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EDITORIAL NOTE

The idea for this collection of essays in anthropology has come from the graduate students of the Sub-Faculty of Anthropology at Oxford, in particular from those of the Institute of Social Anthropology and the Department of Ethnology. Papers given at graduate seminars, and preliminary ideas arising from work for the Diplomas and higher degrees, very often merit wider circulation and discussion, without necessarily being ready for formal publication in professional journals. There is a need for some intermediate form of exchange. The Oxford University Anthropological Society has agreed to act as publisher for this venture and has established a Journal Sub-Committee for the purpose. The Editors are grateful to the Radcliffe-Brown Memorial Fund for a subsidy to help with the initial cost.

It is hoped to produce at least one issue per term. Articles will be welcomed from Diploma, B.Litt. and D.Phil. students in social and other branches of anthropology, and from people in related disciplines interested in social anthropology. Letters, comments, reviews, and similar material, as well as contributions from tutors, will also be welcome. It is hoped that these essays in anthropology will provide a focus for the discussion of work being done at Oxford. It will make it easier for research students to avoid any tendency to become isolated, and for Diploma students to enter into discussion across tutorial boundaries. For the present, it is preferred that the main emphasis should be upon analytical discussion rather than on description or ethnography.

This first issue has had to be rather more hurriedly produced than we should have wished in order to get it out this term. This was due to the initial problems of organisation and finance, and the editors ask indulgence for its deficiencies, in particular some lack of format and bibliographical reference from paper to paper. The general theme in this issue lies in problems of anthropology and philosophy, or of anthropology as philosophy. The contributors will naturally welcome any comments on their views, and we are grateful to them for agreeing to start off this journal.

FORMAT

Papers should be as short as is necessary to get points over. As a general rule, they should not exceed 4,000 words, but a wide range of shorter contributions will be welcome. For future issues, papers should be submitted following the conventions for citations, notes, and references used in the ASA monographs. Communications should be addressed to the Editors at the Oxford University Institute of Social Anthropology, 51 Banbury Road, Oxford.
'Philosophy does not leave everything just as it is, but how it is going to leave things is a matter of delicate historical prophecy rather than a priori deductions from pre-established philosophical viewpoints.'

We can add - and how does everything leave Philosophy? Rather than attempting to present systematically what is involved in philosophical as opposed to other forms of understanding, I discuss instead various anthropologically-based issues. Issues which suggest that an understanding of certain aspects of philosophy is as imperative to the anthropologist as is knowledge to the fieldwork situation, literary understanding and ability to apply various scientific procedures and theories. Some of these issues will involve us in speaking in 'relevance of' terms; this is largely an organisational device and should not reflect a maginot line mentality in any unnecessary sense.

First, that any form of anthropological understanding involves philosophical pre-suppositions. This involves disputing an inference which can be drawn from Vico's view ('Philosophy contemplates reason, whence comes knowledge of the true; philology (science) observes the authority of human choice, whence comes consciousness of the certain') to the effect that there necessarily need to be a tension in anthropology between these two supposedly disparate modes of understanding.

Traditionally, no such distinction existed - philosophy contributed to the understanding of particular matters of fact; scientific and philosophical explanations were blurred in that philosophy was envisaged as though it were the queen of sciences. With the increasing autonomy of the sciences, the empiricists and rationalists differently re-conceived the role of philosophy. The 18th century empiricists remained, at least in part, scientists: Hume and his Scottish school attempted to found philosophical theories about man and society on an empirical science of man, attempting to re-integrate society with nature through the reductive analysis of human phenomena in order to ascertain the necessary foundation of society. Hume himself wrote the first comparative study of religion. A strong tendency in the work of the school was to react against earlier philosophical theories of society which were seen to be charters for political action; as myths.

And so began the long history of various logics; attempts, that is, to contribute to the philosophical understanding of human nature through scientific endeavour. Such is the basis of Comte's positive philosophy, of Durkheim's sociologism, of the psychologism of Lévi-Strauss and Chomsky. And finally, of the comprehensive attempts of both Cassirer and Sebag to analyse the mind through its linguistic expression in various forms of discourse.

Against this awareness of the relevance of philosophical speculation about human nature, stands the other dominant strand of anthropological thought. A variety which combines a sociological interest with 'phrasing the problem of anthropology, and the conceptual schemes it has adopted, according to the patterns which belong to the scientific tradition of western civilization of the past century.' The tendency was to envisage scientific explanation as a sui-generis sphere of operation, falling out of any philosophical framework. Observation and inductive procedures (the hope that in some way the facts would constitute and so explain themselves), left no room for speculation.

What arguments can be brought to bear against these varieties of scientism? Or, more graphically, who is the greater - Radcliffe-Brown or Lévi-Strauss? Both have been criticised, but that directed against the former authorities scientism and all its associated narrowness, is surely of a more fundamental nature than that entailed by those who criticise Lévi-Strauss on the grounds that his dictum, truth is of reason rather than of fact, has led him into a vague a priorism.

I list a series of observations, each set of which presents different reasons for the advisability of retaining a philosophical perspective.

(a) That despite the methodological autonomy of science itself, its basis is inherently speculative. In the sense that no knowledge is absolute, science is founded on as many myths as is literary criticism. Popper
especially argues that scientific understanding is, fundamentally, based on the same inborn expectations as is any other system of knowledge. Heisenberg is in broad agreement: science is founded in the fundamentals of our existence; the object of research is no longer nature itself, but rather nature exposed to man's questions, and to this extent man here also meets himself. Finally, both Harre and Collingwood have traced the extent to which natural phenomena have been re-interpreted during recent European history, according to the conceptual blue print applied.

(b) The cultural neutrality of the social sciences is even more suspect. Bryson writes that comprehensive philosophical ideas 'are to be seen as the "generalised ancestors" of particular social theories' (she concludes that the chief theoretical background of the modern social sciences lies in 18th century Scotland). More specifically, Leach has traced the foundation of Malinowski's body of theory to the pragmatic philosophy of William James, to suggest that Malinowski's non-critical application of this philosophy is a characteristic he shares with Radcliffe-Brown's equally non-critical application of the philosophy of J.S. Mill. On a broader scale, Honigsheim suggests an identification of the various philosophical orientations which have served to distinguish American from European anthropology.

(c) And finally, in so far as Winch's view that 'any worthwhile study of society must be philosophical in character and any worthwhile philosophy must be concerned with the nature of human society', is correct, it is apparent that even if we discount Winch's view and admit scientific explanation as valuable, such explanation cannot be divorced from the neo-philosophical task of conceptual understanding and the philosophical issues this entails (for instance - the extent to which understanding in terms of reasons is incompatible with explanation in terms of causes, which in turn raises the rules-of-procedure problem). For now it suffices to say that almost any problem, if pursued far enough, exposes a philosophical nature. For instance Bell writes that if the subject matter of sociology is meaningful behaviour, then the social scientist must necessarily get involved 'in the knotty problem of the relation of thought to action.

In attempting to expose the extent to which both science and philosophy are, although to very differing degrees, both speculative and so not absolutely culturally neutral, it has not been my intention to argue for such extreme positions as presented, for instance, by Gellner and Goldmann (Gellner - that anthropology is, at least implicitly, 'a classification and evaluation of societies,' and Goldmann's view that social philosophy is today much as it was when Hume criticised it. For although there might be a certain degree of truth in such contentions, it seems to me that the greatest danger lies not in the influence of one's vested interests, but through forgetting that theories and viewpoints are not in any sense absolute and total. It is for this reason that Leach wrote Rethinking Anthropology. But what, I suggest, he did not sufficiently stress is that a philosophical perspective affords an 'objective' stance from which to argue for and against theories, discuss the structure of concepts and the nature of what we are studying; in sum a critical perspective to help us avoid the 'infection' of blind scientism.

However, it must be stressed that social theorising is inseparable from philosophical speculation. Lukes traces the extent to which the very different interpretations of nineteenth century industrial European society given by Marx and Durkheim can be attributed to their fundamentally different hypotheses about the nature of man and society. And so, how their interpretations reflect their moral and idealist aspirations. Also in the nineteenth century, it is possible to discern the extent to which popular scientific paradigms reflected and influenced mass value systems - hence the scientist, social scientist and public met in their respective theorising about evolution, other peoples, and race.

I do not think that such considerations, despite what the Marxist would argue, bear so heavily today. But the point still remains that at least on certain issues, the anthropologist faces a moral decision in deciding between certain basic theories of man and society. To perpetuate the system through non-critical involvement? To allow a fellow anthropologist who is scientifically convinced of a racist theory to remain a teaching member of the profession? And finally,
how can Sartre (‘Freedom is the irreducibility of the cultural to the natural order’) view Marvin Harris?

Given the fact that philosophy is speculative, arguing only to conclusions of an irrefutable status as opposed to the nature of scientific proof, in what sense can anthropology be envisaged as constituting the empirical branch of philosophy? Ayer\(^{17}\) takes a typical stand against comprehensive empirical evidence, arguing in his article that a priori discussion relying on examples drawn from common experience, is an adequate basis from which to ‘solve’ various problems belonging to the social sciences. Elsewhere, he writes: ‘Philosophical theories are not tested by observation. They are neutral with respect to particular matters of fact.’\(^{18}\) However, Ayer’s philosophy is ‘pure’ to a degree which is not possible, for instance, in much recent work on the philosophy of mind. Hampshire shares with his American colleagues a certain tension between scientific procedures and the employment of reason. He writes that his conclusion: are not based on anthropology — ‘for the philosophical understanding there is no need to look to primitive man’.\(^{19}\) For he is interested instead in distinguishing the general from those features of language that are contingent upon a particular social order.

When the anthropologist or modern linguist aims to discern universal and necessary conditions, the essential nature of certain phenomena, they tend to work through the phenomena in a systematically empirical fashion. Later in his book Hampshire realises the necessity for this — ‘philosophy as linguistic analysis is therefore unwillingly lured into a kind of descriptive anthropology’; the fundamentals of mind can only be reached ‘through the observation of successive forms of the social expressions of mind.’ Cassirer also realises the necessity of such an empirical task — ‘the philosophy of mind involves much more than a theory of knowledge; it involves also a theory of prelogical conceptions and expressions, and their final culmination in reason and factual knowledge’.

In commonsense terms it would seem that anthropology loses its autonomous hold over its boxed subject matter, the primitive, and so develops its Social Anthropology as opposed to Social Anthropology, logicism contributions can only increase. And that these will bear most directly on such philosophical topics as ‘theories’ of cognition, of knowledge, aesthetics, innate ideas.\(^{20}\) Kurtz\(^{21}\) in a brief article, argues for the relevance of empirical research to philosophy, and indicates the absurdity of a situation in which philosophers view logicism in the worst possible light, whereas for some anthropologists such a contribution would belong to the theorem. Ach conceived psychology as experimental philosophy many years ago. Chomsky takes the same line today; and Chomsky is criticised just as severely\(^{22}\) as Ach was, even though he is cautious in his suggestions to philosophy.

A rather different variety of contribution can be discussed insofar as social philosophy is concerned. In terms of philosophical interest in the nature of ‘meta features’ (rules, translation, classification, belief\(^{23}\)) anthropologists have, at least until recently, limited their interest to the actual social working-out of these phenomena, leaving the philosopher to abstract out interesting issues and problems. Insofar as philosophy is opposed to science, the less the anthropologist engages in scientifically based theorising, the more a philosopher he becomes. In the sense that when studying a primitive economic system the anthropologist ‘becomes’ an economist, so too does he become a philosopher when he studies conceptual systems.\(^{24}\) To return briefly to Vico, in the former case explanation is acquired through reduction from full native sui-generis meaning to the formal models of science, whereas in the second case, reason alone can prevail if the system is to be understood in its initial fullness.

So, following Haines\(^{25}\) definition of social philosophy (the interpretation and discovery of the logic of man’s relations in a social context) Evans-Pritchard and Short\(^{\text{*}}\) qualify closely. But whereas the anthropologist directs his attention to the phenomena, the philosopher, following Wittgenstein\(^{26}\), directs his attention ‘not towards the phenomena but toward the possibility of phenomena’.
Thus Whorf's work on the cultural nature of time is only weakly philosophical as compared with the way various American philosophers have reworked his material. And although Evans-Pritchard and Wittgenstein have much in common (both stressed meaning as a function of, relative to, various language games and not as a function of reality in any 'ideal language' sense) Evans-Pritchard aims to understand a form of life, whereas Wittgenstein (to Gellner's disgust) accepts the form of life as given. His interests are basically in social issues.

To conclude, the divergencies within philosophy as to the relevance of scientifically based research is considerable (compare, for instance, Winch with Ayer's position). Even Winch, however, avoids empirical research. So although philosophy largely escapes anything anthropology can offer, anthropology can never escape philosophical insight and speculation. The symmetry of the speculation/observation synthesis is loaded in one direction.

* * *

Turning from what philosophy means for anthropologists, I attempt now to discern certain problems in the question 'meaning for whom?' as referred to understanding other societies.

The field-work situation represents the simplest case; to a large extent this spell is characterised by a growing synthesis between what the native means by an expression and what the anthropologist understands by it. Lévi-Strauss, quoting Merleau-Ponty, suggests that the basically philosophical nature of anthropology is exposed during fieldwork. Weissman speaks with consensus: 'Philosophy has as its positive aim the establishment of new ways of looking at the world' - to defreeze ways of thinking as an alien, to release the mind from the tyranny of all the embedded hypotheses of one's own language, so to realise the 'true' nature of phenomenal strata in their full specificity.

The extreme relativist in severely diminishing one's innate potential/ability to share other modes of thought is put in a difficult position when it is pointed out to him that we seemingly can understand even the most alien native terms. I cannot discuss this problem now, but much of the difficulty obviously involves what is meant by understand, grasp, share, know, believe etc. To give just a few references: MacIntyre's debate with various theologians over the issue: 'is understanding religion compatible with believing?' raises many of the topics discussed in the eighteenth century under the format of whether religious meaning could only be acquired through revelation, or whether reason would suffice to understand its full meaning. Lonergan, (according to Barden) Tillich, Winch take very different views to those argued by MacIntyre, especially over the extent to which 'sharing' involves evoking one's established criteria of word meaning - that words do not denote internal mental states, but instead that their meaning is to be equated with word usage. This position suggests that the anthropologist does not have to feel with the native in order to understand the native. Perhaps against this stands Jasper's phenomenological position: 'the sclerosis of objectivity is the annihilation of the real nature of human existence.' And finally, the view has been put forward that the fieldworker is in a no more difficult situation than the non-believer learning to understand the Catholic service as rendered in Latin.

* * *

We touch upon some of these points later. But now I want to turn to the region of greater difficulty - what happens when the fieldworker, with two systems of meaning 'grasped', comes to translate them.

Nadel gives a commonsense view - we understand other societies (a) in their terms ('subjective') and (b) in terms of general principles - for as anthropologists we must co-ordinate our knowledge with some degree of objectivity. As can be envisaged, Nadel places great importance on the role of theory in effecting translation into the formal (scientific) code of discourse of anthropology. Theories as 'applied' during fieldwork and at home, reorganise the facts into theoretical intelligibility.
In direct opposition to this stands Winch. He considers that understanding another society consists only in making explicit what is already implicit, so rejecting any form of scientific explanation. The reasons why Winch takes this view are complex. Footnote (11) and Glammer's article (see below) cover the basic points. MacIntyre's criticism of Winch in his 1967 article (Aristotelian Society) combined with Banaji's article (see below) indicate other disadvantages associated with the making the implicit/explicit theory.

Instead of developing these criticisms, I want to argue that both Nadel's and Winch's ideas about how to make a primitive society intelligible are extreme. The former's in that meaning for the native is obscured, the latter in that Winch does not appear to realise that translation necessarily involves theorising. He admits that translation must involve the addition of concepts alien to the native system of meaning, but fails to realise that our concepts are often of a highly theoretical order.

Since translation involves re-classification of native criteria of identity and judgment into terms of our criteria, it is, I feel, essential for anthropologists to attempt to understand what is involved in the logic of translation. Winch gives us no criteria to help us either in relating various native words to our theories and concepts, or in terms of the problem of organizing native words into the greatly increased intelligibility which follows through relating them structurally. His idea of a social science is only a first step even if we do not add scientific criteria of intelligibility.

Historically, anthropologists have approached the problem of translation from:

(a) the ethnocentric point of view - particularly common in the nineteenth century, when attempts were made to elevate notions drawn from particular language games to the level of universal applicability in order to fulfill the needs of comparison. Pitkin and Leach (Rethinking Anthropology) relate this to inductive procedures. It is unlikely that this is a useful approach from which to develop universal semantics. Not only does it vacillate along a lowest common denominator and highest common factor spectrum, but other societies are interpreted, constituted through our conceptual blinkers. The words sacred, incest, mana etc. belong to this category. Do we in fact require universally applicable (in what sense) definitions for, say, the family? Murdock seems to think so - yet look at all the obvious failings of his Social Structure.

(b) Structural approach - it is, I think, possible to envisage a spectrum of concepts - (approximate).

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Moving from left to right, the scientific status of concepts devoid of cultural content declines gradually as the component of language game specificity increases. And so the advisability of attempting definitive definitions decreases.

The extent to which descriptive concepts can be given structural definitions varies. At one extreme it is almost impossible - for such notions as belief and the psychological verbs; the criteria of application are almost totally culturally bound. At an intermediary level we find such concepts as pure or impure. These are culturally bound in a way in which the more (see however (6)) scientifically based oppositions such as nature/culture are not. But, as Dumont demonstrates, in selecting the main articulation points of the pure/impure opposition (i.e. in relating the term structurally, to other concepts related by the various logics, of polarity, analogy etc.), structuralisation and so a relatively neutral translation can be effected. We can think also of how Van Gennep translated the cultural specificity of Rites de passage, and Lévi-Strauss' totemism from neutral terms. Or of the manner in which apparently meaningless (for us) native associations can be made intelligible (to us). And finally, at the opposite extreme, a native classification of, say trees, can be given definite structural definitions.
in that if this classification is only based on certain objective criteria (tall, hard, edible etc.) there is no need to abstract the structures in the same way as is necessary when the terms are involved in complex language games.

(c) The cultural relativists' position - we have seen that whereas the logic of hierarchy is culturally neutral, priests are not. And that a structural definition, being relatively devoid of meaning in native terms, cannot express native meaning as adequately as a translation (or so Winch hopes) of that actual native meaning. Since such translation is imperfect, the position of relativism is unavoidable. The extent to which Wittgenstein's views support his is I think, more debatable than Winch allows. Nielsen, for one, argues that Wittgenstein's position does not necessarily entail relativism. However, from Bambrugh's presentation of Wittgenstein's 'Family resemblances' theory of universals and how it dissolves the problems as formulated by the realists and nominalists, we can readily discern the extent to which a view claiming that all that games have in common is that they are games is attractive to a Winchian variety of relativism.

Winch, in reaction to a Durkheimian position of treating social facts as things and other forms of sciencing, is surely correct in stressing that 'Mugwe is Mugve'. Presumably though he would have to translate Mugwe as 'Priest' - which would involve theory in (a) discerning a critical element out of the various language games in which the various instances of the family called 'Mugwe' is manifested in terms of meaning, (b) in approximating this critical unit, meaning, with (c) a similar critical element in the home vocabulary. This can only be a nominalistic definition when words such as priest are concerned; so Wittgenstein's 'solution' is not followed.

But through combining a family resemblance approach, linguistic analysis with (a) not translating certain critical terms in any critical sense (Cran-Pritchard never defines Knuth as God) and (b) a structural approach, allowing in some sense the semantic patterns to speak for themselves with (c) the hypothesing of structures, both the pitfalls of relativism and ethnocentrism can in part be avoided.

The relativists' argument can, however, be presented in a much more extreme form (see note 30). Extreme in the sense that although structural understanding (for us) is not directly threatened, it is indirectly insofar as we have to understand other cultures semantically (for themselves) before structures can be discerned, if this semantic intelligibility is not possible, nothing much else can follow.

Although Winch writes 'the concepts we have settle for us the experiences we have of the world' and 'there is no norm for intelligibility in general' he does not suggest that inter-social concepts are in any sense incommensurable. In fact, he supports Vico's view that 'there must be in the nature of man a mental language common to all nations which uniformly grasps the substance of things feasible in human social life and expresses it with so many diverse modifications as these same things may have diverse aspects'. The theories we now present do not stop at this cultural relativism but introduce the idea of mental relativism.

First, the Sapir/Yorlf hypothesis; that basic linguistic categories are derived from social organisation, so that the universal constants in language would necessarily reflect only certain empirical uniformities in social life and the conditional necessities of human communication. For Sapir, since societies live in different worlds, categorisations of experience is in terms of unlike prime categories. The degree of incommensurability all but makes comparison impossible. To a much greater degree than in Boas's theory of limited relativism, natural logic (that the cognitive processes of all men have something in common) is as severely threatened as in the work of Levy-Bruhl or Cassirer.

In Durkheim's case, although he also was arguing against any a priori basis of morality and logic in suggesting that categories are founded in the social, incommensurability is stressed to a much greater extent; as seen, for instance, in his usage of the word 'sacred'.

These theories suffer, fortunately for anthropology, not only from the fact that they are ill-formulated and unproven, but in that alternative hypothesis,
of much greater power, have been recently developed. The work of men as diverse as Lévi-Strauss, Needham and Chomsky, has suggested that language, together with certain aspects of socio-cultural life mirrors certain universal properties of the mind. Cognitive psychologists such as Vygotsky, Bruner, Piaget, Hubel and Wiesel. From another point of view, philosophers such as Clarke, Nielsen, Rees and various philosophers of education (such as Hirst) have also argued that various modes of thought do not stand in relationships of absolute autonomy.

Needham writes that 'the more nearly a cultural phenomenon approaches the universal, the more necessary it is to explain it in terms of the general psychic character of man.' Here then is a slightly different basis on which to base a transcultural language, a language with properties sufficient to avoid gross misinterpretation; for it belongs to what it interprets. Such a language, more fundamentally even than the varieties of structuralism we have so far discussed, can be termed theoretical realism. For instance, as a hypothesis it is arguable that the fundamental nature of the mind accords to such processes as we term dualism, polarity, metaphor; or, at a larger scale, as the various mentalities - religious, symbolic, theocratic etc. As universals, these terms belong to native thought, yet make it intelligible to us who can only truly understand, for instance, informal logic, if we stand outside it, in the formal realm.

Such a basis would seem to be more adequate than other attempts to found 'ideal languages' (in both senses of the word, that is, as a 'third language' or language as various logical positivists conceived it). Briefly, Gellner, Lounsbury, Murdock, Herton, Fuero, Redfield, Jung and various phenomenologists of religion have all attempted to discern other universal features on which to base transcultural intelligibility. These range from the biology of kinship (Gellner, and Lounsbury's componential analysis of kinship) to a basis in supposedly universal existential world states (Feuer, Murdock but is this not also implied in Van Gennep's and Hertz's theories?), or in universal psychic states in Jungian style.

It seems clear then that there are several bases for universal commonality and so universal intelligibility. But what happens if we ask - how can commonality be discerned when concepts such as belief are concerned? Needham writes anthropology is 'primarily the empirical investigation of human understanding by means of the comparative study of cultural categories' (not of experience itself), so it is essential that problems associated with 'universal semantics' be faced. The problem in brief, is meaning for whom? and in terms of whose criteria of intelligibility? Whose language games?

* * * *

A true conclusion to this paper is impossible, for I have only begun to approach the more difficult problems. In general, we have been discussing the contribution philosophical speculation can make in assessing the extent to which understanding of cultures as our various subjects is incompatible with the anthropologist constituting them as objects within an 'objective' sphere of discourse. It could be objected, however, that the philosopher has little to contribute; after all, he has never gone into the field. Who is {}\textquotesingle{}in\textquotesingle{} that Levi-Strauss's {}\textit{Savage Mind} is philosophically unsound in terms of {}\textit{Winch} s idea of a social science? Or that to translate God speaking to Job through the clouds into scientific language is inexcusable?

Although I might be retracting from the general position which I presented, I think that it is strongly arguable that philosophers such as Nietzsche and Popper have more to offer than many of the philosophers we have discussed. But their contributions, and Wittgenstein's, Hume's etc. are largely undiscussable in any comprehensive sense for they do not {}\textit{theorise} systematically about our concerns. Instead we have to select their insights.

Finally, and this also goes against the tenor of much of what I have been saying, Max Black suggests that translation problems are more akin to problems of a literary order than to those of philosophy. Against this position I quote Lounsbury:
'Partiality to one or another of these views (degree of relativity) may considerably influence both one's field observations and one's interpretation of data, and thus one's conclusions...'

and Winch

'the sociologists who misinterpret alien cultures are like philosophers getting into difficulties over the use of their own concepts.'

In the last resort, the style of anthropology written is governed by what 'meaning' is relative to; is the interpretation in philosophical terms? scientific, literary or as through native meaning? Where, in fact, is our supposed objectivity? Our ability, I argue, to balance these various modes of meaning, is not only intuitively based; philosophical awareness is also desirable, if not essential.

Paul Heelas

References
2. Quoted in Pocock, Social Anthropology, 1961
5. Heisenberg, The Representation of Nature in Contemporary Physics, Daedalus, 1958. See also Hume, quoted by Winch, The Idea of a Social Science, 1958 - 'all the sciences have a relation... to human nature... they will return back (to it) by one passage or another.'
8. Leach, In Man and Culture, edit. Firth 1957. See also Sebag and Scholte on the implicit philosophical premises of Lévi-Strauss.
11. I do not attempt to summarise the long debate as to whether scientific explanation is inapplicable to the understanding of social phenomena. Clammer (see below) points to certain of the issues. Other references include MacIntyre, 'A Mistake about Causality', Philosophy Politics and Society, Vol. 1, 1967 and The Idea of a Social Science, Aristotelian Society, 1967. The second reference includes a good criticism of Winch's thesis that since meaningful behaviour is only intelligible in terms of native ideas, the student must follow the rules of their criteria of judgment, not the rules of procedure of science.
14. As is born out, for instance, in the popular argument that Durkheim's classification of suicide exposes his conservatism.
15. See Dewey as quoted by Bryson, op. cit.


20. We think, for instance, of the possible results of applying Levy-Bruhl's theory to Locke's classification of knowledge.


22. See, for instance, Pitkin and others in Hook, op. cit.

23. See Encyclopaedia Britannica 'Theory of Knowledge' for the different approaches of the philosopher and scientist to the study of belief.

24. Richards, 'African System of Thought', Man 1967, shows the extent to which for many British Anthropologists this is not in fact true; they tend to 'sociologise' the primitive.


27. These similarities can be traced in much greater detail. See, for instance, Pocock, op. cit., p. 72 and Hartnack's Wittgenstein.

28. Or rather, should mean. Barrington's paper (see below) suggests, for example that Lévi-Strauss is too much a philosopher in intent but too little in practice.


30. Following Lounsbury's meaning of the term. See Hook, op. cit.


33. Gellner and MacIntyre both apply this to anthropology. See Gellner's Concepts and Society, 1962 and MacIntyre op. cit (2) (where he relates the issue to Leach's and Evans-Pritchard's differing positions.


35. Hampshire suggests that rationality is the opposite of disconnectedness, others have argued that objectivity, in the sense that we are now speaking, comes only through sharing concepts.

36. Hart - the meaning of various concepts is not determined by definition for no particular set of conditions both necessary and sufficient exist to ensure definitive application. See Hartnock, op. cit.

37. Lloyd, Polarity and Analogy.

39. Bambrough, 'Universals and Family Resemblances' in Wittgenstein, edit. Pitcher 1968. Bambrough also mentions the infinite regress argument which can be applied against a lowest common denominator approach at a descriptive/inductive level. Thus, given Malinowski's definition of the sacred in terms of religion and magic, we can continue to ask - and how can these terms be then definitely defined? And so on.

40. We argued that there is 'a pragmatic connection between phenomena of experience, their mental representations and their linguistic classification'. See Lounsbury in Hook, op. cit.

41. Max Black in Hook op. cit.

42. Vygotsky, Thought and Language.
Bruner in Machamer Recent work on Perception, American Philosophical Quarterly, 1970.
Piaget in Richmond An Introduction to Piaget, 1970.
Hubel and Wiesel - see The Listener, 19th Feb. 1970 - how theories of perception and Chomsky's innate schema are being brought to bear on each other. Together with Brunel's recent work, these theories afford an empirical test for the degree of validity which the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis processes.


46. Chomsky, Language and Mind, 1968 (where he implies that he is well aware of the problems this field presents; difficulties which have remained unsolved since they were last fully discussed in mediaeval days).

47. Nietzsche, Birth of Tragedy, 1956.

48. Popper, op. cit. For example, the trial and error basis of science is a universal procedure.
In any comparative study the initial problem to be faced by the analyst is that of defining the phenomena he has selected for examination. This is rarely an easy task. Whether one focuses on totemism (Goldeneiser 1910; Levi-Strauss 1964), marriage (Leach 1961), incest (Fox 1967), matrilineal descent (Richards 1960), ancestor cults (Kopytoff 1966), or age sets (Eisenstadt 1956), usually one of the first things to be found by the analyst is the fact that a single term has been used to cover a number of often widely varying, although related phenomena. When this happens one may well be tempted to invent a number of new terms to cover all the possible refractions and manifestations of the phenomena being studied, but as Leach has so well demonstrated, this can only lead to the excessive development of terminological classifications, an effort that he has so aptly termed 'butterfly collecting' (1961:2). He strongly suggests that we must seek other methods of organizing and defining our phenomena.

Needham has indicated an awareness of this problem as well, and has pointed out that:

...social anthropology is in a state of conceptual confusion expressed in proliferating technical taxonomies and definitional exercises, each new field study offering enough 'anomalous' features to lead to yet more typological and methodological pronouncements. (1963: xli).

It would probably be a fair statement to say that the tackling of definitional problems is one of the most basic tasks to be faced in our discipline today. Real advances in our understanding of social phenomena can only be made through intensive comparative analysis aimed at establishing workable definitions as well as the essential features and range of variability of the particular phenomena being examined.

The study of witchcraft beliefs is one particular example of a field of study that has suffered from a lack of adequate definition. Although we do not find in the literature on witchcraft beliefs that they are divided into 'Main type... Sub-type... Sub-sub-type', (Leach 1961:3) the way some social phenomena have been, there is, nevertheless, a certain amount of conceptual confusion about what witchcraft really is, and the grounds upon which it may usefully be distinguished from sorcery.

Turner (1964:322), in a review of Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa (Middleton and Winter 1963), refers to the 'terminological wood (or jungle)' one encounters in reading professional accounts of witchcraft beliefs. After surveying the literature on witchcraft beliefs in a number of African societies, he concludes, 'It would seem, therefore, from the various usages which I have discussed that there is little general agreement on the criteria which distinguish sorcery from witchcraft.' (1964:322).

Turner is not entirely accurate in making the above statement however. Most Africanists base their distinction between the two on the one made by Evans-Pritchard for the Azande, despite the fact that many systems of belief do not easily fall into the polar opposite characteristic of the Azande system. Evans-Pritchard states:

Azande believe that some people are witches and can injure them in virtue of an inherent quality. A witch performs no rite, utters no spell, and possesses no medicines. An act of witchcraft is a psychic act. They believe also that sorcerers may do them ill by performing magic rites with bad medicines. Azande distinguish clearly between witches and sorcerers. (1937:21).

Although Evans-Pritchard does not indicate in the Azande work that the witch-sorcerer distinction has any wider application beyond Azande society, the distinction has been widely adopted by Africanists. Examples of its use can

Careful research and analysis will show that in many cases the use of Evans-Pritchard's distinction has, however, been highly inappropriate. Although many writers do appear to appreciate the fact that their material may not easily fit into the Azande framework (see for example Schapera 1934a:294, and Harwick 1963a: 7-8), they nevertheless feel they must adopt the terminology, and if a witch in their society uses medicines, they tend to 'fall into line' as Douglas (1967:72) has put it, and the witch becomes termed a 'sorcerer'. Examples of this usage of terms can be found in studies of the Cewa (Harwick 1965a), and Yao (Mitchell 1956) as well as Douglas's own ethnography of the Lele (1963).

Douglas states that 'Evans-Pritchard... vigorously disavowed the intention of foisting a terminological straight-jacket on future generations.' (1967:72) This has, however, been the effect of his distinction. Use of the Azande model has imposed a straight-jacket of thought which has blinded people for many years and kept them from seeing what the essential characteristics of witchcraft beliefs are.

Implicit in this criticism of the use which has been made of Evans-Pritchard's distinction, is the conviction that it is the image of the witch that is important for definitional purposes, not the use or non-use of medicines, or unconscious use of evil power. When we ask ourselves what it is that many of the African systems of belief have in common, we find the witch image occurring in a large number of cases - combined with the use of medicines as well as the possession of innate mystical ability to cause harm.

Audrey Richards, in a review of Witchcraft and Sorcery in East Africa, has commented on the fact that 'The similarity of the witch image in all these societies is striking.' (1964:188) She points out that:

Essay after essay describes imaginary figures, usually with hereditary attributes, thought to be able to fly by night, to produce a glow in the sky, to eat corpses or the entrails of human beings, to be accompanied by familiars and to act contrary to all moral rules. The similarity of these images is not of course limited to East Africa. (1964:188).

It is somewhat remarkable to note however, that in all the African literature on societies with witchcraft and sorcery beliefs (of which there are at least sixty-five available accounts), not one writer has ever thought to focus on this image as the defining characteristic of witchcraft. Unfortunately, it does not appear to have been as clearly evident as it might have been that the features associated with this image themselves form a category of symbolic phenomena worthy of investigation. Once the pattern had been set by Evans-Pritchard, it was all too easy for others to follow what had become established categories of classification, despite the all too obvious fact that the categories were often inappropriate.

It is not possible to define witchcraft until it is recognized that the definitional problem is a problem in symbolic classification. Witchcraft beliefs form a special category of classification to which a great many varying elements or components may be assigned. The solution to the definitional problem is implicit in the literature; the problem has not been solved because no one has ever thought to ask the right questions. The main question we must ask ourselves is why does the image of the witch take the form it does from society to society throughout Africa and indeed throughout the world. Following that, we must ask ourselves why does this image occur so universally.

The solution to the first question was found by John Middleton and its earliest statement can be found in two articles, 'Some Social Aspects of Lugbara Myth' (1954), and 'The Concept of Bewitching in Lugbara'. (1955).
In analyzing Lugbara mythology, Middleton found that 'one of the general characteristics of Lugbara myth is the inverted character of its actors and events'. (1965:195).

The theme of inversion is found not only in mythology, but in witchcraft beliefs as well. To the Lugbara the normal is 'good' and the abnormal is 'bad', and this dichotomy is related to the distinction they make between what is social and what is anti-social. The difference between the two is expressed in terms of inversion. The image of the Lugbara witch is that of a being characterized by inverted attributes.

A witch has the characteristics of an abnormal person.
His face is grey and drawn, 'like a corpse', he may have red eyes or a squint, he may vomit blood, he walks at night, and is associated with night creatures. (1955:258).

A witch is also associated with incest, cannibalism and filthy behaviour (Middleton 1960:248), and 'may be visible as a light on the top of a hut, or as a light moving rapidly across fields.' (1955:255).

What is most inverted about witches however, is the fact that they have perverted normal kinship and authority relations. Middleton states:

... a witch is the embodiment of those attributes that are in direct contrast to those ideally possessed by elders or senior kin. Senior kinmen... should be 'slow', understanding, gentle, generous, angry only when the interests of their family clusters are concerned and not on account of their own personal pride. A witch behaves in a diametrically opposite manner. (1960:244-4)

From the above we can see that witchcraft for the Lugbara is a conceptual category, one that is bound up with the anti-social. It tends therefore to find expression in inverted symbols that are opposed to what the society values and considers normal. Knowing this provides an element of predictability.

We would expect that other elements associated with witchcraft by the Lugbara would be somewhat abnormal or unusual. The following confirms this suspicion,

Certain animals are associated with witches; they are both omens of witchcraft and may be vehicles for witches, and they are also used as ingredients in sorcery-poisons. They include the jackal, the leopard-cat, the bat, the screech monkey, snakes, the owl and several other birds, the water tortoise, if it leaves its riverine home and comes to the compounds, and certain frogs and toads. All these creatures are 'like witches' and are much feared. If a man sees them at night, and especially in a dream, he is seeing a witch or the soul of a witch. All are night creatures or, like the water-tortoise, out of their normal habitat. Indeed any animal away from its usual home may be suspected of being something to do with witchcraft. (Middleton 1960:241).

All of the above is somewhat reminiscent of Chapter Three of Purity and Danger, 'The Abominations of Leviticus' (Douglas 1966:41-57). Douglas is able to demonstrate that Hebrew dietary laws stem from a system of symbolic classification. Traditionally Jewish people have considered certain animals to be either 'clean', and therefore edible, or 'unclean' and therefore unfit for human consumption. The usual rational has been that certain animals such as pigs, lobsters and other shellfish are scavengers, and therefore 'unclean'.

By looking at the relevant selections from Leviticus and Deuteronomy in a new way, however, Douglas was able to offer a completely new and highly satisfactory interpretation, one that is expressed in terms of symbolic classification. She finds that 'Any class of creatures which is not equipped for the right kind of locomotion in its element is contrary to holiness.' (1966:55) Therefore anything in the water that does not have fins or scales is unclean, or four-footed creatures capable of flying are unclean and so on.
The above example demonstrates that analysis of ethnographically puzzling practices in terms of symbolic classification can sometimes be extremely illuminating, or as Needham might put it, be successful in terms of 'rendering many aspects of social life intelligible.' (1963:xliii) Needham has demonstrated in several papers that this can be an effective analytical technique particularly in 'The Left Hand of the Muggle' (1960), and 'Shiva's Earings' (1966).

Use of the concept of symbolic classification can also be an effective technique for one attempting to understand and define witchcraft beliefs. If we adopt the symbolic approach in attempting to define witchcraft, we find that the category witch can be expressed as the following:

A witch is an individual thought capable of harming others super-naturally through the use of innate mystical power, medicines or familiars, and who is associated with inverted characteristics that are a reversal of social and physical norms.

Adoption of such a definition immediately rids us of one difficulty, that of attempting to classify the inverted being who consciously makes use of medicines. As well, it explains the image of the witch, an image which consists of characteristics that are inverted, reversals of the norm, or simply things that are defined by a particular society as bad, harmful, unusual or abnormal. Witchcraft beliefs form a category of classification in which a great many varying elements or components may be found. Turner has shown an appreciation of this point. He states:

Many African societies recognize the same range of components: 'innate', 'acquired', 'learned', 'inherited' skills to harm and kill; power to kill immediately and power created by medicines; the use of familiars, visible and invisible; the magical introjection of objects into enemies; nocturnal and diurnal hostile magic; invocation of ghosts by a curse; and so on. But as between societies, and often in different situations in a single society, these components are varyingly clustered and separated. (1964:324)

He suggests that 'Clues to their clusterings and segregations may be found if societies are analyzed in terms of process-theory'. (1964:324) What he fails to realize however, is that these components are always found combined in a particular pattern, and that it is more useful to analyse their symbolic elements than it is to look at them in terms of process-theory. If we concentrate on the symbolic approach it is impossible to find a workable definition for the term 'witchcraft', and find our way out of the 'terminological wood (or jungle' Turner has indicated.

While it may be said that we are determining what witchcraft is 'by definition', the point is that we can find a large number of examples of the phenomena so defined throughout the world. These phenomena form an interesting category of associated elements that we may study quite usefully and profitably. The definition of witchcraft beliefs that has been offered is applicable to a wide number of cases both within and outside of Africa and it can certainly be applied to European witchcraft beliefs as well.

If the form of witchcraft beliefs is determined by the fact that they are a reversal of social and physical norms, it is only to be expected that certain features of this form will vary from society to society. There is one constant however: the witch is always thought to do what is most abhorred by other members of the society. The witch is the ultimate anti-social being, a fact which is symbolized by the inverted attributes making up the image of the witch. This latter point provides the answer to our second question, 'Why does the image of the witch occur so universally?'

In concluding, it should be mentioned that one of the reasons many writers have given for separating witchcraft from sorcery on the basis of use or non-use of medicine (for example Wilson 1951:308, and Lair 1969:23), is the fact
that sorcery is something which can actually be practiced whereas witchcraft (at least as it has usually been defined), cannot. Mair feels that the fact that:

... the sorcerer uses material objects and the witch does not...
is by no means insignificant, since it is possible to find evidence of sorcery, and indeed many objects used for that purpose have been found when people are accused... But there can never be evidence of witchcraft, and so accusations of witchcraft can only be pursued by means as mystical as the supposed offence. (1969:23)

Wilson stresses the distinction as well and says it:

... is an important one; for sorcery, as I have defined it, is practiced, that is people use medicines (which are sometimes poisons) with the object of harming others, while few anthropologists would admit the reality of witchcraft - the exercise of an innate power to harm others directly. (1951:308).

While it is true that the distinction may have some importance legally, as Reynolds (1963:14) for example, has shown, this is an importance that may ultimately be significant only to Europeans - and not to the people concerned. It does not really essentially matter that one may be practiced and the other not, what does matter is that both are thought to exist and be practiced. We have no right to presume that just because something may matter to us legally, that it has any relevance whatsoever for the members of an African tribe. This is, in effect, imposing our own categories of classification upon those of the people we are studying, a far cry from the cultural relativity and un-prejudiced accuracy of reporting and interpretation which is supposed to be the hallmark of anthropological research. We must keep what matters to us legally, separate from those things which matter to the people themselves. It is only by looking at the latter that we will be aided in the task of understanding how they do in fact order their universe and conceptual categories. Once we have done this it becomes clear what a witch and witchcraft are.

Roma Standefer

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Methodologically speaking one might distinguish two broad traditions of philosophising about the content and procedures of the social sciences. On the one hand there is the 'analytical' tradition that has descended from logical positivism via, in particular, Wittgenstein, contemporary philosophers such as Pinch and Mcintyre, and which is characterized by its concentration on language. On the other hand there is the tradition of what is commonly called on the European continent 'philosophical anthropology' which has descended, particularly from Kant, to become absorbed in the movement of phenomenological philosophy, the influence of which is steadily increasing as it expands beyond its European sources, and as it finds its way from the original descriptive analysis of the immediate data of consciousness (conceived of in a purely mental sense) to the analysis of wider fields, such as aesthetics and the social sciences. In the contemporary philosophical climate in this country, particularly, these two approaches are seen as not merely contrasting philosophical methods, but as mutually exclusive. This attitude reaches to the extent that each school denies or at least questions, that the other is indeed a 'philosophy'. My thesis in this paper will be to argue that, on the contrary, and at least in the social sciences these two methods have not arrived at essentially the same conclusion vis-a-vis the 'scientific' status of social sciences, but also that the recommendation that they imply for the practical methodology of the social sciences come to exactly the same thing. To illustrate this I will take a representative of each 'school' and examine the reasons they offer for the conclusions they reach. For the Analytical School I will take Peter Pinch as my example, and for Phenomenology Alfred Schutz, although I will refer to others of each persuasion where they illuminate a point.

The Phenomenology School

It is worth beginning with phenomenology, because one might assume that this is the least understood of the two traditions in this country. Phenomenology has most recently been defined as:

Rejecting all a priori constructions and system building, phenomenology proposes for aim the description of experience or "phenomena of consciousness". These "phenomena" it understands in terms of world-directed intentions or projects of the subject, incorporated in appropriate patterns of behaviour, whereby the subject endows the world with specific senses and meanings.

Essentially descriptive, its method is confined to the description and classification of the various sense-giving structures of consciousness or types of project (perceptual, cognitive, emotional, etc.) as these are displayed within the self-body-world unity.4

There are a number of important theses here, notably (a) that the method is descriptive, (b) the notion of the lived-world or 'Lebenswelt' of the actors, and (c) the question of the ascription of meaning to aspects of the world. Each of these raises a host of problems in its wake, but we may remove some of them by explicating more fully these points.

Firstly description must not be taken in the naive sense in which one nowadays degrades descriptive ethnography 'for its lack of theoretical rigour'. The very point of a phenomenological analysis is to expose what a posteriori allows a theoretical structure to be erected, and this can only be done by rejecting presuppositions and describing what is there. The status of sociology and social anthropology as sciences is itself here obviously in question, for, as Merleau-Ponty says, if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science in the second-order expression2
a notion which Schutz endorses by noting that:

the constructs of the social sciences are, so to speak, constructs of the second degree, namely, constructs of the constructs made by the actors on the social scene, whose behaviour the social scientist has to observe and explain in accordance with the procedural rules of the science.5

Winch, in his long critique of Mill makes in effect precisely the same point in distinguishing the social from the natural sciences.6 Description is thus reintroduced as an approach which is fundamental to accurate understanding of what is happening in the world.

Secondly, the notion of the 'life-world' of the actor or actors in question occupies an important place in phenomenological literature, as the life-world is the viewpoint or context from which an individual sees himself in relation to other individuals, to the physical world and to social institutions. The raising of the life 'project' to the status of a phenomenon of philosophical concern will be a matter familiar to the reader of the Existentialist literature, and its significance in phenomenology lies in its being both the point of departure from which analyses of individual aspects of the actors' life-worlds are made, and the point which is returned to when the social world has been 'constituted' or explicated by phenomenological methods.

The most critical question from our point of view is undoubtedly the third: the assertion that the 'sociological' function of phenomenology is to explicate the meaningful behaviour of actors in a social context and thereby understand the specific senses with which the social world is endowed by its inhabitants. The crucial idea here is obviously that the role of the social science is to understand the meanings that people give their social behaviour and institutions, and social science itself is 'an objective context of meaning constructed out of and referring to subjective contexts of meaning.' Or in other words:

In sum, the purpose of the phenomenological approach to the study of social behaviour is to make explicit what is implicit in the social action of the members of a new community... the whole point of the investigation is to reveal what precisely it is that makes the actor's action intelligible.8

This is a very bold statement of the phenomenologists' conclusions, and the complexity of the arguments leading to them need only be mentioned. Schutz's Phenomenology of the Social World is basically entirely directed to demonstrating the last quotation. To phenomenology we will return when considering the precise methodological postulates of this view and how they in practice would affect the social sciences.

The Analytical School

Peter Winch in his The Idea of a Social Science starts from completely different premises: his frame of reference is the philosophy of Wittgenstein and his method is that of the analytic school. From a consideration of the nature of philosophy and of the central role of epistemology, Winch moves to a consideration of how an understanding of reality is possible and concludes that:

To answer this question it is necessary to show the central role that the concept of understanding plays in the activities which are characteristic of human societies. In this way the discussion of what an understanding of reality consists in merges into the discussion of the difference the possession of such an understanding may be expected to make to the life of men and this again involves a consideration of the general nature of a human society, an analysis that is, of the concept of a human society.7

The key concept here, of course, is that of understanding, and this approach to society Winch contrasts explicitly with that expounded by Durkheim. This thesis
is elevated to major philosophical importance when one sees it in the light of Wittgenstein's dictum that 'What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say - the forms of life': the specialized branches of philosophy e.g. of science, art, etc. have the function of 'elucidating the peculiar natures of these forms of life, called "science", "art", etc! while 'epistemology will try to elucidate what is involved in the notion of a form of life as such.'

The notion of a 'form of life' has, if one examines it, a remarkable similarity to many aspects of the phenomenologist's 'life-world' itself, while the specialized phenomenologies, of art etc. explore their respective 'projects' or aspects of the general life-world of their subject. The purpose of the specialized philosophy of social science (and of its phenomenological counterpart) thus becomes the exploration and elucidation of meaningful behaviour, a subject to which Winch devotes some space in examining, and to which Schutz devotes his entire time. For reasons much too lengthy to discuss here Winch also rejects the idea of the social studies and science, as conceived by Mill. (pp. 66-94), on the basis of logical arguments: 'I want to show that the notion of a human society involves a scheme of concepts which is logically incompatible with the kinds of explanation offered in the natural sciences,' and that motive explanations are not a species of causal explanations on the model of those of the natural sciences, an argument which also applies to the investigation of regularities in the social sciences:

so to investigate the type of regularity studied in a given kind of enquiry is to examine the nature of the rule according to which judgements of identity are made in that enquiry. Such judgements are intelligible only relatively to a given mode of human behaviour governed by its own rules.

Avoiding the trap of complete cultural relativity (and relativity between different modes of discourse, e.g. aesthetic, religious, scientific), which is clearly not proven either way, the postulate of this is clearly that the social scientists role is to penetrate the scheme of concepts held by the society he is studying, to map their inter-relationships in that particular society and to explicate the social relationships which maintain or are maintained by this scheme of concepts. This can only be done by explicating the attitude of the actors towards their own actions, as Goldstein points out in the quote given above. Goldstein's fallacy is to assume that the phenomenologist proceeds merely by describing his own reactions to the behaviour he is studying: in the social sciences of course the object of study is for the investigator to get the actors to explicate their own actions to him or in such a way that he can understand what form of behaviour is occurring.

Conclusions

Thus in many respects phenomenology and Winchian analysis are identical in the methodological postulates they generate. Both are anti-reductionist, Winch because motive explanations (and therefore social explanations) cannot be reduced to physiological explanations, and phenomenology because its aim is to examine the data of consciousness at the level of consciousness, so reduction to a supposedly 'more basic' category of explanations is irrelevant.

It also follows from Winch's assertion that an activity (social, religious, or whatever) can only be understood in terms of criteria internal to that activity that the relation of the investigator cannot be simply that of observer to observed: he must be a participant to some degree in the activity in question. Phenomenologically of course there is no other form of approach. This postulate also requires that one approaches an alien culture without any fixed presuppositions: there can be no a priori approach to the social. If we look back at the initial definition of phenomenology it will be seen that this has always been a fundamental tenet of that approach, regardless of the specific subject matter, and to arrive at the same conclusion from the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum is an achievement indeed.

Several more general points are also implied. It follows that statistical data can never themselves make sociology or anthropology: they become so only
when they are interpreted within a sociological framework. Simple counting or correlating is not doing social science until such procedures contribute to an act of understanding: they are only preliminaries, or in certain situations, conditions, for such an act. This is also presumably the general point behind Dilthey's idea that the social sciences, as a generalizing and public activity, provide not the laws of society, but rather the frameworks within which human institutions may be understood.

All these conclusions follow quite naturally, or so it seems in retrospect, from the nature of the material of the social studies which have, as it were, forced social theorists to become aware that this material is not the stuff of science in the usual sense of the term. There is always a danger of losing the world of phenomena that a methodology is set up to explore, and phenomenology and the Winchian philosophy both meet on the common ground of agreeing that this has happened with other approaches to the social sciences, but that a mutually agreeable methodology can be formulated, the postulates of which, whether one is a phenomenologist or analyst, coincide. Both the schools agree that society is an object of philosophical enquiry, and quite necessarily so if one's approach is to be valid, and this, from a slightly different point of view, adds great weight to Marcuse's contention that sociology should be a 'critical philosophy'.16 Many of the detailed contents of the two philosophical schools are still in need of further clarification, but there is still the danger that the preoccupation with methodology will lead to lack of application of that methodology to the data. To paraphrase a saying by Marx: the philosophers have described the world of methodology; the point, however, of methodology, is to change the world.

John Clammer

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7. P. Winch, ibid, pp. 22-23.


10. See for e.g. Husserl, Meditations cartesienes, Paris 1931.

11. P. Winch, ibid, pp. 45-51.


15. Ibid., p. 78.
MODEL AND STRUCTURE IN C. LEVI-STRAUSS'S "STRUCTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY"

This paper is concerned solely with a question of methodology. It does not attempt to assess the adequacy or interpretation of the ethnographic material brought to bear by Levi-Strauss. I should imagine that some, at the least, of the remarks made in the following pages are already familiar to anthropologists; if they are too familiar, I apologise in advance. The paper is based exclusively on the author's Structural Anthropology, particularly chapters II to V and XVI. These chapters seem to provide a clear enough picture of the methodology and presuppositions of the structural method.

The following seems to be the approach in outline. On the basis of observed facts, the structural anthropologist builds a model to explain those facts (cf. p. 280). Correlated with this model is a structure in reality, and this is what the model maps, or represents. "The structuralist's task... is to recognize and isolate levels of reality which have strategic value from his point of view, namely, which admit of representation as models, whatever their type" (p. 234). Equally, certain practices in a people, insofar as they can be brought under the concept of communication (pp. 48, 61, 63, 236 etc.), can be reckoned as a semantic system, or language. As such, it is a mapping on the social level of a structure found in the human unconsciousness (cf. p. 261). Considered as a mapping, the particular social practice in question is an arbitrary symbolization of that process. Thus, "a kinship system does not consist in the objective ties of descent or consanguinity between individuals. It exists only in human consciousness: it is an arbitrary system of representations, not the spontaneous development of a real situation" (p. 50). However, though the symbols are arbitrary from this point of view, from other points of view they may have an inherent value. Indeed certain elements in the mapping can never be reduced as a matter of fact to mere symbols. For instance the women that are used as counters in the communication system comprised by marriage "as producers of signs... can never be reduced to the status of symbols or tokens" (pp. 61; cf. pp. 91-94.)

The major question one asks here is "What is the theoretical and methodological effect of the postulation of a real structure answering to a model, whether the model be the one constructed by the anthropologist or a conscious model of the particular group?" Prime attention obviously attaches to the anthropologist's model, rather than any conscious model. "For conscious models, which are usually known as "norms", are by definition very poor ones, since they are not intended to explain the phenomena but to perpetuate them" (p. 281). Equally, the anthropologist's model is, or ought to be, superior to the model that is a particular practice, since the former model is designed to explain a greater range of arbitrary mappings than the arbitrary mapping that is the latter: "For instance, one model constructed by the anthropologist can explain the various models constituted by kinship, mythology and art."

One important characteristic of the anthropologist's model is that it is analytic, in the technical sense, whereby any proposed counter-example to the model in question by the very fact that it accepted it would be a counter-example is ipso facto mal-formed, either simply false or embodying a misinterpretation. (This is, strictly speaking, a consequence of analyticity of course.) It is equally the case that any of the sub-models, whether conscious models or rituals, artistic practices and myths, are analytic within their own terms, within the scope of the range of phenomena to which they are applicable, but the anthropologist's model, ranging over a wider area, is more absolutely analytic. For it is a hypothesis the most powerful model available.

At the same time, because of the postulation of a real structure corresponding to the model, it has the appearance of an empirically verifiable, 'scientific' model. For the underlying structure is, in theory at any rate, susceptible to empirical investigation, the processes of scientific and, in the present context, psychological, verification or refutation. However, even if some one specific structure that might be postulated should be shown either to be non-existent or not of the type required by the theory, the analytic character of the model will win through, in that it can be held to be the case that, even if this one structure
does not meet the requirements, still there must be some structure answering to the model which the model maps. In this way, the structural approach hovers rather disconcertingly between the analytic and the synthetic.

This same point can be expressed in the following way: such an approach cannot be counted as a synthetic approach unless there is some method of determining what is to count as a structure appropriate to a particular model other than the method, or any method, formulated in terms of, or presupposing the terms of, the model itself.

What is the cause of this situation? Lévi-Strauss constantly draws a parallel between the structural method in anthropology and structural linguistics, and it seems to me that both methods share the difficulty that with relation to semantic systems they cannot explain in a non-tautologous fashion why it is that any system describable by the theory is significant. Since linguistics starts from a significant system, which it analyses into the constituent elements of that system (that is, phonemes as opposed to phones) and has, basically, to identify morphemes and the minimum units of significant discourse of that system, it just cannot be the case that within such a theoretical framework it can explain how it is that the marks and sound-waves in question do have significance. Similarly, philosophers have argued that there can be no criterion for truth. They presuppose a theory of meaningfulness whereby the meaningfulness of any declarative sentence in a language is exhausted by the range of states of affairs in which that sentence is true or false. Therefore, in that any proposed criterion of truth is, ex hypothesi, meaningful it must be that, within the framework of such a theory, a precondition for understanding the criterion is knowledge of what it is for a sentence of the language to be true and false. Thus any criterion for a notion expressed within the range of a theory in which that notion has been used, whether explicitly or implicitly, in order to formulate the theory is necessarily trivially tautological.

Hence, if one takes a system which is a 'language' insofar as it can be described as a system of communication, it cannot be the case that within such a theory one can explain why it is significant, why it is a semantic system: for that it is a semantic system is already presupposed for the theory to be applied to it. Therefore, to say that it is a semantic system because it maps an underlying structure is to say no more than that it is a semantic system, and this much is already guaranteed by the fact that it is a system of communication.

Yet there does seem to be a need to postulate a structure, or something that will fulfill the same role, to underly the model. For Lévi-Strauss, following Jakobson and the majority of structural linguists, represents a 'language' as a set of spatio-temporally bound phenomena, arbitrary in form (sound-waves, kinship, relations etc.) which are significant only insofar as there is something designated by each of the terms. Even in the case of the associated 'values', it is clearly the case that a token cannot achieve a value unless it is already significant, that is, in the terms of the theory in question, designates something. Here the situation is different from that suggested above. For it could be maintained that the present presupposition as to the conditions of meaningfulness belongs to a more powerful theory than that embodying structural descriptions. The latter proceeds from a consideration of actual phenomena, actual languages, actual kinship systems, whereas the former expresses a necessary condition for the possibility of these actual phenomena having the character that they do have, it expresses a necessary condition for the possibility of significance. Thus the structuralist's postulation of an underlying structure can be presented not as a trivial tautology but as an instance of a basic requirement of a yet more powerful theory which any structural model presupposes. The postulation of a structure to underly a particular model will still be a priori, but no longer tautological.

However, it is simply not the case that in order for a symbol to be meaningful there must be something "in reality" designated by that symbol. If that were so it would be simply impossible ever to intelligibly deny that something existed. Nor would one be able (with any ease or plausibility) to explain the meaningfulness of false sentences. Much more than these considerations would be required to show that far from it being the case that a pre-
condition for meaningfulness is that there be something designated it is always the case that a precondition for the possibility of something being designated, is that the term designating (or being used to designate) be already significant. It is, however, sufficient for our purposes to observe that it is impossible for it to be necessarily the case that every significant term designates something.

Here again it has been suggested (notably by Wittgenstein) that a theory of meaning construed in terms of designation needs to be supplemented by criteria for the identification of designata other than that formulated by the theory in question.

This is as far as space permits these questions being taken. It would however be of great interest to investigate the theoretical point of the introduction of the notion of 'value' into the theory in relation to the characterization of language in terms of communication, and to examine the plausibility of the assumption that there is a single, determinate set of facts to be observed and described on the observational level (p. 280) and the interrelation between this thesis and Lévi-Strauss's suggestion that there is a basic structuring of the mind common to everyone.

What has been done in this paper is to suggest, not that a structuralist approach to explanation is incorrect, but that the postulation of structures in the real world correlated with their models is either tautologous or, at the least, dubious.

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Reference

IS LEVI-STRAUSS A JEWISH MYSTIC?

The question which I have chosen as a title for this essay is not concerned with the accident of birth which made Levi-Strauss a Jew; whether or not this fact has influenced his work is a matter outside my concern. Nor do I intend (at least directly) to take up Leach's recent (1970: p. 18 and passim) hints that Levi-Strauss's later work has crossed the boundary between science and metaphysics. Rather I propose to suggest certain features of the literature of Jewish mysticism which are so amenable to structural analysis that at times they give the impression that the texts themselves have been invented by a structuralist manufacturing a prototype mythology for analysis. Since this is not the case, I intend to adduce the existence of the Jewish mystic material as evidence for the usefulness of the structural method in the analysis of material from 'higher' as well as 'primitive' religions. I shall also inquire (though necessarily in a limited way) into the question of whether the usefulness of similar techniques in investigating primitive and civilized religions indicates a similarity sufficient to make the comparative study of religious systems a simpler (or at least more rewarding) project than might otherwise be the case.

Analysis of Jewish religious forms within the tradition stretching from the sociology of Durkheim to current structuralism is, of course, not unheard of. Durkheim, Mauss, and Hertz all cited examples from Judaism (and Hinduism and Christianity, for that matter) with no hint that it was necessary to view these examples in any different light from examples drawn from primitive tribes. Within a very different comparative tradition, Frazer did the same thing. Among the modern structuralists, Leach (1969) and Mary Douglas (1966) have produced significant applications of the structural method to the understanding of aspects of the Old Testament. Yet Leach, unlike Durkheim, has been forced to explain and justify his use of Judaic material. A good deal of the opposition to Leach's use of Old Testament texts as sources seems to stem from his disregard for chronology. As Leach points out (1969: p. 28), 'Myth proper lacks a chronology in any strict sense, for the beginning and the end must be apprehended simultaneously: significance is to be discerned only in the relations between the component parts of the story; sequence is simply a persistent rearrangement of elements which are present from the start.' Leach anticipates (and receives) objections to this view from those who believe the Bible to represent, in some sense, 'true' history. This is a matter of faith, which it is not the province of an anthropologist to question and which is, by and large, irrelevant to theoretical considerations. There is, however, a seemingly less emotional case sometimes made for a fundamental difference between the concepts of history and of time implicit in Judaism and Christianity and those found in primitive religion. Eliade, particularly, has observed such a crucial difference between what he calls the 'cyclical' time of 'archaic' religion and the 'irreversible' time of Judaism. The wrath expressed by God at the fall of Samaria, he says, is not the 'same wrath' expressed when Jerusalem falls (1961: pp. 110-111). As to Eliade's first point, there is a good case to be made out for a strong 'cyclical' element in Jewish concepts of time. Judaism, like any other religion has a ritual calendar which is repeated year after year, and which has survived amazingly unchanged through centuries of the most cataclysmic upheavals in the circumstances of the Jewish people. Moreover, the ongoing chronicle of the Jews was never conceived as leading eventually to a total halt. The Messiah, after all, would bring with him a new era of peace, justice, and felicity and (since the Diaspora) a return of the Jews to the promised land. One is tempted to say that, just as the Biblical narrative begins in a state of paradise, it is in such a state that it conceives its eventual end. Surely this aspect of Hebrew Messianism can be termed, in some sense, a 'reversal' of time. Moreover, Leach himself has argued, quite convincingly, the case for a fundamental tension between linear and cyclical time in all types of religious systems (1961: pp. 124-136).

Eliade, however, covers himself against this objection by the second half of his statement, in which he sees a lack of 'sameness' between comparable but not identical Biblical episodes. If 'same' is to be interpreted in so strict a way, one is immediately tempted to inquire how 'same' are similar episodes, or even repetitions of episodes in primitive bodies of myth. Although
Blade has not been involved in the controversy over Leach's Old Testament analyses, such an insistence upon identity between episodes upon whose comparability structural analysis depends would serve, once and for all, to put paid to all such analysis, not only that relating to Biblical materials. Absolute equivalence in myth is by nature an unprovable. However, neither Leach nor any other structuralist makes such an extreme claim for their comparisons. The juxtaposition of mythical episodes is justified only if one can, thereby, discover a level upon which they exhibit, in some respect or other, a hitherto unsuspected similarity. Whether the methods used to discern such similarities is in sufficiently close touch with the contents of the myths themselves is, of course, an important aspect of the argument between pro and anti-structuralists, even when structuralists are perverse enough to call themselves functionalists (Leach, 1970: p. 9). The argument ranges whether the material is taken from primitive or from Biblical sources, and one can, in the last resort, only fall back upon one's own satisfaction with the results produced, or lack thereof, in deciding one's own side of the fence. One of the features of Jewish mysticism which particularly attracted me to its study is that it seems to offer something approaching a resolution of this dilemma, or at least an instance where the facts themselves are so incontrovertibly co-terminal with the system (to paraphrase Dumont) that the most extreme doubters of the validity of the structural method will, at least, be forced to do some quick thinking to explain away this example.

In Jewish mysticism we are faced with an extreme case of a technique used in more orthodox theology of seeking meaning in Biblical passages by juxtaposition of diverse Biblical texts on the grounds of hidden logical similarities. These efforts sometimes cause the most seasoned follower of Lévi-Strauss to wonder if the texts can possibly be genuine! In the Zohar, the fundamental text of Jewish mysticism, first circulated in the thirteenth century, a passage on a statement from, say, Genesis, is likely to involve us with characters and incidents from such scattered sources as Exodus, Deuteronomy, Leviticus and the Psalms. The logic involved is often quite complicated, and related to the total structure of the Zohar as well as to conventional notions in Judaism and it is for this reason that I cannot quote an example in this small space. I can, however, quote examples of an even more interesting feature of Jewish mysticism, its tendency to express itself in series of dualities, reminiscent of the chains of structural oppositions perceived by Lévi-Strauss and his followers in tribal material. But while the oppositions discovered by anthropologists in primitive material are sometimes of such a nature that the non-believer sees them as forced, the literature of Jewish mysticism is a gold-mine of symbolic opposites, in this case undoubtedly direct from the 'native's pen, if not his mouth.

What more could Levi-Strauss himself ask for than the opening statement of the Zohar? Referring to the 'Lily among thorns' of the 'Song of Songs', we are told that the Lily symbolizes the Community of Israel, for 'as the lily among thorns is tinged with red and white, so the Community of Israel is visited now with justice and now with mercy.' (Zohar, Vol. I, p. 4). And so it goes for five volumes; we meet with all our friends: left and right, male and female, up and down, fire and water, etc., all explicitly compared both to each other and to such abstract dualities in Jewish theology as justice and mercy, unity and divinity of God, holiness and impurity. Moreover, the author does not rest until he has included the whole Bible and the great body of Jewish ritual law within his terminology, and done so in a remarkably consistent way. I do not know whether the analysis of the Old Testament is valid; what I do know, is that a believer in a religion has, in order to make his religion more meaningful to himself and his circle of co-thinkers, ordered it in terms which allow me to admit his results to the body of material subjected to structural analysis, without having to superimpose upon it any great number of logical oppositions which are not explicitly there to begin with. And the Zohar is not simply the work of an individual genius (or madman), for almost all its material, if not its total system, is traditional.

If I may be allowed the unscholarly indulgence of a generalization from a single example, perhaps Lévi-Strauss's descent into 'metaphysics' represents no more than an apprehension of how much metaphysical thought (which is, after
all, the object of myth) is likely to proceed, whether or not this is immediately evident to the observer. Or has the great man been secretly poring over his grandfather's books?

Harriet Lyons

Bibliography


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The edition of the Zohar used is the English translation by Simon, Sperling and Levertovf published in New York and London by the Soncino Press at various dates between 1932 and 1934.
Beidelman on the jajmani system:

The jajmani system is a feudalistic system of prescribed hereditary obligations of payment and of occupational and ceremonial duties between two or more specific families of different castes in the same locality. Position in the system rests upon a person's relation to the land. By his land-based power a jajman may coerce other castes as tenants or labourers; he may coerce them by his control of farm implements and oxen, carts, seed, food, pasture, forage, and sometimes even house sites and wells. Land is the major integrative factor about which the caste and village system operate. Such coercive integration is supported and reaffirmed by ritual and ceremonies which the jajmans hold both to emphasize the jajman-kamin relationship and to enhance or affirm their status.

Dumont on Beidelman:

(according to B.) the system is based on an unequal distribution of power, therefore it represents a form of "exploitation" and "coercion". The "ritual" aspect is secondary, the economic-political aspect, dominated by relation to the land, essential. In short, hierarchy means "exploitation". A doctrinaire and blind materialism...2

The problem posed is that of the specific mode of articulation of status (ritual, hierarchy) and power in the caste system. What we are dealing with is two structures of relationships, what Dumont in his own terms refers to as the 'gradation of statuses', on the one hand, and the 'distribution of power' on the other.

1. Beidelman tells us that 'socio-economic and ritual factors are closely interrelated, but they are certainly not the same' (p. 15). That is to say, he distinguishes between two structures and postulates a 'close interrelationship' between them. What, according to Beidelman, is this (problematic) interrelationship? There is a high correlation between socio-economic rank and jajmains, and a lower correlation between ritual rank and jajmains. For example, 'the role of a Brahman jajman derives from his control of land' (p. 16). Power (based on control of the means of production) is the determining structure in the jajmani system, according to Beidelman. But the partial non-coincidence of these structures (ritual/power) and the primacy of one (power) over the other (ritual) should not conceal what is in fact necessarily implied in that relationship, viz, their partial coincidence. Beidelman refers to this partial coincidence as a 'parallelism of roles'.

The primacy of the economic over the ritual structure is expressed in the following terms:

the web of ritual services, Beidelman says, connecting a ritually higher caste to a ritually lower one is an ideological expression of the dependence which the higher caste's economic and political subordinates have toward it (p. 18).

Despite this, however, 'ritual ideology... is not fully dependent on socio-economic factors (p. 19).

To be even more precise in formulating Beidelman's position, we may say that, while the ritual-ideological structure 'expresses' (p. 16), 'supports' and reaffirms' (p. 75) the structure of political and economic relationships (power), it still possesses a relative autonomy of its own. This view of ritual (status) as the ideological expression and validation of the political and economic relationships in a caste society is repeated by Gould,4 who tells us that religious attitudes 'underlie and perpetuate the existing division of
labour, that Hinduism elaborately rationalises and congeals the fundamental distinction between those who possess land and those who do not.

2. Dumont, on the other hand, asks, 'Do we have to believe that "ritual" theory rationalises the "exploitation of the Charmans"?5 How then does Dumont conceptualise the relationship? He insists emphatically that the specificity of caste societies resides precisely in the absolute disjunction, 'in principle', between the ritual-ideological and economic-political structures.

The priest, the Brahman, is highest in status even when he is poor and materially dependent. In the oldest texts referring to the varna order, priesthood is set above, that is, it encompasses rulership; and at the same time, these "twin forces" together encompass all the rest (1967, 34).

In the essay on 'Caste, Racism and Stratification'6 he elaborates this point:

It is necessary to distinguish between two very different things: the scale of statuses (called "religious") which I call hierarchy and which is absolutely distinct from the fact of power on the one hand, and on the other the distribution of power, economic and political, which is very important in practice, but is distinct from, and subordinate to, the hierarchy. It will be asked then how power and hierarchy are articulated. Precisely, Indian society answers this question in a very explicit manner... while the Brahman is spiritually or absolutely supreme, he is materially dependent; while the king is materially the master, he is spiritually subordinate.

In this conception the distribution of power (that structure which Beidelman sees as determinant) is distinct from, and subordinate to, hierarchy. What is still problematic is the status of this relationship of 'subordination' - at what level, and in what way, is power subordinate to hierarchy (ritual, status)? 'In every society one aspect of social life receives a primary value stress and simultaneously is made to encompass all others and express them as far as it can.7 As the basic value of caste societies status or hierarchy both 'encompasses' and 'expresses' all other aspects, including the structure of social and political relationships. Dumont corroborates this in his own words:

There is in Swat no fundamental distinction between status and power; the "Priests" are inferior to the dominant group (Pakhtun), and the religious quality of the "Saints" expresses itself in terms of dominance instead of dominance (of the Kshatriya etc.) being obliged to express itself in terms of religion (ibid, 35 - my emphasis). Hierarchy, then, is the mode of expression of power. The structure of political relationships and economic power expresses itself in the religious idiom of hierarchy. Religion is the language of power relationships (and ultimately of the relations of production) in a caste society.

This, in fact, is what Dumont says in so many words: 'the "religious" is here the universal mode of expression, and this is perfectly coherent given that the global orientation is religious, that the religious language is that of hierarchy.'8 And finally, 'Hierarchy marks the conceptual integration of a whole, it is, so to speak, its intellectual cement.'9

The structure of political and economic relationships ('power') is 'subordinate to' hierarchy in the sense that these relationships are expressed in religious terms, in the language of hierarchy, which constitutes the global principle of caste societies. I have quoted at length from Dumont's work because I wish to make the point that (i) nothing Dumont says refutes Beidelman, and (ii) there is no necessary opposition between their respective conceptualisations of the relationship between power and ritual in the Indian village.

This may seem strange since Beidelman subordinates ritual (status) to power (relations of production), and Dumont, conversely, power to ritual. Yet this apparent contradiction evaporates once it is realised that 'hierarchy', in Dumont's view, 'marks the conceptual integration of the whole,' that power is
subordinate to hierarchy at the conceptual level, that is, within the domain of the ideology itself.

The 'essential' function of hierarchy is that it constitutes the conceptual or symbolic, not material (Dumont stresses the antithesis), unity of caste societies. 'Hierarchy integrates the society by reference to its values.' In other words, what we are dealing with is a conscious model, a mode of conceptualisation of the social and cosmological universe. An ideology is precisely such a conceptualisation - it defines 'lived experience' that is, the way in which men live their conditions of existence. But the crucial point is this: an ideology is not visible to the agents themselves. Because it is their very mode of conscious existence men do not normally establish that psychic distance from it which is the essential precondition of science. That is to say, and this is the paradoxical point which Dumont fails to grasp, the conscious model is profoundly unconscious of itself.

This means that an ideology of course - as hierarchy - is not simply a mode of conceptualisation of the universe, a way in which men consciously experience their social relationships, it is also itself a structure of which the agents are quite unconscious. As such it is defined by its own specific 'functions' (like Dumont I use the word reluctantly - cf. HH 318), of which the agents have no immediate knowledge.

To reformulate the original problem of the mode of articulation of ritual (status) and power - how is the ideological structure implicit in men's conceptual image of their universe related to the actual structure of the relations of production into which they enter? Dumont asked, 'Must we believe that "ritual" theory rationalises the "exploitation" of the Chamar?' The answer, of course, is 'no'. 'Rationalise' implied that the conceptualisation embodied in the dominant motifs and themes of the hierarchical ideology (purity/impurity etc.) is a consciously planned and deliberate exercise. Yet Beidelman's view was that ritual (meaning by this that gradation of statuses which is the concrete form of hierarchy) 'supports and reaffirms' the coercive integration of caste society. Beidelman then, was not referring to some conscious process of mystification, but to an objective function of the hierarchical principle. That is to say, the conscious model (hierarchy) is unconscious of its own objective functions. Beidelman's weakness is that he nowhere specifies in a clear and explicit fashion what these 'functions' are or indeed even how the ideology embodied in ritual functions in such a way as to 'support and reaffirm' the existing social relationships.

For our purposes it is sufficient to focus on two of these functions. The first was understood by Dumont. An ideology 'cements' a society on the conceptual plane. It is a mode of conceptual integration. As Dumont says in a beautifully lucid phrase: 'Hierarchy integrates the society by reference to its values.' But while putting emphasis on this aspect Dumont scarcely mentions the second. Because no ideology ever reflects the existing social universe in a clear and precise fashion (or what would be the function of science?) it inevitably distorts, to some degree, the social perception of reality. This is precisely the deeper meaning of the hierarchical principle. For what, after all, is hierarchy? Dumont stresses that it is a matter purely of religious values. If we are to generalise, it can be supposed that hierarchy, in the sense that we are using the word here, and in accord with its etymology, never attaches itself to power as such, but always to religious functions. In other words, the ideology encoded in the structure of ritual relationships is an ideology which focuses predominantly on religious functions. I would maintain that this focus by its very nature ignores that sector of reality which consists in specifically economic functions, that is, the field of the relations of production, the structure of 'power' as opposed to 'status'. In short, caste ideology excludes the dominant structure of social life from the field of social perception. In this way it necessarily distorts that perception.

I have found in Dumont's Homo Hierarchicus only one passage where he more or less explicitly recognises this function of the principle of hierarchy:

Hierarchy or the gradation of statuses... is not everything. What it leaves out of account ("laisse en dehors d'elles") is the
distribution of power, but then you might ask, if that is the case, should it not at least reflect that distribution in some way, since in practice it never attaches itself to power? Generally speaking, an ideology orientates or orders reality rather than reproducing it, and the act of awareness ("prise de conscience") is always in fact a choice of one dimension in preference to others; it is impossible to focus on certain relationships without completely ignoring ("se rendant aveugle à") others...13

In this remarkable passage Dumont grasps the essential point that an ideology is not simply a conceptual 'integration', and 'intellectual cement', but also an unconscious distortion of the social universe; that the hierarchical ideology necessarily distorts reality by concealing the structure of 'power'. This function is as 'essential' as the other.14

To conclude - we might say that while power is 'subordinate to' ritual (status) at the conceptual-ideological level, the relationship is reversed at the level of the total mode of articulation of these structures (status, power), and that this reversal is precisely a consequence of the hierarchical principle. As a 'blind and doctrinaire' materialist I am certainly not committed to the nonsensical view Dumont attributes to 'blind and doctrinaire' materialists, viz. that 'hierarchy means "exploitation"'.

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3. ________, in Caste and Race (ed. de Reuck and Knight, 1967), p. 34.
4. Gould, S. W. J., 14 (1958). Cf. Gough JRAI 89 (1959) "Like all the higher Hindu castes of India, (The Nayars) based their belief in the moral rightness of the caste system in part upon a racist ideology..."
5. Louis Dumont, Homo Hierarchicus, 137.
10. See N. Poulantzas Pouvoir Politique et Classes Sociales (1968), 223 f.
14. The relationship between hierarchy and power is to some extent homologous to the (much more problematic) relationship between the visible symmetry (dualism) and concealed asymmetry (class structure) of social formations in Central and Eastern Brazil - Lévi-Strauss American Anthropologist 46 (1944) and "Do Dual Organisations Exist?"
EMOTION AND MEANING

The study of human emotionality has been a part of the subject matter of social anthropology since the beginning. It is perfectly obvious that men, in some sense which I think would be understood by all, are not affectively neutral towards the world and their fellows; this fact has been seized upon by field-workers and theorists in very many different ways. It seems that, more often than not emotion is seen as a specific motivation for action; and theories in which emotion is seen as a specific motivation for behaviour have a tendency to be of an impressionistic or ad hoc character. This is not necessarily a point against motivation theories; there are probably reasonable grounds for saying that every person has some kind of intuitive grasp of the affective life of every other person regardless of culture. But, while one might be ready to admit the generality of phenomena which could be categorized as fear, hate, joy, love, etc., it would be impossible to establish a priori what would be the specific occasions for such outbursts.

Emotionality can be seen as part of the symbolic system of a culture, and inappropriate emotionality, as our own psychiatry shows, can be classified as mad. Before a reasonable use may be made of emotion as an analytic concept it is clearly necessary for one to have a grasp of the idiom in which the phenomenon described as emotion occurs. As Durkheim recognized in The Elementary Forms, the public expression of emotion may have a highly conventionalized aspect; emotionality may or may not be "true" emotionality however passionate seeing its manifestation.

But for all its use in anthropological discourse, it strikes me that, on the whole, remarkably little of interest has been said about the social nature of emotions. Yet emotionality is a critical experience of life and it has been possible for some to say that it is virtually life itself, or so essential to life that it would be impossible to imagine its absence; curious that so little should be known of it when deductive considerations indicate that its nature must be profoundly social. Here I will indicate some possible approaches to its study; for this purpose I will briefly examine William James' opinions on the subject.

James' theory was physiologically based; he believed that every different emotion had a different physical manifestation: "Here we go through the whole list of emotions which have been named by men, and study their organic manifestations, we should but ring the changes on the elements... Rigidity of this muscle, relaxation of that, constriction of the arteries here, dilation there... etc., etc.," (James' Principles of Psychology: 447). He finds this tedious and proceeds on to a general formulation. "Our natural way of thinking about... emotions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur IS the emotion" (449). Emotion in short, is a reflex in much the same way as is the jerking of an arm unexpectedly put on an open flame.

There are many possible objections to this theory; I will forward one of potential interest to social anthropology. We might ask what justification James has for stating that the feeling of an emotion is subsequent to the perception of the object which aroused it. It seems far more plausible that, when an emotion is found to be in association with a perception, they occur simultaneously, and that the emotion is an integral part of the symbolic content of the thing perceived; this implies that emotion is a part of something which might be described as the lexicon of a language.

If the view that emotion can best be treated as a part of languages is viable, then emotionality and specific emotional responses are learned in the same way that verbal language is learned and in the same contexts. Language is picked up through experience, and at first very largely through simple
ostension - 'that is a knife'/'that hurts'; and this is followed by increasing ability to deal with abstraction and to use the generative rules of language with facility. Emotion is a part of primitive experience in much the same way that language is, but with the difference that emotion is internally generated; however this can make no essential difference; the emotional response to an external event is as much a part of the meaning of this event as are the external sensory data which gave word of it; in fact it might be said that the effective response is really the only thing in terms of which the event can be evaluated.

But emotion will only be evoked under some circumstances, and many objects of experience will to a large degree be affectively neutral. Language per se may or may not be associated with affect-arousing situations and I think that it is a valid assumption that language and emotion are theoretically separable though not necessarily always separate. What this seems to mean is that words and linguistic rules have no necessary sway over the experiencing of events of great subjective importance. It further seems to imply that experiences may occur for which there is no ready categorical slot within the person experiencing them. This idea is of relevance to psychopathology and to the cross-cultural study of emotion; the former can be illustrated through the following quotation from Karl Jaspers General Psychopathology (113):

The elementary break-through of experiences, which are not understandable in their genesis, is manifested in unattached feelings. If they are to become meaningful to the subject, these feelings must first search for an object or try to create one. For instance, unattached anxiety is very common in depressive states, so is a contentless euphoria in manic states ... so are the feelings roused at the start of a pregnancy and in the early states of a psychosis. Driven by an almost inescapable need to give some content to such feelings, patients will often supply some content of their own (delusions).

This refers to persons of more or less our own culture. It is possible that, where other cultures can interpret their emotional experiences in terms of spirits, multiple souls, witchcraft, etc., we are only offered the option of going mad.

It should be noted at this point that I have avoided any definition of emotion. Psychologists have increasingly come to believe that emotion cannot be defined in terms of those stirrings which are commonsensically held to be emotions; with each addition to a catalogue of this nature any technical usefulness for the word 'emotion' steadily decreases. It would seem far more useful to define emotion in a developmental and behaviouristic manner. This in fact is the way in which it would have to be defined, if I am to consider emotion a part of language in the broad sense; it is absurd to talk of an infant feeling pride, or any sophisticated affective perception at all, and equally suspect to suppose that such feelings as pride come into being as such at some definable developmental stage. We must begin with primeval affective responses, and observe them as they differentiate, perhaps from a simple predisposition to activity, through the avoidance and approach responses associated with pleasure and pain, etc. This is surely not to imply that the problem is likely to be a simple one; however I am given hope by the psychologists who find that complex affective states may be built out of simpler elements.

If emotions and language are inculcated in the same way, and to some extent in conjunction, then it seems evident that there should be significant differences between the emotional aspects of the symbolic systems of different cultures. But there nonetheless always remains the fact that these systems are inculcated anew in each individual, and that gross differences may exist between individuals of the same culture as a result of different handling.

And given that an individual learns a symbolic system directly, as built out of his own experience, it is at the same time true that a symbol system is enforced on him, and this system includes manifestations of emotionality,
publically enjoined as such or implicitly in the behaviour patterns of others. Ego sees others acting emotionally (as we would describe it) in certain contexts, and learns how to do so himself if not called short; this fact introduces a real complication into any empirical study of emotion. Just how does the individual come to behave as he does? And what, after all, does this mean to him?

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Every society has a number of images of itself and of other societies. These images correspond to the anthropologist's conception of a 'model', the device by which order is made of chaos, discontinuity out of continuity, so that the 'myriad impressions' with which we are 'bombarded', the 'flux of sensations', can be selected, discriminated and therefore made intelligible. This model is a heuristic device and its basis, if we are to accept Lévi-Strauss' conception of mind, lies in the very categories of the human consciousness which provides the possibility for a fundamental taxonomy for classifying the universe. Thus the model involves a process of selection from experience rather than reproduction of it, so in the very nature of a cross-cultural 'image' lie the seeds of its distortion of 'reality'.

This image, then, is to be seen as part of the total system of classification of a people. And it is thus important to understand the criteria by which the classification is made in order to understand fully how it operates on the ground. Mary Douglas, in her analysis of Judaic classification, shows how the criteria are not merely related to economic, 'functional' aspects of life but are to be explained in terms of the total cosmology; the pig is forbidden because it is an anomaly in the system, not because pork is harmful in hot climates. Lévi-Strauss adds some more examples to those cited by Durkheim and Mauss in explaining the same principle, and adds that they are 'evidence of thought which is experienced in all the exercises of speculation and resembles that of the naturalists and alchemists of antiquity and the middle ages.' And he provides an example which leads us directly into our present concern, with that aspect of the classification system by which members of other human groups are pigeon-holed; 'The Omaha Indians', he writes 'consider one of the main differences between themselves and the whites to be that "Indians never pick flowers", that is, never picked them for pleasure'.

The reason for this criterion being applied is that 'plants have sacred uses known (only) to the secret owners' and thus the use of them defines those within the culture, who have access to particular plants, and those without who have no such restrictions. Among the Lugbara an important criterion is distance - those more than a certain distance from the home culture are conceived of as upside down; thus white people in their own lands walk on their heads. And Evans-Pritchard provides a diagram in Nuer Religion which shows the Nuer at the centre of a series of concentric circles by which the farther one moves out the more people are regarded as strangers. Distances and indigenous superiority, however, are not the only criteria, or even indispensable ones; in Melanesia the myth of the two brothers explains that the white brother is superior to the black according to the economic-religious criterion of access to power and goods. The missionary, who seemed at first to be providing a ritual key to access to European goods and power, is thus identified with the 'good' white brother of the myth who is traditionally expected to help his black brother; while those Europeans who merely took without giving are related to the traditional white brother who refused to close the gap with the poorer black. The myth provides a ready-made framework into which the actions of various European arrivals can be placed, and therefore understood according to traditional values.

The validation that a myth can give to the framework of thought in which the members of another group or culture can be 'placed' is a key to our understanding of the nature of inter-group relations. The framework may be given force by contemporary political and economic conditions but it must derive validation and authority from the wider system of values of a society.

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The sources of the image of 'primitive' man in 19th century England (and still today to some extent) are customarily found in psychology, in politics and economic exploitation. The notion that primitive man was inferior, less intelligent, and less capable of managing his own affairs through an inherent
childishness, predilection to anarchy etc. is assumed to derive from the exigencies of exploitation, from a need to justify the domination of the black man by the white. These political and economic considerations obviously played a large part in the dissemination and acceptance of the image, but they do not account for the origin and nature of the image itself; it is the object of this article to go beyond the well-worked themes to posit two further elements in the formation of the image of the 'savage'; (a) Science, which gave the image authority and provided the framework of the model. (b) Literature, which gave the image popular currency, added its own authority and moulded it in terms of the literary tradition, and which provides us today with an empirical source for generalisations about 'popular images' and 'the popular mind' since they were given concrete expression through such literature.

Recalling what has been said about the nature of classification systems, and the fact that an image of another society must be seen as part of such a total system, it is inevitable that we must look to the source of validation for the system and to its medium of expression, in order to fully understand how the system operates, and in particular that part of the system which we are interested in, the image of other people. During the period in European history that we are concerned with the breakdown of the authority of the Bible led to a shift in values and in sources of authority for those values.9 And in the re-integration, the new synthesis10 Science served to some extent to fill the gap, to provide the authority and validation for current values. In treating of the relation between cultures at this time we must thus look for the source of authority for many English ideas about other cultures to the science of the day, and in particular to anthropology which claimed to be dealing directly with this problem. And in this case anthropology not only had the authority, it also had a ready-made model which the public could use as conveniently as the Melanesians used the myth of the two brothers.

And when we look at the situation on the ground and realise the close connection of science and literature, scientists and writers, in Victorian England and see the extent to which popular novels, the million plus 'best seller' reflect and continue the debates going on at the British Academy and the Anthropological Society of London, we cannot but accept that there are empirical grounds too for tracing much of the image of the 'primitive' back to popular literature and science.

Blumenbach11 in 1761 traced the history of the use of 'race' as an element in the taxonomy of mankind only a few generations previous to his own work. He himself contributed to the use of the term and introduced, in his five-fold division, the word 'Caucasian' to cover the most beautiful' race, the white one. Bendyshe prophetically declares in his introduction that, having been introduced by Blumenbach to the sciences, the races will remain there.12 And subsequent classifications13 continued Blumenbach's confusion of 'external' and 'internal' characteristics, so that along with hair, colour, and skull shape such value-loaded aspects of human nature as attractiveness, temperament and ability were taken into account, and assumed to be transmitted biologically from one generation to another in a given race. To understand the scientists' conception of other societies in the last two hundred years we must thus discern the criteria used; in discussing the attitude of Victorian society to the negro there is no point trying to prove whether the negro is less, more or as intelligent as the white man but rather whether the criterion of intelligence makes any contribution to our understanding of both negroes and whites. The acceptance of the framework provided by the scientists meant that both sides started from a false premise and it is this framework which the anthropologist today must reconsider in any discussion of race. The quality of much of the mass media today in its representation of other cultures makes such obvious points worth repeating.

The 19th century taxonomy owed much to the medieval 'Great Chain of Being' (which Lévi-Strauss compared to other systems of classification, 'advanced and primitive', above) whereby the whole natural world was divided according to a hierarchical chain of categories with, inevitably, Man at the top.14 The growing flow of information on other cultures during the 19th century led to a debate among scientists and anthropologists as to where the many different types of mankind could fit in this great chain, the hierarchical quality of which
was supported by the very nature of Victorian class-conscious society.¹⁵ The unit adopted for pigeon-holing men in this hierarchy was that of race, as we have seen, leant itself to ethnocentric value-judgements. And with the dilemma of how the supposed equality of man could be reconciled with what seemed obvious evidence of the inferiority of some men, the hierarchy was subsumed beneath an evolutionary framework that was reinforced by the discoveries of biology and of Darwin. It could thus be scientifically asserted that, while all men were ultimately equal, some were below others on the evolutionary tree so had to be looked after by their superior brethren until they had progressed further.

The taxonomy of race, the acceptance of both 'internal' and 'external' as criteria of classification and features of heredity and the hierarchical, evolutionary framework within which the unit was race, provided scientists, politicians, travellers and priests with a model in which their own whims and vested interests could receive the validation of science. The politician could claim that those in an earlier stage of development needed guidance from above, and while some used the scheme for deliberate exploitation, others genuinely believed in 'the white man's burden': the anthropologists could classify races according to how friendly they found them to be, how religious, intelligent, industrious, clean, moral, honest etc.; repressed members of Victorian society could 'project' their sublimated desires, restricted by a strict code of morals, onto the members of other cultures;¹⁶ and idealists and romantics could see in the nearness of primitive man to humanity's primeval origins scientific proof of the 'noble savage' theme. The model was everything to everyone; and to look for the explanation of the phenomenon of Victorian racism only in the particular political and economic forces of the day is to miss the basis of the phenomenon, which lies in a science that provided both the authority for the model and the framework of the model itself.

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The man in the street, however, did not read the treatises of Blumenbach or de Gobineau, though he may well have heard, or read in his newspapers, what was made of them by Knox and later Hunt. The model, though, percolated through and along with it the techniques for its application and the authority for such usage. And the medium for the dissemination of scientific views was the mass media; this may include sermons from the pulpit, such newsworthy events as the ape versus angel controversy at Oxford, the repercussions of the Jamaica uprising, the Great Exhibition and the travels of Livingstone. But the particular feature we are concerned with here is popular fiction, which we can use from our 20th century vantage point as an index for what the 'man in the street' thought at that time.

A spate of novels about Britain's overseas territories and the activities of travellers and colonists arose in the 1880's to replace the introverted domestic novel with tales of dramatic open-air events in exotic lands. And this literature, provided by such writers as Kipling, Rider Haggard, John Buchan, Bertram Mitford, Edgar Wallace and Conan Doyle, many of whom had spent some time in the countries they dramatised provided the public with their 'knowledge' of the peoples of these exotic lands.¹⁷ But the literature itself, for all its individual variations from author to author, had inherited a traditional framework of its own, and was subject to certain conventions and techniques which further served to delimit the ethnography according to English concepts and values.

The noble savage tradition took a hard blow when travellers began to bring back tales of savagery but it never died entirely and the literature of the period revolved around the debate between 'primitivism' and 'progress', which Lois Whitney has traced back to the 16th century.¹⁸ Given the framework of the discussion and the criterion of 'progress' romantic writers could transfer their traditional themes into contemporary jargon. In some cases a reconciliation is attempted by presenting the white man as a noble savage, as in the Tarzan stories;¹⁹ in many the framework of the journey to a lost land enables the gap between advances, and 'primitive' to be represented in vivid, imaginative symbols, huge mountain ranges, sun-blistered deserts and gaping chasms, far more memorable than the scientific treatises that were making the same point; the old chivalric tradition lived on to present the exotic land as a dream world, a fairy land in which the travellers are shining knights and the
habitants strange, grotesque, inhuman figures whose disturbing 'foreigness' is further emphasised by the Gothic style in which many of these novels were written. The very nature of such fiction, the creation of flat, one-dimensional figures whose character can be inferred from their physical appearance, fits all too neatly the scientific confusion of internal and external characteristics. And the noble savage tradition, in which shepherds, 'natives', and children were all attributed similar qualities, likewise fits the scientific theory that primitive men, being earlier stages in the evolutionary development of European man, could be seen as children where the European races were adult.

Thus the traditional techniques of the medium which disseminated the scientific knowledge of the age to a wider public contributed to the framework of thought in which other cultures were considered; science was strained through the sieve of fiction. Any future travellers would see exotic lands through the spectacles provided by science and literature and bring home further reports of the 'savagery' and 'primitiveness' of other cultures to add to the body of 'proof' validating a framework that was thus self-sufficient.

The extent to which political and economic and religious motivations served to further reinforce the image, and to fill out its content, must thus be considered in the light of these two important elements which provided such a considerable part of the model then, and to a disturbingly large extent, continue to do so today. While the anthropological ideas have been subject to the rigours of academic scholarship and have radically changed since the 19th century, the literature which first presented such views to a wider public continues to be read and taught in schools today and has thus fossilized many outdated academic ideas in a vivid, memorable way that provides the 'proof' as well as the framework for many current prejudices.

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References

1. V. Woolf, The Common Reader, 1928; her criticism of the 'naturalistic' school of writing was that we can only know experience through selection, we cannot hope to reproduce it.
5. Lévi-Strauss, op. cit, p. 42.
9. The Bible itself was not necessarily 'disproved' by Darwinism; Kingsley amongst others, publicly showed how they could be reconciled; but the public believed the Bible had lost its authority and this is what mattered. But cf.
10. These words are appropriate since there are elements in the 19th century breakdown of values of the 'cargo cult' phenomenon which Burridge claims involves 're-integration'.
12. Ibid. Introduction.
13. e.g. de Gobineau, Ammon, Lapouge, Cuvier, Lamarck, Pritchard (though he distinguishes between 'internal' and 'external').
15. Thus class, while not to be confused with scientific racism, contributed to the acceptance of the hierarchical categorisation of race.
17. cf. Cohen, M., Rider Haggard, His Life and Works, 1960. To many public school boys Africa was the Africa of 'King Solomon's Mines' - these boys were later to become the District Commissioners who helped to rule that Africa.
19. Burroughs, E. N. Tarzan of the Apes, English ed. 1917, etc. of also Allan Quartermain's 'noble' deeds.