RETHINKING SOCIALIZATION

Social worlds are uneven; they do not have a single texture. We journey out of infancy, where 'self' and 'other', 'group' and 'society' seem meaningless labels, and learn somehow to know the pressures of principalities and powers, economic survival. We learn to live as best we can through different life experiences, from the sheltered to the horrific. Class, clan, gender, all the concepts of sociology and social anthropology must somehow be encountered, expressed and reproduced by individual human beings (including the makers of such concepts) since social theories are in some way or another abstracted from the observation and experience of human action. Are the human abilities which enable them to make such abstractions the same as those which enable them to act? What do we mean by the social and how do human beings develop 'socialness'?

In the social sciences answers to the second question have been determined by answers to the first: as I shall try to show, socialization is a concept that has been developed within a specific set of assumptions about the nature of society and the individual. I shall suggest that we need to 'rethink socialization' because there are alternative social theories to which the old concept does not apply, but I also think that such rethinking might modify social theory.

Sociological thinking was made possible by assuming there is a social level of events independent of individual volition. The assumption is simple but fundamental; the status of the social is not described in it and my gloss 'the social level of events' is more specific, and substantive, than many theorists'.
'Events' are not described by systemic and organisational theories of society, and it is proper to say that the assumption can be an 'as if' one, and often has been. Neither is it easy in practice to distinguish, in analytical descriptions of society, between this purely theoretical supposition, abstracted generalisation, and experiential features of human life - but then, these three interact in ordinary perception.

As we all know, functionalist accounts of society need discrete human beings only as slot or role fillers, and so have had to account for the empirical circumstance that this anonymous labour force is composed of you and me by claiming that we are half social and half individual. Only the first half is the social anthropologist's/sociologist's concern. Nadel made the point with customary firmness:

The whole familiar antithesis individual-society is in certain respects a false one. Action patterns are realized by individuals; groupings and relationships exist through individuals. Yet if the action pattern is conceived of as standardized, regular, and recurrent, it is also independent of the concrete living individual... our analysis also leads us away from the individual to something else. We need a word for this "something else", that is, for the human being who is the point of all things social yet is not a concrete, uniquely existing human being... (1951:92)

Nadel borrows Radcliffe-Brown's term person to analyse this focal human being who is not unique or existent. The Romantic opposition between wilful individualism and social order is one version of a dichotomy that recurs again and again, though the components may be differently weighted.

People function in our society, as in most societies on the record of history, by becoming adjusted to their social role at the price of giving up part of their own will, their originality and spontaneity.... But man is not born to be broken, so the child fights against the authority represented by his parents; he fights for his freedom not only from pressure but also for his freedom to be himself, a full-fledged human being, not an automaton (Fromm 1944 [1949]: 409-410).

This evaluation has been expressed even more sharply in recent years. Although Nadel argued in detail against the 'antithesis individual-society' he did not in fact dissolve it but rephrased it by antithesising the random and the predictable: with a holistic model emphasising continuity and inter-dependence there is no way to deal with cruelty, folly, world-conquering ambition or lively passions except as randomly distributed traits. The all-or-nothing character of this
distinction between individual and society, whether of Nadel's or Fromm's variety, belongs to a long-lived, originally Judeo-Christian tradition, most powerfully analysed by Dumont. Nadel's definitions of person or individual, carefully and objectively framed as they are, do not escape from Western world views of self and personality. As Burridge says, 'We contain in the one notion [of the individual] the ordinary or common and the special or peculiar' (1979:4). Despite assuming that there are persons, the distinction between humankind and human being is nevertheless maintained, even though 'persons' belong to the 'social', because the individual is an instance of the species and the species is 'social'. But social description nowadays changes its meaning because of the findings of ethology (I will come back to this later on). If instead one uses the word society, the assumption is clearer: the individual is thought to be an instance of society. These reasons are wholly either-or and both concepts are absolute: there is the single category society, and the category items, all individuals.

The individual seems to be the focus of classical psychology as the instance of the species; that is why variations in the behaviour of a small number of university students may be held to instantiate variations at large in the world. Social characteristics can be edited out by randomising, so they are perceived in exactly the same way as individual ones in Nadel's account. Practitioners of social anthropology/sociology first identify features which they consider social (and therefore criterial). Non-criterial features are synonymously idiosyncratic, individual, and psychological. Practitioners of psychology in their experimental tradition do exactly the same, but their residual category is the social. To be fair, social variables may indeed be incorporated into the design, just as attitudes are often a subject for their many sociological counterparts. But in that case, the basic structuring assumption may be at odds with the ostensible aims, and will naturally colour or constrain them. Thus surveys using random samples obscure sociological factors, and may in consequence be wrong, as Leach showed some years ago (1958 [1967]).

It is not my aim here to criticise types of theory, which would in any case be a very unoriginal exercise, nor do I suppose that my accounts fully characterise types of research, still less disciplines. I simply wish to tease out the structural necessities of these theories and approaches. It is clear that concepts of socialization have been dependent on the dichotomies I have noted here, that is, that the individual is a species instance and the person is an instance of society. The 'person' is in fact treated as if coterminous with the individual, though Nadel's model, more innovative theoretically, did not require this. Socialization then is the grafting process, by which the individual acquires personhood. This view, I found, was exactly expressed by a rare social
anthropological explorer on the terrain, who begins 'Socialization may be broadly defined as the inculcation of the skills and attitudes necessary for playing given social roles' (Mayer 1970:xiii). It is also the view of earlier sociologists and later psychologists, as is shown by Danziger (1971) who reviewed the literature very critically. His objections focus on different weaknesses of behaviourist and 'psychoanalytically derived' and 'cognitively oriented' theories; his own interests however are in the psychological aspects of socialization, that is the development of cognitive and affective characteristics, primarily in the setting of the nuclear family. Social influences mean peers, parents, teachers, 'role behaviour' instanced by 'sex-typing'.

Among the problems which the cited examples present, we can note that psychology and sociology do not 'cover for' each other. Their terrains are not adjacent but on different planets because the species and society are differently conceived entities, though they are based formally on the same laws of taxonomy. Then, Mayer has no means of expressing how socialization occurs other than by *inculcating given roles*; that is, he is working within a paradigm that has no place for change, and does not differentiate the processes of social action. He notes uncomfortably that socialization does not seem analytically separable from social control, 'there seems to be no hard and fast level between them' (xv). He thereby, incidentally, shows why with this paradigm one could not get beyond the poles of 'conflict and consensus'.

One might suppose that as Mayer's approach was already dated - there were already theories challenging functionalism in those dark ages a dozen years ago! - more satisfactory accounts of socialization would already have been put forward. Indeed, accounts of childhood development (and of course socialization can go under different names) were deeply affected by the structuralist propositions of Chomsky and *Structuralism* is the title of a book not by Lévi-Strauss, but by the psychologist, Jean Piaget (first published in 1968). Above all, symbolic interactionists freed the individual from functionalism's and indeed structuralism's bonds, for once human beings can be seen as actors, and makers of social reality, socialization can no longer be described as a reactive process.

Different social theories, one would think, imply different senses of 'social'. The tautology vanishes, alas, when one tries to define these senses, whether by reference to the theoretical propositions themselves, or by abstraction from the research findings that follow them. It is like peeling an onion. However, systems-type theories, including structural ones, require models of generation and regulation, which do not encourage focus on the *variability* of human behaviour, as can be seen even in contemporary examples (cf.Cohen 1981). So in a sense such theories do not investigate 'social relations' at all, and in practice one finds that 'social' is again a synonym
for collective. (One should note that Durkheim attempted a theory of socialization in his description of 'conscience collective'.)

British structural-functionalists argued that their innovation was to focus on social relations, for which again Nadel is a good example. For him roles were dyadic relationships, (which means that the term 'role' has some analytical possibilities missed by the general, vacuous user today). Nevertheless their 'relations' remained abstractions from events, and within the taxonomic model. Relationships themselves, therefore, could not be the subject of investigation as they came to be for interactionists. For the purpose of this paper I will lump together several, and in some respects contradictory, movements: my interactionists would include transactionalists, ethnomethodologists and different phenomenologists. These interactionists also have branches in psychology, e.g. construction-theorists and social psychology reformers like Harré and Secord, who explicitly tried to set up a 'scientific study of those psychological states, conditions and powers which are to be attributed to individual people when they are engaged in social activity' from 'a general theory of social action' and by rejecting positivistic methods (Harré and Secord 1972:1).

The theories and methods of social interactionists make it look as if differences of discipline can be transcended or indeed integrated. However, the author of a text-book subtitled *A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology* introduces his subject by arguing that 'while a host of interesting materials are to be found within contemporary psychology, for the most part a coherent, sophisticated, and sociologically relevant body of theory is not to be found there. This is a judgment with which most psychologists and many sociologists will take issue, to be sure, but it is firm: the most promising resources for a sociological social psychology are to be found, today, within sociology itself' (Hewitt 1976:3).

In a theory of human interaction 'the social' is the interaction itself, since social beings = interacting beings. This interaction is not specifically human, however, since other animal species display the same characteristic of surviving through patterned relationships in different kinds of interdependence. It can be argued that these relationships have properties which cannot be described by reference to the relators alone, and should therefore be studied independently. When Hinde attempted to do so, he found that he had to try and integrate findings from several disciplines. Starting from scratch and confining himself to human dyads, he still found there was a huge and complex amount of data to simplify (Hinde 1979).

For Hinde then, human relationships are social by definition, and he sees like Harré and Secord that analysing them is analysing social action. But the features of these relationships which he considers are psychological ones in the
usual sense of that term: aspects of perception, affectivity, 
exchange and dependency, the parent-child relationship (which 
is always expressed like this - a "given" dyad - in lists of 
attributes in social psychology). One could conclude from 
Hinde that human relationships only include the properties of 
the relationship that have no reference outside the dyad. Thus 
a master-slave relationship could not be investigated in those 
aspects of dominance and servility which are derived from law, 
means of coercion, economic conditions and the like - the 
social in these senses is excluded from consideration. What 
remains for analysis, therefore, is just those variations 
visible enough using the universal-species model, exactly as 
for 'positivist' psychology.2

Such consideration may be behind Hewitt's criticism of 
psychology. He draws his readers' attention to 'the 
distinction between social structure and social process' and 
asks a series of questions that at first made me suppose this 
paper had been written for me. 'How do members of a class 
collectives their goals and values from the class experience, and 
how do they translate them into real behaviour? ... How do the 
members of one class interact with members of another....And 
over time how do relationships among classes among individuals 
within a class change or remain the same?' (1976:5-6). But I 
do not find that he answers these questions, and the reason, 
I believe, is that 'from the perspective of symbolic 
interactionists, society consists of extended interlinkages of 
joint actions and collectivities are connected over space and 
time' (Hewitt 1976:167).

It is not enough to divide 'joint action' from 
'collectivities'. The network analogy hides the imbalanced 
pressures and the different kinds of relationship which 
actually occur. To treat society essentially as a network of 
dyadic relationships - the dyad writ large - is to ignore those 
non-dyadic relationships into which humans universally enter. 
The dyad is simply the irreducible feature, the minimum form 
of relationship, and 'the social' (also called 'sociality'/ 
'socialness'/ 'sociation') should refer to all the forms in 
which this principle is manifested.

This point can be demonstrated by reference to the 
dramaturgical model favoured by some interactionists (cf. 
Harro and Secord - they do not mention Kenneth Burke). Instead 
of asking how a drama is a model of society, we can ask how 
social life is different from a drama.

In the theatre, one can hardly replicate the variety in 
scale and number of interactions in even one person's 
ordinary day. Thus I may shop in a crowded supermarket, work 
in the garden--alone, but conscious of the other gardeners 
visible across the suburban strips--and go through a space-time 
dance of interaction in the university. There are so many 
kinds of interaction, and from 1-1 to 1-100s, involving such 
complicated power processes. In the theatre these events are 
transposed onto one limited stage and the interactions, too,
are scaled down, limited, concentrated through a few actors. The great freedom achieved by film was to present a different
simple empirical fact of life for so many of the human race;
a cast of thousands is able to represent the crowds, armies,
processions that each one of us, on occasion, sees face-to-face.

The ways in which art is created to project life are of
course part of that life, and social scientists might ponder
also on the many aspects of social life which are captured by
art and not by social theory. Besides the flattest pragmatic
differences of number, we know that art too has its own means
of suggesting to the audience's interpretive eye the social
differences among people by styles and symbols, glimpsed
agendas, deference and guns. Dramaturgical techniques are in
turn used in life, and on TV art and life dissolve into one
another, policies are personalised, and death becomes a play;
but also, when pressures and conflicts are realised in action,
the mass media can extend their effects.

Action-based theories of society, then, may be
predicted on the theoretical equivalence of individual and
network or they may assert that 'society' is sustained by
individual interactions, at the level of small groups. Any
mode of socialization derivable from such theories must
correspondingly reduce the structural complexity of social
experience. It is surprising that sociological interactionists
have not focussed on socialization - so far as I know - but it
seems they could only substitute an undifferentiated ability to
create social forms for the functionalists' inculcation of
roles.

Functionalist/systemic theories, in which I include Marxist
theories of society, do not of course posit an all-or-one atom
versus totality as the sum total of social relations. Even
though 'the individual' (or person) is treated as the minimal
unit of structure, this structure is not a network connecting
identical nodes but a collection of different structures, which
are of different internal organization, can 'nest', overlap
unevenly, or simply co-exist. A mass of research and common-
sense observation demands this view of society, the social; the
moment of error comes when these concepts of structuring are
applied to a society. At this point conceptual and pragmatic
criteria have often been hopelessly confused, to produce the
parti-coloured beach-ball model (Tonkin 1971), which suggests
that there are actual societies made up of equivalent and
equivalently related parts. That this model remains in use
- implicitly, since many of its users reject the theories which
permit it as an explicit proposition - attests to the power of
the either-or dichotomy of 'social' and 'individual' and its
necessary corollary of even and invariant socialization. I
quote from Dumont's comments on this phenomenon in the foot-
notes.

Some Marxist theories explicitly deny any significance to
individuals in the social process (while advocating policies
that are supposed to benefit 'the people' in the long run).
You can turn to E.P. Thompson for a powerful refutation, which demonstrates that it is the purest idealism to 'evict human agency from history' (1978:281) and replace it by structural determinations. (All of structuralism gets wrongly tarred with Althusser's brush, but Thompson's arguments are much too important to be depreciated by anthropologists because of that.)

To Thompson, there is a missing term: "human experience"... Men and women also return as subjects... not as autonomous subjects, "free individuals", but as persons experiencing their determinate productive situations and relationships, as needs and interests and as antagonisms, and then "handling" this experience within their consciousness and their culture... in the most complex (yes, "relatively autonomous") ways, and then (often but not always through the ensuing structures of class) acting upon their determinate situation in their turn (1978: 356).

It is instructive to compare this vision with the subject matter of social interactionism, for instance in Hewitt's account, from which I quoted extracts earlier. One can certainly argue with Thompson's model, and even strongly criticise the choice and relative weighting of components, but it still recognises more of the character of social life than Hewitt's does. One does not have to be a Marxist to see this.

When I criticised the dramaturgical view of society I deliberately mentioned only actual, visible and audible characteristics of life - the actual number of people one can see in a day and their relative location in space - which cannot be replicated in most dramatic performances. I deliberately ignored the other means by which social life is carried on, and all the invisible powers that have been postulated to explain why human interactions have particular consequences, or no significant consequences (so that personal actions and reactions appear to be irrelevant). This was because it is necessary to show that the dramaturgical model cannot explain social action even as it is empirically observable, without any reference to class or underlying structure or ideology or productive forces.

Human beings are characterised memory which stores and sorts experience, leading us to face new experience with modes of understanding already built, and enabling new conclusions to be kept for further application. Even the non-literate also have aids to the recording of knowledge outside the human memory and with literate records the capacity to do this and to analyse and theorise experience is much enhanced. Speech, which is a criterial feature of human socialness because it operates interactively, can also be used self-reflectively. The other universal fact for humans, as for other organisms, is that they live in irreversible time, everyone born, everyone dying. Whatever additional beliefs there may be about time and
survival, these conditions are universally understood, as is the need to care for babies and that they have limited capacities compared with adults.

One cannot properly account for 'the social' and exclude these features, which are some (not all) of the tools, the means of social action. They mean that while society, too, exists in irreversible time it may take on the appearance of pattern or even stasis. There does not have to be a gap between 'social structure' and 'social process' - they can be dealt with in the same analytical framework - if one realizes that human beings continuously but fleetingly sustain and create social worlds into which new members are forever being born and will continue to socialise and be socialised until they die; that is to say, they will participate variously in teaching, enforcing, obeying, in mutually acquiring the processes of social life.

Raymond Williams claims that what is abstracted in orthodox sociology as 'socialization' is in any actual society, a specific kind of incorporation. Any process of socialization of course includes things that all human beings have to learn, but any specific process ties this necessary learning to a selected range of meanings, values and practices which, in the very closeness of their association with necessary learning, constitute the real foundations of the hegemonic. (1977:117)

Taking the point that this account does no more than redescribe and relabel - to leave the species hegemonised instead of socialised in an equally holistic manner - Williams then argues that because there are so many specific forms and occasions of incorporation 'the hegemonic process... is in practice full of contradictions and of unresolved conflicts... it must not be reduced to the activities of an "ideological state apparatus" (118).

We may add surely that the hegemonic process (leading to 'self identification with the hegemonic forms') is more likely to be total where institutions and cosmology are as it were mapped on one another, in communities that are productively undifferentiated and acted on indifferently by external forces. These are small, and rare, 'societies'. Elsewhere, differentiation is such that ruling classes do not monopolize all the messages - contradiction emerges at any moment from the inconsistency of demand, the impossibility of choice, and closure is even more incomplete. Contradictions have even more causes than Williams goes on to describe. Above all, there are creative capacities which not all of society stifles, so new messages get across.

These are all processes which operate dialectically on and through people, and with cumulative effect. They must begin at birth, yet very little is known about how small children shape themselves by the actual, successive physical encounters of
their lives, in what shapes they perceive power and authority, how soon they internalise specific expectations of social action, how far their milieu successively blocks, or creates, or enables them to become people with certain capacities. So much attention has been paid to child development (and some to politically urgent aspects from time to time, like race consciousness) but so little to these sociological factors, in which I stress aspects of power. Salmon writes a programmatic article urging that children be considered as social beings. 'Because the official psychological expertise excludes social settings where children are not clearly in receipt of "socialization" many places and situations of a child's everyday experience have been almost completely overlooked' (1979: 225). In Britain, he notes, these different experiences will result in very different behaviour towards, or feelings about, policemen or social security officials. Indeed.

Salmon also finds it necessary to point out that children will have very different expectations of status and sex in that familiar focus of research 'the family', which takes so many forms in reality, even at the gross level of what he calls 'culture' (he means as between families of Asian and English working-class origin). Such differences will be obvious to social anthropologists, but their training does not direct them to analysing the context I am trying to delineate. It is not true either that anthropologists have altogether lacked psychological expertise, but that expertise has itself been directed to 'psychological', i.e. non-sociological concerns. Cross-cultural psychology has furnished many points of interest to us, but I think still within the paradigm that I have described above; ultimately therefore the focus is on how cognition is affected by culture rather than on how different aspects of culture, including political culture, are entered into and continued.

British anthropologists, unlike American ones, have been conspicuously impatient of psychology as they understood it, which no doubt is why organizers of the conference which gave rise to Mayer's volume wanted to exclude 'child-training' (1970:xi). And yet child development (not just explicit training) could be crucial in answering my questions about the nature of socialization. If we ask in what ways human beings in different classes and cultures become able to perpetuate, change or reject their worlds, we must suppose that this is a question which studies in child development could answer. People in the women's movement have started to ask this question about females: it is a question which is more obviously necessary just because there are, world-wide, fewer inductions into public roles, less formal training even, for women. Investigators therefore have to pay attention to the domestic sphere - the child-raising sphere - and to the non-articulated, inexplicit realms to which women seemingly banished themselves (cf. Ardener 1975). Feminist accounts of patriarchy may over-emphasise the formal, articulated role,
which is itself predicated on male-centred sociological assumptions. Many female roles, on the other hand, continue to repeat the attentiveness, the monitoring and closed-in reference of the domestic sphere. This need not be because these qualities are innate, but perhaps because they become imprinted; and this may contribute to women's roles not becoming so diversified as men's are. We might equally suppose that many males become trained to 'attend to' females in this context, so that later they are genuinely incompetent to notice them in others. Visibility is a social perception, but it may be 'psychologically' developed.

I said earlier that psychology and sociology do not 'cover for' one another. The aspects of socialization to which I am drawing attention are either defined away, as being said to belong to another discipline (although they are not in fact covered by it), or they cannot be explored without extending and applying concepts and methods used in one discipline or theory to those of another. So, for instance, 'hegemony' and 'cognition' would be brought into one discourse. I have suggested that we should pay attention to the palpable social world, which is the mediating element between these two, because it seems to be analysed as such in no discipline. It is however taken seriously by rulers, the military, publicists, mediamen, and all those whose aim is not to describe but to persuade, to legitimate and to mystify. There are conditions under which young and old are socialised through conscious display and bureaucratically organised ritual and others of more spontaneous effervescence (cf. for example, the growth in official Russian ceremonial since the Revolution, Binns 1979,1980).

When I saw, on an educational TV programme, how French researchers have established that very young children internalise gestures and body postures through interaction, I realised the obvious point that words such as 'deference', 'superiority' and 'threat' presuppose actions and reactions which in the end are of individual physical shape, but can also be generalised and applied to more complex, less visible social behaviour. Our disciplines divide these two realms, and thus we do not connect them. Yet, considering anthropologists have learned from Mauss that there is a technique du corps, and from Lévi-Strauss and his followers that the body is good to think with, this question is not remote from structuralists' concerns.

Because I have looked for absences, I may be reproached for ignoring existing work which contributes to 'rethinking socialization'. This work might be more 'visible' if its premisses were part of overt anthropological interests, and if its authors did not have to work against the contemporary theoretical grain. We ought, too, to be able to use and incorporate existing research on complementary, more conventional aspects of socialization, e.g. language learning, or formal education. The whole anthropological enterprise,
is potentially relevant. Since so much attention has been paid to the structures of cosmology and its interrelation with social organisation, to rites of passage, to conditions which seem to cause change and to forces and relations which act to make people think as they do, it does not seem a great leap to ask how these effects operate through people.

Conceptually and theoretically, of course, it is a very considerable leap, which requires different assumptions and might incur different conclusions. Practically, many difficulties would have to be faced. And there is not one 'how', any more than there is 'the individual' or 'the society'; there are many forms of socialization differently exercised and enacted. Incorporation, as inferred by Raymond Williams, is by no means easy to understand, and must be experientially very varied. It may be achieved in selected victims by deliberately used 'psychological' means, such as brainwashing— or by techniques which have a like result (see e.g. Spencer 1970). The real difficulty lies in understanding less obvious forms of conversion. Although anthropologists have been taught that inner states need not be their concern if public rites are the effective transformers (see, e.g. Leach 1969:88-9), transformations are not all of this kind (cf. Tonkin 1979), and if we want to understand events better, we have to find a way of understanding changes in their participants.

This, finally, is why rethinking socialization is necessary: not just to bring it up to date with other approaches in social anthropology and sociology, but to enable new thinking in these disciplines. Anthropological attention, for instance, is turning from structures to people who structure, the makers and processors of knowledge who live and die in historical time. I am interested in social selves, but in order really to understand how these are constructed, I think it will be necessary for anthropologists to explore and no doubt to colonize, the limbo I have described. (For an example of one exploration, see Gell 1979). And since we have wrongly bounded anthropological territory before, we should not accept existing labels at face value, so as to decide in advance that child and adult or primary and secondary socialization are all different.

New academic interest in individual action is, no doubt, related to deeper political and economic changes, as other social models have been before. But this fact does not invalidate a model, any more than its creation thereby invalidates the predecessors; it merely cuts them down to size. Each model can be used for understanding particular aspects of the world, and none account for the whole of it. Socialization revived does not replace systemic or class models, and understanding of the world should not be reduced to socialization. Yet new theories, I have tried to show, prove to be but old ones writ large if their underlying assumptions have not altered. Anthropologists seem to be struggling in a post-structuralist world, to work out new
approaches that look profoundly different. If these are to be really so, I suggest that they will have to be underpinned by a new approach to socialization.

NOTES

1 It is too easily said that functionalist thinking is complacently conservative. Nadel wrote after the Second World War and the Holocaust, Fromm in 1944. He and several other contributors to Kluckhohn and Murray's readings seem to be grappling with the problem of explaining these evils in the framework of 'culture and personality', itself predicated on the individual-society dichotomy, which Dumont argues the Nazis actually exploited.

The nation is the type of global society... whose members are not aware of being essentially social beings, but only so many equivalent embodiments of man in the abstract, so many representatives of human-kind.... Renan wrote that the nation was "a plebiscite of every day", a formula which sounds ominous after the Nazis succeeded in using the appearance of consensus against the very spirit of consensus, exploiting the ingenuity of the democratic formula to manipulate it in favour of its opposite. In this formula, there is nor real, no ontological intermediary between the individual man and mankind at large (1970:34).

The State is likewise the 'empirical' manifestation of mankind (ibid).

2 As my other examples also show, the social in 'social psychology' usually means only 'the psychological' when it is seen operating in a (usually very small, face-to-face) group. I am arguing that social relations even at this level are not so explicable, and especially because one should consider the properties of a relationship. Hinde is not uniquely at fault - but may be misled by his sources.

3 One can also learn a great deal about the social as I am trying to define it here from accounts like Primo Levi's wise and distilled If This is a Man and The Truce (1979) which describe the horrors of the world turned upside down, in Auschwitz and after. Here 'incorporation' was achieved by systematically subverting the features of life which make it rationally ordered, and the prisoners could not survive physically if their social personality died.
REFERENCES

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