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1. Is Germany a Special Case?

German identity problems are usually viewed as a special case. I do not think it is necessary to argue this point with any elaboration. It is argued that the Germans' obsessions about identity reached a peak of mental aberration in the Second World War, when in a fit of total national insanity they set about mass murdering most of Europe on the grounds of arbitrary and invented grades of approved and disapproved races, drawn from a misunderstanding of physical anthropology. The sources of the identity problem have been subjected to a great deal of analysis, but remain obscure.¹ Before I go on to look at how true it is that German identity poses special problems, let me briefly mention a recent example of the extent to which the attitudes drawn from the Second World War have permeated our consciousness.

I enjoy science fiction, and last summer I watched a film on TV, made in America by a consortium of apparently largely Mafia money, which concerned the invasion of the earth from outer space. The invaders were lizards from another solar system. They were lizards who were able to make themselves look like people by wearing a synthetic human skin, but underneath they were reptiles. Some clever people observed this from the beginning, but were disbelieved. The lizards seemed friendly, and quickly acquired what were called collaborators, drawn from the ambitious and weak elements in society. Lizards played on conservative instincts, such as a desire for law and order.

However, it turned out that lizard policy aims were not what they seemed. The lizards intended to steal all the Earth's water, and also steal the people, in order to eat them. They started doing this bit by bit, so that the full implications of their actions went unobserved. Eventually an Irish freedom-fighter started a guerrilla movement, and broadcast to the nations, calling to them to rise up against the lizards 'because they were fascists'. 'These fascist lizards are taking over the earth, and nobody cared,' he shouted. The fascist lizards now began to wear jackboots, black uniforms, and strange jagged, silvery emblems on their lapels, somewhat similar to a swastika, and gradually I realised that before my eyes a re-write of the American media-industry view of the Second World War was in progress. Perhaps I should emphasise that the film was not exclusivist or racialist in its attitude to the fascist lizards. Although lizards were killed in large numbers by the Resistance, there were good lizards as well as bad lizards, and it turned out that it was even possible to produce lizard-human crosses, who, like Vietnamese orphans, were silent and appealing and cute, with strange intuitive gifts and an absolute loyalty to the human race. The good lizards hated being lizards, and realised they were bad and fascist lizards. Despite their reptilian skin, they could be re-educated, and change their diet to hamburgers, instead of people.

That example probably encapsulates more clearly than could a mass of historiography the gut feeling about Germans, Germans versus the others, and German identity problems. A distinction is commonly drawn between German exclusivity and other supposedly more malleable identities. But is this distinction valid? What does national and group identity mean to non-Germans, and is there any purpose in examining the question comparatively?

Here are some textual examples of attempts to locate identity. The purpose is to show that exclusivist methods of identification often taken to be uniquely German are not in fact so but exist in all countries and cultures. The following quotations have been 'Germanised':

'The German question is not a social question,... it is a national question;... we are one folk, one folk....'\(^2\)

'Our blood has sunk into one common earth.... May this warm blood, this soldiers' blood, the most precious in Germany, be the new seed for brotherhood under our feet.'\(^3\)


'A bloody, arrogant power rose out of the race, uttering it, mastering it.'

'As Christians, we live by this German heritage, the German Millennium, this German Christianity of ours. Such is the law of reality.'

'He [an escaped murderer]'s gone to Hell, along with the rest of the Jewish race'.

This last remark was made in a cops and robbers series, Cagney and Lacey, and referred to a dead murderer, a German. It sounds quite exclusivist if you keep saying it.

Of course, these are only a few examples, but the point is that I made no effort at all to find them, or organise a search for non-German, non-fascist identity statements which contain the exclusivity generally associated with German racialism. I suppose that when Hindus murder Sikhs in revenge for the assassination of Mrs Gandhi, they don't stop to try to convert them to Hinduism first. Cagney, or perhaps Lacey, did not say, 'Oh dear, if only the German beast had been exposed to the American way of life a little longer.' Franz Fanon clearly feels that not only are whites a hopeless case, through nature not nurture, but that their evil possesses a Manichean capacity to infiltrate decent non-whites. Distinctions between exclusivist and assimilatory conceptions of identity, then, are not as clear as has been argued. What is clear is that supposedly objective observers of human societies seem to have knee-jerk reactions to identity statements which depend not on the fact of the identity statement, but on the position the relevant, the observed group holds in terms of majority or minority power; for example, a recent conference held in Oxford at Ruskin College included a series of lectures on nationalism and identity. In these seminars, a strikingly different attitude was used to look at black nationalist feelings in Britain, and British nationalism over the century. The first, a minority, or reactive identity, was good, the second, seen as an expression of untrammelled majority power, was presented as unequivocally bad.

The moral categorisation of big-small groups is not a new problem. In The Napoleon of Notting Hill, the ex-President of Nicaragua is found wandering through Hyde Park, stabbing himself on a rose bush in order to add red to the yellow of his robes, and mark Nicaragua's national colours. The civilised, Western hero expostulates with him:


'We moderns believe in a great cosmopolitan civilisation, one that shall include all the talents of the absorbed peoples' - to which the ex-president of Nicaragua replies, 'How will you know how to catch a wild horse?' 'I never catch a wild horse,' replies our hero with dignity. 'Precisely, that is what I complain of in your cosmopolitanism.... Something went from the world when Nicaragua was civilised'.

Many anthropologists would agree with the fictional ex-President. But Chesterton's hero goes on to say crushingly, 'The superstition of big nationalities is bad, but the superstition of small nationalities is worse. The superstition of reverencing our own country is bad, but the superstition of reverencing other people's countries is worse.' Chesterton concludes that nationalities, whether large or small, but preferably small, are vital to humanity's existence. But see how the whirligig of time's revenge has altered the implications of this argument.

Régis Debray writes that 'Like language, the nation is an invariable which cuts across modes of production.' His rationale here is biological, that the 'laws regulating the survival of the human species' fight death, including entropy, which is chaos and disorder in its form as time, also as 'spatial disintegration, the disaggregation of a community....'

The two anti-death processes set by the human species are, he suggests, first a fixed point of origin (or Ark), the mythical zero point, and second a sacred space. Debray disputes any connection between this desire and economic and/or social change, and makes the need for a fixed and formal spatial identity unit a human constant.

'Take the foundation of Rome. I choose Rome for its importance, and because it may have been Roman universalism which, along with the Judaeo-Christian tradition, has contaminated Marxism with certain universalist concepts.... Encllosure [i.e., spatial enclosure] is the foundation of a state...it stems disorder, it stems entropy.'

Debray resists a comparison with conservatives or neo-conservatives. He argues that there is something deeply materialistic about the concept of the 'viable group', that it is 'a left-wing concept, but not ultra-left.... It is anti-voluntarist, anti-idealistic, anti-intellectual...and populist' (or Volkish).

Can this analysis be applied to Germany? Is there some

special need to avoid disorder, to protect space? Certainly, German identity ideas have an anti-establishment element. Establishments are usually anti-nationalist. Debray's analysis avoids the problem of conflict. Does identity have to conflict in order to exist? Does the assertion 'I am an I' have to be countered or followed by the assertion 'He is not an I', or even 'He is not a he' in order to make identity real? What is the role of tradition and the past? How and why do identity markers change? The process of looking - yearning - for identity seems different from the quality of having one. I will argue here that the two activities - looking for identity and having an identity - have frequently been confused, when they should rather have been opposed. The conservative sociologist David Levy describes what it is to have an identity.

My place...is a bounded space, however objectively insignificant, arising in and contributing to, the history of my native group. This in turn emerged in the wider history of a human species....I know myself and my place together, for to know who I am is to understand the bounds of the space I am called upon to fill.... I myself am formed at the point of intersection between the objective processes of natural and cultural history which precede and accompany my life, and a personal experience.8

But when Nietzsche argues that past identities should be rejected, that they interfere with potential creativity, that one must learn to know one's true self, and that this true self is always being born anew, like Venus, he is describing a different kind of process - the looking, not the having. For him the having is an obstacle, because what you have will not, by definition, be authentic.9

The lack of firm or continuous boundaries means that Germans have never equated identity with physical, territorial qualities, and this has always been a major conceptual stumbling-block for British and American writers. To take one example, Professor Margaret Gowing writes indignantly of the atom bomb programme in 1939-40 that the British contribution is ignored; the British contribution she defines as that made in fact by an émigré German scientist, Rudolf Peierls, who had arrived in Britain some months before. He had become British - I do not mean this in a technical sense (though no doubt that too), but rather that he was perceived as British because he had acquired


a territorial, linguistic and Establishment connection; he was on British soil, and being on British soil was equated with Britishness. Ernst von Salomon, on the other hand, writing from a similar social background, stresses that his biological identity is different from his territorial one. One parent was born in St Petersburg, one in Britain; he was born in Kiel; but he is a Prussian, of Prussian parentage and Prussian culture, despite non-Prussian birthplaces. If the boundaries of your physical space do not continue, then what else does? Language, culture and kinship can all be identified as a continuous 'identity pool'; through these, you learn your identity as a code, a collection of symbols. But the codes can become as it were polluted through a lack of real continuity. Language can be learned by anyone, and a majority group thus loses control of 'its' language, and its code of identity. It can be doubly despoiled, because minority groups are permitted to retain their own language as a strong symbol of identity, while 'infiltrating' the majority group, which then is left with a weak symbol.

2. The German Empire: 1871-1918

The very complexity of German ethnic relationships, religious differences, seems to have emphasised the need to have means of identification. The upper classes, like the Prussian Junkers, were less interested in kin identification, but used caste as a marker instead. One might argue that all upper classes are more caste-conscious than kin-oriented: this is Debray's point.

The late 19th century saw a shift away from Darwinian theory to vitalist, Lamarckian elements; culture became catching, especially when it could damage: it pollutes, as well as creates. The eugenic theories of this period were utopian, and involved communard ideas; a small identity group within the large, new successful Reich which gave the same identity to everyone - but an imperial, not a national one. German jurists such as Savigny and Gierke evolve a 'theory of groups'; they study the problem of giving a legal soul to corporate, urban and national groups. Nietzsche writes on 'the danger of perishing through history', the misleading nature of the false identity code.

They [the Greeks] learned to organise the chaos... thinking back to their real needs.... Each one of us must organise the chaos within him by thinking back to his real needs.11


How did people think back to their 'real needs' during the Wilhelmine Empire? I have looked at groups who consciously worried about their identity as Germans. Therefore groups whose ideology consciously excluded the search for identity - the Social Democrats, for example, or the German Marxists - do not appear in my categories. The groups are divided into two kinds, yearning and alienated. This means that I see reactions to the existing formal identity as breaking down into two kinds: those who yearn for an identity within, and those who look for an identity without. There are other possible sub-divisions - notably that of age-groups - but that would require a more schematic treatment.

Yearning groups between 1871-1918 would include those non-incorporated German-speaking nationalities excluded from the Kleindeutschland of 1871, assimilated and semi-assimilated German Jews enthusiastic about the Wilhelminian social and political power structure, and also the new Mittelstand (white-collar workers, middle management, entrepreneurial businessmen, civil servants, teachers) - all pro-expansion and empire. Roger Chickering's study of the Pan-German League shows that nearly all of its leaders were born abroad, lived abroad for a long period, married non-German wives or were educated abroad, or some combination of these factors.12

Alienated groups include assimilated and semi-assimilated German Jews, conscious of impassable barriers to acceptance and full assimilation, cultural nationalists, dissatisfied with the new, plutocratic, vulgar Reich (this group includes conservatives, Catholic landowners and the old army), the old Mittelstand (particularist, often Catholic, artisans and small shopkeepers opposed to Prussia and the centralised state), utopian eugenicists, communards, social reformers (these groups often connected by education and marriage), temperance activists, vegetarians.

The yearning and the alienation cross-connect. Yearning is close to alienation. If your yearning is rejected, you feel alienated. Thus, a substantial proportion of interest-groups and classes in the Reich felt dissatisfied, but in different ways. The empire was held together by mutual dissatisfaction. Everyone was searching for a mutual code, and the significant shift to vitalist philosophies that takes place in the 1890s may reflect this search.

One example of the omnipresent worry about a viable code, with the right inclusions and exclusions, can be found in the works of Thomas Mann, whose great virtue, apart from literary ones, is that he is the mirror of all the banalities and clichés of his age, or ages. Mann's writings about human relationships express a disturbing insecurity; he portrays an early kind of anti-hero. His heroes are always yearning after the 'other',

sometimes transcendental, sometimes not, always embodied in a person whose physical attributes are also 'other'. The blonde Castorpi yearns for an untrammelled, feckless, 'bad Russian' carelessness, in the form of a slant-eyed Russian woman. His will has been sabotaged by an early love for an utterly 'other' slant-eyed Russian boy. Other works show the yearning of the small, dark, earth-bound for the blonde, carefree, healthy, callous; and from 1910 on, an age axis enters. A three-year old girl falls in love with a young man; an ageing musician with a fourteen-year old boy; a fifty-year old woman with a twenty-five year old youth. All the several loves in Doctor Faustus end in death or suicide; the yearning is never achievable, and it is implied that it never can be. The existence of the other is always a threat; a threat to the sense of identity of the lover, because it involves a sense of incompleteness and inadequacy, and a threat because completion would mean destruction.

3. 1920 to 1933

The events of the immediate post-war era are sufficiently well known. Germany ceased to be an empire, and became a nation. But what kind of nation should she be?

A variety of new identities were put forward. Prussian Socialists located Germanness in Prussia, which led in one case to the 'Red' Count von Schulenberg claiming that 'without a Beamten, or bureaucrat, class, the German people as a Race is unthinkable, not to think of its present dangerous situation.' The early 1920s saw what Golo Mann thinks is the most extreme outbreak of antisemitism in Germany, worse than in the Nazi period, and worse than in the Depression. It saw the growth of the Inflationsheilige - among whom one writer has placed Hitler - the Messianic movements, who look to a transcendental 'other' for identity; to India, to the Aryan past, to occult religions, to pre-Roman Germany, to sun-worship, to communes. Theosophist racial theories were anti-national and spiritualist; Aryans and Semites were descended from the Lemurian race of Atlantis, each characterised by special gifts. Neo-conservatives like Möller van der Bruck look to the German idealist tradition to be


fulfilled in a future 'Third Reich'.

Yearning groups between 1919 and 1933 seem not to exist. Alienated groups include those who call for a new nobility, either from the sound peasantry, or from a German-jewish fusion, or from a cleaned-up Junker class, those with simple revisionist and colonial ambitions, Messiahs and Messianic followers, those who look to a Russo-German detente (Prussian Socialists and Catholic Conservatives) or who look to a new Zollverein between Germany and the new Baltic nations (see Jung below). Those who are seeking an 'other' - pro-India, Eastern Aryans, sun-worshippers, communards, Theosophists, linked by an interest in occultism to the Nordicists, who want to create a new Nordic race - look only to Northern Germans. Many Auslanddeutsche belong to this group, as do regionalist and particularist movements.

One of the fundamental arguments of the 1920s was the ideal nature of Germany's political structure - empire or nation? This should be stressed, because to see German thinking at this time only in terms of racial coding is to miss many of the points. Edgar Jung, for example, author and lawyer prominent in neo-conservative circles, wrote,

> It was obvious that the dethronement of the nation ideal and its replacement by the imperial idea would meet opposition.... But it is clear that in the Baltic states there is a condition of hooligan nationalism which must collapse.... This intellectual sterility is exactly what makes for the greatest hopes in German policy towards the East. German cultural superiority will throw these splintered peoples back into our arms.\(^\text{16}\)

Along with the political and economic problems, a sense of cultural violation obtrudes surprisingly often, as when Rilke writes,

> Even for our grandparents, a house, a well, a familiar tower, their very dress, their cloak, was infinitely more, infinitely more intimate; almost everything a receptacle in which they both found and enlarged a store of humanness....\(^\text{17}\)

> Now there are intruding, from America, empty, indifferent things, sham things, dummies of life. A house etc. as the Americans understand it, has nothing in common with the house into which the hope and thoughtfulness of our

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\(^{16}\) Letter to R. Walther Darré, in Darré papers, Goslar City Archives, West Germany, file no. 84a, 11.5. 1928.

forefathers had entered. The animated, experienced things that share our lives are running out, and cannot be replaced. We are perhaps the last to have known such things.  

Or, the cultural code has been violated by a cheating substitution of non-like for like. Democratic lizards had taken over Germany. One anti-lizard reaction was the revival of the Nordicist movement in Germany, a variation of the pan-Celticism of the German romantics. Of course, the search for 'roots' in the 19th century was not confined to Germany. Many European peoples were developing a self-conscious identity. The discovery of ancient graves complete with bodies helped to inspire an interest in physical anthropology. French authors re-wrote history as the interplay of racial and tribal forces.

Among the newly-aware groups were the Scandinavian countries of Northern Europe. Nordic has become a word associated almost exclusively with Nazi propaganda, but originally the word simply meant Northern, and was used to describe the 'tribes' of Northern Europe, with the rest partitioned between Eastern, Western and Southern. Nordic was not coterminous with Aryan, Indo-European or Germanic. Houston Stewart Chamberlain used the word 'Germanic' to describe the Northern Europeans, but this term included a wide range of 'non-Nordic' peoples, such as Slavs. 'Aryan' originally referred to the inhabitants of the Iranian plains, and was still used in this way in the 1920s.

A feeling for the Nordic, for Northernness, existed in England, too, perhaps as a counter-balancing national ethic to the expropriation of the natural, the rooted and the spontaneous carried out by Celtophiles. Morris, Tolkien, C. S. Lewis, all looked to the North for spiritual and literary inspiration.

...this was no Celtic or sylvan or terrestrial twilight.... Pure Northernness engulfed me: a vision of huge, clear spaces hanging above the Atlantic in the endless twilight of Northern summer, remoteness, severity...the same world as Baldur and sunward-sailing cranes, cold, spacious, pale.  

In 1922 a book called Racial Handbook of the German People was published by Hans Günther, later to be Professor of Racial Anthropology at Jena, and became a best-seller. It differed from earlier popular works on race and culture in its deliberate-

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18 Quoted and discussed in M. Heidegger, 'What are Poets For?', in Poetry, Language, Thought (transl. A. Hofstadter), New York: Harper Colophon Books 1975, p. 113 (emphasis in original). In Leishman's edition of Rilke this passage has been omitted.

ly scientific attitude and analytical vein. The late 19th-century völkisch writers had written more on art, culture, civilisations and spirit than on quantitative physical distinctions between groups. They were inspired by the tradition of German Idealism, which was still to be found in the writings of Spengler and Moeller. Günther worked from recent developments in physical anthropology and eugenics to argue that mankind was divided into races which differed in physical structure and mental character. The highest type was the Nordic: comprising Scandinavia, North Germany, Holland, Britain and the United States (the latter still seen as a potentially Anglo-Saxon country; Lenz, co-author of a text-book on biology, had called on the USA to lead a 'blonde international' after the First World War). The Nordic movement of the 1920s was first a pan-national and cultural one. It searched for ancient Northern myths and sagas. It emphasised, especially in Denmark and Germany, the rural nature of the Nordics - in fact, the peasant adult education movement originated in Denmark. The Nordics were seen as racially and culturally threatened, surrounded by non-Nordic groups, split between nations, without exclusive territory or unity, and with a declining birth-rate. Further, because of their rural nature they were especially threatened by urbanisation and technology.

Scandinavia was the ideal nation for the Nordicists. Günther married a Swedish woman, and lived in Sweden for some years. Scandinavian writers were popular. Knut Hamsun and Selma Lagerlöf depicted a stern, hard-working, but deeply satisfying peasant society. The peasant was strong, inarticulate but superior. In Scandinavia, where there was only a small Jewish community, there was little antisemitism in the Nordic movement. Instead, animosity was directed to the petty bourgeois townsman and bureaucrat as the enemy of the peasant. The published writings of the German Nordicists also contain little antisemitism, but it emerges from their private correspondence that they identified the Jew as the Nordic movement's enemy.

The eugenic interest among Nordicists was the preservation of what was seen as a dying group. It was a defensive concept, and phrases like Supermen or Master Race are hard to find in Nordicist writing (I have not found them at all so far, but they could exist somewhere in the literature). Günther defined the Jews as a nation, not as a race or as a religion, dispersed worldwide, but on the way to becoming a 'race' through 'seclusion and in-breeding'. His later writings showed that Nordicism was still confusing different kinds of codes in its search for identity. Linguistic and racial codes were mingled, as were determinants of

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character.

But the racialism inherent both in the web of rural values and in pan-Nordicism was hard to reconcile with nation-state boundaries; peasant intra-racialism was smaller-scale, while Nordic racialists envisaged a Northern European 'Green' union, stretching from Holland to Finland. This became unacceptable to the Nazi Party, which was committed to restoring German power and territory to, as a minimum, its pre-First-World-War position. Not only were Monists and Social Darwinist societies closed down in 1935, but a variety of racialist and antisemitic extremists, including chiromantor Issberner-Haldane, and Lanz von Liebenfels, were banned between 1934 and 1938. When a group was started in 1939 to study Northern customs and report on eugenic ideas it was done in conditions of semi-secrecy, and as a gesture of defiance. Ideas of union with the Scandinavian states were dropped as impractical and irrelevant as foreign policy aims in 1933.

Nazi practice during the 1930s was, in fact, inconsistent with their theories. The Polish minority living within Germany was largely left alone; in fact, many Polish farmers were made into honorary German farmers, which did not please them, especially as they were then unable to sell their land (this was due to a tactical understanding with Poland from 1934). But the Churches, Freemasons, and other German groups were labelled as 'other' and ejected into outer darkness. Everything culturally foreign was rejected; but loyal ethnic Germans were called back to the homeland.

A list of groups under the Third Reich, phase one (peace-time) would look something like this: yearning groups include Germans who had belonged to the Wilhelminian Empire, now excluded by the Versailles Treaties, ethnic Germans ('next year in Schleswig-Holstein'), an apparent majority of Germans within Germany's borders who identified Hitler, if not the Nazi Party, with Germany's continued existence and future expansion, nationalist social reformers, such as Weimar administrators concerned with public health and eugenics, classes gaining from meritocratic elitism - foremen, NCOs, Majors.

The alienated groups are fairly obvious. They would include Polish Jews living within German borders, and later German Jews, many partly Jewish German citizens, but not all, the distinctions being at first sight random, but said by some to be based on usefulness to the new Germany. It includes groups hard to


22 See Darré papers, Federal Archives, Coblenz, file no. 94II/ld.

incorporate into a secular, exclusivist, rationalist Reich: the Churches, Freemasons, Anthroposophists, Theosophists, including racial eugenicists (see above) and particularist Nordic fringe groups suspect for having supra-German sympathies. The racial and Nordic groups, however, find a haven and power base in the later SS. Neo-conservative intellectuals and National Bolsheviks, yearning for the purity of the revolution, reject the world of the machine, of technocracy.

The list of alienated groups is incomplete, because I have excluded those who are concerned for values other than the identity value, such as, again, socialists, communists and liberal humanists. It may be noted here that 'transcendentalist' groups do not yearn towards the Third Reich, despite their alienation from Weimar Germany.

4. Third Reich II: 1939-45

The internal dynamism of the Third Reich seemed to have led inexorably to empire, for reasons which are still the subject of vigorous dispute. This imperial drive entailed a 'from above' power structure, with in its turn an essentially elitist, but non-racialist social base, which was to cross national and racial boundaries in search of allies and ability. This contradiction had been seen in pre-First-World-War imperialists, for example Rathenau. 'His often quoted phrases lamenting the fate of the blonde Nordic gave way to an increasingly vague, inconsistent, and when he dealt with imperialism, peripheral racialism.' In this, Rathenau resembles both Rhodes and Mosley.

Empire was to mean a strong central government, playing off some ethnic and national groups against others within it. It meant accepting a cross-current of foreign influence, of exogenous cultural inputs. Foreign agricultural labourers were imported, for example, while German peasants were recruited for death on the Russian front. In practice, racial selection, and the breeding of an elite, was subordinated to the more pressing need to preserve and extend Germany's power base. This subordination of theory to practice was characteristic of the Third Reich, and not only under the exigencies of war; it was observable throughout its governmental practice. One writer observes that even within the SS, supposedly the heart of the racial selection process, the practice of mass co-option of outside bodies meant that racial selection became secondary to the creation of an 'open yet authoritarian elite', except at the lower levels, where racial selection was used to weed out the politically committed after 1933.

Much of the anti-Polish feeling felt by German administrators during the war stemmed from their first reactions to a more primitive, backward and socially more divisive agrarian structure.

24 Ibid., pp. 158-9.
Reports back to Berlin from agricultural advisers commented on the decline, after 1918, in food production levels in former German areas. Others criticised the lack of infrastructure - roads, electrification, schools. The local Polish peasants were despised more than pitied. 'Everything is primitive, poverty-stricken and filthy.... I was told that people actually lived in holes in the ground round here. I saw poverty-stricken villages...unplastered houses, reed thatched roofs...farmhouses without solid floors or even plaster,' wrote one administrator in his diary.25

The new population of the Incorporated Areas was to be 50-50 German-Polish, with land held 60-40 by Germans to Poles. But the reality was more complex. Integrated Germans were found in Poland, often estate factors and managers, who had intermarried with Poles over generations. Families were split in complex loyalties. Many of these ethnic Germans were seen as having 'gone native', including some well-born landowners. Unfriendliness towards returning ethnic Germans was normal. Even local tennis clubs were split by non-Polish German versus Polish German enmities. Local Nazi Party welfare workers also found their sense of nationalist propriety offended when they heard, for example, Polish maids singing German nationalist songs in a Reichsdeutsche household. For some Germans it was a relief to get away to Bulgaria, where there were ethnic German colonies: 'One may very truly say,' as one Wehrmacht officer put it, 'that Bulgaria is the Prussia of the Balkans.'26

Why concentrate on Poles and ethnic Germans at this point? Because of the ambiguity inherent in the 're-Germanisation' programme, allegedly the heart of Nazi ideology. Already, as Koehl has commented, 'the best of the Nazis' had to show their racial superiority 'if not wholly by external hallmarks, at least by behaviour, bearing and attitude.'27 He describes recruitment of labourers and soldiers as 'a winnowing process involving service or...a test which might eventually make them assimilable.... There were police units who were Ukrainian, Russian, Lithuanian.' Himmler appears to have seized upon the opportunities offered in 1938, and Gross suggests that the Nazi


26 See A. C. Bramwell, 'National Socialist Agrarian Theory and Practice', Oxford University: D. Phil. Thesis 1982, chapter 6; and an unsigned report dated 1940 by a serving Wehrmacht officer on his part in and experience of Volksdeutsche resettlement, in the author's possession.

creed was incapable of coping with the concept of empire, that both Nazi racialism and its emphasis on institutionalised 'personalism' was incompatible with the creation of a real 'New Order'.

Himmler, almost alone among many other Nazis, was capable of thinking in imperial terms; he represented National Socialism's (perhaps inevitable) transformation into the full fascist state - imperialist and anti-nationalist; elitist rather than populist; seeking the efficient, planned and rootless European super-state. And by 1944 more than half the Waffen SS were non-German.

In pursuit of this super-state, Himmler discovered that racial purity could - had to - be subordinated to a supra-racial and supra-national categorisation that magically enabled a vast source of manpower to become available. By relabelling, people could be drawn into the system and ranked on a scale of Germanism. But the concept now lost racial and national meaning, and became a means of grading usable human material - it acquired 'an achievement dimension'.

The Volksliste became a sifting procedure to procure potential citizens of the New Order: loyal, healthy, and possessed of five fingers on each hand.

Ethnically German Polish Counts of impeccably Aryan lineage were refused 'Germanness' because of their immorality. Germanness now meant not being an anti-social part-time smuggler, but being diligent. It meant paying your bills, not jilting pretty Jewish actresses you seduce in Vienna, and paying your gambling debts. The physical aspect became confined to what was usable. Germanisation now revolved around the concept of merit, of earning and deserving Germanness. Your usefulness to the German Imperium would be investigated before the length of your ear-lobes. Leaving aside the multi-ethnic nature of the Waffen SS, with its Crimean Tartar, Indian and Russian divisions, why were the Ukrainians in Poland treated more favourably than Poles? Surely, because as political allies they were more useful. They were lower down the racial tree. Slovaks were not really more Germanic than Czechs, Croats than Serbs: but they were given autonomy because they were potential allies. Being un-German included being socially backward, having lice, having

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29 Ibid., p. 196.


31 See 'Germanisation' files in Federal Archives, Coblenz, such as, for this example, file no. R49/46.
no glass in your windows, and no trunk roads. The test was political reliability, and also individual capabilities. Power, social control and technocratic efficiency were the aims.

Listing groups who were attracted or repulsed by the war-time Third Reich is difficult because of the changing frontiers and loyalties. But yearning groups could be said to include definitely non-German but acceptable equals and partners: Japanese, Sikhs, Brahmins, Tartars, all ethnic Germans, German speakers, including German-Americans, multiple non-German European states and groups, according to strategic value and political allegiance, 'Germanisable'; fit, healthy, bright, virtuous, punctual, hard-working, honest.

Alienated groups include all Jews (except for a handful of German part-Jews who could be of use, such as Field-Marshall Milch), nationalist Slavs, usually middle and upper-middle-class, and the non-Germanisable: partly a self-selecting category, partly 'anti-social', playboys, etc.

5. Germany 1970 on

For decades the German legal system failed to accept the formal partition of Germany, or the loss of territory to Poland and Russia after Potsdam. In the 1950s, nationalist feelings took the form either of neo-Nazi groups located largely in refugee communities, or of the desire to break from Yalta, and seek a neutralised, united Germany. In recent years, a new German national consciousness has arisen, located in the intellectual left. They are the new National Revolutionaries. 'I used to call myself Marxist, Socialist, an anti-fascist, and it was very easy to dodge the German question. Today I don't see how we can talk about returning to our roots without recognising our own nationality,' writes Peter Brandt, son of Willy Brandt. Syberberg talks of the need to 'find the German soul'. One radical right journal, Mut, is also strongly pacifist and pro the ecological movement. Aufbruch is far left, but wants the re-unification of all German territories. A left-wing sociologist, Henning Eichberg, writes in The Left and the National Question, that the problem of nationhood is a problem not of national interest but of national identity.

It is not what we have that defines our nationhood, but what we are...nationalism is not out of date. It emerges when we confront our own alienation, part of the process by which a people becomes a subject of history, against dynasties, consortiums and bureaucracies.

The Greens see national identity as struggling under an alien American cultural colonisation. They think the Americans are the lizards. Rudolf Bahro, an ex-East German and ex-member of the Green executive, talks of the need to move towards Asiatic religions, to 'decompose' society and return to small, autarkic
German Identity Transformed

communities.

German history does not just stretch from 1848 to 1945; it is one and the same cultural tradition, which was there during the great peasants' war, and, as a disposition, under Hitler. 32

When I began to categorise groups for this period, I found that, as under Weimar, nobody seemed to be yearning to belong to the post-war German nation. Alienated groups included old-type nationalists (NPD), refugee groups, militarist groups, anti-American groups with regionalist sympathies, the Greens, anti-materialist, some national revolutionaries, using slogans like 'Vodka Cola', pro-'other', transcedentalist religions (e.g. Hinduism, Anthroposophy), anti-USA, neo-Nazi but non-German racialists, who are pan-European, anti-USA and neutralist. Many of these alienated groups have a yearning flavour: like our Weimar seekers, they are looking for something to yearn towards.

There is one further oddity involved in this process of change from empire to nation, to empire, to nation again. While it seems that today's German National Revolutionaries, or equivalent to National Bolsheviks, take the 'soft', yearning for the 'other', line (where is the German soul, not just, we want it back), there are those writers who are inspired by the lizard image of German identity. One work, published by a Californian underground press in 1966, describes the destruction of the USA by a joint East and West German task force, of precisely three people. It doesn't take long to push the rotten corpse of America into a self-destruct mode. They then return to a South American country, where the natives are herded into sexually segregated camps (so that they can't breed, and will die out) and made to work to plant trees along the Amazon, restore the ecological balance of the country, destroyed by an unholy alliance between corrupt native politicians and American interests. The writer was obviously inspired by the Nuremberg Trials descriptions of the SS-run concentration camps, but thought they were a really good thing. He discards Germanness in terms of physical location, or politics. 33

Another pro-old Nazi movement, of a different kind, seems to be alive and well and living in India.34 Certainly, an ecologically based, highly coloured, religious Nazi ideology has


transplanted well among Brahmins in India and our anonymous South American author. It doesn't seem to have left the same kind of mark in Germany today, where they have gone back to yearning, not doing.

Professor Gordon Craig's recent history of Germany began with an analogy between the new Wilhelmine Empire and Fortinbras' takeover of Denmark after Hamlet's death. His analogy was inspired by a German poem of 1844 which equated Hamlet with those Germans who championed the cause of 'political freedom', lost, along with democracy, in the new Reich. Professor Craig goes on to attribute the failure of the Weimar Republic to the fact that German officers 'put their epaulettes back on again so quickly after 1918' and, more strikingly, to the fact that 'the public buildings were not burned down, along with the bureaucrats who inhabited them.'

Professor Craig may be seen as a classical democratic lizard. He likes democracy, freedom and humanism, and dislikes tough-mindedness, brute force and realism. But he wants to burn down buildings and their inhabitants. The trouble is that idealism, loyalty, yearning and alienation do not fall into simple categories. I offer another, more sympathetic look at Fortinbras, and his farewell to Hamlet:

\begin{quote}
Adieu prince I have tasks a sewer project
and a decree on prostitutes and beggars.
I must also elaborate a better system of prisons
since as you justly said Denmark is a prison.
I go to my affairs. This night is born
A star named Hamlet. We shall never meet
What I shall leave will not be worth a tragedy.

It is not for us to greet each other or bid farewell we live on archipelagos.
And that water these words what can they do what can they do prince.
\end{quote}

But then, Poles are realists. But that is another story.

\begin{flushright}
\textbf{ANNA BRAMWELL}
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NATIONAL SYMBOLS IN THE CONTEXT OF RITUAL:  
THE POLISH EXAMPLE

Amongst the many symbols that help to order collective thoughts and actions, national symbols are, after religious symbols, those which possess the broadest range and relate to a particularly important sphere of social life. These symbols are often deeply rooted in the traditions of the nation and at the present day they continue to play a role, frequently assuming greater significance in cases of the appearance and intensification of nationalism.

This paper aims to demonstrate the functioning of Polish national symbols under the present-day conditions of the communist state, to describe those of their features that arise from the particular situation of Polish society, and to indicate certain symbolic processes typical of dictatorships dominated by ideology.

Without dwelling on the long-running discussion of the definition of symbols and how they differ from other sorts of sign, I shall assume that a symbol is a type of sign which carries an emotional charge, the interpretation of which not only depends on reference to a particular code, but also stimulates thought and stirs feelings. The symbol, then, has special significance in the inspiration and ordering of human activity.

National symbols are *par excellence* public, according to the distinction made by Raymond Firth between public and private symbols;¹ they refer to values cultivated and shared by the whole

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nation, and also represent that nation. They are universal, at least in the sense that among the members of a given nation there exists an agreement that the given symbol represents the nation as a whole. In contemporary societies there usually exists a classical set of national symbols - emblem, flag and national anthem - which are officially recognised, unambiguously defined, and protected by law. Thus symbols have, in the most superficial semantic sphere, an ordering significance, distinguishing one nation from another and denoting the unity of the members of each nation. But they are also something considerably more important. In all countries national symbols are recognised as sacred both officially, in the legal sense, and by the informal scale of values. They have this property because they symbolise the permanence and identity of the nation, its greatness and its traditions, its ambitions and ideals. To use Durkheim's definition, these symbols express national solidarity. Thus the significance of actions relating to national symbols is the same as if those actions related to the nation as a whole.

Considering the exceptional capacity of national symbols for the generation and ordering of collective actions and remembering their universal range - going beyond the boundaries of particular professional, religious or class interests - these symbols become a central element in the majority of political rituals. Ritual is understood here in the same way that Victor Turner uses it, to mean 'prescribed formal behavior for occasions not given over to technological routine, having reference to beliefs in mystical beings or powers. The symbol is the smallest unit of ritual which still retains the specific properties of ritual behavior; it is the ultimate unit of specific structure in a ritual context.' To use Turner's terminology further, it may be said that in national culture and in the context of political ritual the symbols of which I speak are the dominant ones. 'Dominant symbols', according to Turner, possess three principal features: 1) condensation, involving the concentration of many potential meanings manifesting themselves in various contexts; 2) unification of disparate meanings in a single symbolic formation; and 3) polarization of meaning, by which the given symbol at one extreme of its meaning 'refers to components of the moral and social orders of...society, to principles of social organization...and to norms and values inherent in structural relationships', while at the other extreme it refers to elementary feelings usually connected with the simplest natural associations evoked by the symbol.2

National symbols are indeed 'condensed' in the sense that in various contexts they may manifest various semantic aspects, evoking various elements of national tradition and various values, and may arouse various emotions from affection to despair, from

In considering the social functions and the various semantic aspects of national symbols, reference must be made to Firth's exhaustive study of flags. Many of his observations can be applied to all kinds of national symbols. As Firth writes, flags fulfil a role of decoration and display, expressing solidarity and the identification of the individual with the group. National flags usually express in symbolic form the principal values, ideology or aspirations of the nation. Firth quotes an Indian government pamphlet explaining the sense of symbols, in which it is written that 'The National Flag, the National Anthem and the National Emblem are the three symbols through which an independent country proclaims its identity and sovereignty and, as such, they command instantaneous respect and loyalty. In themselves, they reflect the entire background, thought and culture of a nation'. Firth further asserts that 'Flags are also capable of being greatly varied in shape and design, by use of different patterns, colour combinations and specific motifs. The adaptability of flags in display means that their symbolic value can appear over a great range of ritual occasions... Because a flag is cheap to make or buy, easy to manipulate, observable by numbers of people at once, it is a prime vehicle for conveying attitudes towards a social unit, of which one is a member, or expressing other sentiments'.

Polish national symbols, though similar in many respects to the majority of contemporary analogous symbolic representations of European nations, are distinguished by one essential feature, namely that they remained fundamentally unchanged from their very beginning. It is, as Firth emphasises, a feature of national symbols that 'a change in type of government may be symbolized by abandonment of the old flag and creation of a different one'. As a rule, a change of political system or of political leadership has brought with it a change of national symbols. Not only have nearly all communist countries adopted new symbols, but the same happened in France after the Revolution, in Italy, and in Germany after the Second World War. From the moment that democratic systems were introduced in the majority of European countries, the old symbols that had come from the ancestral signs of the monarchs were discarded.

In Poland things were different. The emblem and flag of Poland have their origin in the Middle Ages, and the exact time of their appearance cannot be ascertained. Historical sources record their existence at the beginning of the thirteenth century. The emblem of Poland precedes the flag, and so should be the starting-point of our discussion. The emblem depicts a white eagle with outspread wings, its head turned to the right,

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3 Firth, op.cit., pp. 341-2.
4 Ibid., p. 347.
with golden talons and beak. Until the end of the Second World War the eagle wore a golden crown. It is set against the background of an evenly red shield. The emblem is derived directly from the coat-of-arms of the Piast family, who ruled Poland from the tenth to the fourteenth centuries. The first Polish king Bolesław received, according to some historical sources, the sign of the silver eagle from the German emperor Otto III as a symbol of their mutual equality. During the Piast dynasty, the Polish state was formed. The eagle has been a popular symbol of power in Europe since Roman times. The reason was, of course, the features attributed to the eagle as the king of birds - the strongest, and the most powerful, independent and majestic. Polish sources indicate that in the period of the break-up of the kingdom into feudal principalities under the German emperors, the Piast eagle had no crown (see Figures 1 and 2). It was given one when, in the course of the unification of the Polish lands at the end of the thirteenth century, Prince Przemysł was crowned king, sovereign ruler of a Christian state, the equal of all other European rulers (see Figure 3). From this time, one may say that the crown on the eagle's head has been a symbol of the political sovereignty of the Polish nation. Later on, I shall consider the far-reaching contemporary implications of this fact.

Przemysł's coronation seal from 1295 depicted an eagle with a crown and carried around its rim the inscription: 'The Almighty himself hath returned the victorious signs to the Poles'. From that time right up to the present day, the white eagle has been the symbol, not of individual rulers or even dynasties, but of the nation and the state. The loss of the emblem, for example during battle, symbolised defeat and dishonour, as is clear from the 15th-century chronicle of Jan Długosz in his description of an event which took place during the great Battle of Grunwald in 1410 between the Poles and the Teutonic Knights. In the course of the battle, a great red standard with a white eagle symbolising the whole Polish army found itself in the midst of the fray and nearly fell into the hands of the enemy. Seeing the symbol in danger, the Polish Knights threw themselves desperately to the rescue, while the Teutonic knights had already begun a hymn of victory, judging quite rightly that the loss of the symbol would be the final blow administered to the Polish army. The Poles, however, recovered the standard and attacked the enemy with redoubled fervour in order to give vent to their patriotic feelings and to clear themselves of dishonour (Figure 4).

Despite minor formal changes, the eagle remained the emblem of Poland throughout the countless upheavals of Poland's history: it survived the partitions, the change of system to parliamentary

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5 S. Russecki, S. K. Kuczynski and J. Willaume, Godło, flaga i hymn Rzeczypospolitej [The Emblem, Flag and National Anthem of the Polish Republic], Warsaw 1963.
Figure 1: Eagle on the Shield of Prince Kazimierz of Opole (Piast Dynasty)

Figure 2: Eagle - The Emblem of Prince Henryk V (Piast)
Figure 3: Eagle - The Emblem of King Przemysł

Figure 4: Eagle - The Emblem of Poland at the Time of King Władysław Jagiełło
democracy (Figure 5), and even, as I have mentioned, the imposition of communism (Figure 6). Its symbolic value, beyond the straightforward symbol of the eagle, king of birds, is not entirely clear. The red background is presumably linked with the royal purple, the symbol of the majesty of rulers. The white eagle is sometimes associated with the symbolic colour of good from Slavonic mythology, black representing evil. A more worldly explanation may be that on a real emblem, not a stylised one, the eagle was made of silver-plated tin, which when transferred to other materials yielded a white colour.

The Polish flag is composed of two horizontal bands, white above and red below. It comes historically from the heraldic colours of the emblem (the white of the eagle, being more important, above, the red of the background below). In the Middle Ages the national flag simply depicted the emblem. In the nineteenth century it assumed its present form. It is something quite exceptional on a world scale that the Polish flag does not possess a concrete symbolic significance of its own, independent of the emblem. As a whole it is a national symbol, but its individual elements do not represent concrete ideas. This is the case precisely because the Polish flag is so old and did not appear as the result of a conscious decision at a particular moment in history, like the flags of many countries, but is the product of a gradual evolution from the coat-of-arms. This, however, does not reduce its meaning as a national symbol.

The Polish National Anthem in its present form dates from the end of the eighteenth century. Previously, a role similar to that of a national anthem was played by various songs and primarily hymns, above all the 'Bogurodżica', a hymn originating in the thirteenth century and constituting quite possibly the earliest recorded literature in the Polish language. It was this hymn that inspired the Knights to fight in the Battle of Grunwald mentioned above. Its deeply religious and at the same time patriotic text is perhaps the first example of the close links between Polish national symbols and religious symbolism. The 'Bogurodżica' today no longer fulfils its ancient symbolic role, but another, nineteenth-century hymn, 'Boże coś Polskę!' ('O God, who hath protected Poland'), an exalted prayer for the return of liberty to the fatherland, is sung to this day in churches and at various opposition demonstrations. During the partitions of Poland (1795-1918), this hymn was directed against the invaders and represented a symbolic expression of national solidarity and the struggle for national sovereignty. Nowadays it is still a popular religious song, having at the same time a strong patriotic character, and is sung on practically every occasion when both patriotic and religious feelings are expressed.

The music of Chopin, romantic and deeply rooted in Polish

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folk music, very often fulfils various symbolic functions, 
although it was never chosen as an official anthem. Recently, 
at the beginning of martial law, it was broadcast in the mass 
media as a delicate, subtle background of official speeches, 
obviously with the intention of stressing - but not too openly 
and straightforwardly - the truly Polish and patriotic character 
of the military government and its actions.

The present official National Anthem, the so-called 
Dąbrowski Mazurka, originated in 1797 as a song sung by the 
Polish legions fighting on the side of the French against the 
invaders who shortly before had deprived Poland of its indepen­
dence. The author of the song was Józef Wybicki. The Dąbrowski 
Mazurka, sung to a tune taken from Polish folk music, has a 
strongly militant character, expressing a desire for armed 
struggle for liberty and recalling historical moments when Poles 
succeeded, despite early set-backs, in restoring their indepen­
dence by force of arms. The text of the song underwent various 
minor changes, until in 1926, having become the official Polish 
National Anthem, it assumed its present character.

Apart from the above-mentioned symbols (emblem, flag and 
national anthem), which are found as a rule in every country, 
other signs may also be included amongst Polish national symbols, 
occuring less universally and having a shorter and less rich 
historical tradition, but possessing great significance and 
aiding the understanding of the sense of many symbolic texts 
appearing in Polish ritual. I shall indicate two such symbols 
here. The first is the anchor - a religious symbol of hope. The 
anchor appeared during the partitions of Poland as part of a 
tripartite set of concepts alongside faith (represented by a 
cross) and charity (whose symbol was a heart). During the Nazi 
occupation, there appeared a symbolic sign for Polska Walcząca 
or Fighting Poland, in which the letters P and W were joined to 
make a stylized anchor. More recently, after the outlawing in 
December 1981 of the Solidarity union (created in August 1980) 
and the introduction of martial law, this sign took on new life, 
after being transformed into Solidarność Walcząca (Fighting 
Solidarity), this time comprising the letters S and W. This 
symbol refers not only, as in the case of Fighting Poland, to the 
symbol of the anchor and the idea of hope but also, by analogy, to 
the Nazi occupation and the resistance movement against an alien 
power. Solidarity, being rather a national liberation movement 
than a trade union, adopted the anchor sign as a symbol of the 
continuity of the struggle for national independence.

The second symbol very often appearing in patriotic contexts 
is the Polish military uniform. The tradition of struggle for 
indepenence meant that the Polish uniform acquired entirely 
positive symbolic associations. It was linked with the time of 
greatness, independence and heroism, and its replacement with a 
foreign uniform was an omen of misfortune. Furthermore, the 
various characteristic elements of the uniform, evoking the once­ 
time greatness of the Polish army, began during the partitions to 
function as symbols of the permanence and sovereignty of the army.
The characteristic wings worn by mounted knights in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries during the victorious battles with invaders, the characteristic four-cornered cap or rogatywka of the ułan (modern Polish cavalryman) - a head-dress that became part of the uniform of the Polish army at the time of independence - and finally the Polish curved sword with its special shape: all symbolise the Polish army in the service of the nation. As we shall see later, these military symbols are presently being used by the political authorities to try to legitimize their rule.

As I mentioned above, one characteristic feature of Polish national symbolism is its close ties with religious symbols. Despite Poland's traditional religious tolerance, Polish society was and is decidedly Catholic, and remains tightly bound to its religious tradition. It so happened in history that the nations threatening the political sovereignty of the Polish nation - Turkey, Sweden, Russia and Prussia - differed from it in terms of religion. Thus for centuries Polishness was closely associated with Catholicism. This found its symbolic expression in the uniting of national and religious symbolic elements into a single whole. In 1768-1772, for example, the anti-Russian military confederacy called the Bar Confederacy adopted as its symbol a white-and-red flag with a silhouette of the Virgin Mary. A sign surprisingly similar in form and symbolic meaning appeared during the recent state of martial law, when a lapel badge depicting Our Lady of Częstochowa on a white-and-red background became popular. During the partitions in the nineteenth century, particularly after the defeat of the armed uprising of 1864, there arose the custom of wearing black mourning jewellery, representing a combination of national and religious symbols (like the aforementioned symbol of faith, hope and charity). At present, one of the most commonly worn signs in Poland is a black and silver cross, on which, in the place of Christ, an eagle with a crown is crucified - a transparent symbol of the martyrdom of the nation.

The Catholic Church in Poland has generally taken the part of the nation in its struggle with various oppressors, and it is a tradition in Polish thinking to combine national ideas with religious ones. In the image of the world generally accepted in Polish society the two elements support each other mutually and are never in opposition to each other. Furthermore, in consequence of this association, not only are patriotic ideas enriched with a mystical element, but the concept of the union of the nation with the Catholic Church is expressed. This union was clearly visible during the Solidarity period, both in decrees, demonstrations and ritual and also in political activity. At present, now that the Catholic Church is once again the only legally operating political opposition in Poland, it fulfils a prime role in the ideological battle with totalitarianism, which, as we shall see later, has an interesting symbolic dimension.

At this point, some attention should be paid to the particular political situation and the specific character of the
ideology and symbolic political activity to be found at present in Poland. The communist authorities, like any authorities, devote a considerable amount of their activity to the affirmation of their legitimacy, their legal validity. The types of such legitimacy can be defined here with reference to Weber's classic division into traditional, charismatic and legal rules. The essence of communist power is that in justifying the reasons for its own existence, it can appeal neither to tradition, nor to the personal traits of its leaders, nor to generally observed rules of legal democratic behaviour and a subsequent social mandate. The one reason for the existence of communist authority is ideology, a certain vision of history, its guiding forces and its aims. Only by accepting this vision can communist rule be recognised as legally valid. Consequently, political ritual plays a fundamental role in the process of the legitimisation of communist power. It serves to create a certain kind of symbolic reality which replaces the reality of social existence and which is consistent with ideology. Political rituals organised by communists in the countries they govern therefore fulfil a function of strengthening and validating the political system: participation in the ritual introduces into a vision of the world of the masses an order consistent with ideology, helps that ideology to be accepted and organises activity in a direction consistent with it. Through mass participation in the ritual, whether forced or voluntary, be it through conformism or fear, an ideological creation of reality and a legitimisation of power are achieved. A characteristic of communist political ritual in its Polish version is the introduction of national elements. Fundamental orthodox communist ideology is anti-nationalistic, stressing instead class elements. However, the particularly turbulent history of Poland, full of heroic struggle for the independence and even the biological existence of the nation (inasmuch as it faced extermination during the Nazi occupation), meant that the good of the nation stood and still stands at the top of the Polish hierarchy of values, before peace, well-being or even religion. In view of this, the communists, in imposing their rule on Poland with the help of Soviet troops, decided against a systematic destruction of national values, and attempted instead to introduce them into the compass of their own ideological system. This process has manifested itself particularly clearly recently, after the arousal of aspirations to independence in the Solidarity period and the subsequent introduction of martial law.

Thus national symbols were introduced into communist political ritual, and appeared alongside class symbols and portraits of party and state leaders. This was ironically facilitated by formal similarity between the national flag and the flag of the Communist Party. In a hall or street decorated

7 I owe this point to Andrzej Flis (personal communication).
Figure 5: Eagle - Polish National Emblem 1927-1945

Figure 6: Eagle - Polish National Emblem since 1945
(Note the absence of the Crown as in Figure 5)
for the purpose of such a ritual, the colour red predominates, the white part of the national flag being less striking in relation to the red. The decision to retain unchanged the official national symbols (emblem, flag and national anthem) was motivated, it would seem, by a desire to exploit national ideology as an element strengthening communist ideology and contributing to the legitimisation of the new powers. The authorities, in using such symbols, were intended to be seen by society first as sovereign, independent of the USSR, and second as a native Polish power, coming from the nation, conscious of its links with that nation and working for its good. A change of official symbols would have confirmed the general intuitive feeling about the alien-ness of the communists as regards the nation, especially when considering the fact that after the Second World War the new state leaders arrived in Poland along with the Soviet army and de facto fulfilled the function of Soviet representatives. A strong argument in favour of such an interpretation is the particular form of the national emblem chosen by the communists, an eagle similar in appearance to the Piast eagle. Thus in Polish history every once in a while the memory is revived of the greatness of the Piasts, during whose rule Poland attained full state sovereignty and saw economic prosperity, and whose representatives, unlike the majority of later elected kings, were Polish. The Piast sovereign, therefore, was a symbol of a Polish sovereign. The Piast symbol represented first, a powerful and sovereign nation, and secondly, a nation ruled by Poles. The only change - and yet a fundamental one - introduced by the communists in the national symbols was to deprive the eagle of its crown. In the past, certain radical organisations had attempted to introduce just such a change, but had always stepped down in the face of resistance from the majority of society. This time, the communists used their absolute power to this end. They believed that removing the eagle's crown would symbolise the liberation of the Polish people from class hierarchy and the relics of feudalism. However, they ignored the important fact that the eagle's crown symbolised above all state sovereignty, that far back in history the eagle had been given a crown when the nation attained full independence. An eagle without a crown, then, was not just an egalitarian eagle but above all an eagle deprived of sovereignty. This too, it would seem, is the way society understand this symbol. In all opposition actions against the communists in which national symbols play a part, the eagle regains its crown. This does not signify nostalgia for pre-war times - it is not retrospection, longing for past greatness - but it looks forward, desiring to return political independence to the Polish people. Similar significance can apparently be attributed to the custom of veneration of royal tombs in Cracow Cathedral. This veneration signifies the desire to return sovereignty, symbolised in this context by certain kings known historically as powerful leaders of a great and free nation. The same veneration became customary in the case of the tomb of Marshal Piłsudski - a leader
of independent Poland in the period between the World Wars. School children used to decorate his tomb with their school emblems along with national symbols and red and white flowers.

Throughout the period of communist rule, national symbols have appeared, with varying degrees of intensity, in ritual situations organised by the state bureaucracy. Political meetings on the occasion of official public holidays, anniversaries or the condemnation of the 'enemies of socialism' are held in halls in which, alongside the red flag and busts or portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Marx, Engels and present leaders of the Communist parties of the USSR and Poland, there are also white-and-red flags and the national emblem, the Dąbrowski Mazurka being sung alongside the International. After the introduction of martial law, General Jaruzelski began his speech on radio and television with the words 'Poland has not yet perished', the opening words of the National Anthem. He emphasised then, and continues to emphasise, that martial law was introduced by the Polish army and that it was a sovereign Polish decision taken by the so-called 'Military Council for National Salvation' in order to save the nation. In this way, he was trying to exploit the positive attitude to the army traditional in Poland by saying that this time, as so often in history, the Polish army had fulfilled the role of saviour of the nation. The positive symbol of the army uniform was also used to calm rebelliousness. Even police patrolling the streets were often dressed in army uniforms, and television announcers also appeared in army uniforms when reading propaganda texts. This serves above all to draw attention to the symbolic meaning contained in the assertion that the Polish uniform signified the struggle for good and for the liberty of the nation. Jaruzelski even went so far as to bring back the characteristic military head-dress, the rogatywka, which was henceforth worn by the Guard of Honour. This head-dress had been banned after the Second World War as representing the 'bourgeois' army, but had remained in the popular consciousness as a symbol of a truly Polish uniform.

We can see, then, that the communist powers extensively and ably manipulate national symbols in the quest for legitimacy. But these symbols also play a leading role in the ritual of political opposition. Traditionally they are, as I have mentioned, associated with religious symbols. In times of relative social peace they appear in an opposition role, principally in churches. At moments of increased tension and open social protest they become visible on the streets, on the walls of houses and in public places generally, and on duplicated leaflets. National symbols appear here in a different function; being changed by appearing in different contexts, they no longer fulfil the role of strengthening and legitimising the political system, but on the contrary generate social emotions aimed against the unwanted authorities. In the context of opposition they first of all signify the polarisation of Polish society into, on the one hand the Polish nation, deprived of sovereignty and all political rights but vehemently demanding them, and on the other hand a
handful of communists possessed of the means of force and the support of the neighbouring power and ruling despite the wishes of the nation. Secondly, these symbols fulfil the function of integrating the nation, gathering together all its various sections on an ideological plane and uniting it in the struggle for sovereignty. And thirdly, they stir strong emotions, order them and turn them against the enemy, the political authorities.

Not without reason, then, they appear on every occasion of oppositional ritual, be it a mass meeting, a march, or a spontaneous gathering of people — for example, around a monument to fallen workers white-and-red flags appear, while the Dąbrowski Mazurka or 'Boże coś Polskę' is sung. Striking workers hang out national flags and wear white-and-red armbands to stress that in their protest it is a question of more than the particular interests of one or another group of workers. An attack by police units on a place of work on strike assumes the character of the storming of a bastion in which the nation is defending itself. The Solidarity union introduced a national flag into its own symbol, already designed in white and red. The 'Solidarity' sign takes the form of lettering in which the characters are styled to resemble a marching crowd with flag raised. After the introduction of martial law and the suspension and subsequent disbanding of Solidarity this sign was banned, and so instead people began to wear badges of a similar graphic design but of usually religious content. On walls there appeared the sign of Fighting Solidarity, recalling the symbol of the anchor — representing hope and the struggle for liberty. The monument to workers who died in Gdańsk at the hands of the police, built as a result of social pressure during the Solidarity period, takes the form of three crosses linked with three anchors — a symbol of faith and hope.

During and after martial law, as always during periods of the intensification of repression, the church became a centre for the organisation of political ritual. National ideas and symbols are present at the majority of services, and from time to time exhibitions are organised at which national and religious symbols are put on show in the context of political opposition. A good example of this was the crib organised during Christmas 1984 in a church in Nowa Huta. The centre was formed by an altar with Our Lady of Częstochowa against a white-and-red background. Alongside was a photograph of the Pope wearing a tragic, suffering expression. All around were candles wrapped in white-and-red sashes, the anchors of Fighting Poland and Fighting Solidarity, patriotic inscriptions centring on the words Poland, Nation, and Solidarity. An important element in this crib was the analogy with the homage of the Three Kings, where instead of the Kings there were three policemen dragging the body of a priest to the feet of the new-born Christ. This is a reference to the murder of Father Popiełuszko, the chaplain of Solidarity, by three officials of the secret police. The whole crib is a condensed, multi-elemental, politico-religious symbol of the struggle with communism.
While on the subject of the functioning of national symbols in the context of the opposition, a theoretical observation emerges connected with the various conceptions of the 'opposition-ness' of the use of symbols in democratic and totalitarian societies. In the above-mentioned study of flags, Firth asserts that in democratic societies the use of symbols by the opposition involves their desecration, their destruction or their being treated in a way recognised as humiliating, in any case violating their function as symbols of national solidarity, unity and permanence. It appears that the essence of the matter is that in democratic societies the opposition may be opposed to the state of society, its structure, its organisation and so on, and not just towards a particular group of leaders. As a result, the opposition may desecrate national symbols, which for them are symbols of what they would like to change. In totalitarian societies, on the other hand, the protest is levelled at the group of leaders who are ruling against the wishes of the nation as a whole, which is represented by national symbols. These symbols serve to distinguish the positively valued society from the negatively valued authorities; they represent solidarity and national permanence, and at the same time symbolise the opposition between nation and rulers. Therefore, national symbols, constituting for the nation sacred objects, are treated in opposition ritual with complete respect and veneration. Paying them homage represents a cult of national values, in opposition to the communist ideology which is the property of the authorities. Thus in Poland there is not the slightest indication of contempt for or animosity to national symbols. Their use by the authorities is treated as usurpation, and they themselves are the property of the nation.

Of course, the exponents of power see the dangers arising from the use of national symbols in opposition situations, and do not intend to tolerate it, for it is a feature of communist ideology to exclude any alternatives, since the existence of alternative, rival rituals would impair the legitimacy of the authorities, based exclusively on ideology and on the myth of its being universally accepted by society. The assuring of a monopoly in the sphere of political ritual has therefore become one of the principal subjects of concern for the authorities. This manifests itself through legal action and through the exploitation of conformism. The monopolization of national symbols is one of the means to this end; it is a question of the leaders having the exclusive freedom to decide where, when, by whom and in what situations national symbols may be used. The first step here was the decree of 1955 introducing fines or imprisonment for up to a year for illegal use of the emblem and colours of the Polish People's Republic. In the 1970s, along with the intensification of opposition political activity involving wide use of national symbolism, there was also an increase in the activities of the authorities in the direction of monopolization. In 1976, an amendment was introduced into the Constitution of the Polish People's Republic banning the use of national symbols in a way
incompatible with the intentions of the legislators. The use of the flag or the emblem or the singing of the National Anthem without the approval of the authorities had become a crime. This law was reinforced by a decree issued during martial law banning the use of all unregistered symbols (including, for example, the Solidarity badge). On the other hand, there exists a decree ordering the decoration of streets and even of private houses with national flags on the occasion of public holidays and other celebrations dictated by the authorities. A refusal to take part in this ritual also entails a fine. Of course, as I have mentioned, the purpose of all these decrees is not to secure respect for symbols, for no one in Poland seeks to abuse them. It is simply a question of the authorities assuring a monopoly of their use.

Thus, briefly, we may characterize the role of national symbols in Polish political ritual. They are an element in a very active political battle and at the same time contribute to the assurance of national permanence and unity, representing the values dearest to the nation. In this way, national symbols are not just a sign of belonging to a nation, nor just the object of a patriotic cult; they are alive as a central element in the most crucial social processes in Poland, ordering the thinking of great masses of people and fundamentally influencing their actions.
A NOTE ON A DURKHEIMIAN CRITIC OF MARX:
THE CASE OF GASTON RICHARD

'Of all the criticisms which Richard addresses to Marx, the strongest seems to me that which limits itself to placing in relief the gap which separates the fundamental proposition of the system and the observations on which it rests.'

E. Durkheim (1897)

Among the members of the Durkheimian School, Gaston Richard was the only writer who wrote extensively on socialism and historical materialism (1894; 1903a; 1903b; 1909; 1910; 1912; 1914, for the pre-war period). In this long list of publications, the discussion of these topics did not always play the central role, but socialism and/or historical materialism were worthy, though often distorted contenders. It is reasonable to assume that Richard's early interest in Marxism was not altogether stamped out by his association with Durkheim; after all, Richard accepted only in part the theoretical framework of Durkheim, and he was always a maverick in the Année Sociologique group.

Richard, who chronologically was Durkheim's peer, began to show an interest in Marxism at a very early stage in his academic career. In a long review article published in 1894, he tried to demolish Engels' The Origins of the Family (which had only appeared recently in a French translation), alleging that the book was not constructed on the basis of a scientific method. The main thrust of his argument revolved around a critique of Engels' use of ethnographic materials to reconstruct prehistoric societies. More specifically, he maintained that the social and cultural institutions of the Iroquois could not be used to provide us with the missing link of the type of social organization preceding the Greek, Roman and Celtic gens. Richard asked himself whether Engels' proofs were based on scientific induction or on vague analogies, since if sociology was to become a...
positive science, with a status equal to that of experimental psychology or biology, it could not be based on subjectivism, faith or a philosophy of history. Engels' method was not scientific, concluded Richard, because he arbitrarily substituted ethnographic documents for historical ones, the study of lower societies for that of the distant past of mankind. There should be two different though complementary sciences: history and ethnography. Only when the construction of both disciplines had been achieved could one think of bringing them together for comparative purposes. The final conclusion drawn by Richard was that the so-called 'materialist theory of history' lacked the true requisites of a positive social science.

Of course, Richard was only voicing some of the criticisms against evolutionism that were being put forward at the time. He was partly right, but the question is too complex to be discussed here. On the other hand, on the basis of Engels' book he projected the same criticisms onto Morgan and Marx. He was eager to point out logical inconsistencies in Marxism, but his arguments are often superficial. For example, he blows out of proportion the analogy between the bourgeois/proletariat relation and the husband/wife relation because, he says, the husband provides for the wife - but if the comparison were to hold the wife should be providing for the husband. Of course, he is apparently forgetting two things, namely female labour outside the household and domestic labour. When he ventures any sort of alternative explanation to Engels' theories, as in the case of the position of women in Ancient Greece, he emphasizes a rather legalistic conception of history, which can be explained by his own background (his doctoral thesis, published in 1892, was entitled De l'Origine de l'Idée de Droit). In spite of all these criticisms, it is fair to say that Richard's review shows a certain familiarity with the ethnographic materials and it is based on a detailed consideration of Engels' book.

*Le socialisme et la science sociale*, published in 1897, is Richard's major contribution to the study of historical materialism and socialism. The book was successful both in France and abroad, to the extent that by 1899 a second edition was required. It was widely reviewed - among others by Lafargue (1896), Durkheim (1897) and Simiand (1898) - its reception being mixed, following basically political lines. It would not be an exaggeration to say that *Le socialisme* became for a short, though decisive period, one of the anti-socialist Bibles - though Richard and his sympathisers (including Durkheim) maintained that it was an objective and scientific study. I have discussed elsewhere (Llobera 1981: 230-2) the paramount conclusions that Durkheim extracted from the book, i.e., that Marxism is not a science, and that there is a 'gap which separates the fundamental propositions of the system and the observations on which it rests' (Durkheim 1897: 138).

The book is constructed on the assumption that the doctrines of Marx and Engels constitute the essence of modern socialism, and hence Richard dedicates little space to previous socialist
writers. As a conception of history Marxism is equated with 'economic materialism', and an attempt is made to refute its claims to scientficity. Marxism aims at explaining a great variety of facts, from the domestication of animals in pre-historic times to the establishment of the International in the present day. It is basically a naturalistic and deterministic theory, which tries to put forward a general law allowing us to deduce the social facts of the future from those of the past, a conception of history in which the role of the individual is rather limited. Richard also pointed out that the practical conclusions drawn by Marx and Engels are invalidated by the fact that they are prior to their theoretical studies; in other words, their socialism preceded their conception of history.

On the basis of an examination of Capital I and other works of Marx and Engels, Richard put forward the following points:

1) Marx's theory is not original; it owes a lot to his predecessors and particularly to Proudhon (for the critique of the theory of value), Lasalle (for the iron law of wages), List and Rochser (for the idea of a self-propelling economic process), Morgan (for the analogy between the communism of the North American tribes and that of the prehistoric ancestors of civilized humanity) and Hegel (for the idea of necessary return to the starting point, which for Marx was not the Geist, but communism). In conclusion, the elements had been laid down by his predecessors; Marx's sole task was to produce the synthesis.

2) The outstanding contribution of Marx is to have reduced all problems of modern society to the question of the nature and formation of capital. However, the two proofs that Marx provided to explain capital accumulation by surplus labour or surplus value, the one abstract and deductive (the labour theory of value), the other analogical (surplus labour is a hidden and intensified form of corvée labour), are both shown to be wrong. On the one hand, Richard maintained that the profits of capital do not originate in the surplus labour of the worker, but in the co-operation introduced by capitalism; on the other, he emphasized the non-economic aspects of the evolution of Western civilization, concluding that the wage labourer is not the descendant of the medieval serf, but of the 'guilded' craftsman.

3) Marx's use of the comparative method is defective because he does not distinguish social types. For him, evolution is seen as a series of moments which succeed each other, here a bit early and there a bit late, but without any major variation. Marx fails to see that variation and adaptation to different environments are the very features of a scientific evolutionary theory. Instead of using observation and comparison, Marx engages in premature abstraction, as is the case when he uses England as lieu classique to illustrate his theory and then generalizes from the English experience to other parts of Europe.

4) Marx's materialism is unvarnished; ideas are purely a consequence of the economy. Historical development is uniformly dominated by economic materialism. History can be explained only by reference to the material needs of human beings. These
determine the mode of production and exchange, which in turn reflect themselves in the legal and political system.

It is hardly surprising that the socialist establishment reacted quite negatively to Richard's book. Lafargue's invectives and sarcasms characterised his review article published in Sorel's journal *Le Devenir Social*. Durkheim's review was rather neutral, without attempting to correct any of the multiple blunders which Richard incurred in his interpretation of Marx's theory and particularly of *Capital I*. This only suggests either that Durkheim was not aware of the misreadings, or that he decided to keep them to himself. From a scientific point of view, either alternative is dismal. Even Richard himself was aware of the limitations of his book. Two years after its publication, and in a letter (which I have recently discovered) addressed to his intellectual mentor Emile Boutroux, Richard admitted that his work was superficial and surmised that this might explain its success. Of course, a perceptive spirit such as that of F. Simiand could not miss the weaknesses of Richard's book. (The fact that his review was published in the first issue of *l'Année Sociologique* confirms Besnard's idea (1983) that, at the beginning, the Durkheimians were not a close-knit group.) Simiand emphasized the fact that Richard's discussion of 'economic materialism' was far from thorough, and that consequently he failed to confront its philosophical principles. Simiand also objected to a number of Richard's misinterpretations of *Capital I*, and in particular to Richard's suggestion that Marx favoured the analogy between serf and wage-labourer and reduced the transition from feudalism to capitalism to a purely economic matter. As for the question of using England as a classical example for the development of capitalism, Simiand indicated that Richard failed to see the distinction between history and theory. In his *Preface* to the first edition of *Capital I*, Marx had already foreseen this problem when he said that he was dealing not with England but with the capitalist mode of production, the former being only the classic ground where the latter had developed; and he added that in the social sciences the force of abstraction was the appropriate scientific approach. With hindsight it would be possible to demolish Richard's presentation of Marx's ideas. But I have limited myself to what an informed reader of that time - Simiand - could have already perceived. Richard mentioned neither Sorel nor Labriola, and had he been familiar with these authors he might have avoided the mistake of taking the works of Ferri and Loria as expositions of the Marxist doctrine.

Between the publication of his *magnum opus* on socialism and the time of his break with the Durkheimian School around 1907, Richard published relatively little on Marxism. In his *L'idée d'évolution dans la nature et dans l'histoire*, published in 1903, he repeated some of his early stereotypes on Marx and Engels, emphasizing, for example, that 'economic materialism' was a monist conception of history in which the primacy was given to
production. In approaching the problem of theories of revolution, he concluded that the idea of class struggle was one of the two sociological explanations available, though he personally found more convincing Jhering's 'legal struggle' theory. He was prepared to accept, however, that a synthesis was possible, and he quoted approvingly Gumplovicz's idea that both theses were not incompatible. More interesting from our point of view is his *Notions élémentaires de sociologie*, published the same year, and reprinted at least twice before 1910. This book is a sort of sociology primer, and it is interesting to see that, in contrast to his 1912 book, he did not consider Marx as one of the authors who had contributed to the development of sociology. He referred to socialism as a premature attempt to develop an applied sociology, and as one of the reasons why our discipline was so discredited.

His book *La femme dans l'histoire*, published in 1909, provided Richard with an opportunity to criticize Engels as a representative of the naturalist theories that, in their attempt to explain the transition from mother-right to father-right, had ignored collective consciousness and had relied exclusively on external factors - or, more precisely in Engel's case, on the transformation of production. Richard went to great pains to provide an alternative theory based on the importance of religious and moral beliefs. He suggested that the transition from matriarchy to patriarchy is always associated with the appearance of ancestor cults. He based his demonstration on the fact that all transitional societies can be characterised by the presence of those cults, and that one can observe how these cults modify mother-right in favour of father-right. The supposed historic defeat of woman is in part a dramatic effect created by Engels; women never had much power and in any case lost it very gradually.

In 1910 Richard contributed to a collective book on the topic of morality and the social question. In his paper he made use of the famous letter that Marx sent to Mikhailovsky in 1877, but which was not published till 1888. In this letter Marx objected to any attempt to transform his 'historical sketch of the genesis of capitalism in Western Europe into an historio-philosophical theory of the general path every people is fated to tread'. Now Richard interpreted this passage as meaning that Marx had renounced his scientific theory in favour of a political stand, and he praised his moral fibre, so rare those days among socialists.

I have already mentioned that in his major sociological treatise, *La sociologie générale et les lois sociologiques* (1912), Richard considered Marxism ('economic determinism') as one of the three major existing sociological theories, along with consensus theory and the theory of social forms. He dedicated a full chapter to the examination of the basic assumption of the theory of 'economic determinism'. At the beginning of the chapter he nuanced some of his early formulations on the subject, suggesting for example that the materialist conception of history
was independent of any metaphysical materialism. Having come across some of the letters written by Engels in the last few years of his life, Richard accepted that 'economic determinism' did not exclude interaction between the different spheres of society - thus economic causality was decisive but not exclusive. Unfortunately, most of the chapter is focused on the objective of debunking the idea of economic law in many of the early economists. The major thrust against historical materialism is not through a detailed examination of the works of the founding parents, but on the basis of Stammler's *Wirtschaft und Recht nach der materialistischen Geschichtsauffassung* of 1906, which tried to demonstrate the importance of legal factors in history.

Against 'economic determinism', which considers the legal system as a product of social co-operation, Richard can say with Stammler that it is not a result of, but a factor contributing to, the development of co-operation. The use of Stammler's book for the reconstruction of historical materialism is as unfortunate as the use of Loria and Ferri. It is a pity that Richard was never aware of Weber's critique of Stammler (published in 1907) - he might have found him less reliable (Weber 1977).

In his last book published prior to the war, *La question sociale et le mouvement philosophique au XIXe siècle* (1914), 'scientific socialism' is subjected to the same barrage of criticism that we have seen up to now, namely lack of originality, reductionism, not meeting the canons of science, etc. Richard concludes that historical materialism, or any other naturalist and objectivist sociology for that matter, cannot tell us how the future will be. Scientific socialism is an impossible dream. The only correct attitude towards the social question is the reformist one which will bring change through social legislation and will be the work not of violent socialist parties, but of enlightened minorities.

In conclusion, Gaston Richard's presentation of historical materialism was simplistic and occasionally even grotesque, though in his later writings showing a better understanding of some of the Marxist standpoints. Today his name is only known to a few specialists (Pickering 1975: 1979), after having been condemned to the 'dustbin of history' for daring to rebel against the Durkheimian School. And yet his book *Le socialisme et la science sociale* was Durkheim's main source of inspiration in effecting his devastating 'refutation' and rejection of Marx's historical materialism (Llobera 1981).
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TWO ANTHROPOLOGISTS—THE SAME INFORMANT:
SOME DIFFERENCES IN THEIR RECORDED DATA

In mid-summer 1924, Dr Elsie Clews Parsons 'invited' me to make a field trip for the Southwest Society to study the Laguna split-off to Isleta. 'The idea,' she wrote,

came to me in connection with you this month while I was making some very interesting comparisons between Northern Tewa and their split off two hundred years ago to first mesa. I have almost decided to go down for a month, Nov.-Dec. to the Northern Tewa... How about it? But even if I didn't go, why not you? Leave behind a good nurse,

and she concluded, with a completely unwarranted optimism, 'and everybody will profit.'

This article was presented as a paper at the Annual Meeting of the AAA in Washington D.C. in December 1982. It was written to satisfy the request of the chairman of the session somewhat cryptically entitled Women Emerita. As a subscribing member of the AAA since 1922, I am still not sure what this title meant. I did, however, feel that my work in Isleta in 1924 and Dr Parsons' in 1925 with the same informant did pose interesting problems and suggested interesting answers. Because of illness I was unable to be present at the meeting, but I was told that the standing-room-only audience applauded with unusual gusto at the close. My paper, which was the last to be scheduled, was read by Professor Gloria Levitas, who edited my Notes On An Undirected Life—As One Anthropologist Tells It.
In December 1922 I had married Walter Goldfrank who, most comfortably for me, had fathered three sons, then aged six, nine and twelve. Our daughter was entering her fourth month when Dr Parsons' letter arrived. With my advancing domesticity, I had put anthropology on the shelf. We were now living in the suburbs, and since moving there, I had seen virtually nothing of the anthropologists - not even Dr Boas, whom I had served, if you can call it that, as secretary from October 1919 to August 1922 - and whom I had accompanied in 1920, 1921 and 1922 on three short field trips to Laguna and Cochiti pueblos; the first of these had been shared by Dr Parsons and Grant LaFarge on their way from Zuni to Albuquerque, which was also our final stop-over.

My husband, most generously, seconded Dr Parsons' suggestion, and in November I left for Isleta. In my Notes on An Undirected Life (1978) I tell of the frustrations I suffered there and my good luck, after a week of rejections, in finding one Isletan man willing to be seriously interviewed by me. But a night of unwelcome interruptions persuaded him to continue our talks in Albuquerque, some eight or ten miles away. There he lived with friends and worked with me in my hotel room for some two weeks - and usually for three sessions a day.

I was certainly lucky - how lucky I did not realize at the time. I had not read Dr Parsons' 'Acoma, Isleta and Santa Ana' (1920), nor her 'Further Notes on Isleta' (1921), most probably because they did not deal with 'my' pueblos. Nor had she mentioned them in our few and far-between contacts. In either case I would certainly have been better prepared for the difficulties I encountered in Isleta.

In her 1920 paper - the information on Isleta was collected in 1919 - Dr Parsons' opening sentence reads: 'The following data were got during a stay at Laguna', and she continues: 'On Isleta, my informant was a Laguna man...whose family had moved to Isleta and who had grown up and married there.' And she leaves it at that. The opening sentence of her second paragraph reads: 'The clans (daatinit) of Isleta are Day (tí), Bear, Lizard, Eagle, Chaparral Cock, Parrot, Goose, Corn', and she adds: 'The clans are matrilineal and exogamous' (pp. 56f.). In her 1921 paper, the opening sentence reads: 'The following notes were made during a brief visit to Isleta and at interviews with an Isleta woman at Albuquerque, in a hotel room, safe from observation.' But despite the fact that this informant 'spoke English in the vernacular...dressed as an American, and had worked for years in Albuquerque', she 'resisted all endeavours to learn from her not only words of ceremonial import but clan names or the native name for the town.' And it was in this 1921 paper that she again listed the clan names she had recorded in 1919 along with those noted earlier by Bandelier and Lummi's.

Seemingly, in asking me to work along similar lines (in her 1920 paper, she was fully cognizant of the Laguna split-off to Isleta), Dr Parsons must have believed that naivete and ignorance might, by some good fortune, succeed in eliciting the types of information she had been denied—and this despite her broad
experience and knowledge of Pueblo social and ceremonial life. But my ignorance had one advantage. I did not question the validity of the information given me by Juan Abeita (Dr Parsons' pseudonym for him in her *Isleta, New Mexico*, of 1932). I just wrote and wrote. In Isleta, Abeita had concentrated on myths, but in Albuquerque — and much to my delight — he had no hesitation in discussing aspects of the social and ceremonial organization of his native village.

Almost sixty years have passed since I returned from Isleta. Not too surprisingly, my hand-written notes have disappeared and, in the typed-up notes still in my possession, the entries are not dated, so I do not know the order in which they were obtained. However, among the topics on which Abeita gave information were the Isleta corn groups, which he frequently referred to as 'clans', the moieties (*shifun* and *shure*), medicine societies, birth, marriage and death — enough to indicate here the breadth of the subjects he raised and why, given the limitations of time, I was not impelled to question what he said or inject comparisons with what I knew regarding analogues from my fieldwork elsewhere.

Dr Parsons did not come to the Southwest while I was there, but as soon as I had typed up my notes I sent her a copy. And the following November she did go Isleta. On the 27th of that month she wrote to me:

Dear Esther:
I stopped off at Albuquerque and motored to Isleta and within ten minutes kidnapped [Abeita] without his daughter who had to stay to care for the grandfather. [She then took him to Taos where he had spent his young years] for a week's visit to relatives and detective work I hope. A word about [Abeita] as informant. He is frank enough; but of accuracy he has no sense whatever.... He has a very striking imaginative turn of mind, something I have never seen before in a Pueblo Indian. Of course how much is cultural and how much personal it is difficult to decide.... It is tempting to think that we have here a blend of Plains and Pueblo. [She concluded:] In view of [Abeita's] psychological make-up our joint notes are bound to show many discrepancies.... Within a week I will send you a more detailed report. [Signed] E.C.P.

Although Dr Parsons no doubt intended to write to me again 'within a week', it would seem that she held up this letter to include in it a little over a page of comments. At the top of the first page she wrote the single word 'Clanship', and under it: 'There are 7 matrilineal groups, unconcerned with marriage.' Then one beneath the other she listed them along with the direction with which each was affiliated, viz.: '1. White Corn-East; 2. Black Corn-North; 3. Yellow Corn-West; 4. Blue Corn-South; 5. All Colors Corn-Zenith and Nadir'— and rising at an angle and in handwriting, 'as actual as any other group'; then
again beneath this entry, '6. Sichu, a split off from All Colors about 30 years ago.' And finally, '7. Eagle and Goose, 2 alternating groups which split off from All Colors in 1923.' (This repeated the list given in her 1921 article.) Parsons then noted:

These seven groups have solstice ceremonies, White Corn which come[s] one day ahead of the others, Sichu, one day behind. Individuals appeal to their own matrilineal group chief in connection with their personal ritual, child birth, curing, burial. These groups do not have particular functions as you indicate (Yellow—growth of corn, etc. in charge of summer solstice; Blue—pregnancy; Black, death; All Colors cazique. I consider that these groups are not clans in the Pueblo sense, but ceremonial organizations to which children are given with the rule that they follow the mother's group, quite analogous to the rule alternating the children of a family between the shifun and shure.

In an undated response I wrote to Dr Parsons:

I got your letter some days ago.... I was not surprised to learn that the corn mothers and clan heads were one person, but it seems surprising to me that the functions he [Abeita] so clearly outlined do not adhere to them. He had said to me that in matters of birth, death, etc., the person desiring aid would approach their own clan mother first, but that he in turn would call upon the one whose affair it was to function. In regard to the clan of all colors, is it true that officials are adopted into it, and then give up their former affiliations with the other corn divisions? He also said that the cacique's wife was adopted into this division. She functions at cures. I did not inquire about the wives of other officials. You say it is a real division. Did you investigate whether the members of it could trace their descent from some official, past or present, in the village?

With respect to the two Isleta medicine societies, Town Fathers and Laguna Fathers, I wrote:

The division of medicine men into Laguna and Isleta, I also got. I enquired a bit into the Laguna division and was told that the oldest member was a Laguna man [this refers to the group that emigrated from Laguna in 1879 and settled in Isleta, maintaining their separate identity, but as I soon found out, sharing their activities and sometimes even retaining their previous identity] but that the ranks had been filled with Isletans, so I imagined this had originally been a real Laguna group.
In regard to the Isleta group of medicine societies I am not altogether surprised. It was not the natural thing to think of them in the groupings he gave me, but he gave it over so many times that I thought them correct. In your 1919 list you have duck or goose. Do you believe that originally these were divisions under the corns? He never mentioned a split-off to me, nor have I any note on your last division [Sichu].

My first paragraph on my Isleta data reads:

In regard to the informant and the question of ceremonial pattern. It would seem that anyone so full of detail would be bound to mix-up sequence. However, the question I should think most important would be whether or not certain formulas appear in the ritual rather than the order in which they are used. The association of a person in the form of the sun, Lake Youth, Salt Youth, etc., I don't think so very novel, and the fact that people may impersonate these beings is certainly borne out by the kachina dances. In regard to the deer ceremonial before hunting, he is probably confusing an impersonation with the actual appearance of the deer, although he himself is convinced it is a real animal.

I concluded with what, after these many decades, seems unusually presumptuous coming, as it did, from an ex-secretary with limited field experience to an anthropologist some twenty years her senior whose scientific work was esteemed by the numerous eminent anthropologists with whom she had been cooperating closely for years, who in addition had taught at the New School for Social Research, and who for years had edited the *Journal of American Folklore*. But obviously undaunted by this history and encouraged by Dr Parsons' conviction that, whatever my failings, I should feel free to speak out frankly, I did. To this already controversial letter, I added a list of some twenty items which was headed, without any adornments, by the simple sentence: 'The following details I would like checked.' And though it may be hard to believe, Dr Parsons mailed these three pages of questions and comments back to me, and in the margins alongside fifteen of them, she had written her responses.

Here I only cite my first question and Dr Parsons' responses. I wrote: 'Do the corn mothers not officiating, act as helpers to the one who is—or has he his special trained helpers?' Alongside in the left margin, Dr Parsons wrote: 'Each corn mother has his own helpers.' And in the right margin she wrote: 'no, corn mothers do not act together.' My comment continued: 'I asked this question, but could not be sure of the answers. If the informant could be persuaded to give the Spanish names of the incumbents, it would be easy to determine.' To this suggestion, which underlined my wishful thinking more than my astuteness, she made no comment. But as soon as her field notes were typed up,
she sent me a complete copy. Unfortunately, not long afterward she asked me to return the whole of it since it was her only one. This I did, and since xeroxing was still a not commonly available technique, without making a copy for myself. Only when her Isleta, New Mexico appeared some seven years later did I have a reliable basis for a comparison of my notes and hers.

It is of interest that Dr Parsons had no hesitation in questioning data given her on Isleta clanship in 1919 by a Laguna man married to an Isleta woman and a year later by an Isleta woman employed in Albuquerque. In the 1921 article she had written: 'It was impossible for me to verify my earlier list of clans or the similar lists made by Bandelier and Lummis.... Informants stated most positively that they did not have clans... of that kind at Isleta.' Then she listed four 'divisions' given her in Albuquerque 'that are theoretically oriented and associated with corn of different colors', to wit: white corn, east; black corn, north; yellow corn, west; blue corn, south. She added also corn of all colors, nadir and zenith, but noted that in the case of this last there were no social divisions to correspond to these directions. She also added: 'My informant appeared to think that marriage was allowed within these divisions, but she could cite only one such endogamous marriage' - in the white corn group, 'on the part of the leading man...!' (pp. 153-4).

As already stated, Dr Parsons had written to me on 27th November, 1925—almost surely after she had read my undated letter to her: 'I consider these are not clans in the Pueblo sense...' (see above); and in her Isleta, New Mexico she wrote:

These groups are... all inclusive; everybody belongs to one of the seven. Theoretically he or she belongs to his mother's group, but not merely from birth:...he or she has to be adopted ritually into the group. [A] group, not the mother's, may be selected for the child by the parents...(p. 269).

Intrigued by the many differences in our notes, I almost immediately made a comparison of the variants of ten folktales given to Dr Parsons and myself (Goldfrank 1926: 71-4), and I concluded: 'The story-teller is not bound to retell the tale as he heard it, but has the pleasure of revamping it.' It may not be irrelevant here to mention that Professor Barbara Babcock of the University of Arizona—who is well-acquainted with Helen Cordero, the outstanding potter in Cochiti, particularly famous for her 'story-teller'—told me recently that Cordero had said it was her grandfather's ability to vary the details in retelling a story that had made him so interesting to listen to.

Dr Parsons liked this paper, but after some thought of publishing our complete data jointly, she opted for separate presentations. Hers was given in Isleta, New Mexico (pp. 200-466), and what she said there was quite similar to the points she had made in response to those I had raised in my undated letter
to her while she was still in the field (see above). But except for a most generous recognition of my labours in Isleta and the problematic character of our single informant, she made no reference to my data nor to our differences. My notes just rested on the bookshelf, but I did give typed copies to a number of anthropologists in the hope that they or students under their guidance would utilize them in their classrooms or in the field. And some have done just that.

At this point, I would like to add a few footnotes to document the value of follow-up studies on the structure and changes in the history of even such small complexes as Isleta—virtually unnoticed except by anthropologists, local traders, and, at widely separated times, by U.S. government officials.

I do not know whether Dr Parsons returned to Isleta after 1925, when most of her time was spent with our shared informant in Taos country. As already noted, it would seem that her *Isleta, New Mexico* was based virtually entirely on her 1925 researches. The same can be said of the short chapter on Isleta in her *Pueblo Indian Religion* (1939: 923-32), except for the inclusion of certain citations and, most interesting for my present purpose, the third footnote on page 928, elaborating on a statement underlining the peaceable character of Isleta's Town Chief. This reads: 'And yet in a recently acquired picture he is represented holding a bow and arrow' (see Parsons 1962: 171, picture 79). In so far as I know, and vague though it is, this is the first reference in print to the paintings Dr Parsons, at the suggestion of W. Matthew Stirling, then head of the Bureau of American Ethnology, had begun to buy in June 1936 for $5.00 each from an unusually talented Isletan artist. And her reticence on this arrangement is also evidenced by a remark she made to me in the spring of 1940 after dinner at her New York house to which Professors Wittfogel and Duncan Strong had also been invited. Turning to me she said, without any preamble: 'Esther, you were certainly a good sport to turn over your Isleta notes to me.' But she gave no hint then that she had been receiving a substantial number of paintings from this Isletan artist. Only after her death in December 1941 did I learn from Gladys Reichard, her literary executor, that along with these more than 140 paintings, Dr Parsons had completed a sizeable manuscript—a long introduction recapitulating much of what she had published previously on Isleta, her correspondence with the Bureau, and certain of the artist's statements (some of which he had written on his paintings in pencil) contradicting data given to us by our joint Isletan informant—surely a unique contribution to Pueblo ethnological research.

When Gladys told me about this manuscript, she had added that it was dedicated to me and Julian H. Steward, 'to whom I owe the opening of Isleta.' Years later, as already noted, I learned that it was Mat Stirling who had first written to Dr Parsons about the artist—and also years later, Julian told me he had
never been in Isleta. Manifestly, memory can mislead even a highly experienced recorder.

For years Gladys had been trying to get financial help for publishing this important manuscript. And it was 1953 before I saw the pictures which Dr Parsons' family had, in 1949, turned over to the American Philosophical Society to be filed with her other papers. Alone in their stacks, I looked at each and every one of them. It was an experience never to be forgotten. And it was nine more years before the BAE distributed this unusual manuscript along with 140 of the artist's paintings, some twelve of them in colour, thanks to the generosity of the Bollingen Foundation (see Parsons 1962).

Two years after *Isleta Paintings* was published I learned that the artist had died in 1953. In 1936 he had written to the BAE: 'I don't want any soul to know as long as I live that I have drawn these pictures.' And, of course, as Editor, I had kept faith. But in 1964 I felt the situation had changed. The artist had been dead for over a decade, and it is clear from his 1936 letter that, except for himself, he had not sought to protect anyone else in Isleta or elsewhere. Having learned of his death I felt it was only just that this unusually talented Isletan be identified and recognized for his unique contribution as artist and commentator on the social and ceremonial life of his village.

In 1967, the Smithsonian Institution published *The Artist of Isleta Paintings in Pueblo Society*, which, along with my Introduction, contained many of the artist's signed letters to Dr Parsons, along with her *Who's Who of Isleta*, to which a few items from *Isleta Paintings* were now added. I had refrained from including this item in the 1962 publication because I feared it might inadvertently lead to the identification of the artist, but in 1964, after learning of his death, I saw no reasons to withhold it any longer.

Both *Isleta Paintings* and *The Artist*...have been recognized as exceptional contributions to our knowledge of Isleta, and this not only from individuals directly connected with the Smithsonian Institution. It is enough here to cite from Edward P. Dozier's review of *Isleta Paintings* in *American Anthropologist* (1963). Part Pueblo Indian raised in a Pueblo village and long-time professor of anthropology at the University of Arizona, he wrote:

*Isleta Paintings* represents the only pictorial ethnographic account of Pueblo ceremonial life executed entirely by a native artist. It is unlikely there will ever be another collection quite like it, for Pueblo Indians who are...artists are rare. Perhaps most unlikely is the possibility that another native Pueblo artist will have the courage to venture on a project of painting ceremonial activities.

And Alfonso Ortiz, like Ed Dozier raised in an Indian Pueblo, and then at Princeton University, deplored, in his review of *The Artist of Isleta Paintings in Pueblo Society* (1968: 839), the
thinness of my data - that 'very little information is given of Lente's early life and even less of the dozen or so years by which he survived Parsons'. Nevertheless, he 'congratulated' me for my 'dedication' and 'labors' in editing both *Isleta Paintings* and *The Artist*, and he concluded: 'In Lente we had not only a talented artist but a resourceful and perceptive observer', whose paintings and letters, taken together, 'provide rich ethnographic fare'. In neither case was there any indication that I had sinned in naming the Leonardo da Vinci of Isleta Pueblo.

I can mention only two other Isleta follow-up studies here. The first is David H. French's *Factionalism in Isleta Pueblo* (1948). His account begins in 1870, when the Indian Agency in Albuquerque was officially established. In important ways he confirms data included in Parsons 1932, but he goes much further in underlining frictions created by the Agency's quick appointment of a governor and by a long statement by the 'big man' of the Pueblo protesting against the appointment in 1921 of a judge who, like the governor, took over duties regularly performed by village officials. And French notes that factionalism also developed with respect to hierarchical succession, most particularly in the case of the cacique, and because the long period between his nomination and accession might be disrupted by death, illness or claims of unfitness.

French concludes that in the not-too-distant past 'there was factionalism', but at these times the leaders 'were always able to agree, though not immediately'. But he also states that 'the influence of White culture has changed the attitudes of the leaders and the common people. The identification with the village and dependence on the village has decreased.' He gives much more, but this should be sufficient to underline present but not entirely new trends.

The second follow-up study I want to mention was made some forty years after I and Dr Parsons investigated Isleta society. Intermittently, from 1967 or 1968, sometimes together, sometimes separately, M. Estellie Smith and William Leap studied aspects of this pueblo. Smith's work was ethnographically oriented, Leap's more linguistic, but both touched on aspects that Dr Parsons and I had reported on. Among them, and in tapes sent me recently by Dr Leap, exogamy is clearly indicated for the 'corn groups' or 'clans', which terms, as in our time, were still used with easy exchangability, and with the understanding that these were exogamous units. And also, as with us, the naming process exhibited variations. Yet, as Dr Parsons noted, the woman who gives the new-born child its name was preferable the mother's sister.

In this same recent letter, Leap also comments on the differences between the recordings made by Dr Parsons and myself concerning the functions of the headmen of the corn groups. Leap notes that on the tapes he sent me, the informant followed the Parsons line, but he also found that what I was told 'is a very accurate parallel of what our informants told us in 1968-70'. He then continued:
If so, and this is an important point - if he deliberately was not hiding facts about ceremonies, why would he deliberately distort facts about corn group ceremonies? Hence I do not think he was lying to you. So what was he doing? What could explain the difference, your data from Parsons?

1) Linguistic problems. He did not understand your question.
2) Pueblo theory of knowledge which says you know only certain things, and are less sure about other things....
3) Actual change in the system, and both reports are accurate.

Is there any way the BOTH explanations could be correct?

Without further data, I am willing to say that, on the basis of French's monograph, both explanations could be correct.

ESTHER S. GOLDFRANK

[Editors' Note: A recent biography of Elsie Clews Parsons is reviewed on p. 68 of this issue.]

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Of the Kirghiz of the Pamirs approximately 1,000 have been resettled in eastern Turkey since 1983. They are temporarily housed in the village of Karagündüz, in individual cinder-block houses, some thirty miles north of the city of Van (which is situated about fifty miles west of the frontier with Iran). Their permanent settlement village is currently (1984) under construction at Altindere, almost twelve miles from the northern tip of Lake Van.

The location of their permanent settlement appears to have been selected by the Turkish government with an eye towards climate and terrain compatible with their previous home in the Pamirs. The Kirghiz, in private as well as in public, have expressed their approval of their new environment, which is entirely suitable for raising sheep, most of the grass around Altindere being of a variety with which they are familiar from the Pamirs. The grazing area allocated to the Kirghiz by the Turkish Government at Altindere to tend the herds of sheep they will receive upon moving there adds up to several thousand acres of rolling land at an altitude of roughly 6,000 feet above sea level.1 During the past year they have also been experimenting

The author spent part of summer 1984 in eastern Turkey undertaking linguistic research amongst Kirghiz refugees. He gratefully acknowledges the financial support received from the Society for Central Asian Studies, and the valuable comments made by Dr Mark Elvin on a previous draft of the manuscript.

1 A Coordinating Committee, with representatives from all relevant government departments in Ankara, is functioning under
with sedentary agriculture, the seeds of various vegetables having been provided for them. On the whole they expect to become largely self-sufficient in the near future - once they have moved to Altindere - and hope to engage primarily in sheep-raising, as they have done for centuries. This positive view is largely supported by the extensive and long-established practice of animal husbandry in and around Van province.

All Kirghiz children under the age of eleven attend classes in the village school, staffed by assigned teachers. Only the boys appear to be going on to middle- and high-school education, as boarding students in Turkish institutions 35 miles away. Most of these young men are desirous of going on to university, medicine ranking high among careers they hope for. The literacy rate is quite high across the total group, albeit in the Arabic script. Shortly after arrival in Karagündüz they were given individual instruction in modern Turkish orthography (based on the Latin alphabet), and they are now able to read local newspapers. Language difficulties among individuals up to the age of 35 are basically non-existent, as they all have nearly total fluency in modern Turkish. The older people are able to comprehend spoken modern Turkish, but their responses are intelligible only to the trained ear. A large majority are able to follow Turkish television and radio broadcasts with ease. A limited number of the older men are proficient in Farsi, due to their dealings with Afghan officials during the past three decades.

The birth rate, according to the records of resident Turkish health officials, is high, with 97 births to nearly 250 females in the 14 to 55 age-group in the first twelve months of resettlement in Turkey. The elders indicate that in the Pamirs it would have taken up to seven years to have this many surviving children.

The Kirghiz now in Turkey are members of one particular tribe. They are adherents of Sunni Islam and had their own hojas (clerics) in the Pamirs, all three of whom were educated in medreses (seminaries) in Bukhara. The hojas did not engage in tarikat (Muslim religious sects, e.g. Sufi mystical practice) work among their kinsmen, although it is believed that the hojas themselves were either adherents of, or at least familiar with, some of the orders. The Kirghiz in Karagündüz are under the leadership of Haci Rahman Kul, who is not a hereditary ruler but the chairmanship of the Governor of Van to ease the strains of resettlement. Also, a private organization, the Van and Environs Development Foundation (headed by Dr Ahmet Akyurek, who is a member of the Coordinating Committee) is channelling private contributions to this end.

2 One of these hojas died in Pakistan, shortly after the group's escape from the forward elements of the Soviet army.

3 According to Turkish law, all the refugees have adopted family
was informally and tacitly accepted as Khan of the tribe by all its members. Perhaps because they were brought into Turkey as a unified and largely intact group, and are living as such, the Kirghiz are able to maintain their tribal customs, dress and values without much difficulty. The HRK (Haci Rahman Kul) tribe has claims on land, houses and fortified defensive positions which they inherited from their fathers and grandfathers, and which are currently under Chinese administration in Eastern Turkestan, at scattered locations as far east as Urumchi.5 A number of HRK tribe members, as well as Haci Rahman Kul himself, spent time many years ago among the Uighurs of eastern Turkestan, fleeing from the Soviet Union in the 1920s. It is in fact from that date that the Kirghiz settled in the Pamirs. They still have distant relatives in this area - both Uighur and Kirghiz - but no widespread contacts with them have been reported since the communist revolution in China.

The Kirghiz tribes that remain in the Soviet Union east of Tashkurgan, Kahsha and further to the south-east (from where the HRK clan members originally hailed before the 1920s) speak the same dialect, according to HRK tribal informants. North and west of the Tashkent-Alay line, they claim, the Kirghiz dialect names. Haci Rahman Kul chose the old Turkic word Kutlu as his surname, meaning 'auspicious', 'fortunate'. This is derived from the word Kut, as in Kutadgu Bilig, the title chosen by Yusuf Has Hajib for his celebrated book in 1071.

changes once again. This latter assertion may be viewed, however, with a certain amount of scepticism, since when I passed to the elders a printed copy of the Alpamysh (the Central Asian dastan, or epic, written in Turki, which has been the literary language of Central Asia since the fourteenth century), they were able to read it with ease. Yet this text contains material that was compiled from the very area which, according to the same elders, possesses a different Kirghiz dialect.

This discrepancy, between perception on the one hand and practice on the other, may also provide a clue to the large-scale linguistic unity found among the various tribes. The written language, especially because it is set down in the Arabic script, conceals the distinctions between the phonetics of various tongues. Thus one basic language, complete with its grammar, vocabulary and syntax, may masquerade as many when spoken with different accents. This phenomenon of 'different languages' or the creation thereof was encouraged, indeed enforced, and their 'existence' propagated by the Soviet authorities, and prior to that by their Tsarist predecessors.6

The Kirghiz of Van express a strong affinity with the Chaghatai dialect, referring to it as Turkistani, or simply Turki. In fact, the first response of the elders, upon laying eyes on the text referred to above, was to declare its language to be Chaghatai. They are aware of the dual labelling of this single tongue; over the last 600 years, all authors who had utilized it, such as Babur, Navai, Ulug Bey, Timur, etc. have termed it Turki. However, the elderly gravitate toward the Chaghatai designation, whereas middle-aged men prefer 'Turkistani', or Turki, perhaps due to their reverence towards the Turkistan Soviet Socialist Republic of the 1920s, which was the predecessor of the contemporary 'Republics' of Central Asia. The tendency to refer to all of the Kazakhs, Kirghiz, Uzbeks and Uighurs as Turks is strong. There is practically no memory of contact with the Tajiks in the Pamirs. The only unprompted reference to the latter that I noted during my stay amongst the Kirghiz of Van came about in the following manner: during a set of wedding festivities which I happened to witness, a Kirghiz boy of seven was spotted riding a horse. Immediately he was chided for 'riding like a Tajik'. The remark may have been made in a jocular manner, but there was no doubt that the Kirghiz style is felt to be much more refined and that this un-Kirghiz style of novice horse-riding was not to be tolerated. The elders then apologised to me on behalf of the boy, excusing him for having been forced to leave his homeland before he could learn this traditionally vital skill.

After the forcible closure of the Soviet borders, which the HRK clan members trace back to 1938, trade relations with their kinsmen in eastern Turkestan flourished. It seems that the

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Chinese knowingly aided these cross-border transactions between eastern Turkestan and the Pamirs during the 1920s, the 1930s, and the early part of the 1940s. These links were at their peak when the Soviet Union helped the Chinese Communists with their revolution and physically participated in impeding all such traffic. Communications along this route have been sparse ever since.

During the 1930s, a rebellion led by Hoja Niyaz, starting around komul, was suppressed by the Chinese with extensive aid from the Soviet Union. The objective of the insurgency was to recover the Kirghiz home territories and re-unite eastern Turkestan. For the most part, this event was classified by Russian chroniclers as one of the Basmaci movements. The word *basmaci*, as employed in the Turki dialect, was coined by the Russians to designate and denigrate the insurgents as 'bandits'. The official Soviet view is that the Basmaci are nothing but looters, renegades and outlaws. It is true that *basmaci* is the correct term to describe such people as defined by their activities, but it hardly portrays the notion of resistance fighters, which the Basmaci actually were. The Basmaci themselves, namely those who were fighting the invading Russian armies, called those of their kinsmen who collaborated with the Russians *dördüncü*. These traitors accepted bribes of all kinds from the Russians and were composed of individuals from amongst the Kirghiz, Chaghatay, Kazakh, Uzbek, and Turkmen - in short, of various origins. According to the *mollas*, the *dördüncü* would not learn, teach or perform the religious rites, but on the contrary believed in and perpetuated heresy. The *basmaci* were called *mucahit* by the Kirghiz, presumably because they were carrying out a *cihad* (Arabic *jihad*, or holy war) against the invading Russians. But they had their shortcomings, to a certain degree not respecting the private property of their kinsmen and neighbours. These *mucahit* (cf. *mujahideen*) would forcibly appropriate norses, clothing, food, women, etc. according to their needs or whims, without compensation or consent. In an

7 Isa Alptekin's ancestors, an extended family that fought its way out of China, were closely involved in this uprising.


9 This brings to mind the contrast with the old Chinese guerrilla maxims and practice based on the concept of 'fish in the water'. During the period of Communist Chinese guerrilla activities, it was usual for each fighter to be quartered in a household in the vicinity of his operational area. Mao had issued strict orders to his guerrillas, requiring them to leave their hosts with more than they had found on arrival, and forbade such wanton personal satisfaction. If the guerrillas could not leave behind anything
effort to discredit the Basmaci further, the Russians employed widespread propaganda, declaring them to be without any religious belief, scruples or loyalty to their own tribes. This was a continuation of the long-standing policies of Tsarist military and civilian officials in promising independent and totally autonomous republics to all of the tribes, in which nomadic traditions would be preserved unimpeded. These two factors, it seems, contributed greatly to the eventual suppression of the revolt led by Hoja Niyaz.

Thus when 'hunters' from the Soviet side started appearing around HRK clan encampments in the Pamirs during the early and middle 1970s, these memories were very much in the minds of the Kirghiz elders. Since Westerners were also common in their area hunting the big-horned 'Marco Polo' rams, the presence of hunters from other regions was not in itself something that should have created much concern. What caused consternation among the Kirghiz was that the approach of this group of hunters to the 'hunt' was rather different, moving about in groups of four, armed with AK-47 assault rifles, and more interested in asking questions than in chasing after game. They were also carrying maps, which they seemed to mark continuously as they looked around. Unlike Western hunting enthusiasts, they spoke Kirghiz and Tajik. Nor did their inquiries follow the usual line of 'Where can we find the rams?' The questions were directed rather towards discovering the locations of Kirghiz summer and winter camping places, the roads leading to them, the relations of the Kirghiz with their neighbours, the names and business of their visitors, and even the whereabouts of the nearest Afghan security forces. All the while, these 'hunters' were assuring the Kirghiz that the Russians were good friends of Davud Han (the King of Afghanistan at that time). Whatever their feelings towards Russians or Soviet hunters, the Kirghiz decided to leave the Pamirs upon spotting Soviet military vehicles on the frozen tributary of the Amu Derya river, which constitutes the border between the USSR and Afghanistan. Their former pastures are now occupied by Soviet military encampments.

In their new home in Turkey, the Kirghiz are undoubtedly facing a variety of changes in their domestic and traditional lives. That is not to suggest they are being forced to give up their

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material, they would perform manual chores instead.

10 The Soviet Union has continually followed precisely this policy line since the 1917 revolution, without exception.

11 Some big-game enthusiasts and collectors in the West were reportedly prepared to spend as much as $500,000 to obtain a 'Marco Polo Ram' trophy.
identity or social customs. On the contrary, the Kirghiz have been welcomed with open arms and fraternal ties. However, by the very fact of having been uprooted under the pressure of an alien power from one habitat and settled into another, albeit a very hospitable one, they will need to undergo a number of adaptations.

The first change that comes to mind is the issue of leadership. Will the Kirghiz choose a new Khan after the death of the present one? If so, will the new Khan command the respect that his predecessor presently enjoys? In answer to these questions, it seems quite unlikely that any new Khan would command the same respect, to judge from the deeds performed by Hacı Rahman Kul, especially within the environment in which he has discharged his responsibilities. As for making any new appointment at all, the answer here should be a guarded 'yes', for two reasons: first, because the force of tradition will compel the Kirghiz to elect a new Khan; and secondly, because under Turkish law each village must possess an elected muhtar or headman, and it can be expected that the new Khan will himself assume this post.

The same modern Turkish law also requires the election and establishment of a 'council of elders' for every village, to work with the headman. Perhaps this aspect of contemporary Turkish law will also cause the re-emergence of the old second ruling stratum, that of the former 'nobility' together with the 'lieutenants of the Khan'. Observed in ancestral documents, the concept of this second-stratum leadership does not seem to have had a clear-cut definition in recent memory among the Kirghiz. Historically, these second-stratum leaders consisted of individual males who performed valuable services for the good of the tribe, or to the Khan in his external relations (such as carrying ambassadorial messages to the rulers of hostile neighbours, or protecting the herds of horses from being stolen by marauders). The offspring of the ruling family may or may not take their places among their ranks, depending on whether or not they are men of courage. These new 'lieutenants' may well constitute the 'council of elders' in their new setting, whatever their contemporary titles or functions.

In the past, the selection of a Khan (or Tekin in Turkish) involved a series of rituals, some of which had strong ties with the symbolism of Lebensraum, etc. Raising the new Khan seated on

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13 See Shahrani, The Kirghiz, op.cit., for details of the conditions under which he was selected and 'ruled'.

14 In larger tribes or confederations of tribes, this group traditionally included individual 'champions' (of contests or competitions) and high-ranking officers of the army.
a suitably large white felt seven times over the heads of the 'lieutenants', and his shooting of an arrow to the four winds were two such prominent practices. It is possible to discern both in the Orkhon Tablets of the 8th century AD\(^{15}\) and the Oguz Khan Dastan.\(^{16}\) The origin of the latter very likely predates the former, also providing scholars with some idea about how the second-stratum leaders were sometimes 'created'.

Owing to the migrations forced on the Kirghiz for external reasons over the centuries, not all of their election rituals have maintained their vigour. On the other hand, the Kenge\(^{17}\) tradition will no doubt be rejuvenated, spurred on by the Turkish law referred to above. The Kenge may well serve as a platform for future leaders, continually providing the basis of village council deliberations in the new environment. Whether the Kenge will involve every member of the tribe or only the elite cannot yet be determined. There is a possibility that tribal members will tacitly or explicitly designate the second-stratum leaders to represent them at the Kenge. This would then be tantamount to a two-tier election, designed by the tribe itself, and providing a system of checks and balances. (It is possible to identify a precedent for this in the Orkhon Tablets.) The 'lieutenants' of former times seemed to have been charged with the duties of parliamentary deputies in a democratic society. It must be noted that there is not a shred of evidence to suggest that this system was influenced by outside currents; the traces of this institution found in the documents and literature referred to point to an internal evolution.

Another issue involves marriage. The Kirghiz were traditionally exogamous, there being another Kirghiz tribe, living three days' ride away in the Pamirs, from which men of the HRK tribe selected their brides. In return, the men of the second tribe married the women of the HRK tribe. Now that the HRK tribe are in Turkey, with the second Kirghiz tribe still in the Pamirs, the former faces the problem of where to look for spouses when possible pairings within the group are exhausted. They may first

\(^{15}\) H. N. Orkun, Eski Türk Yazıtları, Istanbul: TDK 1936. These tablets were first 'decoded' by Wilhelm Thomsen in 1896. For details and an English translation, see Tablet Tekin, A Grammar of Orkhon Turkic, Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press 1968.

\(^{16}\) See A. Z. V. Togan, Oguz Destani, Istanbul: Ahmet Sait Matbaası 1972.

\(^{17}\) Literally 'assembly', and also known as kurultay in other Turkic dialects, this is the gathering which requires the members of the tribe to vote for a leader when the previous one has died. The Kenge was also used by the ruler as a council of elders convened on his order, and enabling him to obtain advice from experienced men on issues confronting the larger body.
of all explore marriage possibilities with members of other recent emigré groups settled across the Turkish Republic. The implications of this issue are probably more profound than the leadership question, for a certain amount of cultural dilution seems inevitable.

As a final point, it is worth mentioning the effects that a modern, higher education will have on the general attitudes of the younger members of the HRK tribe. A university course, which at least some of the young men are looking forward to, is bound to alter their perceptions of their traditional life-style, including marriage and cultural integrity. It should be possible to measure the degree of any such transformation by the return of the young men to the village after the completion of their courses at university. This assumes that such students will read a subject directly applicable to the rural setting, which may well provide yet another index, a ratio between adaptation and a stubborn adherence to tradition. A subsidiary set of indicators that could be examined involves the visits of city-dwelling members of the tribe to the village. Will parents send their children back to the village during the summer vacations? Will they attempt to provide cultural continuity for future generations? For the present, one can only ask these questions and prepare to observe events, for it may require several years before any appreciable transformation takes place.

H. B. PAKSOY

18 These include Turkmens, Uzbeks, Uighurs and Kazakhs, each of which has been resettled by the Turkish Government along the lines offered to the Kirghiz. Members of these groups have remained in contact with one another in Turkey, as formerly in Pakistan.

This large book offers twenty studies by twenty-three authors; the last of the essays, a joint production, is long enough to stand by itself. The specifically Indian side of Dumont's contribution has been accommodated in the Festschrift edited by T.N. Madan: Way of Life: King, Householder, Renouncer (1982; reviewed in JASO Vol XIV, no. 2). Dumont's association with the Institute of Social Anthropology at Oxford (1951-55)—according to Dumont a formative period in his career—is acknowledged by anecdote and through David Pocock's contribution to that volume. The book under review is more broadly cast, doing justice to the range of Dumont's scholarly programme and of his professional influence, but Oxford per se drops from the picture. Only slightly over half of the papers are specifically anthropological. The others consider topics as diverse as a comparison of Western and Chinese thought in one instance and an examination of purity in Samuel Richardson's Pamela in another. Twelve of the essays are in French, the other eight all being in English.

The collection begins appropriately with a comparative study by François Delpech of the ceremonial complex in Spain and France involving the use of a dragon effigy at Pentecost to which Dumont devoted an early book: La Tarasque: Essai de description d'un fait local d'un point de vue ethnographique (1951). Although it has hardly had the same impact as his later publications, this work and Dumont's other writings on French folklore are linked to his Indian and other comparative enterprises. Jean-François Billeter contrasts the ocular metaphor which dominates the history of Western epistemology with the idea of action or activity central to ancient Chinese philosophy. Francis Zimmermann considers possible Greek Stoic influence on Sanskrit medical texts of the first centuries of the present era. Reinhart Koselleck argues that since the Enlightenment static political concepts, such as those of Aristotle, have become temporalized; instead of collecting and organizing past experiences, modern concepts are preconceptions, anticipating the future. Claude Lefort examines the nineteenth-century Italian political philosopher Joseph Ferrari and his consideration of contemporary revolutions in light of Machiavelli. François Furet discusses the relations between Edgar Quinet and Alexis de Tocqueville: 'For Quinet, democracy is an idea that dominates a history. For Tocqueville, it is an idea shaped by a history'. Jean-Claude Perrot explores
the place of individual interest and economic value in seventeenth and eighteenth-century social philosophy. Maurizio Catani employs biography to explore personal values and the history of social life in the context of a transition from tradition to modernity. Edmund Leites takes inspiration from Dumont's analysis of equality and hierarchy in the Western and Indian systems of value for his consideration of views of women and purity in eighteenth-century British society as exemplified in the novel *Pamela*. Wilfred Cantwell Smith argues that the Greek rationalist-idealistic-humanist tradition in Western civilization should be understood within the context of the various religious traditions of man and that the world's religious systems have nothing in common which is of central significance to each.

As for the more directly anthropological essays, Lévi-Strauss attempts to find out why some quite diverse societies permit marriage between children of the same father but different mothers, while prohibiting the inverse case, even though descent is patrilineal. Some of the evidence he adduces, such as that from the Karo Batak, is not strictly relevant. More interesting is Stephen Tyler's study of patterns of structural change in Dravidian and Indo-Aryan terminologies under conditions of contact. He is able to propose a variety of intermediate arrangements which are exemplified in various parts of India. Dominique Casajus's rereading of Mauss's *The Gift* should be placed alongside the last essay, a joint undertaking by Cécile Barraud, Daniel de Coppet, André Iteanu and Raymond Janous to compare exchange in four societies, one in Papua New Guinea, another in the Solomons, a third in eastern Indonesia, and the last in Morocco. Among their points is that a strict distinction between subject and object is a poor guide to understanding the exchange systems under consideration. Each of the authors has recently published in French impressive monographs on one or other of these societies. This joint paper deserves to be translated and published by itself as a book for use in teaching about exchange.

Ernest Gellner writes about the Asiatic Mode of Production and reactions to Wittfogel in Soviet Anthropology, while Jean-Claude Galey discusses the royal function in the Upper Ganges. Four consecutive essays deal directly with hierarchy. Terence Turner takes up dual opposition and hierarchy in Brazilian moiety structure, which he holds is characterized simultaneously by symmetric and asymmetric aspects. Terence Evens defends Evans-Pritchard and also the ambiguity of the distinction between territory and agnation in Even's own treatment of Nuer hierarchy. Michael Houseman interprets Dumont's recent discussions of hierarchy as implying two versions of the principle of hierarchy. In the 'restricted' version, one term of a pair is identical with the whole and encompasses its opposite. In the 'general' version the nature of the difference is not specified, but it is implied that most oppositions have a hierarchical aspect. Houseman later asks how many distinct types of hierarchy exist. In the new edition of *Homo hierarchicus*, Dumont reveals that he owes his
idea of encompassment to Raymond Apthorpe's Oxford D.Phil. thesis of 1956. Since access to this thesis is restricted, Apthorpe's excerpt from it, in which he presents his analysis of kinds of opposition, is necessarily important. The reader may now judge the nature of the inspiration, but he can also clearly discern significant differences between Apthorpe's and Dumont's interpretations.

A reader could acquire a liberal education from these essays and the leads they provide—an observation intended also to hint at the standard problems of any Festschrift.

R. H. BARNES


These two important books are the work of teaching members of the Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford University. Both merit extended reviews by experts in the fields which each book covers; the present review, by a Southeast Asianist, will concentrate upon more general matters.

Individual and Society in Guiana by Dr Peter Rivière, the current Chairman of the Management Committee of the Institute, consists of eight chapters, which progress from the minutely particular to generalization. Informative notes are placed after the text. The bibliography contains over 125 references to sources, quotations from which are used admirably appositely and exactly in the text and the notes. The book, which is priced most reasonably, has been produced very well.

Two Crows Denies It by Dr R. H. Barnes consists of eleven chapters which consider such matters as Chieftainship, The Tribal Circle, Descent Groups, Relationship Terminology, Marriage and Patterns of Marriage, Residence, Kinship, and 'Omaha Alliance' and Dispersed Alliance. Thirteen plates complement the text well, while the eighteen figures and twenty tables are clear, helpful, and (in contrast to many such supposed aids to scholarship which a reader is burdened with these days) genuinely cast light on the matters in question. The two books contain notes which illuminate the text pointedly, while the bibliography of
Two Crows, as this book is assuredly destined to be referred to colloquially, contains a large number of references to the work of writers ranging from Frege and Strawson to Buchler and Selby, from Peters (1848) to Gay (1981), from Dorsey to Onvlee, and from Da Matta to Godfrey Leinhardt.

Individual and Society in Guiana is a contribution to a timely stock-taking of the information available about lowland South America by considering what is known about a part of the area. The book has three aims: to be an introduction to the region; to identify the essential elements and relationships in Guiana social organization; and to make suggestions for the wider study of lowland South American society.

Apart from the intrinsic interest of the ethnographical and other data which Rivière addresses, and the substantive conclusions to which he comes, there are two matters which are of particular interest to this reviewer.

The first is that the people with whom Rivière is chiefly concerned - Amerindians who live mainly along the watershed that divides the rivers that flow into the Amazon from those that flow into the Orinoco or directly into the Atlantic—may be said to inhabit an area which (Rivière emphasises) has 'fuzzy' edges which are not watertight, and which change unevenly from one region to another. However, the idea that these societies constitute an integral area or region is most justified by the social organization of the societies considered. This organization provides 'a fine balance between the requirements of society and the autonomy of the individual' (p.4). Features of this organization common to the societies considered are: cognatic descent; a two-line prescriptive relationship terminology; preferred settlement endogamy and/or uxorilocality; an emphasis on co-residence in ordering relationships; and small and impermanent settlements.

This approach is characteristic, of course, of J. P. B. de Josselin de Jong's idea of the ethnologisch studieveld, the field of anthropological study, about which a collection of essays (Unity in Diversity, ed. P. E. de Josselin de Jong, Dordrecht etc. 1984) has recently appeared. This coincidence of approach in areas conventionally considered so different as lowland South America and eastern Indonesia and Oceania suggests again that much Dutch social anthropology, influenced more or less directly by the teaching of J. P. B. de Josselin de Jong and deriving essentially from Primitive Classification, provides an example which is put to use profitably in the analysis of social facts from areas far from Indonesia and Oceania.

The second matter which strikes this reviewer as especially interesting is Rivière's consideration of comparison in social anthropology. Rivière suggests, and one can only concur with his suggestion, that in the past comparison has very often been vitiated because the analysts' aims were too grandiose and because they did not make sure that they were comparing like with like. 'The remedy for these failings lies in restricting the comparison to a bounded territorial and cultural area, to peoples
who exhibit, at least in their gross features, some homogeneity', in order to obtain 'a better understanding of the localized societies under investigation' (p.6). Rivière's approach is through the consideration in turn of a number of themes or aspects of society, and via indigenous categories. The analysis of a number of related but different societies in this way allows a mosaic to be made in which, as it were, the complete picture emerges more and more clearly as each piece is positioned relative to the others.

However, this occurs only at what Rivière calls 'the social level': 'the distinctiveness of each piece, of each group, is expressed through cultural elements. It is through variation in language, body adornments, technical equipment, methods of processing food, funerary rites, and the consumption of hallucinogens...' (pp.7-8). Rivière alludes to Lévi-Strauss's view (expressed in *The Scope of Social Anthropology*, London: Cape 1957, p.19) that these matters can probably always be accommodated within the totality which any form of life constitutes, as has been demonstrated many times in Dutch anthropology and, latterly, in British anthropology as well. But Rivière suggests that there are formidable difficulties in the way of studying such matters, because it is not obvious that the ethnography upon which an analyst has to rely is 'good enough...since it is often the minutiae of cultural detail that are significant'. Once again, attention is drawn to the importance of ethnography, if not in determining, then in delimiting sharply the shape of analysis; there is here a significant lesson for ethnographers.

However, since these cultural traits vary widely in time and can also change drastically through time, it would appear that 'what is fundamental and invariant is the social structure' (p.8). This makes an interesting comparison with Balinese views about their own form of life which social anthropological analysis means that it is the jural which is variable and transient. Clearly this matter will reward further investigation.

*Two Crows Denies It*, as the author remarks on pp.3-4, 'constitutes a criticism of sources insofar as the documents are pertinent to specific analytic questions.... The factual evidence...[is]...weighed and, to an extent, sifted. This process necessitates considering aspects of Omaha history as well as looking closely at the history of the ethnographies themselves, the ethnographers, and where possible their informants. This study is not, however, a history of the Omahas.... Looking again at how the story of the Omahas was put together permits us to reassess in certain regards the present state of anthropology. Of greater interest, it involves confrontation with the Omaha people' (original emphasis). *Two Crows*, however, keeps rather close to social organization and, like Rivière's book, does not attempt a comprehensive treatment of cultural matters; religion, myth, ritual, oral literature, and music are all left aside, since they demand competence in the Omaha language.

Two points, among a wealth of other historical and analytical description, impress this reviewer. First, Barnes remarks that
'Durkheim was right in underlining the revolutionary importance of ethnography to social anthropological understanding' (p.235), a point (of course) which Rivière makes also, and which is incontrovertible. Barnes writes, in concluding his study, that 'the personalities of the ethnographers may act as a filter, but, especially where there are independent reporters, ethnographic facts impose themselves sufficiently to prove that the facts are not merely the imaginative creations of the anthropologist' (p.234). This view, one with which any ethnographer will surely concur, is a welcome corrective to the view which seems to be fairly widespread among social scientists, and especially among writers who concentrate on methodology, that the data collected by field researchers cannot be ascribed any objectivity whatsoever. This view is quite wrong, and it is pleasing that Barnes has said so, and so authoritatively.

Secondly, Barnes writes that 'complementary opposites of course are those where each side fills out or completes what the other side lacks.... It is doubtful that complementary opposites ever permit a perfect equality between the sides. A recurrent feature of studies of complementary governance is the superiority of one form of authority, usually the spiritual or mystical' (p.61). Many people would agree with these remarks, of course, but it seems to me that a number of comments can be made about this formulation of these ideas. Thus, although Barnes's formulation of what complementary opposites are might be said to apply to such dyads as male/female and north/south (and some might argue about accepting these dyads as complementary opposites, as opposed simply to complementaries or opposites), it is not clear how it might apply to sun/moon, for instance, or high/low. Does it make much sense to say that high, for instance, lacks low, or that low fills out high? Then, it is not clear what Barnes intends by 'perfect', by 'equality', and by 'superiority'; but these words are analytically crucial. Finally, empirical studies by writers such as Signe Howell (e.g., Society and Cosmos, Singapore: Oxford University Press 1984, reviewed in JASO, Vol. XV, no. 3) and by the present reviewer (e.g., 'Duality in Aspects of a Balinese Form of Life on Lombok', Traditional Cosmology, in press) suggest that dyads which are 'perfectly equal', in the sense that the relations which obtain between the two terms which constitute the dyads are for all intents and purposes symmetrical, are identifiable as social facts. But none of these remarks should be taken to deny in any way the importance and provocative interest of Dr Barnes's book.

Two Crows Denies It and Individual and Society in Guiana exemplify the Oxford tradition generally, and Oxford social anthropology as established by Evans-Pritchard particularly, at their best: a commitment to social facts and their analysis in depth; lucid English; a strong sense of history; exact and imaginative scholarship; and argumentation which is rigorous, creative, and stimulating. Both books are examples also of a most compelling view of what scientific enquiry consists of: they answer particular questions, and in doing so raise other questions which need answering. Both books would be fine additions to any library.

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER
Like Alice Fletcher thirty years earlier, Elsie Clews Parsons turned to professional anthropology in her forties. Today, anthropologists are likely to remember her for her extensive ethnographic publications on the Pueblo peoples and on Mexico. She also collected and published much folklore, especially that of American Negroes, the peoples of the West Indies and Cape Verdians of Nantucket. When she was younger she published several volumes of her personal sociology. She wrote extensively for popular journals on feminism, pacifism and other topics. Her English-born father made millions on Wall Street. She numbered among her numerous influential friends and acquaintances Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and William Howard Taft. Her wealth permitted her to give financial support to various scholarly journals and to many young anthropologists, especially those working on the Southwest. She served as President of the American Folklore Society and the American Ethnological Society, and she was the first woman elected President of the American Anthropological Association. She helped to found the New School for Social Research. Among her causes were trial marriage, contraception, nude bathing, open marriages, and sex education. She rejected all conventions which in her opinion constrained the freedom of personality. Hare describes her as a feminist who seldom enjoyed the companionship of women.

The scholar portrayed in this book is the author's paternal great-aunt. Hare was able to exploit and quote extensively from her personal papers. Through the opening chapters the book threatens to become little more than a narrative of salacious family gossip. To my taste the many excerpts from private letters detailing her extra-marital friendships and her jealousies were not really pleasant reading. Though, we are told, her husband tolerated her affairs, she was emotionally unable to accept it when he too took up another relationship in accordance with her expressed principles. Eventually the marriage failed. When the book turns to chapters on her feminism and pacifism, however, the early account of personal strains informs these aspects of her public career.

Hare does not go deeply into her anthropology, but he does offer useful chapters on her field trips and ethnographic publications. There is food for thought in how she imposed herself on various unwelcoming Pueblo communities and perhaps wry amusement in the incident when their Laguna hostess whitewashed Boas and Parsons out of her house. However, Parsons deserves a second book by another hand, examining more closely her scholarly and philanthropic contributions.

R.H. BARNES
Man is human but he wishes that he could revert to being an animal again. This theme runs through both of these iconoclastic volumes on human nature. It is not so much a question of a 'will' to become instinctual and unselfconscious (again) which plagues you or me, rather it is a nagging urge which arises from time to time. After de Grazia's description of the problematic this ill-defined urge should be recast as a sort of conscious imperative.

According to de Grazia, the central event in the emergence of mankind as distinct from the apes was the instinct delay mechanism and the attendant rise of self-consciousness. Here, exactly at the point where human emerges from animal, his central character trait is defined. He is schizotypical. He is capable of splitting himself into two, three or even more personae. This has always been a source of anxiety for man because he could question and doubt the validity of his persona, and he began to wonder if he had any right to exist at all. In turn he built up around himself a whole panoply of rules and institutions which only served to reinforce his feelings of self-doubt and fear.

Looking through a recent issue of Psychology Abstracts, de Grazia reports that he could find no single article on the topics of 'human nature' or 'instinct', but that there were hundreds of entries under 'schizophrenia'. Could it be that schizophrenia has become synonymous with human nature? As Pascal once said, 'There is no man who differs more from another than he does from himself at another time.'

Methodologically de Grazia aligns himself with the circle of catastrophists who worked with Immanuel Velikovsky at Princeton in the 'sixties and early 'seventies. He claims that major planetary and terrestrial catastrophes were influential in forcing mankind to emerge; that internal psychological shifts such as instinct delay or self-consciousness may be viewed as catastrophes; and that all subsequent catastrophes, both physical and physiological, only served to reinforce 'the catastrophic character of the human mind'.

Alfred de Grazia is a renegade, but a clever and well-read one. A graduate of the University of Chicago's highly interdisciplinary faculty of social sciences, he resigned his post as Professor of Political Science partly in order to write Homo Schizo and the eight or nine other volumes of his Quantavolution Series (all of which have been published by Metron in the last two years).

Some contentions of the book are certain to startle most readers, and not only those who are specialists in physical and
social anthropology, geology or palaeontology. De Grazia asserts, for example, that the defining steps in the evolution of mankind - the development of speech, consciousness etc. - could all have occurred within the span of a thousand years. He would not object to anyone wanting to call this 'creation' (nor would he, I think, particularly object to anyone calling it 'evolution').

These books are certain to make the reader reconsider his own positions as well as the status of received wisdom on matters of human evolution. After all, evolution is our own creation myth, and perhaps we should examine whether or not it has been bent or refashioned in the service of some dominant (perhaps schizotypical) ideology.

CHARLES STEWART

LOLA ROMANUCCI-ROSS, DANIEL E. MOERMAN and LAURENCE R. TANCREDI (eds.), The Anthropology of Medicine: from Culture to Method, South Hadley, Massachusetts: Bergin & Garvey 1983. xii, 400pp., References, Index. £16.10.

This book sets out to illustrate how differences in culture can structure and influence the experience of disease and affect the way in which both the doctor and the patient perceive and define illness. It is a collection of twenty fairly short papers divided into five major sections, each section starting with a short introduction written by the editors. The papers cover a wide range of topics, perhaps indicative of the varied interests of the individual authors, and are illustrated clearly by specific examples taken from a variety of cultural contexts. As with most compilation volumes the standard of the papers naturally varies, but on the whole they are clearly written and well presented, references being given at the end of each individual paper rather than at the back of the book.

The first major section of the volume deals with the interaction of different medical systems, highlighting ways in which conceptual positions can change (or not change) following culture contact. Four case studies are presented, representing different types of interaction: the imposition of a 'Western' medical system on the traditional folk medicine of Italy, the relationship between Aztec and Spanish medical thought which combined to produce Mexican folk medicine, the medical options open to the Ningerum of New Guinea, and the discrediting of the traditional Siberian Khanty medical practice by the Soviet authorities. The four examples show clearly that the ultimate outcome of the interaction of two differing medical systems can be both complex and unexpected.
The second part then explores certain conceptual aspects of non-Western medicine which are entirely absent from purely 'scientific' medical systems. This includes a detailed examination of relationships between the process and the consequences of healing. The five papers deal in turn with Mexican spiritualist healing, the shaman tradition of the Diegueno Indians, Tabwa medicine and witchcraft, the Iroquois use of medicinal plants, and the importance of the placebo effect in Western biomedicine. They provide an interesting, if at times slightly confusing demonstration of how the diagnosis and successful treatment of disease can be as dependent on external factors and concepts as it is on the physiological illness itself.

Part Three is perhaps the most directly medical section of the book. It demonstrates clearly, with many examples, that where botanical and other elements are used in the treatment of the sick the materials used are in no way the result of random selection; even in cases where plants are chosen for apparently traditional or ritual reasons, there is almost always a sound medical reason behind the selection, whether this is directly understood or not. This has been demonstrated in several papers over the past five years, but is stressed here by detailed discussion of the properties of plants used in teeth cleaning and consideration of native North American medicinal plants. The emphasis then shifts slightly to consider nutrition and diet in relation to both culture and health, and the avoidance of disease.

Section Four considers the place of mental disorders in various cultural systems. This is an area where traditional beliefs and acceptances can play an extremely important part in the definition and perception of normal behaviour and in the classification of mental illness. The extent to which culture can shape individual responses to psychological problems is shown in the first four papers; the fifth paper considers psychotherapy, and questions the aims of treatment and its effect on the patient.

The final section is the shortest, containing two papers dealing with modern (American) medicine as a part of culture, influenced by non-medical beliefs and events. The two papers seem somewhat out of place in this volume, but make fairly interesting reading.

Although it by no means covers the whole field of medical anthropology, this book should serve as a useful and informative introduction to the subject, and should be of equal use to students of anthropology and students of medicine, or related subjects.

JOYCE TYLDESLEY

In his latest contribution, Clash of Cultures, the prolific Brian Fagan professes to analyse the period of initial contact between Western and non-Western societies with regard both to the effects that this contact had on the societies involved, and to its implications for modern Western/non-Western relations. Unfortunately, the book discusses contact situations only superficially, and ignores the proposed lines of analysis.

The major part of the book consists of eight case studies of Western contact with non-Western societies: the Khoikhoi (Hottentot), Aztecs, Tahitians, Van Diemeners (Tasmanians), Hurons, Northwest Coast Indians, Fuegians, and Maori. These case studies supposedly recount how non-Western societies adapted to the advent of Western civilization, and they form the core of Fagan’s analysis. However, a close look reveals them to be little more than adventure stories held together by threads of prevaricating eloquence which have little to do with anthropology or anthropological theory. The only apparent criterion for choosing these studies seems to be the chronological one, viz. the cases of cultures that came into contact with Europeans at different phases of Western philosophical thinking: from the early 15th-century searches for 'paradisical' kingdoms, through the 18th-century ideal of the Noble Savage, and finally into the evangelical zeal and Social Darwinism of the 19th century (where apparently the story ends). The studies are set out completely from a European perspective, the traditional societies providing merely an exotic backdrop against which the story unfolds - an odd slant for a book based on the assumption that world history is one of 'thousands of diverse societies interacting with one another', rather than the story of Western expansion.

Despite the fact that the supposed aim of the book is to examine the background to modern underdevelopment, it is curious to note that four of the societies that are examined no longer exist, and that the other four are economically and politically insignificant in the modern world. One might ask why Fagan did not make a better choice of examples for this purpose, or at least make better use of the examples he selected. For example, why did he not discuss the conquistadores’ impressment of the vast economic networks of the Maya empire instead of the annihilation of the warlike Aztecs? Alternatively, why not at least discuss the role of the encomienda system in the turbulent development of modern Latin America? Could the answer simply be that Fagan has already written a book on the Aztecs, and was not really interested in how contact influenced modern societies? In fact, it is not until the conclusion that the idea of colonists being interested in controlling natural resource production for the world market is mentioned at all.

Economic factors are considered in the case studies only when they are a necessary part of the background to the themes
the book does contain: conflict and religion. For example, the fur trade along the St Lawrence is seen as being the means by which the Jesuits gained influence over the Huron Indians, which eventually led to the tribe's destruction. Little or no time is spent discussing such issues as how the relationships between the Huron and other Indian groups were altered by the fur trades; the formation of the Wyandot; how the Huron became increasingly dependent on the French; the role of British colonists in this situation; how the Huron adapted to destruction as a tribe and physical displacement from their homeland; how they developed into a totally different group by the 19th century; or even their place in modern Canada. In fact, to read the book is to get the impression that culture contact is all about fights, God and venereal disease, all of which are exciting and dramatic topics, but scarcely the ones necessarily of most relevance to anthropologists.

The Christian religion is seen throughout the book as a major dynamic factor in the breakdown of traditional societies. Fagan seems fascinated by the idea that Western contact irrevocably undermined non-Western societies by introducing them to Christianity and the doctrine that all individuals are equal with respect to law and opportunity. He claims that traditional societies were inherently unequal, with a socially stratified system of a few chiefs ruling by divine right and most of the population being labourers. Therefore, introducing the concept of the importance of the individual to such societies caused them to collapse. Although the thesis runs throughout the book, certain points are never developed. For example, how this theory applied to hunter-gatherer societies; how this message managed to be carried by Christians of all forms and disciplines; or how this perfidious doctrine affected the European nations themselves - in short, a thesis, like the rest of the book, ill thought out and poorly documented.

I cannot recommend the book even as an introductory guide to the specialist literature on culture contact, the societies discussed, or even European exploration. Much could have been forgiven had the book been able to do any of these things. However, all the 'References' and 'Guide to Sources' do is reveal how little work actually went into the writing of the book, and that will already be apparent to the attentive reader. The subject-matter of Clash of Cultures is fascinating and timely, but deserving of better treatment than is given in this book - as are the students of anthropology for whom it was supposedly designed.

ALISON ROBERTS
It is hardly necessary to remind readers of JASO of the special interest of this publication. Tikopia, having provided the richest of Polynesian ethnographies, now emerges as an island of considerable significance in the prehistory of this part of the South Pacific. Kirch and Yen, two of the most experienced scholars now working in Oceanic prehistory, have produced a fine report which one hopes has given Sir Raymond Firth much pleasure. It is a long, detailed and thoroughly professional account of archaeological and ethno-botanical research undertaken in 1977 and 1978, which offers a first-ever interpretation of local prehistory, set in the context of the prehistory of the region end, in its later phases, correlated with Firth's interpretation of the island's traditional history. The report is written in clear, jargon-free prose and is a pleasure to read.

The authors based their excavation procedure on the solid foundation of understanding the local geomorphology, and their interpretation of the occupation sequence is derived from excavations systematically related to their appreciation of the effects of environment, specifically ecology, on the history of human settlement. But this is no deterministic study. Settlement patterns, artefacts, and faunal remains are analysed in a most sophisticated fashion to provide, in the final analysis, a synthesis of the evolution of Tikopia culture, firmly based on dated occupation phases, and seen as a process of changing forms of human adaptation to, and modification of, the local environment.

Apart from the possibility of some earlier, transient settlement, Tikopia was first occupied, on present evidence, about 900 BC by settlers who were part of the Lapita cultural complex, their pottery representing a late phase in the Lapitoid series. The definition of the Lapita culture, representing, apparently, the initial settlement of Austronesian speakers in the south-west Pacific during the second millennium BC, has been one of the great achievements of Oceanic archaeologists in the last twenty years. It is not surprising that Tikopia was late in the spread of settlement, but it is gratifying that the nature and sequence of occupation can be dovetailed neatly into that of Anuta and other neighbouring islands. The presence on Tikopia during this Lapitoid phase of such exotic materials as metavolcanic adzes, obsidian, and fine-grained chert, demonstrates that Tikopia was, from the first, part of a network of communities engaged in long-distance exchange. A marked change in material culture about 100 BC (defined by a matrix analysis of the sequence) is indicated by the presence of Mangaasi-style pottery, derived from Melanesian islands to the south, and first recognised by Garanger on Efate, in central Vanuatu. This adds body to the
evidence from myths and material traits in the ethnography collected by Firth of long-standing connections with Melanesia, which is not at variance with the fact that Tikopia language and culture, from the viewpoints of both history and ethnography, are Polynesian. Kirch and Yen date this further change from AD 1200, when 'there appear in the Tikopia sequence several new and distinctly Polynesian-appearing elements: the pa atu type of pearl-shell trolling-lure point, exotic adzes of oceanic basalt in West Polynesian types, and the use of cut-and-dressed slab masonry' (p.341). They relate this change to the evidence of oral traditions collected by Firth, identifying 'Uvea, Samoa and Tonga as homelands of certain Tikopia lineages, and they argue that, from the evidence of archaeology and oral traditions, Polynesian culture has been dominant in Tikopia for 'no more than about seven or eight centuries'(p.342).

At the same time, Kirch and Yen demonstrate that over time, occupation showed increasing sophistication and autonomy, with a shift in emphasis towards agriculture and domestic resources at the expense of the exploitation of marine and wild species. They do not claim, however, any simple correlation between this process and population growth or change, stressing instead the need to recognise the effect of such factors as a forty per cent increase in land area (a striking fact), continued biotic introductions, new agronomic techniques, and, in the long run, new concepts of land use and production. Prehistoric Tikopia is thus seen as no mere 'outlier' but as a developing economic and social system intimately linked with its neighbours over a long period of time. Indeed, with regard to its Polynesian phase, the authors say that its 'indigenous political history...is remarkable for its resonance in the archaeological record' (p.367). It is not really surprising that they see archaeology as providing a 'real historical basis' (p.362) for oral traditions, in contrast to the views of Leach and Hooper that Tikopia perceptions of the past are undifferentiated (pp.362-4).

The report is very well produced. Fittingly, it is dedicated to the memory of Genevieve Highland, much-loved editor of the Bishop Museum Press between 1962 and 1981, the year of her death. A most welcome feature is the inclusion of a comprehensive index.

PETER GATHERCOLE

This book was planned before but published after its author's death. It consists of a group of essays on (mainly) Scottish witchcraft and the set of five Clifford Lectures on Natural Theology delivered at Glasgow in 1982. Three further essays were intended for inclusion but had to be omitted as they were left in note form. The collection is edited by Alan Macfarlane, who has added a helpful Foreword. He has avoided altering or restructuring the essays, even though they overlap with parts of Larner's monograph *Enemies of God*. They overlap, too, with each other and inevitably read like separate essays rather than as the chapters of a book. In Part II, the Gifford Lectures offer a very different style of argument, having been little altered after their oral presentation. The five essays and the five lectures belong together in that there is a unity of subject-matter, but the reader must work to twist together the various threads of argument. Larner's critical stance and explorative approach make the book important and stimulating reading for anybody interested in the arguments about witchcraft in Europe.

It has been usual in the discussion of European witchcraft to distinguish *maleficium* - the use of sorcery to harm one's neighbours - and the more theoretical notion of the demonic pact which gained ground in the sixteenth century. Larner accepts the view that, by and large, *maleficium* was of the people and theoretical demonology of the elite, though she mentions exceptions (where peasants seared for the 'Devil's mark', or where aristocrats used accusations of witchcraft in the working out of political enmities). For witch-hunts to occur on any scale, it was necessary that there should be a level of demonological belief among the populace. The interaction of educated and uneducated sectors of the population, given this basic level of belief, was such that the peasants had a 'production line' which provided the 'human fodder' for the trials of those who consorted with evil powers. For their part, the elite 'in a conspicuous and unequivocal way controlled and manipulated the demand for and supply of witchcraft suspects'.

Larner gives primacy to the attitudes of the educated elite. A whole chapter is dedicated to the intellectual career of James VI/I. There are, Larner reminds us, three corners to every witch-trial - the accuser, the accused and the judge; the latter always belongs to the elite. Explanations of witchcraft as the product of social tensions omit this element, Larner states. Towards the end of the sixteenth century there was a trend towards abstraction and rationalisation in the legal reaction to witchcraft, so that eventually it became a crime against the state. It was the combination of this trend towards rationality with a basic level of witchcraft belief which created the conditions for witch-hunts.
Why witch-hunts occurred when they did is the main question implicit in the essays. The most intense waves occurred at times of clamping down on other forms of moral degeneracy. Is witchcraft to be treated by historians and sociologists as a crime among other crimes? Larner sees advantages in such an approach but stresses the necessity for the appropriate cosmological background. In witchcraft cases, what was at issue was not what the accused had done, but what she or he was, and as a crime witchcraft could be made to represent everything perverted. At certain periods the state became involved in a process of ideological reaffirmation, purging all elements identified as negating accepted values. If they are seen in this light, pre-industrial witch-hunts had a similar dynamic to the metaphorical 'witch-hunts' of Macarthy and Khomeini. But as Larner argues in the fifth essay, modern European or American 'witch-hunting' has to be conducted in other terms without the framework of Christian belief. Witchcraft cannot occur in a social vacuum, and the witch-cults in modern European societies, lacking a basis in popular belief, have to hark back to the traditions of previous centuries, usually through a quasi-scholarship. (The standard witchcraft magazines all look as though a copy of Penthouse has been crossed with a PhD thesis.)

In making the point that the existence of a developed theory of witchcraft and demonology was not in itself enough to give rise to witch-hunts, Larner is driven to question how belief and behaviour are related and to what extent ideas are autonomous. Ideas may not be the sole originators of activities such as witch-hunts but on the other hand ideas are not simply the products of social forces, since ideas dysfunctional to the society may be held and rulers may have to make efforts to convince populations of the correctness of certain beliefs. These issues are raised with a certain naivety as 'awkward questions' which can be dealt with only in a limited way.

The argument of the lectures differs somewhat in emphasis. As scientific rationality gained authority, the scope of 'faith' (defined as optional belief involving commitment) was reduced and the Church was divested of some authority. Christianity was until the sixteenth century a functioning 'political ideology' - the world's first, Larner suggests. She is using the political scientists' terminology so that the phrase means 'a total worldview which serves to mobilize political action or to legitimize governments'. A new personalized form of Christianity was imposed on an unready populace, and the interaction resulted in witch-hunting. The account is framed in a discussion of relativism, and the authority of twentieth-century science when confronted with the beliefs of other times is questioned. Larner, as a declared 'methodological atheist', keeps her distance in this book from beliefs of all kinds, and what is frustrating is that there is little or no analysis of the 'popular belief' of the sub-title. Illustrative material is not used, and there is no indication that the author considers it worth looking at the words (or other forms of expression), where available, of those
not of the educated elite. We may agree that peasant religion is primarily performative, with little spontaneous articulation of beliefs. But other recent historical and anthropological work in Europe has shown that where statements are elicited — in Inquisition trials, for example — the results, although sometimes fragmentary and contradictory, illuminate the processes of belief among ordinary people.

Such examples are part of the interface between educated elite and uneducated populace, across which, as Larner says, elements are flowing in both directions. Because of her relatively distant focus, she says less than she could have done about the very issue towards which her arguments direct us — that is, the way ideas and actions are related.

LUCY RUSHTON


In the first book Dr Mourant does what biological anthropologists have always hoped he would do. He brings together salient features, carefully chosen from the enormous bulk of our knowledge of human blood groups, and carefully ties these together to present an integrated picture of the genetic variation of the various peoples of the world. He does not allow a great many pre-conceived notions of population movements or developments of civilizations to guide him, and the book is thus somewhat austere. In its 130 pages of text, we are presented with no easy guide to human genetical variation. But a careful reading reveals a remarkable insight into the genetic process — the world's major clines and gradients, the extreme gene frequencies found in isolates such as the Basques or the Lapps, the genetic reflection of migration patterns in Oceania, the effects of endogamy among Jews and Gypsies. Above all, it is the constant possibility, occasionally amounting to certainty, that the gene frequencies we see are due not to chance but to the action of natural selection that gives the book its deeper significance. From the direct genetic evidence, we can best understand man as a species evolving through time — subject, like all other species, to the elimination of some genes and the emergence and spread of others. We owe Dr Mourant a considerable debt for
distilling his lifelong commitment to this difficult subject into the confines of one slim, succinct work.

The second book will be a source book for many years to come on various facets of the human biology of South Asia. Subject areas covered in Part I are the palaeontology of the Siwaliks, the Mesolithic South Asians, the Bronze Age Harappans, the Indo-Aryan invasions, early Indian demography, dental variation, and prehistoric burial practices. In Part II we return to the living, with studies of epidemiology, dermatoglyphic variation, inbreeding, taxonomic distance and genetic relationships, population structure in relation to caste, demography, ageing, biocultural adaptations, ecology in relation to human physiology, and pastoral subsistence strategies.

V. REYNOLDS

The best previous bibliography of Irian Jaya, Irian Barat, West Irian or West New Guinea was compiled by the second of the present three authors. Remarkably, the first author was the last Governor of Netherlands New Guinea, while the third, who is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Indonesia, has long had an instrumental role in implementing *Indonesia's* research policies. Both men, of course, are also distinguished anthropologists. That they could appear as joint authors of a work devoted to West Irian is an indication of how attitudes have changed since 1962 when the Netherlands finally relinquished its last Southeast Asian colony to Indonesia. This change is the result of deliberate diplomacy, and this bibliography is its symbol. In December 1981, the Dutch and Indonesian Steering Committees for implementing the Programme of Indonesian Studies, the framework for Dutch-Indonesian cooperation in the social sciences and humanities, commissioned Koentjaraningrat and Van Baal to prepare the Bibliography. They in turn enlisted Galis.

This work does not attempt to be complete, and it embodies arbitrary decisions about the relative value of excluded items. However, it gives by far the best coverage of its subject yet available. Its value for anthropologists is greatly enhanced by their decision to include sections on other subjects. The principal divisions are (1) general works, (2) climate, geology and soils, (3) zoology and botany, (4) physical anthropology and demography, (5) linguistics, (6) history, (7) cultural anthropology, (8) regional ethnography, and (9) economic and social development after 1950. The book also reproduces in Dutch P. Nienhuis's 1968 inventory of the official archives of Dutch New Guinea which were repatriated during the transfer of sovereignty in 1962. This work will remain an essential aid for scholars working on Irian Jaya for a very long time. We must hope that the Indonesian government will now begin to encourage the ethnographic research which is so desperately needed there.

R.H.B.
Dakwah or *da'awat* in Arabic represents a call to join the faith. Little used in Malaysia before the 1960s, it was adopted to name a largely urban movement of religious revival in the 1970s and 1980s. This development is the Malay form of the contemporary drive for religious revitalization throughout the Islamic world; yet it lacks a comprehensive ideology or organization. Dakwah therefore applies loosely to a variety of attitudes and activities thought to promote Islam. Persons regarded as adhering to these trends are apt to belong to non-establishment groupings and are vulnerable to usually indirect measures by the government to represent them as not partaking in legitimate practices. A central theme of this study is the uncomfortable contrast between Islamic universalism and various manifestations of Malay Muslim particularism. Nagata explores the place of religious allegiance in Malaysian communal politics, its connection with Malay racism, the social and political strains Dakwah reveals or exacerbates within the Malay community, the opposition or alternatives fostered by Malays to Dakwah, and its relations to the colonial experience and the present international politics of Malaysia. The book represents a rich body of information of immediate interest. Those who heard the Malaysian Prime Minister's address recently in the University of Oxford will find it suitable background reading. Inevitably, it is an outsider's account, but useful at least for those who are not Malaysians.

R.H.B.


These two books are specifically intended as companion volumes, enabling comparisons to be made between groups of tales linked by a common theme and taken from two separate but neighbouring tribes of the southwestern United States. The first follows on from the two previous volumes in the series (reviewed in *JASO* Vol. XV, no.1, p. 72) in having been collected by Father Berard Haile earlier this century. The second is a modern collaborative effort between
Malotki and an educated Hopi informant. Both books have indigenous texts with translations, Volume 9 in parallel text form; and this volume also has a parallel text glossary. Neither set of texts has any real commentary (save that provided by the footnotes in the Navajo volume), though a shortish introduction by Luckert in Volume 8 is explicitly designed to do duty for both volumes (this discusses the popularity of the image of the coyote to these tribes in particular, and the difficulty of defining its exact place in their collective consciousness). As with Volumes 6 and 7, then, appreciation of these tales will be greatly enhanced by a prior acquaintance with the wider ethnography.

R.J.P.

THE GENERAL THEORY OF NOT-GARDENING:
A Major Contribution to Social Anthropology, Ontology, Moral Philosophy, Psychology, Sociology, Political Theory and Many Other Fields of Scientific Investigation

Those who hate gardening need a theory. Not to garden without a theory is a shallow, unworthy way of life.

A theory must be convincing and scientific. Yet to various people various theories are convincing and scientific. Therefore we need a number of theories.

The alternative to not-gardening without a theory is to garden. However, it is much easier to have a theory than actually to garden.

Marxist Theory

Capitalists try to corrupt the minds of the toiling masses and to poison them with their reactionary 'values'. They want to 'convince' workers that gardening is a great 'pleasure' and thereby to keep them busy in their leisure time and to prevent them from making the proletarian revolution. Besides, they want to make them believe that with their miserable plot of land they are really 'owners' and not wage-earners, and so to win them over to the side of the owners in the class struggle. To garden is therefore to participate in the great plot aiming at the ideological deception of the masses. Do not garden! Q.E.D.

Psychoanalytical Theory

Fondness for gardening is a typically English quality. It is easy to see why this is so. England was the first country of industrial revolution. The industrial revolution killed the natural environment. Nature is the symbol of Mother. By killing Nature, English people committed matricide. They are subconsciously haunted by the feeling of guilt and they try to expiate their crime by cultivating and worshipping their small pseudo-natural garden. To garden is to take
part in this gigantic self-deception which perpetuates the childish myth. You must not garden. Q.E.D.

Existentialist Theory

People garden in order to make nature human, to 'civilise' it. This, however, is a desperate and futile attempt to transform being-in-itself into being-for-itself. This is not only ontologically impossible. It is a deceptive, morally inadmissible escape from reality, as the distinction between being-in-itself and being-for-itself cannot be abolished. To garden, or to imagine that one can 'humanise' Nature, is to try to efface this distinction and hopelessly to deny one's own irreducibly human ontological status. To garden is to live in bad faith. Gardening is wrong. Q.E.D.

Structuralist Theory

In primitive societies life was divided into the pair of opposites work/leisure, which corresponded to the distinction field/house. People worked in the field and rested at home. In modern societies the axis of opposition has been reversed: people work in houses (factories, offices) and rest in the open (gardens, parks, forests, rivers etc.). This distinction is crucial in maintaining the conceptual framework whereby people structure their lives. To garden is to confuse the distinction between house and field, between leisure and work; it is to blur, indeed to destroy, the opposition structure which is the condition of thinking. Gardening is a blunder. Q.E.D.

Analytical Philosophy

In spite of many attempts, no satisfactory definition of garden and of gardening has been found; all existing definitions leave a large area of uncertainty about what belongs where. We simply do not know what exactly the garden and gardening are. To use these concepts is therefore intellectually irresponsible, and actually to garden would be even more so. Thou shalt not garden. Q.E.D.

LESZEK KOLAKOWSKI

13TH EUROPEAN CONGRESS FOR RURAL SOCIOLOGY

The XIIIth Congress of the European Society for Rural Sociology will be held at Braga (Portugal) between 1-4 April, 1986. The theme of the Congress will be Survival Strategies in Rural Society: Continuity and Change. Local arrangements for the organisation of the Congress are in the hands of the Portuguese Host Committee, under the Chairmanship of Manuel V. Cabral. Michael Redclift, Chairman of the Scientific Committee of the Society, is in charge of the academic arrangements; his address is Wye College, near Ashford, Kent TN25 5AH, England.


VICENTE, Ana and Maria Reynolds de SOUZA, *Family Planning in Portugal: How an Information and Education Project was Implemented*, Lisbon: Comissão da Comissão Feminina 1984. 56pp., Plates. No Price given.
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Unity in Diversity (P.E. de Josselin de Jong 1984a) presents the results of an international symposium on 'Indonesia as a Field of Anthropological Study' held at Leiden, The Netherlands, 22-26 November 1982. The idea of a 'Field of Anthropological Study' (FAS) derives from Jan Petrus Benjamin de Josselin de Jong's inaugural lecture, 'De Maleische archipel als ethnologisch studieveld', delivered on 24th May 1935 upon his appointment to the Chair of Indonesian and General Anthropology at Leiden University. In this lecture, the speaker presented a programme for further anthropological studies in the archipelago guided by attention to features of a system comprising the structural core of numerous ancient Indonesian cultures. This programme, intended to reveal the ethnological unity behind the obvious cultural diversity, had already been significantly exemplified by the path-breaking survey of eastern Indonesian social forms in T.A.E. van Wouden's doctoral dissertation Sociale Structuurtypen in de Groote Oost, defended 26th February 1935, supervised by J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong, and today accepted as an analytically original precursor to Lévi-Strauss's Elementary Structures of Kinship. Patrick Edward de Josselin de Jong (1980a: 317) writes, 'I cannot now, forty years later, contribute anything to answer the question to what extent van Wouden's comparative research led de Josselin de Jong to recognize Indonesia as a field of ethnological study or whether van...
Wouden was stimulated by his supervisor's teaching to apply the field of ethnological study approach to eastern Indonesian societies. Whatever the answer may be, these two publications of 1935 effectively serve as the joint inspiration for "ethnologisch studieveld work.

Encouraged by a revival of Indonesian language, literature and anthropological studies following the post-colonial doldrums of the late 1950s and early 1960s, the Leiden group decided to consider how much the idea of an Indonesian field of anthropological study had been revised since 1935. In order to keep the discussion from being confined only to the Leiden circle, they invited an international group of scholars to comment on papers written primarily by the Leiden authors. By publishing the results of a seminar so defined, they are inviting further international attention to the occasion for such re-examination, the boundaries and focus of the field, the elements of its structural core, and the use of their approach.

P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1984b: viii) says that their intentions were turned into a definite plan by the publication of three books: *The Flow of Life: Essays on Eastern Indonesia* (Fox 1980a), *Nature and Man in South East Asia* (Stott 1978) and *Natural Symbols in South East Asia* (Milner 1978). Indeed, a variety of publishing activities has made maritime Southeast Asia increasingly convenient for scholarly treatment as a special anthropological area. Among these are two series of the Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology, Leiden: the *Verhandelingen*, of which *Unity in Diversity* is the latest, and the Translation Series. The latter is important not only because it has made many significant works of Dutch scholarship available in English, but also because some of these works are occasionally difficult to obtain even in the Dutch original. Of immediate relevance is the appearance in the Translation Series in English of van Wouden's *Types of Social Structure in Eastern Indonesia* (1968) and *Structural Anthropology in the Netherlands: A Reader* (P.E. de Josselin de Jong [ed.] 1977a), which makes available the inaugural lecture and several other classic papers central to the FAS direction. Among these are van Ossenbruggen's investigation of numerical classification on Java, Pigeaud's study of Javanese divination, Onvlee's splendid discussion of the social symbolism behind Sumbanese dam construction, van Wouden's paper on double descent in West Sumba, and J. P.B. de Josselin de Jong's long critique of Lévi-Strauss's theory of elementary kinship structures. *Unity in Diversity* and *Structural Anthropology in the Netherlands*, both edited by P.E. de Josselin de Jong, are as close to being a wedded pair as any two collections of essays by diverse hands can be. Contrary to what might be expected, less than half the papers in *Symbolic Anthropology in the Netherlands* (edited by P.E. de Josselin de Jong and Schwimmer, 1982) have any bearing on Indonesia, and in some that do the connection is slight.

Maritime Southeast Asia still lacks and undoubtedly will never have its own *Homo Hierarchicus*, but the sense that it is drawing together as an international area of scholarship is
bolstered by several recent collections of archaeological, historical, geographical and anthropological papers conceived within a broad scope. Among these books may be mentioned *Sunda and Sahul: Prehistoric Studies in Southeast Asia, Melanesia and Australia* (Allen, Golsen and Jones [eds.] 1977), *Early South East Asia: Essays in Archaeology, History and Historical Geography* (Smith and Watson [eds.] 1979), and *Indonesia: The Making of a Culture* (Fox [ed.] 1980b) - all of which are useful for understanding the prehistorical background and population events behind any Southeast Asian field of study.

Among primarily historical works may be mentioned *Perceptions of the Past in Southeast Asia* (Reid and Marr [eds.] 1979), *The Development of Indonesian Society from the Coming of Islam to the Present Day* (Aveling [ed.] 1979), the fourth and much expanded edition of D.G.E. Hall's *A History of South-East Asia* (1981), O.W. Wolters's *History, Culture and Region in South East Asian Perspective* (1982), and *Slavery, Bondage and Dependency in Southeast Asia* (Reid [ed.] 1983). Within the national boundaries of modern Indonesia, these historical works are strongly biased toward the western islands and, inevitably for history, generally limited in scholarly imagination to topics that can be approached through written documents and inscriptions.

Wolters's attempt to establish features of the 'cultural matrix' of ancient Southeast Asia invites comparison with J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong's 'structural core'. Wolters makes no reference to any of the literature on the studieveld movement, nor to any of its ideas. Wolters's conception embraces both mainland and maritime Southeast Asia, while de Josselin de Jong was concerned only with the island world. P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1984c: 2) abbreviates the structural core to four elements. First is the resilience of Indonesian cultures toward foreign cultural elements, which they Indonesianized, rather than rejecting or taking over unchanged. Second there is 'socio-cosmic dualism', followed by double descent and finally asymmetric connubium. This list, however, reflects changes in attitude that have taken place in the last fifty years. J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong (1977) originally described a more complex, and empirically more improbable, configuration, which included unilineal descent groups linked in a closed chain of affinal relations, a hierarchical system of etiquette, rights and duties in which bride-givers were superior, the constant circulation throughout society in opposite directions of 'masculine' and 'feminine' goods, a cross-cutting system of phratri dualism linked by symmetric connubium, double unilineal descent, and a primary four-fold division of society. Furthermore, the dualistic social division was part of a cosmic dichotomy. Other elements of the core were the distribution of functions among individual dignitaries and groups, the preference for particular numbers, caste-like systems existing prior to Hinduism but culturally closely related to Indian caste, and finally a variety of foreign influences and Indonesian responses to them. J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong recognized that the social structural elements were found in eastern Indonesia (Timor, Kei, Tanimbar, and the Moluccas) and in the west (particularly the Batak peoples of
In contrast, the following features may be extracted from Wolters' discussion (1982: 1-15) of the 'cultural matrix'. The ancient inhabitants of Southeast Asia lived in fairly isolated groups, of which none should be deemed peripheral because all looked outward and, 'Every centre was a centre in its own right as far as its inhabitants were concerned.' The major language families (Austronesian, Austroasiatic, Sino-Tibetan, Tai-Kadai) were represented by numerous local and isolated speech variations. Linguistic similarities did not provide cultural bridges. Kinship provided the idiom of social organization, but it was cognatic and lineages were relatively unimportant. Leadership was based on a 'big man' model, centering around 'men of prowess' possessing an abnormal amount of personal or innate 'soul stuff'. Leadership became associated with an ancestor cult, with special speech forms for addressing superiors, with prestigious public life and with a hierarchy established by the leader who rewarded achievements and meritorious deeds with titles and gifts. The arrival of Hinduism brought ideas of personal devotion (bhakti), popular cults of Śiva and Viṣṇu, elitist teacher-inspired sects, and divine kingship.

Without yet offering criticism or appreciation of these two speculative schemes, we may note that though they could be rendered compatible in various ways, they generally place emphasis differently where they are closest, and they strikingly diverge when it comes to issues of kinship and leadership. Wolters' attempt to impose the Melanesian model of 'big men' is precipitate and at least likely to cause confusion before it brings clarity in considering the multitude of issues about leadership in the various Southeast Asian regions.

Whereas the studieveld places unilineal descent, in its variety, and marriage alliance at the centre of interest, Wolters simply leaves societies with these social concerns out of the Southeast Asian picture. Characteristic of historians who have worked in Indonesia and Malaysia, he shows an implicit bias of interest for the cultures of the western part of the region, commonly, but not always, characterized by literacy, cognatic kinship, strong Indian influence, and involvement in problems of state formation. Conversely, the studieveld is also characterized by what it leaves aside. Though most of the recent practitioners have carried out research in the west, especially on Sumatra, J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong and van Wouden eventually acquired field experience in the east, on Kisar, Wetar and Sumba (J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong 1937, 1947; van Wouden 1977). Unusual in Indonesian scholarship, the studieveld model was worked out in large part, but not exclusively, for eastern Indonesia, though also derivative from and applicable to Batak groups of Sumatra and certainly relevant to highland peoples of Burma and Laos. Attempts have been made to find relevance for it in Java, in a rigid way by Rassers and others, more cautiously by P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1970).

A field of study suggests boundaries and perhaps a focus. In his inaugural lecture, J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong proposed the
The problem, however, is inherent in the word and its history and cannot therefore be disposed of simply by setting the facts straight. Bosch (1951: 393) has remarked that if 'Indonesia' has any meaning it is 'the archipelago of the Indus...which naturally is nonsense'. It was made generally known by the title of a book by Bastian (1884) and taken over by Wilken in his writings, where Indonesians were 'the inhabitants of the Malay Archipelago, the Philippines, the population groups of Indonesian origin in Madagascar, and also the Papuans of West New Guinea' and Indonesia 'covered the archipelago of the Dutch East Indies together with British Borneo and Portuguese Timor' (Ave 1976: 228). In other words, in Wilken's usage, the region occupied by Indonesians was vaster than the geographical area termed Indonesia. Several authors have noted that Bastian did not invent the name, but adopted it from J.R. Logan (1850), who accepted it from a friend G.S. W. Earl, who invented it and proposed that it stand for the Malay Archipelago (see R. Jones 1973 and Ave 1976 for a list of relevant publications).

As a scholarly contrivance Indonesia did not therefore originally refer to the territory of the Netherlands East Indies, but early in the twentieth century it was adopted by nationalists as a name for the developed Malay language, which with its burgeoning literature was conceived as the 'linguistic vehicle of national unity' (Ricklefs 1981: 176) and taken over in the names of many nationalist groups and parties. A demand by the nationalist politician Muhammad H. Thamrin that the Netherlands Indies be named Indonesia and that the word Inlander (native) be replaced by Indonesian in government documents was rejected in 1940 by the Dutch government in exile (Ave 1976: 229; Pluvier 1974: 140). Of course, the word was eventually adopted as the name of the new republic.

The point of the preceding review is to demonstrate how the scholarly and political aspects of the quandary about what Indonesia means play back on each other. It is not the case that
Indonesian national unity lacked a basis, but none of the factors which suggest unity indicate that the national boundaries be drawn where they were in fact drawn. This problem was recognized by the Indonesian nationalists. In his defence oration at his political trial of 1930, Sukarno conceded that "Physically [only] Indonesia has been made one; physically she has been bound into a unified whole. But this unity, according to one socialist, is "an imposed unity, merely the unity of subjection" (Paget 1975: 86). It is interesting to compare this rhetoric with J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong's defence five years later (1977: 168) of the Indonesian field of study:

We in Holland are accustomed to hearing the views expressed that the population of the Netherlands East Indies is by no means homogeneous; that the only thing knitting together the many parts of this archipelago, which is as heterogeneous as can be with regard to race, language and culture, is the authority of the mother country; and that hence there is no question of a national, indigenous feeling of unity. It is not my intention at present to deliberately refute this statement, superficial and contrary to reality though it may be. I would rather call your attention to a few phenomena which shed light on the significance of the Malay Archipelago as an ethnographic field of study, and which will, I hope, at the same time reveal at least something of the unity which makes the diversity all the more instructive and interesting.

This statement obviously responds to political events of the times, as well as to the fact that most anthropological fieldwork in Indonesia was undertaken then by administrative or legal officers serving in the Netherlands East Indies or by Catholic and Protestant missionaries, all of whom generally had received anthropological instruction during their university studies (P.E. de Josselin de Jong 1984b: vii). It may be recalled that at the time the statement was made the full territorial limits of the Indonesian colony were barely a quarter of a century old and that the Dutch were to possess the Netherlands East Indies for only a further seven years.

A major problem facing the nationalists was the temptation to expand their nationalist aspirations beyond the bounds of the old Dutch East Indies. Fortunately the views of Mohammad Hatta, Indonesia's first Vice-President, prevailed, namely, that Indonesia be established on the basis of the unifying factors present in the situation, identified with the territory of the former Dutch-held state (H.P. Jones 1973: 273). Until 1975, this principle effectively guided the policy of the Indonesian government and justified the campaign for acquiring the racially, culturally and linguistically predominantly unrelated Irian Jaya (West New Guinea) in 1962. Sukarno was sometimes tempted to step over these bounds, as seen by the episode during World War II when he allowed
himself to be drawn into the short-lived Japanese-condoned project for a Greater Indonesia, incorporating Malaya, or the period of 'Konfrontasi' with Malaysia (Pluvier 1977: 355-6; H.P. Jones 1973: 273).

The arbitrary nature of the present make-up of Indonesia was also demonstrated by moves by various foreign powers to break it up. This aim had been part of the original Japanese plan in World War II. It surfaced again in the Dutch-instigated 'United States of Indonesia' after the war and in an army-led rebellion in Sumatra, covertly supported by the Eisenhower administration. Indonesia is currently involved in a costly war in the former Portuguese part of Timor of ten years' duration, which marks the first lasting deviation from the original principles of the Republic's territorial formation.

Unity in Diversity is, of course, the official (but slightly inaccurate) translation of the Indonesian national motto, Bhinneka Tunggal Ika (Ricklefs 1981: 244), sometimes rendered 'diversity in unity' (Peacock 1973: 135). The motto derives from an Old Javanese Buddhist text of the fourteenth century and expresses the ultimate identity of Buddha and Siwa. Literally it means 'different they are, one are they'. Dutch scholars have tended to regard 'Indonesia' as extending beyond the national entity, while nevertheless looking out at the island world from the political formation to which their scholarship has had such close institutional and historical ties. This circumstance no doubt lies behind Blust's claim (1980a: 2) that with the exception of H. Kern, who placed his Old Javanese studies in a comparative context of Malayo-Polynesian investigations, 'the Dutch contribution to comparative Austronesian linguistics has been characterized by a tendency to define its scope in political terms (the comparison of "Indonesian" languages), and by an absence of systematic reconstruction.' Of course, Austronesian languages extend from Easter Island to Madagascar and the boundaries of the family coincide with neither national nor cultural limits. P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1984d: 238) appears to be willing now to drop the idea of an 'Indonesian' field and also to contemplate variant levels of fields of study.

P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1984c: 3-7) wishes to identify three periods in the studieveld tradition. The first period dates from 1935 until 1956. Dutch regulations did not permit persons to be sent under government auspices to do anthropological or linguistic research until they had proven themselves by writing a doctoral thesis based on library research in The Netherlands. Van Wouden's survey and P.E. de Josselin de Jong's study of Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan (1951) were written under these circumstances and both applied a model to the information found in the ethnographic literature. The lack of direct experience inevitably affected the way they handled the data and contributed to a sense that the model was leading the interpretation of facts, rather than facts determining the interpretation of models. 'One looked for resemblances. When there were imperfections in the resemblances (as was often the case), one had a. to explain the imperfections, and b. to find data which would outweigh them.' After World War II, van Wouden and P.E. de Josselin de Jong managed to obtain field experience in West Sumba and Negri Sembilan, respect-
ively. Both authors published articles in 1956 (republished in 1977) reflecting this experience and marking 'a turning point which, in retrospect, was so influential that I do it the honour of calling it a period.' Their application of the model became less rigid and the model open to modification. The final period brings the group to the present. In this period they distinguish between rule principles and idea principles, which appear to be jural regulations affecting groups on the one hand and ideological or classificatory principles on the other. The terms are exemplified, but not defined, in Unity and Diversity (P.E. de Josselin de Jong 1984d: 238, 242, 248-50). The group also claims to be less interested in imperfect resemblances than in transformations, inspired by Lévi-Strauss's 'logical transformations' without yet being quite the same thing. 'What we now need to do, is to... adopt a coherent, well-defined method.'

Referring to van Wouden's model of a two-phratry system of four marriage classes based on matrilateral marriage and double unilineal descent, Fox (1980f: 233-4) has remarked that none of the fourteen ethnographers contributing to The Flow of Life found confirmation for it and that several had shown it to be neither a genuine historical reconstruction, nor a valid interpretation of ethnographic evidence, but instead an unworkable illusion based on the merging of the different analytic constructs. 'Since the '50s, research on this subject has aimed primarily at disentangling the various incompatible elements of this model.' Curiously, Blust (1980a, 1980b) has tried to demonstrate an unmodified version of this model for Proto-Austronesian society. This step led him to conclude that the ethnological field of study approach 'must be viewed with renewed interest by all historically minded anthropologists' (1980a: 225).

The elements of the model are indeed heterogeneous. The criterion of response to foreign influence merely refers to a disparate set of factors which, though important in Indonesia, are of a kind that must be given careful consideration everywhere. J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong's comments about Indonesian resilience, itself real enough, is reminiscent of similar observations elsewhere. 'The combination of large-scale borrowing - or inventing - with a strong tendency to retain the old is a characteristic feature of Indian culture' (Dumont 1952: 83). The question of socio-cosmic dualism relates to Durkheimian influence on early Dutch anthropology, often described (Needham 1963: xxxii; P.E. de Josselin de Jong 1972), and to the lessons the Dutch took from Durkheim and Mauss's essay on primitive classification. What most inspired several contributors to The Flow of Life was not the complex model, but van Wouden's determination to treat social structure and social classification as a totality in Mauss's sense (Fox 1980f: 3).

Van Wouden showed that an asymmetric marriage system functions equally well with either a matrilineal or patrilineal rule of descent. He then inferred that such a system would necessarily involve both matrilineal and patrilineal groups or clans (1968: 90-1, 163). He built up his phratry model on this basis. These points had already been discovered and demonstrated by Fortune (1933),
though neither van Wouden nor J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong refers to this paper, so directly related to their own model. Van Wouden's system can easily be diagrammed (Fortune 1933: 8; van Wouden 1968: 91; P.E. de Josselin de Jong 1980b: 37). The empirical difficulty is that, as van Wouden later realized (1977: 218), in Indonesia double unilineality governing groups does not occur in conjunction with asymmetric marriage rules. Both institutions are found on Sumba, but double descent is characteristic only of Kodi in the west, while asymmetric marriage alliance is practised in the east.

In attempting a revision of Murdock's classification (1940) of societies with double descent, Goody (1961) proposed that double descent be recognized only in societies with both matrilineal and patrilineal corporate groups - corporateness being defined as holding property. In his commentary Fischer (1961) accepted that recognition and naming of both kinds of groups by members of a society was essential, but declined to accept the criterion of corporateness, preferring instead to distinguish between double descent systems with and those without corporate groups. It is easy to sympathize with Fischer's position. As Bulmer (1961) remarked, 'does not this criterion [corporateness] suggest, for example, that because the Nuer lineage is not corporate, it is not particularly important?' I have tried to show (Barnes 1980b: 98, 117) that even where corporate groups are associated with unilineal descent in eastern Indonesia, it is corporateness which reveals complications and demands explanations rather than being itself an answer. However, P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1961) accepts neither the requirement of recognition, nor that of corporateness. Hence P.E. de Josselin de Jong says (1984c: 7) that van Wouden is correct to conclude that circulating connubium with generalized exchange was emphasized at the cost of double descent in eastern Sumba, 'but only if we concentrate on double descent as a "rule principle": the participants in this connubium system are the patrilineal descent groups. However, matrilineality is also recognized in this society, but is an "idea principle".' His example of the 'idea principle' of matrilineality is that in eastern Sumba a person is recognized as belonging to the highest nobility only if he is able to trace a purely high noble ancestry in the matriline as well as the patriline, without a single ancestor of lower nobility.

Since the author does not spell out what he means by 'idea principles', it is difficult to assess the notion without fear of misrepresenting it. Nevertheless, that rule principles should be entirely distinct rather than one kind of manifestation among many of idea principles seems doubtful. The above example shows that the Leiden authors recognize double descent even when its features are relevant to only a segment of a community. Furthermore, it raises the question whether P.E. de Josselin de Jong clearly distinguishes between double descent and cognatic kinship. Presumably, if any one of four grandparents were of inappropriate rank, ego's standing would be affected, but only two of the grandparents are related to him through a unilineal principle. The debates in Britain of the 1950s and early 1960s over the understanding of
descent, corporateness, complementary filiation, affinity and marriage alliance informed Kloos's critique (1963, 1964) of P.E. de Josselin de Jong's attempt to discover double unilineal descent among the Minangkabau of Sumatra and Negri Sembilan of western Malaysia. As de Josselin de Jong's book was originally conceived (1980b: 40), it did seem to be open to the objection that the author was looking for evidence of double unilineal groups; and seen in those terms the evidence simply failed to support a case. In the revised edition (1980b: 224), the author concedes that he is now less concerned with the question whether principles become manifest in actual descent groups. In keeping with this attitude, he chooses not to distinguish between descent and filiation, though he recognizes (1980b: 225) that other authors would deem much of his evidence for patrilineal descent in Minangkabau society as exemplifying patrifiliation to matrilineal descent groups or differential rules of inheritance.

P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1984c: 7) considers that the matriline in Toba Batak society is recognized in passing textiles and weaving equipment from mother to daughter. The father's heirloom treasures are divided among his sons, while those of the mother are divided among daughters (Niessen 1983: 468; 1984: 88), allegedly exemplifying double unilineal descent. These examples suggest that the 'idea principles' of the Leiden group are similar to Needham's formally presented 'elementary modes of descent' (Needham 1971: 10). However, the differential inheritance of household possessions according to the sex of parents and children is one of the more common examples of what is sometimes called parallel descent. By treating this Toba Batak example as evidence for double descent, the Leiden authors seem implicitly to reject Needham's list of six modes and to be returning to Murdock's recognition of only four kinds, bilateral (cognatic), patrilineal, matrilineal, and double - although Murdock (1949: 44-5) did not in fact count examples of parallel and alternating descent as double descent. There are indeed grounds for arguing that the six modes are not of the same analytic standing. The sixth, cognation, is not even a principle, nor do the six modes exhaust the formal possibilities (Barnes 1982b: 224 n.5). Following this line of thought, we might reduce the list to two principles, denominated patrilineal and matrilineal, which appear in a variety of formal combinations (compare Scheffler 1966: 544-5).

In van Wouden's (and Fortune's) original model of circulating connubium and double descent, the marriage system and the descent lines were plainly distinguished features, diagrammatically as well as in fact. There are, however, concomitant aspects of Indonesian societies with asymmetric marriage alliance which occasionally have been characterized as alternative descent lines. Among the Toba Batak the wife-takers must regard the wife-givers as a source of supernatural power, sahala, which may be beneficial, but which creates fear and respect. The wife-givers are the source of all life and prosperity (van Ossenbruggen 1935: 11), and they stand in the mortal world as the deputy of the High God (Vergouwen 1954: 55). Kloos (1963: 294) criticized Fischer for saying (1952: 118) that the sahala is inherited matrilineally because if the
mother's group does not help, one goes further to that of the mother's mother, whereas in fact sahala derives from the patrilineal group of the mother or mother's mother.

Like the Toba Batak, the Kédang and the neighbouring Lamaholot of the East Flores Regency compare wife-givers to Divinity. In Kédang, the 'trunk mother's brother' is spoken of as God, while the Lamaholot describe him as 'like a second God' (Barnes 1974: 247-50; 1977a: 150; 1979: 23). Both societies practise prescriptive asymmetric marriage alliance. The people of Roti, who do not have such a marriage system, do nevertheless recognize alliance between patrilineal groupings. Within alliance the Rotinese mark the tie to the 'mother's brother of origin' and the 'mother's mother's brother of origin' (Fox 1971; 1980d: 118-19). On Roti a person derives flesh and blood via his mother, and her agnates provide rituals sustaining his life. The nature of the alliance group is unspecified and may according to context be defined as a house, a lineage or a clan. In each case, of course, the grouping is patrilineal. In Kédang too the analytic notion of an alliance group cannot be given a fixed definition (Barnes 1980a: 81-5). In all three societies, if for some reason the genealogical mother's brother is unavailable as 'trunk mother's brother', the position passes to close agnatic relatives, either the son, brother or parallel cousin of the mother's brother. What Fox calls the line of maternal affiliation linking a Rotinese to the group of his mother's brother and mother's mother's brother is not matrilineal descent, but matrifiliation to patrilineally ordered alliance groups, within an overarching alliance relating the groups. According to Fox (1980d: 131), 'Instead of attending to the complex use of categories and the hierarchy of relations they can connote, van Wouden confounded levels of alliance by compressing them into one.' Given the structural relativity inherent in the alliance groups, the meaning of alliance cannot be located in the, only sporadically occurring, political content of marriage alliance among substantive groupings.

Hocart (1923) wrote that cross cousins in Fiji are 'gods to one another', ancestor and descendant, god and worshipper, even though the relationship is marked by ritualized ill manners and appropriation, in other words, a joking relationship. The Fiji pattern is symmetric, unlike the eastern Indonesian asymmetric arrangement under immediate consideration (there are, of course, also symmetric systems on Flores, Pantar, Alor and Timor). Miller (1984: 13) contrasts the institutionalized licence towards matrilateral kin in Fiji with the Indonesian pattern where maternal kin are ambivalently beneficial and harmful. Thus in Fiji a privilege may be conferred on a sister's son to take freely possessions from his mother's brother or mother's father. In fact this regional distinction does not exist. In Kédang a sister's son may claim some of his mother's brother's coconut trees at his mother's brother's funeral. By doing so he would, however, incur heavy obligations (Barnes 1974: 179).
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(1969: 122) said of relationships of this kind that they 'correspond to reciprocal rights and that, generally, when these rights are unequal, they correspond to a religious inequality.' A religious inequality is inevitably a hierarchy. J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong realized that if we abstract from the chain of alliances and look at the position of any one group, we see that it finds itself in the centre of a triad, constituting a micro-society. Each group in fact occupies three different positions from the point of view of hierarchy: wife-giver, wife-taker, and the centre of the triad. Alliances are accompanied by the exchange of goods and persons as well as a 'hierarchically based system of etiquette'.

Here is posed the question of the relation between the differential position of allies and the nature of hierarchy. Two underlying issues may also be referred to. As we know, Dumont (1966) has distinguished between hierarchy and social stratification, applying his idea of encompassment of contraries to hierarchy, whereas social stratification implies merely unequal access to power and resources. Furthermore, Leach has argued (1954: 211) that an asymmetric ('mayu-dama') marriage rule like that of the Kachin of Burma will not be found with stable equalitarian social organization because alliance inequality will lead to status inequality. Finally there is the problem of class systems in the archipelago. J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong (1977: 177) referred, perhaps incautiously, to 'the caste-like class systems found throughout Indonesia'. Although in terms of empirical groupings, as well as ideological categories, asymmetric alliance produces triads and other plural patterns, the alliance tie is basically dyadic, that is, wife-giver versus wife-taker. Native language idiom expressing alliance is also commonly dyadic. Wife-givers in Southeast Asia are religiously superior and in idiom and practice are analogous to ancestors or Divinity. This kind of superiority, however, is ultimately intransitive. You may be God or priest to me, and I may be God or priest to someone else, but you will not be God or priest to him; indeed, he may stand in that position to you. Social stratification, however, is transitive. There is a crucial difference, therefore, between the situational, religiously defined, inequality of affines and class inequality (Barnes 1974: 245). The former appears to me to be closer to what Dumont calls hierarchy, though what is being encompassed by what is a complicated question.

Leach (1952) criticized P.E. de Josselin de Jong's attempt to discover circulating connubium in Minangkabau society precisely because wife-givers are superior to wife-takers in Indonesia, as they are among the Kachin. This criticism actually constitutes an attack on the idea of a closed cycle of alliances as an empirical reality. It provoked de Josselin de Jong (1980b: 218-21) to reaffirm the difference between alliance status and social class by reference to Indonesian ethnography, though he now appears (1984c: 4) to prefer to speak of 'asymmetric' rather than 'circulating' connubium. This retreat is well advised because although in a model, and occasionally in fact, 'circulating connubium', 'alliance cycles' with closure, or what have you, is compatible
with alliance inequality, clear patterns of culturally recognized, stable alliance cycles leading to closed circles are actually quite rare in Indonesia. Though I agree, naturally, with de Josselin de Jong's rebuttal to Leach, Leach's arguments about combining alliance with class may help in explaining the confusing empirical variety we find in practical implementations of alliance ideologies. A good deal of Leach's discussion of Kachin alliance, the indeterminacy of groups, the importance of the status of mothers and wives, and even the oscillation between stratified and equalitarian community structures either obviously applies to Indonesian societies of the appropriate kind or could by argument be made to apply.

For example, Leach (1961: 84-6) shows that at each level of Kachin society, but particularly for chiefs, cycles of three groups, 'cousin circle paths', can form, establishing the equality of the parties, maintaining prestige by huge, but imaginary bridewealth obligations, and even forming the basis of large-scale political alliances. Van Wouden (1977: 217-19) concluded that a completely closed system of alliance relations would require a fixed number of groups, but that the arrangement had never been encountered in Indonesia. However, on Tanimbar the foremost groups of one community maintain asymmetric alliances with similar groups in other communities. On Sumba, royal lineages were linked by such alliances with similar lineages elsewhere. Van Wouden therefore spoke of the 'international character' of such alliances. This observation brings up two further considerations. In the first place, there is the historical question whether the precise maintenance of asymmetric alliances is not primarily an activity of an aristocracy, with commoners or non-aristocratic communities being unable or unconcerned for political, economic or class reasons to follow a strict pattern. The second matter is that this 'international' character affects alliance for all groups through the bridewealth objects, characteristically of outside derivation, which circulate among allies. The basically non-commercial exchanges at the centre of the community are therefore inextricably linked to foreign trade, and hence the essentially internal focus of social structure is simultaneously outward-looking (Barnes 1980b: 119). It is at precisely this point of internal/external orientation that Barraud has applied Dumont's conception of hierarchy to Tanebar-Evav society (1979, 1984, 1985).

Indonesian class systems, where they exist, commonly consist in rulers, aristocrats, commoners and slaves, with possible distinctions within each group. Lineages of aristocrats, commoners or slaves may belong to the same clan, and slave lineages sometimes obey the same alliance rules as the superior members of their clan (Barnes 1977a; Forth 1981: 414). Pigeaud (1962: 468-9) says that Javanese society as a whole in the fourteenth and preceding centuries was probably divided into the four classes of rulers, men of religion, commoners and bondmen, though the bondmen received no recognition. The Indian varna categories were known in East Java, but hardly corresponded to reality. In tenth-century Java, villages were relatively egalitarian. They were run by a council of authorities, *rama*, divided into those with special
functions, often four in number, and the other elders. The rama belonged to the anak wanua (children of the domain, earth), the dominant group of descendants of the presumed village founders. Inscriptions give few details of others in the village who were not anak wanua (de Casparis 1981: 136-7). Allowing for the somewhat imprecise nature of this picture, it would apply easily to parts of eastern Indonesia well into the twentieth century and, at least residually, still today—for example, in East Flores (Arndt 1940: 101-4). The quasi-democratic structure of the Javanese village contrasted with the hierarchic nature of central government. After the eighteenth century, the Javanese village theoretically replicated the central government (de Casparis 1981: 140-7). Remnants of Indian caste influence are most apparent in Bali and Lombok, where Howe argues (1985) that any attempt to compare Balinese title groups to Indian caste leads not to a simple answer, but to a multitude of supplementary questions. J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong did not explain what he meant by caste-like systems throughout Indonesia, culturally related to Indian caste, but existing before Hindu contact. In particular, the underlying opposition of purity and impurity in Indian caste is lacking for much of Indonesia.

Among his criteria were the distribution of functions among individual dignitaries and the preference for particular numbers. These two issues are often connected. Wolters includes the mandala pattern among his cultural complex. There is a tendency to represent village, regional or state structure by a numerically defined structure, commonly of even-numbered positions around a centre, such as the Javanese monca-pat and monca-lima (5 and 9 structures, respectively), described by van Ossenbruggen (1977). Tambiah's chapter seven (1976: 103-31) offers a survey of surveys in some respects of the Southeast Asian exploitation of mandala-like geometric patterns of several levels of complexity, rising to seventeen and thirty-three configurations in Buddhist state theory. Though the mandala strictly speaking belongs to Hindu and Buddhist influence in Southeast Asia, very similar patterns appear to be pre-Hindu. Tambiah says they constitute communities from clan-based societies practising slash-and-burn agriculture to complex polities of valley-based sedentary rice cultivators. He has united them under his phrase 'galactic-polity'.

In his chapter on dualism and tripartition, van Wouden (1968: 25-84) draws together information from the east for a variety of configurations, including the common system of four cooperating officials of diverse functions and a division between secular and sacred authority associated with ruler or political head and 'lord of the land', respectively. Among sources for East Flores not used by van Wouden, Vatter (1932: 81) and Arndt (1940: 101-4) describe an ideal pattern in which four autochthonous land-owning clans of a village share four offices called head (koten), hind quarter (kelen), sacrificer (hurit, from suri, sword), and speech (marang). At the sacrifice, the bearer of the office of koten holds the animal's head and subsequently receives it when the animal is divided. This official holds the animal from behind and normally receives the hind legs. Hurit kills the animal, while
Koten is the most prominent of the four ritual figures and assumes leadership over affairs within the village. Vatter calls him to some extent the minister of the interior, and Arndt says he is lord of the land. Kelen concerns himself with external affairs, especially peace and war and relations with neighbouring villages. There are generally wide divergences from the pattern throughout the region, and in places it appears to have been totally absent, but the Raja of Larantuka incorporated it into his governmental structure. A Timor myth connects this four-part authority structure with the story of four tribes who travelled from Malaysia to Larantuka, Flores and from there to Timor, leaving behind in Larantuka the ancestors of its raja (Grijzen 1904: 18; van Wouden 1968: 46). Influenced by van Ossenbruggen, Jansen (1977, originally 1933) described the numerology of Ambonese political classification, which was often of four-five structure, but sometimes simply a fourfold or twofold unit. The familiar four-quarter or saku pattern of Sumatran cultures has parallels, and no doubt at least linguistic influence, throughout the archipelago. P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1980b: 108, 153) also found the four around the centre pattern in Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan territorial organization, and Schulte Nordholt (1971) has comprehensively described a similar arrangement and its elaborations in Timorese political history.

The preference for particular numbers, referred to by J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong, actually concerns a complex of related issues. One of these literally concerns the frequent use of a specific number or pair of numbers for classification, in which case they serve as conventions or templates, what Bergaigne called 'frameworks prepared beforehand' (Barnes 1982a: 15-17; Lévy-Bruhl 1926: 196). Examples are the frequent use of seven in Malay magic (Skeat 1900: 50), the special symbolic preference for nine among the Wemale of Seran (Jensen 1946: 55), the preference for eight or its even fractions to express completion or fulfilment on Sumba (Onvlee 1977: 157), four as an expression of unity among the Atoni of Timor (Cunningham 1973: 212), and three to express completeness and nine to express totality on Roti (Fox 1980d: 110). Behind these practices lies the distinction between the even and odd number series. Generally even numbers are complete numbers, with exceptions as just seen (i.e. Roti), and Dempwoff (1938) has reconstructed, at least for the western branch, words of Proto-Austronesian for both the odd- and even-numbered series, as well as for 'hundred' and 'thousand'. Dahl (1981: 53) accepts that reflexes of the root for 'hundred' are widely distributed in Austronesian languages outside of Formosa, but recognizes 'thousand' only in western languages.

The symbolic or classificatory use of specific numbers has been found to relate to the underlying opposition between the odd- and even-numbered series (Barnes 1982a), and the older Dutch contributions to symbolic numerology could perhaps be expanded and deepened by attention to this background. The symbolic interchangeability of numbers also is only to be understood by reference to the opposition between the two series. In Wemale, Seran, odd numbers are preferred to even numbers and appear to be to some
extent interchangeable (Jensen 1948: 55ff.). The same seems to hold true on Roti (Fox 1980d: 110) and is certainly true of Kédayang (Barnes 1974, 1975, 1982a). In Rindi, east Sumba, two, four, eight, and sixteen are symbolically equivalent (Forth 1981: 35; compare Adams 1980: 216-18). Very similar cultures in closely adjacent regions can differ as to which series they regard as preferable. In Kédayang, Lembata odd numbers are propitious ('the numbers of life'), while in Rindi, Sumba, even numbers are propitious (Forth 1981: 211).

Austronesian languages have ten-based number systems. Lancy (1983: 104, 106) says of the number systems of the Austronesian languages of New Guinea, which like those farther west are base-ten and have terms for 100 and 1000, that they are flexible and appear to be used in a variety of applications. Unlike other Papua-New Guinea systems, as true counting systems, they do treat number as a concept. Furthermore, an Austronesian-speaking fishing community, the Ponam, where Lancy and his colleagues conducted Piagetian tests, was found to provide the necessary environmental support for cognitive development in Western terms, whereas it was uncertain that other kinds of societies in Papua-New Guinea did so (1983: 145). Austronesian numbers appear to have been relatively recently introduced there. Dahl (1981) appears to attribute the development of the Austronesian numeral system to cultural growth connected with seafaring, migration and above all trade. 'Even very primitive forms of trade call for numerals' (Dahl 1981: 46). These systems and their use in trade also imply the ability to perform basic arithmetical operations, at least for smaller quantities. In this light Jansen's comments (1977: 103) on Ambonese symbolic arithmetic take on special interest.

After this survey of factors, the question may now be taken up as to the use of the idea of the anthropological field of study. Fox (1980e: 330-1) has written that 'research in the social categories of particular societies has tended not to dispel the notion of a structural core but rather to reinterpret it.' However, P.E. de Josselin de Jong (1984d: 240) thinks it remarkable that though persons have suggested additions and deletions, no one has questioned the utility or status of the structural core as such, about which he confesses to have grave doubts. He prefers to speak of a 'basis for comparison', the constituents of which are 'basic elements'. We may wonder whether this modification represents anything more than a shift of metaphor. The similarity of J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong's programme to the recommendations of Eggan (1954) and Evans-Pritchard (1965), that controlled comparison should be of linguistically and ethnologically related societies, has been noted by various authors (see Fox 1980c: 5). The Leiden authors also distrust broad statistical comparisons. P.E. de Josselin de Jong argues that the studieveld conception, being programmatic, is to be distinguished from the cultural area method of American anthropology, which is based on proven common traits. There is something unusual about a fifty-year-old programme that has not yet reconstituted itself into a synopsis of proven results.

There is no doubt, though, that scholars will continue to work with an open-ended set of comparative themes. Among these
is the general question of descent. We can expect a variety of principles to be exploited in any society. Societies that organize corporate or non-corporate descent groups patrilineally are apt to have neighbours who do so matrilineally, but they may also have neighbours with what in effect are cognatic descent groups (Barnes 1980b). Similarly, symmetric and asymmetric prescriptive systems are apt to be adjacent, and they are also apt to have related, non-prescriptive or simply cognatic neighbours, especially in eastern Indonesia (Needham 1984: 227). Whatever is meant by prescriptive alliance, non-prescriptive societies in the east are likely to have institutions that are relevant to the theme of alliance (Fox 1980d).

Blust observes (1980a: 205) that the majority of western Indonesians reckon descent through bilateral kindreds and lack extended corporate groups. These have been 'lost over a more or less continuous area in the Malay Peninsula, Java, Sumbawa, Borneo, parts of Sulawesi, and the Philippines.' Except for Bima, the societies in question speak Western Malayo-Polynesian languages. There are, of course, cognitive systems on Flores, Pantar, Alor, Timor and in the Moluccas. Sumatran groups speaking languages of the Western Malayo-Polynesian family have descent systems and sometimes alliance systems that make them not just directly, but intimately comparable to Central Malayo-Polynesian-speaking communities of eastern Indonesia. Blust finds it difficult to explain the distribution of cognitive societies by diffusion of a common influence or by parallel development. Berthe (1970) attributed the cognitive system of Java to wet-rice agriculture, but this factor will hardly serve for all societies in question. Like the studieveld, Berthe's survey is notable for leaving out of the picture the cognitive peoples of Borneo (see King 1978). Fox (1980f: 234) remarks that a large percentage of Austronesian societies do not fit the simple type of bilateral versus prescriptive and unilineal. He proposes that the proto-terminologies of the various linguistic sub-families be worked out before ambitious attempts like Blust's be made to arrive at the proto-organization for all of Austronesia. This effort would also provide a background for establishing smaller anthropological fields. This approach should facilitate coping with the diffusion of social forms across the boundaries of major language families, such as occurs where Austronesian confronts non-Austronesian languages on Timor, in the Moluccas and in Irian Jaya, and runs against Austroasiatic languages on the Southeast Asian mainland.

In addition to the themes of descent and alliance, or their absence, there are further comparative factors requiring consideration. Among these are the common dual division between secular or war leader and the lord of the land, the differential distribution of ritual offices (often four in number), and the issue of social classes. The distinction between male and female cosmological principles appears to be more general than that between male and female cycles of goods exchanged in connection with marriage. The relation of external trade (and warfare and slavery) to these internal systems of exchange is extremely important. Also pertinent is the co-existence of international trade in some areas with
non-cash economies and local, ritualized, permanent barter networks of subsistence goods and crafts. Numeracy and the possibility of an ancient and widespread knowledge of writing (de Casparis 1975: 1; Blust 1976: 33,36) also deserve consideration. Niessen's suggestion (1984) that textiles be added to the list of elements receives support from the fact that early Austronesian forms exist for weaving cloth, the loom and the weaving sword.

Fox (1980e: 331) has pointed to the shared social category of the house for descent groupings, relative age categories, and the reference to 'trunks' and 'origins' as metaphors for social relationships like that between mother's brother and sister's child (see also Barnes 1977; 1979: 29). In this respect, reference may also be made to the orientation of building material in the construction of houses and boats. Houseposts commonly have to retain the orientation of the original tree, and evidence has recently begun to emerge that this rule of orientation expressed horizontally as 'move to the right' may well be widespread and serve as a powerful social metaphor for marriage regulations (Barnes 1974: 337 - s.v. wana pan; 1975: 82-3; Forth 1981: 515 - s.v. movement to the right; Howe 1983: 152). Direction terms are a central issue (Blust 1980a: 220; Barnes 1974: 78-89), as is the yearly calendar, especially as it is marked by celestial events (see Barnes 1974: 117-21 and the references cited there).

This list is not exhaustive, and some factors offered here may indeed prove to be only scattered and uncommon. I would prefer to work with an expandable list and to include items at various stages of proven relevance, starting with those which are known to be of concern everywhere, but including some that are not always present and others which are speculatively offered on the chance that they will be found to have more importance than at present recognized (e.g. rules that things must circulate to the right). Smaller areas of common history and languages should be well worked out with constant reference to pan-Austronesian forms. An approach that restricts itself too much by reference to linguistic boundaries will not deal adequately with cultural comparison. Pragmatically we ought not to exclude non-Austronesian-speaking communities directly associated with Austronesian social patterns. What use does the FAS have? It has definitely had programmatic value. That stimulus will remain for all who read the relevant literature. That it ought to be tenaciously defended and preserved at all cost now, I doubt. It is, after all, only one among several ways of training ourselves what questions are useful to ask. Boundaries may be left to take care of themselves, but most would probably now concede that 'Indonesia' is not the proper name for an ethnological field.

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'The "white" wants to learn about Swazi traditions.' This was the final sentence with which the chief of the area I had chosen for my fieldwork in Swaziland summed up my long speech. I had tried to convince him (but in this case, due to rather special circumstances, it was a 'her') that I wished to live and indeed was capable of living in one of the homesteads under her control; and I had tried to explain as clearly as I could what I wanted to do among her people and how long I was planning to stay. After my first meeting with the chief, I had to wait for the local political elections to take place and for the libandla (the local general council) to be held, so that I could be granted permission to live there; only then could I transfer to 'my' area.

I was eager to see which homestead had been chosen for me by the libandla. The chief was very positive about the matter, leaving no room for further discussion: my umuti (homestead) was to be one of the richest in the area, 'the most suitable for me'. It had a concrete house, many fields and a large cattle byre. The headman, who was employed by the railway company, was a counsellor to the chief and a very prominent man in the community. He had probably had a part in the decision taken by the libandla, and was certainly a 'trusted' man who could assume the responsibility of looking after me. I arrived on a Saturday, and early on the Sunday I undertook fieldwork in Swaziland for my doctoral dissertation at the University of Siena, Italy. In Swaziland, I relied on the help and assistance of the staff of the Social Science Research Unit, University of Swaziland. Here, I found a most stimulating and friendly environment, which was more than essential for the success of my research. I wish also to thank two friends, Joan Knowles and David Collett, for the help they provided in discussing this paper.
babe (the father and head of the homestead) left for his job. I was left with make (the mother) and an ever-changing number of children.

What did make expect of me? Her husband had been happy to have me as his guest, as an opportunity to raise his social status, but now she was left to deal with me, the umlumbi ('white'). Her expectations were in reality rather simple and primarily based on the fact that I was an umlumbi. I would not and could not eat the food she normally cooked, I would not eat with my hands, sleep on the floor, or use their lavatory. Therefore, she cooked rice for me, gave me a spoon, and provided me with a mattress, though in the case of the last, she did not know what I was going to do. She could not forget that first and foremost I was an umlumbi; but she also needed to give me a status known to her and through which she could define and try to control me. The most obvious thing I could be was a guest, even if a white one.

However, I did not behave as a guest. I remember clearly the very first night in my umuti, when make came with a metal tray (I do not know how and where she had found it) with a dish and a spoon upon it. She left it on the floor, but then came back with a chair for me. Very much confused and embarrassed, I simply refused to eat alone, on a chair, with a spoon. I walked into the kitchen and sat down on the floor with the children. Make stared at me, not knowing how to react to this strange, rather astonishing umlumbi. Sitting on the kitchen floor, that very first night, I upset the cultural stereotype of an umlumbi, leaving make in a state of complete uncertainty. But at that time I was not able to grasp what was happening and what my behaviour meant for my new mother.

I went even further. Helped by my interpreter (a Swazi girl I hired to work for me), I learnt how to be useful and cooperative in the 'house': first I helped to wash the dishes, then the two of us offered to take turns sweeping the floor in the morning; one afternoon we went and fetched water from the communal tap. I also started to take care of a little child, the son of one of make's sisters who worked in town. Finally, one morning I saw make washing her clothes. Wanting to be of use and hoping to have a chance to talk to her, I offered to help. She looked at me with surprise, then handed me the shirt she was washing and walked off, leaving me with a huge pile of dirty clothes. Afterwards, when the washing was on the line, she welcomed me in the house, calling me mntfuxane (her daughter). It was the first time she had ever referred to me in this way. At first I was delighted to be accepted as one of the family, ignorant as I was of the real meaning of my new position. This, however, soon became clear.

We had heard make complaining that she had too many small children and no daughters old enough to help. But from that day, make treated me as her daughter, and my interpreter became my assistant, so make could rejoice at the unexpected gift of having two grown-up daughters.

From then on, make started to behave very differently: she would leave in the morning, saying we could feed the children;
she stopped fetching the water; and one morning we woke up to find that the fire had not been lit and the children had been left on their own. Little by little, she gave up all her responsibilities, praising our good nature and efficiency with her friends, who started to be invited frequently to our umutši.

All this happened during the first month of my fieldwork. While it was happening I had no way of realizing what was going on, and the situation got out of control. Despite my new role as a daughter, I was determined to continue with what I felt was my 'real' research. Every morning there would be dishes to wash, children to be looked after, wood to be cut or collected; but I would also go out with my interpreter to do 'research', walking to new homesteads, meeting new people, collecting new data, sketching new genealogies. Then in the afternoon, back at our umutši, we would become daughters again, and as such fulfil all our tasks.

At this time, I wrote in my diary:

I have lost control of the situation and our position in the umutši is becoming unbearable. Make is really going too far: she considers us her servants and she shamelessly orders us to do anything she wants. But I cannot see how I can change what is happening.

I was wrong: make did not consider us servants; she just considered us her daughters. But the situation remained unbearable; I felt my research was suffering from it, because I did not have enough time or energy to devote to it. Soon after writing this note, I firmly decided that I could not accept the existing situation any more. But how could I change it? My interpreter and I tried to talk with make, but all she replied was that she was very pleased to have us with her ('I bet she is', was my comment).

I finally realised that the situation was quite simple, and very much at hand. Every time I visited a homestead, I would ask about any makoti (wife and daughter-in-law) living there; I was particularly interested in a makoti's status vis-à-vis a gogo (grandmother and mother-in-law). I very soon discovered that the distinctive characteristic of a recently married makoti was that she did not have a kitchen of her own, and therefore had to cook with gogo or, more precisely, for gogo. Her status completely changed when she was allowed to set up her own fireplace.¹ More-

¹ Even if it is commonly assumed that a makoti will be allowed to have her kitchen after delivering her first child (and this was the usual statement Swazi informants would make), I found that the 'rule' is not followed in any strict way. I met daughters-in-law with a number of children who still had to cook for gogo, and newly married girls who already had their own fireplace. The decision as to when to let a makoti have an independent kitchen, and therefore a more independent status, lies entirely with her husband or his father (if he is the head of the homestead). However, a gogo's position in the umutši (depending, for instance, on
over, I found that, from a gogo's point of view, a daughter lost through marriage was not replaced by a daughter-in-law acquired by her son and brought into the homestead. This was because, as one gogo told me, 'my daughter would fetch water for me, collect wood for me, do my washing, look after my other children, and cook for me in my kitchen'.

After a long conversation with a makoti, I suddenly realised what the solution to my problem was: I was make's daughter, and I ought to become her daughter-in-law. It was obvious that what I needed most was a kitchen. I just had to find an excuse to justify such an innovation - after all, I was an umlumbi and, in the eyes of my hosts, still had some independence - and I would have solved my problems.

I told make that, because of my research, I had to wake up very early in the morning and come back home very late at night, as I would be spending all day from dawn to sunset with another woman, following her in all her activities and daily tasks; therefore, I had to have a very early breakfast and very late dinner. I pointed out the inconvenience of my schedule for the whole family, and suggested providing myself with a small gas stove to cook for my interpreter and myself. Make did not understand the purpose of my research, but she understood very well what a new kitchen in the house would mean. However, there was no way she could object to my decision.

Within two days, I had provided myself with a stove and sufficient food. As I expected, my status suddenly changed, together with my responsibilities in the homestead. It was now fully accepted, and what is more, expected by everyone, that I would wash only my own dishes and clothes, fetch only the water I needed, and cook only the food for myself and my 'dependant' - my interpreter. Make accepted the change - but she stopped calling me her daughter. Nevertheless, the transformation was not so sudden for her that she had to resume her full responsibilities when I abandoned them. By a curious coincidence, on the same day that I set up my new kitchen, two of make's daughters, aged 12 and 14, came home from the boarding school they attended. They stayed with us for a couple of days, and as true daughters, naturally replaced me and my interpreter, allowing make to behave as she had for the month and a half since our arrival.

But the weekend was soon over, and the two girls left. Early next morning, make woke me up and started the fire, cooked the porridge for all the children, filled up the water-tank and started complaining about not having any daughters to help her. Only one of her previous duties was not taken up by make again: she would not look after the little child, her sister's son, who by then had become very devoted to me. In fact, having a son - as the child practically became for me - fitted in with my new family role as a makoti.

whether she still has daughters at home or whether she has other and younger daughters-in-law to cook for her in her kitchen) is normally taken into account when making this decision.
Reading through my diary, I can recollect the feelings I had during this period in the field as a daughter, when I did not realise I was one. I felt frustrated, unable to react, and cheated by this woman who was not treating me as an anthropologist. I felt like a servant ('What does she think I came all the way from Swaziland for? To wash her dishes?'). Only later, and probably only after I left Swaziland, could I fully appreciate the meaning of my experience and realise what a valuable and essential insight into the functioning of a Swazi homestead I had acquired.

Because I was an umlumbi and in this case, more specifically, a white anthropologist, I was in a powerful position, which I sometimes took advantage of without even realising it. By deciding that I did not want to be treated as a guest, I imposed my new status as a daughter on make. When I realised what the new situation meant for me, I once again took the initiative of changing it, and became a makoti. As an umlumbi,2 I was always facing the ambiguous position of feeling like an outsider, and yet having sufficient power to take actions which would affect not only me (not always in a desirable way), but also the people around me. It was probably the stubborn passivity which faced me and rejected me everywhere and all of the time that put the greatest psychological strain on me during my whole field experience.

But I also learnt a lot from my actions. Thanks to them - whether they were taken unintentionally or deliberately - I was able in a short space of time to go through the change of status which every Swazi woman experiences in her lifetime. As a result of my exceptional circumstances, I played the roles of both daughter and daughter-in-law, and thus experienced at first hand the consequences of this change in status. I was then able to appreciate what happens when a mother loses a daughter through marriage or acquires a daughter-in-law. The abrupt change of make's way of life following my change of status made me aware of a female (feminist?) perspective of lobolo (bridewealth). It is commonly held that cattle received upon a daughter's marriage are meant to compensate the family for her loss, to amend 'a breach of the family solidarity'.3 However, thanks to my experience, I could clearly perceive how it is that women are also subjected to a form of expropriation: they are the ones who effectively suffer from their daughters' loss without receiving any compensation from the bridewealth paid for their offspring, because 'cattle do not belong to women'.

2 During most of my stay in the field I was called umlumbi, and it was only a few weeks before my departure that people started calling me muntfu ('person', as compared with 'white'). I felt that this was one of the more notable achievements of my fieldwork.

This direct experience of the functioning of an umuti provided an insight into the bridewealth system, which enabled a correct appreciation of the ideological view of lobolo as presented by Swazi women. Women are the first to explain that lobolo is a good thing because 'we bear our children, we deliver them, bring them up, educate them; then a man comes and takes our daughters away: it is quite fair that this man pay lobolo, so that we can at least have something in exchange for our efforts to bring up our daughters'. But all a woman can hope to receive in exchange for her daughter is a daughter-in-law, and as I have suggested, the exchange is not equal.4

Despite my feelings of frustration during my 'training' and 'performance' as a daughter, and despite the fear of losing precious time from my 'real' research, I can now clearly see that every minute I spent as a daughter was a profitable learning process. But I must confess that I would not want to be a daughter again.

4 I have discussed elsewhere (R. Astuti, "Una donna vale più delle capre": Compensazione matrimoni, valore della donna e circuiti di scambio in Swaziland', University of Siena thesis 1984) how a woman is gradually assimilated into her husband's umuti, and how she eventually becomes a part of her husband's clan. If a woman suffers a loss through the replacement, eventually, of a daughter by a daughter-in-law, it must, however, be remembered that becoming a mother-in-law is a very significant and powerful move in the 'long journey' a woman undertakes in her lifetime (cf. H. Ngubane, 'Marriage, Affinity and the Ancestral Realm: Zulu Marriage in Female Perspective', in E.J. Krige and J.L. Comaroff [eds.], Essays on African Marriage in Southern Africa, Cape Town and Johannesburg: Juta 1981, pp.84-95, at p.85).
A SUGGESTION

That charming and intelligent Austrian-American anthropologist Paul Radin has said that no one quite knows how one goes about fieldwork. Perhaps we should leave the question with that sort of answer. But when I was a serious young student in London I thought I would try to get a few tips from experienced fieldworkers before setting out for Central Africa. I first sought advice from Westermarck. All I got from him was 'don't converse with an informant for more than twenty minutes because if you are not bored by that time, he will be'. Very good advice, if somewhat inadequate. I sought instruction from Haddon, a man foremost in field-research. He told me that it was really all quite simple; one should always behave as a gentleman. Also very good advice. My teacher, Seligman, told me to take two grains of quinine every night and to keep off women. The famous Egyptologist, Sir Flinders Petrie, just told me not to bother about drinking dirty water as one soon became immune to it. Finally I asked Malinowski and was told not to be a bloody fool. So there was no clear answer, much will depend on the man, on the society he is to study, and the conditions in which he is to make it.¹

The relation an anthropologist forms with the object of his observation - as well as the way he goes about doing fieldwork - has often been a source of preoccupation for me. When wondering about my fieldwork experience I have often been tempted to tell myself to take 'two grains of quinine' and stop being a 'bloody fool'. When faced with the awe-inspiring task of observing and recording

everything, even the commonplace, one is reminded of Karl R. Popper instructing his students in Vienna: "Take pencil and paper; carefully observe, and write down what you have observed!" They asked, of course, what I wanted them to observe. Clearly the instruction, "Observe!" is absurd. Observation is always selective.3

Clearly, what anthropologists see, hear, observe and note during fieldwork depends on their personality. Furthermore, the evidence is interpreted in terms of their own intellectual make-up, conditioned by the period and culture in which they have been brought up, their social and religious background, current assumptions and presuppositions, their age and status, and so on. Perhaps few have faced this with the honesty of Osbert Lancaster, who prefaced a book with the words: 'My criteria, political, architectural and scenic, remain firmly Anglo-Saxon and the standards or judgement are always those of an Anglican graduate of Oxford with a taste for architecture, turned cartoonist, approaching middle age and living in Kensington.'4 Such candidness may be illuminating, as far as it goes, but if we are to compare it with what would be required of a fieldwork anthropologist, further clarification would still be needed, particularly on the relation of such details to the author's work.

In the last few years I have followed with interest the activities of a centre of study and research on human relationships and communications named CAFE-ECOLE (an extension in Athens, Greece, of CAFE-ECOLE of the University of Montreal) under the guidance of Efi Georgiou and Professor Costas Fotinos (Faculté des Sciences de l'Education, Université de Montreal). Starting from a basis of Alderian psychology, they have developed an approach towards individual perception that may prove of interest to the fieldworker. Part of this approach seems to be helpful to our purpose, as it has a starting-point similar to that of an anthropologist setting out to study a community: perceiving the individual as a whole, trying to analyze the structures that regulate his life, and beginning the investigation with as few preconceived ideas as possible. In the attempt to describe and define the personality - the 'private logic' - of the individual, the approach is to analyze early childhood memories. This interest in the early history of an individual is not because it is believed that one can find there the causes of his later development - but rather,

2 'Though he may not publish every detail he has recorded you will find in a good anthropologist's notebooks a detailed description of even the most commonplace activities, for example, how a cow is milked or how meat is cooked' (E.E. Evans-Pritchard, Social Anthropology, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1972, p.80).


by reconstructing the past, one gives perspective to his present-day problems, trends and attitudes. Decoding such memories unearths the 'private logic' of an individual.

Early memories truly emphasize and epitomize 'private logic'. The fact that out of the multiple events of our early years we normally choose to remember only a few, and the freedom of reconstruction that we enjoy due to the time distance that separates us from such events, make early memories a useful aid in summarizing our 'private logic'. (If readers find this suggestion odd, let them treat it in the same way as they would treat a puzzling piece of fieldwork evidence - which they would have to decipher in the context of the totality of their evidence in the field. After all, in so far as oneself is concerned, the context that gives meaning to a thought or action is never absent.)

The method is simple enough. Take three or four of your earliest childhood memories, as early as you can remember. Write them down in as short a form as possible (adding in parentheses the feeling that accompanies them). Then disembodify the memory into the broad categories of 'actors' (persons and objects), 'actions and reactions', 'time' and 'place' (the last two may not be easily recalled). Find the semantic meaning that each word or term has for you in this particular memory. People are often perplexed, when they analyze memories, by the fact that they cannot remember the special meaning that a term had for them at the time that a particular memory happened. The answer is that the meaning we give to the term today is equally valid provided it is derived from the framework of that specific memory (e.g., 'father' in the context of one memory may mean 'power'; in another memory of the same person, 'father' may mean 'compassion and love'). After all, our memories of our early past are our own present-day fabrications of what the past has been. Having found all the 'special meanings' of the words or terms, substitute the 'special meaning' for the word in the memory and form it into a sentence. For example: I play with a ball in the garden (happiness); 'actors' - me: bold; ball: specific; 'actions' - play: experiment; 'place' - garden: my own area, familiar, a space I consider I know. Interpretation: when I am bold and in an area I consider I know, I find something specific to experiment with and feel happy.

Having done this for a number of memories, one may try to find the common elements that form the picture one has of oneself, of others, and of life in general. To be aided in this, one may try to combine the interpretation of all these memories into a single statement through their commonalities and differences. Examination and analysis of early childhood memories along these lines is reminiscent of the following comment by Leach with regard to Lévi-Strauss's view of myth:

Now let us imagine the situation of an individual A who is trying to get a message to a friend B who is almost out of earshot and let us suppose that communication is further hampered by various kinds of interference—noise from the wind, passing cars and so on. What will A do? If he is sensible he will not be satisfied with shouting
his message just once, he will shout it several times, and give a different wording to the message each time, supplementing his words with visual signals. At the receiving end, B may very likely get the meaning of each of the individual messages slightly wrong, but when he puts them together the redundancies and mutual consistencies and inconsistencies will make it quite clear what is really being said.\(^5\)

In our case A and B are the same person - ourselves. One's messages are addressed to oneself.

When I first arrived at the idea that the method I have outlined above may be of help in understanding how one goes about doing fieldwork, I applied it first to myself and my fieldwork experience and was indeed intrigued by the results. I then contacted other anthropologists and again the results were of considerable interest. I even experimented on predicting through one's work what one's 'private logic' could be, and then cross-checking the results. I came to be preoccupied by the thought that a vicious circle could be created that might lead to a dead end, if the anthropologist analyzing a society was himself analyzed by someone else. Normally a person decides for himself the extent to which the conclusions he arrives at about himself have any relevance for his work. But this is very close to what the anthropologist does in the field. There are no other experts, apart from himself. It is true that an informant knows more than he does, or that another anthropologist might have been more competent. Still, he is in the last resort alone with his material and can do no more than make the best out of it.

The suggestion, then, is that the anthropologist does fieldwork on himself. When we examine our early past, what we are really doing is to examine ourselves today. In order to facilitate such an examination, we have to project ourselves into the past, into what one might call a more exotic environment. In an exotic society things do not necessarily have to be the way we expect them to be; when thinking of our early childhood we tend to permit ourselves a freedom of reconstruction that is less constrained than if we were to examine yesterday's events. It seems a reasonable hypothesis. It does not mean that we falsify our early memories - merely that our subjective truths are more apparent there. Early memories and fieldwork material: the conjunction may well be productive, and worthy of further thought.

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ETHNOGRAPHIC NOTES
ON TWO OPERATIONS OF THE BODY
AMONG A COMMUNITY OF BALINESE ON LOMBOK

'It is...an axiom in anthropology that what is needed is not discursive treatment of large subjects but the minute discussion of special themes.'

N. W. Thomas

'...we really do not know much about what people actually feel.'

Rodney Needham

I

Hocart once wrote (1970: 11) that life depended upon many things, and that one of the things upon which it depended was food; few, surely, would take serious issue with this contention. Yet (as we shall see) there has arisen in the literature about the Balinese an interpretation about an aspect of their life which at first sight does not seem to accord well with the fundamental importance which food has in creating and sustaining life.

In *Naven*, Bateson contended (1936: 115) that 'culture standardises the emotional reactions of individuals, and modifies the organization of their sentiments.' It is not perhaps surprising, therefore, that in his later work about the Balinese in collaboration with Margaret Mead he should have tried to find out how the Balinese, by any standard a remarkable people, organise these aspects of human experience which are 'of such radical and pervasive importance...' (Needham 1971: lix).

Bateson and Mead came to the conclusion in their *Balinese*
Character that - among other slightly odd things which the Balinese are supposed to be doing when, for instance, they chew betel, or when they respond to children in different ways - when the Balinese eat they are doing something akin to defecation, for 'the Balinese cultural emphases...classify eating with defecation' (Bateson and Mead 1946: 116). Through a series of associations, Bateson and Mead further suggest (ibid.: 116) that defecation is classified with birth; that food is identified with faeces (ibid.: 120); and that the consumption of food during meals, but not as snacks, 'is accompanied by considerable shame' (ibid.: 112). Faeces, these authors suggest, 'are regarded with disgust', though urine has a 'very different psychological value' from faeces. While the latter are regarded with disgust by the Balinese, 'urine is unimportant and the act of urination is performed very casually and without conspicuous modesty' (ibid.: 119).

The aim of Bateson and Mead's book, which of course relies heavily upon series of photographs of Balinese from different villages, was to concentrate upon the way in which the Balinese 'as living persons, moving, standing, eating, sleeping, dancing, and going into trance, embody that abstraction which (after we have abstracted it) we technically call culture' (ibid.: xii). One can only applaud such openness on the part of investigators into the Balinese form of life, for these matters (among many others) are both important to the Balinese, and they reflect ideas and principles which are discernible in other, disparate areas of Balinese life (cf., for example, Duff-Cooper 1984a, 1984b, in press a, b, e).

I think that it is right to say that Bateson and Mead were the first scholars to suggest that the above was the case, and that their suggestions were not taken up by social anthropologists, either in connection with the Balinese or comparatively.

About thirty years after the publication of Balinese Character, though, it was suggested (Geertz 1973: 420; cf. Thomas 1983: 367 n. 8) that 'not only defecation but eating is regarded as disgusting, almost obscene activity...', because eating is regarded as animal-like, and that is behaviour which the Balinese avoid as far as possible. Covarrubias mentioned this in 1937, of course: 'The repugnance of the Balinese for actions characteristic of animals causes them not to permit children to crawl on all fours, and before the child is three months old he may not even touch the earth and is carried everywhere' (1972: 129).

Geertz's view of the matter is clearly authoritative. By the early 1960s, Geertz's many journal articles about Bali, and about Java too, were praised for their excellence (Du Bois 1961: 602), and Geertz had already attained 'a well-nigh towering stature...in the field of Indonesian studies' (Benda 1966: 1542).1

1 Not all, it must be said, have rated work by Geertz, in collaboration with H. Geertz, about Bali quite so highly: see, for example, Hooykaas's review (1976b) and his subsequent reply
It was not unexpected, therefore, that the eminent Oxford historian Keith Thomas, when making a comparative point about eating in his book *Man and the Natural World* (1983), should cite Geertz as the authority for the social fact that on Bali the consumption of food is regarded as 'a disgusting operation' (ibid.: 37; cf. Christie 1961: 108).

As it happens, though, neither the interpretation of Bateson and Mead nor that of Geertz accords well with the facts as they came to my notice while I was living closely with a community of Balinese on Lombok, the island immediately east of Bali. The community with which I lived in Pagutan, western Lombok, it should be said, is entirely comparable with other communities of Balinese on Lombok and Bali and, I dare say, on Sumbawa. Western Lombok, where most of the Balinese on the island live, forms a part of Bali ideologically (cf. for example, Tan 1967: 443) though not administratively; and the Balinese whom I knew on Lombok consider themselves as much Balinese and where they live as much a part of Bali as do those who live there.

The aims of this essay are essentially ethnographic, in particular to contribute to the ethnographic record in two ways - first, by reporting data which have not previously been published and by suggesting that the assertions of Bateson and Mead and of Geertz quoted above are, if not erroneous, then at least suspect in the light of the new data presented here about the Balinese; and secondly to suggest that Balinese ideas and practices concerned with eating and defecation from western Lombok contribute to our further understanding of the Balinese. This is so because, as has been demonstrated elsewhere (cf., for example, Duff-Cooper in press b, e), Balinese society is a totality. The many aspects (cf. Schärer 1963: 3) of this totality are replications of the high god of the Balinese, Ida Sang Hyang Widhi. Widhi is most simply expressed, in Western terms, as \([a/b]\), where \(a\) and \(b\) are two complementary entities which are juxtaposed (represented by the oblique) in various contexts (represented by the square brackets) (cf. Duff-Cooper in (1976c) to C. Geertz's angry retort (1976) to Hooykaas's assessment of *Kinship in Bali* (Geertz and Geertz 1975); see also Barnes 1975, Needham 1976, and Hobart 1977.

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2 The fieldwork upon which this essay is based was supported by an award from the Social Science Research Council of Great Britain and by two awards from the Esmée Horniman Anthropological Scholarship Fund of the Royal Anthropological Institute. I am most grateful for the support of these bodies.

3 That the Balinese on Bali do not entirely share this view, to the extent that they are often unaware that any person from Lombok could be Balinese, and term them Sasak (Lombok Moslems) until they are put right, reflects more the ignorance of Balinese on Bali in this regard than anything else.
press c). This form, which is diarchic, is discernible in Balinese ideas and practices which concern eating and defecation. A number of social facts concerning these operations of the body are presented in some detail in subsequent sections. Thus in section II, situations in which food is consumed communally are described, and similarities and differences both among such situations, and between such situations and when one eats alone, are drawn out; section III then addresses the left hand and defecation. Once these social facts have been presented, it is then methodologically sound (cf. Needham 1981: 62) to ask whether the community in question feels about eating as reports from Bali tell us that people there do.

I should like to make one point before we begin. I do not take specific issue with Bateson and Mead's interpretation in this essay. Such an undertaking would be too vast for a piece of this kind, and it is any way not an undertaking which directly concerns the data which are reported here. In any case, although I happen to think that the method of interpretation adopted by Bateson and Mead is probably superfluous to an understanding of Balinese life - and, indeed, of any form of life - there are doubtless scholars and others who have profited, and will continue to do so, from a book co-authored by the man who wrote *Naven*, which is by even the highest standards a remarkable and admirable monograph.

In so far as the approach adopted in this essay is concerned, the method has received ample justification in the many monographs which I consider to be among the best which social anthropology has produced (cf. Duff-Cooper 1984a: notes 5 and 44). A method is to be judged, moreover, as much against the results which it procures as against anything else. The results to which the present essay leads at least have the virtue of being compatible, as Balinese metaphysics (sa: PWa-surya) suggests that they should, with the results of other enquiries into the same form of life.

Nor, further, am I bound to explain why Bateson and Mead, and later Geertz, fastened on to the notion that the Balinese consider eating to be a disgusting, fearful activity (cf. Bateson and Mead op. cit.: 123). Clearly among the assumptions upon which Bateson and Mead base their work is that Western psychology, in one guise or another, can provide a key to the understanding of people's behaviour, as recorded in series of photographs. I have already said that I think it is probably unnecessary to use such tenets to come to some understanding of the Balinese form of life; but, of course, as an essentially philosophical question, this is probably unsoluble. For our purposes, at any rate, it is enough that the assertions have been made, and by such luminaries.

Before we proceed, let us consider the word *disgusting*. According to *Chambers*, the word means 'loathing: feelings of sickness,' and continues '(0. Fr. desgouter-gouster, to taste)'. The *Concise Oxford Dictionary* has it that *disgust* means 'repugnance, strong aversion, indignation (at, for)', and that the word derives as follows: OF desgoust from desgouster, or from
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It. _disgueto_, from _disgustare_ as dis-, gusto.

In Balinese, _agrèsem_ (Ind. _mengotori_), from _résem_, dirty, soiled, filthy, means 'to dirty'. In a number of other forms, _résem_ refers to dirt, to menstruation, to faeces, and to refuse (cf. Warna 1978: 478, s.v. _résem_; Wojowasito and Poerwadarminta 1961: 114, s.v. _kotor_). In neither of these dictionaries is there any mention of disgust or disgusting in connection with these words and variants of them. _Résem_ in connection with food means that the food is 'ritually polluted'. This occurs when, for example, food is sniffed by a dog or a cat, when a chicken flies over the food, when a sarong passes over it, or when the food comes into contact with faeces or money (cf. Hobart 1979: 423). Food which has touched the ground, i.e., food which is _dahi_, fallen, and food which is _résem_ are not consumed.

Associated with _résem_ and with _dahi_ are _kumel_ and _sebel_. _Kumel_ and _sebel_ refer to people who are ritually impure, so to say, through in the first case, the birth of a child, for example, and in the second case, death. In neither of these cases is there any evidence that the Balinese consider such people disgusting. Rather, as with words of approbation, such as _alus_, high, fine, _bagus_, handsome, and of derogation, such as _corah_, greedy, and _kaon_, ugly (cf. Duff-Cooper 1984a: 1-2), the words describe the state in which a particular person or thing stands. This standing is measured, so to say, by an assessment of how far the person or thing is close to an ideal. This ideal consists of a centre of reference. However far from the centre of reference a person or thing is assessed to stand, there is no evidence that the person or thing in question is considered by the Balinese to be disgusting. These remarks, we shall see, apply equally to eating and to defecation.

II

One may eat communally in situations which are of more or less formality - by which is meant the formality of one's dress, demeanour, and the language one is permitted by custom to use - and the way in which one eats one's meal, the contents of which are also variable according to the formality of the meal.

I have used the word formal to set the scene for the reader, but a more exact rendering of the Balinese word to which this formality corresponds - _alus_ - would be a group of words such as high, northeast, fine, clean, right, handsome, and such like. We are, that is, discussing an aspect of purity, what the Balinese term _suai_.

I propose to begin our consideration of eating, like the Balinese view of the creation of the universe, with the most formal. This is when men (and women, separately) _megibung_ in the course of a rite associated with the cremation of a corpse, for instance, or at a rite associated with the joining of a male to
a female. 

On Lombok, to megibung means more than 'to eat together at one serving (rice and side-dishes set on one dish)' (makan bersama satu hidangan [nasi lauk pauk dalam satu tempat], as Warna (1978: 204 s.v. gibung) suggests. Indeed, it refers to one part of a process which could include the whole rite of which it is a part, from the decision upon which day the rite should, as it were, begin, to the point (perhaps as long as 210 days later, though this is exceptional; 14 or 21 days is more usual) when constructions erected for the rites are demolished three days after the last rite 'proper' of cremation, for instance in melatagin.

The part of the process to which megibung refers is eating specially prepared rice and pork, and other foods to which I shall refer below, with other people of one's own sex (and, in days gone by, of one's own estate also). What is eaten must be prepared, of course, and this is done in the main by those who are to partake of the food.

In temple ceremonies, the food which men and women eat is food which has been offered to the gods, who eat the essence or germ (sari) of the food, and allow men what remains (lungsuran or parèdan). Howe has written (1983: 142-3) that 'in Balinese culture food represents gross material substance which is opposed to the immaterial essence of the purified spirits... This seems to be confirmed by what has just been said, where what is immaterial is taken for sustenance by the beings, who are themselves immaterial beings without physical bodies (sthula sarira), and where what is material is taken to to help sustain the lives of men, who possess physical bodies.

In cremation and other rites, large or small, the food is not as a whole offered first to gods. Portions of the food prepared are, however, given to the gods with other offerings, and before any others are served. The gods are present like the other guests; their status requires that they be served first.

Preparation of the food in these circumstances - and in so far as the meat is concerned, the killing of the animal - is always done by men. The killing of the animal - pig, ox, water buffalo, or chicken or duck - is a blood offering to those beings

4 Pitra yadnya, ceremonies for defunct humans, are the most important ceremonies held for humans.

5 Henceforth, 'men' and 'he' and such like should be taken to include 'women' etc., unless otherwise stated or made plain from the context.

6 Rites may be either small-scale (nista, low) or large-scale (utama, high), or else moderate in scale (madya, middle). It is the scale of the rites which differs, but not their meaning.
who are invisible, at least normally by day, and who could disrupt the proceedings (which the Balinese term pegaén or, in high Balinese, pekaryan, which both mean 'work') were they not suitably proffered to.

The rice which is prepared to be eaten in a communal meal is not an offering, but when it has been cooked, it is placed on a wicker table or bed in huge piles. The rice is then termed Sri, the goddess of rice. Offerings are placed at the head of the pile, i.e., to the east, where a tumpeng (a cone of boiled rice) has been placed. The offerings consist of salt and water, of different kebabs (sate), and of bottled drinks. The tumpeng, the salt and the offerings represent the head of the goddess, the pile of rice is a representation of the goddess's body, and the salt gives thought and emotions (aita) to both.

Women may do the humdrum cooking of the rice, but it is men who attend to the large pile of cooked rice which is made into the tumpeng (also by men), which, as we shall see, people eat. The animal to be served is weighed, if it is a pig or an ox or a water buffalo. (I am not sure that ducks and chickens are weighed; I think not, for I do not recall seeing it done in the village, and anyway, most people can judge the weight of a bird by looking at it and by holding it.)

The animal is also fed before it is slaughtered. This is to ensure that the soul, if it happens to be a human being who was reincarnated as a pig, for instance, does not suffer hunger on its way to heaven (cf. Hooykaas 1976a): a reincarnation is released from this animal state by being slaughtered in sacrifice. Meat is prepared by men, but by different groups of men according to the stage of preparation. The cutting of the meat is a task which is highly skilled, and it is usually done by men who have reached an age when they can reasonably be expected to know how to set about getting as much as possible off the animal in the proper way. Different cuts are to make different dishes, and each dish is as important as the others: one dish may not be skimmed in favour of another. Younger men of particular ability may be allowed to cut the meat, but most are responsible for other jobs.

It is important for a person to be seen to be present when he should be present, and it is always important that the young be diligent (rajin) in their tasks. Such diligence often compensates for excesses in other areas of social life: for example the Balinese are inveterate and most enthusiastic followers of the cock-fight, as Cool (1896: 102) long ago remarked. But one who gambles in a profligate manner and also works hard is often popular, whereas the heavy gambler who is also lazy is thought to be like a wastrel, a person who contributes little to life and who, like the blind, is rather like a

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7 Except perhaps at those times of day, such as midday and dusk, which are particularly dangerous (cf. Howe 1981: 225-6).
pig, an animal which does little but sit, sleep, and eat (but cf. Forge 1980: 16). In this spirit, then, the young and old men who are, perhaps, close to the local descent group holding the rite, clean the meat either at springs or with water from wells.

Much preparation goes into the assembling of the ingredients for making the dishes which form the meal. Different combinations of meat (including the blood and the bones) are concocted, and cooked in various processes. Older, experienced men attend to the cooking and the combinations of the ingredients; the herbs, spices and other ingredients are prepared, some by older men, who cut up the herbs and spices, and some by the younger men, who pound them. (Pounding is usually women's work.) Younger men also act as helpers to those doing the more skilled work, and bring coffee, cakes and biscuits to those who are working to help sustain them through the long hours. Copious flagons of palm wine (tuak; cf. Schaareman 1981, I: 188-93) are also served to those who are working.

It should perhaps be mentioned here that in the community with which I lived eighteen spices are used in this ceremonial cooking. The spices are either white, black, red, or green. There are eight white spices, seven red, two black, and one green spice. White, black, and red are the colours of Siwa, Wisnu, and Brahma respectively (cf. Wirz 1928: 526; Pott 1966: 134; Swellengrebel 1977: 89); green is the colour of Kresna, according to one friend of mine, an old and learned temple priest (Pemangku). The number nine is an important one for the Balinese, especially in the context of the nawa sanga, the eight gods which sit at the eight points of the Balinese compass, with Siwa at their centre. I was also told that each of the herbs or spices has a taste which, naturally, is classifiable as one of the sad rasa, the six tastes: manis, sweet; pahit, bitter; asam, acid or sour; asin, salt; pedas, sharp; sepat, sour. I was not told that there are three herbs or spices of each taste, however, which would accord nicely with Balinese ideas.

Once the dishes which comprise the meal have been prepared, rice cones are made by pressing rice into bowls. Thisrice is turned out onto the centre of a low, circular table which reaches to about the height of the knees of a man sitting cross-

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8 The pigsty in a Balinese compound, the anus of the compound according to Covarrubias (1972: 88), is always situated as far from the family temple, the head of the compound (ibid.), i.e. as far south, as possible. The south is associated with the low and with the impure (cf. Geertz and Geertz 1975: 50-1; Hobart 1978a: 9; Covarrubias 1972: 90, 91).

9 See Needham (1967) and Huntington and Metcalf (1979: 50-3) for a possible relationship between percussion, pounding, and transition.
legged at it. Salt is placed in small dishes made from palm leaf and these dishes are placed at the base of the cone, one at the north and one at the south. Later, the salt is emptied from the dishes onto the broken cone by people eating at four points which, in relation to one another, represent the direction towards the mountain (kaler on Lombok), towards the sea and other low-lying areas (kelod), and towards the east (kangin) and west (kauh). The cone represents the Mahameru of the Balinese on Lombok (see Duff-Cooper in press g, n. 5), or else Siwa; the salt represents the sea which surrounds the Balinese world.

The cone and the salt are then covered with a wicker basket as the sky (akasa) covers the middle world (madyapada), and, carried at shoulder height, are brought to the area where it has been decided that eating should take place. This site is often a compound courtyard (cf. Covarrubias 1972: 88; Hobart 1978a: 9), or else the pavilion of the village banjar (assembly). In any case, men and women eat separately.10

The tables are arranged in straight lines and mats are placed around their pedestals. Water and tuak in a hollowed-out coconut shell (pideran) are placed by each table. The guests may now be invited to take their places around the tables. The invitation to eat, like all the language used while eating progresses, should be expressed in fine Balinese.11 Indeed, ideally, anything concerned with a rite, and above all with cremations and with rites for the gods, should be expressed in high language – rather as dress should be formal, i.e., it should include a waist-cloth.

People are invited to eat according to distance from the local descent group which is holding the rite. A Brahmana high priest, or one who might, had circumstances been different, have been a king, are served after the gods, unless either is performing the rite, in which case he will not eat until his guests have done so. Distance may either be distance by kawitan, origin point (cf. Geertz and Geertz 1975; Gerdin 1981: 17; Zoetmulder 1982, II: s.v. wít I; Pigeaud 1938: s.v. wít; Duff-Cooper 1984b: 486-7), or by virtue of age and/or estate. This distance is, in Balinese social life, also expressed spatially, so that those who are more distant by kawitan and by estate are

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10 A European woman who visited the village one night to watch a performance of an Islamic Sasak entertainment called jepung was given dinner by the most senior males of the local descent group holding the performance, but only she ate. Jepung are both entertainment and an offering to the gods, often in payment for a promise (sot) to hold the show if such-and-such a circumstance occurred.

11 For Balinese language levels, see Swellengrebel (1950: 124, 127, 128) and Kersten (1970: 13-25). Where two Balinese terms are cited in this essay, the first is the fine (alus) form, the second is the coarse (kasar) form (cf. note 13 below).
most often those whose residences are further from the centre of reference (in this case, the local descent group holding the rite and issuing the invitation to eat through its spokesman) than those who are closer by kawitan and by estate. Those closest, of course, are those who comprise the local descent group hosting the event; these people eat last.

Men gather to be invited to take their places to eat near the tables, but it is becoming to hang back physically and to decline the invitation to eat, should it be extended to one early. Those who are asked first, however, are usually those who eat first, although they may appear to need some persuasion to take their places. Generally, once enough men of similar status have been asked to eat so that, perhaps, two tables could be filled, the men move as a body and take their places (beginning towards the north and east), and others may then follow after less, but still some, prevarication.

Eight men or eight women sit around a table; this group of people is called a seluur. Each person represents one point of the Balinese compass, while the table signifies the centre, the ninth point of the nawa sanga, as was mentioned above. The zenith (keluanan) and the nadir (ketebenan) are represented by the top of the cone and by its base.

People do not begin eating, once seated, but wait for the command to wash their right hands in water, which is passed round each seluur separately for the purpose. The cover on the table may now be removed. The rice cone is demolished so that the rice is spread more or less evenly over the top of the table, and a bowl of komoh (blood and herbs) is placed on the top of the rice, at the centre. At the command, people take rice and dipping it in the komoh begin eating. No food from one's hand should be allowed to drop back into the communal meal, and one shakes one's hand on the floor before taking more rice from the dish to make sure that this does not happen. Some consider that these droppings, rather like the left-overs from offerings and from the food served to a Pedanda, a high Balinese 'priest', have value as medicine.

The gibungan usually consists of nine courses, although these may be augmented to comprise eleven courses in important rites like ngororas, for instance, held twelve days after the actual cremation (ngabér) of a corpse, i.e., in second-level rites. The courses consist of various kinds of kebab (cf. Warna 1978: 503, s.v. sate), other meat from the pig, including the bones, and vegetables, usually plantains and bean-sprouts. Each course is placed in a certain and specified direction. Be it north-south, or east-west, or both, the head of the sate, which is the meat end, is always placed to the superior direction (north, east). The sate served in Baturujung number eighteen, i.e., one batch of four, and one of fourteen (5 + 9, perhaps). The various kinds of sate represent the trees and plants which exist in the Balinese world.

The courses are served to each seluur by a man (to men) or by a woman (to women) who approaches the table, crouching so as
not to tower over the people seated at the tables - a usual point of Balinese etiquette - and sits down outside the ring of eaters. He holds a covered basket in his right hand. He lifts the lid off with his left hand, and proffers the next course in the basket, usually to the senior man in the seluar. This course is arranged on the rice, extra amounts of which are liberally scooped onto the table as the fifth and seventh courses, and the eating continues. It is again becoming to be retiring in breaking into a new course and to offer first pick at the satê or whatever to a neighbour. In fact, there is more than enough for all (a point of honour for the hosts), and there is always food left over after the meal.

The end of the meal is signalled by all having eaten and drunk sufficiently and by acknowledging the fact to the person who issued the invitation to eat in the first place. All rise from the tables together; some collect the remains of the meal to give to a favourite dog; others help to shake the mats and clear the eating area for a subsequent sitting. If there is to be another sitting, the tables are replenished with another cone of rice and salt, and set out. This continues until all guests have been fed, when the local descent group is free to eat. Afterwards, men perhaps sit and drink, or return home, to come again to the place of the rite later - i.e. for the public witness of the events (ngeletening) which, strictly, are what the rite is for. (There may be more than one such occasion in, for instance, a large cremation.)

This protracted (but still incomplete) account of what happens when the host Balinese eat communally has tried to convey the ways in which formality is expressed: that is, through dress, through language, through demeanour, and, very importantly, through making sure that everything down to the positioning of the satê on the table is as it should be. In these ways, the fineness and the purity of the occasion are established.

Less formal occasions are less rigorous and less complete, and are correlative of a smaller scale. Any number of seluar may, in principle, gather together to eat; how many will do so depends upon the occasion, but whatever the occasion, what is proper should be observed.

A good example of this is the communal evening meal, which in some compounds takes place at about seven o'clock in the evening, when people have bathed and changed after the work of the day, and have also in some cases - in every case on certain important days - done homage in the family or village temple. One is therefore clean. With others one is served rice and, in wealthier compounds, meat and vegetables. Sitting cross-

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12 The wedding of my friend I Wayan Care was reckoned small; about 320 people were given food on one morning.

13 Meat, ulam or bé, is a generic term for flesh, be it human or animal flesh. It is further used for all accompaniments to a
legged on mats round the food, one washes one's right hand in a bowl of water passed round for the purpose and helps oneself to rice and to small amounts of meat or fish and the other foods put there by women (for men, but not *vice versa*) for consumption. One should try to eat the meal at the same pace as others: a healthy appetite is admired (and liked by those who cook), but excess in the form of greed or of eating very little are disliked. Greed is disliked in itself, as one of the *sad ripu*, the six enemies against which the three central upper and lower front teeth are filed, at puberty or at least before cremation; and eating little is taken as a mark of illness, perhaps, or of being angry, or distressed in some way. All of these destroy the proper, peaceful order of things. One tries to finish with all the rest, and to leave with them - or else sit on and drink and talk, often late into the night.

The communal meals described above have a formality about them. Other communal meals, when men move into a temple (*ngaturan*) for two or three days to make offerings and be with the gods of the temple, are more or less formal depending upon the temple involved, those who are present, and their material circumstances and aspirations.

It should not be thought, however, that it is necessarily the wealth or status of those who are eating together which is important in determining the formality of an occasion. I was invited, for instance, by an old but very poor man to take palm wine and eat duck he had killed and prepared for the purpose (*this occasion is called melagar*) with four other men. I drank and ate. Then, while others were still imbibing, and not in any obvious way trying to keep pace with one another, I started to roll a cigarette. This led to a discussion among the guests about whether I might properly do so, or whether I should wait until all had consumed enough duck, and were just drinking. That it was decided that I could smoke before all the duck had been finished can be put down to the Balinese being charming: my impression (which I acted upon) was that one should not do so.

Certain situations are thus more or less formal than others. In the Balinese case, this appears to involve the constitution of those taking part in the occasion, both in terms of their status (age, estate) and of their distance from or closeness to one another, in the senses mentioned above. It would be inappropriate, however, to posit a causal relation between the people present and the formality of the occasion. Rather, the people present and the nature of the occasion are correlated. When the gods in the family temple come out in the *piodalan* (temple festival, (person's) birth day), the gods and the people present, and the actions and events which occur, combine to create the *piodalan*. Relations between men and gods should be as

meal - rice, that is - which are not classified as vegetables. Thus, for example, peanuts, soya beans, and eggs are 'meat'. The term is used here to refer to meat.
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**alus** as they can be. These relations (ways of thinking and of behaving) create the *piodalan*, and in turn are demanded of men by it. Just as the gods could not exist without men, so man is totally dependent in the last resort (cf. Sukawati 1926: 426; Hobart 1978b: 74) upon the gods.

Even when two people of an age where informality might be encouraged could eat together, formality still prevails; they should sit side by side or facing one another, and cross-legged or with their feet away from the other; the two do not share one another's food, but take food, each separately, from the (communal) food placed there for them, or from the stocks in the kitchen, where women prepare the food (cf. Howe 1980).

Seemingly even more informal is the gathering to drink coffee and eat fruit and cakes after one's rest in the afternoon (at about two o'clock), or in the evening after dinner, when coffee is often augmented, for the men, by alcohol. On these occasions, the people who congregate are usually so closely related by *kawitan* that they live in the same compound, and may even share sleeping places.

Even in these situations, however, men tend to sit near the other men present, and women with the other women, and the young with the young.

On all the occasions we have mentioned, the right hand is alone used for passing food and drink to the mouth. The right hand is used to perform these operations when a person eats alone. As a matter of frequency, eating alone is the norm in the village, people snatching a plate of rice and some nuts or vegetables when they feel peckish, eating it somewhere secluded, and eating it quickly. It would be wrong to think that this way of taking sustenance, however, should be the base-line, as it were, from which other ways of eating and drinking diverge. Rather, eating and drinking can be accomplished in more or less formal, i.e., *alus*, ways. The ways differ from one another in that the more *alus* is the more elaborate or complex. Similarly, the most *alus* person in Balinese society, a Brahmana high priest, is competent to know everything; a Resi, a kind of Brahmana priest from the Ksatrya estate, is lower than the Brahmana but superior to all others: he may know much of what the Brahmana may know, but not all; and the ordinary Balinese, the *anak* Bali, should know only what we might consider more practical matters — fighting, animal husbandry, construction, the preparation of ceremonial food and such like. A Brahmana priest should know this, and far more besides; the higher one is, the more elaborate one's existence, ideologically speaking. The highest, *Bindu*, the point from which all derives, is the most elaborate,

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14 Among some young Balinese of different estates, Indonesian is frequently adopted as the language of communication. It does not possess language levels, and is taken to be a leveller by many Balinese.
containing and pervading all that exists.

In Balinese thought, the right hand is contrasted with the left hand as male is contrasted with female. They are complementary, and they are opposed. The right hand is *bresih*, clean. It is used for all operations which concern those parts of the physical body which are similarly *bresih*—that is to say, for eating, drinking, combing the hair, cleaning the teeth, and (most importantly) for anointing oneself and for imbibing holy water. One also always uses offensive weapons in the right hand. Defensive measures are exercised by the left hand.

III

The left hand is not dirty, or anything of the kind: it is merely less clean than the right hand, only the tips of the fingers of the left hand being *bresih*. The left hand is used for operations of the body which concern the lower region: anything such as urination or contact with another's sexual organs is done with the left hand. On no account should the left hand be used to offer something to anyone; in practice, the thought that one might use the left hand to do so is almost non-existent: people use the right hand automatically, having been trained since soon after birth to do so. The right hand, also, is never used to wash after one has defecated.

In the village, defecation involves finding a spot in one of the irrigation ditches which were (tacitly) recognised as places at which one might defecate. In the Gria Taman, people defecate in the part of the extensive gardens most to the west of the compound, and wash at the spring to the south. In either case, one makes it clear (perhaps by one's style of walking [cf. Duff-Cooper 1983: 72] in the village, or by raising one's sarong at the back) that one is going to defecate, and that one should therefore be left alone.

Finding a spot in the irrigation ditch, one steps down into it, adjusting one's sarong and any underwear as one does so. Having performed the operation, one cleans the anus by splashing it with water with the left hand, and on no account with the right hand.

The head and the lower regions of another's body should not come into contact. When I was digging a trench to start building a wall with two others, I was warned not to get too close to the person in front of me along the trench (one digs head-on to the line of the trench) who was bending, as my head might come into contact with his rear.

The allocation of primary and secondary values to the hands is just one example of the way in which opposites are used complementarily to establish relative value. Right and left (cf. Needham 1973) are analogues of up/down, high/low, male/female, elder/younger, and more besides (cf. Howe 1983: 157 n. 10; Duff-Cooper 1983: *passim*). It is little surprising,
therefore, to learn that those who are able to detect what is written in one's heart - i.e., character - by looking at one's hands deduce the better traits from the right hand, and the less desirable ones from the left hand.

There was doubt in some quarters that such things could be deduced from looking at the hands. I enquired of many whether there was anyone who could do so, but never received an encouraging reply. One woman, a known léak - witches who practise pengiwa, the black arts (from kiwa, left) - of advanced ability, read my left hand, though. Her conclusion, that I was mean and stingy, was generally taken to be true by those present. This, however, may have more to do with the characteristics which are ascribed to turis (tourists; Caucasians) than with the witch's ability to interpret the hands. Whatever, the left is associated with the low, the unclean, and the undesirable, while the right hand is associated with the high, the clean, and the desirable.

Defecation usually takes place in private for adults - only the very young defecate together - and so does eating alone, although not always. But I never heard anyone say that he thought defecation and eating were disgusting, let alone almost obscene, operations. It is true that defecation and solitary eating are conducted 'hurriedly' (Geertz 1973), but neither was ever in my experience (to which I shall refer again below) conducted with any of the demeanour which might suggest that they were found to be disgusting by people. Rather, both operations appeared to be among those which one performed naturally - i.e., as part of being what one was. This attitude is reflected in the following. I once asked a friend of mine whether he enjoyed ceremonies. He replied that it was not a matter of enjoyment or otherwise; it was merely something which one did as part of one's way of life (dharmā) (cf. Gorer 1936: 59).

We have seen that one may eat privately or communally. However, if a Balinese is eating alone, and another passes or enters the place where he is eating, it is usual for the person eating to invite the other to join him. The inviter does not usually, I think, expect acceptance, but acceptance is clearly a possibility.

This is quite clearly different from when one is defecating. People then wish to be alone - they demonstrate the fact - and are usually left alone. Sometimes, the young make jokes with people of the same sex when they are defecating. Pace Bateson and Mead, and Geertz too, defecation and eating appear to be opposites, rather like the hands which perform the operations, and also rather like the orifices and the parts of the body in which they are located and via which the operations proceed.

In spite of the fact, however, that eating and defecation are opposites at the level of analysis at which I have been operating in this essay, it must be allowed that by other criteria the two operations may be classified together. Men and women, for example, are opposites, but they may be classed together as human beings. This category, manusa, is, however,
opposed to other categories of being (gods, turis, malevolent spirits, and so on) at varying removes.

Supposing, therefore, that eating and defecation are classified together, to what might they be opposed? In the first place, eating material food and defecation are attributes of men, but not of gods. They are also things which animals do, of course, but even so, it is seen once again that the operations are simply defining characteristics of one class of being (men) which because of what it is simply performs the operations. (No need to impute disgust.)

It might be that the Balinese do not like the idea that they perform things which animals perform (cf. Covarrubias 1972: 129; Geertz 1973), and that when they do things which animals do, they are disgusted by such actions.

Two examples spring to mind: the taking of a partner, and sexual intercourse. Béro buron is 'incest', the taking of a partner which, as the name implies (buron, animal), is likened to the behaviour of animals, of which it is said that they couple with any of the right species and that they do not distinguish between prospective mates. The Balinese usually so distinguish (cf. Belo 1936; Covarrubias 1972: 159, n. 9), but when they do not there does not appear to be a reaction which one would confidently suggest was disgust at the breach. While I was in the village, a man in town was said to have had sexual intercourse with his daughter. People seemed to think that the man must have been off his head (bodoh), and dismissed the report, more, I should say, in puzzlement than in disgust. In the literature, also, there is no evidence that the occurrence bero was found disgusting. Béro applied to a musical sound means that the sound is not harmonious, and this is essentially what the taking of a prohibited woman results in: mystical dis-harmony evidenced by the couple's chronic illness or poverty or childlessness - or by the infirmity or stupidity, for instance, of any children the couple may produce. In the days of the kings - before the Dutch abolished them, that is - those who created a state which was adjudged béro were executed as a sacrifice to the gods, and other rites were held to restore the proper order of things. Once again, no disgust as such is in evidence (cf. Needham 1974: 63-7).

In so far as sexual intercourse is concerned (cf. Duff-Cooper in press a), again, I did not come across anyone who thought the matter was disgusting. Young men sometimes made jokes about sex, and teased widows and divorcees about it, but I did not encounter anyone who seemed to feel ill at the thought of having sexual intercourse or when the subject was raised. Indeed, that men (and women with large breasts, at least) liked it, and that they wanted to perform the sex act often, especially when they had first taken a woman in marriage, was treated in my experience as an entirely natural thing. Men with large penises were admired as being, in this regard, strong and capable (mampuh), although men who showed no interest in sex were taken to be holier than those who did. Still, men who were
thought to have an active sexual life were not the objects of
disgust, any more than were the acts themselves. These are
normally performed, it is true, in the privacy of the sleeping
quarters at night, but this shows merely that the Balinese have
a strong sense of propriety and modesty, not that the acts are
thought to be disgusting. As Howe (1980: 153) remarks, sexual
intercourse should never take place within a temple of any kind,
and it is seen 'as the absolute contrary to the gods outside of
becoming a leyak (witch).' Once again, we see that sexual
intercourse is merely thought to be associated with what is low,
not that it is considered disgusting. Witches are people of
whom one might be afraid or wary, whom one might respect, or by
whom one might be fascinated or attracted, as the case may be,
but I judge that they are not considered disgusting. They can
make others ill, through the use of spells and charms, and they
can be irritating (cf. De Kat Angelino 1921), but they are often
talked about and even pointed out without any apparent trace of
disgust.

A further point is that while sexual intercourse (and of
course defecation) may not take place within a temple, eating
often does, and at its most formal (pinih ažus). It would
therefore seem as though eating and sexual intercourse are also
opposites, as was suggested above in relation to the two hands
and their functions.\footnote{Farting, entut, by an adult among adults was only ever taken
to be rude, or embarrassing for the person who did so, or
distressing (for the usual reasons) for others. To spit phlegm
out in polite society is, by contrast, merely rude. Two
further operations of mouth and bowel and anus are therefore
contrasted, as one would expect from opposites. Rudeness (cf.
Swellengrebel 1950) involves an offence against the proper order
of things. Perhaps part of the rudeness attaching to farting
and to spitting phlegm or clearing the throat noisily can be
attributed to the fact that, in farting, air is expelled
(whereas matter is the element proper to the anus for evacuation)
and in spitting phlegm matter is expelled, whereas matter or
air (bayu) are proper for the mouth to take in. Belching,
however, is neither rude nor embarrassing nor distressing; air
both enters and leaves the body through the mouth, and through
the nose, another superior orifice.}
intercourse) are opposites.

In my experience, neither operation was ever performed in a way which suggested repugnance for either of the operations or indignation at having to perform them. Speed and privacy are taken to be important by Geertz in establishing what Balinese people feel in the face of eating and having to defecate. But the same facts could be used to support other interpretations: that one might be, if not over-fond, then very fond of food, and that one had to be alone to consume lots, fast. Similarly, hurried, private defecation might be put down to the constitution of Balinese food and drink, especially coffee, and to a pervasive modesty in Balinese life. (Husbands, I gather, never see their wives naked; bathing men should conceal their genitals from one another; and so on.)

My time on Lombok involved me in living very closely with some members of the community, and at least once a day while I was there I ate either privately in a Balinese compound or else with others communally. I also had hepatitis while I was in the village, for the first fortnight or so of which even the smell of food, let alone food itself, made me want to vomit. That is to say, food and its smell disgusted me. One should not, of course, take anything for granted, but I find it hard to conceive that the Balinese feel as I did then - physically and mentally - every time that they eat, perhaps five or six times a day, and every time that they defecate. They certainly gave no recognisable signs of doing so (cf. Wittgenstein 1970: 2-4).

There are, further, many good reasons (cf. Needham 1981: 59-71) to make us sceptical about claims as to the inner states of other peoples. Since, further, it has been contended, most persuasively, that 'there are strictly speaking no inner states, as collectively recognized conditions of consciousness, that are universal' (ibid.: 69), the claimants for an inner state of another people with another linguistic tradition and other, alien, institutions must show the similarities and the differences between their own tradition and that of the people under consideration. This is an undertaking which neither Bateson and Mead nor Geertz have carried out convincingly.

For myself, I find it very hard to begin to conjecture about the inner states of Balinese individuals, even those I lived with most closely, in the same house. On the basis of my experience, however, I am led to the view that inner states as expressed among the Balinese are a social contrivance in which behaviour of a certain kind expresses certain attitudes to events and to the behaviour of other people. For example, a friend of mine who is aged was much feared by the young (as some young people told me) and by some older men for his strength of character and his knowledge. If he was 'angry' (gedeg), he might shout at people or weep. He admitted to me, though, that his behaviour was a performance to enjoin certain actions in other people; if he was truly angry, he said, then he would go quiet, silent even, and retire into himself and make himself physically small, and perhaps even refuse to eat.
One problem with taking even this old man's assertions at face
value is that others may behave in much the same way - if they
are shy or embarrassed, for instance, or are very tired, or ill,
or have just got up. It is experientially easy enough to decide
which of these situations is appropriate to an understanding of
the behaviour - one can simply ask, for example - and hence to
decide how to proceed. But I find it very hard now, as I did in
the village, to go on to assert that the actions are evidence
for an inner state which is adequately translated by 'anger',
'embarrassment', or 'disgust', say, and harder still to specify
much, if anything, about the inner state in question. Indeed, it
might be that a person's behaviour is the inner state; perhaps
Balinese love (cf. Covarrubias 1972: 140-6), for instance, is
sexual desire, being attentive to the one who is desired,
suggesting that they run away together and marry, supporting the
loved one and having children by her, etc. - rather as a person's
mind can cogently be said to be merely chemical processes (cf.,
for example, Needham 1981: 39).

We are brought back to much firmer ground, though, by the
social facts which have been reported above. Put shortly, the
data presented in the present essay show that eating and
defecation are opposites. They are opposed in the ways which
have been described. Eating is a much more elaborate area of
social life than defecation. Eating may be more or less
formally conducted. The finest meals are those where the meal
forms part of a series of activities which are most closely
connected with the gods, in different aspects, and with rites.
These activities are most often carried out in temples. Rites
during which a large number of people are entertained over many
days with great formality are most appropriately held by local
descent groups of the Brahmana and Ksatrya estates. They are
also held in grida and in puri, the compounds of descent groups
of these two estates respectively. The gods, temples, Brahmana
and Ksatrya and their compounds constitute centres in Balinese
society. As mentioned above, also, what is closest to a centre
of reference in Balinese life is concomitantly also finer than
what is further away, physically or ideationally, from the same
centre of reference (cf. Duff-Cooper 1984a: 36). Eating and its
opposite, defecation, is one further aspect of Balinese life
in which this principle of order is discernible. Neither
activity, however, appears to be considered disgusting in
Balinese ideology nor by individual Balinese people, of which-
ever estate. Whether individual Balinese really, as it were,
feel disgusted by these activities remains to be established, if
indeed it is possible to establish.

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For over 500 meetings, from the beginnings of the Society in 1909 until 1954, when it discontinued its affiliatory membership of the Royal Anthropological Institute due to lack of funds, the elections of new members were recorded in the minutes. Alas, this does not prove to be a perfect record, for there are a number of names missing, including that of Max Gluckman. The first record of his active participation in a meeting is as a discussant of Dr J.F. Nadel’s lecture, 'illustrated with interesting slides', on 'Witchcraft and Anti-Witchcraft among the Nupe in N. Nigeria', at the 308th meeting on 13th June 1935. Presumably he had been elected as a member before this date.

His name had been mentioned at a Committee meeting just before this, in May, when he had been suggested as a possible speaker for the following Michaelmas Term. In the event, Sir Charles Harper (giving his Presidential Address), Dr B.G. MacGraith, Professor Le Gros Clark and Dr M. Fortes (see JASO Vol. XII, no.2, pp.114-115) spoke that term. Gluckman attended the next Committee meeting in November and again in February 1936. A little later, there seems to have been some confusion as to exactly who was on the Committee, for when at another meeting in November 1938 it was announced that Mr M.M. Rix was departing for Aden, and hence resigning his seat.

The question of replacing him on the Committee was discussed but it was decided to take no action until next term, the other three ordinary members being Dr E.E. Evans Pritchard (co-opted 18 November 1936), Dr M. Gluckmann (no record of election or co-option), and Mr Deric Nusbaum (elected 1937).

It may be puzzling that a Committee should feel it necessary to remind itself of its composition, though the frequent absences of anthropologists on fieldwork, as well as all the other movements of academic life, might be sufficient to explain this. Whatever the case, there was apparently no suspicion attaching to Gluckman's slipping onto the Committee (and indeed into the Society) unrecorded, for it was decided at the same meeting to approach him (or Miss
Blackwood), among others, to lecture to the Society the following term. This approach was successful, and Gluckman addressed the Society for the first time at the 348th meeting on 2nd February 1939, reading a paper on 'Black-White Hostility and Co-operation in the Zulu Church and State' (cf. his 'Analysis of a Social Situation in Modern Zululand', Bantu Studies, Vol. XIV, 1940, pp.1-30 and 147-174). According to the minuter, 'Dr H.M. Gluckmann, D. Phil. [as he was referred to] presented very fairly both sides of the problem - the black and the white man's [sic] point of view - in this difficult case of acculturation.' Marett and Miss Hadow took part in the following discussion and, for the record, Schapera was present in the audience as a visitor.

At the end of the year, it was noted that the Committee accepted the resignation of 'Dr H.M. Gluckmann', who had taken up an appointment in Northern Rhodesia. After his return to England some eight years later it was resolved, in May 1948, to co-opt him back onto the Committee. On leaving Oxford one year later, however, Gluckman tendered his resignation for the second time, Dr Srinivas being co-opted in his place. During his periods of stay in Oxford, Gluckman had been a very active member of the Society, frequently noted among the discussants at meetings. For instance, at the Presidential Address of Mr D.B. Harden at the 448th meeting in November 1947 on 'The Phoenicians on the West African Coast', Gluckman, Evans-Pritchard and Fortes (of whom Gluckman had earlier said, 'My general debt is greatest', ibid., p.2) were the discussants the minuter thought foremost to name.

Gluckman's second, and only other talk to the Society was thirteen years later, on 31st October 1962, at the second of two meetings both numbered the 594th. The second of these is now distinguishable as the Michaelmas Term Meeting, the other being Hilary. The subject was 'Gossip and Scandal', but unfortunately for the eager researcher, the minuter recorded no more about this meeting than a very straightforward account of Gluckman's argument familiar in its more sophisticated exposition from his article 'Gossip and Scandal: A Paper in Honor of Melville J. Herskovits' (Current Anthropology, Vol. IV, pp. 307-316). In 1964 and 1965, Gluckman gave two Marett lectures at Exeter, his old Oxford college, but he was not to return to the Anthropological Society.

It would seem that Gluckman was never in Oxford long enough to join the long list of eminent Presidents of the Society; but it is, I hope, worthwhile to record his involvement with it from the sometimes revealing but often disappointingly limited minutes.

JEREMY COOTE
Former Secretary
O.U.A.S.
REVIE W ART I C LE

MELANESIAN MEDLEY


Is Melanesia the first post-structuralist civilization? Or are traditional Melanesians 'uncivilized' structuralists, seemingly capricious *bricoleurs* ignoring the formal strictures of ageing Parisian greats? Are they logical glue-sniffers? Or are they livers of leaky wholes lacking in conceptual adhesive? Can such creative individualists be bound by hard-back ethnography? And who is bound: the locale or the field-worker? Is Melanesia to
be the anthropologists’ whipping-post, a suitable home for masochistic intellectuals? So many questions, so much (recently published) ethnography, so many answers. Just what is going on?

But first, the best of the bunch. The dry husk of Iteanu’s *Ronde* is a methodological introduction and an appendix of myths enclosing the meaty kernel of the book: groups of men centred around coconut palm trees, linked by name to place, by exchange to members of other categories, the whole given ghostly frame – the ever-absent presence of the spirits. Finding form in ritual, Iteanu places all Orokaiva ideology in the ritual cycle. All acts, all social facts are interpreted as a function of their position within this cycle. Parts only have meaning in relation to this ceremonial whole. In the first part of *La Ronde* he describes post-natal ceremonies, initiations and wakes, and he elucidates the fundamental opposition of forest: village (: wild: domesticated :: home of spirits: home of men). Garden is tricky middle-ground, an ambivalent spot where pigs eat taro, men kill pigs, and the spirits are – sometimes – kept at bay. Over all, the spirits hover. Exchange, in Iteanu’s account, is central - its types, times, content and conceptual typology. The spirits, by giving men pigs, provide them with the means to perpetuate both relations between villages and those between individuals. Men, by transforming their immediate exchange with the spirits into a differed one, gain time within which to play out their lives. The big-man is reduced to pulsive initiator of the societal motor: as though the culture was put on automatic pilot and the big-man had his foot on the accelerator. A driven personality indeed.

The second part shows how 'patrilineages', 'clans', plant emblems, land tenure, kinship terminology and marriage must be understood in terms of their relation to the ritual cycle and not vice versa. Iteanu extricates the priority of the brother-sister relation in social organisation and the way in which it articulates the circulation of exchanges. Incest, he shows, is merely part of the marriage rules, not a generator of society. In a closing chapter, he unites the results of his analysis around a 'superior value': *tendre vers la reciprocité* (p. 283). Types of relation are oriented about this value and a unified model of Orokaiva society is so constructed. It's all very neat and very nicely done.

*La ronde des échanges* is ethnographic analysis at its best. The poverty of my précis hides the rich subtlety of his sustained incisiveness. The occasional symbolic interpretation may seem too imaginative a leap to some but is justified in relation to the revelatory whole of his text. I will not carp over quibbles, for there are bigger fish to catch.

Iteanu, a member of the Dumont/de Coppet *équipe*, sees his work as an extension of his mentors' teachings. Dumont discusses hierarchy (in India) and de Coppet gives it temporal expression. Iteanu is concerned to divide Orokaiva categories into 'levels' and then to rank them – hierarchically: one level 'englobes' another, one opposition is 'subordinate' to another. In the closing pages he gives his three-level hierarchy: superior, where spirits are consubstantial to the Orokaiva world; inferior, where men create the different social unities; lowest level, that of
relation between individuals (pp. 286-7). But why stop here? Couldn't the model be given a fourth level by aducing the relations within individuals? Do not the different parts of the body have to be in harmony for life to proceed? Or how is illness discussed? And do we even need a metaphor of verticality? What more does it tell us? Couldn't it be replaced by a flat spatial metaphor, or by one of concentric globes, or by a one-dimensional metaphor (e.g. overlapping bars or concentric holes of varying depth)? Can Iteanu's arbitrary spatial metaphor of two-dimensional elevation even be said to have comparative value, when the senses of 'hierarchy' and 'inversion' in Indian castes and Melanesian rituals are so different? Do we (as I suspect) lose nothing when this theoretical frame, this dry husk, is discarded? Comparison may be the point of social anthropology, but precipitate juxtaposition may conceal the distinctiveness of the very areas compared.

These comments do not affect the achievements of the book's kernel, which withstands comparison with the best of modern ethnographies of Melanesia, and whose ideas fully deserve comparison within Melanesia.

Herdt's edition is one of blood, sweat and tears: the initiates' blood, the initiators' sweat and the fieldworkers' tears. For this is the ethnography of beating, nose-bleeding, scarring, forced vomiting, fellatio, sodomy, pus-eating, serial sex, penis incising, ear- and nose-piercing, and judicial murder. Painful stuff, both for the locals and the reader. Little wonder the fieldworkers begin to ponder ethics.

After a preface by Herdt, Keesing provides a summary introduction. He draws out the recurrent themes of New Guinean male initiation that are concerned with the physiological opposition between the sexes' powers and essences: the restriction of men's contact with the emanations of women's generative powers; the symbolic portrayal of the sexes' powers and essences as both parallel and antithetical; that girls become women, but boys must be made into men. Damning any simple-minded argument from ecological adaptation, Marxist theory, functionalist sociology, or Freudianism, Keesing attempts a programmatic synthesis: not an unconnected collection of partial explanations drawn from different paradigms, but an integrated set dynamically grounded on warfare, population increase and intensification of production. In a climate of combat, traumatic initiations dramatically separate boys from females and turn them into sturdy masculine characters prepared to fight.

Herdt opens the collection with a paper on fetish and fantasy in the initiation rituals of the Sambia of the Eastern Highlands. Hays and Hays give a rounded picture of the opposition and complementarity of the sexes among the Ndumba (also Eastern Highlands) by analysing both a male initiation ceremony and one held for girls at their first menstruation. Newman and Boyd describe the ritual preparation of women and the making of men among the Awa (again, Eastern Highlands); during initiation, men learn techniques to
manipulate their bodily substances, which immunize them against the perils of swiving and allow them to establish 'the necessary complementary relationships of married life' (p. 283). Gewertz contributes a subtle paper on how an analysis of the role of the central characters in Chambri initiation illuminates the articulation of their social categories. Schieffelin argues convincingly that though the ceremonial hunting lodge of Kaluli bachelors (bau a) may appear an initiation programme at first sight, it is not, since its performance causes no formal change in status and since novices do not have to depend on sponsors or initiators. Graduates of the lodge do not submit to socially formative ordeals; they are not reincorporated into a new structural position in society, rather they bestow a prestation on society, placing themselves, implicitly and symbolically, in the position of marriage allies through the making of a grand prestation. Thus the bau a 'strives to establish a relationship between the youths and the elder members of Kaluli society on the model of alliance' (p. 197, original emphasis).

Tuzin's paper on ritual violence among the Ilahita Arapesh describes the continuing conflict men feel between their attachment to their wives and children and the antagonism they must prescriptively display towards them. For men (surprisingly) are sceptical about the status of beliefs concerning the local version of the Tambaran cult and recognize the sometimes purely pragmatic nature of ritual acts. To senior initiates, the cult is just 'what men do' (p. 349), one whose artifice they must - to their embarrassment - eventually reveal to more junior initiates. This is ritual as drug, with the Arapesh as 'cultural addicts' (p. 350): continuing these customs pains them, but giving them up would be even more painful.

Many of the papers in this collection try to provide an ethnography of ritual experience, to draw out both the affective aspect of symbolism and individual psychology from cultural experience - a stress on the interconnexion of cognition and emotion that promises to give a more representative picture of many Melanesian modes of thought. Some contributors fall into the easy trap of a facile psychoanalysis (no matter how 'sophisticated'), letting 'primary and secondary anxiety', 'Oedipal conflict' and 'male envy' interfere with their ethnography. Anthropologists, rather than imposing crudely in this way, need to depict a native theory of the emotions, an account of indigenous forms of feeling and their ritual expression. So the pearl of these papers is the piece by Poole on the ritual forging of identity among the Bimin-Kuskusmin (West Sepik). There, initiators emphasize the physiological consequences of the intense ritual experience undergone by the novices. In these rites, the intensity of the novices' experience of self is a major criterion of ritual efficacy. Poole reconstructs the novices' views by use of in-depth interviews both before and after the rite, dream reports, draw-a-person exercises and Rorschach tests. The mutually confirmative results of these enquiries uncover the enormously traumatic nature of the ritual and how much of the trauma is focused on bodily injury, and on body parts and effluvia. The ritual sensationally separates boys from females and starts to make them men: an explicit contrast of gender which 'is often coded in bodily
imagery and its behavioural entailments. And, these entailments have their subjective dimensions' (p.150). It is a real strength of Poole's sensitivity that we gain some idea of those dimensions.

Dealing with affect is a tricky business, as anyone in love knows. Some of Herdt's contributors have the moral fortitude and sufficient strength of character to describe these customs for what they are: unpleasant, cruel, at times vicious and sadistic. These fieldworkers do not shrink from displaying their discomfort before these disagreeable traditions. Rather, they exhibit their necessary sensitivity by incorporating the role of emotion into their studies. It is for this reason, above all, that these ethnographically rich papers deserve to be read.

Keesing's book is plainly intended for students, with its simple prose, large type, lots of big photos and footnotes on who Tylor, Durkheim and Muchona are. Its fifteen chapters trot quickly through various aspects of this Solomon Island ethnography: the spirit world, the forms of magic, the cosmological structures, the powers and precepts of the dead, relations with the ancestors, sacrifice, death and desacralization, the sociology and symbolism of Kwaio religion, its sociology of knowledge and, finally, the culture since contact. It's all well done. The different topics are first placed in their anthropological setting and then swiftly described. Intellectual problems are not skirted, but bluntly faced. Keesing is very careful that his deciphering of Kwaio symbolic codes does not end up advertising his decoding flair rather than Kwaio concerns. To him, single-minded structuralist analysis leads to a sterile 'cultural cryptography'. Such code-cracking must be allied to a sociology of knowledge if it is to be both fertile and representative of local ways. Thanks to his years of fieldwork among the Kwaio, he details this sociology well and then subjects it to a neo-Marxist approach which sketches how Kwaio ideology is perpetuated and who gains what from it.

Throughout, Keesing cautiously teases out what can and cannot be said about Kwaio life. Unconcerned with ultimate explanations and origins, they have an 'open' conceptual system. They accept innovation (within limits Keesing assiduously draws out), can interpret the same type of event differently at different times (see, for example, pp.106-7) and, generally, do not provide elaborate systematised exegesis on their highly developed ritual system: a lack of emphasis that makes Keesing underline the experiential nature of ceremonial. He also shows that pollution is relational, that *mana* is a stative, not a substantive (corroborating my own work on *mana* in Vanuatu), and that *abu* ('forbidden', related to Eastern Oceanic *tapu*) is defined according to context and perspective. Thus the change from *abu* to *mola* ('secular, ordinary') can be glossed for a priest as 'desacralization' and for a woman as 'purification'. Such rewriting of ethnography uncovers past male bias (by fieldworkers) and reveals the powers of women for what
they are. The occasional inclusion of a divergent analysis by another anthropologist (McKinley) of some aspect of Kwalo ritual reinforces this sense of continuing interpretation. Keessing refuses to judge these tantalizing quotes definitively. In sum, in other words, it is not just students who will learn much from this book.

A final note: if this ethnography is for students, why is it so expensive that only affluent Ivy Leaguers can afford it?

In Meigs' book, the Hua men of the Eastern Highlands regard women's interiors as rotting, putrid, dark and heavy matter, the home of a wild, awesome fertility. To them, women are like *pitpit*, a fast-growing, rapidly reproducing vegetable with a soft, wet inside; men are like the black palm tree, slow-growing but strong, relatively infertile. Women have excess *nu* ('animating principle, vital essence', including all bodily substances, especially fluids); males have little *nu* and have difficulty maintaining adequate vitality when adult. Though men insist on the inferiority of women, deny them political voice and seek to impress their superiority symbolically, they imitate menstruation, believe in male pregnancy, and secretly eat foods identified with the *korogo* ('wet, soft, fast-growing, fertile') qualities of women. Women pollute when menstruating, having sex, or giving birth. However, gender is not tied to genitals 'but can flow and change with contact as substances seep in and out of his or her body. Gender is not an immutable state but a dynamic flow' (p.72). Men and women can resolve their categorical differences by reference to the opposition of *korogo* versus *hakeri'a* ('dry, hard, slow-growing, infertile'): the balanced middle is ideal, but women must be extremely *korogo* to reproduce, and men extremely *hakeri'a* to defend themselves and their wives.

Hua food rules are strikingly numerous and, since one's food (including bodily exuviae) is a product of one's *nu*, these dietary rules both symbolize social relationships and express the Hua theory of growth and health. For *nu* is central to the Hua: exchange of food is both prestation and transfer of *nu*. *Nu* connects food, sex and pollution: food and sex are exchanges of physical substances between bodies and 'both are subject to pollution, which is merely the transfer of body substances under negative social conditions' (p.124). In a cosmos without gods or many beliefs about the spirits, *nu* is seen as the source and sustainer of life, the means of saving oneself. Management of *nu* is the point of most ritual. Hua husband their bodies, not their souls. This is their religion.

Meigs' ethnography is notable for its careful dissection of the narrow, highly organised contexts where men are hostile to women, for her well-drawn picture of the links between food, sex and pollution, and for her stimulating discussion on *nu* as religion. She says her ethnography is one of the male ideology and that her next task is to examine the extent of Hua women's religious ideas. I look forward to her results with interest.
The Garia is essentially a revised version of Lawrence's doctorate, supervised in the late 'forties by Meyer Fortes, who prefaces the book. In his introduction, Lawrence says he delayed publication for 33 years partly because of administrative and teaching pressures, and partly because of his colleagues' original lack of enthusiasm for his interpretation of Garia ethnography - many doubted his analysis. The advantages of this delay are that the author, thanks to his repeated returns to the Garia, can now give historical depth to his doctoral study, correct past (published) errors, amend earlier biases, and take account of some critics' comments and reply to those of others; both his thesis and his subsequent, scattered papers can now be read in a single, coherent text. The disadvantages are that what once may have seemed revolutionary now appears relatively commonplace (today, Garia social organization can be seen as one extreme along a recognized continuum), and that some of Lawrence's concerns may strike some as not very up to date:

In view of its nature, it would be at least premature to try to interpret my material in the light of several prominent current anthropological theories - such as French structuralism, symbolism, and neo-Marxism - certainly until it has been ordered and presented in its own right (p.4).

The Garia appeared so exceptional in New Guinea anthropology because they lack territorially based societies. Their cognatic groups cannot function according to classical lineage theory, but are bound to overlap and create divided interests. Lawrence uses 'network analysis', since most settlements are irregular and unstable groupings of people linked either by their present common economic interests in the same geographical area or by their wish to associate with a particular big-man. In fine detail he shows that local organisation is a by-product of the interaction of ego-centred networks of kinship, marriage and descent relationships (which he calls security-circles), the rules of land tenure and the influence of big-men. Security-circles have no corporate identity, since each exists in relation to ego. Their members namuramu ('think on, have concern for') fellow members. They are bound to one another by moral obligations of mutual trust and solidarity. In this world of high mobility, where big-men are more renowned as masters of ritual knowledge than as policy-makers, moral principles ultimately depend 'not on legal and political sanctions but on an individual's sense of responsibility, reinforced by his own self-interest' towards fellow members and the gods and ghosts that make up his superhuman security-circle. 'Religion' is no separable category. The 'human' and the 'superhuman' interlock like the fingers of clasped hands. Both are parts of the same cosmic system - a fine web of relationships between
beings (whether human or superhuman) all of whom exist together in the same natural environment. Both are aspects of the same terrestrial reality.

In closing, Lawrence argues that New Guinean government officials and expatriate professionals working in the country can read his book with profit, and that if New Guineans are to become their own masters they must develop their indigenous economy and raise the general level of education - even at the possible expense of the traditional ways of life he has described. The general form of Garia society may have survived because it is so supple, but should it be allowed to continue? This final, explicit political message gives Lawrence's book a value far beyond the purely academic.

Trying to tie the main threads of these books together would produce something as arbitrary as the concept 'Melanesia' itself. And any general review article about the latest editions on the subject tends to say more about present anthropological approaches than about the ethnography of the area. Our original questions remain unanswered though we can, perhaps, now ask them more precisely. We can, for instance, isolate certain common themes, ethnographic signposts to future potentially productive avenues of research: the lissomness of Melanesian social organization, the importance of innovation, the central role of exchange, the indiscrète nature of 'religion' as a category, the prominence of the individual, and the cultural significance of ritually produced emotion - for it is Poole's paper that holds the imagination long after reading. Such intensive, methodologically aware investigation of individual psychology promises much. When is he to publish the rest of his five-volume doctorate about the first stage of the Bimin-Kuskusmin ritual cycle of initiation?

JEREMY MacCLANCY

This synthesis, which makes little claim to originality, is explicitly inspired by E.O. Wilson and puts its emphasis on evolution rather than philosophizing. Perhaps this is just as well, in view of the suggestion (p.337) that

> The humanist philosophy which arose centuries ago, through ordinary observation of the human being [sic!] is still very valid and the new science merely corroborates it.

Instead of philosophy, the author presents, at a level somewhat less demanding than in *Scientific American*, a mass of information bearing on the evolution of life, brains, mind, society, etc. Starting with the Big Bang and the Oxygen Revolution, she moves briskly across the biological disciplines, for instance, into split-brain research, child development (Piaget gets 3½ pages), primate social structures, Washoe, hominid fossils, and the spread of cultigens. All but the best informed will learn something: the reviewer was particularly intrigued by the summary of Klima and Bellugi on wit and poetry expressed in the sign language of the deaf.

However, to a social anthropologist, what is most striking about this book is the poverty and insignificance of the reference to his own discipline. *Man the Hunter* appears, and a few names are dropped, but essentially the 'philosophy' proposed is that implicit in the common sense of our own culture. This leads not only to error ('in human society the filling of different jobs is usually controlled by the economic factors of supply and demand' - p.138), but also to a shirking of the serious objections to sociobiology. It is easy to argue that if a gene promotes a type of behaviour with kin-selection advantages, then both gene and behaviour will spread; but given the facility with which human behaviour changes with cultural history, it is far harder to show that genes are involved in the behaviour in the first place, in anything more than a merely permissive sense. Sahlin's *Use and Abuse of Biology* (1977) is simply ignored. Finally, no sense whatever is conveyed of the positive contribution social anthropology could make to a realistic, world-historically aware, philosophical anthropology. So long as social anthropologists avoid the larger canvas, the popular demand for syntheses will no doubt continue to be met by writers lacking the relevant background: but in any case, a true philosophical anthropology, of necessity reflexive, might perhaps
be forced to recognise that serious attempts to examine our society's presuppositions from a comparative perspective (e.g. Dumont's *On Value*, 1982) could never really be popular.

The usefulness of the bibliography (solely English-language) would have been increased if the footnote numerals had not been omitted from the text.

N.J. ALLEN


Pyramid Lake lies near the California border in northwest Nevada and is fed via the Truckee River by Lake Tahoe, which straddles that border. Like other Great Basin lakes, it lacks any outlet, but is subject to extensive evaporation by desert sun and westerly winds, made good every few years by abnormal rains. Until white men came to Nevada, Pyramid Lake was the centre of the hunting and fishing territories of Northern Paiute bands. Fur trappers appeared in the Basin in the 1820s. In 1833 a group of trappers led by Joseph Redford Walker, finding themselves surrounded by curious Paiutes, rejected peaceable overtures and, fearing a trap, attacked and killed thirty-nine of them. By the 1840s, the Humbolt River in northern Nevada had become a favoured trail for immigrants to California, bringing them closer and closer to Pyramid Lake. The lake was first sighted in 1844 by John C. Frémont, later to be the first, but unsuccessful, Republican presidential candidate (the second was Lincoln). Within twenty years (in 1864) Nevada became a state in the Union. In 1846 the famous Donner expedition tried to cross into California via the Truckee River too late in the season and was trapped for the winter in the mountains. Their cannibalism horrified the Paiute and branded whites in their eyes as consumers of men and land. The discovery of placer gold in California in 1848 brought on the gold rush. In the 1850s gold and silver strikes in Nevada made it a centre for mining, and soon whites outnumbered Indians. Their pressures and activities transformed Paiute ways of life, depriving them of land and resources while pushing them into marginal occupations.

Knack and Stewart describe carefully and strikingly the racism, violence and exploitation to which the Paiute were subjected in the latter half of the nineteenth century. Efforts to found the reservation began in 1859, but its legal status remained uncertain until 1924. The authors continue through to the present their narrative of illegal white encroachment on reservation land, malfeasance by
Bureau of Indian Affairs officials, Nevada legislative maneuvering to control fishing and water rights, and trickery by Nevada senators to see that Paiute legal rights were not defended. Federal irrigation projects diverted massive amounts of water from the Truckee River, leading to the disappearance of Lake Winnemucca and drastic lowering and increased salinization of Pyramid Lake. By the 1960s fears over the fate of the lake led to multi-sided litigation pitting powerful agricultural interests against the Paiutes and involving the States of California and Nevada. In 1969 Governors Ronald Reagan of California and Paul Laxalt of Nevada met for an hour on a yacht in the middle of Lake Tahoe to resolve the disputes. They proposed that the lake be drained to a level that could be supported by its reduced inflow and that recreational investment be allowed to proceed on the basis of the new shoreline.

This developer's dream was a conservationist's nightmare, for the lake surface would have to be dropped another 152 vertical feet to reach this balance point. The now sparkling lake would become a salt pond in the middle of an ugly barren flat, totally uninhabitable by fish life and thoroughly unattractive to tourists and the recreation-seeking public. This single action would totally destroy for all time any economic potential Pyramid Lake held out to the Paiutes.

Fortunately, both state legislatures were as shocked as were the Paiutes, and the project never took place. In 1983 the United States Supreme Court overturned a Court of Appeals finding in favour of the Northern Paiutes in a major case involving water rights and also turned down another appeal on their behalf. These decisions capped

The 125-year history of Paiute dealings with Anglo-Americans [which] showed a pattern of weak federal protection of tribal resources and toleration of the loss of land to white farmers, pasturage to trespassing cattle, fish from the lake, and massive amounts of water from the Truckee River, taken by an arm of the Government itself. Indian agents were unable to defend against such encroachments, senators aided and encouraged it, and the Bureau of Indian Affairs blocked tribal self-protection by ignoring petitions and manipulating attorney's contracts.

Stewart served from 1975 as expert witness for the Paiutes in the lawsuit. This book is based on the documentation he collected for this purpose. Knack wrote the book with consultation and verification by Stewart. The result is openly partisan, but considering the record it contains, the Paiutes are due for some favourable partisanship. Besides providing a lucidly written, if depressing account of the course of Paiute dispossession, it also offers a
vivid introduction to an aspect of western American history. The
writing is clear and fluent, and the illustrations, documentary
notes and index are satisfactory. The printing, paper quality and
binding are also pleasing.

R.H. BARNES

WILLIAM BRIGHT, *American Indian Linguistics and Literature*, Berlin

This book does not provide the comprehensive guide to American
Indian linguistics and literature that its title suggests. Instead it
reproduces a series of Bright's papers, grouped into two
parts, one on American Indian linguistics and the other on American
Indian oral literatures. For the most part, they are clearly
written, enjoyable and informative to read. Even anthropologists
uninterested in linguistics may benefit from Bright's 'Boasian'
discussion of diffusionist versus genetic interpretations of lan-
guage grouping in the first chapter. The next two chapters, on
sibilants and naturalness in aboriginal California and on Hispan-
isms, have a more specialized appeal. The three reviews of place-
name dictionaries brought together in the fourth chapter make
cogent points about the deficiencies which result when the authors
ignore work which has been done on American Indian linguistics.

Most of the second section is devoted to demonstrating the
utility of combining the approaches of Dell Hymes and Dennis Ted-
lock to translating American Indian literature, although the first
and last chapters in the section are more general. Tedlock has
developed a method of conveying paralinguistic features, pauses,
shouts, whispers, chants and tone, while Hymes identifies verses
and lines by attention to structural features such as 'sentence-
initial particles': 'and', 'so', 'but' and so on. In three chap-
ters, Bright applies both techniques to a cycle of Karok Coyote
stories and finds that they complement each other and in fact
 correspond ninety per cent of the time in locating the basic
narrative units. His method of presenting the stories does seem
to bring the reader closer to the oral performance and to make
them more enjoyable. Chapter five discusses the reasons why the
phrase 'oral literature' should not be deemed an oxymoron. The
last chapter, on 'the virtues of illiteracy', argues that rather
than being limited to formulaic repetitions, as Goody has it, some
oral traditions, such as those of ancient India, place emphasis on
exact repetition of oral compositions that in some cases require
days and nights to recite in full. Bright thinks that we have
lost much beside immediacy through literacy:
Non-literate peoples have retained powers of memory of a magnitude hard for us who are 'civilized' to comprehend, and...the holding of knowledge in such memorized form may often imply a deeper form of knowledge than that held by us who only have 'book-learning'.

Bright concludes with an amusing anecdote in which his cat urinates on John Cage's *Silence*, the point of which readers will have to discover for themselves.

My main complaint about this book is that, especially in the second section, there is too much unnecessary repetition. For example, an entire paragraph in chapter eight repeats verbatim a sentence from the main text and a long footnote of chapter five. Potential readers should also be alerted to the fact that the linguistic material is heavily concentrated on California.

R.H. BARNES


This latest book in the *Cambridge Studies in Oral and Literate Culture* series moves away from the more specific concerns of its earlier works and provides a well-documented account of recent scholarship in the growing field of literacy studies. Brian Street is to be commended for taking on such a task, not least because he draws together diverse theoretical perspectives from the disciplines of social anthropology, linguistics, psychology, history and pedagogy, applying them not only to the analysis of traditional literacies in the case of Iran, but also to modern and radically different literacy campaigns such as those of the United Kingdom and Nicaragua, to mention only two.

Street's argument is that both the research and practice of literacy have tended to assume characteristics of either an 'autonomous' model or an 'ideological' one. The former treats literacy as a neutral skill which has a direct influence on cognitive development and hence indirectly on economic growth. This approach is, he suggests, implicit in the majority of literacy campaigns. The latter is concerned more with the social practice of literacy and its relation to ideology and social structure. It recognises the existence of specific literacies rather than a universal literacy which is isolable and deterministic. Having established the principal features of both models, Street spends the remainder of the book examining ways in which diverse authors and literary
practices assume characteristics of either model. Goody, perhaps understandably, is singled out as the arch-villain of the autonomous model in anthropological studies of literacy; he, in turn, exerted a major influence on 'unwary anthropologists' of the ilk of Clammer (p.6). Amongst development psychologists, the author criticises the work of Hillyard and Olson, and of Greenfield, for the way in which they have isolated literacy as an independent variable, identifying it as a direct cause of cognitive development in the Piagetian sense. He contrasts these 'autonomous' approaches with those of anthropologists such as Finnegan and Parry who stress the relation between oral and literate modes of communication rather than the polarization of orality and literacy. Similar approximations to the ideological model are found, he suggests, in the work of Clanchy and Graff, historians who have charted the development of the social conditions for literacy in medieval England and nineteenth-century Canada.

However, one of the problems with this either/or approach is that it tends to oversimplify an extremely complex area of study. It also assumes that the academic concerns of diverse disciplines are comparable. For better or worse, development psychologists are engaged in quite different kinds of research from social anthropologists, and the degree to which they can be compared in terms of theoretical models is inevitably limited by the intellectual problems they pose.

The first part of the book is an exposition of these models, which Street puts forward in an analysis of major published work on literacy. Why he has chosen to ignore Ong, one of the most influential current writers on the subject, is not immediately apparent; neither does MacLuhan, Ong's intellectual godfather, merit a mention. The second part of the book describes different kinds of literacy practices found in village Iran and is based on the author's own field work there during the 1970s. The third and final part, entitled 'Literacy in Practice', is devoted to an analysis of literacy campaigns. It is only here, however, that we come across a discussion of one of the main third-world theorists on literacy, Paolo Freire. Some might also question the exclusion of the theoretical (and practical) work of the Summer Institute of Linguistics in the field of literacy. Educational linguists such as Pike and Gudschinsky have made a substantial though much criticised contribution to the corpus of literacy theory, while their missionary work with American Indians offers ample material for an analysis of literacy in practice. However, these are the kinds of omissions inevitable in a study of this scope. The importance of the book is that it introduces a fresh anthropological perspective on development and education work. It also presents a challenge to those anthropologists who continue to work comfortably within the notion of pre-literate and literate societies. It ends with a plea for the dissemination of the ideological model amongst literacy practitioners and for a radical reshaping of the classic distinction between theory and practice.

In *Naven*, Bateson writes that 'when we study a culture, we find at once that the same structural assumptions are present in large numbers of its details'. Anyone who has wrestled successfully with the myriad social facts which comprise an ethnographer's data will concede readily that Bateson's remark makes a good deal of sense. One corollary of the remark (methodologically speaking) is that social anthropologists cannot afford to ignore such aspects of people's lives as sexual activities in their studies. *Ritualized Homosexuality in Melanesia* demonstrates admirably the force of this point.

This collection of essays by nine distinguished contributors - Van Baal, Schwimmer, Michael K. Allen, K.E. Read, Serpenti, Sfrum, and Lindenbaum, as well as the editor - consists of a preface by the editor, and nine chapters, each of which addresses ritualized homosexuality or '(RH)' and some of its associated institutions in different but related forms of life in Melanesia. Herdt's introduction to the study of '(RH)' in Melanesia sets the tone for the essays which follow by devoting most of it 'to clarifying both what we do and do not know about it' (p.5). The bibliography is extensive and will doubtless prove useful to workers on this and related topics in other parts of the world. The index is serviceable, and the maps are clear and helpful. The book has been produced excellently.

The editors of JASO (it was suggested to them by one interested subscriber) might well earmark *Ritualized Homosexuality* for review either by a Melanesianist or by a homosexualist. In the absence abroad of Dr MacClancy (who worked in Vanuatu, of course), the present writer (not a Melanesianist) was asked to review the book. In the event, and as was predictable, there is no reason why this book and the studies which comprise it should be of especial interest to social anthropologists who have sexual relations with people of their own sex; any more than women's social anthropology (so to say) should appeal especially to women, or details of Balinese sartorial conventions, for example, should appeal more to fashion designers and retailers than to social anthropologists.

From the point of view of this reviewer as a very junior social anthropologist, the book makes three points which are worth noting particularly, though much else could be mentioned, of course. The first point is the matter of analytical terms. Readers of JASO may well find reference to this topic tiresome, for many are well aware, surely, of the arguments which maintain that the categories of our ordinary, everyday language do not have the steadiness which scientific analysis requires. This reviewer's impression, though, is that the cogency of the arguments for such a view (which seem to him to be beyond reasonable doubt) is far from generally accepted. These studies, like the title of the book, refer to what is 'homosexual', but Herdt and the other contributors make it clear that 'in Melanesia, our Western norms do not apply; males who engage in
ritual activities are not "homosexuals," nor have they ever heard
the concept "gay" (p.x).

The situation is a little paradoxical, though. The 'sexual'
acts studied in this book are not performed by 'homosexuals',
though the adjective homosexual is used. The reason for this
usage is that 'as a simple modifier, homosexual is preferable and
more accurate than any other, since these societies permit sexual
penetration and insemination between people of the same sex', i.e.
'(RH). Bisexual is also inaccurate to describe these people or
their homoerotic acts: 'Typically, (RH) groups often forbid hetero­
sexual contacts during the same period when boys are being inse­
minated by older males; and the younger insertees are strictly sep­
arated from females and are only allowed sexual contacts with
superordinate males after initiation' (pp.7-8). So, if ordinary
language is used, it can operate only after being defined in terms
of social facts. This goes also for 'social inequality' and such
related terms, a drawback which symmetry (for instance) does not
have.

The second noteworthy point is, again, one which many social
anthropologists, especially those versed in the Dutch literature
about Southeast Asia, would most probably find incontrovertible:
that what might be termed myth, ritual, religion, and social organ­
ization often constitute a whole, the unity of the aspects of which
is recognised and acted upon to the benefit of an analyst's study.
This point has been demonstrated time and again in work on South­
east Asia, and the essays in this book reinforce the point. It is
much to be hoped that these essays prod those who maintain - in the
face of all the evidence to the contrary - that such holism is in­
defensible into adjusting their dogmatically taken position. This
adjustment will require partially that social facts be given their
due weight by analysts.

Thirdly, the studies, and especially Herdt's introductory
essay, demonstrate again that the notion of a 'culture area' can be
useful to social anthropological enquiry. This notion, under the
guise of a 'field of ethnological study' (ethnologisch studieveld),
was articulated in detail by J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong at Leiden
in 1935 (De Maleische Archipel als Ethnologisch Studieveld, Leiden).
This field is an area with a population which appears to be suffi­
ciently homogeneous and unique to form a separate object of ethno­
logical study, and which at the same time apparently reveals suf­
ficient local shades of differences to make internal comparative
research worthwhile. Herdt's analysis, based upon an acceptance
of the 'culture area', turns up the provocative conclusion (among
many others) that the customs which constitute the 'sociocultural
forms and ecological distribution' of (RH) are not shapeless or
random. Rather, 'these customs belong to an ancient ritual complex
manifested primarily in non-Austronesian-speaking groups of the
western region of Irian Jaya and associated fringe areas, and some
northeastern Melanesian island societies' (p.54). It should be
borne in mind, though, in this reviewer's judgement, that comparison
on this scale, in various parts of the world, is only a first step.
Finally, if social anthropology is going to have something inter­
esting to say not just about society but about humankind, then
comparison is not to be restricted to any area less than world-wide. By proceeding cautiously, moreover, and with sceptical scrutiny of the technique and tools of analysis, such comparison can demonstrably avoid the difficulties which are apparent in comparativism of the kind which Frazer employed.

From the point of view of a homosexualist, this reviewer (as he has mentioned already) finds nothing in this book which strikes him as especially interesting and important because of the fact. A general question which is raised in the book, though, perhaps bears some reflection; as Herdt puts it, 'I must end by expressing my bewilderment at an anthropology that has ignored their [the rich inter-linkages and ideas presented in the essays through comparative ethnography] theoretical importance for so many decades' (p.73). Read, in 'The Nama Cult Recalled', suggests that the centuries-old Western view that 'homosexual practices [are] foremost among behaviors that are contrary to nature' has both bedevilled and inhibited anthropological studies of homosexual behaviour. Most anthropologists were, and are, Western males. 'Almost certainly, Western ideology and a male bias have contributed to placing homosexual behaviors into the recesses of the anthropological closet' (p.214). It is, though, a moot point whether these circumstances have not inhibited also their studies of human sexuality in general (cf. p.216).

A point raised by Read (p.215) is 'Why...did Evans-Pritchard delay so long (almost thirty years) in reporting in the American Anthropologist [1970, pp. 1428-34] institutionalized male homosexuality among the Zande?' Jeremy Coote comments (personal communication to this reviewer) that much of Evans-Pritchard's material concerning many aspects of Zande life was not published until thirty or forty years after his field work. For instance, The Azande: History and Political Institutions and Man and Woman among the Azande were both published in the 1970s. 'It seems hardly surprising,' writes Coote, 'when this material had to wait so long to be published, that that on Zande homosexuality had to as well.' Furthermore, in his Introductory to Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic (Oxford 1937), Evans-Pritchard explains that he does not include 'more than a few introductory notes on Zande institutions other than those dealt with in this book because...[inter alia]...Professor and Mrs Seligman had the full use of my material in writing in their Pagan Tribes of the Nilotic Sudan just such a chapter as might be needful here' (p.3). Thus there is a perfectly straightforward discussion of male homosexuality among the Azande at pp. 506-7 of the Seligmans' book. Female homosexuality in Zande is discussed in Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic (pp.56-7). It is therefore clear, as Coote comments, that Evans-Pritchard did not delay reporting institutionalized male homosexuality among the Azande.

Finally, a question: why should it be that the penetrated partner in sexual intercourse (oral, vaginal, and anal) appears nearly universally to be disvalued relative to the penetrator, even when the latter may be younger than, may take an inferior physical position to, and may be more 'passive' than the former; and this, when the parties may both be either male or female?

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER

Emmanuel Milingo was for fourteen years Roman Catholic Archbishop of Lusaka, Zambia, before being recalled to Rome in 1982 to 'silence the controversy which had arisen over his pastoral methods'. In 1973 he discovered that he had gifts of healing and of the casting-out of devils. He was ordered by the Secretariat for the Propagation of the Faith in Rome to stop his healing ministry in 1974, but people continued to follow him, and he felt compelled to carry on. The prophetess Alice Lenshina had some years earlier been the moving force behind an important breakaway movement from the Church in Zambia, but it was not Milingo's intention to lead a similar secession. The extracts from Milingo's booklets, which have been brought together by Mona Macmillan, provide an account in his own words of his attempts to remain within the Church without denying the validity and importance of his gifts.

The editor has interspersed the extracts with useful historical and anthropological material, which provides a background to the 'case' of Milingo, and to the problems of translation involved in the discussion of words like 'spirits' and 'devils'. In a collection of this kind, it is not surprising that a number of things remain unexplained, such as the reasons for some of the wilder accusations made against Milingo. But the work is essentially apologetic and devotional and, because of the nature of Milingo's gifts, provocative in its challenge to the established church. As such, it is an interesting ethnographic contribution to the subject of Christianity in Africa.

It is hardly surprising that an African archbishop should be concerned with healing and with the casting-out of devils, or that he should regard healing as a holistic process. But it is the living reality of the spirits, which almost leap out of the pages, which must have caused confusion and embarrassment in Rome.

The Archbishop shows a reluctant but inevitable acceptance of his gifts, and his compulsion to exercise them appears at times to be outside his control. His case is an example of the kind of controversy long argued in the Christian Church, and one which concerns the nature of prophetic authority. The gifts themselves may be available to many, but their validity as representative of the divine life in the person who uses them can only be confirmed by the Church and the community. There is a very fine line between the divine and the diabolical.

The struggle represented in these extracts belongs both to the Church and to Milingo. The Church has rejected the authenticity of the gifts, and in doing so, rejects certain aspects of African religious experience. An archbishop whose 'spirits' have refused to be exorcised by the longstanding process of conversion and priesthood cannot easily be accommodated within the Church.

Nevertheless, Milingo's descriptions of his ministry are very reminiscent of the primitive Christianity of St Mark's Gospel, which depicts the relentless pursuit of Christ by those with devils...
to be cast out, and his reluctant limitation of these activities because of their demands on him. Milingo is fully aware of these parallels, and in addition draws on the devotional and scriptural evidence that points to himself as the typological rejected prophet.

Milingo's articulate theological treatise is a plea for a more African-centred Christianity, but not just for Africa. His main theme is the creation of a ministry of healing which invites a response from the spirits. He suggests that this particular kind of ministry may have relevance for the whole world in its present state of spiritual crisis.

The title of the book, *The World Between*, refers to the spirit world, but Milingo is himself very much 'in between'. He received a Catholic education not only in Zambia, but also in Dublin and Rome. He has read some anthropology. In his writing, he makes use of the African christological approach, in which typologies from an assumed African theological constellation are incorporated into the Christian paradigm: hence Christ the medicine-man, Christ the diviner and, for Milingo, Christ the 'elder'. But he is critical of Western Christianity and of the West. He says that many Africans have returned from Europe, their faith abandoned, because Europeans had turned out to be so different from the high expectations of them. He adds that for some in Europe, the query, 'What good can come out of Nazareth?' could be replaced by 'Africa?'. He stresses that 'We still have to struggle to present the needs of Africans in the church', and cites the Kenyan nun who said 'We leave Him in church on Sunday and ask our ancestral gods to accompany us for the rest of the week'. God is equated with 'European', and is, moreover, considered too remote to deal with the problems of ordinary Africans.

The extracts in the book in no way challenge the existing political order, but they do provide some criticism of the present state of the Church in Africa. He says that those now in power are themselves the products of a Christian (often Catholic) upbringing and education, and yet they have 'imprisoned' the Church and its officials, who have to flatter those in high office for survival.

Milingo can be regarded as a 'sign' that has come out of Africa, but one that remains contained within the edges of the Church. He is a reminder that the Christian Church has remained unbending in its attitude towards its loyal African converts. It seems stubbornly to refuse to learn from other experiences. Milingo refers to 'God our mother' and evokes the idea that the Church's rigid rejection of the female claim to priesthood can be paralleled with its reluctance to accept the prophetic voice of an African priest. In both cases, the challenge comes from things associated with the Church's 'darker' past - the temptresses, witches, unruly spirits and magic still hovering threateningly on her boundaries.
OTHER NOTES AND NOTICES


This booklet has been produced to accompany the exhibition of the same name that is currently being staged at the Museum of Mankind. It is well produced and illustrated with numerous photographs and colour plates. The text consists of three pieces, the first, a general survey of the Amazon region of Lowland South America and its native inhabitants by Elizabeth Carmichael, which also acts as an introduction to the exhibition as a whole. The second part, by Brian Moser and Donald Tayler, is a shortened version of that section of their 1965 travel book, *The Cocaine Eaters*, that deals with their visit to the Tukanoan Indians of the Northwest Amazon. Unfortunately, the editing has not been done all that skilfully, and this version flows nothing like as smoothly as the original. In the final part, Stephen Hugh-Jones also writes on the Tukanoan peoples, focusing attention on the longhouse, a microcosm of their universe.

The Northwest Amazon receives particular emphasis in this book, and that is in keeping with the exhibition. Although there are items from all over Amazonia on display, the climax of the exhibition is a reconstruction of a Tukanoan longhouse. This has been impressively done, and the authentic atmosphere is heightened by background noises of village and jungle life. The exhibition will be open for at least another year and deserves a visit. For those who know little about Amazonia, it is worth reading the accompanying booklet in advance.

P.G. RIVIERE
In Trinity Term 1985, the O.U.A.S. held a series of eight lectures under the title 'Art and Anthropology' in conjunction with Wolfson College, Oxford, who provided the venue and very welcome financial support. The series was organised by Jeremy Coote and Anthony Shelton as a follow-up to a series of seminars on the same theme which they had held the previous term at the Institute of Social Anthropology. All the lectures were exceptionally well attended, with a consistent average audience of 70-80 people, an undoubted success for this new departure in the Society's activities. The organisers hope to secure publication of both the lectures and the preceding term's seminars in a volume under their joint editorship.

R.J. PARKIN
Secretary, O.U.A.S.


Cambridge Anthropology, Vol. IX, No. 3.


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Anthropology today...is not only the name of a discipline; the term denotes a fundamental tendency characteristic of the present position of man with regard to himself and to all that is. According to this tendency, a thing is understood only when it receives an anthropological explanation. Today, anthropology not only seeks the truth concerning man but also claims to have the power of deciding the meaning of truth as such. No other epoch has accumulated so great and so varied a store of knowledge concerning man as the present one. No other epoch has succeeded in presenting its knowledge of man so forcibly and so captivatingly as ours, and no other has succeeded in making this knowledge so quickly and so easily accessible. But also, no epoch is less sure of its knowledge of what man is than the present one. In no other epoch has man appeared so mysterious as in ours.

The words are those of Martin Heidegger: the source a book first published in 1929 and dedicated to the memory of the philosopher Max Scheler, who had died the year before.

But what is Heidegger talking about? Of 'anthropology' to be sure, but certainly not as it is commonly conceived in Britain,

An earlier version of this paper was presented at the seminar 'Modern Conservatisms', organised by Anna Bramwell and Michael Hurst, on 11 June 1985, at Trinity College, Oxford.

where 'anthropology' is identified, primarily, with the discipline of social and cultural anthropology and, popularly, with the study of 'exotic', non-Western, societies. The clue to Heidegger's usage lies in the dedication of the book to Scheler. For Scheler is commonly regarded as the founder of the tradition of what came, in Central Europe between the wars, to be called 'philosophical anthropology'. My purpose in this paper is to introduce some of the central figures, ideas and problems of this tradition, which has, thus far, received little attention in England.

Scheler is the seminal figure of modern philosophical anthropology, whose later works, especially the posthumously published essay Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos, provide a recurring point of reference for his successors. One of the aims of this paper must therefore be to elucidate what Scheler, his followers and critics, mean by 'philosophical anthropology', as well as to sketch something of the content of his work and of the ways in which his heritage was taken up and, more often than not, transformed in the years after his death. The latter topic is vast, and for practical reasons I shall largely confine my discussion of post-Schelerian philosophical anthropology to the work of Arnold Gehlen, especially his influential treatise Der Mensch: seine Natur und seine Stellung in der Welt.

The juxtaposition of Gehlen's name to that of Scheler is apt for many reasons. Historically speaking, Der Mensch is a classic in the post-Schelerian tradition. It has run through many editions since it was first published in 1940; and it is frequently referred to, not least by radical writers, such as Jürgen Habermas and the theologian Jürgen Moltmann, who recognise the importance of a work whose implications for society they find unsympathetic and whose author's political views they regard with understandable suspicion. For Gehlen, a major figure in German sociology until his death in 1976, established his academic reputation under the Third Reich, and in post-war years became the leading theorist of a resurgent German conservatism. If Habermas, the pre-eminent representative of the younger generation of the Frankfurt School, and Moltmann, the fount of much of what is now termed 'liberation theology', take Der Mensch so seriously, so, I suggest, should we.

But there is more than historical importance in the examination of the relationship between Scheler's work and Gehlen's. Not only did the twelve years that elapsed between the publication

2 Bern: Francke Verlag 1927; translated as Man's Place in Nature (Hans Meyerhoff, Boston: Beacon Press 1958). In preparing this essay I have used Frank Dunlop's as yet unpublished translation which renders the title more accurately as The Place of Man in the Cosmos, from which all quotations are taken. I wish to acknowledge my thanks for his permission to use this translation and for the benefit I have gained from his knowledge of both Scheler's and Gehlen's works. His translation of Gehlen's important essay 'Human Nature and Institutions' will appear in The Salisbury Review (Vol. IV no.2, January 1986).

3 Berlin 1940; a translation of this work will be published by Columbia University Press in the course of 1986.
of Scheler's *Die Stellung* and Gehlen's *Der Mensch* see the rise to power of a regime in which the question of what is and what is not a fully human being became a matter of life and death for millions; but Gehlen's selective development of Scheler's themes amounts to a thorough-going naturalization of the older thinker's metaphysical and ultimately religious vision of man's nature and condition. This development is signalled in the replacement of Scheler's term *Kosmos* by the more sober-sounding *Welt* to refer to the context of man's existence in the title of Gehlen's book. Examination of the consequences of this process of naturalization - Gehlen's replacement of an avowedly metaphysical frame of reference with one that is self-consciously natural-scientific - brings to light some of the most important problems hidden in the depths of Kant's deceptively simple question: 'What is Man?'

In view of the prospects opened up for the human race by developments in genetic engineering these problems are of great practical importance, quite apart from their theoretical interest. Assumptions about human nature exercise an influence on our decisions even - perhaps especially - when they are not thought through and made explicit. The explication of the nature of man, its constituent features and attendant consequences, is something that Scheler and his successors tried to provide. Whatever we think of their answers, the questions they asked are ones we ignore at our peril.

In his essay 'Man and History', Scheler remarks, as Heidegger and so many others were to do, on the paradox that in an age in which historical, biological and ethnographic studies have added so much to our empirical knowledge of men, the essence of what it is to be a Man escapes us in a way that it has never seemed to do before. Ours is an age of competing *Weltanschauungen*, each of which has, at its centre, a particular image of man. At such a time the construction of a philosophical anthropology is the most urgent problem of philosophy. By 'philosophical anthropology' he means a basic science which investigates the essence and essential constitution of man, his relationship to the realms of nature (organic, plant and animal life) as well as to the source of all things, man's metaphysical origin as well as his physical, psychic and spiritual origins in the world, the forces and powers which move man and which he moves, the fundamental trends and laws of his biological, psychic, cultural and social evolution along with their essential capabilities and realities.5

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Scheler intended to realize this characteristically ambitious project in two complementary treatises devoted, respectively, to philosophical anthropology and to metaphysics. Neither was ever written. Two years after 'Man and History' was published Scheler was dead, leaving behind a sketch of what might have been in The Place of Man in the Cosmos. Though only an overview of the themes to be developed in the two unwritten books, Die Stellung (as I shall henceforth refer to it) reflects Scheler's lifelong concern with the inseparable questions: 'What is man?' and 'What is man's place in the nature of things?' The result is a dense but brilliantly suggestive essay which more than adequately illustrates the dualistic theory of human nature - man as both a particular form of life and a uniquely spiritual being - which is the hallmark of his anthropology. This is not the absolute dualism of a Descartes, whose model of man, as immaterial mind set somehow in a mechanistically conceived body, results in the ultimately unintelligible model of 'the ghost in the machine'. Scheler's is a qualified dualism which bridges the gap between body and soul - a gap which emerges in pure philosophical meditation but which is quite unknown in man's experience of himself as a living being. The mystery of the origins of what man experiences as the spiritual aspect of his being still remains in Scheler's theory - it is a central topic of his metaphysics - but the gulf that yawns between a purely spiritually conceived mind and a mechanistically conceived, material body in the Cartesian view of man is considerably reduced by the attention Scheler pays to the unique characteristics of living beings. While Descartes' dualism knows only immaterial soul and material body, defined as extension in space and characterised as being mechanistically ordered, Scheler sets the study of man within the context of an examination of organic nature - a realm of being whose uniqueness Descartes denies. Since the result of this denial is to make man an unintelligible compound and to class animals as unthinking, unfeeling machines, Scheler's philosophy of the organism, which sets the agenda for his successors as well, deserves our attention no less than his attempt to vindicate the reality of 'spirit' in a world of otherwise scientifically measurable facts.

The thesis that man's form of life is distinct within the sphere of nature is corroborated by evidence drawn from the life sciences, from biology and from genetic and comparative psychology. The argument that this is not all there is to man - that in addition to being a species of living organism man is also the embodiment of 'spirit' in the world - is developed in two ways. Negatively, Scheler tries to show that the categories we can derive from the idea and experience of organic nature are inadequate to explain crucial aspects of human existence. Positively, he refers to the source of spirit as a constitutive factor of man's being to an admittedly speculative metaphysics, related to but also different from the metaphysical systems of Spinoza and Hegel - according to which the process of reality as a whole, and of man's being as an enduring moment in this process, must be understood in terms of the interpenetration of two originally distinct principles, spirit
and drive. With the emergence of man as a unique form of life, driven like other species by organic compulsions but not motivated by them alone, 'spirit' - powerless until incarnate in the human being - enters the world as a formative factor.

Ours is neither a time nor a place which takes kindly to this sort of metaphysical speculation; but Scheler thought it essential to man's knowledge of himself and the cosmos he inhabits. Gehlen, for one, found this aspect of Scheler's work both unacceptable in and unnecessary to a critically tenable philosophical anthropology. In this, at least, a British audience is likely to share Gehlen's view. To that audience, I can only say 'be patient'. The proof of this particular pudding is in the eating; and the metaphysical ingredient is an essential part of the recipe. Its value is not to be judged by taking a spoonful of pure, Schelerian metaphysics on its own, but by noting what it contributes to the final product. To those tough-minded souls who consider themselves allergic to everything that smacks of 'unscientific', metaphysical speculation, I plead only that they withhold judgment until they can compare Scheler's anthropomy with Geheln's rival product from which metaphysics has been as far as possible removed. After all, how many people who purport to detest the taste of garlic find a salad dressed without it mysteriously incomplete?

At all events, even in the scheme of Scheler's essay, the metaphysical component comes not at the beginning but towards the end. The opening sections of Die Stellung are concerned only with understanding man's being as a distinct form of life. Scheler develops a typology of life forms, plant, animal, man - a morphology quite compatible with a scientific, naturalistic understanding of human evolution. Let us recall that the tasks of morphology and of natural history are analytically distinct. While Darwinian evolutionary theory may explain how the diverse types of living being come into existence, the business of morphology, the theory of forms, is to elucidate what features make each genus and species itself and no other. Sociobiology, as practised by E.O. Wilson and his followers, tends to dissolve morphology in evolutionary theory. This, I believe, leads inevitably to an underestimation of the distinctiveness of life forms, including that of man. There can, in the last resort, be no incompatibility between morphological description of the life forms, specific characteristics and modes of existence, of different species, and a natural historical theory which hypothetically explains their origins. However, the reduction of morphology to being a derivative of natural history results not only in the dogmatism of particular scientific hypotheses - by making a naturalistically conceived evolutionary theory the unquestionable premise which determines a priori what can exist - but, in the case of man in particular, leads to far-fetched attempts to identify unique features of existence (religion and art, for instance) with aspects of the lives of other animals. It is one of the virtues of the philosophical anthropological tradition that it is both willing to ground the philosophy of man in a philosophy of nature, and able to recognise that, even where parallels between human and non-human life exist, the features in question must be understood in the context of qualitatively dis-
tinct forms of life. In this, it stands in stark contrast not only to sociobiology, but also to the prevailing trends in social science which, no less one-sidedly, ignore the organic aspects of man's being in their efforts to establish a pure sociological model of man - man as though formed by social forces alone.

A morphology need not be exhaustive in order to be instructive. To understand man's unique mode of existence we do not require an encyclopaedic knowledge of every other species, but only of such aspects of the general phenomenon of life against which man's peculiarities stand out. It is in this context that we must understand Scheler's distinction between 'man' and 'animal'. As Gehlen was later to point out, to contrast man with animal does not entail denying that man is, in fact, a type of animal, nor that, in almost every way, he has more in common with such an animal as the chimpanzee than the latter has with his fellow animals, the giraffe and the amoeba. The juxtaposition of man to animal serves the sole but essential purpose of bringing into focus just what it is that is unique to our particular species.

That there much we share with other life forms and that these shared characteristics, such as the sexual urge and the need for foods, are also constitutive of man's being is something that philosophical anthropology to tends to emphasise rather than deny. But in a world inhabited by distinct species, careful discrimination is the high road to understanding. Philosophical anthropology makes it its business to understand one such species, our own. And this requires delineation of just what it is that makes us distinct in the community of life. We gain this knowledge by comparing what is human with what is not. That man is a distinct species is something no one is going to deny. That he is a species of animal and not of plant is no less certain. Thus by comparing the particular species, man, with the generality of other beings we recognise as animals, and by discerning what is discoverable in human existence but nowhere else in the animal kingdom - 'kingdoms' for instance - we learn something of what is essential and uniquely human. The legitimacy of the procedure has nothing to do with any special value we may attach to the existence of our own species. Comparison with a view to discrimination is a part of any enquiry in the life sciences; whether its object be the identification of a cancerous cell, the distinction between the Black Rhinoceros and the White, the nature of human anatomy or the anatomy of human nature.

Scheler paints his picture with broad strokes, drawing in only such details of the various forms of life as are necessary to his, strictly anthropological, purpose. We shall follow his example, tailoring discussion of his essay to those aspects most relevant in an introduction to the idea of a philosophical anthropology as he and his successors conceived it. Enough has already been said to inform the reader that what Scheler has in mind as he proceeds, step by careful step, through the examination of the levels of

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organic life - first plant life, with its undifferentiated 'drives' towards nutrition and reproduction, and then animal life in its increasingly complex forms, from amoeba to chimpanzee - is to reach the point at which the distinction of man will begin to appear. *Die Stellung*, indeed, began life as a lecture entitled 'The Unique Place of Man' delivered in Darmstadt in 1927 - and that title expresses as well as any what Scheler aimed to establish.

Is there not, however, something contradictory in referring to both 'broad strokes' and 'careful steps' in characterizing Scheler's text? Given the style of Scheler's argument, I think not. The empirical examples with which he illustrates his thesis are few but telling. The argument moves logically from one step to the next: first, the effort to define man's unique life form as it emerges against the background of the various, successively more complex modes of organic existence; then the attempt to show that man's real distinction is something more than the distinctiveness of one type of organism among others; and finally, the endeavour to make this mark of ontological distinction intelligible in the context of an all-encompassing metaphysics.

Scheler was under no illusion that his task was an easy one. The human and the natural sciences have told us so much about the variety of human societies, about the complexity of the natural universe, inorganic and organic, and about the relationships of dependence and interdependence between one aspect of the world and another, that the very idea of talking about 'man's place in the cosmos' may seem presumptuous. Is 'man' in fact definable? Has he any identifiable, ontologically settled 'place' in the overall scheme of things? And what, in heaven or earth, is 'the cosmos'? Can the philosophical anthropologist do anything more than add yet another 'world view' to the catalogue of those already available on the intellectual and ideological market? If that is all he wants to do, the task is easy enough, though whether anyone will attend to what he says is another matter. But Scheler is more ambitious than that. There is indeed a distinct metaphysical and religious world view in his text, and a very contentious one too. But *Die Stellung* is much more than a piece of special pleading for a particular outlook on life. Scheler's ability to marshall corroborative, scientific evidence in the context of a single illuminating argument is remarkable; and, as Gehlen was to prove, one did not have to accept Scheler's conclusions in order to learn from the steps by which he reached them. One of the marks of Gehlen's response to Scheler's work is precisely the way in which he was able to learn from the anthropology while rejecting the metaphysics in which it was implicated.

The argument of *Die Stellung* is a single coherent thesis, but the elements which make it up also have a completeness and coherence of their own. That is why, while there are no Schelerians as there are, for example, Marxists and Feudians, the work could provide a prime point of reference for some of modern Europe's most prominent exponents of biological and psychological theory as well as setting the agenda for successors in the field of philosophical
Die Stellung provides not a doctrine of life but a framework, one might almost say a display case, for the issues crucial to understanding man's nature and condition.

Within the realm of animal life, Scheler distinguishes three levels of psychic process, each of which is a specification of the general and fundamental 'feeling drive'. Gefühlstrang, characteristic of all organisms and found already, in undifferentiated form, in the unconscious 'movement' of plants 'into' the ground and 'toward' the light. Such drives, essential to sustenance, and reproduction, are the defining mark of organic being. The form of drive, unconscious and, as it were, automatic, found in plant life persists in animal and human life (for example, in the digestive system), but as we turn to the level of animal life, it is supplemented by more specific forms of psychic activity - by instinct, by associative memory and by intelligence. Each of these represents an advance in complexity and specificity within the organism; and while the first, instinct, is found even in the simplest animal, the others, associative memory (i.e. conditioned reflexes and the ability to learn from experience) and intelligence (which Scheler defines as 'a sudden burst of insight into a complex of fact and value within the environment'), appear only as we encounter the higher forms of animal life.

Instinctive behaviour follows a fixed, unalterable pattern and represents a response to typically recurring events in the life of a species. The animal does not learn instinctual behaviour by trial and error. It is ingrained in its genetic formation and is the precondition of its continuing existence. The activity of the simplest animals is characterised by its wholly instinctive nature. In higher animals we find in addition a capacity to learn by trial and error, but this is not yet intelligence as Scheler defines it. Is 'intelligence', then, the hallmark of man? In rejecting this common view, Scheler opens the way to the uncommon perspective of his variety of metaphysical dualism.

Scheler had been deeply impressed by the results of the experiments with chimpanzees conducted by Wolfgang Köhler at the German research station on Tenerife. The findings, published in 1925, showed that the problem-solving activities of the chimpanzee involve something more than a trial-and-error approach, such as that displayed in the frenetic activity of a rat in a maze. Faced with a problem, such as how to get hold of a banana beyond his immediate reach, the ape will, after his initial attempt has failed, commonly sit quite still in his enclosure, as though in a state of rapt contemplation. After a pause, his face will change expression, and only then does he move to put his new scheme into practice. For obvious reasons, Köhler called this an 'Aha!' experience. That there is relatively abstract, 'intelligent' thought involved is suggested by the sequence, frustration, puzzlement, frustration, puzzlement.

7 Apart from Buytendijk, the names of Helmuth Plessner and Adolf Portmann deserve special mention. These three are all subjects of illuminating chapters in Marjorie Grene, Approaches to a Philosophical Biology, New York: Basic Books 1968. 8 Duniop's translation.
consideration, insight, renewed endeavour, which is evident from the chimpanzee's behaviour. If, as Scheler thought, Köhler's reading of the evidence is correct, then intelligence, in the sense of thought 'rationally' applied to the solution of a practical problem and leading to a novel approach, is not the prerogative of man alone. To be sure, the range of human intelligent activity is greater than that of the ape, and the type of thinking involved is more complex and abstract; but in so far as action is directed towards practical problems, the difference is only one of degree. No chimpanzee could calculate how one might build the dome of St Peter's Cathedral, nor would such a problem occur to him, for the very idea of a cathedral, a structure designed not to shelter the organic body from the elements but to testify to the glory of God, is utterly inexplicable in terms of the practical problems of a solely organic being. A chimpanzee understands well enough the significance of a shelter, but only man builds temples.

Here, for Scheler, was the crux of the problem. If certain other animals possess intelligence, what, if anything, sets man apart? The answer he gives is 'spirit'. Spirit is a principle of activity quite distinct from the drives of organic life which find expression in the practical problems of coping with the environment. A spiritual being is one capable of saying 'No' to his environment and even to life itself. 'A "spiritual" being', he writes,

is therefore no longer in bondage to its drives and its environment, but 'free of its environment', and as we shall call it 'open to the world'... Such a being has the power to 'objectify' the 'resistance' and reaction centres of his environment, which are all the animal possesses... he can also grasp the nature (Sosein) of these objects themselves in independence of the limitations imposed on this world of objects and its accessibility by the system of vital drives and the screen extended in front of it by the sense organs and their functions.  

The implications of this are enormous and ought to be made explicit. The most important of these implications lie in the notion of man as a uniquely 'world-open' being - a notion that was to be taken up with varying emphasis by the major figures of post-Schelerian philosophical anthropology. Animals inhabit an 'environment' whose perceived content, as the biologist Jakob von Uexküll showed, is indissolubly linked to the vital needs of the organism.  

My cats can sleep through a recorded performance of Handel's Fireworks Music which would keep my neighbours awake, and yet the cats stir at a rustling sound that even an insomniac would not notice. My neighbours have no more 'interest' in Handel than my cats do, but within the range of frequency to which the human

9 Ibid.  
10 Von Uexküll's experimental work on animal perception exerted a considerable influence on the development of a scientific basis for philosophical anthropology. Among his students was Konrad Lorenz.
ear is organically attuned the objective level of noise, regardless of its significance, is an object of human attention. Man, Scheler remarks, is uniquely open to biologically irrelevant and even harmful stimuli. Man inhabits not an environment exclusively structured by the senses in accord with the needs of the organism, but a world of objects - hence the phenomenon of human self-consciousness. In knowing the world as a world of objects, man understands himself as one element among others - experienced in unique fashion for sure and even an object of a unique type, but an element in the objective picture nonetheless. The self-conscious character of human subjectivity is, we may say, a function of the uniquely objective nature of human perception. By 'objective', I do not mean disinterested or unprejudiced - prejudice or pre-judgement before all the facts of this situation are known is, as Hans-Georg Gadamer shows, a necessary feature of judgement 11 - but simply a perception of things as objects commanding attention regardless of the short- or long-term interests of the organism. It is within this wider field of 'knowledge' that the needs of the human organism appear as problems, not of pure theory, but of practice.

From this objectification of the human environment as a 'world' arises the problem of metaphysics. Animals cannot make their bodies and movements objects for themselves. Hence they have no sense of the objectivity of space and their place within it. Man, in contrast,

learns to reckon ever more comprehensively with his own contingent place in the universe, with his own self and his entire physical and psychical apparatus, as with something completely foreign to him, something that stands in relation of strict causality with other things.

Here we see the Kantian influence on Scheler emerging, an influence which becomes more explicit with what follows. In rising above his nature as an organism, man makes everything, including himself, an object of knowledge from, as it were, beyond the world of space and time.

But the centre, whence Man performs the acts of objectification of his body and soul, and makes the world in its fullness of space and time into an object - this centre cannot itself be a 'part' of this world, cannot possess a definite location in space and time: it can only be situated in the highest ground of being itself.12

The echoes of Kant are unmistakeable, but if the argument is Kantian, Scheler is using it in very un-Kantian, metaphysical, way. While Kant and his successors had typically developed it in the

direction of an epistemology which conceives the 'phenomenal' world - the world as it appears to consciousness - as inevitably structured by categories primordially pertaining to consciousness, Scheler stresses what he sees as its metaphysical significance. He conceives the spiritual centre, which man discovers within himself as something apart from the spatio-temporal world of nature, as the realization in the world of an aspect of the original Ground of Being. Knowing itself to be apart from the world, spirit discovers itself to be directly related to the transcendent reality which founds the very possibility of existence. This position is closer to Hegel than to Kant, but once separated from Scheler's pan-psychic vision of the world process in terms of the progressive interpenetration of spirit and drive, the Schelerian concept of spirit in man as oriented to a world-transcendent reality, of which it is simply the worldly manifestation, brings us close to the claims made by both Platonism and Biblical revelation: according to both of these, divine, world-transcendent truth makes itself directly known to the human seeker, the prophet of the philosopher who rises above earthly concerns to the encounter with God.

To pursue this line of enquiry would take us far from our present concerns, though it is, as developed by Eric Voegelin in particular, an important part of the Schelerian heritage. For our purposes, it is enough to note that Scheler establishes the distinction between the animal's 'environment' and the objective 'world' of human experience, with reference to detailed scientific studies of the limits of animal perception; and that, once this distinction is accepted, it is easy to understand why man's world, not limited to the pursuit of the organic imperatives which are still the precondition of the organism's survival, is experienced as a field of open and estimable possibilities for action. We do not have to accept that any metaphysical or religious explanation of this situation can be found in order to understand why it is that man's discovery of his contingency to the world as a whole, and the finitude of his power to control that world, gives rise to the metaphysical and religious quest. Social anthropology can attest to the variety of forms this takes and to its universality; but it takes a philosophical anthropology to explain why it is there at all and why, in contradistinction to many other universal features of human life, it is unique to our species.

If we want to see what happens when the metaphysical element is expunged from philosophical anthropology, we cannot do better than turn to the work of Gehlen. Gehlen rejects Scheler's theory of spirit as an otherworldly element that enters existence through man's unique form of being; but he does not abandon the position that man's is, indeed, a qualitatively distinct form of life. From Scheler he retains the view that the form of human existence

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can best be understood by approaching it through comparison with the life forms of other animals; and that the picture that emerges is of man as a uniquely world-open being. As Ludwig Landgrebe puts it, Gehlen takes as the guiding principle of his thesis the supposition that man must not be understood with a view to what he has in common with animals, and some subsequently super-added factor, but that all the factors which are efficaciously active in man, beginning with the lowest purely organic ones, must from the outset be grasped in their specific significance.\(^ {14}\)

That is, the special significance they have for the human species. Man is not comprehensible as one among the animals; not even one to whom a higher, metaphysically distinct element of spirit has mysteriously been added. He is quite simply a unique type of natural being whose relationship to the world on which his survival depends is utterly different from that subsisting between the animal and its environment. Here, as in Scheler, the specific difference of man is perceived as one of kind and not of degree; and, Gehlen avers, no feature of man's being can be understood unless it is comprehended as a particular functional part in a whole unique structure of organic existence. Human existence differs from that of the animal almost as much as animal existence differs from that of the plant. Indeed, between man and animal there is an increase in freedom of relationship to the world which is, if anything, greater than that between the mobile self directing animal and the plant, whose movements (if any) are totally subject to forces outside its control. Even the organic processes and cognitive operations common to man and animal alike are, according to Gehlen, misunderstood unless they are conceived as elements within a quite distinct form of life. The 'same' activity has a totally different significance when performed by man and by animal. Landgrebe calls Gehlen's 'the perfected biological approach' to philosophical anthropology. And so it is. But if this suggests that what we are discussing is any variety of biological determinism, at least as this is usually understood, the imputation is quite mistaken. Biology 'determines' the form of human existence negatively and not positively - by its failure to provide solutions to the problems of the species and in no other way.

Under the influence of evolutionism, naturalistic anthropologies prior to Gehlen's had tended to minimize the differences between human and animal life. Against this trend, Gehlen insists that it is precisely the equation of man with animal that prevents us from achieving a biological understanding of what is specifically human. The biology to which he appeals is what he calls 'anthropobiology', i.e. an analysis of organic processes in terms of the functions they fill or fail to fill in the context of the

specific totality of human existence - a form of life which not only could not be derived from the possibilities of animal existence, but which the imperative preconditions of animal survival would seem to make impossible.

There is some analogy between Gehlen's approach and that of the *Gestalt* psychologists, among whom Köhler is one of the most prominent. Like them, Gehlen argues that experience - even that of human existence as a distinct life form - cannot be adequately understood as merely the sum of its analytically separable parts. *Gestalt* psychologists argue that human experience is not, as behaviourism supposes, a succession of discrete 'sensations' along a single time axis. In men as well as animals, the central nervous system performs a prismatical synthetic function, causing the events of the world, and even the world itself, to be apprehended as already constituted 'wholes'. Neither we nor the animals add sensations together to form 'experience'. The sensations, which behaviourists and modern post-lockean empiricists in general regard as the primary building blocks of experience, are real enough; but they enter the reality of the subject only so far as they are experienced as significant elements within a formed picture of the way things seem to be. In other words, the significance of an event is inseparable from its context and from the subjectively constituted form in which it is apprehended. The patterns of experience precede the moments that bear them out.

The *Gestalt* that concerns Gehlen is the form of human life as a whole. An actually existing life form, such as man's, is only partially intelligible in terms of its evolutionary origins. To grasp its own original features, i.e. those whose origins lie in its distinctive formal properties, it must be understood as a totality in which the analytically separable elements stand as functioning parts of a whole capable of maintaining itself in the world. Seen in this way, Gehlen argues, human existence stands out as utterly distinct from any other form of life. While animal and plant life are characterized by the adaptation of the species to its environment, in man both organic adaptation and fixed environment are notable by their absence. In comparison with non-human animals man appears, as Herder put it two hundred years ago, a 'deficient' being, lacking in both instinctual guidance and the sort of bodily equipment and capabilities that would, by themselves, ensure survival.

This very lack of adaptation is man's mark of distinction.

All human functions, such as sensation, feeling, perception, language, derive from this their specific meaning, a meaning and a significance which is not comparable with the role they play in animal life. These functions are not a simple actualization of a prior adaptation to a given environment.... They are functions on which a living being which does not enjoy, in an originary manner, a firm correlation of environment and organic function, must of necessity depend. They must therefore be understood as the 'self-activated performance by virtue of which man transforms the privative existential conditions of an
underprivileged being into the chances of his survival.' Man, by virtue of his nature, must of necessity be an active being, and the quintessence and sum total of that nature which he transforms by his action into that which serves life, is the world of culture and civilization (*Der Mensch*, pp.25ff.)

But in order to be able to act, man stands in need not only of a vista of possibilities but, in addition, of an actual independence of direct impulses; in short, the satisfaction of his needs and wants must be inhibited to some extent rather than being immediately fulfilled. Whereas in the animal sensation and reaction are directly interrelated, man owns the possibility of traversing the world in non-compulsive sensations (*triebfreien Empfindungen*) and of thus gaining a perspective of 'world over man'. It is this capability of 'retaining and restraining impulses' which brings to light man's 'inwardness'. All the sensori-motorial performances are not only carried out mechanically but with a self-awareness which moves them into the realm of cognition and makes them subject to control. Man must become conscious of himself in order to be able to survive as a human being. 'He must acquire knowledge in order to become active; he must be active in order to stay alive tomorrow.' (*Der Mensch*, p.40). 15

In this argument from biological deficiency lies the source of Gehlen's influential theory of institutions - a theory which he developed most fully in *Urmensch und Spätkultur* (1956) and which has, through the work of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, even penetrated the world of English and American sociology. In brief, what Gehlen claims is that institutions are the human, cultural substitute for the absent, behavioural guidance of instinct. This perspective on the anthropological roots of institutionalization provides, like Scheler's analysis of the roots of man's religious quest, an instance of the way in which philosophical anthropology is able to explain a feature of human existence, diverse and yet universal, whose diversity and universality social anthropology can only chronicle. 16

By appeal to the 'anthropobiological' factor of organic deficiency in combination with cultural creativity - a combination difficult to explain in evolutionary terms but unmistakeable in a morphology of life forms - Gehlen believed that he had found a way round what he saw as the insuperable difficulties of Scheler's metaphysical dualism. That his achievement in clarifying certain distinctive features of human life in these terms was considerable is hardly to be denied. There are, however, certain problems in-

15 Ibid., p.23. 16 See my article 'Politics, Nature and Freedom: On the Natural Foundations of the Political Condition', *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, Vol. XV, no.3 (October 1984), pp. 286-300. This is a version of the third chapter of my *Political Order* (see footnote 13).
herent in such an approach - problems that emerge most clearly when Gehlen's anthropology is looked at in the light of Scheler's own survey of contemporary views of human nature.

In 'Man and History', Scheler distinguishes five separate 'fundamental ideas of man' which exerted an influence on his contemporaries. Each represents a distinct anthropological image, from whose assumptions fundamentally different ideas of the nature, structure and origin of man derive. The five are: the Christian doctrine of man as a divinely created but fallen and sinful being; the Greek view of man as uniquely rational being; the naturalistic anthropology which sees man as essentially homo faber, the maker and transformer of the world; the pan-Romantic or Dionysian view, which Scheler associates above all which the then influential views of Ludwig Klages, according to which man is a defective product of evolution, 'a complete desurer from life', alienated from nature by the very 'spirit' or 'mind' in which he takes such pride; and, finally, what Scheler calls the 'postulating atheism of seriousness and responsibility', most rigorously represented in Nicolai Hartmann's philosophy, which pictures man as the uniquely purposeful inhabitant of an otherwise mechanistic universe.

For the moment only the third and fourth positions need concern us. For Gehlen's anthropology is a synthesis between the naturalistic image of man the maker and the pessimistic vitalism of the 'Dionysian' view. It is worth quoting the paragraph in which Scheler identifies the root suppositions of the latter in order to bring out how fully they enter the premises of Gehlen's in some ways quite original anthropology. Theodor Lessing, whom Scheler calls the 'adroit publicist of this idea', encapsulated it in the formula 'Man is a species of predatory ape that gradually went mad with pride over its so-called "mind".'

The Dutch anatomist Louis Bolk...more appropriately summed up the results of his investigation in this sentence: 'Man is an infantile ape with deranged secretions.' In a similar way, the Berlin physician Paul Alsberg claims to have discovered a 'principle of humanity' not concerned with morphological comparison in the 'principle of degenerating organic functions.' Strongly influenced by Schopenhauer, the argument runs like this: Man stands quite defenceless in his environment, altogether far less adapted to it than his closest animal relatives. Unable to further develop his organic functions, man has, therefore, developed a tendency to use as few organic functions as possible and to replace them by tools (language and conceptualization are judged to be 'immaterial tools') which make it unnecessary to develop and sharpen the sensory organs. According to this theory, intelligence is not an a priori spiritual power requiring this disuse and making it possible, but, rather, the result of the fundamental refusal to use these organic functions, indeed, one of the modes of Schopenhauer's 'negation of life by the will'.

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17 Scheler, *Philosophical Perspectives*, p.83.
Typically, as in Klages' own work, this line of thought places the principle of 'spirit' in radical opposition to the 'life force'. In this way, the spirit/life dualism, found in Scheler's metaphysics, is reformulated as a principle of contradiction running through the very form of human existence. While Scheler looked forward to an ever-increasing spiritualization of life, Klages taught that only a reawakening of the in-dwelling impulses of nature could save mankind from the spiritually induced atrophy of the life force. This idea became a major component in the anthropology of National Socialism, with its persistent appeal to a renewed unity of 'blood and soil', recurrent symbols evoking respectively the inner and outer aspects of a single principle of life whose political expression would be the biologically based, racial community.

Gehlen's argument apparently precludes this position. By adhering with exemplary rigour to the consequences of regarding man as an organically deficient being, he rules out the possibility of falling back on the 'life force' as a solution to the problems of existence. At the same time, his anthropology remains significantly bound by the limits of the 'Dionysian' premise. Thus in a roundabout way he confirms the practical implications of Klages' cult of life, even while denying the possibility of depending on the forces to which Klages himself appeals.

From the natural deficiencies of man, Gehlen deduces not the dualistic opposition of life and spirit, but the necessity of a consciously formed cultural order embodied in limiting, authoritative institutions. The inventiveness of human consciousness and the order of culture deriving from it are anthropological necessities; and Gehlen revealingly describes consciousness as 'the auxiliary means of the organic process' which, in man at least, is otherwise fatally defective. To Klages he replies that we cannot fall back on what is no longer effectively present in the human constitution. In place of the absent order of instinctual regulation, man must regulate his life by creating institutions. Lacking the natural endowment that would assure survival, he must equip himself with tools and weapons such as only conscious intelligence could devise.

A certain separation from nature is man's fate, for only in standing back from his immediate environment can he perceive it as an open world of objectively estimable possibilities. This is in turn the precondition for the transformative action on which human survival depends. Objectification of the environment, a function of human consciousness, permits the achievement of a humanly habitable world of culture. And culture is the only nature in which man can exist.

Thus starting from premises identical with those of Klages and the 'back to nature' school, Gehlen arrives at the position he was later to formulate in the anti-Rousseauistic slogan 'back to culture'. The contrast here is apparent, but when we ask what is its implication for human action, it begins to disappear. The institutionalized world of culture is, as Gehlen describes it, a product of self-conscious, intelligent, transformative activity.
As such, it stands opposed to the human impossibility of raw nature - the vitalistic utopia of 'blood and soil'. But culture is also defined as an organic necessity for the existence of a particular form of life. True, it is formed by consciously directed activity; but consciousness is only the auxiliary function of an otherwise deficient organism. The human organism may be peculiar, but it is not utterly exceptional. In particular, it is no exception to the general rule that organisms are oriented to their own survival. If, as Gehlen insists, consciousness is an 'auxiliary means of the organic process', then its purposes are governed by the single imperative of assuring organic survival. Culture is the human form of nature in the quite specific sense that it is through cultural means - tools, weapons, institutions - that men achieve their purely natural ends. As much as for any more simplistic naturalism, the struggle for survival is the ultimate datum of Gehlen's anthropology. Within this scheme of things there can be no valid criterion of right or wrong beyond the momentary requirements of the struggle.

Influenced by von Uexküll, according to whom there is a strict correspondence between the life requirements of a species and the way it experiences its surroundings, but aware with Scheler of the peculiar openness of human perception, Gehlen maintains that man's consciousness can illumine only as much as is needed for an improvement in the life chances of the species. To the extent that it seeks to rise above its auxiliary function or believes itself capable of grasping an ethical or religious truth that transcends and so relativises the struggle for survival, consciousness becomes, as Klages thought it always was, diseased.

Readers of Plato will find this argument uncomfortably familiar. It recalls the common position of the sophists, against whom Socrates is compelled to avow that there are properly human cares beyond mere organic survival and circumstances in which it is better to choose to die. In Europe in 1940 (when Gehlen's book appeared), to endorse one position rather than the other was to make a political choice of fateful proportions. Today, the choice may seem less urgent, but the issues involved remain unchanged. No one should imagine that they are easy, but an argument which makes ethical decision subservient to organic imperatives cannot pass unchallenged. If, at the end of the day, we do not accept such an argument, it must be in full awareness of what it implies.18 Such a consideration falls beyond the scope of this article and, to conclude, I should like to return to the figure with whose words I began, Martin Heidegger, the most sympathetic and perceptive critic of Scheler's conception of philosophical anthropology and the inspiration for Ludwig Landgrebe's equally perceptive criticism of Gehlen's work.

In Being and Time,19 Heidegger advances the view that human

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18 For an eloquent and searching discussion of the issues involved see Hans Jonas, The Imperative of Responsibility (note 4, above).
existence is fundamentally hermeneutic. By this, he means that man's being depends not on any given facts of life (beyond his awareness of his mortality), but on the interpretations he places on the world. Heidegger talks not of 'man' but of dasein, literally 'being-there'. Dasein is essentially the being whose mode of being is questionable to himself. Human finitude is characterised by what Heidegger calls man's being-toward-death, his consciousness of mortality, rather than in terms of the relationship subsisting between a certain identifiable type of being and the more or less manipulable things of the world. Seen in this way, the philosophical anthropologists' approach to man - through a comparative morphology of life forms and, especially in Gehlen's case, through the exaltation of the struggle for biological survival to the point at which it becomes the ultimate reference point for the understanding of human existence - is only one possible interpretation, and one which has quite specific roots in certain currents of nineteenth-century thought. Thus in Landgrebe's judgement, Gehlen's theory absolutizes a particular interpretation of what is significant for man and, in doing so, not only precludes the possibility of political and ethical judgement independent of biological imperatives, but is prevented from comprehending its own historically conditioned origin:

The interpretation of the force of conscious self-knowledge and self-understanding as a mere auxiliary function of some organic process is itself no more than an interpretation... which is posited by man in his striving to understand himself within a set of definite, already established historical conditions.20

From the standpoint of Scheler, it could be argued that what Gehlen's anthropology lacks is any reference to the spiritual dimension and the metaphysical issues which this opens up. The Heideggerian criticism is more radical and extends even to Scheler's own conceptions. What Landgrebe thinks is wrong with Gehlen's theory is not that an aspect of human experience is missing from the picture, but that the characteristic approach of philosophical anthropology, in seeking to ground itself in particular scientifically established facts, inevitably starts from a partial, taken-for-granted, interpretation of the nature of things.

Instead of interpreting the self-understanding of man as a function of the facticity of life regarded as an ultimate, [this] interpretation of human existence...must be understood as the function of a very specific manner of self-understanding....In his self-understanding man designs a blueprint...of what he can be and should be, and in doing so he reaches out beyond everything that he has been. It is precisely when the problems implicit in the anthropological approach are followed to their conclusions - as is...

done in exemplary fashion in Gehlen's treatise — that it becomes clearly evident why these problems are not and cannot be narrowly self-confined but point beyond them­selves to a different plane...on which the approach to the phenomenon of man tries to derive its justification from the structure of human self-understanding.21

In citing Landgrebe at length, I am not endorsing Heidegger's critique of the philosophical anthropological project from the standpoint of a purely hermeneutic understanding of human existence — an approach which seems to me to underestimate the importance of the ontologically given conditions in which self-interpre­tation takes place. I wish merely to suggest that philosophical anthropology, as developed by Scheler and his successors, also has its limitations, and that these limitations have their source in a historical situation in which the findings of experimental science seemed to be the last refuge of certainty in a politically and religiously uncertain world.

With the development of quantum physics in the 1920s and the displacement of Newtonian cosmology by Einstein's theory of relati­vity, the field of science itself — including the life sciences to which philosophical anthropology appeals — came to be under­stood as a field of conflicting, more or less well corroborated interpretations. In this sense, the Heideggerian emphasis on the primacy of interpretation is both understandable and correct. The life process of man is, after all, in the last resort the history of man as a self-interpreting being. Only in this process is the available evidence of the nature of things constituted as science. This means that, on the one hand, consciousness must be re­cognised as something more than an auxiliary function of an unquestionably given life form; and, on the other, that the under­standing of man and the order he creates and inhabits must focus on the historical process of self-interpretation, in whose imperfect life man builds his temporal refuge, as well as on the signi­ficance of his form of life as the best available scientific ev­idence shows it to be. The integration of all these aspects, meta­physical, historical, biological and hermeneutic, remains not the promise of philosophical anthropology, but its challenge and its hope, the perceptible and ever-open horizon of human self-under­standing.

DAVID J. LEVY

21 Ibid., pp. 26-7.
The Crooked Paths of Time:
The Concept of History Among the Tugen of Kenya

I

During my first stay among the Tugen of Kenya in 1978, I became involved in an interesting discussion. Some elders sitting under the shade of a baraza tree claimed that the Europeans would invade their land again and establish themselves as rulers, as they had done some time before; colonialism would come back again 'when the men of the age-set Kaplelach had become elders' - that is, in about thirty to forty years' time. I protested and tried to explain the economic and political situation in Europe which had led to colonial expansion but which had now changed completely. But the elders laughed at me and said: 'You wait. You will see. Time will tell.' This is when I started to become interested in their concept of time and history.

II

The Tugen of northwestern Kenya belong to the Kalenjin group.

1 In 1978, I started fieldwork in Karbartonjo, north of Kabarnet, the capital of Baring District. I continued my work in 1980, moving further into the northern region of Kipsaraman, and finally started working in Ngorore Location, Bartabwa, in 1981. I returned to Bartabwa in 1982 and 1983-84. Most of my material relates to Bartabwa.
linguistically, like the Nandi, Kipsigis, Elgeyo and others. They live in the Tugen Hills of Baringo District, an area of harsh ecological conditions where they grow millet and maize and raise cattle, goats and sheep. When the rains fail and their cattle are raided by their neighbours or diminished by disease or famine, the Tugen leave their scattered homesteads and go hunting and gathering in the bush. The stories the elders tell are stories of hunger and of the need to migrate in order to find a better place to live.

The Tugen are acephalous. There are no central institutions such as kingship, chieftainship or priesthood to maintain and cultivate a general history of all Tugen. Instead, there are many 'histories', each local group maintaining its own distinctive history. However, the Tugen, like other Kalenjin, have a cyclical age-set system which provides them with a general frame of reference to fix past events in the flow of time, and essentially determines their concept of history.

III

Age-sets are social groups, hierarchically arranged, which mark the flow of time by organizing men and women in certain categories based on age and generation. 'The classification of time reproduces the classification of men', as Durkheim and Mauss put it. Age-set systems attempt to 'tame' time, to reconcile age, generation and the flow of time.

The Tugen distinguish eight age-sets, which exist for men and women:

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<tr>
<th>Men</th>
<th>Women</th>
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<tr>
<td>Kimnyegew</td>
<td>Chelemei/Cheptinap</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nyongi</td>
<td>Chepargamei/Chepingwek</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Maina)</td>
<td>Selengwech</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chumo</td>
<td>Chepingwek/Chesiran</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sowe</td>
<td>Chesiru/Chemusinya</td>
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<tr>
<td>Korongoro</td>
<td>Chemusinya/Chesur</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kipkoimet</td>
<td>Kusantya/Chelemei</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kaplelach</td>
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An elder explained the system as follows:

2 Kalenjin is a very recent term; the Tugen belong linguistically to the southern Nilotes.

Now Chumo owns the world, until the next age-set grows. Then Sowe will own the world. Chumo will show Sowe the right way to follow. So they stay. Sowe follows behind Chumo. When Sowe knows everything, then Chumo tells them: 'Now the world belongs to you.' Nyongi taught Chumo. Nyongi has finished its work. Nyongi sleeps now. They say to Chumo: 'It's your turn. We sit.' If there is a meeting of elders, then Nyongi sit and watch how Chumo fulfils its duty. If they make a mistake, Nyongi says: 'You failed to take the right path.' Then Chumo feels sorry. When Chumo gives the world to Sowe, Chumo becomes the master of ritual. Kimnyegew sleeps. They will come back again, when Kaplelach is initiated.

As the names of the women's age-sets demonstrate, there was no agreement among the informants about the exact order of these categories. Women's age-sets are of little importance in social, political and ritual life, a fact which reflects women's actual exclusion from politics and the public sphere. Indeed, after marriage, women 'forget' their own age-sets and identify with those of their husbands. Moreover, whereas men's age-sets are clear-cut categories with defined boundaries, women's age-sets are split: Chumo, for example, marries the youngest women of Selengwach and the oldest of Chesiran, while Sowe marries the youngest Chesiran and the oldest Chemusinya. Thus, although according to marriage regulations, men should marry women from the parallel age-set, they are also allowed to marry women from the following age-sets. Therefore, the correspondence of the women's age-sets to those of the men is not an exact one.

The time for initiation into one of the age-sets is determined by the elders. They watch the sky, the movements of stars, moon and sun. Only if the constellation of heavenly bodies is considered beneficial will initiation be allowed. Also, there must be enough food to feed the initiates during the period of seclusion. In times of hunger and war, children will not be initiated.

Not only do celestial and ecological conditions determine the time of initiation, but also, the antagonistic relation between elders and young men influence the times for the opening or closing of an age-set. Elders say that they try to postpone the initiation of young men, because young men and elders compete for women. Sometimes the elders delay the 'coming out' of young men and marry the young women who were initiated into the parallel age-set. Or else they refuse initiation altogether to the young men, who then 'steal' it, going to Pokot, Nandi or Elegeyo instead; then they return to Tugen to marry those women whom the old men had wanted to monopolize for themselves. Elders also say that before the Europeans came to their country all members of an age-set were initiated at the same time. The initiates came from a wide area to kog, the 'stone', where circumcision took place. Initiation into an age-set not only fixed a central point in space, but also in time: a point of reference for a large part of a society in which people otherwise lived dispersed and isolated. So
in a sense, initiation provided a framework for social synthesis.

When the initiates emerged from many months' seclusion, the age-set was closed for about ten to fifteen years until the time was ready for initiation into the next age-set. Later this changed: during colonial times, the period of initiation became longer and longer, and today initiation takes place every year - there is no longer any closed period.

The unifying character of initiation is also diminished today, because there is no longer just one stone for the initiates of a wide area; instead, every hillside or neighbourhood has its own stone where local 'children' are circumcised. Moreover, the time-span between succeeding age-sets has become shorter; whereas previously, an age-set was separated from the next one by approximately fifteen years, now the time-span between two age-sets is only eight to ten years. Thus time for Tugen has accelerated and become precious. Parents of modern initiates say that they want to initiate their children as quickly as possible, because 'they don't want to waste time!'

IV

Initiation in one of the age-sets marks the 'birth' of the social person and essentially determines the social identity of an individual. If you ask a Tugen: 'Who is this person?', he will answer, e.g.: 'He is a Nyongi'. If you ask for his age, people will give you the same answer.

There is no rigid division of labour between different age-sets. After initiation, young men are called muren or 'warriors', but in time of war every able man goes to fight. The transition from the grade of muren to that of a political elder is marked by a ritual called sohro, which is performed individually for each man, and not collectively, as at initiation. However, because a man has to do sohro before his son can be initiated into an age-set, the time-span allotted to him for this is limited. Thus the rule assures the synchronized transition of sons into muren and fathers into boisiek or political elders. In addition, the social position of the grandfather is altered. When his son performs sohro his grandchild is initiated, and he will retire from political leadership and now 'owns the ritual', becoming a ritual elder.

Elders say that one age-set is the 'teacher' of the following age-set. In rituals that mark the life cycle, there are always motiren or teachers who belong to the age-set 'in front' or above the person for whom the ritual is done. Ritual elders are motiren of the political elders, and political elders are motiren of the muren, who during initiation are motiren for the young men undergoing circumcision. Thus the hierarchically ordered age-sets correspond to a pyramid of wisdom.
The cyclical age-set system also determines the limits of physical life. Elders say that formerly, children who were born to uninitiated girls or fathered by uninitiated boys were strangled before they took their first breath. Only men and women who are circumcised and members of an age-set are full social persons who are allowed to produce children. Members of the oldest age-set, whose name was given to the age-set of new-born children, had to commit suicide. The Tugen of the Highlands say that the elders of this remnant age-set went to a cliff and sang and danced to its edge, from which they fell to their deaths.4

Age-sets of fathers and sons must never be adjacent, but must be separated by at least one other age-set. Elders say that very often there is hatred and envy between fathers and sons, even though they should love each other. Members of the age-set that separates fathers and sons act as motiren in rituals carried out for the latter, teaching, praising and punishing the sons of fathers who acted as their own motiren in rituals. In a way, motiren function as go-betweens for the two generations, and also as substitutes for the fathers, whose teaching and punishing roles they assume.

However, Tugen age-sets are not generation sets, because not all the sons of one man belong to the same predictable age-set: according to the Tugen, his youngest children are 'stolen' by the following age-set and are thus separated from the set of their father by two age-sets.

Nonetheless, the general rule is that fathers and sons are separated by only one age-set. Following this rule, a man belongs to the same age-set as his great-grandfather and his great-grandchildren. Tugen say that in the succession of age-sets there is no beginning and no end, because age-sets 'go round'. This is why, for example, the old Kimnyegew call the young Kipkoi met their fathers, since they are the 'recurrence' of their fathers, who were also Kipkoi met. Age-sets which have the same name are identified with each other, but Tugen do not believe that the members of one age-set are the reincarnation of the previous age-set which bore the same name.5

There is a homologous relation between the circulation of age-set names and the circulation of the personal names of individuals who are given the names of deceased ancestors of the patrilineage.6


5 The Tugen do not believe in reincarnation, as Kettel claims (What's in a Name: Age-Organisation and Reincarnation Beliefs of the Tugen of Kenya, University of Nairobi, Institute of African Studies, Paper no. 32, April 1972). An elder explained: 'We give our children the names of ancestors. For example, Bartonjo was a good ancestor, thus many people bear his name. The child which bears the name Bartonjo stands for Bartonjo, but it is not Bartonjo.'

6 Kettel, ibid., p. 9.
On the one hand, bearing the name of an ancestor individualizes a child, while on the other, it incorporates it into the chain of ancestors with the same name. The child is not only an independent, self-reliant being, but also the recurrence of one, or rather many, ancestors. Parents who give their child the name of a good ancestor hope that the child's destiny will be influenced by the ancestor in a good way, although the ancestor will never act directly as a protector or guide during the child's lifetime. Likewise, age-sets with the same name have certain characteristics in common. Tugen say that Korongoro is 'hot, troublesome, and warlike', and Tugen expect that every age-set with the name Korongoro will be hot, troublesome and warlike, whereas the age-set Kaplelach is said to be 'cool and peaceful', and Tugen expect all the following age-sets which bear the name Kaplelach to have the same characteristics. Likewise, they expect those events which occur during the time of an age-set when its members are warriors or political elders to occur again in the next cycle. On this level, history is a cycle of events which repeats itself eternally, in which nothing is lost, and in which new events cannot develop.

On another level, the cyclical concept of history is suspended: every age-set is divided into two or three sub-sets, according to the age of the members. Elders explain that these sub-sets are given nicknames, in order that an outstanding event taking place during initiation be remembered. Thus one sub-set was called 'kilo', because initiation took place when the colonial government introduced the kilo as a measure. Another sub-set was called 'rain of cleaning the stones', because such rain fell during initiation. These nicknames are never repeated; though related to a unique event, they are soon forgotten. Likewise, children are given not only the names of ancestors, but also names relating to events which took place during their birth. For example, there are children called kemei, 'hunger', because they were born during a famine; or talam, 'locust', because locusts came and destroyed the millet; or chumba, 'European', because there was a European present at the time of their birth. Thus on the one hand, in relation to age-set names and personal names of ancestors, the Tugen concept of time seems to be cyclical, while on the other hand, sub-set names and personal names are based on unique, non-recurring events which are soon forgotten.

The Tugen are not much interested in the recollection of past events. To fix an event in the flow of time, they correlate it with one of the age-sets. They say, for example, 'when Kaplelach were elders, there was a war'; or, 'when Chumo was initiated, locusts came.' If Tugen are asked which Chumo they are speaking of, the last ones or the ones before, they answer that they neither count nor differentiate between the various cycles. It is of no importance, they say, during which Chumo locusts came, because whenever Chumo are initi-
ate, locusts will come.

In fact, events do repeat themselves, because Tugen interpret them in this special way and act in accordance with their interpretation. Although Tugen know that events will recur, they try to prevent the repetition of some of them. When, in the last century, the warriors of the Maina age-set were badly defeated in war, the elders decided to abolish this age-set; and their precaution was successful, for in the next cycle, there was no repetition of this defeat. Since then, Tugen no longer have eight but only seven age-sets. The antinomy between destiny and volition may be a problem for philosophers; for the Tugen it is not.

The Tugen play the same trick on destiny by changing the personal names of individuals. When a child receives the name of an ancestor and afterwards falls sick or behaves in a curious or abnormal way, the elders suggest that the wrong ancestor has given his name to the child and that the right one - offended for being forgotten - has sent sickness to attract attention; accordingly, they change the child's name. Ancestors do not want to be forgotten, and if their name is given to a child they 'live', because the living remember them. The well-being of the child is dependent on the identification of the right ancestor with the right name; the manipulation of the name is the manipulation of destiny.

VII

As has been said, Tugen do not consider events related to age-sets as unique occurrences, but rather they try to interpret one event as the repetition of another. Thus I was interested in establishing how Tugen interpret colonial history - the arrival of Europeans and the establishment of colonial power - which, I thought, was an abrupt break with the past and could not so easily be interpreted as a repetition of a preceding event.

During my stay in the Tugen Hills between 1978 and 1983, I collected stories and songs in which the Tugen remember colonial history. Although Tugen living in the north of Kipsaraman - which was mainly where I stayed - did not have much contact with Europeans, they nevertheless produced an ethnography of the shumbek, as they call them. As in other societies where metaphysical concepts are used to interpret encounters with strangers, the Tugen thought that an olin or ancestor stood before them when they met a European for the first time. The stranger was white like salt, and they could see the blood flowing in streams through his body. He was so fat that they were convinced that he did not eat millet porridge but people.

7 B.E. Kipkorir reports that the Marakwet originally had ten age-sets but erased two from memory, perhaps because of some disaster.

8 Fritz Kramer, Verkehrte Welten, Frankfurt am Main 1977, p.111.
The Tugen say that the first chumbek lived in the mountains wandering from place to place. They ate rice and millet flour, but did not exchange them. They did not hunt and had no women. They were spies who explored the country for their relatives and countrymen, who would follow them later and come into the Tugen Hills.

The first chumbek measured and marked out the land and the hills. They counted people, animals, huts, everything. They dug the earth and looked for metals, which they filled into bottles. They put some of the bottles back into the ground as a sign for the age-set of the next chumbek, which would return to Tugen in the following cycle.

The first chumbek had no power. They had to pay hango, a sort of toll, to be allowed to travel through the hills. Later, more and more chumbek arrived. They carried weapons and refused to pay hango, but instead forced the Tugen to pay taxes. The Tugen felt betrayed. They recall that the chumbek stole Ilat, the god of rain, and took him back to England. Since then, there has been no rain in Baringo, whereas in England there is plenty of rain, the pastures are green, the harvest is good, and the chumbek have become rich and fat, while the Tugen go hungry.

The Tugen say that in the old days, before the arrival of the Europeans, the prophecies of the elders came true. When elders recalled past events tradition and prophecy merged, so that what the elders said about the past became the prophecy of future events. The arrival of the Europeans destroyed the stable relationship between tradition and prophecy, and with it the cycle of historical events; they 'stirred' history, the Tugen say - like women, when they cook millet porridge.

In pre-colonial days, there was always war when the age-set Korongoro was in the warrior grade. Now this has changed, because the Europeans brought peace. At present, Korongoro fight among themselves. Likewise, the Tugen say that the age-set Sowe was known to be very greedy. In pre-colonial times they slaughtered many animals for their meat. During colonial times their hunger changed, and now they sell their animals because they are greedy for money. Thus on the one hand, the Tugen recognize that social change has taken place, while on the other hand they deny this, insisting that, although changes have occurred, the warlike Korongoro and the greedy Sowe are still as before. Ultimately, the Europeans did not really 'stir' the Tugen's cyclical concept of history, because the Tugen were able to integrate the colonial period into their cycle of events: when Kaplelach become elders, Europeans will return, and the colonial period will repeat itself.

Not only do the Tugen expect colonialism to come back again, they also interpret the coming of Europeans as the recurrence of the arrival of the Sirikwa, a mysterious people which disappeared before the arrival of the Europeans.9 The colonial period is

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9 An elder of Bartabwa claimed that even before the arrival of the Sirikwa, Europeans had been there, disappearing when the Sirikwa arrived.
already the repetition of an encounter with strangers which took place in the past and will take place again in the future, the Europeans being the second Sirikwa. It is not that the Tugen concept of history is simply restricted to the repetition of identical events: they also recognize differences between Sirikwa and Europeans. Thus they say that the Sirikwa, in contrast to the Europeans, owned cattle, did not rule, and did not demand taxes. The Sirikwa taught the Tugen rituals and iron-working. In contrast, the Europeans brought peace, but did not teach them anything. Yet under colonialism, Tugen elders predicted that just as the Sirikwa had disappeared, so too would the Europeans disappear, and on the same day on which their age-set was told to retire. This prophecy has become true. The Tugen have experienced that time can tell.
COMMENTARY:
(REJOINDER TO BARNES)

THE COMPARATIVE METHOD IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
IDEAL AND PRACTICE

It is a pleasure to begin my rejoinder to 'The Leiden Version of the Comparative Method in Southeast Asia' (JASO Vol. XVI, no.2) with a few words of appreciation for the way in which its author, Dr R.H. Barnes, has written this review article on Unity in Diversity (P.E. de Josselin de Jong, ed., 1984). Instead of reviewing each of the twelve chapters (several of them double chapters, by nineteen authors altogether) separately, he has given a general survey of the 'Leiden version', i.e. the Field of Anthropological Study (FAS) approach and its history. He has done so with expertise and fairness. This means that, on the whole, I can confine my present reply to Barnes by giving some additional information and introducing some nuances in order to clear up possible misunderstandings.

Such misunderstandings can easily arise, since Barnes and I are discussing publications by Indonesianist anthropologists, mainly associated with Leiden University, who together do not constitute a monolithic 'FAS' school, let alone propound a dogma. Besides individual differences of interest and opinion between members of the FAS group, one has to take the time dimension into account. The FAS programme was launched in 1935, and in Leiden as elsewhere anthropological and philological research carried out during the past half century is marked not only by continuity, but also by change. In fact, discontinuity is a prominent factor in the FAS group's history. As Barnes remarks (p. 88), Indonesian studies in the Netherlands were in the 'post-colonial doldrums' during the war years, the 1950s and early 1960s, before starting afresh with largely new personnel. In addition we must bear in mind that, then and now, no research ever was or is exclusively, or even principally, directed towards the FAS programme. The FAS approach supplements the researcher's field and/or library research
on one or a few Indonesian societies. On the one hand, the anthro­
pologist may consider whether data obtained elsewhere within the
FAS can shed light on apparently inexplicable features of the soc­
diety he or she is studying (what I have called the 'mutually inter­
pretative' approach); on the other, data from his society can be
put forward as local or regional variants of a phenomenon of common
occurrence in the FAS. In other words, a FAS study is not auton­
omous and hardly ever an end in itself.

In the following pages, I shall first deal with some specific
points (most of them factual, and some of them matters of detail); we shall then turn to two topics which involve more general prob­
lems. The first of these is the study of kinship and marriage in
the FAS, which brings us to the relation between models and empir­
ical data; the second, the validity of 'Indonesia' as an anthropo­
logical and linguistic concept in connection with the 'ideal' and
'practice' mentioned in the title of the present article.

Following the page sequence of Dr Barnes's article, we shall first
offer a few addenda et corrigenda.

'Blust's claim', referred to on p. 93, is not quite fair to
H. Kern, who did more, in the field of comparative linguistics,
than placing his Old Javanese studies in the Malayo-Polynesian con­
text. See, for example, the 500 pages devoted to comparative Aus­
tronesian linguistics in Volumes IV, V and VI of his collected
writings (H. Kern 1916, 1917). We shall return to Blust's main
point, i.e. that Dutch scholars tended to define the scope of com­
parative Austronesian linguistics 'in political terms', towards
the end of this paper.

On the following page, Barnes turns to the FAS's two progen­
itors: we are given a brief critique of the work of F.A.E. van
Wouden (following James Fox) and J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong. Both
require a few comments. Van Wouden's model (my italics) of a
two-phratry system in conjunction with marriage classes, matrilat­
eral marriage and double unilineal descent has not been confirmed
by any of the ethnographers who contributed to The Flow of Life.
True enough, so we must enquire whether this undermines the very
basis of the FAS effort as it is still being pursued today. In the
first place, we must not forget the time gap already mentioned
above: it is most unlikely that any anthropologist anywhere would
build up an argument in the manner Van Wouden did fifty years ago.
Nor would there be need to do so: Van Wouden's Ph.D. thesis was
the result of library research, using 'defective data'. 'The gaps
in our knowledge are nearly all the result of highly superficial
descriptions or sheer lack of data' (Van Wouden 1968: 1, 85). It
is of greater importance, however, to note that even the critics'
objections to Van Wouden are not entirely relevant by present-day
standards. The elements of social organisation towards which the
criticism is directed are presented in a concentrated form in Van
Wouden (ibid.: 90-4) - but what is our author's aim with this pas­
sage? Not to describe any or all of the societies of eastern In­
donesia, but to form a model which explains the concepts he is
using (and which will be unfamiliar to most of his readers), and
to demonstrate their relationship to each other. He does not claim
that all the elements of his model are to be found, as a coherent
whole, in any single culture of his area, let alone all of them,
for he stresses what is culture-specific:

Although we shall be dealing primarily with the social
factors of these cultures,...it should be kept constantly
in mind that these social phenomena are firmly rooted in
the totality of the culture. We intend, therefore, not
to detach the social component arbitrarily from the cul-
ture.... (Van Wouden ibid.: 1).

Or, as Locher (1968: ix, x) expresses it more clearly:

An important aspect of analysis by means of models, as
exemplified in Van Wouden's argument, is that diverse
possibilities can be implicit in the model, not all of
which will necessarily be realised in empirical phenomena;
that is, they may be present but remain in a latent state
.... The extent to which such possibilities may be real-
sed in the form of distinct social groupings in empirical
societies is of course a question for closer research in
the field.

Whether a model with the properties of Van Wouden's is an accept-
able tool for research has been discussed in Unity in Diversity
(pp. 241-5), so we need not deal with this question here.

Turning from Van Wouden to J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong, Barnes
objects that his 'structural core' model is heterogeneous, as it
includes the Indonesian resilient manner of responding to foreign
influences, and this 'though important in Indonesia...must be given
careful consideration everywhere' (p. 94). Here we touch on a mis-
understanding of the purpose that the FAS approach is meant to
serve. It was never designed to demarcate the field by drawing up
a list of distinct features which typify it, in the manner of the
North American 'culture area' studies, but to bring to light fea-
tures which are so frequently recurrent in the field that they
give a family likeness to the cultures within it. I grant, how-
ever, that the feature of 'Indonesian resilience' is much less spec-
ific than the others in J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong's model.

Barnes states on the same page (94) that the basic points of
Van Wouden's social system model had 'already been discovered and
demonstrated by Fortune (1933), though neither Van Wouden nor
J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong refers to this paper, so directly re-
lated to their own model'. Here we should remark that J.Ph.
Duyvendak (1926: 126-8), using material from Seran, had preceded
Fortune in discerning a structure made up of 'unilateral marriage
relations' and phratries. This early work was of direct relevance
for Van Wouden, as he himself points out (1968: 8, 153).

In Dr Barnes's review article, I think pp. 96-8, which give a
concise survey of studies on asymmetrical connubium systems, are
particularly useful, as are pp. 100-2 on what we might call numer-
ical classification: 4-5 groups, 8-9 groups, etc. To the examples given on these pages, one could add (e.g.) the pata-5 and pata-9 groups of Seran, discussed by Duyvendak (1926), and the waktu-3 and waktu-5 of Lombok.

To conclude the present section, we must give attention to a few more fundamental matters, which will also lead us into the two following sections.

On p. 102, Barnes mentions that, in the volume under discussion, I expressed my doubts about the utility or status of J.P.B. de Josselin de Jong's notion of four 'structural core' elements in the FAS (viz. asymmetric connubium, double unilineal descent, socio-cosmic dualism and the resilient response to foreign influences referred to above). Barnes wonders whether my preference for a notion to be called 'basis for comparison' is 'anything more than a shift of metaphor'. It certainly is. A core is a marked element or set of elements: this is the core, the other elements are marginal with respect to the core. A basis, on the other hand, is not exclusive: it may be expanded, and the phrase refers to the beginning of an enterprise. The relevant glosses in the Concise Oxford Dictionary are: '...foundation; beginning; ...common ground for negotiation, etc.' Contributors to the Unity in Diversity volume propose or use, for instance, the following basic elements for comparison: the fabrication, use and design of textiles (Sandra Niessen in Chapter V), boat symbolism (Leontine E. Visser in Chapter X), social classification terms (Rodney Needham in Chapter XI) and, published elsewhere, certain themes in political myths (P.E. de Josselin de Jong 1980).

I therefore entirely agree with Barnes: 'In addition to the themes of descent and alliance, or their absence, there are further comparative factors requiring consideration' (p. 103). This is precisely what is being done by present-day members of the FAS group. We 'work with an expandable list' (p. 104) - and this is why I personally prefer not to use the notion of a 'core'.

As we are continuing 'to work with an open-ended set of comparative themes' (p. 103), that is to say, carrying out a programme, I found Barnes's rather disparaging remark on the same page unwarranted: 'There is something unusual about a fifty-year-old programme that has not yet constituted itself into a synopsis of proven results'. A historian of the FAS effort could compile such a synopsis, if he wished, but this is not the aim of its present practitioners. As is the case with other past and present 'isms' in anthropology, FAS research does not strive to reach the 'finish': it can be carried on indefinitely, using certain procedures and putting certain questions to the data.

On the FAS enterprise itself, Dr Barnes writes (p. 104): 'That it ought to be tenaciously defended and preserved at all cost now, I doubt'. I hope the foregoing pages have given some indication that those who adopt 'the Leiden version of the comparative method' do not have such a hidebound attitude towards their predecessors' or their own effort. We are modifying it when necessary. In fact, the very aim of the symposium which led to the Unity in Diversity volume was to elicit critical response from fellow anthropologists.
whose outlook differed from our own. Of how many symposia can this be said?

In this section, which is concerned with descent and connubium, my principal aim will be to clarify what apparently are obscure passages in our book. However, I can hardly be blamed because I do not define (p. 94) or spell out (p. 95) what I mean by 'idea principles' as opposed to 'rule principles'. On p. 7 of *Unity in Diversity* I refer the reader for such a definition to Moyer (1981) and remind him of this reference on pp. 242, 248 and 249. In the present context, however, I think the term can best be elucidated by seeing how it is applied in a specific case, namely the social organization of Sumba.

The original 'structural core' model contained, as we have seen, double descent and asymmetric connubium, but when Van Wouden came to carry out fieldwork in Sumba, he encountered the 'empirical difficulty' that this descent type proved to be 'characteristic only of Kodi in the west, while asymmetric marriage alliance is practised in the east', i.e. in the region named Mangili (Barnes p.95; *cp. Unity in Diversity*: 6; Van Wouden 1977: 218; Onvlee 1977).

This is where, at a later stage, I applied the 'idea principle'. We then see that the principles of social organization occurring in west and east Sumba should not be placed in a simple opposition to each other, as diagrammed below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>West</th>
<th>East</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>+ double descent</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- asymmetric connubium</td>
<td>+</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As for descent, we see the matrilineal principle playing an important role in apparently patrilineal east Sumba, as those claiming membership of the highest nobility validated their claim by means of pedigrees which, except for the most recent period, only reckoned with matrilineal descent. That is to say, it is correct to call east Sumbanese society unilineal (*in casu* patrilineal), but only if we treat patrilineality as a monothetic (Needham 1975) concept, defined by *our* criteria of having only named and organized patrilineal groups. As soon as we take the social participants' 'ideas' into account, however, we see that the matrilineal principle is recognized, although it is not given the form of organized matrilineal groups.¹ The other half of the island, and the other social

¹ In eastern Sumba, the negotiations leading to a wedding are accompanied by gift exchange of a type that is not unusual in the FAS: the (prospective) bride-takers give golden ornaments and horses, the bride-givers textiles. This looks like the familiar pattern: the male side gives masculine, the female side feminine goods. But 'the livestock must be both one stallion and one mare', while the counter-gift of four cloths is specified as a man's dress,
feature with which we are concerned, are no less enlightening. His fieldwork in Kodi, in the extreme west of the island, led Van Woudenberg to the conclusion that there are no connubial arrangements in that area. This is true for Kodi, but discussing western Sumba as a whole, Needham (1980: 34, 35) sums up the situation in these words: '...there is a scale of transformations from asymmetric prescriptive alliance, exemplified by Mamboru in the east [i.e. the east of western Sumba], to the bilineal non-prescriptive system, exemplified by Kodi in the west'. One point of interest is that in Needham's table of social features in sixteen 'domains' of west Sumba, kinship terminology is a prominent feature, as might be expected - and terminology, as a cognitive system, is of direct relevance for the 'idea principle'. Of no less importance is the conclusion that the west Sumbanese societies show a 'scale of transformations'. This is precisely in accordance with the concept which present-day FAS anthropologists have adopted, instead of the search for resemblances which occupied their predecessors (see, for example, Unity in Diversity, p.4) - and which, I may add, is still often attributed to the present-day group by their critics.

After this lengthy passage, I shall be brief on the other points concerning social organization raised by Dr Barnes. First, one final remark on idea principles. That 'rule principles should be entirely distinct rather than one kind of manifestation among many of idea principles seems doubtful' (Barnes, p. 95). This cannot be a criticism, as we never expressed that 'doubtful' opinion. On the contrary, we entirely agree, although we would prefer to say that the idea principle may, but need not, become manifest as a rule principle (e.g. participants' idea of two descent lines in their society may or may not be manifest in the occurrence of two organized types of descent groups).

On descent, and double descent in particular, I must ask the Editors of the Journal for still more space and the readers for still more patience, as Dr Barnes's review raises three more ob-

- a woman's shirt, a masculine loincloth and a feminine headscarf (Onvlee 1977: 157, 158). The structure is in accordance with a 'double descent' model:
Rejoinder to Barnes 203

jections to the 'Leiden authors' use of the term. They use it 'even when its features are relevant only for a segment of a community' (p. 95); we are not clearly distinguishing 'between double descent and cognatic kinship' (ibid.); and we seem to be rejecting the concepts of parallel and alternating descent (p. 96).

The answer to the first objection is: that is so. The east Sumbanese claimants to highest nobility status are members of their society as a whole, so when they keep pedigrees showing their noble ancestry in the matrilines, this indicates that in this overtly patrilineal society, the matrilineal descent principle is recognized, and can be adduced as evidence to serve the purposes of a particular individual or group.

This same case can also be cited to show that we do distinguish between double descent and cognatic kinship: a Sumbanese wishes to demonstrate his membership of a discrete set of persons defined by lines of descent, and not that he is 'a member of several similar-purpose groups at the same time', as is the case when we are dealing with cognatic descent groups (R. Fox 1967: 147).

The linear principle is basic in the Sumbanese case as well as in the Toba Batak case and in all others which have been used to prove the recognition of both descent principles.

That we do not discount parallel descent is proven by Unity in Diversity (p. 249), which refers to page 7 for 'a few Indonesian cases', and summarizes: 'the latent or alternative line...resembles a single-sex line of the kind which is basic in systems of so-called parallel descent'. It is true, though, that I failed to explicate my reasons for subsuming parallel descent under the more inclusive category of double descent. To remedy this, I now propose the following taxonomy:

1. non-linear (cognatic) 2. linear

2.1. unilinear
2.1.1. matrilinear, 2.1.2. patrilinear,

2.2. double-unilinear
2.2.1. 'true', organized double descent,
2.2.2. parallel descent,
2.2.3. alternating descent.

Finally, we pass from descent to connubium. Barnes (p. 98) notes correctly that I now prefer the term 'asymmetric' to 'circulating' connubium. My reasons, however, differ from his and resemble those for including systems 2.2.1., 2.2.2. and 2.2.3. under the

2 For clarity in this diagram, I distinguish between double unilinear and ('true') double descent, but in the text itself I also call the more inclusive category 2.2. 'double descent'.
heading 2.2. in the above taxonomy. Asymmetry is a fundamental feature, standing in opposition to symmetry. On the other hand, it is a feature of some societies that the asymmetric connubium is also circulating: see, for example, Renes (1977) for such a case, and Salisbury (1956) for an asymmetric system which is not, and cannot be, circulating.

It is satisfying to note that Barnes (p. 89) 'agree[s], naturally, with de Josselin de Jong's rebuttal to Leach'. Coming from British social anthropology, even such an en passant statement on a controversy of some empirical and theoretical importance is welcome.

Looking back on the matters discussed in this section, I think the main source of the differences of opinion between the authors and the reviewer - apart from imprecision or vagueness in our formulations - lies in the fact that our signifiés are not the clearly defined, cut-and-dried concepts of the text books but their modalities, also appearing in the ethnography and in the theory as 'idea principles', which need not be associated with organized groups. A result of this is that in the FAS we discern (not 'construct') polythetic rather than monothetic classes. One example of this is our discerning societies with 'double descent', where we use 'descent' as meaning a society's recognition of a principle for the inter-generational classification of categories of persons.

In this final section, we must turn to the matter raised by Barnes on pp. 91-3 and 104: the Leiden group were and are wrong to take 'Indonesia' as their Field of Anthropological Study. As a subject for fruitful discussion, this is a non-starter. While one can understand that a reader of Unity in Diversity may wish a further explication of the way the FAS group distinguishes between double and parallel descent, or double descent and cognatic kinship, it is beyond my comprehension how anyone can attribute to them the notion that Indonesia, in the sense of the territory of the Indonesian Republic or the Netherlands East Indies, is a linguistically or anthropologically defined, 'self-contained' (p. 91), distinct unit. True, J.P.B. de Josselon de Jong's seminal lecture was called 'The Malay Archipelago as a Field of Ethnological Study', and the Unity in Diversity volume's sub-title is Indonesia as a Field of Anthropological Study; but one would have thought the passage on page 5 of that volume would have obviated any misunderstanding:

The preliminary assumption...was based partly on the study of available ethnographic reports, but also, and very strongly, on the known fact that the Indonesian languages are closely related to each other. This is where a problem arises, for it is - and was, in 1935 - equally well known that these languages are also related to Melanesian and Polynesian branches of the Austronesian family, What then is the FAS: the area of the Indonesian, of the Austro-nesian, or even of the 'Austric' languages? [...]
To conclude this paper, I shall summarize the linguistic aspects of the FAS approach. Starting from scratch, we must consider three matters: the genetic basis for the comparative effort; the validity of the term Indonesia(n); and actual practice, which cannot always conform to a recognized ideal.

First, given the established fact that all but a few of the languages spoken in the FAS area (which area that is comes under our second question) are genetically related to each other, it is a reasonable assignment for comparative anthropology to study whether, and if so how, the genetic relatedness of the cultures associated with these languages can be perceived. Whoever undertakes this task has, of course, to take account of several limiting factors - in the first place, that similarity or even identity of language need not indicate similarity of culture; but within our FAS this factor has hardly any disturbing effect. In addition, whenever one can associate a set of cultures, or cultural elements, with each other as a series of transformations, one is not always entitled to attribute this to the genetic relatedness of these cultures. The features in question may be of world-wide occurrence, or they may be due to convergence (independent invention) or diffusion - either from one culture to another in the FAS, or to both (or all) from an external source.

The above remarks are more likely to be regarded as truisms than as contentious. The second question, however, is of a different nature: do the FAS anthropologists define their language-and-culture area, which they call Indonesia, as coterminous with the Indonesian Republic, the ci-devant Netherlands East Indies? We do not, and as we have taken comparative linguistics as our guide, I need only refer (as was done in *Unity in Diversity*, p. 239) to a few earlier and later publications in this discipline. Dempwolff (1934: 23-36) gives an 'Analysis of three Indonesian languages: Tagalog, Toba-Batak and Javanese'; R.A. Kern's article (1942) on prefixes in Indonesian languages includes data on Bisaya and Tagalog; and Uhlenbeck (1971: 55), discussing 'the history of the study of Indonesian languages', refers to 'the Indonesian languages of Madagascar' and to Malaya. Turning to anthropology, I mention only the book *Minangkabau and Negri Sembilan* (i.e. an Indonesian and a Malaysian society), subtitled *Socio-Political Structure in Indonesia* (P.E. de Josselin de Jong 1951).

A more valid objection, however, is that more recently Dr Blust, in several articles published since 1977 and in his *Unity in Diversity* paper, has demonstrated that it is incorrect to consider 'Indonesian' languages (i.e. the Austronesian languages spoken in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and neighbouring islands, and Madagascar) as one of the distinct subgroupings of the Austronesian language family. Does this not affect the FAS enterprise in comparative anthropology? It certainly does. Assuming that Blust's new subgroupings will not be rejected or drastically altered by other linguistic research, I am convinced

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3 As was the case with the admittedly weak association between Indonesian and Thai languages proposed by Benedict (1942).
it should and will be a most valuable guide for future mutually interpretative research of the Leiden type. As such research on, for example, the social organization, the mythology or whatever of the cultures of the entire FAS (i.e. the Austronesian language area) is never practicable as a single project, it is methodically sound to carry out with one of the new sub-groups (in particular the Western Malayo-Polynesian or the Central Eastern Malayo-Polynesian), rather than the formally defined Indonesian language area, as the researcher's universe of discourse.

This brings us, finally, to the 'first matter' for discussion (see previous page). The situation is as follows. As comparative linguistics has been and remains the exemplary model for the FAS enterprise, the 'field' in question remains, in principle, the Austronesian language area. In practice, though, FAS work was limited to the 'Indonesian' language area, and as this concept now appears to be untenable, linguistically speaking, we are in the process of setting our sights on new sub-areas within the Austronesian 'field'. So far, so good; but the objection can be raised (to which Barnes alludes on pp. 91-3) that, even during the period when 'Indonesian languages' was an acceptable term, the FAS group did not study 'Indonesia' in the sense of the Indonesian language area, but in the sense of the territory of the Netherlands East Indies and later the Indonesian Republic. This is true, but I should emphatically state that this practice was never based on the notion that this politically defined area was ever regarded as a linguistically or anthropologically bounded, distinct field. Why, then, was the FAS enterprise in practice almost entirely limited to this field?

The answer is obvious, but should nevertheless be formulated to avoid any possible misunderstanding. In the first place, it was purely realistic that we should not bite off more than we could chew by trying to cover the entire Austronesian area. Uhlenbeck (1971: 55) describes how this area came to be carved up between the colonial powers as separate research areas during the nineteenth century; this meant that the Netherlands concentrated its human and financial resources and its library facilities - in brief its expertise - on that part of 'Indonesia' to which it had direct access. After decolonization and the 'doldrums' of the first decade after 1945, the existing and partly rejuvenated resources were re-activated - hence the cultural convention with Indonesia, the Programme for Indonesian Studies in Indonesia and the Netherlands, and the inter-faculty curriculum for Indonesian studies (Indonesiëkunde) at Leiden University. Our concentration on the politically and historically defined unit 'Indonesia' was and is, therefore, one of practice and not due to the mistaken notion that, in spite of its growing internal unity, it is an entirely self-contained Field of Anthropological Study.
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TANEBAR-EVAV AND EMA:
VARIATION WITHIN THE
EASTERN INDONESIAN FIELD OF STUDY

The southeast Indonesian field of comparative study marked out by van Wouden in his *Types of Social Structure in Eastern Indonesia* (1968) has benefited from a series of modern ethnographic accounts that have deepened and enriched our understanding of van Wouden's themes (see Fox 1980a). Among recent monographs are two that because they have been published in French have received less attention in Britain than they might otherwise have attracted. The first of these launched Louis Dumont's *Atelier d'anthropologie sociale*, published jointly by Maison des Sciences de l'Homme and Cambridge University Press. It is a study by Cécile Barraud (1979) of the single village located on a small island of the Kei Archipelago. The second book is devoted to the Ema (or Kemak) of central Timor (Renard-Clamagirand 1982) and results from research undertaken as part of a team that worked in several regions of what was then Portuguese Timor in the 1960s. Other studies produced by this group are devoted to the Bunaq (Berthe 1972; Friedberg 1978) and the Fataluku (Campagnolo 1979).

In the Moluccas, where the Kei Archipelago is situated, and on and near Timor, Austronesian speech communities collide with cultures using non-Austronesian languages related to those spoken in Irian Jaya (Stokhof 1977: 2). Linguistic and cultural boundaries do not strictly coincide. As Barraud remarks (1979: 247), Tanebar-Evav is situated in a region where social structures seem to mingle. On Timor there are peoples speaking non-Austronesian languages, such as the Makassae, whose social structures display features of asymmetric marriage alliance central to van Wouden's

[Editors' note: Another article by Dr Barnes, on 'The Leiden Version of the Comparative Method in Southeast Asia', appeared in the previous issue of *JASO* (Vol. XVI, no.2, pp. 87-110).]
model and other non-Austronesian peoples like the Bunaq where non-unilineal descent groups are linked by asymmetric marriage alliances maintained by a form of marriage that nevertheless is rarely practised. The Bunaq could almost be said to have simultaneously two social structures, only one of which corresponds to van Wouden's model (Berthe 1961; for a summary see Barnes 1980: 101-4). These variant forms therefore take on special interest when compared with neighbouring societies that are closer to expectations about alliance systems. Both Tanebar-Evav and the Ema speak Austronesian languages. The Ema have what might appear to be an almost crystalline form of asymmetric marriage alliance. Tanebar-Evav has a complex social organisation in which both asymmetric and symmetric alliances are recognized options, but today decreasingly important ones.

Tanebar-Evav is a small village of around six hundred persons that alone occupies a tiny island of the same name at the extreme southwest of the Kei Archipelago. Evav is the local name for Kei, Kei being the name imposed by outsiders. Being closest to Tanimbar, the island is called Tanebar-Evav in distinction to Tanebar-Mav, which is the Tanimbar Archipelago. The same language is spoken throughout the Kei grouping, but Tanebar-Evav maintains traditional cultural forms more tenaciously than other communities.

Barraud begins her work with a discussion of social space: 'The mystery of the composition of a space is fascinating to explore and it was one of the first shocks [I] experienced at the time of my arrival in the village' (1979: 26). Since Codrington (1885: 165) linguists and anthropologists have complained about the difficulty of determining the correct use of terms of direction in Austronesian languages. They generally lack names for the cardinal points strictly speaking. Instead they have terms indicating wind directions, which in modern languages, such as Bahasa Indonesia, have taken on the connotations of north, south, east, west, and the points in between. In addition there are terms relating persons and objects in the local situation, which often carry important symbolic and cosmological implications as well. Though based on the fairly simple opposition of landward versus seaward or upstream versus downstream, precise applications in differing terrains are difficult to predict. 'On shore the sea and the cultivated inland are generally spoken of as down and up; and, according to the configuration of an island, these points of direction are perpetually changing' (ibid.). On the opposite sides of an island, meanings become reversed. The difficulty cannot be ignored, for the relevant terms are constantly used in speech, as Sibree discovered once on Madagascar, when his host told him that he had rice grains stuck on the 'southern' side of his moustache (Sibree 1896: 210, quoted in Condominas 1980: 26). Firth (1970: 191) repeats an almost identical comment from Tikopia: 'There is a spot of mud on your seaward cheek.'

1 In my study of Kédang thought (1974: 87), I wrote: 'It would seem strange to us to think of the objects and persons around us in terms of north, south, east, and west; but this is just the
recognized to be a central aspect of the common Austronesian heritage, but so far there are few intensive discussions of specific systems. Barraud's treatment therefore is the more welcome and can be set beside those that do exist (e.g. Barnes 1974: 78-88) to deepen comparative understanding.

Tanebar-Evav direction terms correspond to a local conception of the world divided into high and low that orients the island, the other islands, but also the village, the house and the whole of the local universe' (1979: 51). There is no need to repeat the details of the analysis here, but mention may be made of the fact that the sail boat serves as a symbolic model of society and that its orientation is the same as that of the house. The people of Tanebar-Evav build and sell sailing boats, and the boat is a key symbol of social relationships involved in warfare and the exchange of women. There are two hierarchically related images of society in general marked by the words lôr and haratut. The subtle nuances of these images have recently been elucidated by Barraud (1985).

Both words have several meanings, but explication of them in this respect begins with the meaning 'whale' for lôr and 'one hundred catches' in the sense of fish or game animals for haratut. The advantage of beginning with a consideration of space appears when the author argues that the patrilineal social groups represented by the 'house' are not to be understood on the model of segmentary lineage systems. It is not a collection of lineages composed by a line of ancestors that organizes society, but the set of houses tied together by exchanges, myths and beliefs. The house is theoretically divided into right and left halves occupied by separate patrilineages hierarchically related as elder and younger. This essentially spatial principle, Barraud suggests, is superior to the principle of patrilineality and shapes it. Lévi-Strauss, of course, has claimed that the idea of the house, in the sense that one speaks of a 'noble house', should be added to ethnological vocabulary, and he has referred to Indonesian examples including those from Timor (Lévi-Strauss 1984: 189-99).

The discussion of the house, in the sense in this case of a patrilineal descent group, merely initiates a description of what in fact is a rather complex pattern of overlapping groupings of different kinds. 'Tanebar-Evav is placed at the periphery of three collections of societies that employ apparently contrasted systems' (1979: 247). To the west are cultures characteristically
patterned on asymmetric alliance among patrilineal groups. Barraud describes those to the east as being a good deal more mysterious, 'as though floating in repeating sequences of ceremonial exchanges.' To the south there are the bilateral marriage systems of Australia (1979: 247-8). Tanebar-Evav houses are composed normally of two distinct patrilineages. Lineages are the holders of titles and functions, conductors of rituals, owners of land and coconut trees, and the units involved in exchanges. The twenty-four houses are distributed among nine $ub$, who sacrifice to one of nine ancestors. Member houses of an $ub$ are located adjacent to each other and provide mutual support and assistance. The $ub$ is hierarchically ordered by a paternal uncle-nephew or elder-younger relation between houses. The $ub$ is not a patrilineal descent group, as the constituent houses lack genealogical connection. They all fall into one of three spatial divisions of the village called $yam$. $Yam$ are not thought to be descent groups and lack a common ancestral cult. They represent society in rituals and exchanges of general interest. The people of Tanebar-Evav also speak of their society being divided into two halves, but the halves are purely conceptual. Barraud remarks that this balance between dual and tripartite division is similar to features of spatial division and the distribution of offices. Others have underlined the significance of dual and tripartite divisions in eastern Indonesian cultures, and the theme is known not only from Lévi-Strauss's paper on dual organization (1956), but also from the second chapter of van Wouden's book. A cross-cutting grouping is the common $fam$ (a word of European derivation), linking certain houses within a $yam$. The $fam$ possesses a name, but lacks a particular function or role, has no cult or property and is not exogamous.

In the Tanebar-Evav relationship system there is only a single term for the first descending level, although this term may be qualified by an adjective to specify nephew or niece (with no regard to the sex of either the person designated or the linking relative). Another adjective specifies the son-in-law or daughter-in-law. Barraud says that the pattern at this level is 'Hawaiian'. In the level of reference, a male applies the same term to his sister and to female cousins both cross and parallel. The equivalent male relatives he distinguishes by relative age terms. A female ego applies the same terms, but inversely according to sex. Distinction of sex relative to ego is therefore of primary importance at this level. For affinal applications absolute sex is determining. The pattern of terms at the intermediate level is more complex than at the first descending, but the configuration remains essentially cognatic. Barraud points out that at the first ascending level the distinctions and equations are found that would be characteristic of a Dravidian or symmetric prescriptive terminology. She argues, however, that the usages at this level are determined by the same relative sex principle as at the level below. Beyond the medial three levels, there are separate self-reciprocal terms disregarding sex at each of the second, third, fourth and fifth ascending and descending levels. In sum the terminology has the following prominent characteristics: generation alternation, the importance of relative sex, symmetric prescriptive pattern in the
first ascending level and a cognatic non-prescriptive pattern in
the next two levels below.

Institutions relating to marriage and alliance are equally
complex. Barraud notes a disaccord between the terminology and
the rule of matrilateral cross-cousin marriage applied to the
eldest son of a house or lineage. Such a marriage in Tanebar-
Evav leads to widespread shifts in the classification of relatives.
Nothing in the terminology, she says, would suggest the existence
of a system of asymmetric alliance. This circumstance leads her
to speak of a functional heterogeneity between the terminology
and the marriage rule.

There are in fact two forms of alliance. The first accords
to the model of generalized exchange, hierarchical relations bet-
 tween affines of opposed kinds and oriented exchange cycles. The
hierarchical relation of affinity is dualistic (superior wife-
givers versus inferior wife-takers), but intransitive, and it does
not create hierarchically divided groups within the village. Each
lineage is situated by reference to its list of wife-giving groups
and of wife-taking groups. One of the wife-giving lineages is re-
 cognized as the trunk or base wife-givers, those who provided the
first woman for the house. These ties are supposed to be main-
tained by repeated marriages in subsequent generations, but
brothers may not take wives from the same lineages. In fact mar-
rriages with the 'base' wife-giving lineages are on the whole
rather infrequent. New alliances are created and the network of
alliance is therefore constantly changing. Wife-givers represent
a particularly feared category of ancestors called the 'dead-gods'.
Otherwise the religious, ritual and exchange implications familiar
in this kind of relationship throughout Indonesia apply here, ex-
cept that the exchange cycles are not characterized as masculine
and feminine.

The second form of alliance involves immediate reciprocity
between two partners related symmetrically. Such marriages do not
require counter-prestations. The relationship is egalitarian.
Generally a woman is given in one generation and another is re-
turned in the next. Direct sister exchange is rare but does occur.
Not all houses have direct exchange partners, though some strongly
value the relationship. Barraud says that generally the option
exists as a potentiality, but is rarely realized through marriage.
She also specifically notes that this form is in accordance with
the features of the first ascending level of the terminology.

Since houses should not be allowed to disappear, groups in
danger of disappearing assure their continuation by adoption. The
relation between adoption and marriage alliance, which can vary,
is an important issue and has been given continuous attention
(some of the evidence is summarized in Barnes 1980). Among the
Bunaq adoption is permitted only among allies or may even be used
to initiate an alliance. It entails the exchange of nearly the
same prestations as in the elaborate marriage form associated
with alliance. Barraud says that in Tanebar-Evav adoption is not
disguised alliance or a means to make an otherwise prohibited
marriage possible. Nevertheless adoption is conceived of as a
marriage and requires the same exchanges. It is the only means
permitted for assuring the continuity of exchange units. Especially relevant, of course, is the adoption of males. Villagers explicitly compare male adoption to the procedures for obtaining wives, and Barraud remarks that we could draw a parallel between the circulation of men and that of women. Adoption pertains, therefore, to the general issue in the region of how persons of either sex are circulated in respect of other life-providing values and how the relevant exchanging units are constituted, defined and maintained.

Because Tanebar-Evav consists essentially of noble or once noble lineages, Barraud's information on the subject of social classes, or as she calls them 'orders', is limited. However, her discussion of the subject as applied to the archipelago, while preliminary, is of considerable comparative interest. Above all, she shows that van Wouden's speculation that types of alliance rules are linked to social class (nobles practising asymmetric alliance and expensive exchanges, commoners symmetric alliance and no exchanges) is unsubstantiated.

Barraud devotes two chapters to the circulation of values, and she has returned to the subject in a joint article on exchange with de Coppet, Iteanu and Jamous. Ceremonial prestations are exchanged in connection with marriage ceremonies, funerals, the completion of a house, the launching of a boat, and ceremonies of departure and return. In what Barraud calls hierarchized relations, such as between wife-givers and wife-takers, the prestations are oriented, with cannons, gongs and jewelry going to the superior, while plates and cloth are returned. The prestations concern not just the living, but involve also the relations to the ancestors and God. Although in her book (1979: 93) Barraud wrote that the house is comprised like a moral person, like a social being, her opinion on this issue appears to have shifted. More recently (Barraud, et al. 1984: 502), she writes that the house in Tanebar-Evav is not a moral person founded on unilineal descent, but a bundle of relations linking the takers to the givers and to God and the dead. The exchange of women is not sufficient to account for Tanebar-Evav society. The exchanges themselves create the exchanging units, and the house is constituted by the relation of exchange between the dead and the living. The superiority of the givers is founded on the fact that they represent the ancestors and divinity, the guardians of life and death (Barraud, et al. 1984: 478-9).

In explaining how these exchanges work, Barraud establishes a factor of considerable historical importance which has repeatedly been encountered in Indonesia. The objects circulate in a system interior to society and in a sense make it up. They are not used for external commerce as are other commodities, and their exchange is not, like that of other commodities, related to the market principle or subject to the fluctuations of the international market. Nevertheless, the actual wealth objects often come from the exterior world and have been acquired by commercial exchanges (see Barnes 1980: 119-20; 1982: 14). On Tanebar-Evav the objects in question consist in Dutch or Portuguese cannon, gongs from China, Sumatra, Java or Bali, Chinese or European dishes and
plates, as well as jewelry and cloth of non-local derivation. Indonesian currency is increasingly entering into the gifts. Previously they had integrated Chinese, Arabic, Portuguese and Dutch currency. What is distinctive is not the nature of the objects circulated, but their usage in closed ceremonial cycles. Disregarding the actual metal, the people describe as gold, mas, all forms of jewelry and currency. Barraud's enquiries revealed that prior to the introduction of cannons, boats and two products classed as being of the sea and the earth, fish and game, were exchanged for women. Boats made in the village and sold elsewhere represent above all else the relation to the exterior. Products of the earth are closer to home, though perhaps seen as still outside the village, while those of the sea are also related to the exterior. Objects of wealth are sometimes called ubran, a phrase which means the interior, contents, significance or sense of the ub. In addition to meaning a kind of grouping of houses, as already explained, ub has the sense of a jar for storing millet, grandfather, ancestor and 'fish-ancestor'. Ub contain men, like the jars contain millet. Golden grained millet symbolizes in the same way as 'gold' jewelry the true riches of society. 'Society defines itself in the limit of its containers: valuables are, like millet, men, ancestors, the content which assures the existence of society.' Elsewhere (Barnes 1973; 1974: 105-6, 111) I have also described totalizing phrases and images in Kédang which unite gold, objects of wealth, and products of the field with spiritual values and radiant luminosity. Like the Kédang (Barnes 1974: 107-9), Tanebar-Evav has a legend about a tree of wealth, the leaves and branches of which were made up of these objects. As Barraud concludes, gold - the wealth objects - is at the origin of history.

Like Barraud, Renard-Clamagirand (1982) begins her study of Ema society with essentially spatial considerations and a description of the house both as physical object and as an extended social grouping. I have, with her permission, summarized aspects of her depiction of Ema institutions in two publications (Barnes 1978: 22-5; 1980: 99-101), and I do not need to repeat what I have said there. Since then, her work has been published, and therefore

2 'Injunction and Illusion' (Barnes 1978) was published without my being shown the proofs, which explains the various omissions and misspellings in the references. Worse, the editors gave it a new first sentence without my knowledge or permission, which introduces the absurd claim that 'prescriptive alliance is not usually examined in relation to the analysis of segmentary descent systems'. The claim is patently false and a worse error than the one the paper was intended to correct. Two sentences in paragraph two (p.19) were run together, while part of each was omitted. They should read, 'For my purposes, I will draw upon a little regarded article by Basil Thompson (1895). Encouraged by Lormer Fison, Thompson set out to explain the system of Fiji, "from the point of view of compulsory or obligatory marriage."'
has become more widely available. It should be remarked that the Ema, like the Bunaq and other peoples situated near the border with Indonesia, were in the path of the Indonesian invasion of 1975. What loss of life and culture has resulted is unknown, but we must fear that the devastation has been great.

Among features that distinguish her work, besides her fifty-six striking photographs, are extensive genealogies which permit a comparison between actual marriages and the lists of recognized wife-givers and wife-takers that she also records for each patrilineal clan. Unlike the situation in Kedang, these lists ensure that actual ties of asymmetric affinal alliance are maintained among the clans. She found no marriages in violation of these rules, although the genealogies suggest that a certain percentage (perhaps around 12%) of marriages takes place between groups with no previous formal relationship.

Renard-Clamagirand writes that the terminology expresses in a particularly coherent way the obligation to marry a matrilateral cross cousin and to enter into a system of generalized exchange. Though the specifications she gives are not as extensive as might be wished, the terminology can indeed adequately be represented in a diagram presupposing patrilineal descent and asymmetric marriage alliance (see Tables 1-4). There are, however, certain contrasting features of interest. Like the Jinghpaw Kachin of Burma, the Ema equate (in the Ema term lai) MBS, FZS, WB, and ZH. In both terminologies this is the only symmetric feature. The appropriate asymmetric distinctions and equations are made at the first ascending level, but only by the adjectives qualifying the words ama and inar, reflexes of proto-Austronesian terms that characteristically designate F and M, respectively, and their appropriate parallel cousins. If the adjectives were to be disregarded, there would be only a cognatic pattern at this level. It would be interesting to see whether this implicit feature has any resonance in Ema sociology.

Van Wouden's model of eastern Indonesian social organization involved four exchange groups in two phratries and linked by matrilateral cross-cousin marriage. An elaborated version involved double unilineal descent and sixteen marriage classes. None of the evidence he surveyed suggested that any society currently had institutions remotely like this arrangement. The Ema too cannot be described in these terms. Nevertheless Renard-Clamagirand found a model of alliance among four partners applicable in various ways to her material. Furthermore, Ema practices reveal ways in which such a four-term pattern could reduce to three-partner cycles. She has already published part of this demonstration in English (Clamagirand 1980: 146-8).

She writes that the division of the community into east and west is apparent in collective rituals. Three patrilineal core or 'mother' houses located in the east in a relation of younger to elder brothers may not intermarry. In the west three such houses are similarly related. In addition there are three chiefly houses, not designated as being east or west. The eastern houses also may not contract marriages with those of the west. As a result eastern and western houses must contract their alliances with the
<table>
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<th>Relationship</th>
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<td>great-grandparents, ancestors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>inar tuman</td>
<td>MM, FM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>amar</td>
<td>F</td>
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<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>amar ba'ak</td>
<td>FeB, MeZH</td>
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<td>6.</td>
<td>amar mori</td>
<td>FyB, MyZH</td>
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<tr>
<td>7.</td>
<td>amar na'i</td>
<td>MB, WF</td>
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<tr>
<td>8.</td>
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<td>FZH</td>
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<td>9.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10.</td>
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<td>11.</td>
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<td>MyZ, FyBW</td>
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<td>FZ</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>ka'ar</td>
<td>eB, FeBS, MeZS, WeZH</td>
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<tr>
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<td>alir</td>
<td>yB, FyBS, MyZS, yBW, WyZ, WyZH</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16.</td>
<td>nanar</td>
<td>WeZ, eBW</td>
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<tr>
<td>17.</td>
<td>mtor</td>
<td>Z, FBD, MZD, FZD, WBW</td>
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<td>18.</td>
<td>liar</td>
<td>FZS, MBS, ZH, WB</td>
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<td>19.</td>
<td>her</td>
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<td>anar</td>
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<td>S</td>
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<td>SW</td>
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<td>anar lain</td>
<td>DH</td>
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<tr>
<td>25.</td>
<td>ubur</td>
<td>DC, SC, CC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26.</td>
<td>beir anan</td>
<td>great-grandchildren</td>
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### Table 2

**Ema relationship terminology (terms of reference, female ego)**

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<td>great-grandparents, ancestors</td>
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<td>amar mori</td>
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<td>8.</td>
<td>amar bagi</td>
<td>FZH, HF</td>
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<td>MeZ, FeBW</td>
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<td>11.</td>
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<td>MyZ, FyBW</td>
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<td>12.</td>
<td>inar na’i</td>
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<td>inar ki’i</td>
<td>FZ, HM</td>
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<td>14.</td>
<td>ka’ar</td>
<td>eZH, HeB</td>
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<td>alir</td>
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<td>nanar</td>
<td>eZ, FeBD, FeZD, MeZD, HeBW, eBW (if not MBD)</td>
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<td>17.</td>
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<td>HZ</td>
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<td>MBD, ’BW’</td>
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<td>BW (if MBD)</td>
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Dna categories of descent and alliance (terms of reference, male ego)

Table 3

Timebar-Enaro and Ena
219
chieftain houses, who control the circulation of women. Chiefly houses also may not intermarry. The author demonstrates a number of four-partner exchange cycles, each of which necessarily involves two chiefly houses and two non-chiefly houses. The overall pattern is one of bipartition in conjunction with four-term chains. There are three separate groupings of three houses each. Dualism, tripartition and quadripartition are present therefore in a single configuration representing the whole community. The bipartition represents an alternative to exogamous moieties or two endogamous communities. No exchanges take place directly between east and west. By not participating in the division, the chiefly houses are able to surmount it and maintain alliances on both sides. Each chiefly house has one wife-giver and one wife-taker on each side.

This model apparently receives some overt oral and practical substantiation. As the author shows, information in its support can also be extracted from the lists of recognized allies for each of the lineages. She also sets forth clearly some of the discrepancies they reveal. At any event, this model does not account for all of the practical detail of the present alliance arrangements. Not even all of the core houses are accommodated by it, much less all of the 114 lower-order lineages. Her record shows too many apparent contradictions of it. Some segments of the western houses contract alliances with those of the east or with other western lineages. The same is true of the eastern houses. Even the chiefly houses actually contract alliance with other chiefly lineages. I do not wish to argue that these contradictions to the model do not have their explanations in terms of the rich distinctions in the sociology of clanship that the author describes. Nevertheless, whatever its empirical standing, the model emerges within a greatly more complex sociological reality.

Houses which are not allied to each other may, as in other cultures of the region, recognize a relationship of ceremonial elder and younger brotherhood with each other that normally excludes intermarriage. By examining these relationships, Renard-Clamagirand found further local four-partner cycles. However, there are recognized procedures for obtaining women from groups to whom one is allied only by means of an intermediary, that is, from a wife-giver's wife-giver. When two houses of a four-partner circuit resort to this option, they split the cycle into two triadic relationships. In consequence, wife-takers of wife-takers become wife-givers. For some, this procedure can lead to the painful necessity of shifting attitudes toward close relatives. Such strains, the author argues, can be averted only when generalized exchange is practised by four lines. Followed in two successive generations, but with alternative intermediaries, this procedure can convert generalized exchange among four alliance groups into direct exchanges, as happened in one strongly disapproved of case. Renard-Clamagirand writes of the contradiction that seems to exist between the desire to close alliance cycles as quickly as possible, in order to return the woman to the nest from which she originated, and the desire to extend through several houses by means of female descendants. The quandary has been felt and dealt with differently by different cultures. The Rindi of Sumba dislike closed cycles.
of alliance, especially among three partners (Forth 1981: 409). In Kédang on the other hand, a chief strategy in acquitting the obligations of marriage prestations is uncovering closed cycles of outstanding obligations, and a highly favoured marriage is with the daughter of the daughter of a woman from ego's own clan, though these marriages rarely take place (Barnes 1974: 248, 289; compare Lehman 1970).

There is a great deal more of interest in these two books and much in the ethnographic facts that strikes anyone familiar with another Indonesian culture as being startlingly familiar, but at the same time strangely transformed. For example Barraud (1979: 155) writes that in Tanebar-Evav a house that stands as wife-taker in an alliance established by the ancestors is called "vu'ūn", a term which means both a knot in wood and joint or articulation, as in the structure of a body. Renard-Clamagirand (1982: 205, 267) writes that collective festivals, particularly those at the beginning of the seasons, are called knots, "vu'ūn", because they are the points of reference in the annual calendar and for time in general and that 'knots' have the sense of marked or important events. These instances of botanical idiom including trunks, joints and tips as metaphors for social and temporal relationships are of a kind that has repeatedly received attention (Fox 1971; Barnes 1974: 229-33) and that, along with the 'house' and the relative age terms elder and younger for expressing other social categories, Fox has argued (1980b: 331) are needed in a redefinition of the structural core of van Wouden's model. Each of the suggested additions and others are amply demonstrated in the two studies under consideration.

In summarizing the social categories revealed for Tanebar-Evav by Barraud - but also in his view a part of a structural core shared throughout eastern Indonesia - Fox (1981: 483) comments that 'Barraud's achievement is not simply to have depicted another new configuration of these categories, but to have indicated how they are manipulated to maintain a lived in reality'. Hicks has remarked (1982; 1984) of both Marobo and Tanebar-Evav that each exemplifies the Maussian inspiration behind van Wouden's attempt to demonstrate 'the essential unity of social organization, myth, and ritual' (van Wouden 1968: 9). There are now several modern ethnographic accounts that represent proven achievement in the area and that have provided substantial tests of van Wouden's programme to a degree not possible when he was compiling ethnographic information for his book. In large measure they confirm the present usefulness of his programme. In Fox's view (1981) they also confirm a theoretical shift from the formal study of models toward the investigation of metaphors for living. These metaphors comprise the common civilization behind the manifold variations found among the disparate eastern Indonesian communities.
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On 3 February 1986 'STRANGERS ABROAD', a documentary television series about fieldwork and the history of anthropology, will begin transmission on Channel 4 (UK). It is an innovative and adventurous project and one that was not without its problems.

At the time of conceiving this project, there was no anthropological film unit active anywhere in British television. The BBC did not have such a unit, and Granada Television of the Independent Television Network had recently run down the team that had made its award-winning 'Disappearing World' series. (Granada's loss proved to be 'Strangers' gain, as it acquired its director-producer Andre Singer and its cameraman Mike Thomson.) Central Television, which made the series for Channel 4, took a risk, and a freelance team to make this production was brought together on the strength of Bruce Dakowski's original idea for the series.

The team was put together under the wing of the Head of Factual Programming at Central, Richard Creasey, without whose enlightened vision and protection the series could never have been made. That commercial television picked up the series at all is a surprise; it is remarkable that it could risk such vast sums on such a project at a time when ninety-nine people out of a hundred met on the street answer the question 'What is anthropology?' with 'It's something to do with monkeys, isn't it?' The total cost for the series was not unadjacent to one million pounds. Each programme was budgeted at something approaching £130,000 excluding corporate overheads. When at the same time each episode of 'Dallas' was being marketed in

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1 The original working title for this series, and the title under which most informants were approached, was 'NATIVES!'. For political reasons this was changed to 'STRANGERS ABROAD' midway through production.
England for £50,000, it is all the more remarkable that commercial television could make such a move.

'Strangers Abroad' is an innovative experiment in broadcasting. It is a six-part documentary series which looks at the history of anthropology through the achievements of six of its pioneers. Ethnography has been a staple of television fare for some years. The revolutionary aspect of this series may be found in its attempt to give the general viewing audience an idea of what anthropology (or, more exactly, fieldwork) is all about. Thus 'Strangers Abroad' differs from its more illustrious cousins (e.g. 'Disappearing World', 'Tribal Eye') in that it is not another 'human zoology' programme; the emphasis is not on exotic peoples, places or customs, but rather on the activities and ideas of the anthropologists themselves.

Each programme concentrates on the life and work of one anthropologist (a list of anthropologists and programme titles is appended below). The programmes are arranged in a vaguely chronological order (Spencer - who replaced Leenhardt after rebellion in New Caledonia made filming there impossible - Boas, Rivers, Malinowski, Mead and Evans-Pritchard). While visually very different, all follow a broadly similar structure. They are not strictly biographical, although pertinent biographical information is provided in order to set the scene and to put the anthropologist's achievements in context. The core of each programme is its location filming. In each case we went back to the very village, in some cases to the very houses, in which the subject anthropologists lived. Each programme contains interviews with native informants (usually those who had personal contact with the subject anthropologist or his work) and with friends and colleagues of that anthropologist. Wherever possible archive material (variously photographs, cinefilm and/or sound recordings) made by the subject anthropologists themselves was used. The most obvious difference in format between this series and its ethnographic predecessors is the presence of a presenter, Dr Bruce Dakowski, the series originator and writer.

It had never been our intention to make 'ethnographic' films. This series is about the history of anthropology; it is about six of the personalities who influenced the development of the discipline; about the process of fieldwork itself and about what we (as Westerners and as anthropologists) have learned as a result. Thus the problems and processes of our filming were rather different than those experienced by the 'Disappearing World' or the Oxford Ethnographic Films crews. Like anthropologists, good ethnographic film crews spend months, ideally years, in the field. We did not and could not do this. In the twenty weeks of filming budgeted for this series we were expected to film twelve cultures in upwards of twenty locations. It was unusual to have a week in one location. Consequently we did not have the time to familiarize ourselves with the rhythms of daily life, nor to wait for events to happen, nor to build any rapport with the local people. Most importantly, we did not have the time to spend several months gaining the confidence and acceptance of the people in the field. We were opportunistic intruders, taking advantage of what was happening and, when necessary, arranging for things to happen. Sometimes events
worked to our advantage. A death occurred shortly after the crew's arrival in a Zande village, enabling us to pursue in some verisimilitude E-P's work on witchcraft and magic. At other times even our best laid plans went awry. We had, for example, planned our Pacific Islands shoot to coincide with a major kula expedition in the Trobriands. Only days before arrival in Kiriwina we were informed that it had been cancelled under confused circumstances. It was subsequently suggested that the man for whom it was being held, a ranking government official, was fighting an impeachment action. It would seem that he had decided among other considerations that he could not afford to be tainted with the brush of colonialism and cultural imperialism by association with a European film crew at that time. A second kula subsequently fell through due to the actions of a rival film crew. Sometimes 'authentic' events were staged for our benefit. The Warramungu in Central Australia held the biggest corroboree in memory, once it was agreed that Central Television would provide refreshments for the participants (something that would have otherwise unbearably taxed the resources of the local community).

A rather different kind of problem arose as a result of the ground rules we had made for ourselves. While each programme included substantial segments 'in the field', the programmes were not restricted to the presenter simply re-tracing the footsteps of six pioneer fieldworkers. Indeed, a healthy proportion of each programme included interviews. There were, however, restrictions on just which 'talking heads' would be filmed. Early on it was decided that there was no place for 'experts' in the series; only individuals who had a personal connection with the anthropologist would be invited to appear. This self-imposed criterion made for certain difficulties. This was especially true for Spencer and Rivers, both of whom had done their most important work around the turn of the century. More importantly, neither had established 'schools' in the discipline, and both had died in the 1920s. Consequently there were few surviving filmable students or colleagues for them (in the end it was necessary to relax this rule for Rivers). The situation vis-à-vis Margaret Mead, the most public of anthropologists, was, not surprisingly, quite the reverse. Making a programme about E-P posed special problems. In addition to the difficulty of filming around a civil war, which made it impossible to get to the Nuer heartland, there were problems at home in England. It would seem that the twelve years since his death were not sufficient time to ease the memories of those closest to him, and we encountered an unexpected reticence to talk about his achievements and his place in anthropology.

Problems of a more mundane sort familiar to all fieldworkers - recalcitrant bureaucrats losing visa applications and confiscating equipment, logistic nightmares, missed opportunities ('If only you had come last week you could have filmed our potlatch'), uncooperative weather, interfering 'minders' (both official and self-appointed) - were part and parcel of the project only multiplied by a factor of twelve.

The series was two years in the making. Bruce Dakowski, the series originator and writer-presenter, spent two years lobbying
to get it funded before 'Strangers Abroad' was officially launched in July 1983. The series was completed, on schedule, in August 1985. The first nine months, the period of gestation, were spent primarily on research. This was initially based in Oxford with Dakowski, Dr Peter Riviere, the series consultant, a secretary, Linora Lawrence, and myself, as researcher, on stream. Having decided the six subject anthropologists of the series (originally Boas, Rivers, Malinowski, Leenhardt, Mead and E-P), our time was now spent trying to gather as much biographical material as possible. Libraries were ransacked and copyright law regarding photocopying was stretched to the limit. As a consequence of the far-flung nature of our subjects, the telephone lines hummed far into the night. ('If it's 2am in England it's time to place that call to Melbourne...') At one point our telephone bill topped £1000 per month - surely contributing to the success of the British Telecom privatisation.) During the research period, Dakowski also undertook a major reconnaissance trip, circumnavigating the globe in order to visit each of the prospective filming locations. This was an essential part of the research. During this trip preliminary local contacts were made, government representatives and leaders of local communities were approached and appraised of our intentions, and likely individuals for filming were identified. Local opinion regarding the project was solicited and incorporated.

By the time Dakowski returned from his world recce in January 1984 the full team was coming together. An office had been established in Central Television's London centre; Andre Singer, the director, came on stream fulltime, as did the production secretary, Kate Jessop. Karl Sabbagh, the executive producer, kept a watching brief throughout the entire production. As the only non-anthropologist on the production team, his task was to keep not only the budget in line, but also ourselves.

Throughout the research period our efforts were aimed in two rather different directions. It was first necessary to amass as much biographical material on each anthropologist as possible. This was done not only through published sources (books, articles, theses, obituaries, etc.), but also through personal (or, in the case of informants overseas, telephone) interviews. Contact was made with the descendants (both biological and intellectual) of each anthropologist. At the same time as we were collecting biographical data we also had to identify the key contributions each subject made to the discipline. This was important, as it was necessary to identify which particular contributions would be emphasized in each programme. The fifty-two minute television hour is not enough time to talk about more than a tiny fraction of what each anthropologist accomplished in his or her life. A consequence of this constraint was that we selected two or sometimes three themes that could be developed in each programme. Significantly, compromises were necessary between what was anthropologically important and what was filmically possible.

The second phase of the project was the filming. Twenty weeks were allocated for the filming of all six programmes. It was originally intended to complete this by Christmas 1984, leaving six clear months to do the final script-writing and editing. In
order to rationalize costs, it was decided to do the location filming in three trips of approximately five weeks' duration each (five weeks were reckoned to be the optimum period for the crew to be abroad). These were scheduled for the Spring, Summer and Autumn of 1984. The remaining five weeks were reserved for interviews, location- and museum-filming in the UK and on the Continent and for 'contingencies'. (In the event, a fourth filming trip [in April of 1985] was added after the rebellion in New Caledonia had resulted in the substitution of Spencer for Leenhardt.) Again for budgetary reasons each shooting trip was arranged more with an eye to international transport schedules than to the logic or requirements of each programme. Ease of access influenced the choice of filming locations. Filming in the New Hebrides for Rivers or on Bali for Mead was rejected because of considerations of time and cost. Furthermore, we did not have the luxury of being able to film one complete programme before beginning the next, as this would have resulted in the uneconomic duplication of travel arrangements. Instead, each shooting trip was arranged with reference to include all filming in a particular geographic region without regard to the particular programme or anthropologist. (Thus the Spring Shoot covered North America and Samoa, the Summer Shoot Asia and Africa, and the Autumn Shoot the South Pacific and Australia.) As this included interview as well as location filming, it made for some rather interesting juxtapositions. It was not uncommon, for example, to switch from filming about one anthropologist to another in the same location (e.g. both Malinowski and E-P at LSE or Spencer and Malinowski in Melbourne). Similarly, it is not surprising that the same interviewee might comment about the subject of more than one programme (for example Sir Raymond Firth about both his teacher, Malinowski, and his fellow student and colleague, E-P). And, as can be imagined, there could be no sense of continuity in the filming when adjacent scenes in a single programme were often filmed months apart. The result of all this was that each programme began as a collection of disassociated segments. At this point the programmes existed only in the writer's and the director's imaginations.

The location crew consisted of six members. These were the director, writer-presenter and researcher plus the film crew of cameraman, sound-recordist and assistant cameraman. (Again, this is smaller than the standard crew. The union requires a minimum crew of nine. Working as independents we were allowed to work without the benefit of a production assistant, assistant sound-recordist or electrician. This was an invaluable concession. Under normal circumstances, for example, the absence of electricity in the New Guinea jungle would not have absolved us from the requirement to travel with an electrician.) As it was, even our reduced numbers frequently threatened to swamp local resources and transport facilities. Inevitably the presence of the crew generated a conflict between Western and local notions of time, value and efficiency. This conflict was further exacerbated by the demands of the craft (e.g. the tyranny of the camera's presence, with its requirements of natural light, re-takes, re-loads and the like).

The period between each filming trip was spent in script-
writing and in continued research. Production team (director, writer, executive producer, researcher and consultant) meetings were held throughout this period to thrash out issues and approaches. A difficult and recurrent task of the production team was to reconcile what was cinemographically possible with what was anthropologically desirable. It was during this period too that the identification and acquisition of the still photographs (admirably orchestrated by Elizabeth Edwards), archive footage and music to flesh out the programmes was begun.

Filming was done on a ratio of 8:1. That is, eight hours of film were shot for every one hour actually used. (This is below the industry average. BBC documentaries are filmed on a ratio of between 10 and 12:1) This does not mean that seven hours of rejected film were in any way technically deficient - indeed, it was frequently outstanding - rather, this film was simply inappropriate for our purposes. Beautiful, evocative shots were abandoned simply because there was nothing which advanced the programme to say over them. Similarly, filmed interviews often lasted thirty minutes or more - but, because of the antipathy of the television audience to talking heads, only a pithy minute (never more than two) of that interview will ever be seen on the screen. The rest, which for whatever reason does not fit into the framework of the programme, however good it may be, is omitted. It may even be that the best, the most interesting, the anthropologically most provocative statement made in an interview, ends up on the cutting room floor - not, of course, because it is interesting or provocative, but despite it. There is no room in a programme for anything that does not advance the narrative of the film. Film is a harsh mistress. Its conventions and style of narrative may be different from those of the academic world, but they are no less rigid.

The director and the editor work together to decide what is cinemographically possible within the grammar of film. It is their alchemy which amalgamates the disparate images captured on film with the structure outlined in the script.

Editing marks the next stage of the process, and in our case it occasioned another move. For convenience of access, new production offices were established adjacent to the editing suites elsewhere in London. The editing, with interruptions, was scheduled for the period January to July 1985. Two editing teams (editor and assistant editor) were established and two editing suites ran simultaneously. Each editing team was given responsibility for three programmes, and each programme was scheduled for an edit of six weeks' duration (this is somewhat below the industry standard of eight weeks editing for a one-hour documentary). A programme was not, however, worked on consecutively. Rather, it jumped from the Steenbeck (editing machine) to shelf and back again, as new archive material and revised scripts appeared.

The edit began with the breaking down and cataloguing of each frame of film and sound. The editors were given rough outlines of each programme's structure, and then left to make a preliminary cut through the film. At this time a division was made between what was cinemographically 'good' or 'interesting' or 'evocative' - that is, what was good television in the eyes of the editor - and
what was not. By this time, conscientious editors would have
familiarized themselves by reading up on the subject of each pro-
grame (mainly through the research files accumulated on each
anthropologist). In the on-going tension between 'good television'
and 'good anthropology', however, the editors' first priority was
always what the public would watch.

A rough assembly, lasting two to three hours, was then made
for each programme. (Film rejected at this time, and indeed through-
out the project, was saved and stored for possible future resusci-
tation. No film was ever destroyed.) This assembly represented the
combination of those elements individually selected (according to
their own, sometimes contradictory, criteria) by the writer, the
director or the editor. There was at this stage no structure to
the assembly. It was merely a string of the best bits.

The process from now until completion of the edit was one
of refinement. Together, the director and the editor had to refine
those images, to reduce the assembly from something over two hours
to the required fifty-two minutes, to shape and re-shape the as-
sembly until it had a cogent structure - a structure which was,
moreover, consistent with the intention of the writer. Commentary
was written and re-written to fit the pictures; pictures were cut,
moved, added, and re-cut to fit the words. The process was bi-
directional. Nothing was sacrosanct. Pictures were found to fit
words. When our own pictures were not sufficient substitutes were
found. Thematic issues, some planned since the earliest programme
outline, were abandoned as it became clear that they could not be
televised. (How does one put the concept of segmentary organization
on television without recourse to complicated charts? This is,
after all, commercial television, not the Open University.) The
edit was a period of consultation and compromise, with the writer,
editor and director each having his or her own priorities. It was
through their constant interaction and, ultimately, in the mediating
role of the director, that the shape of each film was finally
established.

Having established the shape of a programme, the remaining
time was spent in polishing the product. Word and image revisions
were the order of the day. Substitutions were continuously made
in the search for ever sharper results. During this process, the
nuts and bolts of the editing also took place. Maps and graphics
were devised and inserted. So too were sound tracks ('atmospherics',
commentary and music). Title graphics were commissioned, as was
theme music. No sooner did each new element appear than it was
blended in to the growing whole. Eventually a 'fine cut' was
produced, after which the structure and the images could not be
altered. Final commentary was then tailored to fit this cut and
recorded. Lastly, sub-titles and credits were appended. It was
now ready for transmission.

STEVEN SEIDENBERG
STRANGERS ABROAD

Programme 1. Fieldwork (Sir Walter Baldwin Spencer)
Programme 2. The Shackles of Tradition (Franz Boas)
Programme 3. Everything Is Relatives (William Halse Rivers Rivers)
Programme 4. Off the Verandah (Bronislaw Malinowski)
Programme 5. Coming of Age (Margaret Mead)
Programme 6. Strange Beliefs (Sir Edward Evans-Pritchard)

*Torture* appears in a series of historical studies of general topics - opened by Ernest Gellner's *Nations and Nationalism*, and including *The Family and Markets* among several more political titles - under the rubric *New Perspectives on the Past*. The editors aim to encourage wider reception of the results of modern historical research, and this book provides a wealth of well-presented data relating to the past of a practice, the present and future of which are of extremely general interest. Its closing chapter, incorporating material from Amnesty International's 1984 report, *Torture in the Eighties*, makes distressing reading - both the pathology of the victims' pain, including the chronic or permanent 'sequelae', and the process of the recruitment and making of torturers, are described in a detail possible only because of the great volume of documentary material available.

Peters defines the scope of his enquiry narrowly, to the use of pain, by public powers, upon people's bodies, for the purposes of eliciting information, confessions, or other statements. We have before us a historical chronicle: chapters on torture in Ancient Greece and Rome, and in medieval and early modern Europe, based on the primary material of juridical debates, legal codes and court records; chapters on torture in late 18th- and 19th-century Europe, the period of 'abolition', on its reappearance in 20th-century Europe, and finally on its present global ubiquity. There is a brief excursion into comparison with the place of torture in the written legal procedures of the Ottoman Empire, Japan and Czarist Russia (pp.92-7) and a too-brief discussion of the importance, among the factors enabling the return of torture in the modern period, of its use in European colonies (pp.137-8). Torture of prisoners of war and of captured spies in time of war was never effectively abolished, and it was from this autonomous military-political judiciary, and as a result of the emergence of ideologies of the transcendent Party/Revolution/Volk/Nation/State or other Supreme Interest, that torture - now rarely codified - reappeared.

The book's greatest strength lies in the lucid exposition of the mix of continuity and discontinuity marking the history of torture in the grand European legal tradition. As might be expected from a specialist in medieval history, the first chapters are demandingly detailed accounts. Evidently, torture was routinely used in Classical Antiquity - not, in Greece, on free citizens, but on slaves, whose evidence was not to be relied upon unless they had been tortured. Jurists debated the difficulty of
using such evidence, well aware that torture does not guarantee
truthfulness of testimony, but they showed no sign of moral
scruple. A succession of Roman emperors, elaborating the concept
of the crime of treason, weakened the immunity of free citizens
in this respect. Treason became the focus of a category of 'extra-
ordinary crimes' in the prosecution of which torture was deemed
appropriate, as it often still is. In medieval and early modern
Europe, the fluid category of people considered to be, for legal
purposes, 'infamous', were liable to be tortured, not only in
'extraordinary cases' (witchcraft and heresy being the ecclesi-
astical equivalents of secular treason) but wherever the dictates
of the complex, but flexible algebra of Romano-Canonical law of
proof required it: for where the value in points (indicia) of
other testimony was not sufficient to establish guilt, torture
was called for to secure a confession. Its abuses, and the need
for specialist skills in applying it, were the subject of learned
treatises by experts in the system of prosecutorial justice.

In the Enlightenment, torture became the epitome of every-
thing superstitious, barbaric, irrational and contrary to human
dignity in the old social order. More than moral revolution,
though, it was transformations internal to legal practise - in
the law of proof and in the adoption of new sanctions - that en-
abled torture to be denounced, eloquently and rightly enough, when
it had already become unnecessary. 'A number of aspects of the
abolition were shaped by doctrines and reforms that in other
circumstances would be and have been condemned as sternly as
torture itself.' (p.86). This narrative - as well as the evid-
ence of your daily paper - corrects the historiography of the
19th century, which saw in the history of torture a vindication
of a progressive view of the history of civilisation in general.

In the military, and in the state security police, torture
returned to Europe in the early 20th century, in Russia, Italy,
Spain, Germany, etc. The United Nations abolished it again, but
in 1957 there was news that the French army and colonial police
were torturing Algerian prisoners. In 1961 Amnesty Internation-
al was founded. Torture is now being used by one state in three.

The crucial Enlightenment doctrine of the dignity of human
beings is the focus of Peters' last chapter. He describes it as
a programmatic 'anthropology', threatened by those of nationalist
and internationalist political ideologies which make individual
rights secondary to ideal interests. 'The human capacity for
intra-specific violence', he suggests, referring to Koestler,
derives from the prior 'capacity to place supreme values upon
transcendental ideas and to deduce an anthropology from them'
(p.164). Perhaps the famous Milgram experiments on obedience to
authority prove that such ideas can include 'science'. He prov-
ides a history of changing concepts of political crime in the
20th century in relation to anti-humanitarian 'anthropologies',
indicating also that a thread of tradition links the paranoia of
Nero and the contemporary situation, described in the Introduction:
'In an age of vast state strength, ability to mobilize resources,
and possession of virtually infinite means of coercion, much of
state policy has been based upon the concept of extreme state vulnerability to enemies, external and internal' (p.7).

There are issues that Peters cannot explore fully in a book dense with information and richly suggestive of possible side-tracks. There is no mention of animal rights, but he does see the possibility of a history that would integrate torture more fully with other aspects of the relations between 'legal' powers and subjects. The significance of confession in early modern Europe is one complex which unites the domains of religion, polity and the law as these were thoroughly interwoven in practice, if less so in contemporary theory. In many cases, the distinction between torture and forms of physical sanction is hard to draw. Though most modern torture remains rudimentary in technique, more grey areas appear where it draws on advances in medical science. Truth-serums, the sterilisation of sexual offenders, Soviet psychiatry, the forcible feeding of hunger strikers, are described as 'existing along the ambiguous edge between torture and legitimate state treatment of prisoners' (p.182).

Peters rightly disparages a 'thinning out' of the content of political discourse into sentimentalities as he describes (pp. 148-55) how 'torture' has become, in casual parlance, the semantic marker of a particular 'threshold of outrage', and he makes excellent use of George Orwell's work on this general process. But even in the restricted context of crime and politics, there is a dialectic of understanding of 'legitimacy' and 'dignity': many forms of mere incarceration are torture, and a grey area he does not refer to is that in which it seems reasonable to many Argentinians to call the Junta's policy of 'disappearing' people a deliberate torture of those remaining at liberty', a policy intended - like much modern torture - to traumatize and destroy the will to resist, and which has had damaging psychological effects on many individuals who were never actually taken away. The defence of the concept of human dignity, the embattled will to realise the 'anthropology' it entails, can and should be furthered by continuing to increase the demands the concept makes on the existing order of things, particularly as states - including our own, which daily strip-searches women in Ulster jails - become ever more powerful, ingenious, and terrified of people.

TOM CHEESMAN

Is feminist anthropology a form of special pleading, a brand of restrictive practice designed to help women get jobs in an ever-shrinking marketplace? Or is it of legitimate concern to us all, an intellectual pursuit that will lead to greater attention to all muted groups? Happily, it is the second question to which we can answer 'Yes'. For, as this collection of essays shows, the anthropology of women promises a finer-grained sociology of knowledge, plus a heightened, critical sensitivity to our predecessors' biases and (by reflection) to our position - both in the field and in the discipline.

Tiffany introduces the book, setting out the intellectual history of feminist anthropology, its claimed centrality within the subject, and its subversive potential. McDowell details the interrelated contexts where female/male complementarity in Bun (East Sepik) is relevant: subsistence, values, world view and the definition of human being, and the social domain. O'Brien, in a review of how Melanesianists have portrayed women, shows that until very recently, women were either invisible or denigrated by male ethnographers and their male informants; male anthropologists ignored women's economic roles and exaggerated the importance of motherhood. Counts describes how revenge suicide is a recognized political strategy for powerless, shamed, angry Lusi (New Britain) women 'who cannot otherwise alter the balance of power or relieve an intolerable situation' (p.88). So threat of suicide can deter male coercion of women. Nash criticises the Marxist notion that kin-based (normally domestic) work is a source of women's devaluation. She shows that Nagovisi (Bougainville) women are the recognized skilled authorities in gardening (husbands merely provide elbow grease) and that no sharp distinction between public and domestic domains can be drawn. Since a Nagovisi husband can best provide for his children by cultivating land of his wife's matriline, the introduction of cash-cropping has led, not to a strengthening of men's position, but to an increased adherence to matrilineality and uxorilocality. Sexton details the remarkable development of Wok Meri, a twenty-year-old exchange system and network of savings associations run by, and for, women of the East Highlands. Wok Meri is their successful attempt to correct the decline in their economic rights - a fall-off that began in the '50s. The last two papers of the volume are both by historians - both men, for the anthropology of women is not, of course, restricted to women anthropologists. Forman surveys the changes in the role of women in the churches in Oceania since their foundation in the last century. Boutilier contributes a fine article on white women in the Solomons in the first half of this century: their background and class, their life (whether on missions, on plantations, or as members of the capital's 'Society'), how they coped with 'booze, boredom, and adultery', how they aggravated
racial division by disapproving of 'island mistresses' and by trying to 'civilise' their peers, and how they perpetuated traditional female roles in the backward-looking, racialist society that the Solomons expatriate community then was.

Perhaps the most exciting paper is Marilyn Strathern's rich but concise piece. She demonstrates that criticism by Fell and Weiner of her earlier work tells us more about their modes of thought than it does about those of Mount Hagen women. Nature/Culture, that distinctive opposition so frequently used by anthropologists, does not apply in Mount Hagen, nor is domesticity denigrated by Hagen women. Rather, it is a domain within which a woman can display her achievement of adulthood and her successful candidacy of the role of 'full person'.

Strathern's paper highlights the best in the anthropology of women, for it is sensitive, reflexive and illuminating. The other papers exhibit the variety of concerns of feminist anthropology, needed correctives in a discipline still dominated by men. But, a final worry: will studies in geographical areas where the sexual division is not so sharply scored provide similarly rewarding ethnography? I wonder.

JEREMY MACCLANCY


Few readers of JASO have not presumably at one time or another wondered whether they were awake or asleep and dreaming; or, when deeply in love, have not often thought long and hard about their friend; or have not been watching a film or reading a story or a poem and become so engrossed in what they were watching or reading that they have been transported into the realm of the fantastic. Imaginary Social Worlds is about these and comparable mental operations.

This book consists of a short Prologue, a brief theoretical Introduction, and six chapters which consider in turn social relations with media figures, social relations in dreams, in the stream of consciousness, in fantasy, and in hallucinations and delusions. The concluding chapter, Chapter 7, addresses the cultural significance of imaginary social worlds. Full references are contained in the notes; the index is useful.

The analytical focus of Imaginary Social Worlds is 'the patterns governing social interactions in imaginary worlds' (p.29). These imaginary worlds involve a person in social relations with three main classes of imaginary figures: media figures, i.e. 'all
those beings with which the individual is "familiar" through television, movies, books, newspapers, magazines, and other forms of the media'; 'purely imaginary figures produced by the individual's own consciousness'; and 'imaginary replicas of friends, kin, and lovers [who] play important roles in all forms of inner experience ...

The data upon which Caughey focuses his attention are based largely on 'introspective self-reports', i.e. published autobiographical accounts; on 'ethnographic interviews' among Sufis in Pakistan and among the people of Pânahakkar (in the Truk group of the Caroline Islands, Micronesia) in 1968 and 1976-77 respectively; and on his own imaginary experiences. The data also include information collected during a field study of an urban American psychiatric ward from 1972 to 1975, although the majority of data about American imaginary relationships is derived from some 500 people within the author's own social circles - that is, from his personal acquaintances and from interviews and survey work with faculty, staff, and students at two eastern American universities where he worked.

Caughey is a relativist who thinks (as this reviewer thinks) that many interpretations and theories of anthropological and of psychological data are 'outside schemes' which often tell us more about the interpreter's theory than about the data under consideration; he also thinks (as does this reviewer) that such interpretations and theories very often involve 'scanty attention to the text itself - that is, the internal structure...' of the data (p.82).

Thus Caughey is most interested in grasping 'the inner view' and thereby explicating the logic of the data (p.86). The upshot of this approach to his data is that Caughey can maintain, most plausibly, that 'intense imaginary relationships through fantasy, media, dreams, and the stream of consciousness are characteristic of contemporary American society' (p.7). However, 'in passing much of our lives in imaginary social worlds, we are engaging not in private but in social experiences'. 'Cultural aspects of social organization have regulated a fundamental aspect of our subjective experience' - our 'pervasive involvement' in imaginary relationships (p.241).

*Imaginary Social Worlds* makes many interesting points. Caughey suggests (not entirely originally, of course, though unfashionably these days) that psychotherapy, for instance, is a form of social control. 'It involves procedures designed to remove deviants from society and/or to bring deviants back into conformity with the current beliefs and perceptions of society' (p.199). He also suggests that it is mistaken to imply that 'the inner world of mental illness is not "social"' (p.201), and that 'our understanding of many basic aspects of culture can be enhanced through systematic attention to imaginary experiences. Studies of values, for example, can clearly benefit from a careful examination of the ways in which people play out conceptions of the desirable in fantasies, dreams, and anticipations' (p.244). As concerns this last point, attention to the imaginary worlds (in the form of sexual fantasies, for example) of some young married and unmarried Balinese men on Lombok does indeed highlight the relative standing of men and women in that form of life.
The social function of fantasy - what is unrealistic because it is impossible or improbable that it will ever be realizable - is twofold. On the one hand, 'Fantasy, like religion, is an inexpensive opium for the people' (p.186); on the other hand, fantasy may provide the basis for social change by, for instance, providing 'the visionary image' for revolutionary and utopian movements (p.187). Caughey suggests finally that an examination of our own imaginary relationships is a potentially rich source for increasing self-understanding. In part, one is learning here about the shape of one's own personality, but the process also reveals social and cultural influences. By paying attention to imaginary systems, the individual can increase significantly awareness of cultural conditioning. If a person is happy with what he or she finds here, no action is necessary, but in some cases it may be appropriate to try and alter passive uncontrolled use of imaginary experience. People have the power to become aware of their own imaginary worlds, they also have the ability to modify these experiences (p.251).

*Imaginary Social Worlds* is an optimistic and encouraging book, which will probably interest anyone who is concerned seriously to explicate the nature of humankind. It makes the general point that it is wrong to think that most people cogitate and most of the time. Indeed, the opposite appears to be the case, which must have implications for political philosophies and programmes of action which assume the reverse. It also suggests that Waismann, for instance, was right when he maintained (in *How I See Philosophy*, edited by Rom Harré, London: Macmillan, 1958, pp.57ff.) that the evidence that a domain of 'the real' exists is very slender. *Imaginary Social Worlds* in some ways, indeed, raises more questions than it answers; but this reviewer takes that to be a point in the book's favour. He is pleased to be able to recommend it to *JASO* readers, though they would do well (in his judgement) to consult Rodney Needham's *Primordial Characters* (Charlottesville, Va.: University Press of Virginia, 1978) again as well.

ANDREW DUFF-COOPER


The first of these books by Nigel Barley is both an investigation into the nature of symbolism, in which he shows the limitations of existing theories and proposes an alternative approach to this topic, and an account of aspects of Dowayo culture of the Cameroons, West Africa. This book, then, has an obvious appeal to scholars involved in the study of West African societies as well as to those anthropologists concerned with the study of symbolism. Indeed, it is probably more to this last audience that the book is addressed. Barley attempts to construct an analytical framework that is not only applicable to Dowayo culture, but which also provides the basis for the study of symbolic processes in cross-cultural comparison.

This relatively short work (98 pages of text, 13 pages of appendixes and 7 of notes) is divided into eight chapters. The author introduces us to the Dowayo in Chapter 1, situating them historically and geographically and briefly covering the main areas of social organisation—politics, economy, residence patterns, marriage, kinship and rites of passage. In Chapter 2, he addresses the problem of the nature of symbolism. He dispatches Sperber's approach to this problem as one based on irrationality ('This looks crazy. It must be symbolism', p.10) and is wary of structural-functionalist views of ritual in that they treat it in terms of its effects, which results in crudely representational interpretations. Instead, he draws on Needham and Lévi-Strauss in order to investigate the nature of diverse cultural forms and the transformational processes that allow structures to be detected in various areas of social and cultural life. Thus 'structuralism', for Barley, offers a third way out of this apparent dilemma between irrationality and representational interpretations.

From this beginning, the author starts his journey into a symbolic analysis, his aim being 'a description of the ways in which Dowayo culture is punctuated and divided into spheres and domains' (p.12). In Chapter 3, Barley attempts to move away from purely linguistic models of symbolic analysis. First, he criticises the type of approach which relies on naive notions of word-meaning as elements in their analysis, treating only those elements which appeal to sense qualities. He cites the work of Victor Turner as exemplary of this perspective. From Saussure, Barley draws on the notions of analogy and motivation, both internal and external; yet he uses these latter terms to denote specific areas of interest. Internal motivation relates to the more pervasive internal structuring, the purely structural rules that are encapsulated in the rules of generative grammar. He opposes this concept
to external motivation that makes appeal to the outside world; that is, representational symbolic interpretations. This distinction he sees reflected in the difference between the French 'structural' style of anthropology and the British 'word-oriented' style - perhaps a little harsh on, and a limited generalization of aspects of, British anthropology. Moreover, he points to weaknesses in regarding either approach as exclusive, in that one may confuse structure for meaning, whilst the other is inherently ad hoc by nature. Thus he seeks both forms of motivation in his analysis, not expecting to find either in isolation in these matters. Yet it soon becomes apparent that he falls on the side of internal motivation, explicitly stating its predominance over the other form on p.96.

In the course of the following chapters, the author casts a wide net to provide some rich ethnographic data for his analysis. He must be applauded for his attempt to broaden the scope of symbolic analysis to include oral literature, material culture, festivals, ritual and belief. His object is the search for themes of Dowayo culture, often expressed in terms of binary oppositions or tripartite classificatory schemata. These themes are located in specific instances, but are 'extended gratuitously' into other areas of social and cultural life, where they are unearthed by the analyst. Nonetheless, sophisticated though this analysis is, and lucid though the arguments may be, this reviewer is left wondering at times about the methods and results of this symbolic exegesis.

First, Barley's uncritical adoption of a structuralist position may appear somewhat strange in this post-structuralist era. It might be thought that his battle cries of structuralism offering 'a third way out' sound decidedly hollow, and that his banners look peculiarly pale. Moreover, in places, his rather idiosyncratic literary style sometimes stretches our credulity as to the seriousness of his thesis. For instance, Dowayos seem to be a particularly unfortunate lot who suffer from a number of astonishing complaints probably new to medical science. Through excessive contact with the implements of smithing and potting, men can be afflicted by 'prolapsed anus (piles)' and women by 'ingrowing vagina'. However, Dr Barley puts our minds at rest by placing these two strange complaints in a recognizable relation to each other:

The first thing to note is that we are in the presence of a basic binary opposition between the two terms 'ingrowing vagina' and 'outgrowing anus', i.e. internal motivation is also structuring the system in play (p.24).

Staying with this theme of sexuality, the author states: 'For any post-Freudian Westerner, it is impossible not to see the circumcised penis in the blacksmith's bellows (illustrated in figure 14). One may surely ask whether the pre-Freudian Dowayo have a similar perception or not. The question which returned to the reviewer while reading the book was how much of the analysis is true to the Dowayo perception of the world and how much to that of
the analyst. In the nature of symbolic analysis we will probably never know, since the assumption is that these structures are unconscious.

At times, Barley seems to display a strange attitude to his ethnography, rich and interesting though it is. In the Preface, he states of the customary general ethnographic background that precedes most anthropological works: 'This serves the useful function of locating the people firmly in space and time and separating them from the undifferentiated mass of "primitive man"' (p. viii). And again on the same page he justifies his inclusion of some ethnographic material in the five and a half pages of Chapter 1 by saying that his data 'would otherwise have to be introduced piecemeal throughout the work in the form of footnotes, unnecessarily impeding and clogging the flow of the analysis'. This is a genuine problem, namely the combination of narrative and analysis in a text. However, his aim that 'the serious student will wish to check the analysis for himself' (hence the inclusion of appendices) is precluded by the lack of some key information. One cannot ask Barley to have written a book he did not set out to write, but more ethnographic data would have been helpful. For instance, by p.15 he has isolated a tripartite classificatory schema of ordinary Dowayo/blacksmith/rain-chief; but what of the "special class" of 'true cultivator' he mentions on p.77? We are not in any position to judge.

This symbolic analysis is a synchronic study of the Dowayo of northern Cameroon. Barley treats the subjects of his analysis in isolation, both spatial and temporal. Yet in the introductory chapter we are told that Fulani penetration and dominance of the area forced the Dowayo into marginal lands, and that the French colonial administration introduced chiefs into a once acephalous society. These past transformations and the modern influences of schooling and education are mentioned occasionally, but we do not receive any impression of how these aspects of social life are assimilated into the Dowayo symbolic universe - if indeed they are. Yet we are told that their 'traditional enemies, the Fulani', introduced circumcision (a central issue in the analysis, the 'joker in the pack' of Chapter 8), and indeed, 'older Dowayos deck themselves with the trappings of Fulani chieftains to claim status' and 'rich men wear Fulani robes and swords, carry umbrellas etc.' (p.9). Indeed, some of them even refuse to speak their mother tongue, solely adopting Fulani. This lack of historical perspective and the sense given of cultural exclusiveness must leave doubts as to the validity of the analysis. Only once is the subject of adaptation or change brought up, and that on pp.97-8 - the last two pages of the text.

Unfortunately, at £15.00 for 98 pages of text and 27 pages of appendixes and notes, etc., this volume cannot be recommended to students by the present reviewer. Moreover, for that price one might have expected better reproduction of photographs (and texts to accompany them) and at least an acute accent for Lévi-Strauss.

In an altogether different vein is The Innocent Anthropologist. Nigel Barley returns home from fieldwork in the Cameroons, his wounds of initiation barely healed, the experience still vivid
in his mind. Dressed only in the meagre costume of an initiate still smarting from his ordeal, this newly-integrated member of the community runs through the anthropological village screaming the secrets of the bush encampment to all and sundry. Whilst more primitive peoples would surely punish such renegades, we must congratulate Barley on the writing of this book.

This innocent anthropologist lays bare before us the vicissitudes of a fieldworker doing research in West Africa. Yet, far from the turgid preoccupations of Malinowski's diaries, this book is extremely funny. From the brusque encounters with bureaucrats and officials to the embarrassments of his first contacts with the Dowayo, the enigmatic Barley marched, limped and was carried through his field research. Indeed, it is a marvel that he recalls his memories in such good humour, given that he was almost killed in a car accident, lost his front teeth through the incompetence of a Cameroon dentist's assistant and suffered numerous complaints and diseases. Certainly, however, his depiction of the Dowayos is unflattering at times. Stuck in some sort of early Piagetian stage of perception, they seemed to have had great difficulty in recognising pictures he was using in an attempt to initiate discussion of the local fauna:

I tried using photographs of lions and leopards. Old men would stare at the cards, which were perfectly clear, turn them in all manner of directions and then say something like 'I do not know this man' (p.96).

He himself, though, does not escape ridicule. After being troubled by nocturnal sounds emanating from a hut behind his own, he assumed his neighbour had similar intestinal problems to himself:

One day I mentioned this to Matthieu who gave a loud scream of laughter and ran off to share my latest folly with Mariyo. About a minute later, a loud scream of laughter came from her hut, and thereafter I could chart the progress of the story round the village as hysteria hit one hut after another (p.130).

It was only later that he became aware that the inhabitants of this nearby hut were goats.

This is a useful and amusing book for anyone about to leave for the field or, indeed, as a reminder of the joys of fieldwork for those who have returned. Far from discouraging anyone by this warts-and-all view of research, it made me want to return to Africa.

ROY DILLEY
Infanticide is a phenomena which affects almost all living creatures. This highly stimulating volume contains papers discussing the practice among invertebrates, insects, spiders, fishes, birds, amphibians, rodents, carnivorous mammals, non-human primates and man, and is the end-product of the Wenner-Gren Symposium on 'Infanticide in Animals and Man' held at Cornell University during August 1982. Editors Dr Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, who in the 1970s was one of the first researchers to voice the opinion that infanticide might be a useful biological mechanism rather than simply violent, aberrant behaviour, and Dr Glenn Hausfater, a specialist in non-human primates, maintain that although there is no unitary mechanism for infanticide across species, the practice can be reduced to five functional categories of motivation: exploitation of the infant as a resource, usually food; competition for resources with the infant; improvement of breeding opportunity by eliminating dependant offspring of a prospective mate; parental manipulation of progeny for best reproductive success (the category used most frequently by man); and social pathology. This framework is followed in most of the papers, and provides a useful basis against which to discuss the many varied factors, for different species, which lead to infanticidal practices. One of the more fascinating aspects of the book is the attempt by most of the contributors to define a new and dynamic field: what is infanticide, what are the situations in which it occurs, who are the perpetrators, who are the victims, what are the motives, how do these factors vary between species, and how can the subject best be studied?

The volume contains twenty-five chapters divided into four sections. Section I, 'Background and Taxonomic Reviews', is the least coherent but most important section for specialist and non-specialist alike, as it contains a collection of review articles on specific aspects of the subject and background material for the later sections. Section II, 'Infanticide in Nonhuman Primates: A Topic for Continuing Debate', is the longest and most comprehensive section, being the area in which most of the research on infanticide has taken place. Anthropologists acquainted with the subject through the work of such people as Dian Fossey and the editors on non-human primate social behaviour will not be disappointed in the papers, and this section should not be missed by anyone interested in the theoretical and practical aspects of such research. Section III, 'Infanticide in Rodents: Questions of Proximate and Ultimate Causation', is less likely to be of interest to anthropologists, as it is more concerned with biological than with social factors affecting infanticide.

The most interesting section for anthropologists is Section IV, 'Infanticide in Humans: Ethnography, Demography, Sociobiology, and History'. Although it comprises only four chapters and an introduction, it is an exceptional and thorough treatment of a highly emotional and complicated topic. The introduction by M.
Dickemann reviews the subject in total and ties in with the rest of the book. The article by S.C.M. Scrimshaw reviews the ethno­graphic and historical data about human infanticide and discusses the motivations, decision-making processes and culturally sanctioned conditions under which it occurs in human populations. An apparently unique and subtle human infanticidal practice is discussed in S.R. Ryan's historical demographic study of the excess mortality rates of females between infancy and child-bearing age (deferred infanticide) in pre-modern Europe. Although these societies did not sanction female infanticide, the economic changes caused by the modernization of agriculture and the beginnings of industrialization led parents to devalue daughters and withhold family resources, such as food, from them in favour of sons. As a result, the mortality rates of females were excessively high, as they were more susceptible to nutritionally sensitive diseases such as tuberculosis, the major killer of the nineteenth century. Daly and Wilson compare data from modern Canada with traditional societies in their sociobiological analysis, which maintains that even pathological infanticide in societies which do not condone it is a product of natural selection. The section concludes with a fascinating case study by Bugos and McCarthy of the Ayoreo, a traditional tribal society in South America which practiced infanticide until recently. Such empirical data provides a good balance to the more theoretical papers. All the articles are worth reading separately, and together they form an excellent treatment of this frequently misunderstood and under-researched aspect of human behaviour.

Unusually for symposium proceedings, this volume is coherent, well organized and understandable to the non-specialist - in short, an excellent presentation of the current state of research on a highly controversial and dynamic subject of great importance. The papers are of consistently high quality and complement each other well, although they often present differing points of view. The overviews are invaluable in putting the more scientific papers into true perspective, as well as being very interesting in themselves. A bonus is the 68-page bibliography, which is comprehensive in its coverage of the widely disparate literature. The volume is to be highly recommended.

ALISON ROBERTS

This is a very boring book for anyone not desperately interested in the daily life and recent history of the Ait 'Atta of southern Morocco. It is a companion book to the author's previous MENAS publication, Dadda 'Atta and his Forty Grandsons (1981), which discussed the socio-political organization of the Ait 'Atta. The present book contains a variety of information on this transhumant, segmentary 'super-tribe', covering their ecological and economic situation, their way of life and beliefs, their relations with other peoples, and their twentieth-century history. This latter is, disappointingly, told very much from an external point of view and we are told very little of how the Ait 'Atta see their recent history.

There is also a chapter on 'Origins - Legend and Reality', but Hart seems quite confused about myth and legend. In the blurb, descriptions of 'myths of origin' are promised, but Hart claims that as only profane time is relevant for the Ait 'Atta, 'the real issue is one of legend and origin tradition...rather than myth' (p.40). At the end of the chapter, however, Hart remarks that 'No doubt many of these accounts are really myths' (p.74). This realisation is too late to prevent him ignoring such possibilities as considering the stories as charter myths or analysing their symbolic content. Perhaps if he had termed them myths he would not have thought it worth while commenting that the collective marriage ceremony of Dadda 'Atta's forty sons 'also seems unlikely, as does their unanimous impregnation, at first shot, so to speak, of their forty wives' (p.43). Still, perhaps this, and the reference to telepathy (p.47) are meant to be amusing. And so perhaps is the use of such metaphors as 'bowled over' (p.50), 'lip service' (p.91), and 'the backbone of the bridal party' (p.92) - though this latter might indeed be an Ait 'Atta, and not an ethnocentric, expression.

Trying to guess whether Hart is expressing his own views or those of the Ait 'Atta is one of the things that one can do to relieve the boredom of reading this book. Another way is to try and imagine how a bridal party can circumnavigate a groom's house in southern Morocco (p.92), how brides come to be 'automatically virgins' (also p.92), and how, in order to celebrate the 'Aid l-Kbir on Dhu l-Hijja 8-10, the Ait 'Atta manage to 'come from as far away as they can' (p.103).

JEREMY COOTE

This is a well-illustrated introduction to the sculptural traditions outside of the Western, Oriental, archaeological and pre-Hispanic civilizations. It is the latest in a series of British Museum publications which has included *Assyrian Sculpture*, *Egyptian Sculpture* and *Clocks and Watches*. No doubt Assyriologists, Egyptologists and horologists would also feel that a single 72-page booklet is too small to do justice even as an introduction to their subject. Anthropologists can only be grateful that the authors of this booklet have managed to discuss African, Oceanic and American Indian sculptural traditions in a way understandable by the lay person, without any vague generalizations. Being a book for lay persons, the occasional explicit and the always implicit reference is to the lay person's conventional conceptions of illusionistic Western art. Non-Western art is different, that is, made clear. But the authors also manage at least to indicate how other sculptural traditions might be approached in their own terms.

The authors are the Keeper and an Assistant Keeper in the British Museum's Department of Ethnography — better known now as the Museum of Mankind — but this book is by no means a catalogue of the Museum's collection. The last such catalogue appeared in 1925, with a shorter updated version appearing in 1982. Nor does it concentrate, as some recent publications have done, on a few individual pieces, but instead discusses specific traditions and illustrates particular works to further more general discussions. Questions of aesthetics are overtly ignored, and the authors concentrate their, and our, attention on anthropological and technical concerns.

An Introduction discusses the approaches of art history and anthropology, the range of what might be considered 'sculpture', and the 'discovery' of non-Western art by Picasso et al. Following this are detailed accounts of different methods of wood-carving, metal-working, terracotta and stone-working. These accounts provide insights into the problems and advantages of the different methods and lead into a discussion of the artists, their skills, position and status in various societies. The lack of figurative sculpture in non-Western art is posed as a problem, and then rejected, quite properly, as an ethnocentric question. A chapter on 'Masks and Masquerades' makes it clear how little we can know of a mask from seeing it devoid of any associated costume, out of context, static, in a museum. The final chapter makes the similar point that it is only very rarely that we can discover anything about the meaning of a sculpture from an assessment of its form.

The map of the world at the front of the booklet would have benefited from an attempt to locate on it not just some of the nation states and islands referred to in the text, but also all the peoples whose sculptural traditions are discussed. No indication is given of the locations of, amongst others, the Northwest Coast peoples, the Kipsigis, Makonde, or Pueblo Indians. There is
little cross-referencing between the hundred plates and the text, and it is unfortunate that some of the traditions discussed, for example the Asmat, are not illustrated at all. Though the anthropological discussions seem to be sound, the passages concerning the position of cattle among the Nilotic peoples of the Southern Sudan (p.10) are if not inaccurate, at least misleading. In particular, cattle are not bred to try to produce specific colours or configurations of colours, but to produce good milch cows. Preferences for cattle colour configurations are quite general, and particular clans do not have their own preferences. A Nilotic man will not commit suicide when his song-ox dies. And, most importantly, it is not bulls which are groomed, bedecked with tassels, and are the subject of aesthetic attention, but oxen.

JEREMY COOTE


This volume consists of a substantial Introduction by Judith Shapiro and ten ethnographic papers of varying length and interest assembled in two geographically defined sections: Brazil; and the western Amazonian parts of Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru. In many respects, it continues the process encapsulated in the volume Dialectical Societies, not only in demonstrating the unsuitability of models developed in the course of studies in other parts of the world to an area where it is difficult to find such familiar features as descent groups or brideprice marriage or a moiety structure that is part of the kinship domain; but also in giving further demonstration of the ways in which many of these societies resolve the contrasts provided by such antithetical notions as nature/culture, public/private and inside/outside found in cosmology and indigenous social philosophies. This latter point, however, applies mainly to the section on lowland Brazil (to which Dialectical Societies was exclusively devoted), and Joanna Kaplan usefully draws distinctions from the societies further west, which she sees as less ritualized and less highly structured (pp.127ff.).

However, the volume concentrates less on these wider issues than on indigenous conceptions of marriage. Although all of the essays have useful insights into their own data, in her Introduction Shapiro highlights two main anthropological concerns that the volume seeks to address. One is the old and still controversial question of the relationship between affinal alliance and kinship terminology - the extent to which the one reflects the other, and what is implied by the frequent examples in which the type of alliance does not behave in accordance with the logic of the term-
inology - and also, the extent to which an analytical approach which relies too heavily on a genealogical view obscures the true meaning of kin terms. Although the familiar arguments of this longstanding but now rather exhausted controversy are reiterated, little that is new emerges - not even the observation of the inappropriateness of both alliance theory and descent theory to this area. Appeal is finally made to the ethnographic context, hardly a novel idea, yet a wholly commendable one which all the contributors acquit admirably. However, one result of this emphasis on culture-specific interpretation is, as Shapiro admits, to make cross-cultural comparisons difficult to conceive or execute, especially, it would seem, in the circumstances of South America.

This leads to the second main concern dealt with in the Introduction, namely the formulation of an adequate cross-cultural definition of marriage itself. In fact, we are told that '...the relationships that have been labeled "marriage" in the societies of lowland South America have seemed familiar enough not to have occasioned any problems in the application of the term' (p.27). One wonders, therefore, to what extent this discussion is really necessary, in the absence of anything as problematic as Nayar marriage, or the woman-woman marriage found in parts of Africa. Be that as it may, Dole, Shapiro and Kensinger all attempt a comprehensive definition of marriage, the first yet another monothetic one of the type criticised by Riviere in ASA 11, the other two offering solutions little different in essence from the polythetic approach advocated by Needham in the same volume. Needham's initial suggestion was not taken up by the profession at large with any noticeable enthusiasm, and it is doubtful whether Kensinger's wish for something similar, but along the lines of the International Phonetic Alphabet, will fare any better.

So much for the Introduction. All the essays are determinately 'emic' in approach, but not so much as to prevent their authors from drawing inferences that might be concealed from the social actors themselves. A number of the essays deal with changes in the alliance system brought about for the most part by obviously external factors - mainly missionizing, but also a smallpox epidemic in one case (the Wachiperi). Yet particularly interesting is Kracke's evidence of internal change among the Kagwahiv, and his demonstration that this has allowed individuals to manipulate at least some of the traditional rules to their material advantage or emotional satisfaction.

Thus although we are not given much in the way theoretical advance, the volume is very valuable and interesting for its ethnographic insights. Personally, I was yet again struck by the parallels between my own area of Middle India and certain groups in Amazonia (the Quichua and Cashinahua in particular) - especially in marriage rules, kinship terminology, and the transmission of soul substance between alternating generations.

R.J. PARKIN
THE NOTES AND NOTICES

INTERNATIONAL FESTIVAL OF ETHNOGRAPHIC FILM
School of Oriental and African Studies, London
24-26 October, 1985

This Festival, the first of its kind in Britain, was jointly organised by the Royal Anthropological Institute and the National Film and Television School. Its official purpose was 'to encourage greater international awareness of the achievements to date and the future potential of documentary ethnographic film-making.' In effect, it provided an occasion for over one hundred participants from Europe, the United States and developing countries to view a wide variety of new ethnographic films and to discuss the issues involved in their making.

In addition to the main session of film-viewing and discussions, there was a pre-festival educational conference and a supporting programme of films at SOAS, the NFT, the ICA, BAFTA and the French Institute.

Visual anthropology, and film-making in particular, is still a relatively new and largely mistrusted feature in the anthropological repertoire. Previously, the making of ethnographic films by anthropologists was to a large extent dictated by cost, and the finished product was directed towards an academic audience. Nowadays, in contrast, there are a number of film-makers working with or without the collaboration of anthropologists and producing ethnographic films for television. The making of these films is not so much dictated by cost as by the television audience. The danger is, of course, that of emphasising the 'exoticism' of the people in order to snare the audience's undependable attention, but at the risk of misrepresenting the total way of life. The high technical quality of many television films, however pleasing to the eye and captivating to one's sense of adventure, does not in any way make up for the lack of depth of meaning. Some of the most revealing and perceptive ethnographic films have been made on very low budgets, such as David McDougall's 'To Live With Herds' (1969) and Attiat El-Abnoudi's 'Seas of Thirst' (1962). An example of careful collaboration between film-maker Leslie Woodhead and anthropologist David Turton is the Granada Television film 'The Migrants' (1985), about the migration of the Mursi in Ethiopia.

Each day's viewing in the main session of the Festival was structured along a certain theme:

1) Life crises, and how films dealing with universals in human experience, such as death, can bring about cross-cultural understanding;

2) Change and development, and how films can advocate a discriminating approach to modernization;

The common ground shared by all the films was their makers' intention of portraying their understanding of given aspects of another or their own culture. The perspective chosen, as well as the filming techniques employed, differed greatly from one film to another. One of the issues discussed during the Festival was that seeing does not necessarily equate with understanding, especially if one is viewing a culture other than one's own. Various techniques have arisen to supplement the visual content of films, namely commentaries and subtitles. The use of narrative by the commentator or by 'characters' in the film also serves to make the film coherent. Melissa Llewelyn-Davies, in her 'Masai Diary' (1982), has employed a highly effective technique of ordering the sequence of events in her films into the form of a diary.

A 'new wave' in ethnographic film-making has tried to dispense with both commentary and subtitles, thereby freeing the images to convey the meaning. Obviously, this is a difficult technique and open to much criticism, and this type of film is rarely successful. However, one of the most powerfully evocative films shown at the festival, in the words of its maker, Robert Gardner, 'stands as an exclusively visual statement resorting to neither voiced commentary nor subtitles'. The film is entitled 'Forest of Bliss' (1985) and follows the life of the people of Benares on the banks of the Ganges from one sunrise to the next. Produced in collaboration with Ákos Östör, an anthropologist from Harvard, the images in the film bring out the composite layers of the Hindu experience of life and death. A book is also being produced which will explain the finer details of the ceremonies and rituals in the film.

The custom of taking the finished film back to the people, be it the government or the actual group about whom the film has been made, is becoming increasingly widespread. Often, valuable feedback is obtained. Take, for example, the films 'A Balinese Trance Seance' and 'Jero on Jero' (Linda Connor, Timothy and Patsy Asch, 1982). In the first film, clients come to contact the spirit of a recently deceased son. In the second, the reactions of the medium to watching the first film are shown. She is prompted to provide a wealth of additional information and explanation on seeing herself performing the ritual.

Another area in which ethnographic films can make an impact is that of modernization and nation-building in developing countries and the effects on tribal populations. Potentially, ethnographic films concerned with these issues can be useful when shown to indigenous government agencies and may positively influence their policy making. Films of this genre generally embrace the 'Disappearing World' concept and emphasise the destruction of tribal life.

Nowadays, a relatively small number of indigenous film makers are making films about their own societies. Rather than emphasising the 'Disappearing World' theme, there seems to be a focus on 'cultural revival' or on change due to modernization or industrialization. Take, for example, Mariama Hima's 'Falow' (1985) and
'Baabu Banza' (1984). These two films show how scrap metal and old rubber tyres are recycled in Niamey, Niger.

The question now is that, given the wealth of material available, why are ethnographic films rarely used as a tool for teaching anthropology? Such films are sometimes used as an illustrative medium for the written word. Rarely are they used as a representation or interpretation of a given aspect of a society or culture. Also, with camera equipment (i.e. video camera and smaller and less technical cine cameras) becoming more easily accessible to the layman, the potential for making and using ethnographic films is becoming greater.

KRYSTYNA CECH


Some of the fifteen papers in this volume were originally given at the symposium on 'Libya: research papers into economic development' held at SOAS in 1984; others were especially commissioned for this volume. Eight are by Europeans, some of them directly involved in development planning in Libya, and seven by Libyan academics. Together, they give a very detailed and quite comprehensive account of the history of commerce, trade and development in late-nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Libya and an assessment, or rather assessments, of the potential for further development as the oil revenues peak and fall off in the years to come. Ironically, as the oil gluts, a major restriction on agricultural and industrial development is lack of water, and several papers focus on this problem. The book as a whole manages to achieve an informed objectivity with in encouraging lack of wishful thinking.

J.C.


This excellent addition to the Cambridge Studies in Social Anthropology series has been a long time coming. Based on the author's 1951-3 fieldwork in Tamil Nadu, it is nevertheless well worth the
wait. In it, Gough presents in comprehensive form analysis that was only suggested in her contributions to Srinivas' and Marriott's 1955 surveys of Indian villages. The influence of both Evans-Pritchard and Max Gluckman is clearly apparent in this volume. Unusually for a 'village study' monograph the author casts her argument firmly in a historical framework, tracing the impact of 200 years of colonialism on the politics and economics of two Thanjavur (Tanjore) villages. In the process, she addresses herself to some of the most bedevilling issues (e.g. questions of problems of modes of production, agrarian relations, changing class and caste structure) that have long challenged anthropologists of India. The book may be read on two levels. It begins and ends with a theoretical analysis of the utility and applicability of Marxist categories to the understanding of the Indian society. The core of the volume is, however, an extended ethnography of two villages. Here, Gough marshalls an enormous amount of data to great effect. Either aspect would make the volume an invaluable contribution to the field. That they are available together makes it well worth the hefty price. We can only eagerly anticipate the publication of the proposed companion volume, which takes the story through her 1976 return to the field.

S.S.

PAUL CHAO, Chinese Kinship, London etc.: Routledge and Kegan Paul 1983. xvi, 190pp., Glossary, Bibliography, Index. £15.00.

This book claims attention through having been written by one who belongs to the culture he is describing (Chao was born in Hopei) and who is familiar with the literary and historical texts he uses as data. Sadly, however, its virtues cease at this point, for despite having some value as raw data, there are none of the characteristic insights of a comparative or analytical nature that most outsiders manage to bring to their ethnographic accounts. Theoretically, too, the book is outmoded and derivative, being pervaded by the functionalist ideas of Radcliffe-Brown, Fortes and early Goody and interspersed with occasional appeals to personal sentiment as an explanatory device - including, in one case (p. 173), Freudian projections of guilt. Also, the first chapter is largely and irritatingly taken up with standard, text-book, Notes and Queries-type definitions of clans, lineages, households, nuclear families, etc., whose applicability to the Chinese situation is rarely clarified. Compared to the work of Freedman and Baker, then - or even of Feng Han-yi, first published nearly fifty years ago - this book represents a retrograde step in our understanding of Chinese society, despite being one of those rare cases of the anthropologist being his own informant.

R.J.P.
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