comparative Method, inspired as it was by the successful examples of zoology and archaeology (cf. Harris 1968: 150-3) that was to reveal those laws. And just as modern science assumes space and time to be uniform throughout the Universe, just so did nineteenth-century social science envisage itself and its object.
Such a unitary vision has an intrinsic appeal and it is hardly surprising that social evolutionism, though officially assumed to have been superseded in most anthropology courses taught in Western universities, still persists in scholarly discourse. Even the Contemporary Ancestor, in his full-blown Victorian epiphany, is frequently to be encountered in both anthropological and journalistic writings, as Nickerson has underlined:

With the revival of central elements of the Comparative Method in the 1950s, anthropology had come full circle within about half a century with respect to reassertions of notions relating to 'contemporary ancestors' and increased usages of ethnographic analogies. Paralleling this shift in anthropology and other social sciences, theories relating to modernization and development also began to appear in the 1950s, typically with evolutionary implications, especially with regard to a refurbished idea of progress. (1984: 18)

The association of evolutionism and 'development' theory is most explicitly asserted by Harris, for whom the Contemporary Ancestor is an ethnographic fact:

The issue to be confronted is whether the cultures of contemporary primitive groups can be used to orient our understanding of chronologically earlier socio-cultural arrangements. Are there such things as surviving stone-age cultures? The answer, as undeniable today as it was in 1860, is yes. (1968: 154)

But for most of us today, reared on cultural relativism and the nominal equality of all socio-cultural arrangements as long as they do not affect us personally, Harris must himself count as a Contemporary Ancestor. Yet I am here going to argue for the present relevance of that old concept - though in a form quite other than that envisaged in Harris's retrospective optic.

For in officially abandoning Evolutionism, anthropology has itself evolved through a process that is amenable to analytic description. The nineteenth-century paradigm went through two phases of deconstruction. In Diffusionism, the formerly dominant temporal dimension became subordinate to the spatial dimension, the former unity of which was decomposed into a congeries of 'culture regions' (Kulturkreise). Then in the second, more complex and longer-lasting Functionalist paradigm, the process of decentring was completed with the emergence of the epistemologically sovereign tribal-territorial group, ideally (as in the Trobriand and Tikopia cases) an island. In this second and decisive phase the temporal dimension effectively disappeared into the newly sovereign space of the self-contained tribal universe.

1 Nickerson quotes a number of recent anthropological works, including Marshall Sahlins' *Stone Age Economies*. 
But this extreme position, while reconstituting in drastically altered and structurally inverted form the simplicity of the Victorian model, was inherently unstable. Comparison, as Evans-Pritchard observed, is a basic faculty of the human mind, the necessary beginning of all science (Evans-Pritchard 1963). Officially excluded by the functionalist model, comparison returned in the form of Radcliffe-Brown's naturalistic typologies. The occluded temporal dimension has also reappeared in anthropology in the past few decades in the guise of a dualism.

Dualist theories of time have been notably formulated in contributions by Leach (1961), Lévi-Strauss (1967) and Bloch (1977). These dualist models themselves fall into two categories, according to whether, as in Lévi-Strauss, they see the temporal dualism as setting one category of society ('cold', unstratified, atemporal, history-less) against another ('hot', class-structured, immersed in time and history), or whether they see the temporal division as dividing societies internally, as in Leach's contrast of ordinary, linear and unidirectional time with the circular and repetitive time associated with rituals, or Bloch's similar distinction between 'ritual' and 'mundane' time. These various models have more the status of interesting and suggestive hypotheses than of proven facts. Here I want to argue three points: first, that the opposition between 'linear' and 'circular' concepts of time is misleading and can be resolved; second, that such a resolution provides us with a new and improved version of the nineteenth-century Contemporary Ancestor; third, that evidence is accumulating that monistic time, combining linear and circular modes, is characteristic of many societies studied by anthropologists, notably, though not exclusively, in Black Africa.

Conversely, the monistic time posited for these African and other societies - what I shall provisionally call Human Standard Time or the Resonant Present - has implications for the understanding of time and time perception in other global cultures, including both Lévi-Strauss's atemporal, 'cold' societies and our own 'hot' and 'Western' civilization. As for the latter, temporal mode, it seems to me that it is not only linear, as is often said, but is also segmented, giving rise to the sense of being 'cut off' from the past - and from one's self - that is characteristic of the modern epoch. This temporal segmentation would appear to reflect the dominant impulsion in the physical sciences to reduce the phenomenal universe to its smallest units.2

As de Heusch, Feierman, Adam Kuper and the present writer have shown, many of the non-literate societies of Black Africa are susceptible to structural analysis of the kind Lévi-Strauss has explicitly reserved for his supposedly ahistorical 'cold' societies; these African groups with complex social structures and often with state-like organisation are manifestly the products of comp-

2 'It was believed that complex phenomena could always be understood by reducing them to their basic building blocks and by looking for the mechanisms through which these interacted' (Capra 1982: 32).
lex historical evolutions. Referring to the vast Southern Bantu cultural region, Kuper notes 'not the absence of change but a tendency for change to take related forms throughout the region.... The process by which modifications develop is regular and rule-bound' (1982: 5, 157).

Let us consider the implications of Kuper's work and findings. Most importantly, it appears that in these societies time is integrated with social structure in the total transformation group constituted by the cultural region. This is not the same as Evans-Pritchard's reduction of Nuer history, in The Nuer, to an epiphenomenon of Nuer social structure, a view that does little more than restate Malinowski's presentistic theory of myth. On the contrary, it asserts the reality of time and history as a fully paid-up member of the society wherein the Present includes the Past and produces the Future. The first theoretical formulation of such a society, and of such a temporal mode, was proposed by Feierman in 1974. This American student of Jan Vansina who learned his social anthropology at the feet of Evans-Pritchard included in his widely and justly praised study of the Shambaa Bantu kingdom of northern Tanzania the boldly heretical statement that:

...the social utility of traditions, which is so often taken as evidence that they cannot be true accounts of historical events, is precisely what gives the traditions their historical value. (Feierman 1974: 10)

This was so, Feierman asserted, because in societies like that of the Shambaa, there was a tripartite interdependence between oral tradition, history and social structure (ibid.). Perhaps it was fortunate for Feierman's reputation in orthodox anthropology that these outrageous propositions were tucked away in the preface to his monograph and not elaborated in the substantive text. However, what could be termed Feierman's Triangle is the formulaic essence of the temporal monism I am seeking to demonstrate. Lévi-Strauss, in his enthusiastic endorsement of Richard Wagner's brilliant aphorism on myth, 'Here, time turns into space' ('Zum Raum wird hier die Zeit'), forgets that the converse is also, and equally, true, and that mythical space is also time, and history (Lévi-Strauss 1984: 219). Thus, in Ufipa, does the centrally situated village of Milansi evoke, in its stationary position high on Itweelele mountain in relation to the numerous and traditionally warring royal villages of the surrounding plains, at once a historical panorama and a structural model of society, polarized between central and established Settler and peripheral, incoming Stranger (cf. Willis 1981). In yet another part of Tanzania, the archaeologist Peter Schmidt has successfully used structuralist methodology to unite the oral history of the Haya and the archaeological evidence from the sites of royal villages (Schmidt 1978). He notes:

If through archaeological evidence, mythology can be concretely affirmed to contain an order of historical reality that has usually been denied it by most historians,
then it is incumbent to develop methodologies that can continue to test this basic proposition. (p. 6)

Other American scholars, particularly oral historians associated with Joseph Miller, another former student of Vansina, have combined structuralist analysis with more established historical techniques in their endeavours to reconstruct the histories of a number of Central African Bantu kingdoms, mainly in Zaire. The results of their labours were published recently under the significant title of *The African Past Speaks* (Miller ed. 1980). In Britain, the present writer has described for the Fipa of southwest Tanzania a tripartite structure of historical tradition under the overall hegemony of the sovereignty myth with its dual reference to present social structure and historical evolution (Willis 1981). In another part of the world altogether, Lévi-Strauss has described for the Kwakiutl Indians of the northwest coast of North America what appears to be a similarly tripartite organisation of oral tradition, including a group of texts intermediate between 'the stationary structure of myth and the open becoming of history' (1984: 155).3

In yet another culture region unrelated to either Africa or America, the American anthropologist Marshall Sahlins has noted in his study of Hawaiian history that

Polynesian cosmology may lend itself in a specially powerful way to stereotypic reproduction. Strong logical continuities link the earliest elements of cosmogonic myths to the chiefly heroes of the latest historical legends. (1981: 13)

However, there may well be nothing specifically Polynesian about the fusion in Hawaii of cosmological (including social) structure and evolution: it could simply be the norm in all sociocultural entities defined by Feierman's Triangle. And such societies, I am suggesting, probably constitute the normative majority worldwide.

The problem for anthropology is that its theory has not caught up with the substantive findings of such researchers as Feierman, Kuper, Miller and Sahlins. Caught between the atemporal, synchronic bias of classical structuralism à la Lévi-Strauss, the neo-evolutionism of Parisian anthropo-marxism and the fetishization of Malinowski's doctrine of the 'mythological charter', anthropology can, it seems, find little new to say. It seems significant

---

3 According to Lévi-Strauss, 'this combination produced mythical history or, if you prefer, historicized myth, by juxtaposing or superimposing with great freedom of choice elements which are themselves strictly defined' (ibid.). This narrative formula appears to resemble what Miller (1980) calls 'cliché' and Willis calls 'symbolic image of social process' and describes as typical of the intermediary stratum between myth and history proper in Fipa oral narrative (1981).
that the crucial debate between Kuper and de Heusch in the pages of L'Homm on the epistemological status of the structural changes in Southern Bantu society described in Kuper's Brides for Cattle has excited, as far as I know, nary a flicker of interest in British anthropology. In effect, Kuper maintains, as well he may, that the changes he describes are 'real' and that the Southern Bantu societies possess a historical dimension as valid, albeit as structurally constrained, as our own. De Heusch - 'of all structuralists ... the most faithful to the method of Lévi-Strauss' (Vansina 1983) - argues to the contrary and sees the 'reality' of Southern Bantu society as contained in the original, atemporal structure of an elementary system of exchange of women between groups (de Heusch 1983; Kuper 1982).

It may well be some time before this theoretical impasse is overcome, particularly having regard to the post-imperial malaise affecting British anthropology (in the double sense of loss of national and loss of disciplinary world hegemony). Yet critical voices have been raised against existing dogmatic constraints. In a different context from our present concern, Ruth Finnegan has protested against the restrictive effects of the British Malinowskian obsession (1969). In Africa, the Swedish political scientist Goran Hyden has issued a direct challenge to anthro-marxism and its basic axiom, the foundation of a complicated scholastic edifice of intercalated 'modes of production' that assumes the effective dissolution of indigenous African social structures under the combined influence of capitalist penetration and colonial rule.

Hyden's book is important because it appears to identify the techno-economic basis of the temporal monism we are attributing to social formations in Black Africa and elsewhere in the non-Western world. In effect, Hyden's copper-bottomed materialist analysis of what he rather perversely insists on calling the 'peasant' mode of production in Black Africa demolishes anthro-marxism in its Parisian epiphany while providing a needed general theoretical justification for those who, like Feierman, Kuper and the present writer, have found evidence for structural continuity between pre- and post-colonial African social formations at the level of local communities. It also explains, and more convincingly than theories invoking either rural 'backwardness' in the old colonial style or the dominance of a centre-periphery structure in the modes of Frank or Wallerstein, the recurrent failures of officially sponsored 'development' initiatives in Africa:

Unlike industrial societies, capitalist and socialist alike, where the base is solidified and integrated but the superstructure is fragmented into a pluralist pattern, in the

---

4 The magnificent fury of Vansina's polemical onslaught (1983) on de Heusch seems curiously out of proportion to the limited and equivocal claims to derive historical information from structuralist methodology put forward by de Heusch (1971, 1982).
agricultural societies of Africa, the economic base is fragmented. (Hyden 1980: 26)

Hyden is the first theorist of modern rural Africa to have based his analysis on the blatantly obvious fact that typically a local group of co-residents, the 'household', is in effective control of the material means of production (land, tools, livestock). What Hyden's analysis does not do - and nor was it his aim in any case - is explain how socio-economic relations are co-ordinated above the level of the household, the locus of what he calls the 'economy of affection'. That is a task for social anthropology. But what Hyden has done is to outline the economic dimension of the socio-historical formation I have dubbed Feierman's Triangle. In relation to that economic basis, the structure of clan, age organisation or indigenous state is no less ideological than the origin myths and the whole structure of legitimating traditional histories. To understand those socio-historical structures needs more than new terms: a new anthropological way of seeing is called for.

Sahlins' Fijian elder who proclaimed himself to be experiencing history in the present had his earlier anthropological counterpart in Cunnison's Luapula chief of northern Zambia who similarly recounted the deeds of his ancestors in the first person pronoun:

> It will be noticed in the texts...that the first person is normally used. In the story of Chisamamba, which is given as related by him, 'I' is not only the man who is speaking but also the first Chisamamba and all those who have held the name in succession. (1951: 33)

Among the Fipa of south-west Tanzania, as I have sought to demonstrate elsewhere (Willis 1981), the key sovereignty myth invokes at one and the same time a paradigmatic form of social relations and a fundamental and definitive historical transformation. Soon after birth, every Fipa infant is the object of a divinatory ritual which determines the name of the ancestor he or she will thenceforth be known by. *Unnsimu waaweeZaf*, 'The spirit has returned!', the parents are said to explain when learning this name, a reference to the belief, common in this part of Africa, that the dead ancestor's spirit or essence (*unnsimu*) has returned from a sojourn in the underworld to dwell in the body and person of the newborn (1982: 229).

When our own intellectual forebears of a century ago invoked the concept of the Contemporary Ancestor, they were expressing in the idiom of their own epoch - an idiom which has by no means entirely lost its hold over the popular and academic imagination - the perennial and worldwide idea of the mystical co-presence of past, present and future. The idea also appears to involve a concept of human beings as consisting of relatively defined multiple selves, rather than the substantive, concrete and theoretically unique Self or Person of Western ideology. On the synchronic plane, such a multiple self would be defined in terms of the totality of its significant social relations; and on the diachronic plane
by its affinities with other selves living in other times.

I see no reason why a domain of experience our culture chooses to label 'metaphysical' should not be amenable to scientific investigation. Recent works in physics and biology have presented pictures of the cosmos and the organism that radically challenge our concepts of space and time and ask us to think of both in terms of 'timeless', unbroken webs of interconnections. Social science may need to do likewise, notwithstanding the perilously 'magical' implications.

ROY WILLIS

5 Notable among a veritable flood of popularizing works that have recently sought to present new developments in physics and cosmology to the lay public are those of Zukav (1979) and Bohm (1980). In biology, Sheldrake (1981) was described by John Maddox, the distinguished editor of Nature, as 'the best candidate for burning there has been for many years'.

REFERENCES


CUNNISON, I. 1951. History on the Luapula [Rhodes-Livingstone Papers no. 21], Cape Town etc.: Oxford University Press.


Research in African Literatures
Bernth Lindfors, Editor, University of Texas at Austin

RAL provides a stimulating, international forum for discussion of the oral and written literatures of Africa. In addition to presenting critical, interdisciplinary articles, RAL serves the broad needs of the academic community by including varied features such as timely research, accounts of university and school literature programs, and reports from libraries and archives. Each issue focuses on a special topic such as Swahili Verbal Arts and and upcoming special issue on Ayi Kwei Armah.

Recent and Forthcoming articles include:

Special issue on Swahili Verbal Arts
Expressing a Swahili Sense of Humor: S1u Jokes by Carol Eastman.

Special issue on Literature and Society
Mololo's Chaka and the Bambata Rebellion by David Attwell.

Special issue on Ayi Kwei Armah
Pessimism of the Intellect, Optimism of the Will: A Reading of Ayi Kwei Armah's The Beautiful Ones are not Yet Born by Neil Lazarus.
Fragments: The Akan Background by Derek Wright.

Single copy rates: Individual $6, Institution $9
Foreign postage, add $1.50

Yearly subscription rates: Individual $20, Institution $32
Foreign postage, add $4.00

University of Texas Press Journals, P.O. Box 7819, Austin, Texas 78713
A degree of scepticism is no doubt a healthy attribute of any scholar, but few anthropologists have cultivated it to such an extent as Rodney Needham, who on occasion has even been led to doubt the future viability of the subject as a unified discipline. Not content with critically examining substantive issues, especially in kinship, throughout the earlier part of his career, in the last fifteen years or so he has increasingly questioned the validity and usefulness of such standard, monothetically defined categories as descent or belief in comparative studies in anthropology. Inspired principally by the philosopher Wittgenstein and a number of natural scientists, he has suggested replacing them with a polythetic or serial type of classification, while fully appreciating that this would greatly complicate the task of comparison. But this has not simply made Needham an extreme relativist: instead, his dissatisfaction has led to a search for universals at a logically prior or more fundamental stage of human experience than that denoted by the conventional categories. These fundamentals owe much to the Jungian archetype and occur either as images (the half-man, the witch) or else as properties (symmetry, transitivity, analogical classification). Clearly, his work presents a contrast with those approaches which simply cast fresh light on what are treated as essentially stable categories and concepts. And it also has continuity, since many of the ideas involved and the resort to principles rather than types were first worked out in the kinship studies of his earlier career.

His two most recent collections of essays continue this general trend, though the second is in part a new departure in terms of the sort of evidence presented. Against the Tranquility of Axioms contains a rather mixed bag of essays, two of which have been published before, namely 'Polythetic Classification' (Man 1975) and 'Skulls and Causality' (Man 1976). Two others deal respectively with the fundamental and widespread properties of reversal and of alternation in the ordering of human experience. The first is shown to constitute another polythetic class, despite being treated monothetically by most authors; the second is assessed
to be a fundamental and discrete monothetic concept - an aspect of duality, though a more complex one than, say, symmetry. One of the two remaining essays shows the difficulty of distinguishing fact from value, real from ideal, while the other, very short, points to some inconsistencies in the use of the arrow as a diagrammatic device. Despite their diversity, they all have in common the author's explosion of some of the take-for-granted certainties - 'axioms' - he considers burden the profession.

Exemplars pursues similar themes within an equal variety of topics, but some of the evidence invoked is radically different. In order to demonstrate further the validity of his ideas, Needham leaves ethnography aside in four essays and concentrates instead on the mental processes of particular individuals in circumstances where they may be deemed to have been either isolated from or resistant to the usual impulses provided by their cultural surroundings. Thus we have a classical scholar who adds extraneous matter to a text in the course of translating it; a confessedly fraudulent ethnographer; and a mystic, possibly mad but certainly sincere, who records the impressions of heaven and hell brought to him by angels in a series of visions. The concentration of the first and last of these three individuals can be supposed to have been directed firmly away from the experiences of their own social world, the former by respect for his text, the latter by awe of the angels and their message; while the second had both the opportunity and the motive (his deceit) to be as outlandish but at the same time as vague as possible in its execution. Nonetheless, all three betrayed their membership of wider humanity by exploiting one of the primary factors alluded to above, namely a propensity for analogical classification. A similar theme - though it is left more implicit - appears in the essay on Castaneda, whose writings are compared with a previously unsuspected possible influence on them, the imputation being that in fact both may be fictitious. Once again, the message is clearly that the undeniable correspondences between the two arise not from the parallel yet suspect facts they record, but from mental properties common to all humanity. Were it not for the possibility of influence that Needham accepts at the outset, this essay would provide the most impressive evidence for his contention that certain characters of thought are innate, and that they may be found in societies lacking historical or geographical connections: at least in this case the two texts come from widely differing and geographically remote cultural traditions. However, the other examples are all located in and, as the author himself admits, at least partly derivable from the European tradition, and in the last resort he does not make it at all clear why this should not be their origin, rather than any more widely occurring attributes of the human mind.

Other essays in this volume deal with the lessons provided by the early ethnography of the Greek Sceptics and Robert Knox, the former developing into a defence of anthropology, despite the observation that 'anthropological theory over the past century and more... has traced a sequence of failures...' (p. 41); with Dumézil, in defence of his treatment of dual sovereignty; and with Locke's
An Essay concerning Human Understanding, which gives Needham an opportunity to counter possible arguments against the notion of primary factors and is, in fact, a good summary of his general position.

The remaining essay attacks the concept of ritual in the same way that those of descent and belief were attacked earlier. The starting point for this, however, comes from outside anthropology, in the form of a critique of The Golden Bough by the very philosopher whose work has been so influential on Needham's own. In it, Wittgenstein had made the common observation that in the search for universal explanations for the propensity towards ritual action (as in much else, one might say) no help is to be expected from the 'explanations' offered by the participants, which invariably are either patent rationalizations or else refer the enquirer to the ancestors, the society's tradition, etc. In other words, while it need not be difficult to determine the meaning of a particular rite for its participants in terms of its place in their own culture, the reason behind this general human impulsion remains obscure. Wittgenstein's solution - a polythetic classification of ritual - simply releases it from the possibility and necessity of having any single explanation justify its existence: 'Ritual can be self-sufficient, self-sustaining, and self-justifying' (Exemplars, p. 177) and is innate present in the human mind. The example of Wittgenstein's that Needham finds most illuminating is of the distribution of pieces of Schubert's scores to his pupils by his brother after the composer's death (p. 164). This is an example of what must be an exceedingly common occurrence among small groups of friends and colleagues - a limited and largely spontaneous gesture whose content has meaning just to them, free from any compulsion coming directly from the wider society, and simply manifesting the seemingly universal human propensity to use ritual and symbolism to mark the significant with significance.

The original treatment of some of the essays in Exemplars saves this latest volume of Needham's from being just one more in the series of books he has brought out in recent years offering essentially the same arguments and supported by the same ethnographic examples. This slight change in direction should be pursued in any future work if an impression of staleness is to be avoided. The more general critical response to these volumes has ranged from the adulatory (e.g. Pocock in Man XX, 4) to the dismissive (e.g. Crick in Man XVI, 2), and some points of detail have attracted the criticism of Dumont and others. Thus far, their actual application to specific problems by the profession at large has not been very marked, though there have been a number of passing comments on what a good idea polythetic classification is, for example (one exception as far as Needham's own contemporaries are concerned is Martin Southwold, who has tried out p.c., approvingly, on religion, in Man XIII, 2).

This, no doubt, is the fate of many 'good ideas' in anthropology, whose practitioners are ever concerned to plough furrows of their own; but in the present case it is possible to suggest some
special reasons for it. One is that there have always been other ways of circumventing the insufficiencies of monothetic classification - above all, perhaps, the Weberian 'ideal type'. Indeed, there are precedents (under different names) for the polythetic idea itself in Leach's well-known definition of marriage as 'a bundle of rights' and Kroeber's suggestion of a serial classification for couvade, which date back to 1955 and 1948 respectively. Nor can it be claimed that such concepts as reversal, alternation, dual sovereignty or analogical classification had gone unnoticed previously. Adherents of Needham's approach seem to be outnumbered by those who sympathise but who nonetheless find polythetic classification, say, too complicated as a practical device, and by those who remain unimpressed with either the remedy itself or the necessity for it.

There are signs, however, that a younger generation is more prepared to incorporate these aspects of Needham's work into their own. Many, naturally enough, come from the ranks of his own students, starting with Rivière, whose well-known essay on marriage (1967) was as deconstructionist as Needham's own contributions to the same volume (ASA 11), and who was to go on to do something very similar for couvade (1974). More recently, there have been Endicott, Napier, Howell, Duff-Cooper and Crocker (the last really a student of a student), some of whom have applied polythetic classification in ethnographic analysis rather than as a comparative device. Outside this circle there is Anthony Good, co-author of a book likely to become influential as the new standard introduction to kinship (and which I hope to review shortly for JASO). Through it, Needham's ideas should reach a wider and still younger audience.

ROBERT PARKIN


Both musicians and non-musicians alike readily credit music with mysterious powers, and it seems natural to assume that these powers and their supposed drug-like effect on the remoter recesses of the human brain are directly responsible for inducing states of trance or possession. Gilbert Rouget devotes most of Music and Trance to the crushing of this assumption, which is taken for granted in most of the anthropological literature on these phenomena, an assumption to which 'even the best minds are not always immune' (p. 240) - including those of Melville Herskovits, Bestide,
Ioan Lewis and Eliade. Dismantling the theory is a relatively simple matter given the impressive range of historical and ethnographic material that Rouget uses, ranging from the *Book of Kings* to his own fieldwork in Benin: there are simply no common denominators in the kinds of music that supposedly induce trance states to allow us to draw any conclusions of the kind. Given the opening quote from Rousseau's *Essay on the Origin of Languages*,

As long as we continue to consider sounds only through the commotions they stir in our nerves, we will never have the true principles of music and its power over our hearts,

Rouget's conclusion that the effect of music derives from its cultural and symbolic role comes as no great shock. *Music and Trance* has little to offer simply as a structuralist critique of physiological explanations of musically induced trance. One wonders indeed why he uses so weighty a sledgehammer to crack such a small nut. But the wide range of material, both anthropological and musicological, that he draws together in the process is ultimately of greater value. He begins with a useful review of the large quantity of French work on altered states of consciousness, a quantity that is not surprising in view of the continuing importance of Freud for French intellectuals. In picking his way carefully through the debris of misused terminology, Rouget makes important distinctions between individual cases of hysteria and ecstasy and socially motivated trance states, of which he singles out possession cults and shamanic trances for special treatment. Structural differences in the nature of the two experiences are related to two structurally opposed uses of music. Having defined his field of operations — what he means by trance and indeed music, and the grounds on which an analysis can bring them together — Rouget plunges into a re-reading of well-known texts on music theory from the Ancient World, the French Renaissance and medieval Arab philosophy. Set beside ethnographic data on trance from the Brazilian *condomblé* to shamanic trance among the Tungus of Siberia, Rouget's account of the vocabulary of trance and musical enchantment in the work of Plato, Baif and Al-Ghazzali makes interesting reading, showing amongst other things that Plato and Aristotle at least cannot be counted among the 'best minds' who confuse the symbolic relation of music to trance with an inductive relationship.

Brunhilde Biebuyck's translation and revision of the text (done in collaboration with Rouget) evidently retains the style and pace of the French, in spite of an almost Derridean penchant for coining words that the Anglophone reader may occasionally find hard to swallow. What are more striking are some of Rouget's omissions from the second, musicological, part of the book. Why, for example, does Orpheus — surely a prototype shaman — get such brief coverage in his account of music and trance in the Ancient World? The Orpheus myth also played an important role in the development of monodic opera in the Florentine *camerata*
and the Mantuan court in the early seventeenth century. One wonders why his account of opera in the Renaissance is, apart from obvious reasons, so heavily biased against the Italian material in favour of the French. And yet he criticises the achievements of French Renaissance opera as being literary and watered down (p. 241), an accusation which could hardly be levelled against the bold musical experiments of Wert, Gesualdo and Monteverdi.

The most important criticism relates partly to Rouget's comparative and structural approach and partly to the sheer density of material that Rouget brings together to make his point. If, in each case examined, ideas of trance and music are so differently constituted, on what basis can they be compared? Is there a single logic which connects the two? If in one case music is used to prepare the recipient of spirit possession, in another to accompany its progress, in a third to bring the possessee out of his trance, while in a fourth (the Bori cult of Niger, or the Brazilian condómble) music may not play any part at all, it is clear that Rouget cannot be proposing a theory of the relations between music and trance. What he is effectively proposing is a structuralist theory of trance and a variety of logics by which music may, or may not, be fitted into the process. One feels that if he were not a distinguished ethnomusicologist, he would be happier simply to drop the whole idea of music from his account. Indeed, when he admits that dance should be regarded as 'doubly more important than music' (p. 114), it is almost as if he resents having to drag music into it at all.

In spite of this, his fundamental premise, that music can only be interpreted in terms of culture, not nature, is one that should be borne in mind by all those working in musicological and ethnomusicological theory, as well as providing a cue at least for an anthropological account of musical thought and behaviour, an account which has begun but which is still in its infancy.

MARTIN STOKES


The emergence of feminist and Marxist anthropologies in the 1970s helped problematise the notion of power in anthropological inquiry. Work by Bourdieu further aggravated concerned anthropologists' interest in this troublesome topic. So by the 1980s many had come to regard studying the manifold, complex relations between power and knowledge as a central pursuit. The stimulating, often testing papers in Fardon's collection indicate how far anthropologists have been affected by this continuing investigation. In their
variety, they show how diversely this continuing discussion invades our subject.

In a spirited introduction Fardon claims that 'political anthropology' no longer exists as a discrete sub-discipline and that, thanks above all to Marxist and feminist influences, many now seek a 'relevant anthropology' - one which inquires into the notion of ideology and the efficacy of knowledge, one in which our concept of power is not so broad that it invites an infinite regression of questions about the ultimate 'source' of power.

Bloch, furthering his interests in where to site and how to identify the production of ideology, distinguishes between cognition - a culturally modified universal form of infant learning - and ideology, which is constructed and transmitted through ritual. Ideology persists because it is so adaptable. Essentially vague, it is powerful because it provides an all-encompassing explanatory scheme and because it is enforced by the powers whose authority it legitimates. (Parkin has already attacked Bloch's dichotomy in his 'Political Language', Annual Review of Anthropology 1984.) Parkin, analysing the relations between language and power in a formal speech before an audience, shows that while speakers control and are controlled by knowledge, knowledge can be constituted in the act of speaking; the power of oration lies not in itself but derives from participants' attitudes to the connexions between speech and knowledge. Marilyn Strathern, concerned with the notion of agent within any investigation of power, highlights our own ethnocentric bias by reporting the different ways attributes are attached to persons in three Melanesian societies. Holy argues that in the Middle East the symbolic capital of groups is logically articulated by their concepts of FBD marriage, agnatic descent, and the prestige of the descent group, and that it is the marriage strategies which are the crux in accumulating capital and validating claims to power. Riches argues that unless 'power' is used as part of an interactionist approach, it is merely a metaphorical device devoid of explanatory potential. Fardon explains the institutional change undergone by the Chamba of Nigeria/Cameroon since the eighteenth century by deducing two opposed forms of sociability: change is a product of the change in relation between these 'competing modes of intentionality'.

Three papers, each by an eminent sociologist, end the collection. Kreckel, discussing ideology as a theoretical concept in sociology, proposes the view that only a restricted definition of ideology, one historically limited to the study of advanced capitalist and socialist societies, can be both explanatory and critical. Hirst demonstrates how Foucaultian formulations illuminate our understanding of constructed space (specifically, temples and prisons) in Western society. Finally, Turner, in a highly critical piece, lays bare the (sometimes very large) omissions in Foucault's approach: he doesn't investigate whether discourse is effective and 'there is an almost wilful disregard for evidence' (p. 211); he avoids economic explanations and class analysis, and so cannot ask how knowledge is accumulated and transmitted institutionally. These last two contributors form a complementary couple, as a suitably critical introduction to Foucault for ignorant academics.
These papers proceed from a conference held in St Andrews in December 1982. Unlike most such collections, the papers Fardon has edited are of a uniformly high quality. In my summary I have not revealed the subtlety and informed richness of many of their arguments. Fardon brought anthropologists and sociologists together because he thinks their merging interests in power and knowledge signal the end of the disciplinary division. Though none of the anthropologists (other than Fardon himself) refers to Foucault or quotes more than one or two sociologists, Fardon suggests that anthropologists interested in power and ideology must acquaint themselves with what sociologists are saying on these topics. Whether or not the merger he heralds will come to pass (I doubt it), this edition of thought-provoking papers is still well worth reading for any anthropologist. And at its price, it's even worth buying.

JEREMY MACCLANCY


History and Anthropology (Volume 1, part 1: Gestures, edited by Jean-Claude Schmitt, 1984, 237pp., $47.00; Volume 1, part 2: The Discourse of Law, edited by Sally Humphreys, 1985, 224pp., $62.00), Chur etc.: Harwood Academic Publishers.

These two similarly titled but fundamentally different serials mark exciting additions to our discipline. They simultaneously define and fill a neglected niche. Each opens new doors in historiography and epistemology. These volumes should not, however, be confused, since the different connecting words in their respective titles indicate their alternate foci. Certainly, as the discipline of anthropology enters its second century the time for informed reflection on our antecedents has arrived.

Superficial similarities between the volumes include comparable length, format and presentation, and prestigious editorial panels (of the two, H&A has a more international flavour, being primarily a Franco-American co-production with Italian, Polish and Danish leavening agents: HoA is more provincial, with mostly scholars from the USA and a Canadian and a British anthropologist thrown in; also, both are produced to exceptionally high standards. Although both publications address themselves to a dualistic audience, they differ in their subject-matter. H&A explicitly aims to bring together scholars from both disciplines in a way
that will cause both groups to view their scholarly ideas in a new light' (editorial statement of aims and scope). It is a symbiosis which applies anthropological methods to the study of history. In effect, it presents a new way of doing history. By way of contrast, HoA looks not at what one discipline has to offer the other, but rather more narrowly at the history of the discipline of anthropology itself. HoA uses what historians can tell us about our own discipline, using their methods to illuminate the process of anthropology. Both serials are interesting and provocative. Neither is without a precursor (which, perhaps, betrays its culture area). HoA continues the now well-founded American tradition of books-that-look-like-journals begun by the Biennial Reviews of Bernard Seigal et al.; H&A belies its Continental origin as a rather more tightly reined version of Contemporary Studies in Society and History. Neither is any the worse for following such admirable models.

HoA is excellently produced by the University of Wisconsin Press. These excellent volumes contain articles of a consistently high standard rigorously edited by the founder of the series, George Stocking. Each annual volume has a theme ('Fieldwork', 'Functionalism') around which most of the contributions revolve (although room is left for the maverick 'miscellaneous' study). Stocking begins the first volume of his series with an essay explaining its genesis. The volume then continues with seven original and thought-provoking articles about the discipline's earliest fieldworkers. The articles present a reasonably good geographical spread covering the three major centres of anthropological tradition, with the US, UK and France all represented.

Douglas Cole opens the volume with a translation of Boas's diary from his earliest fieldwork in Baffinland - an altogether fitting introduction for this American volume, published exactly a hundred years after Boas, the father of American anthropology, made his first expedition to the field. Through it, we get a better understanding of Boas the man and the route that led him to anthropology than we could through any amount of reading Kwakiutl tales.

Curtis Hinsley contrasts the charismatic approach of Frank Cushing with the scientific approach of Jesse Fewkes in the early study of the Indians of the American Southwest.

The editor's contribution is the centrepiece of the volume. This formidable essay (by far the longest in the book) surveys the place of fieldwork in British anthropology before Malinowski rewrote the rules. It discusses the contributions of Haddon, the Cambridge School (Rivers, Myers, Seligman) and Spencer, before moving on to a more detailed treatment of Malinowski's own evolution as a fieldworker.

James Clifford follows up his recently published and masterful biography of Maurice Leenhardt (reviewed later in HoA 1) with a fascinating prespective of Marcel Griaule. He is especially to be applauded for continuing his excellent efforts at making that lost age-set of French anthropologists - i.e. those falling between the Année Sociologique and the modern structuralist schools - more accessible to the English-speaking world.
Homer Barnett introduces the first of the autobiographical elements into the volume with a discussion of his role as ethnographer and later as administrator. Joan Larcom continues the autobiographical vein in her elliptical article about the work of Bernard Deacon and how it affected her own work when she followed in his footsteps to the New Hebrides.

Paul Rabinow's contribution is rather different. His 'Facts Are a Word of God' is an extended review essay of another contributor's (Clifford's) recent biography of Maurice Leenhardt. But the maverick article in the first volume of HoA is Richard Handler's 'The Dainty and the Hungry Man'. This looks at how Edward Sapir used literature (in particular his own poetry) to explicate his anthropology.

History and Anthropology is an even more innovative departure from the usual restrictions of serial publication. Each annual volume is intended to be approximately four hundred pages in length. The publication schedule is flexible, however, in that each volume will be published in an irregular number of parts, each part containing articles on a single theme; thus Volume 1 has been published as two separate numbers. The series editors bring in guest editors for each number, who for Volume 1 are members of the H&A editorial board.

Schmitt's 'Gestures' is a bilingual volume with eight articles in English and two in French (although all but two of the contributors are French). In addition to Schmitt's broad introduction, with its useful bibliography, there is a symmetry to the issue, with three articles each on the subjects of 'Gesture in Ancient Greece', 'Gesture in the Christian Church' and 'Gesture in Art'. Readers will be struck by the imaginative use that the contributors make of anthropological method. The volume is copiously illustrated and excellently produced.

'The Discourse of Law', edited by Sally Humphreys, is, perhaps, of greater interest to the anthropologist. Indeed, there is an all too neat bifurcation between Part 1 and Part 2, with the former being overwhelmingly historical and the latter overwhelmingly anthropological. As yet, the institutional lines that the series editors hope to cross remain quite distinctly drawn.

Although its entire contents are in English, Humphrey's volume is much more international of the two, since it contains articles from authors in Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Brazil and the USA. The articles cover a wide range - from classical Athens to nineteenth-century Brittany, the medieval Middle East, eighteenth-century England, nineteenth-century Brazil and contemporary Lebanon. Unlike Part 1, however, there is a balance on disciplinary lines: anthropologists here have at least as much space as historians. In common with 'Gestures', this number begins with a strong introductory essay by the guest editor and, also like Part 1, its content is separated into three distinct sections: 'Law and Local Knowledge', 'Law and Local Power' and 'The Legal Discourse'. Editorial standards are high, and its articles set a high standard for future issues, which will be eagerly awaited.

STEVEN SEIDENBERG

The Gebusi are a distinct linguistic group of just 450 persons living in a lowland environment well inland in the Western Province of Papua New Guinea. Although they have been subject to raiding from the more easterly Bedamini, they are little given to warfare. The principal orientation of Gebusi social life is an attitude which Knauft translates as 'good company'. Good company manifests itself as communal hospitality, relaxed friendship in gatherings, and elaborate etiquette and hospitality for visitors and affines. Knauft says that their social life is extremely pleasant to participate in. Rituals, narratives and spirit seances are 'rich and moving in the amity and enjoyment they engender'. The peaceful atmosphere of Gebusi life, however, is marred by sorcery accusations and a homicide rate that Knauft describes as being among the highest reported for any human society. Killings by physical violence accounted for 32.7 per cent of adult deaths between 1940 and 1982.

Knauf't's study begins with the premise that the models of male aggressiveness, collective violence and kin-group antagonism that have been applied to other societies are inadequate to explain Gebusi violence. The great majority of Gebusi homicides result directly from attributions of sorcery, through the killing of the sorcery suspect. Gebusi attribute all natural deaths to sorcery. In an unhealthy environment, this dialectic of death through illness, sorcery accusation and resulting homicide, combined with an infant mortality rate of fifty per cent within the first year of life, has led to population decline. Only one in every six males who live to five years of age, and only one in every three females, reaches his or her fortieth year. At least sixty per cent of middle-aged men have committed sorcery-related homicides, usually within their own community. Combined with this grim pattern is the practice of the release of heterosexual frustrations through publicly condoned and recognised homosexual encounters.

Sorcery accusations tend to be directed towards the oldest members of the community, and they are especially likely to occur where there is an imbalance of women exchanged in marriages between patriline. Affinal ties based on sister exchange are immune. The anger felt but not acknowledged by the kinsmen of the supposed sorcery victim is rediscovered in the reactions of the accused sorcerer in a manner that excludes any effective defence. According to Knauft, violence does not merely co-exist with good company, but the two are necessarily related. Violence resulting from sorcery accusations is not only the antithesis of good company, but also its culmination. Despite their claims to goodwill, sorcerers are perceived as a lethal threat to the community. They must be killed so that the values of good company may be preserved.
Knauff has written not only an excellent ethnographic account of a small New Guinea community, but an important contribution to the comparative understanding of sorcery beliefs and the sociology of sorcery accusations. What is especially impressive is his ability to analyse and re-analyse his material from a variety of perspectives. He carefully relates the Gebusi situation to well-known explanations of similar material in other parts of the world and plainly differentiates Gebusi sociology from that of these other societies. He also situates the Gebusi within the range of New Guinea communities and explains how they are distinctive. His various discussions of method are generally helpful and unobtrusive. With his narratives of sorcery accusations, ritual feasts, spirit seances and myths, he has achieved a fine balance between ethnography and theory. His two maps, 22 figures and 36 tables are well laid out and informative. The 28 photographs are attractive and evocative. It is a shame that none of this material is listed in the table of contents. The book is further enhanced by seven appendices. In the whole, it is well written and well structured. The printing, paper and binding are pleasant, though the dull grey cloth cover and violet lettering are an unfortunate combination. This is definitely a book to be recommended to a wide anthropological readership.

R.H. BARNES


There are more Welsh speakers in industrial South Wales than in rural Gwynedd, but whereas in South Glamorgan Welsh speakers form less than six per cent of the population, in Gwynedd the proportion is over seventy per cent. This distinction between absolute numbers and proportions of Welsh speakers is vital in any discussion of bilingualism in Wales. Colin Baker's careful assessment of the state of the Welsh language, based on a computer analysis of the 1981 Welsh Language Census data, examines the value of statistical analysis in understanding the phenomenon of bilingualism in Wales. An educationalist, Baker concentrates on issues surrounding Welsh bilingual educational policy, including an assessment of recent curricular development projects aimed at providing materials suitable for Welsh schools and the role of microcomputers in education.

Although cautious in answering questions such as 'who speaks Welsh?' or 'Does bilingual education work?', Baker reaches some interesting but not altogether unexpected conclusions concerning the
relationship of Welsh language to culture (or 'cultures', taken to include the environment of the pub, home and sports field, as well as the Urdd, chapels and eisteddfodau). There has been a tendency to stress the importance of safeguarding the Welsh language so as to preserve the attendant distinctive and historic culture. Basing his conclusions on an analysis of the relationship between language background, attainment, preference and media influences, Baker turns the argument round, claiming that it is the culture which needs to be preserved in order to safeguard the language. The statistical data suggests that

At the onset of adolescence, language attitude and attainment flourish particularly when there exists the immersion in traditional Welsh culture. To protect the Welsh language may mean first protecting traditional Welsh culture (p. 150).

If this is so, it can be argued that policy objectives and finances should be directed at institutions, such as the Welsh League of Youth (Yr Urdd) and the Welsh Medium Nursery Schools and Playgroups Association (Mudnad Ysgolion Meithrin), which play a vital role in mediating a Welsh cultural atmosphere to both first language Welsh speakers and learners.

Although a useful handbook for anyone interested in bilingualism in Wales, the limitations of a purely statistical analysis are recognised, and Baker points to the need for qualitative 'anthropological type' research in the area of language use. Without the knowledge that such detailed research could yield, analysis of bilingualism in Wales and of the 'state of the Welsh language' remains inevitably at the level of crude statistical generalizations which beg more questions than they can answer.

FIONA BOWIE

VIV EDWARDS, Language in a Black Community (Multilingual Matters 24), Clevedon: Multilingual Matters 1986. xii, 135pp., Figures, Tables, Appendixes, Bibliography, Index. £19.90/£7.95.

This is the first of two books which report the findings of an ESRC-funded study of the language of British-born Afro-Caribbeans. The study takes place in a hitherto sociolinguistically unresearched black community in the West Midlands. It deals with the determinants, social and psychological, of inter-situational speech variation among a judgement sample of forty-five 16 to 23 year-olds. The frequency and pattern of Patois use as well as the degree of proficiency of speakers in the sample are established. Edwards' findings challenge aspects of conventional wisdom on the
role of Patois in a black minority community: for example, devaluing the simple equation of extensive use of 'black' language with hostility to or withdrawal from 'white' society.

Although essentially a sociolinguistic study, the book will appeal to the wide-ranging audience for whom it was written. Anthropologists could be added to the author's list of interested parties, as there is much of mainstream anthropological relevance here. Linguistic variation has long been a theme of recurring interest for Caribbeanists, and that literature is reviewed. 'Careful ethnographic observation' provides the basis for the selection of the sample population. Social network analysis is preferred to class analysis as a more appropriate medium for the internal differentiation of the population. Excellent use is made of the potentially most problematic aspect of data collection where 'speaker' perceptions of the researcher and the research context are likely to affect the extent and character of Patois used. A team of black and white, male and female researchers of various ages, operating both formally and informally, provided the body of tape-recorded material on which the study is based.

Edwards' book is a welcome addition to the growing number of detailed accounts of Britain's Afro-Caribbean population. The inclusion of detailed accounts of the research methods used during the study is to be applauded. The book will be of particular benefit to those planning or undertaking fieldwork among Britain's black youth.

PHILIP HARDING


The title of this book suggests that it is concerned with looking, both archaeologically and ethnographically, at the subject of African pottery - specifically at the craft practices and products of three contemporary Bantu women potters living in the Transvaal, South Africa, contrasting their work with their regional Iron Age predecessors. In fact, the book reveals itself to be a vessel containing a much wider than expected selection of ingredients. These other ingredients include material relating to North American Indian culture, as well as a formal archaeological assessment of Eskimo sherds excavated by Dr Edwin S. Hall at the Tuktu Lake sites on the north slope of the Brooks Range in Alaska in 1982. All this might seem at first to indicate a rather unlikely mixture. However (and here I end the analogy), the author does manage to blend his material purposefully inside a carefully considered and measured stock of ideas.
Indeed, this is a work in which factual substance and idea cling encouragingly to each other for mutual support. Once read, it is clear that Krause's intention is to present us with a systematic method, or formal procedure, for analysing artefact pottery - one which uses a species of rule-governed/mathematical-type notation to marshal ceramic data into a form suitable for quantitative and comparative purposes. He describes his method as analytical rather than taxonomic (p. 21).

Whatever may or may not be the overall classificatory designation of the system itself, his system is, in essence, a particularized scientific language designed with empirical purpose for precision analysis of ceramic vessels - taking into account both vessel morphology and decorative feature. The lexical and rule arrangements of his system allow for its definitions to be geared to the use of sample-specific iconographic models, such as one for Iron Age Bantu vessels (p. 40), for purposes of measurement. Potentially, such a sensitive, ordered system can enable even slight variations within traditional pottery types to be registered. Given a sufficient quantity of sherd material it would, in theory, at least, be possible to distinguish the work of individual potters with Krause's method. He sees this as being a feasible goal and in the book's conclusion expands on the contentious issue of post-nuptial residence among the Arikara, pointing out that an ability to discern an individual potter's work from sherd remains could on this score help to resolve some presently unanswerable questions, or at least lend strength or otherwise to particular existing theories.

What is certainly of special significance about Krause's system is that its descriptive definitions are logically structured to follow the actual processes of vessel manufacture, because any new alteration to the order in which an object-kind is regularly made will tend to make for a different object-kind or result. When, as with pottery vessels, one is dealing with conservative traditions where proven methods which minimize product loss are adhered to, it is possible, through the examination of archaeological material, to find consistent features which are likely to indicate how and in what sequence an object was manufactured. To test this over time is another question unless, as in this case, one can manage to find relatively intact continuations of ancient practices. Krause's system, it seems, efficiently incorporates the notion of predictability. He first (in America, in 1971) examined the analysed results of some 15,000 Bantu Iron Age sherd samples which spanned roughly a 1,000-year period (these samples were acquired from a survey undertaken by Nickolaas J. van der Merwe from sites in the Phalabowa district of the north-eastern Transvaal). Among other things, it was apparent from these samples that the widest central portion, the vessel shoulder, was thicker than either the vessel bottoms or body walls, implying that construction was started from the shoulder. In 1972, the ethnographic evidence collected by the author in fieldwork with three contemporary potters representing the Transvaal Ndebele, Tswana and Venda traditions verified this matter in all cases, as well as the predicted construction sequence which had been postulated by the author in the model.
he derived originally from analysis of the archaeological material. Further, with a non-African sample of Alaskan sherds he demonstrates the cross-cultural adaptability of his formal method, for he is able to generate another model for the Eskimo material entirely within the method's strict panoply of descriptive and relational terms - this stated model reflects a quite different construction sequence and decorative approach.

The three chapters which detail the working practices of the potters Emma Rabalago (Ndebele), Mutshekwa Litshira (Venda) and Thelma Makwe (Tswana) are exemplary descriptions. Apart from their rich ethnological value they are enough to make any ethnologist or archaeologist scream for clay and imagine himself or herself an active adept at Bantu pot-making. Nevertheless, one must not assume from this that the book as a whole is easy to read. The nature of its content requires, particularly in the first sixty pages or so, considerable efforts of concentration. As an incidental point of criticism, I would like to see the bottom half of p. 56 respaced and made more understandable.

This book has no polemical thrust when proffering its author's formal method, and as such it is unsettlingly self-effacing for those like myself who enjoy some measure of the spice of disputational combat. I would have greatly appreciated having had just a short, slightly talkative preamble for claims and context to be announced together unequivocally. Obviously, though, there is an important need for a standardized formal method for ceramics analysis - and I would like to think that Krause ought not to fear striding into the ring on this issue.

PETER STRONG


The first of these two 'official' publications is based on an international study conducted by the WHO between 1973 and 1982 among fourteen socio-cultural groups in ten countries (Egypt, Indonesia, Jamaica, Mexico, Pakistan, Philippines, Republic of Korea, UK and Yugoslavia). The study is in three parts. The first is a survey of the views of the 'knowledgeable sources' - the local experts - on the experience and perception of menstrual bleeding among women.
in their own country or region; this is compared with a survey of views gathered directly from women themselves. The second part involves the collection of menstrual data from illiterate women, while the third catalogues a general survey of over 5,000 women from different social and cultural groups.

The principal aim of the study was to elicit the ability of women to predict menstrual cycles and their attitudes to the management of menstrual bleeding in relation to the introduction of new methods of fertility regulation which have profound effects on bleeding patterns. This study was stimulated by reports that the most common reason given for discontinuation of a variety of contraceptive devices was unacceptable disturbance of menstrual cycles.

The social survey methods were adopted in the absence, it is claimed, of sufficient anthropological data. Ethnographic data have not been collected 'from a theoretical perspective which makes the systematic analysis of menstrual patterns explicit'. However, the editors do acknowledge that 'embedded in the literature are some clues and indications that societies not only acknowledge the menstrual event but impose social conventions in relation to it'.

While the editors claim that anthropologists do not have a theoretical perspective, one wonders about the value of the perspective which requires that respondents for the general survey be parous, non-pregnant, non-menopausal and not breast-feeding at the time of the interview. Any ethnographer familiar with conditions in most of the rural areas of the countries in which this study took place would be immediately sceptical of the possibility of obtaining such a sample. In the present reviewer's recent experience in a village in Central America with over seventy parous, fertile women, not one would have satisfied the criteria, for the simple reason that breast-feeding only ceases with the acknowledgement of another pregnancy. The editors do note that there were difficulties in obtaining the required sample in the rural areas of Mexico, but they seem satisfied that they were finally successful. In fact, the only women in the village who would have appeared to satisfy the criteria were parous women who were no longer breast-feeding but were infertile, although still menstruating. Such women would scarcely be representative of the group with whom the aims of the study were most concerned, i.e. those women who might experience difficulty in accepting new contraceptive technology because of its effect on the menstrual cycle.

Limitation of the survey method is apparent in many other areas of this study, and while a wealth of data has been collected and analysed, the anthropological reader is left wondering what can be made of these disparate and dubious statistics. The fact that menstrual bleeding may be part of a whole complex of ideas about not only the woman's body and her health but also social and cosmological events does not appear to have been taken into account. Varying ideas about conception and the role of menstrual blood in forming the foetus are not canvased, although the anthropological literature contains many references to this in various societies.
The main conclusion of the study, following a brief and entirely inadequate review of the literature, is that in all societies menstruation is regarded negatively and that it is hoped that increased knowledge (the editors' knowledge, presumably) will ameliorate the situation. A second conclusion is that while women share cultural perceptions of menstrual bleeding, they can also differentiate their own personal patterns, and these two perceptions can and do interact in a woman's reporting of these phenomena. This is a valid and interesting point and one to which social anthropologists should be able to contribute valuable data. Anthropologists should demonstrate their ability to present data systematically on current issues of concern, and an alternative social anthropological volume addressed to the same issues would be a significant contribution to the current literature on this topic.

The second volume, Joycelin Massiah's Caribbean case study, forms part of the UNESCO Population Division's programme on 'Studies on the Status of Women in Relation to Development and Demographic Behaviour'. Three sources of data have been used: the 1970 Population Census, the basis of a demographic profile of women in the Caribbean who head households; data from a small pilot study concerned with the 'Role of Women in the Caribbean', used to demonstrate the kinds of problems and survival strategies adopted by these women in three territories (Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago); and data from National Assistance records from one territory, Barbados, used to demonstrate one type of governmental response to the plight of the poorest of these women.

It is not surprising that a sociological study based on such limited material should fail to do more than restate an already well-described phenomenon - the preponderance of female household heads in the Caribbean population.

Massiah does point to the difficulties in defining households, as well as household heads. She implies that there is inter-ethnic variation, claiming that countries with significantly larger black populations are those recording a high proportion of female-headed households, while the converse holds true for countries with significant proportions of East Indians (Trinidad and Guyana) or indigenous Indians (Belize). She does not give any figures to suggest the extent of the variation between ethnic groups within any one country, but female heads of households are invariably less educated and more often unemployed or not gainfully employed than male ones, and their pattern of occupation is markedly different.

Massiah's discussion of the strategies for survival adopted by Caribbean female household heads and their prospects for economic improvement is too superficial to merit comment. She fails to draw the obvious conclusion from her own data, namely that welfare systems based on the assumption that families consist of economically active and present male heads of households with female dependent wives and children will invariably prove inappropriate for populations where these assumptions do not hold, whether in the economically depressed territories of the Caribbean or in
the inner cities of Britain. Her recommendations contain an un­fortunate bias. While no one would deny the need for child-care centres allowing women to work if they want to, societies suffering from the disadvantages of the Caribbean need economic development and programmes aimed at introducing marketable skills to both men and women equally, as well as stimulating the industries which would utilise these skills. Special programmes aimed at meeting the needs of female heads of households and discriminating against males could have exactly the same effect as those welfare policies which, as Massiah herself points out, encourage men to desert their families so that their wives can claim benefits. It is surely dangerous and irresponsible to recommend for any society policies which discriminate against men, even if they are aimed at enhancing the status of women.

ANN E. FINK

JAMES M. TAGGART, *Nahuat Myth and Social Structure*, Austin: University of Texas Press 1983. x, 204pp., Appendixes, Bibliography, Index. £18.75.

*Nahuat Myth and Social Structure* is an elegant, if not particularly adventurous, exposition of the relationship between these two domains among contemporary communities in the Sierra del Puebla, Mexico. The monograph, based on various periods of fieldwork carried out over eleven years, readily recommends itself by the attention it focuses on indigenous categories and classifications and is thus related to a growing American tradition already represented by works by such authors as Hunt, Bricker, Blaffer and Gossen. The monograph has twelve chapters, including a conclusion, which are divided into three sections. Two useful appendixes provide summaries of the narratives collected and biographical details of the story tellers. The first section opens with a general geographical and historical introduction to the area. After acknowledging certain historical experiences shared by the Nahuat communities of the Sierra, Taggart contrasts the different experiences which have influenced two closely situated municipalities, producing within one, Huitzilan, a biethnic society, while Santiago Yaomáhuac remained indigenous. The difference in social structure occasioned by particular historical transformations between the two have produced distinct styles of narrative which reflect the distinct world views of their inhabitants.

The second section opens with an exposition of the conceptual categories which have been abstracted from all 280 of the narratives collected from both communities. Their common cultural heritage consists of spatial and temporal preconceptions and certain mechanisms to provide the transposition of one into the other
which act as a template by which a geography of time and a history of space are developed in different ways according to the specificities of historical process. The second chapter of this section develops this by describing how the rules for the transposition of temporal categories into spatial categories introduce additional qualitative elements by their association with an invariable moral classification. Thus to give but one example, temporally the past is to the present what the centre is to the periphery (p. 56), and in each case the former is given a moral ascendency over the latter. This moral classification then incorporates ethnic and gender differences which take their significance from their spatial association. There is nothing new in this which has not been noted by Durkheim and Mauss and commented on and attested to by Needham and many ethnographers, but the careful description of the structure and exposition of its rules of transformation provides an eloquent model at a level of abstraction which will allow useful comparison with other Mesoamerican groups.

The third and final section describes how this basic template has responded in generating different codifications of narrative determined by historical incidence and by an identical underlying structural logic which has its origin in pre-conquest society. In five of the chapters Taggart compares narratives from Huitzilan with those of Yaonahuac and describes their variations as reflecting their different social structural conditions. Succinctly, the narrative structure from the more traditional Yaonahuac community uses natural categories as intermediaries between classes organised by a binary code, while the ethnically more polarised Huitzilan story-tellers stress unmediated oppositions. These variations are related to the position held by the Nahuat in the distribution of power within their communities. In Huitzilan, pronounced asymmetry between the mestizo and the indigenous groups is reflected in the sets of relations which transpose ethnic groups to other categories in their narrative. And also, as a result of social stratification, they show less egalitarian gender relationships than are found in Yaonahuac. Taggart argues that in this latter monoeethnic community, the breakdown of the hierarchically structured pre-Hispanic society, combined with the land reforms of the turn of the century, actually levelled out gender relations and formalised bilateral inheritance. These tendencies are illustrated in the narratives discussed by him.

Taggart has produced an excellent addition to Mesoamerican ethnography within the terms he has set himself. However, the monograph leaves the impression of an uncompromising determinism which subordinates cultural productions to social structural constraints. Stories which contain episodes not reflecting material conditions are left as a residual category while the process of cultural reproduction and its relation to social reproduction is not discussed.

The comparative ethnography of Mesoamerica is notoriously variable in its details and must be used with the greatest of caution. The principles underlying the spatialization of temporal and historical periods and their association with moral valuations may be similar throughout the region but not to the extent that the author
assumes (pp. 58, 64-5). In pre-Hispanic times variations existed between communities, and these are reflected in the lack of agreement reached by Spanish chroniclers on this point. Beyer and Hunt have argued that the Aztec associated the south with the day and the north with the night, giving positive moral values to the first and negative values to the second. That this continues to be the case in some areas of the Republic is verified by the Huichol, who associate positive qualities with the south and east quadrants of space and negative values to the north and west. This is in conflict with the position of the authors quoted by Taggart and which he finds in the Sierra del Puebla; they are basic points which must be resolved before one is seduced into accepting a common proto-classificatory logic for this area as a whole, no matter how probable and alluring this position may be.

Despite these reservations, Nahuat Myth and Social Structure is an eloquent and valuable work, which, as with the others mentioned previously, constitutes a welcome stepping stone for a more sensitive and less dogmatic understanding than this highly impassioned area has received during the past few decades.

ANTHONY SHELTON


Réciprocity et Hiérarchie combines three elements: a general treatment of tribes in India; some first-hand ethnography on the kinship systems of two central Indian tribes and their Hinduized neighbours; and a discussion of general issues in kinship theory. The introductory essay on tribes might have put more emphasis on the various distinctions that need to be made: for instance, tribe as an administrative category and as a sociological one, tribes of the interior and tribes on the borders, tribe as ideal type and as observed phenomenon, tribe versus caste and tribe versus caste system. As for the ethnography, any new information from an area for which research permits are now virtually unobtainable is very welcome, though one would like to know how long Bouez spent there. It is a pity too that he could not take account of related but simultaneous work on Munda kinship by Georg Pfeffer, then of Heidelberg, and Robert Parkin at Oxford. The theoretical discussion draws on analyses from elsewhere in India and on the long-standing debate between Lévi-Straussian and American cognitive approaches. The book is not always easy to follow.

N.J. ALLEN


AL-SHAIKH, Ahmed, Themes from Northern Sudan (BRISMES Series 1) London: Ithaca Press (for the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies) 1986. xii, 244 pp., Bibliography, Index, Map, Tables. £15.00.


BAILEY, Garrison and Barbara Glenn BAILEY, A History of the Navajo: The Reservation Years, Santa Fe: School of American Research Press 1986. x, 297 pp., Appendices, Notes, References, Index, Maps, Figures, Plates. £10.00.

BACH, Hugh (ed.), Contributions to Circumpoliar Research (Uppsala Research Reports in Cultural Anthropology, no. 71), Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology, University of Uppsala 1986. viii, 177 pp., Notes, Bibliography, 30 SwKr.


COLENS, Roger, The Backs of The Peoples of Europe; gen. eds.: James Campbell and Barry Cunliffe, Oxford: Basil Blackwell 1986. xii, 217 pp., Index, Maps, Genealogies, Appendices, Bibliography, Index, Figures, Tables. £27.50.

COURSEY, John, Perspectives on Cross-Cultural Relations: A Practical Guide (Cross-Cultural Research and Methodology Series, no. 91), Beverly Hills etc.: Sage Publications 1986. 322 pp., References, Indexes. £37.50.

DANDA, Dipali G., and Sanchita GHATAK, Contributions to Circumpoliar Research (Uppsala Research Reports in Cultural Anthropology, no. 71), Uppsala: Department of Cultural Anthropology, University of Uppsala 1986. viii, 177 pp., Notes, Bibliography, 30 SwKr.

DOUNIAH, Donald, and Wendy JAMES (eds.), The Southern Heart of Imperial Rhodesia: Essays in History and Social Anthropology [African Studies Series no. 51], Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1986. xvi, 289pp., Notes, selected Bibliography, Index, Plates, Maps, Figures. £15.00.


DUFFEK, Karen, Bill Reid: Beyond the Essential Form (Foreword by Michael K. Ames) [Museum Note no. 19], Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press in Association with the UBC Museum of Anthropology 1986. ix, 56pp., Notes, Plates. £9.30.


GLASMAN, Ronald N., Democracy and Despotism in Primitive Societies: A Neo-Suberanian Approach to Political Theory [Studies in Social Thought: Polity and Civil Society Series], Millwood N.Y. etc.: Associated Faculty Press 1986. 225pp., Notes; 259pp., Notes, Bibliography, £52.00.


HALPIN, Mary Jane, Jack Adshead and the Coastal Indian Image (Foreword by Michael M. Ames) [Museum Note no. 18], Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press in association with the UBC Museum of Anthropology 1986. 58pp., Bibliography, Plates. £11.00.


HART, Gillian, Power, Labor, and Lincolnhood: Processes of Change in Rural Iowa, Berkeley etc.: University of California Press 1986. xvi, 212pp., Bibliography, Index, Tables, Figures, Maps. £25.50.


HORNE, James, The Kuna Gathering: Contemporary Village Politics in Panama [Latin American Monographs no. 67], Austin: University of Texas Press 1986. xvi, 284pp., Appendices, Notes, References, Index, Maps, Figures, Tables, £25.00.

INGRAM, Bruce, Bedouin of Northern Arabia: Traditions of the Al-Dhafir, London etc.: KPI 1986. xvi, 106pp., Notes, Bibliography, Index, Maps, Figures. £18.00.

INGRAM, John M., Mary, Michael, and Lucifer, Folk Catholicism in Central Mexico [Latin American Monographs no. 69], Austin: University of Texas Press 1986. x, 193pp., Notes, Bibliography, Index, Tables, Maps, Figures. £25.00.


273 Publications Received


REID, Kenneth R., Return to the High Valley: Coming Full Circle (Lectures in Melanesian Anthropology), Berkeley etc.: University of California Press 1986. xxii, 239pp., Index. £15.00.


VANDER, Judith, Ghost Dance Songs and Religion of a Wind River Shoshone Woman [Monograph Series in Ethnomusicology no. 41], Los Angeles: Program in Ethnomusicology, Department of Music, UCLA 1986. 70pp., Appendix, References, Tables, Plates, Song Transcriptions. No price given.


ARTICLES

ABU-ZAHRA, NADIA
[Commentary] Fieldwork Remembered: Tunisia 1965 .. 231-244

ALLEN, N.J.
Tetradic Theory: An Approach to Kinship .. 67-109

BOND, HELEN (see EDWARDS)

BRAMWELL, ANNA

Cammaert, M.-F.
Cultural and Shifting Identity: Berber Immigrants from Nadir (N.E. Morocco) in Brussels .. 27-45

CECH, KRYSTYNA
[Review Article] The Malinowski Centenary Conference: Cracow 1984 .. 155-158

CHEETHAM, LINDA (see EDWARDS)

DUFF-COOPER, ANDREW
A Balinese Form of Life in Western Lombok as a Totality .. 207-230

DZIEGISL, LESZEK
[Commentary] Post-War Polish Anthropologists in the Developing Countries: Contributions to Peasant Field Studies .. 126-134

EDWARDS, ELIZABETH, LINDA CHEETHAM and HELEN BOND

KIRKWOOD, KENNETH
[Review Article] Race and Ethnic Relations .. 57-62

KUBICA, Grażyna
All Souls' Day in Polish Culture: Sacred or Secular? .. 110-125

KUBICA, Grażyna
Bronisław Malinowski's Years in Poland .. 140-154
LIENHARDT, PETER ARNOLD
Obituary Notice .......... iii-iv
Some Appreciations and Memorial Appeal .......... 181-186

MESSER, RON
The Unconscious Mind: Do Jung and Levi-Strauss Agree? .......... 1-26

PARKIN, R.J.
[Review Article] History and Kinship: Two Recent Books .......... 50-56

PSTRULENSKA, JADWIGA
Magati: Some Notes on an Unknown Language of Northern Afghanistan .......... 135-139

WILLIS, ROY
On Being One's Own Grandpa: The Contemporary Ancestor Revisited .......... 245-253

REVIEWS

BAKER, COLIN, Aspects of Bilingualism in Wales (Fiona Bowie) .......... 266-267
Banking on Disaster (The Ecologist, Vol. XVI, nos. 2/3) (R.H. Barnes) .......... 176-177
BOUEZ, SERGE Réciprocité et hiérarchie (N.J. Allen) .......... 275
CAWL, FAARAX M.J., Ignorance is the Enemy of Love (J.C.) .......... 180
EDWARDS, VIV, Language in a Black Community (P. Harding) .......... 267-268
GOLOMB, LOUIS, An Anthropology of Curing in Multiethnic Thailand (Linda Hitchcox) .......... 171-173
HANNA, JUDITH LYNNE, The Performer–Audience Connection (Sally Murphy) .......... 163-165
History and Anthropology (Steven Seidenberg) .......... 262-264
HITCHCOCK, MICHAEL, Indonesian Textile Techniques (Ruth Barnes) .......... 67-68
JACQ, CHRISTIAN, Egyptian Magic (N.F.) .......... 178-179
KNAUFT, BRUCE M., Good Company and Violence (R.H. Barnes) .......... 265-266
KRAUSE, RICHARD A., The Clay Sleeps (Peter Strong) .......... 268-270
LANDERMAN, CAROL, Wives and Midwives (Ann E. Fink) .......... 173-174
LEVI-STRAUSS, CLAUDE, The View from Afar (P.G. Rivière) .......... 63-64
MASSIAH, JOYCELIN, Women as Heads of Households in the Caribbean (Ann E. Fink) .... 270-273
MINNIS, PAUL E., Social Adaptation to Food Stress (R.H.B.) 78
MOERAN, BRIAN, Lost Innocence and Okubo Diary (Joy Hendry) ... 159-163
NEEDHAM, RODNEY, Against the Tranquility of Axions and Exemplars (Robert Parkin) .... 255-258
NIESSER, S.A., Motifs of Life in Toba Batak Texts and Textiles (Ruth Barnes) .... 69-70
Research in African Literatures (Jeremy Coote) .... 71-73
ROTHENBERG, JEROME, Technicians of the Sacred (Jeremy Coote) 71-73
ROUGET, GILBERT, Music and Trance (Martin Stokes) .... 258-260
RUBENSTEIN, CAROL, The Honey Tree Song (R.H. Barnes) .... 73
SAHLINS, MARSHALL, Islands of History (Jeremy MacClancy) ... 165-167
SKAR, HARALD O., The Warm Valley People (Ann E. Fink) ... 75-77
SNOWDEN, ROBERT, and BARBARA CHRISTIAN (eds.), Patterns and Perceptions of Menstruation (Ann E. Fink) .... 270-273
STOCKING, GEORGE W. (ed.), Observers Observed (Steven Seidenberg) .... 262-264
TAGGART, JAMES M., Nahua Myth and Social Structure (Anthony Shelton) .... 273-275
TRIGG, ROGER, Understanding Social Science (Aldo Martin) ... 74-75
VALERI, VALEO, Kingship and Sacrifice (Burkhard Schneppel) ... 169-170
VOLL, JOHN OBERT, and SARAH POTTS VOLL, The Sudan: Unity and Diversity in a Multicultural State (J.C.) ... 179-180
WHITE, RICHARD, The Roots of Dependency (M. Sanadjian) ... 167-168
WINZELER, ROBERT L., Ethnic Relations in Kelantan (R.H. Barnes) .... 175