Editorial Note........................................ii

INTRA-RELIGIOUS EXPLANATIONS.............................1
Paul Heelas, Department of Religious Studies, University of Lancaster.

SIERRA LEONE AND THE 'STRANGER PROBLEM'..................17
Alison Sutherland, Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford.

"WHAT WOULD THERE BE TO CREATE IF GODS EXISTED?" ........25
Mike Taylor, Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford.

ANDROGYNY AND CREATIVITY.................................37
Juliet Blair, Institute of Social Anthropology, Oxford.

TWO LETTERS FROM RADCLIFFE-BROWN TO EVANS-PRITCHARD....49

BOOK REVIEWS:
Levi-Strauss, C: Structural Anthropology
vol ii, - by Alan Campbell .......................51

Davis, John: People of the Mediterranean -
by S.J. Ott..............................................53

Crick, Malcolm: Explorations in Language and
Meaning 2 - by Malcolm Chapman..............56

Miller, Jean Baker: Psychoanalysis and
Women - by Juliet Blair and Anita Goode..61

Books Received.............................................62
The journal is published three times per year. Articles are welcome from students of anthropology and from people in other disciplines. It is preferred that the main emphasis should be on analytical discussion rather than on plain description. Papers should be as short as is necessary to get the point over. As a general rule they should not exceed 5,000 words. They should follow the conventions for citations, notes and references used in the A.S.A. monographs. Comments will also be welcome. Communications should be addressed to the Journal Editors, Institute of Social Anthropology, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford.

We omitted to include an index to volume VII at the end of the last issue. An index to volumes VII and VIII will be included in volume VIII no. 3.

SUBSCRIPTIONS

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INTRA-RELIGIOUS EXPLANATIONS

'No longer should it be permitted for historians to write as if philosophies move autonomously in a social vacuum, one idea hitting another, splitting it, growing, decaying and being taken over.'

In Durkheimian fashion, Mary Douglas (1970:119) is objecting to a position I want to defend - namely that the social determination of ideologies is by no means the whole of the story. At a later point in Natural Symbols, she is more explicit about what she is rejecting. We are told of those who would 'rather think of beliefs floating free in an autonomous vacuum, developing according to their own internal logic, bumping into other ideas by the chance of historical contact and being modified by new insights', such an approach being 'an inverted materialism' (ibid:140, my emphasis). I am not sure whether I am an 'inverted materialist' but I do believe in the structuralist emphasis on the explanatory significance of logic.

It is in the context of religion that this issue is best illuminated. With only a few notable exceptions it has for long been supposed that there are two ways of explaining religious phenomena. On the one hand the existence of such phenomena has been explained by reference to religious states of affairs (including gods). Since anthropologists cannot accept theological speculations of this type, they have typically adopted the second - and diametrically opposed - explanatory scheme. They have adopted, that is to say, an approach which I shall call 'extra-religious'. Thus in the case of sociological reductionists (Durkheimians) religious phenomena are explained by reference to social states of affairs, whilst mentalist reductionists (such as Freud and, with reservations, Levi-Strauss) seek the grounds of the religious in the operations of the human mind.

What few have done is adopt an intra-religious position, explaining one religious phenomenon by reference to another. As in the case of Douglas, the explanatory capacity of an internal logic or dynamicism is severely limited, if not discarded, by the positing of extra-religious determinants or constraints. Relations between religious phenomena then exist by default; they are treated as epiphenomenal to the configurations of the social or mental. That there is something curious about this procedure can perhaps be seen by drawing an analogy with the study of kinship. Leach's Pul Eliya (1961) serves to indicate that it can be useful to adopt an 'extra-kinship' approach, but as Needham and others have convincingly shown, the 'intra-kinship' option is also very valuable. For example, kinship terminologies can be explained by demonstrating their internal coherence; by relating them to the rules of the various systems themselves. Such systems are often relatively autonomous with respect to extra-kinship phenomena, yet are clearly explanatory.
The same point could be made by drawing analogies with economics (where economic phenomena are often explained by reference to one another) or with other social and psychological sciences. Yet reductionism seems to rule the day in the anthropological study of religion. Why should this be so? Are there logical grounds for assuming that primitive religions cannot be explained in their own right? It seems clear that positivist and empiricist assumptions have persuaded many to adopt the view that the religious can only be explained by reference to the non-religious. Gods do not exist as part of the scientifically acceptable world, so it has seemed to many that the religious must be caused by processes in social or psychological spheres. Putting this slightly differently, the religious cannot be taken as a 'given', therefore it must be explained by reference to things which demonstrably do exist - namely the two domains we have just mentioned.

However, these and related arguments do not suffice to rule out the possibility of intra-religious explanations. True, they seem to have the force to persuade us that some reductionism is required if the religious is not to be treated as a 'given', but this is not the same as saying that one must indulge in the more or less total reductionism of the scope advocated (amongst many others) by Douglas. So what I now want to examine is whether we can develop a non-reductionistic and yet non-theological way of explaining religious phenomena.

Of those interested in the study of religion, Ninian Smart has done more than most in discussing what is involved in developing intra-religious explanations (see especially 1973(a), 1973(b)). He has been especially concerned with explanations of the 'if A then B' variety, when the B component is causally dependent on the occurrence of A. Applying this to the religious sphere, Smart favours filling in the A component (the independent variable) with various types of religious experiences, the dependent variable taking the form of various belief systems. Simplifying matters considerably, a numinous type of religious experience will give rise to belief systems expressing the attributes of the numinous (such as majesty, awfulness and transcendence), whereas a contemplative experience will engender beliefs conceptualising the ultimate as an undifferentiated unity or as a void.

On first sight this type of explanation seems to have much to commend it. Many authorities - including the marvellous William James - have placed experience at the very heart of the religious, and if we allow that our sense of beauty can result in works of art, why should we not allow the same in the context of religion? But however plausible it might be to maintain that many religious phenomena are the consequence of attempts to express experience of ultimate realities, there are, I think, good reasons for not adopting Smart's scheme.
First, the approach is implicitly theological: the experiences are held to be of a religious nature (for otherwise the explanations would not be intra-religious in style). However, this objection is not in itself especially convincing. I say this because it seems that just as we have a sense of beauty (without believing in Beauty itself) so we could have a sense of the religious.

But our second objection is more powerful. To apply the 'if A then B' causal model one must be able to separately identify the two components. One can say 'A causes B' if B is distinct from A. One cannot say 'A causes B' if B is already involved in the constitution of A. Yet this latter is exactly what could be the case with respect to Smart's appeal to religious experience as the independent variable factor. In other words, it could be the case that various types of belief systems have helped constitute the nature of associated religious experiences, this meaning that these same experiences cannot be said to explain the occurrence of the belief systems. That this is quite feasible, I should add, can be seen from the fact that experimental psychologists such as Schachter (1971) and Mendler (1975) have convincingly shown that a number of emotive experiences owe much of their nature to cultural factors. Such evidence suggests that Catholics do not see Krishna and Hindus do not experience the Virgin Mary because their cultural assessments direct and largely constitute their experiences. This is the opposite to Smart's argument that concordances between experiences and beliefs are due to the determinative force of the first variable.

My third and final objection has to do with the phenomenological status of religious experiences. Clearly, the correlational-cum-causal enterprise of the type advocated by Smart can only get off the ground if one can accurately establish and identify different types of religious experience. But can this be done? I have recently argued - Huxley, Ziehe:r, Stace and others notwithstanding - that it is impossible to say that one religious experience is either the same as or different from another such experience (1977(a)). The basis of my argument is that none of the three types of criteria available for comparing experiences (namely physiological, behavioural and verbal) are sufficiently specific to be useful in the context of the religious. Thus I would argue that Smart cannot identify e.g. a numinous type of experience and then contrast it with others.

It is interesting to note in this connexion that one of the most brilliant attempts to develop a fully-developed intra-religious explanation - namely that made by Evans-Pritchard in Nuer Religion - comes to the same conclusion:

'One cannot speak of any specifically religious emotion for the Nuer. One can only judge by overt behaviour on occasions of religious
activity and, as I have noted, on such occasions Nuer may be afraid, anxious, joyful, indifferent, or in other states, according to the situation and the degree to which they are involved in it!

(1956:312).

Evans-Pritchard quite rightly concludes that those theories which derive the religious from emotions are inadmissible. Yet to a certain extent his intra-religious account has things in common with Smart's position and can be criticised on the same grounds. For example, in his discussion of the one (Kwoth) or many (spirits) issue Evans-Pritchard states that the varying scales of conceptualisation are 'different ways of thinking of the numinous at different levels of experience'(ibid:316). How, we must ask, can it be the case that 'there is nothing constant that we can say is characteristic of the religious life, which is rather to be defined in terms of disposition than of emotion' (ibid:313) when appeal is made to the numinous? Surely the numinous is not a disposition?

The intra-religious nature of Nuer Religion is most clearly brought out when Evans-Pritchard writes:

'In this sense of the totality of Nuer religious beliefs and practices forming a pattern which excludes conflicting elements and subordinates each part to the harmony of the whole, we may speak of their religious system'(ibid:318).

An example of exclusion is provided by the argument that witchcraft and magic are unimportant because they do not fit a theocentric philosophy(ibid:316). And an example of the way in which those elements which do fit the whole are coloured ('subordinated') by more overriding features is provided in the lines:

'We can say that these characteristics (eg. complete absence of ritual), both negative and positive, of Nuer religion indicate a distinctive kind of piety which is dominated by a strong sense of dependence on God and confidence in him rather than in any human powers or endeavours... this sense of dependence...is an intimate, personal, relationship between man and God. This is apparent in Nuer ideas of sin, in their expressions of guilt, in their confessions, and in the dominant piacular theme of their sacrifices'(ibid:317, my emphasis).

Appeal to the numinous aside, Evans-Pritchard is thus drawing our attention to a still largely neglected way of explaining the religious. As I understand it, Evans-Pritchard is saying: get to the core beliefs of a particular religious system, trace the logic of the constitutive and regulative rules embedded in such beliefs; show that this rationale logically excludes some phenomena but so to speak encourages the appearance of others; and finally show how the basic rationale colours the various components of the system. In case this seems
an unlikely program, I will briefly elaborate on some of the examples we have taken from Evans-Pritchard's analysis. First, the claim that witchcraft and magic are unimportant because they do not fit the rules of this particular game. I would argue that besides being excluded by the principle of theocentricity (which means that since fortune and misfortune come from God they cannot be derived from human powers) they are also excluded by the strong sense of dependence mentioned above. In other words, we are applying the general principle that 'the more powerful the ultimate religious state the more dependent is man on the powers above him and the less likely man is to conceptualise or articulate his own powers'.

As a second elaboration we can consider the claim that elements such as sacrifice take certain forms because they are coloured by overriding principles. At the simplest possible level it is clear why sacrifice is so often of a particular nature: dependent on such a powerful God Nuer must take great care to atone for his many sins (many because of his feeble position). It would be an extremely interesting conceptual enquiry to broaden this discussion by comparing Nuer and Dinka sacrifice. I mention this because both the Nuer and the Dinka seem to conceptualise their relationship with external phenomena in terms of being acted on by such phenomena rather than acting positively from the ego onto the world. This, it goes without saying, is something of a generalisation. But a comparison of Godfrey Lienhardt's discussion of the notion passiones (1961:151) with Evans-Pritchard's analysis of the extent to which the Nuer adopt a passive attitude to Kwoth suggests that there is some substance to the generalisation. One is therefore entitled to proceed with the attempt of establishing whether or not what we might call the passiones-principle exercises some degree of control over how sacrifice is conceptualised in the two cultures. It is certain that such a comparative, conceptual, intra-religious enquiry would show that how sacrifice is construed is at least partly a function of such more fundamental cultural principles as that we have termed the passiones-principle.

Before going any further I should meet two objections to the procedure I am advocating. The first objection has to do with the fact that we have mentioned a 'strong sense of dependence' and the passiones-principle (which presumably involves a sense of being under the control of, or passively responding to, the external world). Do not such references take us back to that type of criticism we directed against Smart's style of intra-religious explanation? I think not, this because although emotions might be playing a role in how the sense of dependence etc, functions as a determinant, this is not the whole of the story. For what also matters is that the Nuer believe that they are dependent on their God, and it is this belief which colours and constrains much of their religious life.

Another objection which might be raised concerns the distinction between the notions of intra-religious. Where, especially in a primitive society or in such contexts as Buddhism, does the religious end and the
secular begin? And if such a distinction cannot be drawn why make a fuss about maintaining intra-
religious explanations? The easiest way to reply to such objections is that there are not many cases in
which anthropologists would dispute an ethnographer's application of the term 'religious'. By some quirk
of human nature we seem to recognise the religious — in a general sense, that is — when it is present.
However, since this reply might not suffice, it might be worth going on to say that what matters from the
point of view of intra-religious explanations is not where the religious ends and the secular begins but
where 'religious' explanations end and reductionistic explanations begin. As we shall see in a later
example, it is sometimes possible to illuminate the nature of religious life by reference to psychological
concepts. To an extent, such explanations move from the intra to the extra-religious. But we can still
call them intra-religious in style because they are non-reductionistic. Reductionistic explanations,
when the religious is explained by the non-religious, can generally be distinguished from intra-religious
explanations in that states of affairs are introduced which do not belong to those conceptual configura-
tions present in ethnographies. Since we can generally spot such states of affairs, we can generally dist-
inguish intra-religious explanations from those of an extra-religious variety.

Evans-Pritchard, I have suggested, can be regarded as an important figure in the development of intra-
religious explanations. He clearly shows how one religious phenomena (e.g. sense of dependence) can be used
to explain others (e.g. nature of sacrifice). I now want to discuss some of the more general aspects of the
approach. To begin with, it should be apparent that the approach belongs to that more general approach known
as structuralism. As I understand it structuralism is concerned with conceptual rather than causal
relations; with the notion of following rules rather than obeying laws; with questions of rationality,
rationalities and coherence rather than relations of cause and effect. This is only to be expected in that
structuralist approaches often (in my opinion always) concern themselves with relations between ideas — and
at least since Hume philosophers have never tired of pointing out that such relations cannot be of a causal
order. 2

It is not difficult to see why we consider intra-
religious explanations to belong to the more general
category of structuralism. As we have seen in our
criticism of Smart's position, the conceptual/semantic
way in which religious beliefs and experiences are
related makes it difficult to see how a causal (and
thus non-structural) approach can be applied. A
related consideration is that it would seem that the
only way to move beyond conceptual links, and thus
beyond the domain of structure, is by reduction to
the extra-religious. Thus Douglas and other
Durkheimians can work with a causal-correlatory model
precisely because they are positing determinants
which are not implied by participant beliefs. But to do
this is to move from the intra to the extra-religious approach.

One consequence of the conceptual nature of the structuralism we are discussing is that it is not easy to see in what sense one can make predictions. The issue is complicated, but it appears that predictions are not easy to make. Thus to revert back to an earlier example, it would take a rash person to assert that magic and witchcraft will always be unimportant in theocentric environments. For as Evans-Pritchard himself points out, ideas and beliefs - especially when they are religious - are often related according to such weak logical relations as implication or metaphorical concordance (see op. cit.:318). Belief systems, pace Douglas, do 'develop according to their own internal logic' - but this logic is not necessarily very rigorous. And to make prediction more difficult we must bear in mind that such developments do not occur in a total vacuum. Historical and social contingencies can affect these developments as when, for example, witchcraft beliefs appear in the 'wrong' belief environment because of extra-religious factors.

As a final point, since conceptual relations do not operate according to the causal 'if A then B' formula the very basis for prediction seems to be taken away. True, it appears that given the meaning of the first two statements of a syllogism, or of a mathematical equation, one can apparently 'predict' the conclusion, but such 'predictions' are already entailed by the initial meanings. In causal predictions, on the other hand, nothing is entailed by the A component. In short, prediction involves inductive procedures, and conceptual relations are not established inductively (see also below).

However, the apparent inability of intra-religious structural approaches to make predictions need not really bother us. For granted the complexity of the variables which have to be taken into account in attempts to make predictions within the causal paradigm, anthropologists can rarely make genuine predictions of any type.

A second consequence of the conceptual nature of our intra-religious is much harder to pinpoint but, being of such great importance, requires some comment. Conceptual relations, as Winch (1958) amongst others reminds us, are a priori. By that he means that conceptual relations are given by the meanings of the terms involved (rather than being derived from experience). In this context such relations are of a necessary rather than a contingent variety. Contingent relations, when they have been established via inductive generalising, are known as causal laws. They are contingent because, to give a simple example, it cannot be necessarily the case that water freezes at thirty-two degrees centigrade. If this was necessarily the case we would have no need to engage in induction and would be unable to falsify the proposition. But it is necessarily the
case that all unmarried men are bachelors. Equally, it is necessarily the case that our concept of soul is related to that of immanence: it is part of the meaning of 'soul' that God is believed to dwell within us.

Having elaborated somewhat on this crucial but often neglected distinction between conceptual (a priori and necessary) and causal (contingent) relations, I shall now state the problem as best I can: assuming that the intra-religious structuralist wants to give explanations, and bearing in mind that these cannot be of a causal order, he must somehow find necessary relations. Yet how can necessary relations be found in the shifting sands of social and cultural contingency? Lévi-Strauss more than hints at this problem in the following crucial but, again, oft-neglected passage:

'There is certainly something paradoxical about the idea of a logic whose terms consist of odds and ends left over from psychological or historical processes and are, like these, devoid of necessity. Logic consists in the establishment of necessary connections and how, we may ask, could such relations be established between terms in no way designed to fulfil this function? Propositions cannot be rigorously connected unless the terms they contain have first been unequivocally defined. It might seem as if in the preceding pages we have undertaken the impossible task of discovering the conditions of an a posteriori necessity!' (1966:35, my emphasis).

The problem can now be put more succinctly: are we also trying to do the impossible by seeking the necessary within the ethnographic, or is the impossible not impossible at all? Let us approach this question by means of an example. Bearing in mind that necessary relations are of a strictly logical order, the relational series being deduced from an initial proposition, how might this help answer the question, why are ultimate religious realities so often held to be ineffable? The logical answer might run: initial proposition - the Gods are all-powerful; deductive explanation - to be all-powerful the Gods must exist beyond the constraints of this world, therefore they must be transcendental, therefore they cannot be spoken of in languages taken from this world, but since these are the only languages we have, to use them to talk of the Gods is to attempt to express the inexpressible. It will be seen that this explanation is largely within the domains of the a priori; within the realms of logic. But what actually goes on in socio-cultural life is obviously at least partly a matter of contingency, chance, accident - and thus, as Lévi-Strauss later points out, has to be established a posteriori:

'The truth of the matter is that the principle underlying a classification can never be postulated in advance. It can only be discovered a posteriori by ethnographic investigation, that is, by experience' (ibid:58).
In his examples, it is a contingent matter that certain phenomena are accorded certain symbolic significances (see ibid: 59.) But, and I am not sure whether Levi-Strauss is clear on this, it is surely not a contingent matter that given these symbolic roles the phenomena in question cannot enter into the symbolic code in contingent fashion. It is at this level that some degree of necessity reasserts itself (assuming, that is, that the system is rational).

I mention that I am not sure whether Levi-Strauss is clear on this because in the last quotation he seems to be worrying about something else - something which has to do, I think, with a misunderstanding of the word *a posteriori*. In his sense of the term, there is no problem in finding necessary relations by *a posteriori* investigation. For in this sense of the term *a priori* relations of the type discussed by Winch have also to be found *a posteriori* (that is, for example, by looking them up in a dictionary). Not distinguishing between learning meanings and establishing connexions *via* inductions results in Levi-Strauss concentrating on a false problem. That is to say he falsely conceptualises what it is to establish an *a posteriori* necessity. He does not seem to realise that all necessities are *a posteriori* in the sense that he sometimes uses the term.

Concentrating as he does on a false problem and using a shifting terminology Lévi-Strauss can help us understand our problem but ultimately does not get to the crux of the matter. In short, how can we relate logical explanations of the type given for ineffability to the partly contingently constituted nature of social and cultural life?

To bring this discussion back down to earth, all we are talking about is the interplay between the necessary and the contingent; between what logically or conceptually has to be the case and what happens to be the case in the world of contingent events. To refer back to some of the contingent factors we have already mentioned we can think of such things as the fact that man is not always rational; that history and the emotions can disrupt the logical processes at work within ideational domains. Thus witches could appear - and indeed sometimes do appear - in theocentric religious settings.

But, as Lévi-Strauss' work testifies (most clearly in his discussion of totemism) the existence of the contingent does not always disrupt the explanatory powers of the necessary. Thus in terms of the type of structuralism we are here elaborating, the creation of logical explanatory models is of value. For instance, applying my explanation of ineffability to Nuer religion helps us understand why Kwoth as all-powerful fits the passiones-like Nuer world view and their emphasis on the ineffability of Kwoth.

I am arguing that the intra-religious structuralist aims to devise logical, necessary explanations which function as models which have to be at a remove from ethnographic reality. I am also arguing
that although they have to be at such a remove (because
the ethnographic is partly constituted by the contingent, the arbitrary) they are still of explanatory
value. To elaborate on this last point I should like
briefly to analyse some of these constraints on how
utopias are conceptualised. I first thought along
these lines when I was struck by a passage in the Book
of Genesis:

'And the LORD God said, Behold, the
man is become as one of us, to know
good and evil: and now, let him put forth
his hand, and take also of the tree
of life, and eat, and live for ever:
(3:22).

This passage attracted my attention because its meaning
runs contrary to what we might call the surface mean-
ing of the myth. The surface meaning clearly has
to do with punishment; that God punishes Adam and
Eve by expelling them from Paradise. Why then, I
wondered, should the Lord say 'Behold, the man is
become as one of us'?

Without going into details, I came to the concl-
uision that there are two contrary levels of meaning
in the myth, one bearing on punishment, the other
bearing on the impossibility of utopia for us. This
is perhaps putting it rather strongly, but turning
to the logic of utopias it would appear that there
are logical constraints on what utopias (insofar as
they can exist) have to be in order to be utopias
for us. For example, does it make sense to say
that people exist - as people - in paradises where
there is no such thing as pain or suffering? Logically
speaking, people as we know them could not
exist in such a world. This is because many of the
attributes which we take to be constitutive of
people necessarily depend on the occurrence of pain
and suffering. Imagine exercising compassion,
strength of will, dignity, and so forth, without
having to face pain or suffering.

Now, such logical or conceptual considerations
are clearly at some remove from how utopias are
actually construed in various cultures. The concept-
ual impossibility of having the notion 'loving
forgiveness', in the absence of pain or suffering does
not mean that people can break this rule in their
formulations of utopias. For, as we have already
pointed out, the contingent (in this case the
irrational) can disrupt the necessary. Nevertheless, is it too
far fetched to suggest that logical necessities of
the type we have mentioned are somehow operative in the
construction of utopias? That people have implicitly
(perhaps explicitly) realised that for utopias to be
meaningful for them they must be constrained by con-
ceptual, a priori principles of the type I have
suggested?

My hope - and it is little more than a hope at the
moment - is that we might be able to develop logical
explanations positing what has to be the case for
utopias and so forth to be meaningful for us, then
showing that actual utopias are to an extent constrained by such considerations. The Genesis story of the expulsion from 'paradise' certainly seems to bear out the value of this approach. For close textual analysis shows that Adam and Eve are not really people in 'paradise'; that their salvation is to be expelled; that 'paradise' is not really for us at all. The important thing is that such an analysis, whilst utilising textual evidence, is informed by a model based on logical necessities. It is true that those who construct utopias do not have to heed the constraint that people are only people in a world of pain and suffering, but knowing that pain and suffering are necessary conditions for being a person helps us analyse the myth - and it does this because the necessity is somehow realised by the myth.

There is clearly much more to be said about the possibility and scope of intra-religious explanations. However, since I have already become rather speculative I shall conclude by summarising some of the varieties of intra-religious explanations, some of the problems which require attention, and, as a final note, I shall direct the discussion back to the problem of whether to introduce extra-religious determinants.

Provisionally, we can think of different aspects (not types) of the general intra-religious procedure. Before summarising these aspects I should emphasise first that this list is not yet fully worked out and second that the basic model I am using is by no means original. As should be apparent, the model owes much to the fashionable analogy of likening these structures which lie behind socio-cultural life to the structured rules of chess.

a) CAUSAL. I mention this type of intra-religious explanation because it is the variety favoured by Smart. Since I agree with Winch that relations between meanings cannot be causal in nature, I do not think that intra-religious explanations can take this form.

b) SEMANTIC. In this loosely defined category I include explanations of how, for example, religious language works when it is being stretched. Granted the ineffability of many ultimate religious realities we can ask - how is the inexpressible expressed in various religious traditions? Explanations would direct our attention to the capacities of such devices as analogy, metaphor, silence (the Quakers), paradox, the via negationis, and so forth. The subject is fascinating - especially when one asks why degree of ineffability varies so much cross-culturally - but with a few exceptions (including, yet again, Nuer Religion) is ignored by anthropologists.

c) EXCLUSION. This approach concentrates on showing that the presence of one (normally religious) item tends to exclude other items. We have mentioned the inverse relationship between theocentricity and witchcraft/magic. We can also mention Godfrey Lienhardt's innovatory analysis of what happens to conceptual configurations and content in a culture lacking the notion of mind (1961:147-170; see also Heelas 1974).
It is interesting to note that to an extent necessity absolutely pervades the Dinka material. For example lacking a notion of mind 'as mediating and, as it were, storing up the experiences of the self' (ibid:149) means that the Dinka cannot have the same concept of memory as we do. This is because our concept of memory logically depends on the notion of something (mind) to store them in. On the other hand, necessity is not absolute: lacking the notion of mind does not mean that the Dinka have to conceptualise memory in a certain way.

d) INCLUSION. The emphasis is now on what goes with what and on what encourages what. To revert to an earlier example, the more powerful a deity might be, the more likely it is (in practice) that the deity will be ineffable. To give a new example, I think that it is possible to argue that degree of ritualisation in part depends on degree of literalism. Thus the more one knows about one's deities the more likely it is that one will engage in ritual. If one knows little about one's deities it is difficult to know what to give them; if one has knowledge of their nature and their requests, ritual can flourish. Compare, in this respect, Quakers (pronounced ineffability and little ritual) with the Sherpas (pronounced literalism and much ritual). As a final example of inclusion we can mention the apparent logical fit between emphasizing the notion mind and emphasizing the general attitude of acting on the world. This is the opposite of the Dinka association between lacking our notion of mind and a passiones world-view. In both cases it is not difficult to see the logical grounds for ethnographically expressed associations. Thus in our own culture we conceptualise our dominantly active attitude to the world in such mind-dependent terms as 'act of will' or 'free-choice' whereas the Dinka clearly have no need for such notions within their passiones environment.

e) SUBORDINATION. I am thinking here of the role of what I have called overriding principles in specifying more exactly the nature of previously existing cultural elements. In other words, a phenomenon (e.g. Nuer sacrifice) takes a certain form because of conceptual implications vis-a-vis more general rules (e.g. theocentricity).

So much more could be said and (tentatively) illustrated about intra-religious explanations. But instead of giving more examples I want to return to one or two of the problems that are met when one attempts to find the necessary in the social (or, as Levi-Strauss puts it, when one attempts to find 'the conditions of an a posteriori necessity'). I suppose the major problem hinges on the fact that to the best of my knowledge no anthropologists or philosophers have analysed the notions 'necessary', 'contingent' and 'arbitrary', and what is involved in finding the necessary within the socio-cultural. I should qualify this somewhat in view of Winch's The Idea of a Social Science, but the fact remains there is remarkably little discussion of the major anthropological attempt to develop the notion of the necessary - namely that made by Levi-Strauss. Furthermore, Levi-Strauss is hopelessly confused with the philosophical terminology he uses.
Thus we are told that science aims to establish 'necessary relations' when, as his mention of 'the impossible task of discovering the conditions of an a posteriori necessity indicates, Lévi-Strauss is also aware that causal relations must be contingent in nature. (1966:15, 35 emphasis).

To attempt something positive, I want to suggest that a useful way to regard the relationship between the necessary and the contingent (using this word in the non-mean sense of arbitrary) in the context of social life is to think in terms of the varying degrees to which necessity can be broken. At one extreme we can think of conceptual relations which cannot meaningfully be broken. For utopia to be utopia certain things (such as the things which go on in hell) cannot be allowed to happen - so to that extent at least ideas of utopia are constrained by necessities. It would be meaningless, in any culture, for utopias to include certain things. Another example of such strong necessity is afforded by one of our Dinka examples: from what we have said it should be clear that there is no way in which the Dinka could have the same concept of memory as ourselves.

Turning to some weaker necessities, we are now in the domain when things might be logically necessary but need not necessarily be the case in the domains of socio-cultural contingency. For example, it is possible, I suppose, that an all-powerful God can be treated literally. Or, to give a new example, even though it is logically the case that morality requires freedom of choice which in turn implies the existence of an irreducible world of the mental, participants in social life are not philosophers. Not always realising the logical point, they can maintain morality without its necessary accompaniments. But, as I have tried to argue, such logical necessities often do inform what goes on within the socio-cultural. The primitive, I have always felt, is more of a philosopher, conceptual analyst, than we have sometimes supposed. And case studies demonstrating, for example, that ritual flourishes in the context of literalism could well help me back up my claims for logical connexions.

Turning to the related problem of prediction, I would suggest that bearing in mind the problems of applying that term at all, the weaker the necessity the harder it is to predict how it will constrain socio-cultural phenomena. This sounds like little more than a tautology, but in practice is of some value: our spectrum can now be regarded as ranging from situations of total 'prediction' (to be utopia certain things have to be the case) to progressively weaker forms (eg. 'predicting' what cannot be the case as when the absence of the notion mind rules out certain other notions). As a final point about 'prediction' I would rather speak of expectation than of hard and fast prediction. It might be the case that hard and fast predictions can sometimes be made, but, as the following example indicates, this is not typically the case within the sphere of the symbolic. My example concerns the rather neglected topic
of the motivation of symbols (although it should be said in
this context that Sperber's Rethinking Symbolism has done
much to rectify this situation). Consider the fact that
the eye is one of the most favoured ways of conceptualising
(‘symbolising’) the transmission of both good and evil.
Now consider the fascinating question - why the eye? Why
not the nose or the mouth or whatever? One is then led to
ask what makes the eye peculiarly suited for its
culturally assigned task. For example, one is led to
consider what, if anything, social psychologists have said
about the eye which explains our own beliefs in the powers
of staring(see Heelas 1977(c)).

Now, we cannot really predict under which circum­
stances the eye will be accorded a role in witchcraft.
But we can show how the selection of this 'symbol' has
been motivated by the peculiar appropriateness of the
eye in the context of its witchcraft functions. Similar
points can be made, I think, with respect to those
structuralists who have attempted to answer questions
of the type, 'Why is the Cassowary not a Bird?' (Bulmer
1967). Who have attempted, in other words, to establish
the existence of a predictable rationale within the
symbolic; a rationale with predictive powers.

It is time that we returned to Douglas’ rejection
of intra-ideological (or, to use a terminology with which
I am not so familiar, ‘superstructural’) explanations.
What I find so surprising is that despite the lead given
by Evans-Pritchard, Lienhardt and a few others, together
with the clues in the non-mentalistic features of Levi­
Strauss’ work, so little has been done to develop this
aspect of a semantic anthropology. I find it especially
curious that Douglas and like-minded Durkheimian's still
theorise as though relatively non-specific social
structures-cum-experiences (eg. group/grid) can generate
in vertical fashion the specificities of cosmological
systems. At the very least there is surely a case to be
made for looking at the conceptual relations which bind
together the items of religious systems: that is, to
repeat Evans-Pritchard's programatic statement, to treat
any given cosmological system as 'a pattern which excludes
conflicting elements and subordinates each part to the
harmony of the whole...'. Far from simply being an
'inverted materialism' it might even be the case that such
an approach could complement structural-marxist styles
of explanation; could provide a complementary way of
studying superstructures. In other words, we might have
an approach which could treat the ideological as
irreducible - before, if needs be, some of the ideol­
ogical has to be reductively treated with respect to
non-religious intra-structural constraints and
determinants.

One last point. The type of explanation I have been
advocating boils down to that whose foundations were laid
by Winch in his The Idea of a Social Science (1958). But
although such philosophers can help us analyse notions
like 'necessary' I do not think that we should judge our
programs solely in terms of philosophical criteria.
Practice speaks larger than theorising, and although I have
given as many examples as I can (and sometimes rather crudely I am afraid) I am well aware that I have not presented an entirely convincing example. So I shall close with an outline of what I would do if I were to write on the topic of utopias. I would begin by suggesting what has to be the case for utopia to be utopia - including the fact that the more wonderful the utopia the greater the impossibility of people ever being people in it. I would then analyse various myths (hopefully not just Genesis) to show that they are aware of and are attempting to resolve this problem. Ideally, one would like to show that although utopias have to be plausible for us (which involves, for example, no pain or suffering), such developments from the necessary logic of utopias are not entirely unconstrained by that necessary logic. Thus it might be possible to relate how utopias have to be conceptualised and how they are actually conceptualised. Finally, I would attempt to show that how they are actually conceptualised is at least in part to be explained by other conceptual systems. Could it be the case that utopias cannot exist in certain cultural environments? (the obvious answer is, of course, yes, but there might be more interesting, less obvious, answers as well).

One can speculate like this. Let us hope that these speculations can be put into practice.

Paul Heelas

NOTES

1. I should also make it clear that he has established the term 'intra-religious'.

2. Ryan (1970) provides a good commentary on Winch's important contribution to these and related topics. I have also tried to trace some of the implications of the distinction between causal and conceptual relations, especially as they bear on the notion of a semantic anthropology (1977(b)).

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1973(b) The Phenomenon of Religion.

Sierra Leone and the 'Stranger Problem'

In this paper I shall look at some aspects of self-identification among people of Sierra Leone. This may be done using economic, religious or ethnic criteria, and it is on the latter that I wish to concentrate here. The main axes along which I shall pursue my discussion are (briefly as this has been well documented elsewhere) the Creole-Provincial dichotomy, and the Sierra Leone national identity as it has developed to identify against 'stranger' populations. The presence of certain sectors of the non-Sierra Leonean population is perceived as a problem and I am to show what factors contribute to the attribution of the 'problem' that is posed by the presence of these groups who are seen as 'strangers'. I do not wish to enter into the recent discussions on the concept of ethnicity and its use as an analytic device (for this see Barth, 1969; Cohen, 1974; Ardener, 1974; Glazer and Moynihan, 1975) but a brief statement of my own opinion will be useful.

Ethnicity pertains to racial or cultural differences between people; individuals see themselves as belonging to a particular ethnic group by virtue of a perceived common origin. The objectivity of ethnicity, "the condition of belonging to a particular ethnic group" (Glazer and Moynihan 1975, p.1) and the assumption that ethnic groups are biologically self-perpetuating units with shared cultural values that distinguish them from other such units in an objective way, are notions that I do not hold with. There are really no objective criteria by which one can categorically distinguish between ethnic groups whose essential feature is that they "generate an apprehension of 'otherness' among non-members". (Ardener 1974, p.28). Ethnicities do, as Ardener and Barth say, demand to be viewed from within, that is by the actors themselves who see themselves as being essentially different from others.1 Self-identification can and does change over time and according to context, and people allow themselves a wide scope for asserting which cultural features are relevant or significant to their distinctiveness. Visible differences may form the basis of distinction, for it is easy (for example) to tell a Lebanese from an African, a Sierra Leonean from a Nigerian, or (though less easy for us) a Mende from a Fula or Temne. From the point of view of my discussion relating to Sierra Leone it so happens that the physical, visible differences between groups is a help to people in identifying the 'stranger problem', but mere physical differences do not always warrant the designation of belonging to another ethnic or cultural group. For example a family of European descent, born and raised in Freetown were considered by themselves and indigenous Africans as being Sierra Leonian, for their behaviour and expectations (their 'mentality' if you like) were seen to be more akin to that of a Sierra Leonian than a 'European'.2

It is with these ideas in mind that I will now turn to Sierra Leone and a consideration of the way people identify themselves in opposition to others.

Sierra Leone is a small country with a population of 2,180,335 (1963 census) and exhibits considerable ethnic and cultural diversity. The population comprises eighteen indigenous tribes, plus the Creoles (descendants of liberated and repatriated African slaves) and a sizeable number of Lebanese, 'Europeans' and other non-indigenous Africans, the largest
group of the latter being Fulas from Guinea. The capital city, Freetown, has a population of about 200,000; it is a cosmopolitan city with all ethnic groups represented to some degree.

The Colony of Sierra Leone was founded in 1787 as a settlement for freed slaves. These people coming from very diverse origins attained a common Creole identity through their similar experience of education and Christianity under the influence of missionaries and philanthropists. Their close association and identification with western, specifically British, values led them to assume an air of cultural superiority over the tribal peoples of Sierra Leone, which is maintained to this day. In 1896 the British extended their rule into the hinterland which they administered separately from the Colony as the Protectorate of Sierra Leone. Education of the tribal peoples in the Protectorate had the aim of keeping them "tribal, uncreolized, unsophisticated and unspoilt". (Porter 1963, p.68). The 1931 census tells us much about the colonial view of 'Sierra Leoneans' and the relative importance of different groups: dividing the population of the Colony and the Protectorate separate categories are given for English, Welsh, Scottish, French, Sierra Leonean, Mulatto and African Native Tribes, etc. Their category 'Sierra Leonean' is in my understanding Creole, not even all people of the Colony. Even today implicit in many Creoles' discussion of the good Sierra Leonean character is the limitation of 'Sierra Leonean' to Creoles. The Provincials (that is the 'native' tribes) are thought of as 'other', and in this particular case inferior.

The Creoles, who dominated trade in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, became a hindrance to the British aims of economic exploitation of the Protectorate, and with encouragement from the British, Lebanese traders soon took control over wholesale and retail trade in the country. Thus the Creoles' economic power was eroded. The political and administrative power they had held and looked forward to enjoying in the event of Sierra Leone becoming independent was lost when the dual system of administration of the Colony and the Protectorate ended under the 1947 constitution which decided that political control should be largely in the hands of the tribal peoples who formed the numerical majority. When Sierra Leone became Independent in 1961 the government (the Sierra Leone People's Party under the leadership of Milton Margai) was predominantly Mende. Since 1968 the ruling party has been the All People's Congress under the leadership of Siaka Stevens, a Limba. This party representing the northern part of the country hopes to restore the unfavourable bias that the S.L.P.P. had by favouring the south. In 1971 Sierra Leone became a Republic with Siaka Stevens as President.

In spite of the Creoles' tremendous decline in terms of economic and political significance, they have, as I mentioned above, maintained a close cultural affinity with western and particularly British values, and have retained the social superiority that their association with western influences gave them. They "still set the standards for the social development of the rest of the population", and as Harrell-Bond says:

"The attitude of the Provincial towards the Creoles was very much like his attitude towards the white men. While he resented their dominance, he also envied their achievements and measured his advance by the standards which they set ... Although Provincials resent the
attitude of the Creoles, their behaviour suggests that they have accepted their inferior status vis-a-vis Creoles. Today, although political control is held by provincials, Creoles continue to set the standard for prestige and status. They act as advisers and fill most of the important government posts." (Harrell-Bond, 1975, p.34)

The sharing of many cultural values among provincial tribes of Sierra Leone (promoted for example by the easy means of communication in the country and the sharing of common features such as the Poro and Bundu secret societies for men and women) make the Creole-provincial dichotomy the most important one to draw in Sierra Leone. This is not to deny that ethnic and cultural differences are felt between the provincial peoples and ethnic or tribal stereotypes held of each group go part way to illustrating this. For example the Temne are portrayed as being sullen and enjoy provoking trouble (palavers); the Limba with their penchant for palm-wine (mampona) are seen as being "backward and uncivilised". Broadly speaking cultural differences can be seen to fall along a north-south line. The southern, predominantly Mende area has had more contact with European 'civilising' influences, and Christianity is the dominant religion; the northern part of the country, with the Temne and Limba being the largest tribal groups, is predominantly Muslim and more traditional.

Within Sierra Leone people focus their basic identity on their tribal affiliation, and the Sierra Leone identity has developed principally as a means of identifying against white or 'stranger' populations. The Lebanese, the Fula and 'Europeans' provide us with good examples for illustrating on the one hand the political nature of ethnicity (ethnic or national identity) and on the other hand for identifying the 'stranger problem' which Sierra Leone has seen itself as having for several years.

Simmel states that the position of the stranger in a group "is determined, essentially, by the fact that he has not belonged to it from the beginning, that he imports qualities into it, which do not and cannot stem from the group itself". (Simmel, 1950) While this is doubtless true to an extent, in the Sierra Leone context the classification of someone as a stranger is nearly always used in connection with a perceived problem. I want to show how the Lebanese and the Fulas constitute part of this 'stranger problem' while the 'Europeans' as a group do not. Simmel states that strangers are often traders and as an extension from this, traders are often seen to be strangers. (Ibid. p.403). This is certainly true in the case of Sierra Leone and is axiomatic to the 'problem' caused by the Lebanese and Fula presence.

There has been a Middle Eastern population in Sierra Leone, as in much of West Africa, since the late nineteenth century. These people came to trade, often starting off as wandering hawkers. In 1921 there were 177 Syrians (most of these early migrants came from that part of Syria that is now the Lebanon) in Sierra Leone, in 1931 there were 413 and by 1963 there were 3,301, of whom 813 lived in the Western Area (the former Colony) - mainly in Freetown - and it is fair to say that though there are Lebanese traders in most towns in the Provinces the majority of the rest live in the Kono, diamond mining area. As Harrell-Bond says, many Lebanese now consider Sierra Leone as their home and indeed many were born there. (Ibid. p.280) Yet they cannot hold Sierra Leone passports and most will consider themselves to be
Lebanese rather than Sierra Leonean; they associate socially with other Lebanese and maintain close links with their homeland. Intermarriage between Lebanese women and African men is virtually unknown and is rare between Lebanese men and African women. Their domination of wholesale and large-scale retail trade has, since Independence, led to the Lebanese being considered as an element of the 'stranger problem'; the apparent appropriation of wealth by 'foreigners' who, it is felt, will not use it to Sierra Leone's advantage is seen to be a threat and a problem. Simmel talks of the 'objectivity' of strangers, who are at the same time involved with, yet indifferent to, the host population. (Tbid. p.404). The Lebanese are particularly easy targets for hostility being both physically identifiable from the Africans and also obviously affluent.

It was in the 1950s that the presence of strangers was first articulated as a problem. During the 1950s the diamond boom in Kono region led to the immigration to that area of many thousands of people in search of a living, if not a fortune, from illicit diamond mining. Most of these people were African, from other parts of Sierra Leone and neighbouring West African countries, but many Lebanese also moved in and soon came to dominate the market in diamond dealing, becoming very wealthy. At this time all hostility towards 'strangers' was directed against the Madingo, and all other African migrants who were collapsed into the term 'Madingo'. Newspaper articles of the time talk frequently of "The Madingo Problem" or "The Stranger Problem". One article entitled "The Madingo Problem" reads: "However a crocodile lives in water he cannot turn into a fish. And as a result, you cannot expect the Madingoes to seek the interest and welfare of the economic development of this country". (Sierra Leone Daily Mail 8/6/1956). In a speech to his people a Kono chief exhorts, "every Kono man, woman and child" to joint together to "drive all strangers from Kono". (Shekpendeh 29/10/1958). There was some feeling that it was perhaps unfair to single out the Madingo as targets for hostility, as not all the strangers were Madingo, and also because not all Madingoes were strangers. A Madingo writes that Madingoes are all fellow West Africans and it is impossible to distinguish them by place of birth - , so "Why worry the Madingoes?" (Daily Mail 23/7/1956). Another letter begins "I am no Madingo by tribe", but they should not be singled out for abuse; anyone wearing a gown is automatically taken to be Madingo, and anyway Madingoes have lived in Sierra Leone and intermarried with the Mende since the nineteenth century. (Daily Mail 7/5/1956) Another letter says, "(we) should be proud to have an enterprising African people like the Madingo helping to build a new future for the people of Sierra Leone". (Daily Mail 30/4/56). The violence and lawlessness in Kono in the mid-50s was obviously a great worry to the British who proposed drastic measures; Governor Dorman gave three weeks notice for the removal of all strangers ("foreigners who have 'invaded' the country") from Kono: "We are going to find you and remove you." (Daily Mail 2/11/56 which gave a report of Dorman's speech at Sefadu, Kono district). In three weeks it was estimated that about 25,000 people left the area - most of them going to Freetown. The London Times reports the expulsions with approval: "The ordinance forcing (them) to quit is timely," for they "descended in a joyous swarm" living in squalid conditions; the ultimate sufferers are "those Sierra Leoneans who have not joined in the spree." (The Times. London 27/11/56).
It is worth noting that at the height of the troubles in Kono and while hostility towards 'strangers' was at its strongest, Lucien Genet, a white man of French descent though born in Sievra Leonewao elected Mayor of Freetown: "... he is looked on not as a stranger". (Daily Mail 10/11/56)

The Lebanese also were not regarded as strangers, though lack of official hostility towards them did not go completely unnoticed as one or two letters to the press show - people asked why they were not given the same treatment as the Madingoes. While they expropriated considerable wealth at the expense of the Africans and the colonial territory as a whole, they doubtless did not pose as much of a threat in British eyes as the Madingoes did with their life of poverty, squalor and ill-health. As Dunn has shown in his analysis of colonial achievements in Ahafo, Ghana, the initial ventures of 'civilising' often had as much to do with the exorcism of colonial anxieties about the dangers of 'matter out of place' as with the fostering of local goals. (Dunn & Robertson 1974 p.96-7). The British favour of the Lebanese throughout the colonial period inhibited the articulation of the Lebanese 'stranger problem' during this time, as can be shown by the Kono example. It was not until Independence that Sierra Leoneans were able to fully give voice to their feelings against the Lebanese and their economic activities.

Nowadays it is the Fula who are seen to be at the heart of, and are the largest component of, the 'stranger problem' and they are the focus of much animosity. As with the Madingoes in the 1950s many Fulas were actually born in Sierra Leone, yet today they are definitely thought of as aliens. Their distinctive facial features make them easily distinguishable from other, Sierra Leonean, peoples, so the 'problem' is a visible one that all can point to. The Fula population has increased rapidly in recent years; in 1921 the Fula numbered 6,001 in the Protectorate and less than a thousand in the Colony, and in 1963 there were 66,824 in Sierra Leone as a whole of whom 6,533 lived in Freetown. A household survey conducted in Freetown in 1968 shows that while the ethnic composition of the city has not changed much since the 1963 census, the percentage of Fula has increased from 4.1% to 9.8%. Their numbers are large and increasing but are also being magnified out of all proportion in support of the idea of there being a 'Fula problem'. One headline exclaimed, "One Million Foolahs (sic) now in S. Leone?" (The Times 2/9/76); another estimate given at about the same time was that there are 150,000 Fulas in the country (The People 14/8/76), while the Guinea ambassador in a speech urging the return of all Guineans to their homeland where they are needed to aid the economic development of Guinea, put the number of Fula as 30,000 (Daily Mail 28/8/76). The 'Fula problem' is really a 'Guinea problem', though most of the Guinean migrants to Sierra Leone are Fula, and their distinctive physical appearance provides a visual focus for the 'problem'.

In the last few years many thousands of Guineans have migrated to Sierra Leone to find employment; the currency in Guinea is virtually worthless, food and many other commodities are rationed and there are few opportunities for employment. Sekou Toure (Sheku Turay), the president of Guinea, was an M.P. in French Guinea during the Kono crisis period in the mid-1950s. At that time he pleaded for "unity among all Africans", and felt that, "economic conditions were more favourable to Sierra Leoneans than those 'imposed' on the people of Guinea by the French who did not allow them to exploit their own resources". (Daily Mail 26/9/56).
It seems as though many people in Guinea today feel that Toure's policies, albeit with a different supporting ideology, do not differ much in effect from those of the French. Migrants may come to Sierra Leone for a short time to earn money with which to buy goods to take home: "These Guinea girls come for a few months. They arrive with one set of clothes, no shoes and no address. They stay with men for a home and for money. Then they buy clothes, soap and onions to take home". (personal communication.) Other migrants may stay several years or even a lifetime. The Fula find employment mostly within the informal sector of the economy. Freetown has a high rate of unemployment with 30.8% of adult males and 76.2% of all adult females not in wage employment, (1963 census), though as Hart says, basic employment figures hide the fact that so many people are employed in the 'informal' sector - that is they are non-wage earners. Writing of Frafra migrants in Accra he finds that "non-wage employment is a dominant feature of the urban opportunity structure". (1974 p.328). Many Fulas are petty traders or are employed in the service sector as taxi-drivers, messengers or house-servants. It is felt that their economic activities are ones which any Sierra Leonean could do, and as there is high unemployment the Fulas are seen to be taking work away from indigenous migrants. People worry that "the influx of strangers and their bad business practices will lead to frequent increases in the price of essential commodities." (The People 24/9/76). Of course, if one side of the coin of the 'Fula problem' is the entrepreneurial activities of these migrants, the other side, seen by the Creoles, is the laziness of provincial Sierra Leoneans: "our problem is that the only people trading on the streets are Lebanese and Fula because Sierra Leoneans are too lazy to do it". (personal communication.) Hart distinguishes between legitimate and illegitimate economic activities, the latter being one of the major sources of income. The "satisfaction of criminals and low disapprobation of crime in slum areas," make it easy to engage in activities such as drugs dealing, prostitution or theft. There is a lot of crime in Freetown (particularly theft and burglary; prostitution is not a criminal offence but is socially disapproved and certainly in some areas has connections with the criminal 'underworld'); crime is associated with the presence of many unemployed migrants in the city. The Guinea ambassador, urging the return of Guineans to their own country said "Some Guineans in Sierra Leone have been tarnishing the image of their country especially those involved in burglary, robbery, housebreaking and prostitution". (Daily Mail 28/8/76).

The economic problems for Sierra Leone posed by the presence of many Fulas does have a social dimension which is also exaggerated, adding to the severity of the 'problem'. "What of the Social Problems and hazards they import too? They give birth like ants. They have exhausted all the drugs in our Hospitals. They bring with them also contagious diseases, which today they spread among Sierra Leoneans. They also have with them prostitutes flooding the street corners especially in Freetown and the big cities of the provinces". (Sierra Leone Times n.d., ). The unequivocal attribution of prostitution to Guinea girls ("All Guinea girls are prostitutes", and "Most rarray-girls are from Guinea") could well be a reflection of the stereotype of Guineans in general and Fulas in particular. In view of the fact that socially unattached women are often considered to be prostitutes it is easy to see how Guinea girls fit into the context of the 'stranger problem' as rarray-women (prostitutes).
While the Lebanese and the Fula are both seen as components of a perceived 'stranger problem' in Sierra Leone, 'Europeans' are not. As Harrell-Bond says:

"Attitudes which one might have thought would have been provoked by the political and economic domination have been directed almost completely against the Lebanese and Syrians rather than the British. This is explained no doubt by the fact that the economic competition between Lebanese and Syrians and the Africans was much more direct. Even today the belief in the superiority of British culture remains almost unchallenged." (Ibid. p.280)

Occasionally one does read and hear about the problem of expatriates, but any animosity against them is always directed against individuals and refers to specific events. For example: "Unless we take steps to ensure that these floating expatriates are put exactly where they really belong, they will continue to flood this country, much to our embarrassment." (We Yone 1/9/76). This quotation is taken from an editorial discussing the apparently dubious presence of one man, "who stays in this country on the thin hope that he is about to win a big law-suit". (Ibid). During the summer of 1976 there was a big scandal in Freetown over apparent discrimination against Africans at one of the city's most exclusive clubs, the Hill Station Club, "that monumental relic of colonialism". "Like the colonial relic that it is, the club has been a kind of cult where Sierra Leone and Sierra Leoneans are insulted at will, and where the germ of Jim Crowism has been allowed to take deep root for far too long". (We Yone 1/8/76). Even in this case hostility was directed against individuals and a particular incident. As Simmel says, strangers are never seen as individuals, but always as strangers of a particular type, with no doubt a stereotyped image that is often given to 'others', (Ibid. p.406).

One significant white or 'European' presence in Sierra Leone is the United States Peace Corps, about whom ambivalent feelings are held. In 1976 there were over 200 Peace Corps volunteers in the country, and the numbers had been much higher in the previous two years when all the volunteers from Ethiopia were sent to Sierra Leone after the coup in 1973. I was told that at that time problems concerning the relations between the Peace Corps and the indigenous population were exacerbated to a tremendous extent, and while I was in Sierra Leone in 1976 there was ill-feeling towards them. There is disapproval over the way they dress, the local belief that they take drugs excessively (though I cannot say whether the 'drugs problem' that is seen to be increasing among Sierra Leonean youth is in any way correlated with this belief), and their indiscriminate use of the Krio language. This latter point often upsets educated people, many of whom feel that Krio, though it may be their native tongue and is the lingua franca of Sierra Leone, is just a pidgin-English and somehow inferior to English. There may be correlates here with the situation in the Cameroons where the Peace Corps were considered in some way inferior because they did not speak the 'good' English of the colonial administrators and the like. (E. Ardehen personal communication). However, like the 'European' population, the Peace Corps do not constitute a part of the 'stranger problem'; they do not have an economic stake in the country and hence pose no visible threat to Sierra Leone. Most 'Europeans' perform jobs that would not be open to Sierra Leoneans - they are, for example, representatives of foreign companies, diplomatic missions or Church organisations. The University of Sierra Leone
at Fourah Bay College has several expatriate teachers and here many of them felt that there was some animosity towards their presence from African teachers wanting a more complete Africanisation of the academic staff. In some surprising cases a 'European' was welcomed in his job - for example many of the large factories (most of which are partly government owned) employ a 'European' manager. I was told by Sierra Leoneans (Creoles) that these enterprises were far better off having a white, expatriate managerial staff: "If a black man did the job they would go bankrupt". (personal communication). The rationalisation for this statement was that a 'European' standing outside the Sierra Leonean society would not be pressurized for favours in a way that a local man would be.

Hence, while an individual Peace Corps volunteers may have no problems in his or her relations with Sierra Leoneans, the Peace Corps as a whole is disliked, exemplifying as it does a moral corruption or inferiority, and because, like individual Europeans, they break the code of politeness in their relations with Africans. The Lebanese and the Fulas, posing as they do, an economic threat to the country constitute a problem to the nation which has been articulated as the "Sierra Leone 'Stranger Problem'". The Fulas living and working in the public eye as it were allow for social judgements to be passed on them and in their case the basic economic problem is given a social dimension. The Lebanese who isolate themselves both spatially and physically (most of them living in large houses in the more fashionable part of town) are not seen to add social to the economic problems caused by their presence.

Alison Sutherland.

Footnotes
(1) This point of agreement is made in articles which otherwise follow differing arguments and lines of approach to the topic.
(2) 'European' or 'expatriate' are terms used to describe all people of western European and American descent, in other words the majority of white people in Sierra Leone. While 'expatriate' is a term used by both Africans and 'Europeans', the term 'European' is used solely by Africans.
(3) Khuri (1968) says that African-Lebanese marriages have decreased in number since Lebanese women started migrating to Sierra Leone. Lebanese men do not take marriage to African women seriously... they see it as an 'illicit sexual act' and divorce is common.
(4) All newspapers referred to are Sierra Leonean unless otherwise stated.

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Having forsaken all reference to a metaphysics of Social Anthropology as constituting a discrete discursive field, or text, and, more generally, upon releasing the general text which is society from corresponding metaphysical determinants, we are left with (only) those material statements which constitute social intercourse. However, if all appeals to underlying determinant structures and internal dynamics were to be so suspended, how shall we account for the emergence of new discursive fields? Indeed, as an example of such, we might note the relatively recent appearance of Social Anthropology as a field of discourse in some ways separate from the nineteenth century ethnographical and ethnological discourses from which it might be said to have emerged.

We repeat that the set of statements which together constitute, and have constituted, the discursive field, the text, of Social Anthropology, are not to be seen as constituting a text on account of their common subject matter or referent. Other discursive fields contain reference to a number of these objects (see below). The point is made here that there is no set of objects, or concepts, solely by reference to which any statement is rendered particularly social anthropological. This amounts to a re-statement of the supremacy of the text; adds up to a recognition of the primacy of the material statements which together comprise Social Anthropology (see ref. to Paul de Mann, fn. 3) and by 'material' is meant 'supported' in the sense of constituting and occupying a node (locus) within a network of discursive relations (pace Foucault, 1972).

Neither is any suggestion being made that these material statements constitute a discrete set of discursive elements. By which we mean that social anthropological discourse neither emerged, nor is it maintained, as a function of an internal dynamic peculiar to itself. Rather, the discursive field of Social Anthropology itself constitutes and occupies a node within a whole network of discursive relations which together constitute that general text of the social; that general text which is at once the support of anthropological discourse and the proper object of its study.

Following Heidegger, our present enterprise might be seen as the destruction (in the sense of 'de-structuring') of the signified; the de-structuring of that Being, as a set of classificatory features, by reference to which elements of language have been credited with a function of power, have been regarded as significant. From Heidegger we note, also, that metaphysical thinking has presupposed such a Being, and recognise how subsequent investigations have combined to disguise the active potential of being behind several layers of intelligibility and knowledge. But the construction of these layers of information which have provided answers to questions of what Being is, and provided accounts for the fact that Being is, has done no more than substitute an external understanding of Being in place of an acknowledgement of the active capacity of being, i.e. the fact that it is. As a field of discourse dealing with a metaphysical subject
matter, Social Anthropology, particularly in its several 
'structuralist' guises, has been profoundly guilty of such 
concealments.

But what is this active potential which we claim 
Social Anthropology conceals? It could be said that it is 
that title itself - Social Anthropology (capital letters and 
all) - which, by attributing an a priori substantiality to 
its meaning (or to that which it signifies), pre-disposes us to 
assume that all the writings which we might recognise as 
social anthropological, we recognise as such to the extent 
that they refer to, or are compatible with, that existent 
(Being) which is Social Anthropology. Unlike those philo-
sophers arguing in the debate over the existence of God, we 
cannot accept that Social Anthropology is that One which 
contains its own reason for being; Its very essence being Its 
own necessity.

It has already been pointed out, however, that Social 
Anthropology is evidenced only as text; as pen, pencil, or 
type-written marks on paper. The papers, notepads, journals, 
and books, are but evidence of an activity; they are evidence 
of, but not signs of, social anthropology. They are the 
traces of work undertaken; they do not signify a Social 
Anthropology situated elsewhere.

An analogy with an organic life-form, so effectively 
used by a founding father of our work, Wilhelm Von Humboldt, 
can perhaps help to elucidate this point. Regarding a living 
organism (let us take as our example, a tree) as developing 
through time, we can take these traces as evidencing this 
development, thereby enabling a diagnosis of the state of that 
organism at the instance of those traces. The organism 
develops, producing new limbs, new branches, new growths; 
all the while being in an ecological relationship with all 
other features of its environment. To the extent that 
this organism is essential for the continuance of this 
environment, and having such compounded and fundamental 
relations with all other features, its development must 
be regarded as a profound and intimate function of the whole. 
That these traces might be taken naively as enabling merely 
diagnosis of the state of the single organism is question 
would amount to a trivialisation of our procedure, placing 
unacceptable limits on any diagnosis.

The traces of that activity, which is social anthropology, 
therefore, might enable an historian of academia to construct 
a history of the development of Social Anthropology (or of 
social anthropological thought) as a discrete and unitary 
discipline; but only at his peril. Rather, each statement 
(trace), whether sentence-length or book, is to be seen as 
occupying a locus of discursive relations; a nexus of 
linkages and connections, both intra- and inter-discursive 
field, which constitutes the proper instance for that 
particular discursive event (statement).

The Being of Social Anthropology evidences itself in 
the materiality of text. But do these material texts conceal 
the Being of Social Anthropology? A discipline is Being at 
rest in unconcealment. The repose of Being is sometimes 
defended by an appeal to those statements as the bearers of 
Truth. In such a fashion it is being emasculated; the
impetus of being (verb), and its capacity to overcome resistance, congeals as inertia. That inertia is the resistance presented by Being.

Yet Beings, in our case, disciplines, discursive fields, and statements, do not exist a priori. They come into Being, and this through the action of being (verb). "Being names this 'that' as the decisiveness of the insurrection against nothingness." (Heidegger, 1973:1)

The considerable knowledge which constitutes the intelligibility of Being at once both obscures and evidences Being. Being congeals and becomes lost in the 'true', and the Being of those statements which represent this truth become established authorities suppressing all insurrection. And this after their Being is established by a similar insurrection. The authority of Being thus represents a reactionary force. This is the power of inertia, the resistance of the mechanisms of the customary.

Having emerged through the activity of being, Being itself becomes an object for study. This constitutes the field of metaphysics: the largely complementary analyses of what a Being is and that a Being is. These analyses of whatness and thatness represent synchronic and diachronic studies respectively.

Such investigations should occupy our time no longer. We must learn to live with them and not allow ourselves to become concerned with them. The attraction of any investigation into Being is a function of the acceptance of the authority of Being. This authority is the guarantee of Truth regarding the products of such investigations into Being. As such a guarantor, Being might rest in the authority of its own Truth. Concerning investigations into Being, it has been possible for investigators arriving at different analytical results to exchange arguments, to demonstrate their validity, and 'to be right'. Such arguments over the whatness and thatness of Being have been articulated in an arena of theoreticism which we have since left. We are no longer preoccupied with such debates over our knowledge and the intelligibility of this authoritative Being, regarding all such 'knowledge' as obscuring the primitive force of being; that process of becoming, of coming into Being.

So that our concern lies rather with that very primitive force of becoming. We must be careful to ensure that our writings concerning this process of coming into Being are not confused with those writings of the metaphysician, who undertakes a diachronic survey in order to account for the fact that a 'Being' exists. The metaphysician's enquiry is possible only having first accepted the authority of that Being. That such an authority has been invested in Being, might be seen to present the most formidable obstacle in our path. The problem can thus be stated: to the extent that Being is attributed with actuality, as That wherein is situated Authority as the Guarantor of Truth, to that same extent is being denied its capacity for productive activity, and as Being occupies the locus of inertia.

"The activity of the actual can be limited to the capacity of producing a resistance." Whereas we note the actual to be the completed act or product of an activity, by 'actual' we refer to that Being which is constructed at/s a node within the general text. Upon coming-into-Being, the
actual (as a crystallisation of prior activity) provides a foundation for new beginnings; a material point of departure for subsequent discursive developments.

We are able to outline a certain ambiguity in Heidegger's statement that "The activity of the actual can be limited to the capacity of producing a resistance". How can the completed act, this end product of activity, which is Being (the 'actual' which has the 'thingness' of 'whatness' and 'thatness') how can this completed act be seen to exercise that activity which Heidegger credits it with?

"The capacity of producing a resistance"; but a resistance to what?

It was previously, if naively, suggested how Being is allocated a role as arbiter of the truth of successive statements. This we might take as the Authority of Being; as that completed Being which operates as the external criterion of validity for subsequent statements; thereby providing a security for the complacent.

In what other way might Heidegger's statement be read? Does the use of the term 'resistance' necessitate such a reactive reading?

Making reference to Edward Said's book, Beginnings, we note that for reasons of material significance there is a practical necessity to base each new beginning within the completed act of discursive Being. Only as a correlate to the accepted materiality of the customary can each beginning be said to have a material point of departure. "With its point of departure secure, each subsequent development is able to utilise the energy implicated in the completed act of Being by evoking a resistance to its own development."

Hence Derrida in L'écriture (1967:404)

"Thus we perceive force in recognising the tension, the divided significance of any limiting boundary: as the enclosure of a homogeneous system of meaning and as the point which necessarily incites the transgression of that system."

and again, in De la grammatologie (1967:25)

"Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect and always perilous manoeuvres, risking constantly a relapse back into what one intends to deconstruct, our task is to encircle the critical concepts with a prudent and scrupulous discourse, to note the conditions, the context, the limits of their effectiveness, to indicate in a rigorous manner their adherence to the mechanisms which they themselves will enable us to deconstruct."

It would appear that for Said, and to a lesser (if more obscure) degree, Derrida, the articulation and animation of these uncircumscribed systems depends upon the intentions of an author.

We should like Said to indicate more clearly whether his central notion of 'intention' refers to an author's intention to produce a foreseen end-product, or to an intention involving the production of difference, with no concern as to the results.
Does the author need to examine motives and intentions for producing particular differences, exciting certain resistances, perhaps unleashing certain destructive energies? Or does the responsibility lie within discourse itself? We need only note that, contrary to Enid Blyton, as caricatured by Joyce Grenfell, books do not 'write themselves'.

It does not appear to be straightforward, nevertheless. Jean-Pierre Faye certainly appears to place the responsibilities (and blame) within the procedures of discourse (language-field). Witness what he has to say (?) in a passage taken from his monumental monograph * Languages Totalitaires:*

"Action follows on, is only possible within a 'language field' (un champ de langage). The semantic structures create an empty but prepared space, which political action must fill; or they can seal off other spaces of alternative political behaviour."

Reviewing Faye's book for the T.L.S. (5 April 1974) an un-named critic had this to say:

"What rational sense can be attached to the proposition that it is 'the linked series of utterances' (les chaines de l'enonceation) which has constituted the 'locus' (le lieu) in which, in advance, the Nazi murders were possible, justified, and accomplished?"

It would appear that for Faye the limits of our political action are established by the procedures of semantic structures within a 'language field'. What we should like to know, if our behaviour is so pre-determined, is what are the criteria to which these semantic structures appeal in deciding which 'semantic spaces' to create and which to 'seal-off'. It might well prove to be an instructive exercise to plot the beginnings and subsequent development of that discursive procedure which created the semantic space within which "the Nazi murders were possible, justified, and accomplished."

But such an academic exercise would be as speculative as its arguments and associations would be tenuous. Like the statistician who relates the state of the United Kingdom 'balance of payments' to the average midnight temperature on the island of Huckle Flugga. What we would rather investigate are the control mechanisms, the several limitations on the 'acceptability' of various beginnings; the procedures whereby one potential development is selected and allowed to create its semantic space, whereas other discursive activities are, in some way, disallowed.

Two obvious and external criteria in relation to which a selection can be accomplished are, the availability of financial backing, and the presence of physical opposition or defence. In both cases it is the author with intention who is to be encouraged or otherwise. But by that time the initial selection has been made.

It seems as though from an infinite number of possible beginnings the author has selected the one he has selected. Why? We might be led into inquiring why the beginning selected by the author appeared to him 'more imperative' than the others.
(We recognise the importance of Derrida's warning:

"Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect and perilous manoeuvres, risking constantly a relapse back into what one intends to deconstruct,...")

This question is raised because I feel it demonstrates, quite adequately, the import of Derrida's warning, rather than that it presents a substantial problem. In any discursive development which aims at the deconstruction of a previous language field it is re-emphasised that the beginnings of such a development are given a material ground within the completed act of discursive Being; i.e. "(Within the enclosure itself); within the language field which is the object of that discursive development. But that language field is that of the object of Deconstruction and the means by which that deconstruction will take place.

(Derrida: 

"...our task is to encircle the critical concepts (and to indicate in a rigorous manner their adherence to the mechanisms which they themselves will enable to deconstruct.")

Hence the risk of a relapse "back into what one intends to deconstruct". We shall observe how the imperative question which might be answered only in the form of an explanation of why one discursive development rather than another constitutes (invites) such an opportunity for relapse.

Questions relating to the origins of Beings tend to be answered by making appeal to that (or those) being(s) which 'existed' prior to that Being under question. Thus appeal is made to concepts of causation and history; evidence is provided in order to substantiate this Being (existent) as the contemporary representative of an evolutionary or developmental process; as the effect of 'ings (as cause).

But such questions are based upon the false assumption that phenocogological evidence of Being is of the primitive nature of Being; rather, it is proposed that prior to that evidence of Being, there is developed a necessity of Being. This necessity is referred to as the ground of Being. Hence-Leibniz: "Thus every possible being can be said to strive to exist."

Our question regarding the 'selection' out of possible discursive developments, now becomes directed towards the distinction between 'possibility' and 'necessity'. Why, from amongst the 'possibles' is one seen as 'necessary'; as representing the 'imperativeness of the structure'? In this we detect an echo of Foucault's criticism of linguistics; that having accepted a notion of e.g. grammatical competence, of an infinite number of immanent well-formed strings, no account is offered, nor as yet demanded, of why any one of these strings should be 'realised', should break through the 'threshold of materiality', rather than any other string. Appeals to contexts will not help as this simply implies a sub-language, the grammar for which retains a smaller, yet still infinite, competence.

As a generality we are able to state that the 'necessity' of Being (along with the possibility of Being(s)) is 'generated', rather, 'developed', by the activity of being, prior to the evidence of Being presented to the philosophical subject. And it is in this sense that we understand the concept of materiality.
A statement (which presupposes materiality) is an articulation of the ground. That ground is constituted by, is contemporaneous with, those relations which are produced by the articulation of that statement in its materiality. The statement does not fill a prepared space, neither does it represent the construction of a material edifice upon an area made fit beforehand. In this we might be seen to differ from Faye.

Yet we note that Faye claims that it is the 'semantic structures' which do the selection and this is certainly more in keeping with the general theme of this thesis. It is as though our category 'discourse' is, in some as yet obscure fashion - its own criterion of developmental selection; 'that within the 'general text' mechanisms operate which, in their own particular instance appear to exercise a power of veto and engender some function of necessity'. Such a discourse is a process without criteria. We hear Foucault admonishing us to consider only those statements which have been articulated in their material instance. Foucault's admonition might be contrasted with Heidegger (1973:40) "What is possible previously determines what is real" and "soon they let this origin become completely forgotten". No effort must be wasted on determining which other 'acceptable' statements might have been articulated. Our concern is with statements and in using this term we assume materiality. Neither will it be of value to provide explanation, nor give reason, why one statement was articulated rather than other apparently possible, and what would appear, equally probable statements. Such an investigation would place us back in that area of metaphysics which was concerned with the provision of accounts of whatness and thatness. The fundamental importance of Heidegger's writings can thus be demonstrated in the subsequent writings of contemporary critics such as Derrida, Foucault, Faye, and Said.

We can perhaps summarise by saying that Being is the crystallisation of the activity of becoming-into-Being. This is equally the case whether we refer to the Being of a statement or to the Being of an academic discipline. We note further that the activity of 'becoming' is the proper sense of the verb 'being'. The completed act which is Being presents a resistance in two senses of the term. It can assume an Authority-of-Being (what is actual) regarded by some as the guarantor of Truth. In this it invites complacency and self-satisfaction to those who see themselves as in possession of the Truth. Yet it also provides that essential point of departure; that material resistance which provides a ground (Ur-grund) for new beginnings, for new activities of being.

If one were to credit discourse with an internal dynamic; regard it as exemplifying an 'organic', as opposed to an imposed 'technical', or analytic, form, then by analogy (or to the extent that 'society' is a variable, dependent upon discourse as a free variable), society must be recognised as containing its own dynamic. Humboldt and Heidegger both appear to identify the site of this linguistic (so. discursive) activity as the functioning of several declensions, in the sense of a falling away from a standard.

Yet by 'standard' there is no wish to imply a reference to some normative state situated in either a mythical or an historic past; nor yet to any theoretical category of 'language'. 
On the contrary, though not immediately recognisable as such, by 'standard' I refer to an idealised state of affairs within discursive development; any synchrony (pace Saussure); any idealised stage represented by the relative positions of the pieces in Saussure's chess board analogy. However, contrary to Saussure, we propose that the 'value' (valeur) of any piece depends on the possible positions which that piece might occupy at its next move, and the state of the board which such a move might anticipate. Not that the state of the board at any moment in the game is a notion which might be ignored. Such an idealised 'state' we might take as representing that 'norm', or 'standard', which both Humboldt and Heidegger declared constitutes that from which these various declensions originate. Yet to accept this would constitute a compromise.

Again we recognise the true magnitude of Derrida's warning:

"Within the enclosure itself, by means of indirect and perilous manoeuvres, risking constantly a relapse back into what one intends to deconstruct..."

(1967:25)

(It is as though the whole weight of argument conspires to urge us to take that prior theoretical category of 'language' as the normative, or standard, from which actual articulated linguistic performance deviates; we shall constantly be in danger of reverting back to that security offered to the complacent; for ever aware that that same Being which provides the necessary resistance to any departure will also provide both relief and accolade for those faint-hearted who either choose or are deceived into reposing in Truth's authority.)

Within linguistic studies, since Saussure, the distinction between la langue and la parole is generally accepted as being of the very nature of the object of linguistic study, viz. language. Coinciding with the acceptance of such a distinction has been the demand to regard la langue as the proper object of linguistic enquiry. Yet historical studies have tended to focus upon phonological matters, which, alongside both semantic and syntactic investigations, have been largely restricted to the comparison of two or more stages of development. Evidence for such development is gained upon a consideration of recorded linguistic performance, i.e. at the 'level' of la parole. There is no contradiction here, and it is necessary to demonstrate such.

The distinction between la langue and la parole is no more than a statement regarding the 'form' of any natural language.

It is a statement which is:

"...in itself independent of any experience. In itself, it says nothing at all about the possibility of its application and relation to experimental data. It includes no existence postulate. It constitutes what has been called a purely deductive system, in the sense that it may be used alone to compute the possibilities that follow from its premises."

(Hjelmslæv, L:1953:8)
This distinction, between la langue and la parole, consists of the fewest and most general premises. In many ways it might be said to correspond to Chomsky's distinction between competence and performance. In that such a linguistic theory need make no reference to recorded linguistic performance there is good reason to suppose that any such linguistic theory is arbitrary. (Ibid. 1953:8) Similarly Chomsky proposes a linguistic theory based only on such formal assumptions as he feels are necessary for the construction of an adequate grammar for any natural language. Contrary to the arbitrariness of both Saussure's and Chomsky's linguistic theory, a grammar (which is a theory of a particular language) must be appropriate, i.e., it must provide a sufficient account of: "all and only those utterances which a competent native speaker would recognise as being grammatically well-formed".

Many grammars might be constructed, and be sufficiently justified to the extend that they account for, not only those recorded sample data of performance (la parole), but also the competent native speaker's intuition of well-formedness (la langue - competence).

"In this sense, the grammar is justified on external grounds, on grounds of correspondence to linguistic fact."

(Chomsky, 1965:27)

It is precisely in the matter of principles, of those 'fewest and most general premises'; to the extent that a grammar, as a theory of a particular language, is based upon those 'formal assumptions', that a grammar is said to be justified on internal grounds. A grammar which is justified on internal grounds must demonstrate its own possibility as reflecting or as deducible from those fundamental premises which constitute a linguistic theory.

It should not be necessary to point out that linguistic theories such as proposed by Saussure and Chomsky, which make statements regarding the nature of the object under investigation, and which are situated 'out of time', are timeless. It may not be so widely accepted that in theories of language such as composed by Saussure and Chomsky respectively, the categories of la langue and competence, are similarly ahistoric. This point was made by Hjelmslev:

"The calculation permits the prediction of possibilities, but says nothing about their realisation."

(Hjelmslev, 1953:9)

and has been articulated more recently by Ardener:

"Such models are in themselves 'timeless', or neutral in regard to time - achronic."

(Ardener, 1971:210)

So that, in no way, could it be said that la parole (performance) is but an element, or example, of la langue (competence). La langue (competence) comprises those lexical items, the set of rules allowing for their various combinations, and a device which will enable a semantic and phonetic representation of such combinations to be realised. La parole (performance) on the other hand, is precisely those realised representations.
To suggest, therefore, that a contradiction pertains between
la langue and linguistic performance (la parole), evinces a
misapprehension. La langue (competence) and la parole (per-
formance) are of a different order and thus not comparable
in this fashion; the one is abstract and atemporal, the
other is recordable as an event in an historical instance;
on the one hand we might refer to a purely theoretical
systematic, on the other hand we are confronted with a
material, and hence, significant object. We must also bear
in mind that statements which either constitute linguistic
theories, or comment upon the same, are situated within
the category la parole. We would feel more justified in
situating the origin of the category la langue within
la parole, than we would in seeking the grammatical
'history' of la parole within la langue.

The acceptance of la langue as the proper object of
linguistic enquiry, and the necessity of considering la
parole when undertaking historico-comparative studies, does
not constitute any contradiction. Such assumptions and
procedures do raise various obstacles however, and,
subsequently, these must be addressed. But the claim that there
was a contradiction at issue here is discredited and we must
conclude this aside and return to our main argument.

It will be remembered that we left unsolved those
problems relating to the selection of particular discursive
developments from amongst the plethora of possibilities.
But to address ourselves to this problematic would be to
surrender our effort, and to enjoy the satisfaction and
compacency proper to those engaged in providing account of
the metaphysical history of Being. Corresponding to our
decision to consider only material statements, we must
necessarily abandon those enquiries which aim to demonstrate
what 'might have been said' in their place.

With the recent nullifying of the apparent contradiction
engendered between the categories of la parole and la langue,
our criticisms of Linguistics might be situated more specifically.
Providing account of a purely theoretical and ahistorical
systematic will, in no way, provide detail of the emergence
of a statement in that material instance proper to it.
Working within the boundaries set by such a timeless automaton,
it is surely impossible to provide adequate account as to
how its own phenomenal existence, and those theoretical
categories proper to itself, came to emerge at that historical
conjuncture at which it did.

A claim is made that discourse is the essential process
of becoming-into-Being; that this process is the very nature
of discourse. It has been proposed, however, that any
discursive development requires a material point-of-departure
in the Authority-of-Being. There appears to be yet another
paradox here. If the essential nature of discourse is that
of becoming-into-Being, where then is that Being which
provides that point-of-departure, which is to be regarded as a
function of the trace left by that discursive activity?
We propose that discourse is the very activity of producing
those traces which evidence that activity. There can be no
discourse except it leaves a trace. (It is the elucidation
of such traces in the subconscious, that constitutes the
problematic of psychoanalysis. For example, see Derrida:
'Freud and the scene of writing'. In Y.F.S.) An 'understanding'
of the trace left behind by that activity constitutes the Being from which that development will proceed. The activity of writing, for example, is thus a constant-moving-away-from-Being; an articulation, which we regard as the corollary of the production of a trace, might be described as the attempt to escape that Being, which congeals immediately behind that activity. This constitutes a resistance, a tension, between the articulation (speaking or writing) and the becoming-into-Being. Like Lot's wife, a suspension of activity and a retrospective glance in search of verification, will precipitate a collapse of that tension which is the essential characteristic of that activity which is discourse, and will precipitate a calcification of that activity into Being.

NOTES.

1. By 'founding father' we simply refer to the one who occupied the site at which the development of being (verb) overcomes the resistance offered by the boundaries of that Being (noun). The impetus of the activity of being eventually necessitates, and so constitutes, an insurrection against the Authority of Being. This insurrection is energised from within that Being which it displaces. Institutions have the essential function of maintaining the Being of a discursive formation. Thus, no reference is made, nor implied, to any category of 'creative subject' or 'genius'.

2. A reference to homeopathic medicine. Contemporary medicine is concerned only to suppress individual symptoms, whereas the homeopathic practitioner considers the state of affairs of the patient as a whole.

3. Paul de Mann has this to say about history, a subject which we recognise as having much in common with social anthropology.

"To become good literary historians, we must remember that what we usually call literary history has little or nothing to do with literature and that what we call literary interpretation - provided only it is good interpretation - is in fact literary history. If we extend this notion beyond literature, it merely confirms that the bases of historical knowledge are not empirical facts but written texts, even if these texts masquerade in the guise of wars or revolutions."

Paul de Mann; 'Literary history and literary modernity.' In Daedalus: Theory in Humanistic Studies. 1970.

4. Marxists have no difficulty in providing such accounts. For example:

"(I)It is clearly necessary to think the history of discursive events as structured by material relations embodying themselves in institutions."

Dominique Lecourt: Marxism and Epistemology; 1975:795.

5. There is, however, at least one major sense in which Chomsky's competence:performance couple differs from that of Saussure's la langue : la parole distinction. This difference evinces the historicity of the respective theories. Working within the volkgeist of late 19th.-early 20th. century France,
Saussure situated la langue in le consentement collectif, i.e. as a social fact. Chomsky, in an increasingly liberal, Post-War America, proposes that competence is a function of the individual's bio-chemical constitution.

6. It is worthy of note, however, that any theory of language (which is a theory of la langue, or competence) must be founded upon an initial consideration of linguistic performance. Thus, as a footnote to p. 14 in Syntactic Structures, Chomsky writes: "Notice that to meet the aims of grammar, ..., it is sufficient to have a partial knowledge of the sentences... of the language, since a linguistic theory will state the relation between the set of observed sentences "and the set of grammatical sentences; i.e. it will define 'grammatical sentence' in terms of 'observed sentence,' certain properties of observed sentences, and certain properties of grammars. To use Quine's formulation, a linguistic theory will give a general explanation for what 'could' be in language on the basis of 'what is plus simplicity of the laws whereby we describe and extrapolate what is'. (W.V. Quine, 1953:54)"
Thus it can be argued that Chomsky offers us a 'performance' model, but of an extended type.

7. The qualification 'material' is here redundant, as by 'statement' we assume materiality.

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Androgy and Creativity

This paper came about as a stage in a sequence of thought prompted by the women's seminars in Oxford, especially with regard to an anthropological analysis of women in literature. The main point in putting the concepts of androgy and creativity together is to try to find a formula by which I can convey how useful they have been not only to my thinking, but also in terms of a more personal approach to my work.

Androgy is not a familiar term. Derived from the Greek andro (male) and gyn (female), it defines a condition in which the characteristics of the sexes, the human impulses expressed by men and women, are not rigidly defined. It suggests a spirit of reconciliation between the sexes, a full range of experience open to individuals who may, as women, be aggressive, as men, tender; a spectrum into which human beings fit themselves without regard to propriety or custom. Our present definition of sexual roles is under scrutiny. We are the heirs of the Victorians in this. I have been concerned in previous papers with the biological and medical repercussions of this. (J. Blair J.A.S.O. Vol. V. No. 2. 1974). Juliet Mitchell in her book on Freud has suggested that alternatives to the Freudian view can, at this stage, either be a simple reversal, as in the work of Mary Jane Scherfey, or in the realms of science fiction, since we have no way of knowing what personality developments would be possible in a non-patriarchal system. The sexual revolution pioneered by de Beauvoir and Greer rests very much on adopting the male roles for women. To a certain extent the recent history of the women's liberation movement in America exemplifies the limitations of this more than those of Europe, perhaps because of the climate of opinion which has grown out of the puritan and capitalist ethos with its stress on individualism, competitiveness, achievement, and material advance. Many of the social problems of our time, colonialism, exploitation of the third world, ecological exploitation, racial hierarchies etc. have recently been put in the context of a 'masculine' emphasis on competitiveness and aggressiveness. When thinking in terms of male and female dichotomies, this has suggested to many women that the alternative value system of peace, nurturance, mutual aid, sharing of power and world resources, compassion, understanding, and self-denial, which have traditionally been considered 'feminine' provide the answer to world social problems. It has been thought that while aggression and competitiveness have endangered human survival, gentleness and lovingness are regarded as 'feminine' and out of place among rulers, thus condemning us to continued self-brutalisation and even self-destruction. It was these ideas which suggested to me that I should look at Ghandi's non-violent political praxis in the light of female-maternal ideology. This thesis is not original. In a paper given at a seminar in Oxford in 1971, Cohen tried to explain the anti-Vietnam War movement and the Hippie and yippie movements in terms of the contrasting domestic value system, which he called female, and the sudden exposure of the youth of America to the public political value system which he called masculine. It was not so much a conflict of the Hawk and the Dove, as what Rivers encountered during his work in psychiatric hospitals during the first world war, where the new school of psychiatrists suggested that the condition of shell-shocked soldiers should be attributed
to the ethical conflicts of youth raised for peace and suddenly exposed to war. Needless to say the traditional view was unsympathetic to the soldiers whom they regarded as effeminate. The contradictory value systems have been subjected by Reich to an analysis in terms of male authoritarian competitive and self-perpetuating structures, which fitted neatly into Capitalist-Communist dichotomies, and by Norman O. Brown into Authority-Father, and Egalitarian-Brother ideologies.

At face value the biological and ethological approach to anthropology gives credence to the authoritarian-aggressive infrastructure of man-made power structures. Augé's Marxist-structuralist approach suggests that it might be impossible to think outside these patterns of dominance and subservience. Thus it seems that whatever alternative approaches are used alongside the modern anthropological analyses to give wider perspective, Structuralist, Marxist, Ethological, Psychological, the conclusions are the same. Perhaps it is outside the domains of anthropology to be concerned with biological, psychological, or economic bases for political power structures, but I believe several factors undermine this view. Firstly there is the practical demand that a science of man has, at least at the rational ideological level, to sully itself with some type of social engineering. (See Young, 1972). Secondly, the concerns of women's liberation have forced the science of man to look seriously at whether or not there are basic biological and psychological differences that can be related to ideological differences. Thirdly, accepting that the women's liberation movement has reached the stage of institutionalised recognition in International Women's Year, where are we to take it from here? How are we to be comfortable living in a society where at some level or another we find ourselves living 'against nature'. It seems to me daily more difficult to maintain an integrity of rational and emotional understanding from the boudoir to the polling booth. Of all so-called revolutions it seems least appropriate to see the women's revolution in terms of a power-struggle. It might be considered by the media that Japanese women received the Queen as a symbol of women's liberation, or that Mrs. Thatcher's success was a blow for the cause, but such facts are so far from what the majority of women concerned with liberation are interested in, that further classification is necessary. In the context of the categories available to us it is easier to view Mrs. Thatcher as a man-woman, in contrast, say, to Eva Peron.

In an effort to get a firmer grip on these slippery concepts, I want to concentrate for a while on the other idea in my title 'creativity'. This is a very loose term, and my concern with it is the result of six months' research on dreams. Leaving aside the neurophysiological aspect of the necessity of dreaming, I would like to look at some of the more useful ideas of the psychologist anthropologist Anton Ehrenzweig, who studied under Mary Douglas. From child psychology he took the ideas of syncretic and analytic vision. These he used to contrast the rational-logical faculty in analytic order, and the syncretic-creative faculty. It is easiest to give an example of the latter in terms of the conscious-unconscious dichotomy; when a painter is adding a brush stroke to his work, he is not at that precise moment considering which colour to add where,
but almost suspends conscious thought and allows his hand to be
guided by some unconscious or preconscious. When it is done, it is
right or wrong, and then perhaps can be verbalised and analysed.
This is not to say that an artist is more visually than verbally
orientated, which goes without saying. Another example of synchretic
thinking might be a scientific breakthrough such as the discovery
of a formula explaining the valency linkage explaining the odd
behaviour of a gas. The scientist was supposed to have stumbled on
this while in a day dream holding the problem in his mind but think­
ing at the same time of sausages, and from this he created his model
to explain the scientific problem. In the simplest terms I want to
define creativity as the ability of the human mind to bring out
original ideas and creations from all the number of mathematically
possible combinations of the impressions stored in the unconscious
mind. Dreams, day-dreams, fantasy and play often give easier access
to this facility than reasoned logic, which is more of a post facto
rationale in terms of which the innovation can be more fully
appreciated. This is the aesthetic fun of structuralist analysis.
The original creative thought or act is not available to conscious
scrutiny.

Theories of creativity have been linked to sexual differences
for a long time. Since biologically men fall into the extreme of
idiot or genius more often than women, according to statisticians,
the genius is more likely to be male. But at this point 'male' has
to be requalified. There were too many great homosexual artists
and innovators for the category to be clear-cut. (The subject of
Leonardo fascinated Freud, for example). Furthermore the theory
of sublimation has long confused the picture of creative endeavour.
So many different threads compose the picture we have of artistic
ability. First of all it is interesting simply to look at one
fundamental factor of the allocation of time; men have been used to
taking advantage of the servile position of women to create the
leisure for both artistic and scientific creative work. A good
example of this is in the writings of Alma Mahler, whose musical
talent was sacrificed in her effort:

"to recognise that it was my mission in life to move every
stone from his path and to live for him alone. I cancelled
my will and my being. He saw in me only the comrade,
the mother and housewife, and was to learn too late what
he had lost. His genius ate me up although he meant no
murder". (Werfel 1959, 45).

It was not just the rigid economic cares, the transcription of his
work, and her alienation from the musical circles because of these
that illustrate the necessity of sacrificing one creative autonomy
for the other, but also a type of sexual jealousy. She wrote:

'I happened to say in a letter to Mahler that I could not
write anymore that day as I had some work to finish, meaning
composition, which up to now had taken first place in my
life. The ideas that anything in the world could be of
more importance than writing to him filled him with indignation,
and he wrote me a long letter, ending up by forbidding
me to compose anymore. It was a terrible blow. I spent
the night in tears. Early in the morning I went sobbing
to my mother and she was so horrified by this unreasonable demand, that, deeply as she loved him, she urged me to break with him. Her unqualified support brought me to my senses. I recovered my calm and confidence and finally wrote him a letter promising him what he wished and I kept my promise... I buried my dream and perhaps it was for the best. It has been my privilege to give my creative gifts another life in minds greater than my own. And yet the iron had entered my soul and the wound has never healed".

(Mahler, 1956, p. 45)

Mahler realised the grave mistake he had made in forbidding Alma to compose when he found her song by accident. "God how blind and selfish I was in those days" he remarked. When one of her songs was performed he was more excited than over his own works. Hearing that it had gone well he said "Thank God" over and over. On his death she wrote "It was as if I had been flung out of a train in a foreign land. I had no place on earth". "I lived his life. I had none of my own". (ibid). Clara Schumann's fate was not dissimilar. She was a lot more established as a musician than he was at their marriage. He was jealous of her reputation and forbade her to practise. She was completely responsible for the family and finance and when Robert went to the asylum she supported her family, farmed out to relations and friends, by playing the piano. Brahms worshipped her as a figure on a pedestal, the consort of his hero. Because of the existence of marriage as an institution that reinforces and reproduces gender division, a woman of her capabilities felt that she had to step down and take second place. As with Alma, her wifely duties, her familial duties and her deference to accepted ideas of female behaviour prevented her compositional development. This pattern of behaviour can be cited again and again through specific cases, but provides a sad defence to such criticisms as Schopenhauer's:

"the entire sex have proved incapable of a single truly great, genuine and original achievement in art, or indeed creating anything at all of lasting value; this strikes one most forcibly in regard to painting; the reason being that they lack all objectivity of mind, which is what painting demands above all else. Isolated and partial exceptions do not alter the case." (From H.R. Hays 1966, p.208).

His view of women as procreators and playthings is identical to Nietzsche's. Even their virtues of sympathy, philanthropy and pity he saw as a result of their inability to be objective or rational or to form abstract ideas, thus they could only be affected by the mood of the present.

So far I have only reiterated the kitchen sink argument in explanation of the female's apparent lack of creative participation in culture. The women I have cited both felt compensated for the deprivation of their creative autonomy through their husbands'gifts and by a determined effort to devote themselves to the creative sphere of child-bearing and rearing. At this particular historical epoch it is important to note that there was a major polarisation of male and female spheres. To my mind this provides enough of an
objective theory of the non-creativity of women, and unlike Schopenhauer, I believe the exceptions to be of paramount importance if one wants to see under what conditions women could provide innovations in culture. To recap: biological creativity in women was enough of an ideal for female kind. In the words of Schopenhauer:

"She expiates the guilt of life not through activity but through suffering, through the pains of childbirth, caring for the child and subjection to the man, to whom she should be a patient and cheering companion". (op. cit. 1966). It is the man's role to ensure his immortality through creative participation in all aspects of culture. Freud's sublimation theory suggests that the greatest creations are the result of a type of sexual deviance, in that the natural sexual energies are channelled, because of some alien influence in childhood, to the achievement of a tangible cultural innovation. If one carries psychological explanation of creativity far enough most artists can be categorised as abnormal in one respect or another because of the megalomania necessary for such self-confidence in the face of public criticism, or obsessiveness in dedication to their work, or the frustration of a tremendous narcissism. Out of these grow theories of the artist as eunuch and the artist as stallion, both of which are simplifications. When emphasis is placed on the cultural context rather than the psychological neurosis, the case against women becomes clearer. A pyramid of arguments is used to explain and justify female exclusion from male culture; their biologically defined role in society, the economic necessity of freeing man from menial tasks, their psychological unfitness because of their participation in the inferior world of infants, and finally the fact that all their ingenuity and wit must be used to mould themselves into feminine ideals to ensnare a man who will support them economically while they carry out their biological function of procreation. Women who fail in this, and achieve a position in the male dominated world, like the composer Ethel Smyth, Florence Nightingale, George Eliot, Charlotte Bronte et al, are castigated as men or lesbians, and too unattractive to fulfil their lives in the accepted way.

Gustav Bychowski in his paper 'From Catharsis to Work of Art' (1951) presents a far more satisfying attempted explanation of creativity. He sees the complexity of cultural factors, conscious and unconscious, contributing to the expression of cultural innovation. The creative individual manages to:

"transpose the individual conflicts and complexes onto a vast screen of a social group, a nation, or humanity. In studying this point our analysis of great artists of the past comes out to help and supplements our clinical observations. The latter deals most often with individuals severely handicapped in their creativity by neurosis. We see them struggling, for instance, for the expression of their feeling of social injustice, or of injustice inflicted particularly by the male society on women. Time and again they launch the attack, disguising their individual hurt and rebellion in fictional form."
However, time and again the artistic form becomes disrupted by individual catharsis, so that what originally and consciously was intended as a work of art, becomes an expression of individual abreaction. Instead of mastery of the artist or, to be more specific, of his ego, over the raw material springing from his unconscious, we see him overwhelmed by its overflowing pressure. In such an aura all the characteristic functions of the creative ego - such as selection, discrimination, mastery and formation, that is, the binding of incoming material by form, become a task impossible to tackle. For an individual to confront his own culture, discover some area of it which in terms of his own individuality proves problematic, and to resolve this with an innovative work which appeals to the mass of his contemporaries, is the best description I can give of creativity. It avoids the jargon of psychology. More specifically for me it bridges the gap we have made between artistic and scientific creativity and it includes the sort of analysis I was trying to follow with my discussion of Ericson's analysis of Luther and Gandhi. (Orimer 1976: 191-207).

I believe that the most important factor in this deficient view of creativity is the first part which suggests that an individual has to be in touch with as much of his culture as possible. The present period of specialisation makes this an impossibility, but it is essential to see this as the aim of some of the foremost critics like George Steiner, quite apart from the foremost thinkers and artists and poets. Exclusion from the intellectual world of ideas accounts much more for the small number of women artists than their imprisonment in kitchen and nursery. Leisured women as Schopenhauer knew to his cost, spent a great deal of time painting, versifying and writing, but they generally worked in isolation and without education. Instead of the criticism often raised nowadays by critics such as Kingsley Amis, that women's writing is over-concerned with feelings and sentiments, rather than action and ideas, the criticism then was that women were over concerned with form, expert at the technicalities of art but without any worthwhile content. (Schopenhauer's mother abandoned him to relatives when he was nine, and ran a salon. She finally rejected her son in favour of a young poet whom he particularly resented, and they never spoke again. His relationships with other women were equally unsatisfactory).

I have attempted two approaches to a discussion of creativity, but only for the purpose of aiding a discussion of androgyny. I find it easiest to view creativity of all types as ranging between the sort of short-circuited personal manipulation of meaningful symbols employed in isolation by the neurotically disturbed, to the genius who can express in his chosen form significant innovations for most members of his cultural group. Before turning to the importance of the concept of androgyny, I would like to mention one other way in which women get shunted off into the sidings, instead of being allowed to continue on the main track of the arts.

Here again biologically based arguments are put forward to suggest that women have a 'different but equal' role to play in creativity. Their sensitivity, subjectivism, and heightened intuition make them good interpreters rather than original spirits. Female instrumentalists and singers, dancers and actors have some parity
with men because of the 'extra' quality of sensitivity to the male conductor, choreographer, writer or director. The women who do not settle for this rationalised acceptance I imagine to have a more than usual amount of energy and dedication, since they are then reduced to the male arena of the power struggle. Even in that art form which has almost been devalued because of the high proportion of women in that field, novel writing, there has formerly been experienced a great deal of discrimination against women to the extent that pseudonyms were essential. Scott, reviewing Emma in 1815 considered it beneath the sober consideration of a critic because of its female authorship. It is fascinating to note the difference in the reviews of novels by the Brontes and George Eliot when the reviewers thought the authors to be men, and when they knew them to be women. Here for example is the 1859 Economist review of Adam Bede:

"Novel writing has of late years devolved so largely upon women that it is quite rare to meet with a well-matured and carefully executed novel by a man of genius. In novels written by women, the exaltation and predominance of one class of feelings, and the slight and inadequate treatment of all that lies beyond their immediate influence, make even the best of them seem disproportionate and unreal. The life which they represent is a kind of Saturnalia of love and the domestic affections, the practical business part of it being either slurred over or ludicrously misapprehended. Novels written by men are nearly always more in keeping with the actual world, have a wider outlook, and embrace a greater personal sort of knowledge to be gained from them; when they are original and clever and artistically constructed, they are more delightful as well as more profitable than the best novels by women. Adam Bede is one of the best of this class of novels ... After a course of the feverish, self-critical, posted up to the latest dates novels of the present day, reading Adam Bede is like paying a visit from town to the open hill sides, pure air, and broad sunshine of the country which it describes. We trust it may be no longer than necessary for the conscientious attainment of the high standard reached in this book before we shall meet Mr. Eliot again." (Heilbrun 1973: 76).

Eliot was described as having a 'masculine' mind; other authors were juggled round to fit into categories of 'masculine' and 'feminine'. There is no doubt that there has always been a market for both types of extreme, catering for societies where the male and female spheres might be considered two cultures. Jane Austen, who is perpetually being represented as 'feminine' wrote against the 'female' novels of her day in her parody of them, Northanger Abbey. The fact that our critical tradition is only just refraining from such simplifications indicates how much we have been dominated by the recent division of western culture into male and female, and how little attention has been paid to studying the society and culture of the historic periods in which these works were created. It is essential to have these two perspectives. When we have them an entirely different picture of the history of the various arts emerges, and I would like to suggest that the analytic tools created by our present concerns
with male and female provide an even better adaptation of appre-
ciative faculties, quite apart from the critical ones.

Here I find it easier to talk about the two areas I know best; the
history of European literature and the theatre. I would like
to make a few broad generalisations about these. It appears that at
certain periods society has produced conditions where either an
elitist group or a whole society has permitted the flowering of
what has been considered an apex in civilised life. The continued
enjoyment of the works of art created by these groups indicates their
appeal beyond the vagaries of fashion, they have a universality of
application to the human civilised condition. I wish to emphasise
the word civilised because this is the central theme. Greek literature,
Greek plays, the Renaissance, French and English and Russian culture
before the revolutions bear the same trait of uniting the polarised
male and female spheres of interest, talents and value systems. This
movement away from stereotypes and polar interests I would like to
call androgyny, and it is especially significant that high cultural
achievement should combine the so-called special abilities of both
sexes. Perhaps the most recent example of this might be found in
the Bloomsbury group, which has at present acquired notoriety more
for the blurring of sexual male and female characteristics than for
its work. In this example the life-styles of the group are almost
of as much worth as their work, as they are equally examples of
creative innovation. The conscientious objector who explained his
refusal to fight with the words 'I am the civilisation you are out
there fighting for' believed what he was saying, although the
objectors still had to suffer trials and imprisonment.

This submerged theme of androgyny does not only occur when
women were permitted to contribute to the arts, but also appears
in the preoccupation of artists with the role of women as active
participants in social life. The idea of 'woman as hero' has been
put forward by Heilbrun in her history of male and female in
literature, in order to differentiate between the hero and heroine,
the latter being merely the passive ideal around whom the action may
take place. The female heroes Electra, Medusa, Phaedra, Alcestis,
Portia, Rosalind, Viola, Nora, Henry James' heroines, Anna Karenina,
Emma, Catherine, Jane Eyre, Gudrun, and Ursula, (despite Lawrence)
all have an autonomy, a moral will, and an active passion. I suggest
that the continued popularity of such works is not to be found in
terms of plots and themes or artistry of exposition, but more in
their appeal to the total perspective of human emotions and problems
they convey, which cannot be neatly categorised into polar male and
female areas of experience and empathy.

To indicate that these polar stereotypes still operate, if not
in real life, then at least in our received impressions of real
life, I would like to make use of some Sunday Times quotations from
an article on Lord Lucan. I think this expresses superbly things
that, for example, Doris Lessing wrote in the Golden Notebook about
our notions of the male sphere of aggression, big business, and
politics. The context is culturally specific but I do not think
this diminishes its universality. Molly, a half-successful actress,
is defending the way she has brought up her son in the world of
artists, writers, actors, politicians, and ordinary people, to her
ex-husband who is one of the biggest men in the city. She says: "My son will grow up knowing something about the world he lives in, which is more than I can say for your three sons - Eton and Oxford, it's going to be for all of them. Tommy knows all kinds. He won't see the world in terms of the fishpond of the upper class." (Lassing 1973:39).

The article on Lord Lucan avoids value judgements or apparent bias. The journalist has presented the facts through the mouths of Lucan's friends. Here are some of the descriptions of the man which I believe indicate the 'totally' male world in which he lived. John Aspinall of Tiger fame, and married to the dead racing driver's widow Lady Sara Courage says of him:

"Lucan was my fifth, sixth or seventh best friend. I had known him for 20 years. I saw him as a figure like myself - born out of his own time. His qualities were the old fashioned ones - loyalty, honesty, reliability. He had the dignitas of an aristocrat without the impertinence that goes with great name or possessions. Lucan was really a leader of men. In fact he wasn't - but in more rigorous times he would have found a better role in life. In other words he would have been a valuable acquisition to a country. He wouldn't have had any difficulty getting loyalty from his men. He was a warrior, a Roman. He was quite capable of falling on his sword, as it were? ... He lived in the boys clubs a highly civilised patrician kind of life. He was a gambler, hated foreigners, and niggers, and had the genetic concern with politics bred into the landowning classes." (Fox, 1975 32).

Dominick Elwes described the, dare one call it, the other, female side of his nature, or his cultural interests:

"Lucan had a collection of Hitler's recorded speeches, many books on psychiatric illness - he was trying to get his wife certified to get back his children whom he saw as his last hope of immortality, and countless detective novels. His wardrobe contained rows of identical pin-striped suits. He also had a grand piano, had taught himself to play Bach and latterly Scott Joplin rags. This was one of the things he disguised from the world because people would have thought it soppy. (ibid. 32)

"He didn't really like women or sex. I think he saw women as an inferior race. He was often embarrassed in their company. If anything, I would say that he would perform only the occasional boff de politesse". (ibid. 34)

Perhaps it is unfair to use an attempted wife-murderer to present the polar male ideal, but I am dealing with stereotypes. To give a glimpse of the female stereotype I would like to refer again to Alma Mahler's description of her living death after her husband's death - her feeling of having no part in the world or life of her own. When reading this I was reminded of a talk given by a publisher
who said that he had to read hundreds of novels a year by women who had tried to put into literary form how it felt to be annihilated after their husband's death and to try to find a way of life for themselves afterwards. He always returned them with a short letter of condolence saying he had learnt a lot, and one of their passages had been most original. This seems to be a sad illustration of art as catharsis, though they believed they were passing on useful information to others. Novels about women as complete human beings not handicapped in the race of life by either innate or socially conditioned imperfections suggests the androgyny of the female hero from the Iliad to the Golden Notebook. It is more difficult to isolate the androgynous male but it is indicated by Joyce's Ulysses rather than the Odyssey.

I see the androgynous ideal as the result of permitting human beings to identify with all areas of life. The renaissance female artists were all trained like men in their father's studios and supported not only themselves but their husbands and families on their earnings. (Spare Rib 1973: 11-13).

The protected woman is crippled for life, for living. I think George Eliot expressed this better than anyone. In Middlemarch she did not permit the happy ending, the marriage of true minds and bodies, until the characters of Dorothea and Lydgate had become 'whole'. They were not to find happiness in the marriage ideal of searching for the other half - Dorothea as a sort of Milton's daughter, servant to a great man. Lydgate found that what he was missing was that Dorothea could be not only 'a real friend to a man' but also in another world, a sexual partner. The middle way of Middlemarch depends on an androgynous combination of all the dichotomies we align with the concepts of male and female. At this point I feel like doing a reversal of structural analysis, ending with the gestalt image of the whole, but I will give the last word to George Eliot:

"We women are always in danger of living too exclusively in the affections; and though our affections are perhaps the best gifts that we have, we ought also to have our share of the more independent life - some joy in things for their own sake. It is piteous to see the helplessness of some sweet women when their affections are disappointed - because all their teaching has been that they can only delight in study of any kind for the sake of a personal love. They have never contemplated an independent delight in ideas as an experience which they could confess without being laughed at. Yet surely women need this sort of defence against passionate affliction even more than men". (Heilbrun, 1973, 76).

Juliet Blair
(paper given in 1975)
Androgyny and Creativity: paper given in June 1975


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We are grateful to Dr. Godfrey Lienhardt, acting in his capacity as literary executor to both Radcliffe-Brown and Evans-Pritchard, for the following previously unpublished letters. The letters are undated, though they were probably written sometime between Radcliffe-Brown's retirement from the chair at Oxford in 1946 and the period shortly after the B.B.C. lectures given by Evans-Pritchard in the winter of 1950, to which Radcliffe-Brown refers in the second letter. The first letter is probably the earlier, but it is not certain to which book of Evans-Pritchard's Radcliffe-Brown is referring.

Dept. of Social Anthropology,
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Dear E-P,

I shall probably write something about your book. As to my use of historical data I would give as an instance my repeated use in teaching of such things as the data given or used by Glotz and several others on the historical development of law in ancient Greece. As to 'law' I will accept the account given by Kaufman in his 'Methodology of the Social Sciences'. I certainly distinguish between 'empirical' and 'theoretical' laws. Durkheim formulated empirical laws (based on statistics) as to the correlation of suicide with certain other features of social life. Comte called 'the first law of social statics' the theoretical generalisation that there are relations of interdependence amongst the various features of social life. I regard this as a fundamental theoretical law and you certainly used it in the 'Nuer'. A law of a somewhat different kind is the economic law, many times verified, that if in a money economy there is a marked increase in the quantity of money (gold, silver, paper, dogs' teeth, cowries) in circulation without corresponding increase in goods or services available for purchase, the value of money will decrease, or, in other words, money prices will rise. This has been verified in historic societies many times from the occasion when the great increase in the supply of silver from Spain caused inflation in ancient Egypt. I would call it a theoretical, not an empirical law.

In social anthropology at present we have very few laws with the formulation of which I can be satisfied. If you want 'hypothetical' laws you can find an abundance in Nadel's book, and some of them may perhaps some day be established as laws.

I have always thought that Durkheim might have been a real sociologist if he had freed himself from philosophy.* I should call him a moralist rather than a metaphysician.

Yours ever,

(signed)

R.B.

A law is a general proposition, for which there is believed to be some empirical evidence, asserting some regular relation
between phenomena or events. The typical example of a 'law of nature' has always been the statement 'All men are mortal'.

*Ginsberg was recently expanding this thesis in a lecture here.*

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Endleigh Hotel,
Endleigh Gardens, W.C.I.

Dear E - P,

I am very sorry that I have not been able to get to Oxford, as I had hoped to do. Deterioration in my health has kept me hanging about U.C. Hospital. Now I am in the throes (I think that is the cliche) of packing, which I greatly dislike.

I have been reading my Introduction to the volume on African kinship. I find it is not as bad as I thought it was. I think you should read it and I suggest that you might offer, if not an apology, then a retraction of your statement that in my comparative studies I make no use of historical material. I suspect that the ordinary reader will ask 'Why does this man introduce Anglo-Saxon and Roman systems of kinship and marriage in a book about Africa?' I put in quite a lot of work on Teutonic and Celtic systems and it is a pity to waste it all.

I have written two criticisms of your B.B.C. lectures. I do hope you will not find them too severe. I think a little severity might be called for but I prefer to leave that to the Economist. So I have been as tender as I can in all honesty and sincerity. I feel that you have recently been somewhat led astray, and scientific methodology is something you are not very strong on.

You complained that I had never given an example of a 'law' in social anthropology. It is of course obvious that we do not mean the same thing by the word 'law' and I therefore suspect that I shall never waste my time looking for what you might call a law. But if you will read the Introduction to the African book you will find there more than one example of what I call laws. In science a theoretical law is a guide to investigations, like the law of gravitation or the law of entropy, or the laws of valency in chemistry. I have formulated explicitly a law of prohibited and preferred marriages. There is a law, which it would be difficult to formulate explicitly, implied in my discussion of father-right and mother-right, or rather a combination of two or three laws. What I have to say about generations could, I think be reduced to a certain number of laws. There is an implied law not specifically or explicitly formulated behind my treatment of the principles of unity of the sibling group and unity of the lineage group. You can say, if you will, that all these generalisations are invalid. That provides no reason for thinking that other more intelligent investigators will not be able to formulate valid generalisations. You yourself, in all your work, accept the generalisation of Montesquieu which Comte called 'the first law of social statics', the law that in any society the various features of social life are interconnected so that they form some sort of coherent whole or system. If you reject this theoretical law where are you?

Yours ever,

(signed)
P. R - B
This collection brings together essays published over a space of some 20 years, almost all appearing in the 1960's and 70's after the publication of the first volume of *Anthropologie Structurale* in 1958. As a collection, I think it is well chosen, and, together with the first, we now have two volumes which provide convenient access to most of Levi-Strauss' important essays. As a translation and as an offering of essays "almost all (of which) are impossible to find today" (p.vii), those already familiar with Levi-Strauss' work may be surprised to find that well over half the text consists of essays previously translated, originally written in English, or easily available in publications in this country. It is, nevertheless, a useful reference book and, like the previous volume, will quickly become a standard text for those interested in Levi-Strauss' work.

The 18 essays are grouped under four headings; five essays entitled "Perspective views", two on "Social Organization", seven on "Mythology and Ritual", and four on "Humanism and the Humanities". I find it is also useful to make a binary grouping of canonical essays on structuralism on the one hand and 'obiter dicta' on the other. Parts Two and Three (Chapters VI to XIV) together with Chapter V and to some extent Chapter XVI either show the structuralist method at work or revive the old debates through the well known programmatic statements. For those interested in such issues, perhaps the most important inclusion is Chapter VII where, commenting on a work by Vladimír Propp, the distinction between "structuralism" and "formalism" is argued at some length.

While this group of essays will, for most readers, constitute a re-encounter with structuralism and may offer little new, the English edition has a short preface by the author where the concluding 500 words or so present what I take to be, not a falt­ering of confidence, but certainly a shift of emphasis in the tone by which the structural method is presented.

Beginning (p.viii) by pointing to the "fashionable objection" to structural anthropology - that its hypotheses cannot be "falsified" - a distinction is made between the natural and the human sciences. It is explained why these two activities have a different "epistemological status" and why the hypotheses of the human sciences (as opposed to those of the natural sciences) "cannot now or ever, be falsified." (p.ix). Recalling what was written in 1953:

"...the best model will always be that which is TRUE, that is...while being derived exclusively from the facts...makes it possible to account for all of them..."

*Structural Anthropology, 1963, p.281*

- a statement which I have always construed as indicating something of the preconceptions and expectations of the structuralist method - I must confess to some surprise at finding the argument here going on:

"In this domain, a hypothesis is never true. Consequently it cannot be false either......A hypothesis only possesses a relative value, granted if it succeeds in accounting for MORE facts than those hypotheses it replaces......Structuralism does not presume to contain the truth."

(p.ix my emphasis).
I think the shift is significant and represents, however briefly intimated, a genuine attempt by the author to reconsider structuralism in response to the considerable body of critical commentary which the subject has accumulated. Practitioners of the structuralist method show little enthusiasm to reflect on questions regarding the value and significance of their findings, and if accumulations of debate urge them to do so, that is all to the good.

Qualities which Lévi-Strauss himself describes as "erudition, moral reflection, and aesthetic creation" (c. f. p. 306) I find best revealed in his 'obiter dicta'. Just as Tristes Tropiques remains his best book, so in a collection like this I find that it is when he is not performing structural analysis or defending the structuralist method that the prose and the thought become fascinating and one finds that excitement elicited by the insights of an outstanding man of letters. The pedagogical essays on Rousseau and Durkheim (Chapters II and III) will, in style and content, remind Oxford students of a teaching tradition in anthropology which encourages the view that Montesquieu and Mauss, Hume and Hocart, are more important to one's education than a taste for passing intellectual fashion. The justification for anthropological research presented in Chapter IV together with the remarks on ideas like "culture", "race", "progress", "primitive" "civilization", in Chapters XVII and XVIII deal with questions of disquieting profundity in a manner of assured competence. There is a delightful essay (p. 276) on Picasso and butterfly collecting where, around the image of John Fowles' The Collector a quite passionate moral statement is constructed on the theme of "a more correct sense of beauty and truth" and the "growing stupidity of man in front of himself".

It is this aspect of "moral reflection", taken in a wide sense as a concern with discriminations of value and significance, that structuralism perversely refuses to respond to. If a structuralist interprets a myth as various transformations of sets of binary oppositions, we need no longer question the epistemological status of the interpretation by asking if it is verifiable or falsifiable. The interpretation claims an immunity from those conventional touchstones of the physical sciences. No claims are made for truth. What is now clear is that the appropriate question is not "is the interpretation true?" but "is the interpretation interesting?" It cannot claim immunity from criteria of significance.

Again, to return to Lévi-Strauss' intriguing preface:

"What is interesting in an is not subject to scientific decision but results and always will result from a choice which is ultimately of a philosophical order." (p.ix)

Choice, he could have added, is an ethical matter. It blurs the distinction between description and evaluation. (Hicoeur, "construing and constructing", T.L.S. Feb. 25, 1977). Hence it is not sufficient to justify a structuralist interpretation by indicating how many more facts it succeeds in accounting for. One must also justify on what grounds it is held that this way of accounting for facts is significant enough to claim our interest in the first place.

The debate on structuralism has shown, for instance, that there are sound 'a priori' arguments to support the view that structural analyses cannot tell us anything about "fundamental structures of the mind". Similarly the structural analysis of myth and ritual reveals neither "laws" nor "principles of logical necessity". Even the more modest claim that a structural analysis uncovers "a unity and a coherence" in the material it
addresses cannot be justified unless we have some idea of what sort of coherence we are expecting to find, that is, some indication of the criteria by which something is going to count as coherent.

Our interpretations are a response to the questions we choose to ask. These questions carry with them our interests and our expectations. The value of an interpretation is a matter of how far, and in what way, these expectations have, or have not, been confirmed. My dissatisfaction with structuralist interpretations does not concern doubt about criteria of verifiability but criteria of evaluation and significance. Such interpretations are, and will remain, opaque until a more coherent attempt is made to clarify the questions being asked and examine the conditions of that choice by which we decide "what is interesting in man".

Alan Campbell.


People of the Mediterranean is an exercise in comparative social anthropology. If the lack of necessary evidence and the grounds on which comparison is based make this book a failure, it is at least an instructive failure. How is it possible to talk about the similarities and differences among the societies of the Mediterranean in a productive way? John Davis argues that by being comparative, historical, and thematic, it is possible to trace "patterns of concomitant variation" in Mediterranean societies; and that there is enough similarity and enough history in the Mediterranean to make the enterprise worthwhile (255).

The book is divided into six chapters. The first and last chapters are primarily devoted to the failures of Mediterranean anthropologists and to the ways in which Mediterranean ethnography might be improved. The main body of the text is an ethnographic survey of the economies, forms of stratification, politics, family, and kinship in Mediterranean societies. There is regrettably no chapter devoted to religious systems or to the Church, which is one unifying feature between many of the societies discussed. Davis apologizes for the lack of any such chapter and attributes its absence to the failings of Mediterraneanists. The relations between Christian doctrine and secular ideologies and practices have not been sufficiently and systematically explored in Mediterranean ethnography. Although there is very little material about Mediterranean symbolic systems in the existing literature, Davis virtually ignores the subject. He might well have included it in his list of topics neglected by Mediterraneanists.

The stated aims of People of the Mediterranean are twofold: first, to review the literature of the Mediterranean published
before January 1975; and secondly, to suggest ways in which it might be improved. The book is an informative and useful compendium of ethnographic facts from a wide range of societies. Ninety-seven communities are mentioned in the text; and these are distributed among seventeen countries from Portugal along the Mediterranean shores to Yugoslavia and Turkey. As the author admits, the Mediterranean is neither a discrete geographical entity, nor is it characterised by any specific features that are uniquely Mediterranean; but it is an area in which people from diverse societies have come into contact for thousands of years and one in which similar institutions and ideas take a variety of forms. Davis goes so far as to say that "Mediterranean social facts are the product of the interaction of people of diverse kinds from time to time" over thousands of years (14-15). The hint of cultural diffusionist thinking in that statement is disturbing, and one wonders of what those Mediterranean social facts consist. People of the Mediterranean does not provide us with any answer, and the author states quite explicitly that it was not intended to do so.

A substantial part of this book is concerned with the failure of Mediterranean anthropologists. A recurring theme is that "Mediterraneanists have not made the most of their distinctive opportunities to be comparative and historical" (10). The author complains that his predecessors and colleagues have not only failed to compare the results of their respective investigations; they have also failed to provide the sufficiently detailed evidence required if their accounts are to be comparable. The duties of the Mediterraneanists to be comparative and historical are inextricably linked in "the method of concomitant variation" to which Davis aspires. He argues that Mediterraneanists "have ignored or abused history, and ignored those millennia of intensive interaction which have made Mediterranean societies" (7). Many of his criticisms are well-founded. The wealth of historical and literary sources to which many Mediterraneanists have access has not always been fully utilised. Communities are often studied in a narrow time scale. Few attempts have been made to integrate local and national processes within an historical framework, or to incorporate past events into a sociological account of a contemporary society. Davis adduces Blok and Jason-Tolman as the noteworthy exceptions and concludes that the anthropological future of history lies with these two Mediterraneanists (258).
As an essay in comparative social anthropology, this book does not seek to formulate any general propositions about Mediterranean institutions. No single method of comparison is utilized; and as Davis points out, comparison may mean "no more than putting evidence from one place alongside evidence from others" (15). The Sarakatsani bridegroom who makes secret visits to his bride during the early months of marriage is contrasted to the Bedouin father who ignores the seven-day wedding of his son. The result is interesting and instructive; and Davis does not attempt to formulate any far-reaching conclusions. He contends that only in some cases has it been possible to suggest very tentative sets of concomitant variations. By comparing material from a range of diverse societies, Davis has been able to point out gaps in the ethnographic record, to make a list of notes and queries for future ethnographers, and to make a plea for higher standards and conformity in ethnographic reporting. He uses his knowledge of Mediterranean ethnography in an intelligent and constructive manner; and he has few pretensions about the effectiveness of his comparisons. One simply wishes that he had a clearer understanding of the limitations and difficulties which must be confronted if Mediterranean institutions and ideas are to be compared.

What are the grounds for comparison and of what would the evidence consist? Davis seeks to establish patterns of concomitant variation, but rather than looking for structural similarities, he relies upon spurious analytical notions -- such as class, honour, household, family -- in his attempt to identify similarities and differences. Frequently he attributes the lack of evidence for an effective comparison to the failings of the ethnographers themselves. In some cases, this may be a justifiable complaint; but it seems not to have occurred to him that part of the problem rests not with the ethnographers, but with the kinds of evidence to which Mediterraneanists have access. Generally they do not have recourse to the kinds of formal criteria on which an effective comparison can be based.

This does not mean that it is an uninstructive or futile endeavour to compare Berber Saints and Bedouin camel herders in specific contexts, but having noted some kind of similarity between the two, what more can we say about the "family resemblance"? Davis advises us to note the variations, changes in context, and resulting changes in the balance of elements when similar Mediterranean institutions and processes are compared within an historical framework. Unfortunately he does not fully apply his proposed method of comparison to any of the institutions examined in his book. Once having pointed out similarities and differences between Balkan zadrugas and Sarakatsani stani, he finds that he cannot take the comparison any further. In comparing different Mediterranean societies, he refers to institutions, to types of economic activity, forms of stratification (bureaucracy, honour, class), forms of representation (vindication of rights, class struggle, and patronage), kinds of family, kinds of kinship, and kinds of family-like tie. By referring to typologies and to substantive notions, rather than to formal relations, he gives us no clearer understanding of the similarities and dissimilarities which he attempts to gauge.

There is one topic in this book to which Davis might have more usefully applied his "method of concomitant variation to an historical process" (255) -- namely, godparenthood. In the section devoted to godparenthood (Chapter 5, Family and Kinship), he makes passing reference to an essay by Gudeman, "The compadrazgo as a reflection of the natural and spiritual person" (1971).
Although Gudeman is not a Mediterraneanist, the lack of attention Davis paid to this superb article is surprising, since Gudeman meets the requirements of the comparative, historical social anthropology prescribed by Davis. Gudeman examines the compadrazgo system in a Panamanian peasant community within an historical and comparative framework. He argues that "all compadrazgo systems, including the Church versions, may be seen as a set of variations occurring through time and space; that all of the forms have a similar 'foundation but have evolved in different directions" (Gudeman 1971:46). He traces the historical development of the compadrazgo within the context of Christian dogma, and he locates beneath the visible similarities in compadrazgo systems in Latin America and Europe. There are certain logical rules by means of which "patterns of variation" in the compadrazgo system can be accounted for. By referring to the invariant structure of the compadrazgo and its relation to the family, Gudeman clearly demonstrates that it is possible to compare effectively compadrazgo systems in different societies. It is a pity that Davis has not made better use of this article in his own attempts to compare Mediterranean institutions and processes. He might have seen more clearly what kind of evidence is needed if there is to be a comparative, historical Mediterranean anthropology.

As an exercise in comparative social anthropology, People of the Mediterranean demonstrates how difficult and often impracticable it is to compare Mediterranean societies. The book is well worth reading. As an ethnographic survey, it should be especially useful to those who are doing field work in European and Mediterranean societies. The map of places mentioned in the text and the accompanying list of ethnographers are of special interest; but it should be noted that the list is by no means exhaustive. An excellent bibliography, which covers eighteen pages, will be welcomed by the future Mediterraneanists whom Davis so earnestly seeks to advise, to inspire, and to instruct.

S.J. Ott.


This work, by a former editor of this journal, is a more detailed consideration of issues that have animated the pages of JASO since its inception. These can be variously expressed but may be summed up as "...the shift from function to meaning" in social anthropology (E. Ardener, Ed. Social Anthropology and Language, 1971, Introductory essay, plx.), and the move away from a crudely conceived 'scientific' positivism in the social sciences in general. The background to this reorientation is demonstrated in the first half of the book through an examination of three of the major links between anthropology and language; the theories on the relationship of language to thought developed by Muller (Ch.2), the structuralism of Lévi-Strauss, from the Saussurian inspiration to semiology (Ch.3), and the recent developments in American linguistic anthropology (Ch.4). The shortcomings of these approaches in so far as they attempt to constitute any theory of meaning are demonstrated, although the works of Muller, who has all the virtue of being long dead, are shown to be in some ways more relevant than the structuralisms and formalisms of recent years, whose anti-semantic and often unrealistically optimistic programmes are clearly exposed.
The central themes of the book are expanded in the second half through a consideration of various conceptual problems that social anthropology has inherited, in various ways, from the prevalence in the human sciences of "a hopelessly inadequate positivistic view of scientific method (derived not from the actual practice of natural science but largely from philosophers like Mill)" (p.89). The aid of modern linguistic philosophy is enlisted to show that "human action is a subject matter to which the sorts of explanation given in the physical sciences are inapplicable" (p.91, from Winch, The Idea of a Social Science and its relations to Philosophy, 1958 p.72).

The important point that the 'shift from function to meaning' is more than a merely fashionable move from a functionalist world of 'concrete institutions' to a structuralist world of 'ideas' is well demonstrated in chapter 6, 'Recasting Witchcraft', where this distinction itself is shown to be derived from a positivist prejudice regarding the differential relevance of different kinds of evidence. The move from witchcraft to law and politics "was not one from a conceptual problem on to institutional relations, for our notion of human action renders this division nonsensical" (p.124).

The inadequacies of an opposition of ideas to action are further clarified in chapter 7, where, for example, a short discussion of approaches to the analysis of alchemy shows that the imposition of such analytical oppositions as 'literalist' (alchemy as a proto-science) and 'symbolist' (alchemy as an expressive medium) asks questions of the data which can only be 'answered' by a restructuring of our own academic discourse. In chapter 8, 'The Translation of Cultures', we are shown how further oppositions of this kind, technique/art, explanation/expressiveness, and science/religion, whose second terms might appear potentially constitutive of a semantic anthropology, are in fact dissolved by it. As Crick says, "most of what is important to us is spoken about in discourse which mixes inextricably the analytical oppositions which logical positivism offered" (p.159).

The semantic approach is not, therefore, as structuralism has sometimes been thought to be, complementary to a functional approach, but rather "covers all the territory which was included in the older functional social anthropology" (p.2). That it is not felt necessary to labour this point with quite such force regarding the relationship of the semantic approach to structural anthropology derives perhaps from an assessment of the modernity and youthful open-mindedness of structuralism which is becoming less apt. However, semantic anthropology, although it is not "a new school or...the announcement of a new subdiscipline", and "refers only to an awareness that anthropology is necessarily a semantic enquiry!" (p.2), covers a limitless field, since "all that humanity utters is a statement about itself, so our label includes all systems" (p.159), not only in the humanities but also in the sciences, - "That there are features of scientific maps which overlap with those of others clearly makes science, too, an appropriate subject for semantic investigation" (p.137).

While this potential universality of some kind of semantic approach is established with confidence, it has possible strategic disadvantages. The recognition that "if anthropologists are to tackle this kind of issue more competently we shall need
to cultivate the sort of sensitivities possessed by literary scholars" (p. 135), and the perhaps ironic observations that "human beings are naturally anthropological" (p. 166) and that "To be a person requires the exercise of considerable anthropological skills" (p. 104) all imply that the 'newer anthropology' (p. 8) will appear very like the subjects whose fields it will find itself raiding for material, far beyond its own established empire of the traditional society. Bearing in mind the current vogue for ethological studies of man, the shortcomings of which are outlined in chapter 5, it might be feared that the space in academic and popular discourse which 'anthropology' occupies is more likely to be filled by some new and exuberant reductionism than by a semantic enquiry, however painstaking, which is so lacking in the definitional criteria necessary within the 'nation-state' organisation of academic disciplines. This criticism is to some extent anticipated - "No doubt, for some, the very familiarity of this 'anthropomorphic' approach will make it unacceptable, yet clearly scientific realism demands that an anthropomorphic model be used when a science actually is about human beings". (p. 91). We thus have a welcome, if risky, invitation to disarmament - "A Social scientist has no more basic capacity to understand human action than the people whom he is studying, but it is clearly absurd that he should proceed as if he had far less" (p. 91).

Behind the apparent clarity of this anthropomorphic approach, however, we can discern several difficulties. For example, we are made aware that "since social interaction is so much a matter of exchanging meaning, the precision of measurement of the physical sciences corresponds in the social sciences to a more minute conceptual delimitation" (p. 92, from Harré and Secord, The Explanation of Social Behaviour, 1972, p. 132), and that we must "try to analyse in a more painstaking fashion" (p. 159). We must also bear in mind however, that "Most of our leading concepts have blurred edges, but this is a vital and subtle imprecision" (p. 82), that "it seems highly unrealistic to regard the whole of a lexicon as a mosaic of tightly structured fields". (p. 72), and that the "linguistic registration of conceptual fields may be very partial" (p. 72). Furthermore, pertaining to British work on dual symbolic classification, we are reliably informed that "symbolic grammars never exist at just one level, and so to set out a series of homologous pairs could at best be only a start" (p. 73), and that "we cannot know how complex (the) contextual grammar will be" (p. 73). Bearing these points in mind, then, when we are told, in a dissolution of the category of witchcraft, that "the total moral space of a culture will have many dimensions, each constituted by a system of collective representations. For dissolving witchcraft, only two primary structurings will be discussed: firstly a system of concepts of human action and its evaluation; secondly a system of person categories. Naturally to understand any particular patterns of social action it would be necessary to relate these planes to the other classificatory structures" (p. 113), we begin to feel rather ill at ease. Bearing in mind the indeterminacy of concepts, non-linguistic registration of the 'basic tacit background' (p. 81) to social interaction and the potential complexities of contextual grammar in inter-systemic relations, not to mention the difficulties of translation, the 'naturally ... it would be necessary' rings rather hollow, and we begin to doubt whether conscientiousness will be enough.
Such criticism as this, of an enterprise which is emphatic in its claim to provisionality, and which has "not shrunk from emphasising diversity because it seems more important for anthropologists to avoid an opposite error" (p.149) is not irrelevant, since this book is, among other things, a consideration of the inevitable limits to our enquiry, and it would be a pity if our power to penetrate the 'total moral space' of a culture were thus casually overestimated.

A more serious criticism of a work emphasising the mutual opacity of conceptual systems concerns the use of superficially similar ideas from diverse academic discourses to establish a theoretical concordance such that the only alternative to error appears to be a theoretically innocent unremitting effort. For example, we are told that "...a scientific account is (not) concerned only with noting the forms of event which ordinary language traces. One also has to account for the nature of these forms; and to express their deep structures it will often be necessary to go beyond the resources of ordinary concepts, even to systems like non-metrical mathematics, for instance," (note 3, ch.5 p.173). Also that "...the analytical notions of French sociological thought ....are richly paradigmatic, and sufficiently empty to express the deep structure of cultural facts without violating their surface form" (p.166).

Also that "...the common language used here to recast witchcraft seeks to sink beneath cultural terms which are not safely used in anthropology to an analytical level of sufficient depth that satisfactory commensurability between cultures can be obtained" (p.113); all of which would suggest that 'deep structures' are not semantic, and as such, however they are inferred or located, cannot be subjected to the niceties of semantic and conceptual investigation which are central to this approach. "We require far more to observe the discriminations existing in the culture under study, instead of employing those which our own supplies" (p.113), and there is no reason to suppose that this is any easier at a deep structural level, or that it is at this level that 'satisfactory commensurability', if that is what we are aiming for, will be achieved. As Crick himself shows in his criticism of Levi-Strauss in chapter 3, both structuralism and the search for universals are basically anti-semantic concerns - "structuralism opts for syntax rather than semantics" (p.45).

On the other hand, referring to the apparently innocently empirical nature of a demographic inquiry, he says "Numbers here are the 'surface structures' of systems whose deep structures are necessarily classificatory in nature" (p.92), and similarly, "It is the semantic structures which are generative, behaviour merely being the linear physical realisation of these constitutive programmes" (p.96), where it is clear that deep structures are susceptible to semantic investigation. Since we are told that "semantic anthropology assumes that...more ordinary terms of human self understanding have a most strategic scientific value" (p.57), and that "where human beings are the subject matter of a science they themselves engage in, a perspective which presents its discoveries in terms which they can hardly recognise is in a strange position" (p.56), then the employment of the imagery...
of surface and depth would scarcely seem to be necessary, and one might suspect that the invocation of a deep structure serves only to conjure up a spectre of understanding. This confusion arises in part from the conflation of a series of oppositions introduced to express the inadequacies of functionalist anthropology. The opposition of behaviour to ideas from the crude observationalist model whose conceptual dependence on the first of the pair has been reversed by later anthropology, is felt to be congruent with an opposition of the superficial to the profound, of surface to depth, of ideas, words, and action to the programmatic and explanatory. The success of the first reversal, the relegation of a (never practised) behaviourism that discounted linguistic inquiry, is felt to guarantee the success of the second, although the second in many ways re-establishes the anthropologist as the prime arbiter of explanation.

This problem, in another guise, is formulated by Crick when he says "the...tension between diversity and invariance is clearly locatable in our two central notions of system and map - the one with its implications of closure, and the other involving limited presuppositions" (p.148). We are told that Evans-Pritchard showed low, for the Zande, "The mode of discourse is the very fabric of their thought, and as men are born into conceptual structures in the same way that they are born into the social system, they cannot think that their thought is wrong" (p.131), and that "it is in a diversity of modes of discourse that human beings think and act" (p.150), And Foucault is quoted to the effect that "Sciences exist within a larger 'epistemological space', so their histories are only surface effects of an 'archaeology' which forms the unconscious of all knowledge, which decides how it shall be arranged and approached, and what shall not be formulated at all" (p.138, from Foucault, The Order of Things, 1970, p.280). We can see that the tension between diversity and invariance derives not just from the twin truisms that translation is essentially indeterminate and that translation is always to some degree possible, but also from the attempt to make the discourse of the system, of diversity, the discourse of discourse, lie down with the discourse of the map, of invariance, the discourse of structure, which it will not do. The depths that are excavated by Foucault's archaeology are not at all the same as those inhabited by deep structures, and it would be unfortunate if their juxtaposition were to make it appear that they were.

That being said, however, the central message of this book, the exposure of the deceits practised on social scientists by our 'scientific metaphors' and 'scientific mythologies' (p.142), is skilfully and thoroughly conveyed. Bearing in mind the importance of this message (which is still very far from being widely heard), and the encouragement that the book offers with its own example to use ordinary language critically and well, it is both unfortunate and inevitable that it could not be read with comprehension by anyone lacking some experience of the problems it confronts. The necessary journey that the aspirant to knowledge in the social sciences must make through the errors that this book exposes will, however, be enlivened by its presence.

Malcolm Chapman.
Psychoanalysis and Women Edited by Jean Baker Miller M.D.,


The advances in a theoretical understanding of female psychology which Dr. Baker Miller has collected in this book indicate two things: firstly, that the popular conceptions of psychoanalysis with regard to women are fifty years out of date; and secondly, that the advances themselves have been made in response to the critical social changes of the twenties, World War II, and the feminist movements in the late sixties (405). Disciplines like Anthropology and Psychoanalysis seem linked to social problems. However, a line of research may be advancing, general interest is lacking unless this research has a fashionable orientation.

Few women have been able to recognise in themselves the theories of penis-envy, innate biological passivity, submissiveness, and masochism which early theorists believed characterised the female mentality. This book picks out the classical developments in the approach to women's psychology and exposes the myths while demonstrating the continuity of progress, largely contributed by eminent women analysts. To identify with the subject is a luxury women have seldom experienced, except perhaps vicariously and indirectly, as in Lessing's The Golden Notebook. Miller says that it has fallen to women writers to emphasise women's own set of values' (390).

The book clears misconceptions, but of greatest importance is its contribution in presenting an entirely new and positive theoretical picture of women's growth and development as distinct from men's. This has far-reaching implications for philosophy, sociology, and politics - the minority neglected being 50% of the population.

In a culture whose prevailing ideology is one of individualism, the expectation of growth to achieve integrity of individual identity and personality has so far been conceived as a male prerogative (393). Women's success in this male model appears as a 'deviation', or a second-best to fulfilment as wife and mother - the roles of caring for and serving others (376).

The stress on individualism has led western anthropologists to borrow ethological and bio-social models, ignoring the complexity of human development. We are familiar with the notions of status, hierarchy, competition, aggression, territoriality and even altruism, which have recourse to Freudian discoveries. What this book shows is that neglect of the psychoanalytic study of 50% of humanity has given us a false picture of 'human-ness'. An understanding of the development of a human infant through to maturity reveals the processes of distortion and tortuous alienation we place on boys to achieve the male notion of maturity (387). The idea of sex-linked attributes necessitates that a boy renounce the growth process of identification with the person caring for him - 'the very process and essential feature of growth' (384).

Whereas women's 'work' of caretaking has taught them, from girlhood on, to value their identity in participating in 'the care and growth of human life' (396), men have been socialised away from an appreciation of women's 'keener sense of the meaning of human activity' (388):
What is rare is a man who has incorporated an image of himself as a person who takes care of his equals - both men and women - who feels this identification as a critical part of his inner self, equal to or more important than other images, like that of being superior to his "equals" for example. This leads to severe distortion and limitation of our conceptions of the total human experience" (386).

Anthropologists like Mead have long established the fallacy of sex-linked social characteristics. What have been lacking until now are studies which show the psychological development of the female, and how, when working outside the confines of the family unit, she continues to operate within the framework of this alternative value system. Her socially inferior status perpetuates a devaluation of her 'awareness of the intricate interstices of human relationships rather than the manipulation of things'(388). This limits their application, and creates the frustrations and conflicts familiar to women whatever their occupation.

Zilboorg's article explores the relationship between the male ideal and the female, in which by:

'trying to conquer nature rather than live in harmony with it men have developed a hypertrophied, aggressive, executive and organisational ability that has become a Frankenstein. Their efforts...have squeezed and distorted them into inhibited robot-like creatures, yet militaristic and aggressive power-seekers who have fouled and polluted a large part of nature and threatened to destroy it altogether' (400).

Miller shows how hope for solutions to human and social problems depends on 'a new model for childhood - one which incorporates the idea of the development of some accurate sense of effective individuality as part of a process of interacting equally with others' (392)

Juliet Blair
Anita Goode

Books Received


